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HEADQUARTERS US ARMY EUROPE (U)
1 JANUARY 1953 — 30 JUNE 1954

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HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY, EUROPE (U)

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MEMORANDUM FOR OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, ATTN: AEAGX-MH, APO AE 09014

SUBJECT: Mandatory Declassification Review

1. References:

a. Executive Order 12958

b. DoD Directive 5200.1-R, January 1997

c. AR 380-5, 28 February 1988

2. UP of references 1 a through c, a mandatory declassification review of the following documents:

a. USAREUR Annual Report for 1954-1955 and

b. EUCOM/USAREUR Command Report for 1952.

3. The review determined the following:

a. USAREUR Annual Report for 1954-1955, with the exception of pages 177-178, is declassified. Pages 177-178 will be forwarded to the agency having declassification

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CHAPTER 1

Mission and Organization

Section I: Mission

1. Mission of the Commander in Chief

United States Army, Europe (USAREUR), received a new mission during 1953. In a directive dated 14 January 1953, Gen. Thomas T. Handy, Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command (US EUCOM) assigned to the Commander in Chief, USAREUR, his functions as one of the three component commanders of the newly activated US EUCOM. (The other two commanders were the Commander in Chief, Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNELM) and the Commander in Chief, United States Air Forces in Europe (CINCUSAFE)). Although US EUCOM took shape in mid-1952, the formal assignment of missions to the component commanders did not occur until the following January. Most of the functions assigned to USAREUR were those for which it had been responsible in the past, but following the activation of the joint command in 1952 it was necessary to divide responsibilities between US EUCOM and its three component commands, clearly defining the mission of each. USAREUR had received previously a general statement of its mission but the US EUCOM directive of 14 January was the first official statement of USAREUR's functions. It listed in specific detail the supporting and planning missions for all three component commanders, as well as those functions that were retained by US EUCOM.[1]

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[1] US EUCOM ltr, 14 Jan 53, sub: Assignment of Functions to Component Commanders. PPD 322. SECRET. (2) Paper, Hq USAREUR, n.d., sub: Major Changes Required in Policy, Procedures and Channels of Communications Resulting from US EUCOM Command Directive, 14 January 1953. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 (1953), Vol. I, Item 5 atchd.

a. Functions Common to the Three Component Commanders of US EUCOM. The usual functions of command were stated in general terms and addressed to the three component commanders of US EUCOM. The main provisions charged each of the commanders in chief with responsibility for the security of the U.S. Zone of Germany; for supporting the policies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and higher U.S. commanders, as well as the missions of the other component commanders; and for preparing plans and providing logistical and administrative support as required by other U.S. commands and Allied agencies.[2]

b. Additional Missions Assigned to CINCUSAREUR. The specific functions of CINCUSAREUR were listed separately, clearly defining USAREUR's relationship with other commands, its responsibilities, and the extent of its authority. The mission assigned to CINCUSAREUR was separated into peacetime functions and others that would apply in the event of an emergency.[3]

(1) Mission as Commander in Chief, USAREUR. General Handy designated Germany as CINCUSAREUR's area of responsibility for the fulfillment of the peacetime mission, designating him as "Area Commander, Germany". As such, CINCUSAREUR became responsible for the evacuation of all U.S. noncombatants, and certain other specified noncombatants within the European area for which General Handy, as Deputy CINCEUR, was responsible. CINCUSAREUR was to be prepared to move these noncombatants to ports of embarkation or other safe-haven areas, and to carry out evacuation plans upon CINCEUR'S order. CINCUSAREUR also became responsible for developing agreements between the Air Force, Navy, and Army for whatever interservice support would be necessary, the plans being subject to General Handy's approval.[4] As Area Commander, Germany, CINCUSAREUR received authority for establishing policies applicable to all U.S. forces in Germany. This included authority to establish security measures of joint concern, as well as administrative policies and procedures peculiar to Germany. This grant of authority insured uniformity of practices and conduct among the forces of the Army, Air Force, and Navy within Germany.[5] In his capacity as Area Commander, Germany, CINCUSAREUR was appointed to act as the single point of contact for all U.S. forces in Germany with the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG), with the government of the German Federal Republic, with Soviet forces stationed in Germany, and also with Allied forces stationed in Germany for matters of interservice concern. Several functions fell within this category, the most

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[2] US EUCOM ltr, 14 Jan 53, cited above.

[3] Ibid., Incl 2.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid., par. 3.

important of which were to carry out directives of HICOG and the provisions of the contractual agreements with the German Federal Republic that applied to the U.S. forces in Germany, to support U.S. policy in Germany, and to maintain law and order upon the request of HICOG. Related to this were several functions pertaining to the relationship between U.S. forces in Germany and the German Government or economy. CINCUSAREUR became responsible for consolidating those requirements of U.S. forces in Germany that were provided by the German economy and defending these requirements before the Federal Republic. He was also given final authority for policies and procedures regarding the hiring and administration of indigenous labor, and for the procurement of other services and supplies from the German economy. Finally, CINCUSAREUR was to advise HICOG on all matters that affected U.S. forces in Germany, and otherwise provide logistical and administrative support required by the Office of the High Commissioner and by other U.S. Government agencies in Germany.[6]

(2) Mission as Commander of Joint Task Force for Germany. For the execution of emergency plans, General Handy designated CINCUSAREUR as the commander of a joint task force to which he assigned all U.S. forces in Germany that were subject to his authority. The assignment, however, was to be effective only upon the actual execution of emergency plans. In this capacity, CINCUSAREUR became responsible for the preparation of joint emergency plans for U.S. forces in Germany. He also had the responsibility and authority for assuming control of the joint task force in Germany following an outbreak of hostilities and before the assumption of full command by NATO commanders. The preparation of the emergency plans was to be coordinated with US EUCOM and NATO plans, but for the execution of the plans, providing that the nature of the emergency made it necessary, CINCUSAREUR was empowered to exercise the authority of CINCEUR to announce the alert and put the emergency plans in motion.[7]

2. Major Changes Resulting from Revisions in Mission

The most significant change brought about by the US EUCOM assignment of mission was the removal of two of USAREUR's major commands from CINCUSAREUR's operational control. The Twelfth Air Force and U.S. Naval Forces, Germany (USNAVGER), had both been allocated to the former European Command when it was designated as a joint command. In August 1952, when the European Command became United States Army, Europe, and the U.S. European Command was activated as a joint service command, the Twelfth Air Force and USNAVGER

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[6] Ibid., par. 3.

[7] Ibid., Incl 2, par. 2.

passed to the control of CINCUSAREUR. The US EUCOM directive to 14 January 1953 reassigned these units to their respective service commanders. However, as Area Commander, Germany, and in connection with certain functions pertaining to Germany, CINCUSAREUR still had limited command authority over the naval and air force units in Germany. These changes in responsibilities required corresponding changes in policy, procedure, and channels of communications.[8] Besides allocating the control of the Navy and Air Force elements, the new US EUCOM directive shifted Berlin from USAREUR's to US EUCOM's area of responsibility. Berlin had been a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) specified command of USAREUR, but the new directive required CINCUSAREUR to report to CINCEUR, rather than to the JCS, on all Berlin matters. CINCUSAREUR remained responsible for the general planning and command responsibilities concerning Berlin.[9] Several other changes of a minor nature were required by the new mission. USAREUR's extended responsibilities for evacuation of noncombatants required a complete revision of such plans; it was necessary to develop new interservice support agreements with the Air Force and Navy commands in Europe, and to make provisions to enforce directives issued by HICOG.[10]

3. Implementation of Mission Assigned by US EUCOM

Immediately after receiving the US EUCOM directive of 14 January, CINCUSAREUR directed the chiefs of his staff divisions to determine the major changes that would be required by the new statement of mission. He directed the Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, to coordinate the development of a plan for putting the directive into effect.[11] General Order No. 10, dated 22 January, set forth the functions of CINCUSAREUR as Area Commander, Germany, and officially terminated the allocation of the Twelfth Air Force and USNAVGER to USAREUR. CINCUSAREUR published a directive on 7 April 1953, listing the mission and functions delegated to him in his capacity as commander of USAREUR.[12] The task of implementing the 14 January US EUCOM directive required considerable time

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[8] Paper, Hq USAREUR, n.d., sub: Major Changes Required in Policy, Procedures and Channels of Communication Resulting from US EUCOM Command Directive, 14 January 1953. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 (1953), Vol. I, Item 5 atchd.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] IRS, USAREUR DCOFS Opns to USAREUR G1, G2, G3, G4, CAD and Compt, 17 Jan 53, sub: Implementation of US EUCOM Command Directive. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 (1953), Vol. I, Item 5 atchd.

[12] USAREUR ltr, 7 Apr 53, sub: Functions Assigned Commander in Chief, United States Army, Europe. AG 322 GOT-AGO. SECRET.

and effort and, in the case of several of USAREUR's staff divisions, was not completed at the end of 1953. The G1 Division was required to negotiate on a tripartite basis with the German authorities to establish uniform conditions of employment for all German employees, and thereafter to revise and republish circulars and directives pertaining to that subject. The G2 Division had to prepare both a new USAREUR intelligence directive and a new USAREUR intelligence plan. The task of G3 was probably the largest. It involved drawing up new emergency plans and plans or directives for noncombatant evacuation, and postcontractual measures, as well as for organization and training. A number of the new plans had to be coordinated with other U.S. headquarters, with HICOG, with the German Federal Republic, and with Allied nations.[13]

4. Missions of the Major Commands

a. Seventh Army. As USAREUR's tactical force, Seventh Army's peacetime mission was preparation for its emergency mission and the defense of the eastern border of the U.S. Zone of Germany. In the event of hostilities the Seventh Army would be required to cover the evacuation of dependents and other U.S. noncombatants while resisting an enemy force along a 300-mile front.[14] CINCUSAREUR assigned to Seventh Army full responsibility for the military security of the border separating the U.S. Zone of Germany from the Russian Zone of Germany, Czechoslovakia, and the Russian Zone of Austria. The main purpose of the border operations was to detect and report movement or indications of an impending movement of an enemy force from the Russian Zones or from Czechoslovakia into the U.S. Zone of Germany.[15] To accomplish this mission, CINCUSAREUR authorized the Commanding General, Seventh Army, to use mobile patrols, observation posts, liaison-type aircraft for patrolling the border, and whatever force, including weapons, that was reasonably necessary to prevent illegal border crossings. United States forces were instructed to maintain surveillance but to offer no interference, either by action or by a show of force, to civilians with proper documentation who crossed in an orderly manner. One significant aspect of Seventh Army's mission regarding border operations was to avoid any incident that could cause

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[13] IRS, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to USAREUR DCOFS Opns, 11 Dec 53, sub: Implementation Plan for US EUCOM Directive, 14 January 1953. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 (1953), Vol I, Item 5 atchd.

[14] (1) Interv, Maj R. A. Gugeler, USAREUR Hist Div, with Col B. S. Waterman, Asst to USAREUR DCOFS Opns, 28 Jul 54. SECRET. (2) EUCOM/USAREUR Comd Rept, 1952, p. 9. SECRET.

[15] USAREUR ltr, 4 Jun 53, sub: Letter of Instructions, Border Operations. AG 092 GOT-AGO. SECRET.

embarrassment to the U.S. Government.[16] Seventh Army was also responsible for the collection, by overt methods, of intelligence concerning all matters that affected the physical security of U.S. troops and the military security of the border. This responsibility included such functions as the interrogation of deserters, illegal border crossers, and other selected persons, the investigation of border incidents, and passive counterintelligence measures.[17]

b. USAREUR Communications Zone. The principal mission of the Commanding General, USAREUR Communications Zone (COMZ), was to develop a line of communications across central France, following the route from Bordeaux through Orleans, Verdun, and Metz. During peacetime the line of communications was to be capable of supporting U.S. forces and other agencies of the U.S. Government in France and also capable of providing peacetime logistical support to U.S. forces located in Germany. In addition, the line of communications was to be so organized and constructed that, in the event of an emergency, it could be expanded to provide all logistical support for U.S. forces in Central Europe.[18] During 1953 USAREUR staff divisions restated the mission of the Communications Zone, which had been operating under instructions dated 24 August 1951, although since that date it had become a major command, had become responsible for all of USAREUR's Class II depots in France, and had been affected by several other changes. In May 1953, the Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ, recommended that each of USAREUR'S general staff divisions prepare an individual letter of instructions, which would be combined to constitute a statement of the COMZ mission. Accepting this recommendation, USAREUR asked each division to prepare instructions, and rescinded the existing letter of instructions effective 1 August 1953.[19] Having the dominant interest in COMZ and its mission, G4 prepared the statement of the general mission as set forth above, named the commanding general of COMZ as CINCUSAREUR's representative for negotiations with the French Government, extended the Communication Zone's responsibility for USAREUR depots located in France, and also directed COMZ to assist the Joint Construction Agency (JCA) in carrying out the construction program in France.[20]

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[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid., Annex 2.

[18] USAREUR ltr, 16 Sep 53, sub: Logistic Directive (LOFC), France. AG 400 GLD-AGO. CONFIDENTIAL.

[19] IRS, USAREUR G4 to USAREUR DCOFS Admin, 30 Jul 53, sub: Letter of Instructions, LOFC, France. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 COMZ (1953), Vol. I, Item 2 atchd.

[20] USAREUR ltr, 16 Sep 53, sub: Logistic Directive (LOFC), France. AG 400 GLD-AGO. CONFIDENTIAL.

ORGANIZATION OF UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
30 JUNE 1954



* Staff divisions of Headquarters, USAREUR, having certain assigned and attached units under the command of the respective heads of divisions: Adjutant General, Provost Marshal, Special Activities, Armed Forces Information and Education, Finance, Chemical, Engineer, Medical, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Signal, Transportation.

** Assigned to and administered by Headquarters, USAREUR, and reporting directly to Headquarters, USAREUR, on military matters, but reporting directly to U.S. High Commissioner for Germany on such functions as are directed.

Source: USAREUR Cir 124, 1 Jul 54, sub: Designation of Commands and Units of the United States Army, Europe. UNCLASSIFIED.

Chart 1

Section II: Organizational Structure of USAREUR

5. Organization of USAREUR on 1 January 1953

The organization of USAREUR, as approved by the Army Chief of Staff, was based on the principle that the commander in Chief, USAREUR, and the Commanding General, Seventh Army, should have no responsibilities that would distract them from their combat mission. During most of the eighteen months covered by this report, USAREUR consisted of 2 major commands, 11 subordinate commands, and 12 staff divisions that had assigned or attached units under the command of the chief of the particular division. In addition, there were several units, the commanders of which reported directly to USAREUR headquarters.[21] For the organization of USAREUR on 30 June 1954, see Chart 1.

6. Loss of Twelfth Air Force and U.S. Naval Forces, Germany

On 14 January 1953 US CINCEUR transferred control of the Twelfth Air Force and USNAVGER from USAREUR to their respective service commands. The loss of these units, representing two of USAREUR's four major commands, was the most important change affecting the organizational structure of USAREUR.[22]

7. Other Organizational Changes within the Command

a. Creation of the Joint Construction Agency. On 15 January 1953 the Joint Construction Agency (JCA) was established as a subordinate agency of USAREUR's communications zone.[23] The JCA was assigned responsibility for the direction, management, and supervision of a combined construction program in Western Europe, exclusive of Germany. The establishment of this agency grew out of a proposal by US EUCOM to the Department of the Army that all construction activities in France be placed under a jointly manned construction agency for which the chief engineer of USAREUR COMZ would be responsible. In December 1952, the Department of the Army approved the proposal but asked that the agency be placed directly

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[21] USAREUR Organizational Charts and Directories of Key Headquarters Officers and Unit Commanders, 1953-June 1954. UNCLASSIFIED.

[22] (1) US EUCOM ltr, 14 Jan 53, sub: Assignment of Functions to Component Commanders. PPD 322. SECRET. (2) USAREUR GO 10, 22 Jan 53, sub: Designation of Commander in Chief, United States Army, Europe, as Area Commander, Germany. UNCLASSIFIED.

[23] USAREUR COMZ GO 3, 15 Jan 53, sub: Establishment of the JCA. UNCLASSIFIED.

under Headquarters, US EUCOM, as early as practicable.[24] Accordingly, CINCEUR directed USAREUR to carry out the establishment of JCA in two distinct phases. During the first phase the JCA was to be directly subordinate to the Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ, with the chain of command and the channel of communications going from the director of the JCA to the Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ, to CINCUSAREUR to US CINCEUR.[25] By 15 April 1953 the organization of JCA was nearly complete and it entered the second phase of its activation, at which time it became directly subordinate to US CINCEUR.[26]

b. Reorganization of Finance and Accounting Offices. Near the end of the 1954 fiscal year, USAREUR began laying plans to consolidate into one organization the related functions of disbursing, expenditure accounting, and fiscal and payroll accounting. Known as "integrated accounting," the new system was installed at selected Class I installations in the United States early in FY 1954. In March 1954, the Department of the Army notified USAREUR of its intention to extend this system to overseas commands. The planned reorganization, when complete, would affect the entire structure of the finance, budget, and accounting organization within USAREUR. As directed by the Department of the Army, USAREUR first set up a pilot finance and accounting office to train personnel and to resolve problems peculiar to the command. The Office of the Comptroller selected Headquarters Area Command (HACOM) and located the pilot office there in June 1954.[27] The new system was not expected to be in operation throughout USAREUR until the end of FY 1955, thus allowing plenty of time for an orderly transfer of responsibilities and keeping disruption of operations to a minimum.[28] One objective of the new system was to reduce the number of fiscal stations. Before commencing the consolidation, USAREUR operated 23 allotment-type fiscal stations in Germany, 4 in France, and 44 suballotment-type fiscal stations in the two countries.

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[24](1) USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf No. 1, 6 Jan 53, pp. 3-4. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br. (2) Cable 081516Z, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE, CINCNELM, and USAREUR COMZ, 8 Jan 53. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1953), Vol. I, Item 3 atchd.

[25]Cable SMC-IN 1953, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE, CINCNELM and USAREUR COMZ, 8 Jan 53. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR G3 Div O&E Br Sub File No. 77-7749.

[26]Cable 181332Z, 18 Apr 53, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE, and CINCNELM. RESTRICTED. In SGS 600.1 (1953), Vol. I, Item 3 atchd.

[27]DA ltr, 29 March 54, sub: Integrated Accounting. AGAO-CC 130 (29 Mar 54) FIN. UNCLASSIFIED.

[28]Ibid.

Under the new plan, the number of these offices would be reduced to approximately 12, serving USAREUR activities in both Germany and France.[29] Another purpose of integrated accounting was to eliminate the duplication of effort and to provide more accurate and up-to-date data on obligations and expenditures. A third aim was to introduce into the Army finance and accounting procedures certain approved principles of sound financial management, such as making the disbursement of funds a responsibility of the command incurring the obligation, and providing a structure that would permit both financial and accounting data to flow from common sources through common channels.[30]

c. Redesignation of USAREUR's Table of Distribution Units. Almost all of USAREUR's table of distribution (T/D) units were renamed during the period covered by this report. In 1950 the Department of the Army had issued special regulations covering the manner of designating T/D units, and specifying that, besides being descriptive, the name should reflect the mission of the unit and be followed by the Army unit number assigned to the unit; necessary changes in the designation of USAREUR units to conform with these regulations had never been made. Late in 1953 and during the first six months of 1954 the Organization and Equipment Branch of G3 Division issued orders changing the official name of approximately 150 T/D units located within the zone of responsibility of USAREUR. Accordingly, the official designation of Headquarters, USAREUR, was changed from 7890 Headquarters Group, USAREUR, to Headquarters, USAREUR, 7890 Army Unit, in order to include the term "Army Unit" in the former designation.[31]

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[29] Interv, Maj R. A. Gugeler, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj Paul Kelch, Off of USAREUR Compt, 25 May 53. UNCLASSIFIED.

[30] Ibid.

[31] (1) Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G3, O&E Br, to Col D. C. Tredennick, 4 Dec 53, sub: Redesignation of 7890 Headquarters Group. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G3 Div O&E Br Sub File, Folder 1. (2) SR 220-5-20, 17 Mar 50, sub: Field Organizations, Organization, Designation, and Administration of Table of Distribution Units, par. 7. (3) USAREUR GO 113, 23 Dec 53, sub: Redesignation of Hq USAREUR. UNCLASSIFIED.

Section III: Organization of USAREUR Headquarters

8. Composition of Headquarters, USAREUR, 7890 Army Unit

Throughout the period, the headquarters organization of USAREUR was composed of the Office of the Commander in Chief, the General Staff, the Special Staff, the Administrative Staffs and Services, the Technical Staffs and Services, and the Office of the Comptroller. (See Chart 2.)

a. Office of the Commander in Chief. The Commander in Chief, USAREUR, on 1 January 1953 was Lt. Gen. M. S. Eddy. The Office of the Commander in Chief also included the Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. E. T. Williams; the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Brig. Gen. R. G. Gard; the Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration, Brig. Gen. E. J. O'Neill; the Secretary of the General Staff, Col. Bruce Palmer, Jr.; and the Political Adviser, Mr. H. P. Fales.[32]

b. The General Staff. On 1 January 1953, the commander in chief redesignated the chiefs of the four general staff divisions as Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G1, G2, G3, and G4, respectively. Formerly, these divisions were known as the Personnel and Administrative Division; the Intelligence Division; the Operations, Plans, Organization and Training Division (OPOT); and the Logistics Division. This change conformed with Department of the Army organization and simplified administration within the headquarters.[33] The following officers were designated on 1 January 1953 as assistant chiefs of staff for the staff divisions indicated:[34]

Brig. Gen. John. B. Murphy	Assistant Chief of Staff, G1
Brig. Gen. Mark McClure	Assistant Chief of Staff, G2
Maj. Gen. Claude B. Ferenbaugh	Assistant Chief of Staff, G3
Maj. Gen. Aaron Bradshaw, Jr.	Assistant Chief of Staff, G4

The general staff was primarily a coordinating staff and was organized to include all functions of command.[35]

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[32] USAREUR Organizational Chart and Directory of Key Headquarters Officers, 15 Jan 53. UNCLASSIFIED.

[33] (1) USAREUR GO 1, 1 Jan 53, sub: Redesignation of General Staff Divisions. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf No. 1, 6 Jan 53. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

[34] USAREUR GO 2, 1 Jan 53, sub: Announcement of Staff Divisions. UNCLASSIFIED.

[35] USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf No. 4, 14 Apr 53. SECRET.

UNCLASSIFIED

Chart 2

ORGANIZATION OF HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE

30 JUNE 1954



Source: USAREUR Organizational Chart, 30 Jun 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

UNCLASSIFIED

c. The Special Staff. Except for the Office of the Comptroller, the remainder of USAREUR's staff divisions were included in the special staff. Early in January 1953 the chief of staff designated within the special staff two subgroupings--the Administrative Staffs and Services and the Technical Staffs and Services, which he listed for coordination under G1 and G4, respectively. The purpose of this grouping was to place the staff divisions within the area of responsibility of the general staff division having the primary responsibility for the particular staff function, and to emphasize the coordinating function that he wanted certain of the general staffs to exercise over divisions of the special staff.[36] There remained nine divisions of the special staff which retained that designation and which were left to operate directly under the supervision of the chief of staff. These divisions, and the chief of each on 1 January 1953, were as follows:[37]

Armed Forces Information and Education Division	Col. Maurice G. Stubbs
Civil Affairs Division	Col. Karl E. Henion
Headquarters Commandant	Col. Fred McManaway
Historical Division	Col. Wilbur S. Nye
Inspector General Division	Col. Edward J. Maloney
Judge Advocate Division	Col. Edgar H. Snodgrass
Labor Services Division	Col. Charles M. Busbee
Public Information Division	Col. Bjarne Furuholmen
Special Activities Division	Brig. Gen. Charles H. Swartz

(1) Administrative Staffs and Services. Staff divisions designated as Administrative Staffs and Services and the division heads on 1 January 1953 were:

Adjutant General Division	Brig. Gen. Leo V. Warner
Chaplain Division	Ch. (Col.) John S. Kelly
Provost Marshal Division	Brig. Gen. William H. Maglin

(2) Technical Staffs and Services. Staff divisions included in the Technical Staffs and Services subgroup and the division chiefs on 1 January 1953 were:[38]

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[36] Ibid., comments by COFS. SECRET.

[37] USAREUR GO 2, 1 Jan 53, sub: Announcement of Staff Divisions. UNCLASSIFIED.

[38] Ibid.

Chemical Division	Col. Thomas H. James
Engineer Division	Col. David H. Tulley
Medical Division	Maj. Gen. Guy B. Denit
Ordnance Division	Col. George W. White
Quartermaster Division	Maj. Gen. William H. Middleswart
Signal Division	Brig. Gen. Rex Van Den Corput, Jr.
Transportation Division	Brig. Gen. B. F. Hayford

In splitting up the Special Staff and grouping the staff divisions according to their primary function, the chief of staff emphasized the fact that the administrative staffs and services and the technical staffs and services were placed under G1 and G4 respectively because of the interdependence of their functions; and that the relationship of, for example, the G4 to the quartermaster was not intended to be that of command, but only that of staff coordination of functions within the scope of G4's interest. This relationship did not mean that all correspondence to and from one of the staff divisions should be routed through the appropriate general staff division. In certain instances, the chiefs of the staff divisions were still required to report directly to the commander in chief.[39]

d. The Office of the Comptroller. In much the same way that the G4 Division coordinated the activities of the technical staffs and services, the USAREUR Office of the Comptroller exercised coordinating supervision over the Finance Division and the Budget Division. The comptroller and the heads of the divisions within his zone of interest as of 1 January 1953 were:[40]

Office of the Comptroller	Col. Charles R. Hutchison
Budget Division	Col. Theodore G. Bilbo, Jr.
Finance Division	Col. Leonard H. Sims

9. Organizational Changes within Headquarters, USAREUR

The only significant change in the organization of Headquarters, USAREUR, during the period of this report was the abolishing of the Budget Division on 15 May 1954. The comptroller assumed both the functions and the mission of the Budget Division, and all personnel of that division were reassigned to the Budget Branch, Office of the Comptroller.[41] The comptroller recommended this change, basing

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[39]USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf No. 4, 14 Apr 53, comments by COFS. SECRET.

[40]USAREUR GO 2, 1 Jan 53, sub: Announcement of Staff Divisions. UNCLASSIFIED.

[41]USAREUR GO 65, 14 May 54, sub: Redesignation of the Budget Division as the Budget Branch of the Office of the Comptroller. UNCLASSIFIED.

his action upon the fact that in other headquarters comparable to USAREUR, budget activities had only branch status. Although directly supervised by, and responsible to, the comptroller, the budget staff in USAREUR had been known as the Budget Division since the beginning of 1949. The comptroller held that he had the same responsibility for the budget activities as he had for the accounting, auditing, management, and reporting and statistical activities, all of which had only branch status. Therefore, the comptroller felt that the operating relationships were such that budget activities should be an integral part--that is, a branch--of the Office of the Comptroller.[42]

10. Changes in Assignment of Key Staff Personnel

The following changes in the assignment of division heads and other key staff personnel were made between 1 January 1953 and 30 June 1954:[43]

Commander in Chief, USAREUR	1 Apr 53	Lt. Gen. Charles L. Bolte assumed command
	29 Sep 53	Lt. Gen. W. M. Hoge assumed command
Chief of Staff	17 Jul 53	Maj. Gen. Claude B. Ferenbaugh vice Maj. Gen. Edward T. Williams
Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration	1 Nov 53	Brig. Gen. John F. Cassidy vice Brig. Gen. Edward J. O'Neill
Secretary of the General Staff	1 Feb 53	Lt. Col. Frederic W. Boye, Jr. vice Col. Bruce Palmer, Jr.
	24 May 54	Lt. Col. Wendell J. Coats vice Col. Frederic W. Boye, Jr.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G1	26 May 53	Col. John F. Cassidy vice Brig. Gen. John B. Murphy
	8 Dec 53	Maj. Gen. John G. Van Houten vice Brig. Gen. John. F. Cassidy
Assistant Chief of Staff, G2	12 Aug 53	Brig. Gen. James H. Phillips vice Brig. Gen. Mark McClure

[42] IRS, USAREUR Compt to USAREUR COFS, 20 Apr 54, sub: Change in the Organizational Structure, Hq USAREUR. SECRET. In USAREUR AG Files (1954), Vol. I, USAREUR GO's M/F W(B/P).

[43] USAREUR GO's, 1 Jan 53-30 Jun 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

Assistant Chief of Staff, G3	17 Jul 53	Brig. Gen. Douglas V. Johnson vice Maj. Gen. Claude B. Ferenbaugh
Assistant Chief of Staff, G4	1 Feb 53	Brig. Gen. Frank A. Henning vice Maj. Gen. Aaron Bradshaw, Jr.
	29 Mar 54	Brig. Gen. Harry P. Storke vice Brig. Gen. Frank A. Henning
Comptroller	4 May 54	Col. Robert Hackett vice Col Charles R. Hutchison
Chief, Budget Division	4 Jun 53	Lt. Col. Harris C. Eichen vice Col. Theodore G. Bilbo, Jr.
	23 Jul 53	Col. Edward C. Gorsuch vice Lt. Col. Harris C. Eichen
Provost Marshal	21 Jan 53	Col. S. F. Jarrell vice Brig. Gen. W. H. Maglin
	15 Mar 53	Col. J. P. Holland vice Col. S. F. Jarrell
Chaplain	19 May 53	Col. William P. Maxwell vice Col. John S. Kelly
	15 Jun 53	Col. James B. Murphy vice Col. William P. Maxwell
	6 Jul 53	Col. Edwin L. Kirtley vice Col. James B. Murphy
Chief, Chemical Division	28 Feb 53	Col. James E. McHugh vice Col. T. H. James
	26 Mar 53	Col. Ragnar E. Johnson vice Col. James E. McHugh
	1 Apr 54	Col. Ralph B. Strader vice Col. Ragnar E. Johnson
Chief, Engineer Division	29 Jan 53	Col. Frank McA. Albrecht vice Col. David H. Tulley
Surgeon	24 Aug 53	Maj. Gen. Joseph I. Martin vice Maj. Gen. Guy B. Denit
Chief, Ordnance Division	10 Jan 53	Brig. Gen. Earl S. Gruver vice Col. G. W. White
	1 Feb 54	Brig. Gen. Carroll H. Deitrick vice Brig. Gen. Earl S. Gruver
Quartermaster	29 Sep 53	Col. Webster Anderson vice Maj. Gen. William H. Middleswart

Chief, Signal	23 Jun 53	Brig. Gen Edwin R. Petzing vice Brig. Gen. R. V. D. Corput
Chief, Transportation Division	17 Jul 53	Brig. Gen. Cleland C. Sibley vice Brig. Gen. B. F. Hayford
Armed Forces Information and Education Division	17 Jun 54	Col. Edward R. Ott vice Col. Maurice G. Stubbs
Civil Affairs Division	24 Jun 53	Col. Henry C. Burgess vice Col. Karl E. Henion
Chief, Labor Services Division	6 Jun 53	Col. Russell B. Smith vice Col. Charles M. Busbee
	3 Jun 54	Col. Kirk P. Brock vice Col. Russell B. Smith
Chief, Public Information Division	1 Aug 53	Col. Robert V. Shinn vice Col. B. Furuholmen
Chief, Special Activities Division	6 Jan 54	Maj. Gen. Charles K. Gailey, Jr. vice Brig. Gen. Charles H. Swartz

Section IV: Organization of Major Commands

11. Seventh Army

a. Organizational Structure on 1 January 1953. At the beginning of 1953, Seventh Army was made up of Headquarters, Seventh Army; two corps, V Corps and VII Corps; and five subordinate supporting commands. The latter group included Seventh Army Artillery; Seventh Army Engineer Command; Special Troops, Seventh Army; Seventh Army Troops; and Detached Troops, Seventh Army.[44]

b. Composition of Headquarters, Seventh Army. Headquarters, Seventh Army, as organized at the beginning of 1953, consisted of the office of the commanding general, the chief of staff and seven offices or sections responsible directly to him, the general staff,

[44] Seventh Army Ann Hist Rept, 1953. SECRET.

and the special staff. Directly under the chief of staff were the secretary of the general staff, the deputy chief of staff for plans, the headquarters commandant, the inspector general section, the comptroller's section, the public information section, and the troop information and education section.[45] (See Chart 3.)

c. Organizational Changes between 1 January 1953 and 30 June 1954. Approximately two hundred organizational changes were made within Seventh Army during the 18-month period, but most of these had no significant effect upon the structure of the army. Some were adjustments made to adapt the organization to the available force or to conform with the new strength authorizations or revised tables of organization and equipment (T/O&E's). Falling in this category was a major reorganization, effective 1 October 1953, that resulted in the inactivation of 6 quartermaster service companies, 1 refrigerator company, 5 transportation companies, 1 signal company, 1 ordnance reclamation and classification company, and several service or support detachments.[46] Several units were assigned to Seventh Army during the period. The 42d Field Artillery Group was activated and assigned to Seventh Army effective 2 January 1953. The group consisted at the time of only the headquarters and headquarters battery, which provided the command structure for the 280mm. artillery battalions subsequently assigned to Seventh Army upon their arrival in the theater. Two other significant additions to Seventh Army were the 19th Armored Cavalry Group (later redesignated as the 19th Armored Group) which was attached to V Corps, and the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne). The armor unit was activated 2 January 1953; the assignment of the 10th Special Forces Group was effective 21 November.[47] Only two important changes were made within Headquarters, Seventh Army. In April 1954 the chief of staff abolished the position of the deputy chief of staff for plans, and established in its place the office of deputy chief of staff for operations. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, was directed to assume the planning responsibilities. The other significant change was the creation of the Army aviation section as a section of the special staff. Prior to 11 March 1954, when the change became effective, this activity had been a part of the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G3.[48]

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[45] Seventh Army Organizational Chart and Directory of Key Personnel, 15 Jan 53. UNCLASSIFIED.

[46] Seventh Army Ann Hist Rept, 1953. SECRET.

[47] Ibid.

[48] (1) Seventh Army GO 26, 21 Apr 54, sub: Reorganization of Deputy Chief of Staff Positions. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Seventh Army GO 17, 11 Mar 54, sub: Establishment of Seventh Army Aviation Section. UNCLASSIFIED.

ORGANIZATION OF HEADQUARTERS, SEVENTH ARMY

1 JUNE 1954



Source: Hq Seventh Army Organizational Chart, 1 Jun 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

Chart 3

UNCLASSIFIED

Chart 4

ORGANIZATION OF HEADQUARTERS, USAREUR COMMUNICATIONS ZONE

30 JUNE 1954



Source: USAREUR COMZ Organizational Chart, 1 Jul 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

UNCLASSIFIED

d. Redesignation of Two National Guard Divisions. Another change, and one that was primarily of historical interest, was the redesignation of two of Seventh Army's infantry divisions. Both were National Guard divisions which, with six others, had been called to active duty at the beginning of the Korean emergency. Public Law 461 of the 82d Congress required that the colors and designations of all National Guard divisions be returned to their respective states not more than five years after their call to active duty. Accordingly, the Department of the Army advised USAREUR in March 1954 that the two divisions would be returned to state control in June.[49] One of the divisions, the 28th Infantry Division, was from Pennsylvania; the 43d Infantry Division was from Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Vermont. With the exception of those individuals who had remained voluntarily on active duty, the original members of these units at the time they were called to active duty had been returned to civilian life long ago, and the change involved no movement of troops. According to the Department of the Army plan, the two Seventh Army divisions were transferred to the zone of interior without equipment or personnel. To replace them, the Department of the Army transferred, also without personnel or equipment, two old and historic Regular Army divisions from the United States to Germany. The 9th Infantry Division was transferred from Fort Dix, New Jersey, where it had been a training division since July 1947. It was reorganized with the men and equipment previously assigned to Pennsylvania's 28th Infantry Division. The 5th Infantry Division, which had been inactive since September 1953, was reorganized with the men and equipment from the 43d Division. As far as practicable, the two divisions were made up from units that had been assigned to them during World War II.[50]

12. The USAREUR Communications Zone

a. Organizational Structure. In January 1953 USAREUR COMZ consisted of Headquarters, COMZ, and three subordinate commands. These were: Advance Section, USAREUR COMZ (ADSEC), located at Verdun; Base Section, USAREUR COMZ (BASEC), at La Rochelle; and the Orleans Area Command (OAC).[51] For the organization of Headquarters, COMZ, see Chart 4.

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[49] Cable SMC-IN 4033, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 18 Mar 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SMC.

[50] Cable SMC-IN 3920, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 19 Apr 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SMC.

[51] USAREUR COMZ Organizational Chart and Directory of Key Personnel, 15 Jan 53. UNCLASSIFIED.

b. Organizational Changes. The official name of the communications zone was changed on 15 October 1953 from USAREUR Communications zone to Communications Zone, USAREUR, 7966th Army Unit, and many changes occurred within the assigned T/D units and the T/O&E units, but the over-all structure of the communications zone remained essentially the same. The headquarters of USAREUR COMZ, the Advance Section, and the Base Section were reorganized. The first was set up as Type C logistical command; the other two were patterned after the T/D normally used for a Type B logistical command. The reorganization entailed no major changes, with the exception of adding a headquarters company to each of the three organizations.[52] Two subordinate commands were added to USAREUR COMZ between 1 January 1953 and 30 June 1954. The 34th General Hospital was designated as a subordinate unit, and the Seine Area Command, USAREUR COMZ, was established as a major subordinate command on 20 August 1953. The Seine Area Command was originally the 7961 USAREUR Detachment and, operating directly under Headquarters, USAREUR, performed the mission of providing administrative and logistical support of international and U.S. national elements of SHAPE and its subordinate Allied headquarters; of Headquarters, US EUCOM; and of several other attached organizations. The Paris location of the detachment made it difficult for USAREUR to provide close supervision and to prevent an overlap of functions and support responsibilities between the detachment and COMZ. The 7961 USAREUR Detachment was therefore redesignated a Class I installation and placed under the jurisdiction of COMZ in May 1953.[53] Soon after this change, COMZ proposed that the 7961 Detachment be reorganized as an area command and, upon securing approval from USAREUR, action to that effect was taken on 20 August 1953. By the end of June 1954, the Seine Area Command had expanded to 5 detachments, 3 located in Paris and 2 in Fontainebleau. With assigned and attached strength of approximately 550 personnel, it provided support for approximately 4,300 military personnel, 3,500 civilian personnel, and 4,250 dependents.[54]

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[52] Interv, Maj. R. A. Gugeler, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col Carlyle P. Woelfer, USAREUR ACOFS G3, 20 Aug 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

[53] (1) Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 28 Apr 53, sub: 7961 USAREUR Detachment. SECRET. In USAREUR G4 322 Gen (1953), Vol. II, Item 24. (2) USAREUR GO 41, 6 May 53, sub: Redesignation of USAREUR Class II Installation in France. UNCLASSIFIED.

[54] (1) USAREUR COMZ G3 Div Jnl, Sep 53, Item 6. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR COMZ Hist Br. (2) T/D No. 77-7961, Hq USAREUR, 8 Apr 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

Section V: Mission and Organization of Subordinate Commands and of Units

13. Mission and Organizational Changes

a. The USAREUR Technical Staff Divisions. In addition to being staff officers of Headquarters, USAREUR, the chiefs of the seven technical staffs and services (as shown on the USAREUR organizational chart) exercised command of all troops, installations, and other activities assigned to their control. No change was made in the directive published on 10 June 1951, which defined the functions of the chiefs of the technical services and the relationship between these chiefs and the commanders of military posts.[55]

b. Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Special Troops, Headquarters, USAREUR, 7888 Army Unit. This unit underwent a reorganization during the period, although the changes were mainly in nomenclature. Formerly known as Special Troops, Headquarters, USAREUR, the organization consisted of Headquarters Company, four lettered companies, and the administrative and service sections. The Commander, Special Troops, was redesignated as headquarters commandant, a title that more accurately indicated the duties of his position. Under the new T/D, issued on 27 January 1954, the lettered companies were reduced to detachments, since most members were attached and only the administrative personnel were actually assigned. This reorganization did not affect significantly personnel strength. Approximately 25 officers and 180 enlisted men were assigned to USAREUR's special troop organization.[56] The mission of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Special Troops, USAREUR, was restated as follows: To perform normal headquarters commandant and headquarters, special troops functions for Headquarters, USAREUR.[57]

c. 32d AAA Brigade. At the end of the 1954 fiscal year, USAREUR was in the process of reorganizing the firing battalions of the 32d AAA Brigade, changing from semimobile weapons to the light (75-mm.) mobile Skysweeper weapons. One battalion was reorganized at the end of the period and the other three battalions were to be converted to the new weapon by the end of the calendar

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[55] EUCOM Cir 141, 10 Jun 51, sub: Technical Services of European Command. UNCLASSIFIED.

[56] Interv, Maj R. A. Gugeler, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col Carlyle P. Woelfer, USAREUR ACOFS G4, 19 Aug 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

[57] T/D 77-7888, Hq USAREUR, 27 Jan 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

year. Because the new weapons were nearly automatic, the T/O&E strength of the brigade was reduced by 28 officers and 1,130 enlisted men. On the other hand, some augmentation of T/D strength, particularly in engineer and ordnance units, was necessary to maintain and operate the new automatic weapons.[58] A change in the physical location of the brigade headquarters on 1 October 1953 made necessary further increases in the strength of T/D units. On 1 October 1953, the brigade headquarters moved from Mildenhall, England, an Air Force installation, to Bushey Hall Military Reservation near London. As a result of this move the brigade could no longer benefit from the support services previously furnished by the Air Force, but had to provide security guards and administrative and operating personnel for its own military post. Thus, faced with increased requirements for support personnel and the loss of personnel within the battalions, the 32d AAA Brigade, in October 1953, submitted a request for an increase in its T/D augmentation strength. These changes, reflected in the T/D dated 23 April 1954, provided more support personnel for the brigade headquarters, additional men to operate the firing range, and others to furnish meteorological data required by the new weapons.[59] The mission assigned to the 32d AAA Brigade, unchanged from 1952, was to provide antiaircraft artillery and chemical smoke defense against low-level airplane attacks, for certain U.S. Air Force installations in the United Kingdom. All of the light antiaircraft artillery units of the 32d AAA Brigade were stationed in defense of either medium bomber units of the Strategic Air Command, or light bombers of the 49th Air Division. All airplanes belonging to these units were capable of delivering the atomic bomb.[60]

d. The Area Commands. All area commands underwent reorganizations and consolidation of detachments and some slight changes in their mission, although the chief responsibility of the area commanders to furnish supplies and services to the units and individuals within their areas was retained.

(1) Northern Area Command. At the request of the Commanding General (Maj. Gen. Thomas W. Herren), Northern Area Command (NACOM), the Management and Survey Section of USAREUR's Office of the Comptroller conducted a survey of NACOM during October 1953.

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[58] Ltr, 7726 Aug Det to CINCUSAREUR, 24 Feb 53, sub: Request for the Programming of Organizations for 32d AAA Brigade in USAREUR Troop List, 1954. SECRET. In USAREUR G3 O&E Br Sub Files, 32d AAA Brig, LG Reg No. S-66-53.

[59] T/D 77-7726, Hq USAREUR, 23 Apr 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

[60] 32d AAA Brig Comd Rept, 1952, pp. 1, 9. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

This survey covered both the organization and the functional structure of Headquarters, NACOM, of the municipal detachment, and of Wuerzburg District and Wuerzburg Municipal Detachment. The survey also included a study of the staff and command relationships within and among these organizations.[61] As a result of the survey, the Management and Survey Section recommended a reduction in the number of headquarters and detachments within NACOM. Within the command were the Wuerzburg and the Frankfurt District headquarters, both of which were recommended for elimination, since the functions of the former were found to overlap the functions of the Wuerzburg Municipal Detachment, while those of the latter were being performed by personnel of Headquarters, NACOM.[62] After a detailed study of the comptroller's report, NACOM secured USAREUR's approval for the elimination of the two district headquarters and directed that the reorganization accomplish as many reductions in personnel spaces as possible. The new T/D for NACOM, which became effective at the beginning of 1954, incorporated many minor changes reducing personnel spaces, and eliminated the Aschaffenburg and Wildflecken detachments, in addition to the two district headquarters.[63] Besides eliminating one supervisory level within the command, the reorganization reduced personnel spaces by 31 officers and 95 enlisted men.[64]

(2) Southeastern Area Command. This command underwent several changes before it was eliminated altogether at the end of the 1954 fiscal year. This command consisted of two separate areas, one at Garmisch and the other at Berchtesgaden. It was known as the USAREUR Recreation Area until May 1953, when it was redesignated as the Southeastern Area Command (SEACOM). During FY 1954 the command was reorganized through a gradual replacement of lower grade enlisted men by German civilian employees. At the end of FY 1954 the responsibilities of SEACOM were transferred to the Southern Area Command (SACOM) and the former was eliminated as a separate command, thus eliminating a separate headquarters as well as personnel spaces for 16 officers and 104 enlisted men. The reorganization also simplified logistical support because, although the commanding officer of SEACOM at Garmisch had been responsible for Berchtesgaden, the rest centers at the two locations were so

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[61] Rept, Hq NACOM, 29 Oct 53, sub: Organization and Functional Survey, Sec. I. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Off of the Compt files.

[62] Ibid.

[63] NACOM Hist, 1953, p. 4. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Ref Lib.

[64] Rept, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to USAREUR Compt, 22 Jun 54, sub: Management Improvement Report. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR G3 Div O&E Br, File Folder 39.

widely separated that, in fact, the Southern Area Command had been furnishing logistical support for the rest center at Berchtesgaden.[65]

(3) Southern Area Command. Reorganized toward the end of FY 1954, SACOM discontinued its three district headquarters at Munich, Stuttgart, and Nuernberg, thus eliminating one level of supervision. In addition, the detachments were consolidated and reduced from a previous total of 27 to 10, resulting in a personnel saving of 26 officers and 112 enlisted men. SACOM also absorbed the Garmisch Detachment and the Berchtesgaden Detachment, both of which were transferred to it as a result of the elimination of the Southeastern Area Command.[66] Besides the mission shared by the other area commands, that of logistical and security responsibility for the area and logistical responsibility for activities outside of the U.S. Zone as designated by CINCUSAREUR, SACOM had the further mission of providing U.S. forces in Europe with leave and rest facilities in the Garmisch and Berchtesgaden areas at the lowest practicable cost.[67]

(4) Western Area Command. Only slight adjustments were made within the Western Area Command (WACOM) during 1953. At the end of FY 1954 this area command, located entirely within the French Zone of Germany, was undergoing a reorganization, but during the eighteen months covered by this report the organization, consisting of a command detachment and five area detachments, remained substantially unchanged.[68]

e. Office of the U.S. Commander, Berlin. No significant changes were made in the organization or mission of this unit. Assigned to Headquarters, USAREUR, it was located in Berlin and the 13 officers and 13 enlisted men assigned to the unit were organized into a command section, an intelligence branch, administration and liaison office, and a plans and operations section. The mission of the unit was assigned by CINCUSAREUR. Maj. Gen. T. S. Timberman held the position as U.S. Commander, Berlin (USCOB).[69]

f. Berlin Command. With the exception of a few individuals, the Berlin Command consisted of all U.S. troops located in Berlin. The geographical area was the U.S. Sector, Berlin. The 6th Infantry

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[65](1) Ibid. (2) USAREUR GO 45, 27 May 53. UNCLASSIFIED.

[66]Rept, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to USAREUR Compt, 22 Jun 54, cited above.

[67]T/D 77-7822, Hq USAREUR, 25 May 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

[68]T/D 77-7812, Hq USAREUR, 27 Mar 53. UNCLASSIFIED.

[69]T/D 77-7791, Hq USAREUR, 15 Apr 53. UNCLASSIFIED.

Regiment remained the only tactical unit of the Berlin Command. The mission of the Commanding General, Berlin Command, was to supervise military action in the maintenance of law and order and whatever other action was required to support the policy of the United States in Berlin. In order to contribute to the security of the three Western Powers in Berlin, all plans and actions were required to be coordinated with the British and French commanders. The Commanding General, Berlin, was also responsible for furnishing logistical support for U.S. military units and other agencies and personnel connected with or located within the command.[70]

g. Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation. USAREUR made a thorough reorganization of the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation (BPE) in May 1954. The change was made primarily because of a directive from the Department of the Army requiring that personnel of station complements be shown separately in T/D units. In addition, the USAREUR Transportation Division desired to have the headquarters and headquarters company of the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation organized as a headquarters and headquarters company of a T/O&E transportation port unit; and USAREUR, anticipating that some of the T/D units of Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation would be changed to T/O&E units, desired the organization of these units adjusted so that such a change would be easier to effect later.[71] Accordingly, USAREUR published a new T/D that formed the port of embarkation into a headquarters and headquarters company, a staging area detachment, a station complement detachment, a military police detachment, the Farge POL Depot detachment, the Bremerhaven station hospital, a security company, and a veterinary medical food inspection detachment.[72] As the only U.S. seaport in Germany, the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation had the following mission: the operation of the Bremerhaven military water terminal; the operation of a troop and dependent staging area, a cold-storage warehouse, and a POL depot serving all continental areas for which USAREUR had support responsibility; and the provision of support for other port elements and lodger units as directed by USAREUR.[73] In May 1954, USAREUR amended the T/D for the Bremerhaven port, adding a Todendorf detachment, the mission of which was to operate an antiaircraft practice firing range situated on the North Sea. The range belonged to Seventh Army's 34th AAA Brigade, which had been maintaining a provisional unit at Todendorf to operate the firing range. Since the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation was responsible for supporting

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[70] Berlin Comd Rept, 1952, 31 Mar 53, Sec. II, p. 12. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Ref Lib.

[71] Interv, Maj R. A. Gugeler, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col C. P. Woelfer, USAREUR ACOFS G3, 19 Aug 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

[72] T/D 77-7802, Hq USAREUR, 15 Mar 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

[73] Ibid.

the range activities, and since the range was more than 400 miles from the permanent location of the units that practiced there, USAREUR, at Seventh Army's recommendation, organized the range detachment and placed it under the commanding officer of the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation for administration and support, with the understanding that during actual firing periods the entire detachment was to operate under a range commander furnished by Seventh Army.[74]

14. Units Reporting Directly to USAREUR Headquarters

a. Dependent's Education Group, 7755 Army Unit. In April 1954 this organization, previously known as the Dependents School Detachment (DSD), was completely recast to separate the military responsibilities of furnishing logistical support from the academic administration of the schools, for which civilian personnel were responsible. As reorganized, the military personnel (10 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 5 enlisted men) constituted the Dependents School Detachment, the mission of which was to furnish logistical support for the schools. The operating branch became the Dependents Education Organization (DEO), controlled by a civilian director who was responsible for all activities connected with operating the schools except the support furnished by the Dependents School Detachment. The mission assigned to the director of DEO was to provide educational facilities, on a comparable level with the better public schools in the United States, for eligible minor dependent children of Department of Defense personnel in Germany and France.[75] During the 1953-54 school term, the Dependents Education Group operated 97 elementary schools and 11 high schools, with a combined enrollment that averaged 25,500 pupils. It also operated five dormitories for high school pupils.[76] The entire education organization was placed directly under the Assistant Chief of Staff, G1, who was appointed, effective 15 April 1954, military director of the Dependents Education Group.[77]

b. USAREUR Audit Agency, 7756 Army Unit. This organization remained unchanged. It was composed of a headquarters and approximately fifteen resident audit offices. The comptroller exercised staff supervision over the agency, but it was under the direct

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[74](1) USAREUR GO 51, 4 May 54, Sec. III, sub: Organization of the Todendorf Detachment, Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation, 7802 Army Unit. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Memo for rcd atchd to IRS, USAREUR G3 to BPE AG, 12 May 54, sub: Publication of T/D 77-7802-09. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G3 Div O&E Br Sub File No. 77-7802.

[75]T/D 77-7755, Hq USAREUR, 15 Apr 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

[76]Ibid.

[77]Ibid.

command jurisdiction of CINCUSAREUR.[78] Its mission was to perform audit services for USAREUR on a command-wide basis and included auditing all activities involving appropriated, nonappropriated, and local currency funds for which CINCUSAREUR was responsible.[79]

c. U.S. Military Liaison Mission to Commander in Chief of the Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany, 7893 Army Unit. The mission and the organization of this unit remained unchanged. It was assigned to USAREUR, located in Potsdam, in the Soviet Zone, and in the U.S. Sector of Berlin, and had a strength of 9 officers, 12 enlisted men, and 3 civilians. The unit assisted any U.S. agency in its dealings with the Soviet headquarters, and reported to CINCUSAREUR any failure of the Soviets to carry out agreements of the four powers. The liaison mission was the only U.S. agency having direct daily contact with the Soviets in Germany.[80]

d. 66th Counterintelligence Corps Group. USAREUR shifted cellular units of the 66th CIC Group during the period of this report in order to strengthen the detachment in COMZ and reduce others where the need was less urgent. The group was also reorganized, with a resultant saving of 65 officer spaces and 175 spaces for enlisted men. Its primary mission was to protect U.S. forces in Germany and France against espionage, sabotage, and subversion.[81]

e. 513th Military Intelligence Group. The 513th Military Intelligence Group, activated on 15 January 1953, had the mission of performing specialized intelligence activities through the employment of operational teams that required the use of foreign languages or other skills.[82]

f. Military Assistance Advisory Groups, 7950 Army Unit. At the request of Headquarters, US EUCOM, the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) was completely reorganized, effective 15 October 1953. Prior to that time the organization, known as the 7950 Joint American Military Advisory Group (JAMAG), consisted of 4 units bearing the same designation and 8 MAAG's. The 4 joint advisory groups were eliminated by the October 1953 reorganization; the 8 MAAG's remained, 1 in Belgium, serving that country and Luxembourg, and 1 in each of the following countries: Denmark,

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[78] T/D 77-7756, Hq USAREUR, 15 Dec 53. UNCLASSIFIED.

[79] Ibid.

[80] T/D 77-7893, Hq USAREUR, 15 Dec 53. UNCLASSIFIED.

[81] Interv, Maj R. A. Gugeler, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj R. B. Seeley, USAREUR ACOFS G3 O&E Br, 5 Aug 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

[82] (1) T/O&E 30-600, DA, 26 Sep 53. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR GO 41, 22 Dec 52, sub: Activation of the 513th Military Intelligence Service Group. UNCLASSIFIED.

France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. These 8 units were further reorganized at the end of FY 1954, so as to place each unit on a separate table of distribution. All units were responsible directly to Headquarters, US EUCOM. Their mission was to carry out functions designated by higher authority.[83]

[83] T/D 77-7950, Hq USAREUR, 9 Oct 53, 1 Jul 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

CHAPTER 2

Personnel

15. USAREUR Command Personnel

Congressional action with regard to military personnel in the year and a half under review resulted in significant changes for the Army in general and consequently for USAREUR. Marked reductions in appropriations ordained decreases in personnel of almost all categories. As shown in Table 1, the number of personnel under the command of CINCUSAREUR, declined by almost 20,000 from the beginning of 1953 to the end of June 1954. The large decreases in German civilian personnel and the lesser reductions in military personnel were very nearly compensated for by an increase of 30,000 in the number of dependents and by the addition of 5,000 local wage rate personnel (dollar paid) in USAREUR COMZ, incident to the continued build-up of the line of communications.[1]

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[1](1) Ltr, Gen M. B. Ridgway, COFSA, to Gen W. M. Hoge, CINCUSAREUR, 15 Jan 54, no sub. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 320.4 (1954), B/P #3, Item 2A. (2) USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 31 Dec 53, 30 Jun 54. SECRET.

Table 1--USAREUR Command Personnel

Category	Total 1 Jan 53	Total 30 Jun 54	Germany	France	Other
Grand Total	522,438	502,909	438,195	59,005	5,709
Total: US Military Personnel	256,206	250,298	216,908	29,142	4,248
Officers		19,339	16,595	2,462	282
Enlisted		230,959	200,313	26,680	3,966
Total: Allied Military Personnel	67				
Total: US Civilian Personnel	5,510	4,970	4,097	822	51
Appropriated Fund	3,745	3,460	2,776	637	47
Nonappropriated Fund Agencies	1,765	1,510	1,321	185	4
Total: Dependents	58,144	88,253	72,911	13,955	1,387
of Military Personnel		80,979	66,407	13,189	1,383
of Civilian Personnel		3,335	2,565	766	4
Registered Tourist Dependents		3,939	3,939		
Total: Continental Wage Scale Personnel (Dollar Paid)	218	244	211	32	1
Appropriated Fund	218	146	120	26	
Nonappropriated Fund		98	91	6	1
Total: Local Wage Rate Personnel (Dollar Paid)	7,090	12,598		12,576	22
Appropriated Fund	5,788	9,998		9,979	19
Nonappropriated Fund	1,302	2,600		2,597	3
Total: German Residents	166,454	120,896	120,896		
Direct Hire	98,803	73,221	73,221		
Mandatory Cost	1,575	1,123	1,123		
Contractual	37,723	16,554	16,554		
Nonappropriated Fund Agencies	28,353	29,998	29,998		
Total: Labor Service	28,749	25,650	23,172	2,478	

Source: USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 31 Dec 53, 30 Jun 54. SECRET.

Section I: Military Personnel

16. Military Strength

a. Army Elements. From 1 January to 30 June 1953 the total operating actual strength of USAREUR Army elements declined from 252,137 to 235,632. From this low point it increased by December 1953 to a high of 252,008. With monthly fluctuations, this figure was reduced to 246,835 by the end of June 1954. The net increase, therefore, in military personnel for FY 1954 amounted to 11,203 (4.7%). Authorized strength leveled off at approximately 258,000 from 1 January to 30 June 1953, decreased sharply in the fall of 1953, and declined less sharply during the winter of 1953-54 when a low of 241,500 was reached; but small gains during the spring months brought authorized strength in June 1954 up to approximately 242,956, about 2,102 above the strength ceiling.[2]

b. Officer and Warrant Officer Strength. Until the end of 1953 actual officer strength showed little variation from the 1 January 1953 figure of 17,580. A decrease of 818 in November, coupled with a further decline of 296 in December, brought operating actual strength to 16,740, its lowest point since November 1951, though exceeding the ceiling by 120. Actual strength remained unchanged until March 1954, when a net increase of 539 again raised the figure to over 17,000. Gradual declines until 30 June 1954 brought actual officer strength to 16,772, which was close to the authorized and ceiling strengths indicated by the forecasts, but exceeded the ceiling strength by 220 and the authorized strength by 107. Warrant officer actual strength also remained above ceiling and authorized strengths during the entire report period, although slight decreases brought the figures into closer alignment. Actual strength was 2,734 at the beginning of 1953 and 2,497 at the end of that year. The decline, continuing through the first six months of 1954, reached on 30 June a low mark of 2,323, which was

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[2](1) USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 31 Dec 52, 30 Jun 53, 31 Dec 53, 30 Jun 54. SECRET. (2) Memos, USAREUR Compt to CINCUSAREUR, 21 Jan 54, 23 Jul 54, subs: Analysis of the Monthly Statistical Report, USAREUR (hereafter cited as Analysis USAREUR Mthly Stat Rept), 31 Dec 53, 30 Jun 54. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div 319.1 (1953), Vol. I.

still 165 over authorized strength and 191 above ceiling.[3]

(1) Strength by Grade. The distribution of USAREUR officer and warrant officer strength by grade is shown in Table 2. The actual operating strength of general officers was 15 less than authorized, that of field grade officers 443 above authorization, that of captains 207 above, and that of lieutenants 528 below.

(2) Strength by Major Elements. Table 3 shows the distribution of USAREUR officer and warrant officer strength by major elements at the end of June 1954. On that date Seventh Army accounted for approximately half of the total number of officers in USAREUR. No major changes in Seventh Army officer strength occurred during the period under review.

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[3](1) Ibid. (2) Memo, USAREUR G1 MPB to USAREUR ACOFS G1, 19 Jul 54, sub: Forecast of Officer and Warrant Officer Strength. SECRET. In USAREUR G1 MPB Plans and Pol Sec file (1954), Item 53. Information in this reference is at variance with the Monthly Statistical Reports cited above for the reason that EUCOM elements were not included. On 30 June 1954 officers' actual strength including US EUCOM, was 17,325 or 258 over authorized strength; warrant officer actual strength was 2,352 or 269 above authorization. Shortages were anticipated in both categories by December 1954. Actual strength of officers would be 1,063 short of the 17,067 authorized, and warrant officer actual strength would be short by 327 of the 2,083 spaces authorized.

Table 2--USAREUR Officer and Warrant Officer Strength by Grade, 30 June 1954

Officers

Grade	Ceiling	Authorized	Actual[a]	+ Over - Under
Total	16,552	16,665	16,772	+ 107
General Officers	61	69	54	- 15
Gen			1	
Lt Gen			1	
Maj Gen			21	
Brig Gen			31	
Col	373	380	422	+ 42
Lt Col	1,251	1,221	1,498	+ 277
Maj	2,299	2,331	2,455	+ 124
Capt	5,636	5,739	5,946	+ 207
Lt	6,932	6,925	6,397	- 528
1st Lt			4,702	
2d Lt			1,695	

Warrant Officers

Total	2,132	2,158	2,323	+ 165
CWO			1,526	
WOJG			797	

[a]Actual strength by grade represents operating actual which in turn represents the actual strength of all T/O&E and T/D units under the jurisdiction of USAREUR (unit actual strength) plus the actual strength of all incoming replacements (pipeline-in) and trainees, both categories being chargeable against spaces allocated to USAREUR by the Department of the Army.

Source: USAREUR Mthly Stat Rept, 30 Jun 54, p. 12. SECRET.

Table 3--USAREUR Officer and Warrant Officer Strength by Major Elements, 30 June 1954

Command	Total Authorized	Total Actual[a]	+ Over - Under	Officers Authorized	Officers Actual[a]	+ Over - Under	Warrant Officers Authorized	Warrant Officers Actual[a]	+ Over - Under
Totals	18,823	18,926	+ 103	16,665	16,611	- 54	2,158	2,315	+ 157
USAREUR Hq and Units	789	809	+ 20	743	752	+ 9	46	57	+ 11
Seventh Army	9,753	9,608	- 145	8,584	8,497	- 87	1,169	1,111	- 58
COMZ	2,250	2,282	+ 32	1,949	1,944	- 5	301	338	+ 37
Sub Comds	3,379	3,511	+ 132	3,101	3,138	+ 37	278	373	+ 95
Svcs	2,652	2,716	+ 64	2,288	2,280	- 8	364	436	+ 72

[a]Actual strength by major element represents unit actual.

Source: USAREUR Mthly Stat Rept, 30 Jun 54, p. 12. SECRET.

(3) Strength by Race. Table 4 shows that on 30 June 1954 Negro officers and warrant officers constituted nearly 4 percent of the command's officers and warrant officers. In comparison, on the same date Negro personnel constituted 12.9 percent of the command. No significant fluctuations in the percentage of Negro officers and warrant officers were shown at the end of quarterly periods.

c. Strength of Enlisted Personnel. The enlisted strength of the command underwent large variations and fluctuations. The beginning of the period under review was characterized by substantial shortages in enlisted categories, a development that started in October 1952 as a result of the 24-month service law. But during the latter part of the report period, covering approximately FY 1954, there was a decided tendency toward overstrength, induced by increased allocations to the command, notwithstanding reductions in authorized strength. On 1 January 1953 actual strength of enlisted personnel (including 1,078 Wacs) was 231,675, which was more than 5,000 short of the 237,055 authorized. By March 1953 actual strength had declined by 7,000, but because of increases in authorized strength the command was almost 15,000 men short of the nearly 240,000 authorized. In June 1953 the actual strength of 215,513 was 22,000 short of authorized strength, but in July gains again began to exceed losses. By October actual strength (228,014) surpassed authorized strength by more than 3,000 since, during the three months, authorized strength had decreased to 224,905. By the end of 1953 actual enlisted strength reached 232,771, the high point for the 18-month period under review. This figure was 8,125 more than authorized strength and was also the largest overstrength reported in two years. Both actual and authorized strengths declined in the first few months of 1954, increased slightly in April, and decreased again in May. At fiscal year's end the overstrength had been reduced from its high point but had been by no means eliminated; actual strength stood at 227,740 (including 831 Wacs), about 3,600 above authorization. Ceiling strength which was 238,262 on 1 January 1953, reached its high point of 241,289 in March 1953, suffered a sharp 19,000 drop by June of that year and, after minor fluctuations, settled at 222,170 by 30 June 1954. Table 5 shows authorized and actual strength figures of enlisted personnel during the 18-month period.[4]

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[4](1) USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 31 Dec 52 to 30 Jun 54. SECRET.
(2) Analyses of USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 31 Dec 52 to 30 Jun 54. SECRET.

Table 4--USAREUR Military Personnel Strength by Race

Date	Total Military Personnel	White	Negro	Percentage Negro to Total
Sep 53	247,001	209,858	37,143	15.0
Dec 53	252,008	215,548	36,460	14.4
Mar 54	244,916	211,148	33,768	13.7
Jun 54	246,835	214,867	31,968	12.9
	Officers and Warrant Officers			
Sep 53	20,352	19,570	782	3.8
Dec 53	19,237	18,535	702	3.6
Mar 54	19,579	18,815	764	3.9
Jun 54	19,095	18,347	748	3.9
	Enlisted Personnel			
Sep 53	226,649	190,288	36,361	16.0
Dec 53	232,771	197,013	35,758	15.3
Mar 54	225,337	192,333	33,004	14.6
Jun 54	227,740	196,520	31,220	13.7

Source: USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 31 Dec 53, 30 Jun 54. SECRET.

Table 5--USAREUR Enlisted Personnel Strength

Date	Ceiling	Authorized	Actual (incl Wacs)		Under	Over
1 Jan 53	238,262	237,055	231,675	(1,078)	5,380	
31 Jan	238,262	238,036	223,675	(1,150)	14,361	
28 Feb	241,492	239,250	224,277	(1,007)	14,983	
31 Mar	241,289	239,519	224,689	(1,004)	14,830	
30 Apr	241,302	240,159	220,095	(959)	20,064	
31 May	222,348	240,530	216,914	(950)	23,616	
30 Jun	222,320	237,590	215,513	(964)	21,977	
31 Jul	222,320	237,577	218,777	(904)	18,800	
31 Aug	221,574	236,894	225,164	(929)	11,730	
30 Sep	221,606	234,929	226,649	(900)	8,280	
31 Oct	222,711	224,905	228,014	(864)		3,109
30 Nov	222,779	225,180	230,299	(849)		5,119
31 Dec	222,785	224,646	232,771	(820)		8,125
31 Jan 54	222,763	223,411	230,364	(801)		6,953
28 Feb	222,797	223,104	227,613	(802)		4,509
31 Mar	223,275	223,303	225,337	(849)		2,034
30 Apr	222,453	223,970	226,160	(815)		2,190
31 May	222,453	224,233	228,397	(779)		4,164
30 Jun	222,170	224,133	227,740	(831)		3,607

Source: USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 31 Dec 52 to 30 Jun 54. SECRET.

(1) Strength by Grade. USAREUR enlisted personnel strength by grade as of 30 June 1954 is shown in the following tabulation:[5]

[5] USAREUR Mthly Stat Rept, 30 Jun 54, p. 12. SECRET.

Grade	Ceiling	Authorized	Actual[a]	+ Over - Under
Total	222,170	224,133	227,740	+ 3,607
M/Sgt	8,280	8,181	8,824	+ 643
SFC	18,254	18,130	15,843	- 2,287
Sgt	38,524	38,815	27,808	-11,007
Cpl	71,174	73,724	47,978	-25,746
PFC	72,612	72,290	80,768	+ 8,478
Pvt's	13,326	12,993	46,519	+33,526
Pvt-2			43,880	
Pvt-1			2,639	

[a]Actual strength by grade represents operating actual.

This tabulation does not reflect clearly the serious problem of overstrength in the grade of master sergeant (E-7) which existed in USAREUR during the period under review. After being understrength by over 2,000 toward the end of 1952, this category climbed to an overstrength of 373 at the end of January 1953. However, overshipments in 1953 increased E-7 overstrength to well over 2,000 as the following tabulation shows:

Date	Authorized	Actual	Over	Under
30 Sep 52	8,058	6,030		2,028
31 Jan 53	8,145	8,518	373	
31 Mar 53	8,241	10,961	2,720	
30 Jun 53	8,285	10,893	2,608	
30 Sep 53	8,212	10,305	2,093	
31 Dec 53	8,158	10,068	1,910	
30 Apr 54	8,148	9,737	1,589	
30 Jun 54	8,181	8,824	643	

The situation became a matter of concern to the command in October 1953, when it was noted that the Department of the Army had not allocated to USAREUR, since the previous March, a single authorization for promotion to either E-6 or E-7. CINCUSAREUR requested Washington to consider "even small allocations" to Europe since "it was fundamentally unsound for a command of this size to be repeatedly denied promotion opportunities". Such allocations, if made, at least "would afford some little hope to the many eligible sergeants who...realize that this command holds no possibility for

their advancement for an indefinite period ahead."[6] Relief for the situation was assigned a high priority in the Department of the Army and took form in three measures: an embargo on shipments to USAREUR of E-6 and E-7 personnel, except those with critical MOS's and those needed to control large numbers of replacements; the temporary suspension of authority for extending the foreign service tours of E-7 personnel; the rescission of the regulation permitting Korean veterans to volunteer for and be assigned to USAREUR in excess of requirements. The Department of the Army authorized USAREUR "token promotions" to grades E-6 and E-7 beginning in November 1953 "in order to avoid individual cases of hardship and for morale purposes." These token quotas would be few, as compared with over-all monthly authorizations of the Army, because the Department, as usual, would allocate the whole monthly promotion capability to the field commands and would hold no spaces in reserve. Thus USAREUR's token authorizations would be taken from other commands, which were already understrength in the same grades (i.e., E-6 and E-7).[7] The Army-wide shortage, which the overstrength in this command helped create, forced the Department of the Army in January 1954 to direct CINCUSAREUR to reduce the USAREUR actual E-7 strength to 88.3 percent of authorized strength (the Army-wide percentage authorized). The reduction was to be effected by rotating the required number of personnel to continental United States by 30 June 1954, under the following procedures: (a) the sequence for rotating E-7's would be governed by selecting those with the longest time in USAREUR on their current tours; (b) shipments would be in as nearly equal monthly increments as practicable; (c) the authority for extending normal foreign service tours of E-7's was suspended, although extensions granted before the suspension, if within 88.3 percent of authorized strength as of 30 June 1954, would still be effective but not renewed; (d) foreign service tours might be cut by one-twelfth of the normal tour; (e) critical combat MOS's E-7's or specialists could be retained within percentage and tour limitations; (f) within the percentage limitation of authorized strength, certain E-7 personnel would be exempt--the exemptions to include personnel with a minimum of ten years in the same combat T/O&E unit and those whose wives were seriously ill, were in an advanced state of pregnancy, or had recently given birth.[8] While the command was

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[6] Ltr, Gen W. M. Hoge, CINCUSAREUR, to Gen Charles L. Bolte, VCOFSA, 7 Oct 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 320.2 (1954), Vol. I, Item 9A.

[7] (1) Ltr, VCOFSA to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Nov 53. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to VCOFSA, 7 Nov 53. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in file above, Item 9A atchd.

[8] Cable DA-956324, DA from TAG to CINCUSAREUR, 29 Jan 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

in agreement with the necessity for reducing the E-7 overstrength, CINCUSAREUR was obliged to inform the Department of the Army that the loss of 1,800 E-7 personnel in less than five months would "create too sharp an impact" on the command structure. He emphasized too the fact that USAREUR was being forced to "displace appropriately trained personnel to make room for more recently acquired and less appropriate personnel". To cushion the impact, therefore, CINCUSAREUR recommended that the command be required to reduce E-7 strength only to authorized strength by 30 June 1954 and to 88.3 percent of authorization by 31 December 1954. The Department of the Army granted this request.[9] By May 1954 it appeared that appropriate action had been taken by the command, for in the preceding twelve months USAREUR E-7 overstrength had been reduced by 1,605 men. Early in June, CINCUSAREUR requested and received from the Department of the Army permission to extend to 31 August 1954 the deadline for reducing E-7's to 100 percent of authorization. By 30 June the command was at 107.4 percent of authorized E-7 strength.[10]

(2) Strength by Major Elements. The distribution pattern of enlisted personnel by major elements was fairly consistent during the period under review and revealed no significant deviations. The following tabulation shows USAREUR enlisted personnel strength by major elements as of 30 June 1954:[11]

Command	Authorized	Actual[a]	+ Over - Under
Total	224,133	224,201	+ 68
USAREUR Hq and Units	1,345	1,406	+ 61
Seventh Army	153,985	153,966	- 19
COMZ	25,295	24,601	- 694
Sub Comds	21,455	22,140	+ 685
Svcs	22,053	22,088	+ 35

[a]Actual strength by major element represents unit actual.

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[9](1) Items for CINCUSAREUR's Mthly HICOG-Comdrs Conf, 5 Mar 54. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Cable DA-958639, DA from TAG to CINCUSAREUR, 19 Mar 54. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in file cited above.

[10](1) DF, USAREUR G1 to USAREUR COFS, 3 Jun 54, sub: Periodic Strength Report, Master Sergeants and Sergeants First Class. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Cable DA-962646, DA from G1 to CINCUSAREUR, 7 Jun 54. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR SGS 320.2 (1954), Vol. I, Items 30, 9A atchd. (3) Interv, Mr. R. Sher, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj. E. L. Noreen, USAREUR G1 MPB Enl Pers Sec, 29 Sep 54. CONFIDENTIAL.

[11]USAREUR Mthly Stat Rept, 30 Jun 54, p. 12. SECRET.

(3) Strength by Race. In comparison to the ratio of Negroes to whites in the civilian population of the United States (10 percent average), the command was understrength in white enlisted personnel and overstrength in Negro personnel throughout the period under review. In November 1952 Negro enlisted personnel constituted 15.5 percent of command EM strength, in April 1953 16.1 percent, and in May and June a high of 16.3 percent. Thereafter, a slow but gradual decline set in, discernible in Table 4, so that by 30 June 1954 Negro personnel constituted 13.7 percent of the command's enlisted strength.[12]

(4) Strength by Components. Regular Army enlisted personnel strength exceeded non-RA strength by over 6,000 on 31 January 1953 and this trend continued through most of 1953. By 31 December 1953 the increasing preponderance of non-RA pipeline-in personnel (casuals) and trainees changed the ratio for the first time since the quarter ending 30 September 1952. Increasing numbers of selective service personnel arrived through the replacement stream, thus increasing the non-RA majority through 30 June 1954, as the following tabulation shows:

Date	Strength RA	Strength Non-RA	Percent Non-RA
31 Jan 53	111,965	105,460	49.0
31 Mar 53	129,894	94,795	42.0
30 Jun 53	125,602	89,911	42.0
30 Sep 53	119,210	107,439	47.0
31 Dec 53	113,271	119,500	51.3
31 Mar 54	103,914	121,423	53.9
30 Jun 54	99,677	128,063	56.2

In the period from December 1953 to 30 June 1954 total USAREUR non-RA personnel increased by 6,640 to constitute 56.2 percent of the total enlisted strength. Of the major USAREUR elements, Seventh Army continued to show the highest percentage of non-RA personnel, though all other commands showed increases (see Table 6).[13]

(5) Distribution by Combat Field. During the 18-month period under review the quarterly reports of enlisted personnel MOS distribution in USAREUR combat fields, with few exceptions, showed a pattern of understrength as indicated by the following tabulation:

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[12] USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 30 Nov 52-30 Jun 54. SECRET.

[13] (1) USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 31 Jan, 31 Mar, 30 Jun, 30 Sep, 31 Dec 53; 30 Apr, 30 Jun 54. SECRET. (2) Analyses USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 31 Dec 53, 31 Jul 54. SECRET.

Table 6--USAREUR Enlisted Personnel Strength by Component

	30 Jun 53 Strength		Percent	31 Dec 53 Strength		Percent	30 Jun 54 Strength		Percent
	RA	Non-RA	Non-RA	RA	Non-RA	Non-RA	RA	Non-RA	Non-RA
Total	125,602	89,911	42	113,271	119,500	51.3	99,677	128,063	56.2
USAREUR Hq and Units	994	567	36	811	598	42.4	775	631	44.9
Seventh Army	80,971	59,932	43	71,173	79,833	52.9	63,685	90,281	58.6
COMZ	14,153	7,987	36	13,843	12,800	48.0	12,246	12,355	50.2
Sub Comds	13,123	7,745	37	12,279	10,270	45.5	10,753	11,387	51.4
Svcs	14,983	8,256	36	12,736	10,972	46.3	11,003	11,085	50.2
Pipelines-in and Trainees	1,378	5,424	80	2,429	5,027	67.4	1,215	2,324	65.7

Source: USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 30 Jun, 31 Dec 53; 30 Jun 54. SECRET.

Combat Field	Percentages of Actual Strength Above or Below Authorized Strength		
	1 Jan 53	30 Apr 53	31 Jul 53
Infantry	- 9%	-17%	- 7.1%
Armored	+ 2	- 7	- 2.8
Artillery	-14	-16	-12.6
Engineer and Construction	-11	-12.4	-12.4
Combat Field	**31 Oct 53**	**31 Jan 54**	**30 Apr 54**
Infantry	+ 4.6%	+ 6%	- 3.6%
Armored	+12.9	+ 5	- 5.6
Artillery	- 1.6	- 2.6	- 1.6
Engineer and Construction	- 4.6	- 2.8	- 9.3

The technical fields showing the most consistent shortages of skilled enlisted personnel MOS's through 1953 and early 1954 were armament, automotive equipment, engineer equipment, electronics, and wire maintenance. An analysis of the grade structure in combat MOS's during this period indicated large shortages of NCO's in all major units and fields. The range of NCO shortages in January 1953 was from 32 to 54 percent in infantry units, 38 to 83 percent in armored units, 47 to 65 percent in artillery units, and 43 to 63 percent in combat engineer units. With the exception of the over-strength in master sergeants in infantry MOS's this picture remained essentially the same to 30 April 1954. To illustrate an extreme situation, combat units in USAREUR at that time were short 2,228 E-5's (sergeants) in a total authorization of 8,940 EM armored MOS's, and over-all NCO actual strength was 53 percent below authorization.[14]

d. Troop Program Category. The following tabulation shows USAREUR strength by troop program categories and indicates the ratio of categories to total strength:

[14] (1) USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 31 Dec 52 through 31 Jul 54. SECRET. (2) Analyses USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 31 Dec 52 through 31 Jul 54. SECRET.

	1 Jan 53	30 Jun 53	31 Dec 53	30 Jun 54
Total Strength	249,147	228,221	244,348	243,127
Percentage of Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Category				
Supporting Forces	9.6	9.5	9.4	9.3
Operating Forces	90.4	90.5	90.6	90.7
Combat	57.3	57.0	57.9	59.0
Divisional	33.6	33.0	34.3	34.4
Nondivisional	23.7	24.0	23.6	24.6
Service	33.1	33.5	32.7	31.7
Field Service	13.3	15.5	14.6	14.0
Base Service	19.8	18.0	18.1	17.7

The command objective during the period was to reduce supporting force (T/D) units to the minimum and to funnel all possible personnel into operating force (T/O&E) units.[15] It succeeded in reducing the former from 916 to 9.3 percent of command strength and in increasing the latter from 90.4 to 90.7 percent of command strength. Within the operating forces, by 30 June 1954 the strength of combat units, including nondivisional units, had climbed to 59 percent of total command strength, highest during the 18-month period, and service unit (field and base) personnel constituted 31.7 percent of the total strength.[16]

e. Characteristics of Military Personnel.

(1) GCT by Grade. According to the personnel survey of the Army for 31 January 1954, in USAREUR the lowest category of AGCT scores (Group V) was represented in all RA enlisted grades, but only in the lower grades (privates and corporals) among non-RA enlisted personnel. USAREUR's program of separating low-capacity personnel was expected to eliminate all Group V NCO's excepting a few with combat experience.[17]

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[15](1) USAREUR Mthly Stat Rept, 30 Jun 54, p. 15. SECRET.
(2) Analyses USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 31 Dec 53, 30 Jun 54. SECRET.

[16]Ibid.

[17]Analysis USAREUR Mthly Stat Rept, 31 Jan 54. SECRET.

(2) Education. On 31 January 1954 college graduates and postgraduates constituted 78 percent of RA officer strength and 39 percent of non-RA officer strength, a seldom varying pattern in the year and a half covered by this report. Among enlisted personnel, noncollege men constituted 94 percent of RA strength at the end of 1953 and in the spring of 1954, and 90 and 86.6 percent of non-RA strength at corresponding times.[18]

(3) Marital Status. The June 1954 survey of the marital status of USAREUR personnel showed only slight variations from previous periods; 82 percent of officer personnel were married, as compared to 31 percent of enlisted personnel. In the top three NCO grades, 65 percent of the personnel were married. These percentages were considerably higher than those of the then current formula--75 percent for officers and 45 percent for the top three NCO grades--for computing forecasts of dependents. As of 30 April 1954, 44 percent of married personnel were without children. The average number of children for those with children was 1.8; the average number of children for all married people was 1.0. Fifty-nine percent of the total number of children were under 6 years of age. Three times as many non-RA officers as RA officers were fathers, but the reverse was true among enlisted personnel.[19]

(4) Housing. As of 30 April 1954, 80.4 percent of all married officers and 73 percent of all married enlisted men in USAREUR lived in government quarters. Eight percent of the latter group were below the first-three-grader rank.[20]

(5) Age by Component and Grade. The age distribution as of 30 April 1954 was constant for non-RA enlisted personnel as compared with that of the personnel survey in January of that year. The overwhelming number (89 percent) were under 25 years of age. The curve for the same age group among Regular Army personnel, however, dropped from 50 percent to 41 percent in the 3-month period, indicating that the younger age groups were not re-enlisting. By the end of FY 1954 some 80 percent of USAREUR's officers were less than 40 years old; and about 85 percent of the EM were less than 30 years old.[21]

(6) Foreign Service. As of 31 January 1954, non-RA officers and warrant officers in USAREUR had accumulated more foreign service than had RA company-grade and warrant officers. The foreign service of RA enlisted personnel, on the other hand,

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[18] Ibid., 31 Jan, 30 Apr 54.

[19] Ibid., 31 Jan, 30 Apr, 31 Jul 54.

[20] Ibid., 30 Apr 54.

[21] Ibid., 30 Apr, 31 Jul 54.

exceeded that of non-RA personnel in all grades. Fifteen percent of all officers and 13 percent of all enlisted men in USAREUR had seen service in Korea. Service there was reflected in all grades of non-RA officers but only in the lower grades of RA officers.[22]

17. Replacement Program

a. Characteristics of Enlisted Replacements.

(1) Ratio of Regular Army to Selective Service Replacements. During the 18-month period of this report, 195,718 enlisted replacements were received in USAREUR. Approximately one-third of these were Regular Army personnel. The ratio of RA to non-RA personnel, fluctuated considerably during the period. At the beginning of 1953 RA personnel formed the larger percentage of the replacements, reaching an all-time peak of 70.1 percent in February. The spring and summer months of 1953 saw a considerable drop in RA replacements and a corresponding rise in selective service personnel, so that by the end of the year the latter group constituted well over 80 percent of replacements. However, during the first six months of 1954 RA replacements were on the rise again (see Table 7).

(2) Age. When selective service replacements were at their peak, the 17- to 20-year-old group increased proportionately, as did the "13- to-18 months-to-serve-in-USAREUR" group. Likewise, with a decline in selective service personnel in 1954, a trend toward a greater number of EM in the 21- to 24-year-old group set in.

(3) Educational Levels and AGCT Scores. Probably the most significant changes in the period were the improvements in educational and AGCT levels of the replacements. In February 1953, 59.3 percent of the white replacements had attended (but not necessarily completed) high school; 32.7 percent had attended grammar school (the highest percentage for any month in the year and a half); 8.0 percent had attended college. During the rest of 1953 and the first half of 1954 the high school and college groups expanded at the expense of the grade school group. Percentages for December 1953 were as follows: grammar school, 21.0; high school, 69.0; college, 10.0. By June 1954 the grammar school group was at an all-time low of 17.3 percent and the college group at a record high of 27.4 percent, accounting for the smaller percentage (55.3) of the high school group. The percentages of college graduates (10.4) and high school graduates (61.8) were the highest experienced thus far. During the period under review the educational levels of Negro replacements, who constituted 13.9 percent of all replacements, were not very dissimilar from those of white replacements and

[22] Ibid., 31 Jan 54.

Table 7--Monthly Replacements to USAREUR,
1 January 1953-30 June 1954

Month	Total	Race: White	Race: Negro	Component: Enlisted Reserve Corps and National Guard	Component: Selective Service	Component: Regular Army
Total	195,718	168,571	27,147	(percentage of total)		
Subtotal	147,018	124,441	22,577			
Jan 53	11,630	9,350	2,280	1.2	56.2	42.6
Feb	17,565	14,574	2,991	1.5	28.4	70.1
Mar	14,030	11,720	2,310	0.7	40.5	58.8
Apr	6,884	4,941	1,943	0.2	53.5	46.3
May	4,463	3,317	1,146	0.5	42.3	57.2
Jun	9,935	8,075	1,860	0.6	67.0	32.4
Jul	12,243	10,268	1,975	0.7	85.0	14.3
Aug	16,340	14,166	2,174	0.5	84.1	15.4
Sep	13,728	12,077	1,651	0.7	83.5	15.8
Oct	9,869	8,761	1,108	0.6	80.3	19.1
Nov	12,996	11,800	1,196	1.4	84.0	14.6
Dec	17,335	15,392	1,943	0.8	74.3	24.9
Subtotal	48,700	44,130	4,570			
Jan 54	11,736	10,490	1,246	1.5	73.8	24.7
Feb	9,822	9,009	813	2.1	65.5	32.4
Mar	7,621	6,878	743	2.5	63.8	33.7
Apr	8,488	7,682	806	2.9	57.2	39.9
May	6,200	5,663	537	2.2	65.2	32.6
Jun	4,833	4,408	425	2.5	63.0	34.5

Source: USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 30 Sep 53, 28 Feb 54, 31 Aug 54. SECRET.

likewise showed expansion of the high school and college groups at the expense of the grade school group. The percentages for Negro replacements were as follows:

	Grammar School	High School	College
Feb 53	37.5	56.0	6.5
Dec 53	26.0	67.0	7.0
Jun 54	24.9	63.1	12.0

An important difference in the educational levels of white and Negro replacements was that fewer Negroes than whites had completed high school or college, although the completion record for Negroes in the first 6 months of 1954 was higher than that of any previous period. AGCT levels for the whole command, like educational levels, also improved during the period covered by this report. The larger number of white replacements as usual fell into Groups I to III and the larger number of Negroes into Groups IV and V. However, Negro replacements in June 1953 comprised 36.0 percent of Group V and only 13.6 percent one year later. Significant percentage advances were made in Groups I and II by white replacements and in Groups I, II, and III by Negroes, and corresponding decreases took place in the Group V category, indicating that the command was making progress in its efforts to obtain better personnel.[23] But despite the over-all improvement reflected in the educational levels and AGCT scores of enlisted personnel replacements, the command continued to be concerned with the serious "lack of trained men reaching this theater" and with the "general lowering of the caliber of replacements because of the elimination of leadership schools and other Department of the Army methods which had hitherto improved the quality of enlisted men assigned to USAREUR". The elimination of specialist training in the zone of interior was expected to decrease USAREUR's ability to meet its MOS requirements and to require "considerable" on-the-job training and additional organizational schools.[24]

b. Replacement Plans and Policies.

(1) USAREUR Liaison Detachment. Early in 1953 Headquarters, USAREUR, concurred in a Department of the Army plan to establish a liaison detachment at Camp Kilmer, New Jersey, for the purpose of "expediting" the flow of military personnel through that camp to USAREUR. The USAREUR Liaison Detachment, consisting of an officer and two enlisted men, was established in May under the USAREUR G1 Division's T/D. This detachment facilitated the spending of critically needed specialists to the command by giving such personnel high priority transportation orders. The flow of personnel

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[23](1) USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 28 Feb, 30 Sep, 31 Dec 53; 28 Feb, 31 Aug 54. SECRET. (2) Analyses USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 28 Feb 53, 30 Sep 53; 28 Feb 54, 31 Aug 54. SECRET.

[24](1) Ltr, Gen M. B. Ridgway, COFSA, to Gen W. M. Hoge, CINCUSAREUR, 15 Jan 54, no sub. SECRET. (2) C/N 1, USAREUR G1 to USAREUR COFS, 17 Feb 54, sub: Future Operating Conditions of the Army. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 320.4 (1954), B/P #3, Item 2A and Tab L.

from USAREUR was also facilitated through prompt correction of "administrative discrepancies".[25]

(2) Infantry Replacements. SR 600-150-10, dated 11 June 1953, inaugurated a new method of assigning infantry replacements, designed to maintain a higher esprit de corps among replacements moving from the replacement stream to their initial unit assignments. The basic replacement unit became a 4-man team formed during the twelfth week of basic training and then grouped with other 4-man teams into a carrier company, which was the control unit in which replacements moved to their overseas unit assignments. Qualified commissioned and enlisted cadre personnel who were also eligible for overseas assignment were assigned to the carrier company to administer it en route. The strength of a carrier company varied, but the maximum strength was set at 2 officers and 161 enlisted men. A company was normally assigned to a division, with the least delay, on the basis of relative strengths and Seventh Army recommendations. Assignments within the division were made to maintain the integrity of the 4-man teams. In order to initiate coordination of the new program among all echelons, USAREUR required Seventh Army to submit a plan of implementation, including provision for such activities as orientation and the compilation of statistical information, which had formerly been responsibilities of the USAREUR Replacement Group.[26] The success of the 4-man replacement system was reflected in the extension of the system to branches other than infantry. USAREUR began to receive carrier companies in field artillery, antiaircraft artillery, and combat engineer branches in February 1954. These companies could not always be assigned intact to a division because their strength in a particular MOS often exceeded the number that a division could absorb. In such a case the company was inactivated after arrival at Bremerhaven and its personnel were assigned in groups to two or more divisions or to nondivisional units.[27] In the fall of 1953 the Department

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[25](1) C/N 1, USAREUR G1 Div to USAREUR G3 Div, 5 Feb 53, sub: Establishment of Liaison Detachment at Camp Kilmer; C/N 2, USAREUR G3 Div to USAREUR DCOFS for Admin, 30 Apr 53, same sub; and C/N 3, USAREUR SGS to USAREUR G3 Div, 2 May 53, same sub. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 320.2 (1953), Vol. I, Item 22B-1 atchd. (2) Interv, Mr. R. Sher, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj E. L. Noreen, USAREUR G1 MPB Enl Pers Sec, 29 Sep 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

[26](1) C/N 1, USAREUR G1 to USAREUR COFS, 6 Jul 53, sub: Infantry Replacements. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Ltr, USAREUR AG to CG Seventh Army, 11 Jul 53, same sub. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR SGS 320.2 (1953), Vol. II, Item 33A and atchd.

[27]C/N 1, USAREUR G1 to USAREUR COFS, 19 Jan 54, sub: Replacement Carrier Companies. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 320.2 (1954), Vol. I, Item 9.

of the Army presented for USAREUR's study a plan for training, processing, and shipping infantry platoons to the command as unit replacements, in order to provide the command with more adequately trained personnel. Limited to 28 infantry rifle platoons, the training of the first 4 platoons by the 8th Infantry Division at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, was to start on 16 November 1953. Thereafter, 4 additional platoons would begin training every three weeks. Eleven platoons were to be processed and shipped to USAREUR as 4-man packets between 23 January and 16 May 1954. In order that the experiment might be evaluated, the Department desired CINCUSAREUR's comments and recommendations by 1 August 1954, since plans for extending the experiment to armored units were under consideration.[28]

(3) Replacement Processing. During the period under review the problem of "elapsed time" in USAREUR replacement processing, raised by the Department of the Army, brought about important changes and adjustments. In September 1953 the Army Chief of Staff directed that the total elapsed time in replacement processing--including travel time for military personnel from ship to unit and unit to ship--should not exceed one week, or a maximum of 3½ days in either direction.[29] CINCUSAREUR lost little time in requesting reconsideration of the directive since factors of time, space, classification procedures, physical processing, and maximum use of personnel clearly precluded compliance. CINCUSAREUR suggested as an alternative that the 7-day limit be applied to casual time between ship and unit in either direction and that 7 days combined casual time be regarded as the goal.[30] Early in 1954 the Department of the Army in effect rejected USAREUR's proposal, and instituted a reappraisal of the entire replacement program. CINCUSAREUR was directed to explore "completely" the feasibility of eliminating the replacement depot at Zweibruecken, of requiring internal transportation on the basis of a 100-mile radius from ship, and of expanding the USAREUR Liaison Detachment at Camp Kilmer to perform classification and assignment functions. An examination of these possibilities, CINCUSAREUR was promised, "might lead to reconsideration" of the command's proposals, but

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[28] DA ltr to CINCUSAREUR, CG's USAFE, USFA, 12 Nov 53, sub: Experimental Infantry Platoon Training and Replacement Plan. AGAC-C (M) 353 (2 Nov 53) G3. UNCLASSIFIED. Info cy in USAREUR SGS 320.2 (1953), Vol. II, Item 54A atchd.

[29] (1) Cable DA-948342, COFSA from ACOFSA G1 to CINCUSAREUR, 17 Sep 53. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Cable DA-953920, same addresses, 7 Dec 53. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR SGS 320.2 (1954), Vol. I, Item 6 atchd.

[30] Ltr, USAREUR COFS to ACOFSA G1, 15 Dec 53, sub: Elapsed Time in Replacement Processing. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

CINCUSAREUR's comments were requested before such reconsideration.[31] Within two weeks, CINCUSAREUR indicated to the Department of the Army that the concept of making replacement assignments directly from the zone of interior to USAREUR units, which had been under study in the command for some time, was not acceptable as an alternative to assignment by the Zweibruecken replacement depot, because the removal of enlisted replacement processing and distribution from the geographical boundary of the command "would prove disastrous should the ultimate mission of USAREUR eventuate with little or no warning". Therefore, although the Army's recommendations were considered feasible, they were not desirable. Moreover, the command was earnestly trying to expedite the processing of casuals and, as a result, pipeline casual time had actually been reduced. The port of embarkation at Bremerhaven had inaugurated 24- and 48-hour (for advance party) cycles for the processing of casual personnel returning to the United States. Based on the casual flow during FY 1953, an estimated savings of 210,000 man-days, or more than two million dollars would be made annually as a result of this reduction. During the period under review the 307th Replacement Depot in Zweibruecken reduced the average processing time for incoming EM from about 7 days to about 3.[32] Another step under contemplation was the reduction of the internal travel time of COMZ replacements, by diverting bulk COMZ replacements shipments to a staging area on the west coast of France.[33] Nevertheless, CINCUSAREUR, because of the casual time limitations imposed by Washington, recognized the necessity of limiting USAREUR's control, through Zweibruecken, of the replacement distribution to elements of the command. A headquarters staff study concluded that the separation of the USAREUR replacement stream into four components was not only practicable but desirable. According to this plan COMZ replacements would go directly to France, replacement divisions for Seventh Army to Bremerhaven, and replacements for the 32d AAA Brigade to Southhampton, England (which was the practice since February 1953). The balance of USAREUR replacements would go to Zweibruecken, which would be kept operational because of financial savings, the possibility of early implementation of the plan, and the tactical advantage of having an East-West casual personnel route available. The 4-way replacement stream would be initiated at Camp Kilmer through a 4-part requisition by the Department of the Army, which would place levies to meet the requisition; and

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[31] Cable DA-955326, ACOFSA G1 to CINCUSAREUR, 8 Jan 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

[32] (1) Ltr, USAREUR COFS to ACOFSA G1, 21 Jan 54, sub: Elapsed Time in Replacement Processing. SECRET. In file cited above. (2) USAREUR Off of Compt, Management Improvement Report, Fiscal Year 1954, p. 13. UNCLASSIFIED.

[33] Ltr, USAREUR COFS to ACOFSA G1, 21 Jan 54, cited above.

the assignment team at Kilmer, under the control of USAREUR, would separate the streams and perform many of the screening functions done at Zweibruecken. In Europe a small replacement detachment would be required at La Rochelle, under the operational control of COMZ headquarters to process and assign all COMZ replacements. To insure the success of such a plan, CINCUSAREUR noted, the Department of the Army would have to honor USAREUR requisitions more strictly with respect both to numbers and to MOS's. The Department of the Army approved the USAREUR plan in March 1954 and enlarged the concept of direct replacement streams to include a division or divisions to Seventh Army. During the same month facilities near the port of La Rochelle were examined by COMZ, following USAREUR G1's request that the adequacy and feasibility of that port for the reception, processing, and assignment of COMZ replacements be determined.[34] The portions of the Department of the Army plan pertaining to the assignment teams at Camp Kilmer were not implemented because of the strenuous opposition of CINCUSAREUR, General Hoge, who continued to maintain that under such an arrangement USAREUR would be robbed of assignment flexibility.[35] Following the Department of the Army's approval of the USAREUR plan for direct shipment of replacements to France, the command promised to submit implementation details to The Adjutant General, Washington, by 15 April 1954; but as late as 24 June 1954 the Department of the Army had not received them, and at the end of the period under review no information was available regarding the status of the COMZ replacement plan.[36] Early in July, however, USAREUR G1 informed the USAREUR chief of staff that the administrative procedures to accomplish this plan had been developed. St. Nazaire, rather than the La Rochelle site in France, was thought by USAREUR staff divisions to be the best available site for the proposed personnel center to process COMZ replacements and returnees. Since St. Nazaire was formerly an Air Force (USAFE) installation, CINCUSAREUR requested COMZ to survey the area and requested US CINCEUR to allocate the site to USAREUR. The target date for the arrival of the first direct replacements to COMZ was shifted from October to November 1954.[37]

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[34] C/N 1, USAREUR G1 Div to USAREUR COFS, 12 Mar 54, sub: Replacement Processing and Assignment. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 320.2 (1954), Vol. I, Item 6 atchd.

[35] Interv, Mr. R. Sher, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj E. L. Noreen, USAREUR G1 MPB Enl Pers Sec, 29 Sep 54. SECRET.

[36] (1) Ltr, USAREUR COFS to TAG, 24 Mar 54, sub: Replacement Processing and Assignment. SECRET. (2) Ltr, TAG to CINCUSAREUR, 24 Jun 54, same sub. SECRET. Both USAREUR SGS 320.2 (1954), Vol. I, Item 6 atchd.

[37] Memo, USAREUR G1 to USAREUR COFS, 9 Jul 54, sub: Replacement Processing and Assignment. SECRET. In file cited above.

18. Promotion Program

Except for the authority granted USAREUR to permit subordinate commanders to waive time-in-grade and service requirements for promotion, there were no major changes in USAREUR promotion policies in the year and a half covered by this report. Restatements of Army and USAREUR policies in this field, however, were contained in various circulars and special regulations.[38] Despite restricted promotion opportunities dictated by budgetary and manpower cuts, USAREUR reported nearly 193,000 personnel (grades E-3 to E-7) as eligible for promotion to the next higher grade within the 10-month period from 1 April 1953 to 31 January 1954. In return, the Department of the Army allocated and authorized the promotion of slightly more than 178,000 or 93 percent of those eligible. Of these allocations USAREUR used only 79 percent. Since promotion allocations are monthly and since the unused allocations are returned to Washington at the end of the month, USAREUR in effect "lost" 37,516 promotions--an average of 3,750 per month. These losses were chiefly in grades E-3 to E-5 because all of the limited number of "token" or "morale" promotions to E-6 or E-7 allocated were used.[39] Over the last 4-month period reported (1 February to 31 May 1954), Department of the Army authorizations for promotion in USAREUR to grades E-3 through E-5 were equal to, or in excess of, the number of persons eligible for promotion to these grades. Over 80,000 such promotions were authorized, approximately 78,000 personnel were eligible, and close to 78,000 personnel were actually promoted within that period. Thus the over-all command use of authorizations ranged from excellent (for grades E-3 and E-4) to satisfactory (for grade E-5).[40] The promotion forecast for FY 1955 indicated that promotions to grade E-7 would be 75 percent less than in the previous fiscal year, and to other grades 40 percent less. Moreover, among officer and warrant officer personnel, large cuts anticipated for FY 1955 would inevitably restrict promotion opportunities severely in every grade.[41] As a result of this situation, Lt. Gen. A. C. McAuliffe, Seventh Army commander, foresaw

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[38](1) DA Cir 22, 27 Mar 53. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR Cirs 66, 3 Aug 53, 17 Jun 54, sub: Promotion Policy for USAREUR Enlisted Personnel. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) SR 615-25-50, 5 May 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

[39](1) See par. 16c(1) above for discussion of token promotion allocations to relieve the E-7 overstrength. (2) Analysis USAREUR Mthly Stat Rept, 31 Jan 54. SECRET.

[40](1) Analyses USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 31 Jan, 31 May 54. SECRET. (2) USAREUR Mthly Stat Rept, 31 May 54, p. 15. SECRET.

[41]Ltr, Gen M. B. Ridgway, COFSA, to Gen W. M. Hoge, CINCUSAREUR, 15 Jan 54, no sub. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 320.4 (1954), B/P #3 Item 2A.

a "tremendous morale problem" confronting Army leadership. The idea that the Army was consigned to "second-rate status" had already gained wide currency. He feared that with the unfolding of the restricted promotion program Army officers were going to experience another "rough jolt". An additional disturbing factor was that the Air Force on 15 February 1954, announced a number of promotions to various ranks. General McAuliffe concluded that the command was going to have "a real internal public relations job to perform".[42]

19. Rotation and Discharge Policies

a. Rotation Eligibility. An examination of data concerning rotation eligibility for USAREUR personnel assigned as of 31 December 1953 showed that officer personnel tended to rotate largely in the summer months and enlisted men principally during the winter. The value of this finding lay in the command's ability to determine the length of tours, the degree of turnover and, hence, the shipping requirements within a given period. Thus, the fact that between January 1954 and September 1956 more short-term non-RA enlisted personnel (114,500) than longer-term RA men (110,800) were to be rotated to the United States meant shorter tours, greater turnover, and increased shipping requirements. For personnel assigned to USAREUR as of 30 June 1954 the winter months continued as the period during which the greatest number of enlisted personnel would rotate homeward and the summer months remained as the season when most officers would return to the States. In the rotation periods between July 1954 and June 1957 the margin of non-RA EM over RA EM would grow wider still. Of 227,800 men scheduled to rotate in this period, 128,100 would be non-RA.[43]

b. Extensions and Reductions of Tours of Duty.

(1) Extensions. Oversea commanders were authorized to grant one 6-month extension to an officer's normal foreign service tour, upon the officer's request. Additional 1-month extensions were authorized for the convenience of the government or of the individual, including proper scheduling of shipment. Tours could also be extended, for periods not exceeding 6 months, for officers selected to attend schools in the United States if their return to the zone of interior upon the expiration of their current tours would give them more time there, prior to reporting to school,

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[42] Ltr, Lt Gen A. C. McAuliffe, CG Seventh Army, to Gen W. M. Hoge, CINCUSAREUR, 3 Feb 54, no sub. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, B/P #3, Tab C.

[43] (1) USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 31 Jan, 31 Jul 54. SECRET. (2) Analyses USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 31 Jan, 31 Jul 54. SECRET.

than their accrued or desired leave and travel time would warrant. Approved also, early in 1953, were voluntary extensions of overseas tours of CIC officers and warrant officers for 1-, 2-, or 3-year periods, up to a maximum of 6 years. If an individual had already reported to the Department of the Army for reassignment, no extensions could be made except under the conditions noted above.[44] Implementation of these regulations in the command involved authorizing commanders reporting directly to CINCUSAREUR headquarters to grant the aforementioned extensions, but only in cases where extensions were deemed to be in the best interest of the service, and even then only when the strength of the command in the branch and grade concerned was within the authorized strength. Similarly, commanders reporting directly to CINCUSAREUR could extend tours for enlisted personnel in increments of 6 months, up to a maximum of 5 years. However, extended tours could not be approved for personnel below grade E-5 whose dependents were with them in the command; for EM in MOS's which were excess to the needs of the command; for married EM whose families were not residing with them; for personnel who were convicted once by a special or general court-martial or twice by a summary court-martial during their current tour or whose conduct or behavior reflected unfavorably on the public's respect for the military services; or for personnel in grades E-6 and E-7 (in which an overstrength existed).[45]

(2) Involuntary Release of Non-RA Officers and Warrant Officers. In the summer of 1953 the Department of the Army announced a new program for the involuntary release of non-Regular Army officers and warrant officers on active duty. USAREUR was confronted with a heavy overstrength in field grade officers--especially in combat arms--caused by promotions and Department of the Army assignments in excess of USAREUR requisitions. Eager to relieve this overstrength, CINCUSAREUR directed subordinate commanders to take advantage of the opportunity provided by the new program by recommending the release of non-RA officers and warrant officers whose performance levels were below standard. Commanders were to screen carefully the records of field grade officers and select those officers for release who had the lowest performance standards. These were to be given opportunity to request voluntary release, with the understanding that the final decision on involuntary release remained with the Department of the Army and not with USAREUR headquarters. An officer who

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[44](1) AR 600-175, 17 Jul 53, Sec VIII. (2) Cable DA-982328, 26 Feb 53. UNCLASSIFIED. Extract from USAREUR G1 MPB Plns & Policy Sec Policy file.

[45](1) USAREUR Cir 116, 15 Mar 54, sub: Military Personnel--General, Pars. 19, 20. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR ltr, 7 Jan 54, sub: Extension of Overseas Tours for Officer Personnel Only. AG 210.3 GPA-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

declined voluntary release could be recommended for release from active duty under specified USAREUR provisions.[46] To implement this program further, CINCUSAREUR suspended the authority of major and subordinate commanders to grant field grade officers an initial 6-month extension of their overseas tours. Though CINCUSAREUR could still grant such extensions where warranted, it was hoped that by denying extensions the overstrength could be more quickly reduced through attrition.[47] Additional instructions from the Department of the Army were that officers to be returned to the United States prior to the completion of their normal overseas tours of duty should be selected, whenever practicable, from those with the longest periods of overseas service.[48]

(3) Reduction of TRUST Tour of Duty. The Trieste United States Troops (TRUST) command, where maintenance of dependents was not authorized, suffered from a shortage of qualified nonsponsor personnel to meet TRUST requirements. CINCUSAREUR, in coordination with the Commanding General, TRUST, had therefore, secured Department of the Army approval for limiting the tour of duty in Trieste to 9 months in the case of married officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men in Grades E-5 to E-7 who desired to have their dependents join them. If these personnel had a minimum of 12 months remaining on their current tour, they were to be transferred to USAREUR. The procedures and mechanics of the TRUST-to-USAREUR transfer were spelled out in a USAREUR letter directive in April 1954.[49]

(4) Proposal to Shorten Tours. In May 1954 the Department of the Army requested CINCUSAREUR to review a plan for reducing foreign service tours containing the following provisions: bachelor personnel without dependents and personnel unaccompanied or not joined by their dependents would be authorized a 24-month tour in USAREUR; such personnel could extend their tours to 36 months voluntarily, with USAREUR approval; accompanied personnel or those joined by their dependents would continue in their

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[46](1) Cable DA-944560, TAG to CINCUSAREUR, 24 Jul 53. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) C/N 1, USAREUR G1 to USAREUR COFS, 5 Aug 53, sub: Overstrength of Field Grade Officers. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) Cable SX-2028, USAREUR to Sub Comds, etc., 11 Aug 53. UNCLASSIFIED. All in USAREUR G1 MPB Plns and Policy Sec Classified files (1953), Tab B, Item 12, and Tab E. (4) USAREUR Wkly Dir 31, 31 Jul 53, Sec XXI. UNCLASSIFIED.

[47]Cable SX-2028, 11 Aug 53, cited above.

[48]Cable DA-473082, 9 Dec 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 320.2 (1953), Vol. II, Item 63B.

[49]USAREUR ltr, 9 Apr 54, sub: Assignment and Reassignment of Certain TRUST Personnel. AG 210.3 GPA-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

current 36-month tour. The reasons underlying the plan were as follows: the Army had already prescribed shorter tours in certain "less desirable" areas; since many USAREUR military personnel were unable to have their dependents brought to the command, a 3-year separation was undesirable in view of the number of broken marriages which resulted; bachelor personnel without dependents were separated from a so-called normal environment; accompanied personnel "suffered" the least since their homes were "literally transported"; longer tours generally influenced women against either remaining in or entering the service, and the estimated increase in monthly turnover would be no more than 75 officers and 750 EM, even assuming that none of the 24-month category personnel volunteered for the 12-month extension. The plan, furthermore, would have the advantage of improving morale, of benefiting RA enlisted personnel and thereby increasing the attractiveness of the service as a career, and of bringing the Army tour into favorable alignment with the Navy's tour of 24 months and the Air Force's tour of 18 months for unaccompanied personnel or those not joined by their dependents.[50] Disadvantages were that USAREUR's monthly replacement requirements would be increased, and that the retainability of some RA personnel in USAREUR would be reduced. All of Seventh Army's commands concurred early in June 1954, but the USAREUR Special Activities Division recommended retention of the original 36-month tour since living in the command could scarcely be regarded as a "hardship".[51] In approving the Army's plan in June 1954, CINCUSAREUR recommended that the Department of the Army give attention to the following considerations before implementing the plan: that the increase in the turnover of personnel would aggravate the problem of maintaining properly-trained personnel in overseas areas; that the normal processing and leave time would cut the period of useful service of bachelor personnel from the proposed 24 months to 20½ months; that the plan should indicate at what point during the tour nonbachelor personnel might elect a shorter tour; that provision for requesting an extension to a

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[50] In 1952 a plan to eliminate differences between the tours of the three services was formulated. Early in 1953, at Department of the Army request, USAREUR submitted a proposal to retain the normal 36-month tour but to cut it in half for personnel, with dependents, who were not entitled to quarters or whose dependents could not join them. See memo, USAREUR G1 MPB to USAREUR ACOFS G1, 9 Feb 53, sub: World-wide Rotation Policies for the Four Services. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G1 MPB files.

[51] (1) DF, USAREUR G1 Div to USAREUR COFS, 3 Jun 54, sub: Department of the Army Plan to Reduce Foreign Service Tours. AG 210.481 GPA. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) 2d Ind to DF, C/USAREUR SAD to CINCUSAREUR, 22 May 54, Foreign Service Tours. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR G1 MPB Enl Pers Sec Reading files, Jun 54, Tab C. (3) See also Tab B of same file.

longer tour should be included; and, finally, that a provision should be added to cover personnel who marry overseas.[52] At the end of the period under review no further action was taken to adopt a shorter tour.

20. Integration of Negro and White Troops

One of the accomplishments of the command during the period covered by this report was the virtual completion of the program of integrating Negro and white personnel into the same units and thereby eliminating all-Negro units. In April 1953 the program was one year old and the objective for integrating all combat troops in USAREUR within that time had been met, except in the case of 4 all-Negro combat-type units: 1 combat engineer battalion, 1 combat engineer company, and 2 engineer bridge companies. Service units, which had been given until March 1954 (i.e., two years) to become completely integrated, were two-thirds integrated after one year, with only 50 units of company size or less remaining to be integrated. By November 1953 the integration of combat-type units was completed. The integration process in service units was slower than in combat units due to a general overstrength of Negroes in USAREUR service branches (especially of truck drivers in the command's transportation units) and a corresponding shortage of white personnel in the same MOS's. Nevertheless, in March 1954 only 20 transportation units remained to be integrated. Thirteen of these were in Seventh Army and 7 in USAREUR COMZ. A heavy influx of Caucasian drivers arrived in that month and a small number of Negro drivers arrived in the final phase of the integration program. Thus, on 9 July 1954, a little more than one week beyond the period of this report, the last all-Negro transportation unit in Seventh Army--a transportation truck company--was integrated. The Department of the Army promised USAREUR sufficient white replacements, in the appropriate MOS's within a short period of time so that the racial integration of the few remaining units would be completed.[53]

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[52] 1st Ind, CINCUSAREUR to ACOFSA G1, 7 Jun 54, sub: Foreign Service Tours. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

[53] (1) Memo, for USAREUR COFS, 2 Apr 53, sub: Status of Racial Integration Program, 2 April 1953. SECRET. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to SACEUR, 10 Apr 53, no sub. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 291.2 (1953), Vol. I. (3) Status of Integration, 30 Apr 53. SECRET. (4) Memo, for Reps Seventh Army, USAREUR COMZ, USAREUR Trans Div, and 307th Repl Gp, 10 Mar 54, sub: Racial Integration of Transportation Units in USAREUR. CONFIDENTIAL. Last two in USAREUR G1 MPB file on Integration (1954). (5) Memo, Lt Col H. M. Schiller, USAREUR G1 MPB, to Mr. R. Sher, USAREUR Hist Div, 22 Jul 54, no sub. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR Hist Div Classified files (1954).

21. Changes in Troop Basis

a. Reduction in Troop Basis. The maintaining of combat effectiveness within the limitations on personnel strength established by the Department of the Army was a persistent problem during the period covered by this report. In April 1953, General Bolte received advance information of a probable reduction in the FY 1954 USAREUR troop basis, through a personal letter from Maj. Gen. Robert N. Young, Assistant Chief of Staff, G1, Department of the Army, advising him that the Department anticipated a cut in the USAREUR strength authorization. The Department of the Army expected the cut for two reasons. First, world-wide personnel requirements prevented the Department of the Army from shipping enough replacements to maintain USAREUR's authorized strength. Second, the Secretary of Defense had directed the formulation of a budget for an Army with a much lower end-of-FY-1954 strength. General Young estimated that USAREUR's share of the reduction in authorized strength might run as high as twenty thousand.[54] The actual reduction, made official the following month, amounted to 21,000 spaces and set the USAREUR troop ceiling at 238,000 by the end of June 1954. The Department of the Army ruled that in planning the reduction, USAREUR would inactivate no major combat units, that combat units would in most cases be unaffected, and that the trimming would be effected principally in support units.[55] This directive came after the theater had absorbed, without an increase in spaces, Headquarters, US EUCOM; the Joint Construction Agency (JCA); the 280-mm. gun battalions; and miscellaneous smaller units. In addition, the T/O&E units of the command were already short by more than 3,000 officer and warrant officer spaces, and enlisted personnel shortages were approximately 24,000, of which about 16,000 were in Seventh Army.[56] There existed, then, no excess that could be easily trimmed from USAREUR's personnel roster. In order to accomplish the reduction the G3 Division planned first to eliminate nearly all of the programmed reserve and then to eliminate the least essential activities. Another saving was to be made by reorganizing the various headquarters so as to use appropriate T/O&E units as replacements for T/D units wherever possible. The next cuts were to fall upon service units--first upon base service units, then upon field service and non-divisional combat units, and last upon division service units.

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[54] Ltr, Maj Gen Robert N. Young, ACOFSA G1, to Lt Gen Charles L. Bolte, CINCUSAREUR, 23 Apr 53. SECRET. In USAREUR G3 Div O&E Br Sub File 41, Pt. 2.

[55] Cable SMC-IN 4439, COFSA to CINCUSAREUR, 21 May 53. SECRET. In file above.

[56] Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G3 for USAREUR COFS, n. d., sub: Reduction in Spaces for FY 1954. SECRET. In file above.

It was planned to cut the strength of these units by 13 percent. Finally, USAREUR planned to hold down its troop basis by recognizing no new requirements until the reduction was complete and a reserve established.[57] Several small units were to be discontinued. These included the 7721 Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, the Tank Training Center, and the Transportation School. The Berlin Honor Guard was to be reduced from two platoons to one, and several other organizations would also be reduced in size. The proposed USAREUR-wide reduction was as follows:[58]

	Agg	Off	ANC/WMSC	WO	Enl
Former Ceiling	259,000	17,200	740	2,942	238,118
New Ceiling	238,000	16,000	657	2,089	219,254
Reduction	21,000	1,200	83	853	18,864

b. Increase in Troop Basis, FY 1954. After approving USAREUR's proposed troop basis, the Department of the Army gradually increased the basis during FY 1954 in order to accommodate new units assigned to USAREUR. For the first quarter of FY 1954 Department of the Army authorizations totaled 238,101 spaces, the extra 101 spaces having been added to accommodate a general dispensary transferred from SHAPE headquarters to USAREUR.[59] For the second quarter the Department of the Army boosted the authorizations by more than 4,000 spaces to 242,361, not including the dispensary added during the previous quarter, which was transferred out again. The bulk of this increase resulted from the transfer to USAREUR of engineer units with authorizations of 2,773 spaces, an ordnance unit with 734 spaces, and a special forces group with 853 spaces. The engineer construction units already in the theater had been carried on the Department of the Army's general reserve troop basis and on loan to USAREUR, but after establishing the troop ceiling at 238,000, Washington decided to transfer them to USAREUR and allotted the necessary number of spaces to USAREUR. The ordnance unit had been programmed by USAREUR during the previous year, had been trained and equipped, but was still in the zone of interior. After the reduction in its troop basis USAREUR no longer wanted the unit, but the Department of the Army, having undergone considerable expense to train and equip it, agreed to

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[57] (1) Ibid. (2) Interv, Capt R. A. Gugeler, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col J. R. Looney, USAREUR G3 Div O&E Br, 7 Jul 54. SECRET.

[58] Ibid.

[59] DA ltr, 25 Jun 53, sub: Military and Civilian Personnel Authorization, Voucher No. EU-1. AGAC-C (M) 320.2 (19 Jun 53) Gl. SECRET.

raise USAREUR's ceiling to make room for it.[60] Approximately 800 additional spaces were added during the last half of FY 1954, so that authorized strength for the end of the year amounted to 243,107--an increase of slightly more than 5,000 spaces during the year.[61]

c. Troop Basis Planning for FY 1955. In the fall of 1953 USAREUR was threatened with still another reduction in strength when press dispatches reported expected over-all cuts in Army personnel for FY 1955. In order to be prepared for this contingency, USAREUR made preliminary studies during October and November to determine how it could effect a reduction expected to be somewhere between 8 and 18 percent. This anticipation did not materialize since the Department of the Army required no further cuts in USAREUR's strength for FY 1955.[62] Instead of reducing USAREUR's strength, the Department of the Army was able to provide almost enough additional spaces for FY 1955 to cover the spaces added during the previous year, and in March 1954 the Army advised USAREUR that, for planning purposes, its troop basis would be 242,150 rather than 238,000 as previously mentioned. For USAREUR this figure represented a drop of less than a thousand from the 1954 fiscal-year-end strength; from the Department of the Army's point of view it represented an increase of more than 4,000 spaces in USAREUR's troop basis.[63] The official authorization that reached USAREUR in April 1954 established the authorized 1955 fiscal-year-end strength at 242,267 spaces.[64]

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[60](1) DA ltr, 28 Sep 53, sub: Military and Civilian Personnel Authorization, Voucher EU-2. AGAC-C (M) 320.2 (21 Sep 53) Gl. SECRET. (2) Interv, Capt R. A. Gugeler, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col J. R. Looney, USAREUR G3 Div O&E Br, 7 Jul 54. SECRET.

[61](1) DA ltr, 31 Dec 53, sub: Military and Civilian Personnel Authorization, Voucher No. EU-3. AGAC-C (M) 320.2 (22 Dec 53) Gl. SECRET. (2) DA ltr, 29 Mar 54, same sub, Voucher No. EU-4. AGAC-C (M) 320.2 (22 Mar 54) Gl. SECRET.

[62]Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to DCOFS for Opns, n.d., sub: Reduction in Theater Ceiling. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 320.2 (1954), B/P.

[63]"The Troop Program", DA Objectives and Policies, FY's 54, 55, and 56, Vol. 1, 1 Feb 54, App. I. SECRET.

[64]DA ltr, 26 Mar 54, sub: Presentation of Troop Basis and Tables of Distribution, Fiscal Years 1954, 1955, and 1956. AGAC-C (M) 320.2 (19 Mar 54) Gl. SECRET.

22. Assignment and Reassignment Policies

a. Reassignment and the Housing Shortage. Because of the shortage of dependent housing in USAREUR, the command was obliged in August 1953 to restrict reassignments to the following categories of personnel: officers, enlisted men, and civilian employees whose dependents were not in the command; personnel whose dependents were in the command, provided reassignment involved no movement of dependents or change of quarters; officers who were to be reassigned because of inefficiency or misconduct; medical officers who were eligible for reassignment after serving a minimum nine months in "assignments considered monotonous". Personnel whose dependents were en route to the command and those whose applications for movement of dependents to the command had already been processed were considered as having dependents in the command.[65]

b. Assignment of Officers. In September 1953 the Department of the Army announced the reduction of the number of officer assignments handled on a nomination basis. In furtherance of this program, CINCUSAREUR in November 1953 directed that nominations of officers for assignment to subordinate commands would be made by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G1, USAREUR, only for colonels who might be selected for assignments to the following T/O&E or T/D positions: the chiefs of staff of Seventh Army, the two corps, the infantry or armored divisions, the AAA brigades, or similar tactical organizations; the deputy commanders of USAREUR COMZ and its sections; and the heads of staff divisions at USAREUR headquarters, and at the headquarters of the major commands (i.e., Seventh Army and COMZ). If the nominated officer was acceptable to the commander concerned, CINCUSAREUR would take the action to make him available for further specific assignment.[66] Principles of career guidance dictated the rotation between troop and staff duty for eligible colonels and lieutenant colonels of Infantry, Armor, and Artillery. A policy effecting the rotation of these assignments was announced by USAREUR in January 1954. Such assignments for colonels were to be for minimum periods of 12 months and for lieutenant colonels for from 12 to 18 months. Wherever possible these assignments were to be timed to result in only one change of station during normal tours of duty. In order to equalize the opportunities for command between the officers of Seventh Army and those assigned to other commands or headquarters, USAREUR would fill a fair amount of available command spaces in Seventh Army, the 32d AAA Brigade, and the 6th Infantry Regiment

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[65] USAREUR ltr, 17 Aug 53, sub: Reassignment of Personnel Occupying or Requiring Family Type Quarters. AG 210.3 GPA-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[66] USAREUR ltr, 17 Nov 53, sub: Assignment of Officers. AG 210.3 GPA-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

with officers assigned outside of those commands. Command spaces for the purpose of this policy included a division chief of staff; a regimental, group, or combat command commander; a regimental, group, or division artillery executive officer; and a battalion commander.[67]

23. General Officer Spaces

The general officer category of personnel was chronically short of the command's needs during most of the year and a half under discussion. Authorized 36 T/D general officer spaces, in addition to the T/O&E spaces, as of January 1953, the command found it necessary to request an increase of 2 spaces so that the undergrading of the commander of the Berlin Command and the deputy to the Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ, could be corrected. The Joint Construction Agency (JCA) used 1 of the newly authorized spaces, necessitating a request for the authorization of 2 additional brigadier generals, 1 for the Berlin Command and another for the unfilled space of Chief, USAREUR Special Activities Division. In view of the anticipated activation of a MAAG, Germany, in the near future, a major general's space would be needed for the position of chief of this MAAG. It was also believed that it would be wise to reserve another space for the possible activation of MAAG, European Defense Community (EDC).[68] In December 1953 the Department of the Army approved a USAREUR--revised FY 1954 troop basis which included 44 T/D general officer spaces. USAREUR, as of 30 June 1954, required 29 of these T/D spaces and US EUCOM, whose spaces were charged against USAREUR strength, needed the remaining 15 general officers. As of the same date, Seventh Army filled 25 T/O&E spaces, 3 short of the number authorized in the FY 1954 troop basis. Thus the actual strength of general officers in the command was 69 at the close of the report period.[69]

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[67] USAREUR ltr, 5 Jan 54, sub: Rotation of Command Assignments. AG 210 GPA-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[68] (1) Msg, DA-932224, COFSA from ACOFSA G1 to CINCUSAREUR, 25 Feb 53. SECRET. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to Actg ACOFSA G1, 30 Jan 53, no sub. SECRET. (3) Ltr, Brig Gen J. B. Murphy, USAREUR ACOFS G1, to Maj Gen R. N. Young, ACOFSA G1, 27 Feb 53, no sub. UNCLASSIFIED. All in USAREUR SGS 320.2 (1953), Items 8A atchd, 9B, and atchd.

[69] (1) Memo, USAREUR G1 MPB to USAREUR ACOFS G1, 15 Dec 53, sub: Authorized General Officer Spaces for USAREUR. SECRET. In USAREUR G1 MPB Plns & Pol Sec Classified files (1954), Item 41. (2) C/N 1, USAREUR G3 to USAREUR COFS, 14 Dec 53, sub: USAREUR Officer Branch and Table of Distribution Grade Distribution Fiscal Year 1954. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 320.2 (1953), Vol. II, Item 66. (3) USAREUR Roster of General Officers in U.S. Army, Europe, 1 Jul 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

24. Enlistment and Re-enlistment Program

a. The Recruitment Program. One of the "characteristics" listed in the personnel survey of the Army for 30 June 1954 was "future plans". This listing showed that 41.6 percent of RA personnel planned to reenlist--a percentage gratifyingly close to the Department of the Army's program objective of 42 percent. Non-RA personnel, however, were "attracted to civilian life". Recruitment figures ordinarily tend to support this trend, but for the period under review there was a slight but definite inversion of the pattern. In every fiscal year since 1952 the monthly average recruitment of RA personnel declined noticeably. The monthly average in FY 1952 was 1,325; in FY 1953, 684 (a 48.4 percent drop); in FY 1954, 493 (another decline of 27.9 percent). The total decline in FY 1954 from FY 1952 amounted to 62.8 percent. In contrast, the monthly average recruitment of personnel from non-RA status rose successively over the same periods: from 106 in FY 1952 to 113 in FY 1953 (for a 6.6 percent increase) and to 116 in FY 1954 (for a 2.6 percent increase over FY 1953 and 9.4 percent over FY 1952).[70] A summary of the total number of re-enlistments in USAREUR during the period of this report is given in the following tabulation:[71]

	RA Personnel			Non-RA Personnel		
Date	Eligible	Recruited	Others	Recruited	Extended	Total Recruited
Totals	71,450	3,992	5,835	1,950	776	12,553
1 Jan 53-30 Jun 53	11,534	1,742	2,166	561	769	5,238
1 Jul 53-31 Dec 53	12,301	1,175	2,504	941	7	4,627
1 Jan 54-30 Jun 54	47,615	1,075	1,165	448	-	2,688

The number of alien enlistments in USAREUR from 1 January 1953 to 31 March 1954 totaled 504. No such enlistments were reported for the last three months of FY 1954.[72] To encourage enlistments and re-enlistments and to maintain an acceptable minimum RA enlisted percentage, the Department of the Army in the fall of 1953

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[70] Analyses USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 30 Jun, 31 Jul 54. SECRET.

[71] USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 30 Jun, 31 Dec 53; 30 Jun 54. SECRET.

[72] Ibid.

instituted a new assignment policy for enlisted personnel returning to the continental United States, or to territory of residence from overseas assignments. Such personnel would serve a minimum of 18 months from the date of arrival before again becoming eligible for foreign service. For those re-enlisting within 90 days after their discharge date, the 18-month rule would still apply, although the break in service would be excluded; but if re-enlistment took place after 90 days the rule would not be applicable. For personnel returning to the United States because of injuries or illness not due to misconduct and hospitalized in the United States, the 18-month rule would be applicable and would begin upon the return of the individual to duty status. Re-enlistments during the period of assured service in the United States would not result in extending that period beyond 18 months, except for persons whose enlistments were already stabilized for longer periods under existing Army regulations. Individuals could volunteer for overseas duty before completing 18 months of service in the United States. Regular Army enlisted CIC personnel were excluded from these policies whenever the needs of the service so required. In still another effort to improve the attractiveness of a military career and induce older EM to remain in the service, the Department of the Army adopted the following plan effective 1 January 1954: Regular Army noncommissioned personnel in grades E-5, E-6, and E-7, with over 20 years of active federal service, who had at least one complete overseas tour which began after 1 January 1950 were to be "indefinitely stabilized" in the United States unless they volunteered for additional foreign service.[73]

b. Study of Quality of Prior-Service Personnel. Before the close of the period covered by this report USAREUR received from the Department of the Army the results of a survey of the quality of prior-service enlistees and re-enlistees and a plan evolved therefrom. The mental requirements for the enlistment or re-enlistment of personnel with previous military service in the Regular Army was a percentile score of 31 or more on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) or a standard score of 90 or more on the Aptitude Area I test. If the individual failed to meet the minimum mental requirement he could re-enlist, with his unit commanding officer's approval and declaration that he wanted the individual retained in his unit. The Department of the Army survey revealed that the Army's efforts to retain and attract high quality if not superior personnel through enlistment and re-enlistment

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[73](1) DA ltr, 18 Nov 53, sub: Policies on 18-Month Period of Assured Service for Enlisted Oversea Returnees. AGPA-NC (M) 210.31 (21 Oct 53) Gl. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Msg, DA-948358, 17 Sep 53. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) Msg, DA-469486, TAG to CINCUSAREUR, etc., 24 Nov 53. UNCLASSIFIED. Last two in USAREUR SGS 320.2 (1953), Vol. II, Items 45 and atchd.

were being thwarted, and that actually the opposite was occurring. The number of low-caliber personnel joining and remaining in the Regular Army, particularly in the low grades, was both increasing and adversely affecting the over-all quality of Regular Army personnel. Moreover, this trend was traceable to the excessive number of waivers granted by unit commanders to mental group IV applicants for Regular Army enlistment and re-enlistment. In January and February 1954, the months under study in the survey, only 26 percent of the accessions (i.e., inductees and nonprior-service enlistees) were in mental group IV. At the same time, however, 32 percent of prior-service enlistments and re-enlistments in the Regular Army were in that category, and of these approximately 70 percent were in grade E-4 or lower (see Tables 8 and 9). The plan presented to USAREUR was designed to raise the mental qualifications of those desiring to enlist or re-enlist in the Regular Army and to restrict the authority of unit commanders to grant waivers for those who failed to meet the requirements. Such waivers were to be granted by unit commanders only to personnel who had nine or more years' prior service. Since current requirements concerning mental qualifications did not apply to former selective service, National Guard, and Enlisted Reserve personnel who applied for enlistment in the Regular Army and had been discharged from prior service, the plan proposed that these too be subject to the mental and grade requirements. Another safeguard proposed was that a person would have to attain the rank of sergeant, instead of corporal as theretofore, in order to enter upon a third period of service. In such cases a waiver by the unit commander could be acquired, but only under the new 9-year prior-service proviso. Initially, the plan would involve a reduction in the number of enlistments and re-enlistments and would somewhat restrict the authority of the unit commander, but the prospects of an increased number of higher-quality personnel and improvement in the over-all quality of noncommissioned officers seemed compensation enough. USAREUR distributed the plan in June 1954 to its subordinate commands and staff divisions for further study and comments, but not in time for inclusion of the results of the study in this report.[74]

c. Termination of Infantry Volunteer Program. When the command implemented a program early in 1952 to provide volunteers for infantry units in Korea, no more than moderate success was anticipated. But paradoxically the program was so successful that

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[74](1) USAREUR ltr, 14 Jun 54, sub: Quality of Prior Service Personnel Enlisting and Re-enlisting in the Regular Army, and Incl 1 thereto. AG 340 AGP-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Briefing Notes, 11 Jun 54, sub: Department of the Army Plan to Increase Mental Requirements for Enlistment and Re-enlistment. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G1 MPB Enl Pers Sec file.

Table 8--Quality Report on Enlistments and Re-enlistments of Prior Service Personnel

January 1954

	Other than Negro	Per-cent	Negro	Per-cent	Total	Per-cent	Grade	Mental Group IV Totals: Other than Negro	Per-cent	Negro	Per-cent	Total	Per-cent
Totals	5,483	100	1,164	100	6,647	100		1,513	100	651	100	2,164	100
Mental Gp I	453	8	22	2	475	7	E-1,2,3	516	34	230	35	746	35
II	1,388	25	111	9	1,499	23	E-4	484	32	260	40	744	34
III	2,129	39	380	33	2,509	38	E-5,6,7	513	34	161	25	674	31
IV	1,513	28	651	56	2,164	32							

February 1954

	Other than Negro	Per-cent	Negro	Per-cent	Total	Per-cent	Grade	Mental Group IV Totals: Other than Negro	Per-cent	Negro	Per-cent	Total	Per-cent
Totals	5,614	100	1,212	100	6,828	100		1,504	100	687	100	2,191	100
Mental Gp I	423	7	14	1	437	6	E-1,2,3	608	40	259	38	867	40
II	1,342	24	77	6	1,419	21	E-4	498	33	267	39	765	35
III	2,345	42	434	36	2,779	41	E-5,6,7	398	27	161	23	559	25
IV	1,504	27	687	57	2,191	32							

Source: Incl 1, USAREUR ltr, 14 Jun 54, sub: Quality of Prior Service Personnel Enlisting and Re-enlisting in the Regular Army, Tab B, p. 5. AG 340 AGP-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

Table 9--Quality Report on Inductions and Enlistments of Nonprior Service Personnel

January 1954

	Other than Negro	Per-cent	Negro	Per-cent	Total	Per-cent
Totals	31,067	100	3,430	100	34,497	100
Mental Gp I	2,947	9.5	19	.6	2,966	8.6
II	8,364	26.9	170	5.0	8,534	24.7
III	11,819	38.1	930	27.1	12,749	37.0
IV	7,279	23.4	1,792	52.2	9,071	26.3
Admin	658	2.1	519	15.1	1,177	3.4

February 1954

	Other than Negro	Per-cent	Negro	Per-cent	Total	Per-cent
Totals	25,938	100	2,751	100	28,689	100
Mental Gp I	2,372	9.2	24	.9	2,396	7.2
II	7,118	27.4	145	5.3	7,263	24.7
III	9,864	38.0	750	27.3	10,614	39.4
IV	5,969	23.0	1,467	53.3	7,436	26.7
Admin	615	2.4	365	13.2	980	2.0

Source: Incl 1, USAREUR ltr, 14 Jun 54, sub: Quality of Prior Service Personnel Enlisting and Re-enlisting in the Regular Army, Tab C, p. 10. AG 340 AGP-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

the command was genuinely concerned over the numbers of personnel requesting such assignments. The lure of a relatively short 18-month tour in the Far East was apparently irresistible for a large number of noncommissioned officers, who, confronted with a housing shortage in USAREUR, saw little or no prospect of obtaining quarters during a 36-month tour. To stop the drain on needed infantry MOS's, at CINCUSAREUR's request the Department of the Army terminated the volunteer program at the end of July 1953.[75]

Section II: Civilian Personnel

25. Strength

a. General Status. USAREUR employed and administered, as of 30 June 1954, approximately 157,353 civilian employees of various nationalities. A breakdown of this figure by major or national categories and by appropriated or nonappropriated funds, from which wages or salaries were paid is given in the following tabulation:

[75] (1) C/N 1, USAREUR DCOFS Opns to USAREUR G1, 1 Jul 53, sub: Increased Number of Military in USAREUR Requesting Infantry Assignments in Korea. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Cable, DA-439358, TAG to CINCUSAREUR, 29 Jul 53. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR SGS 320.2 (1953), Vol. II, Item 32A and atchd. (3) SR 615-220-7, 9 Jun 53, Sec. III, Volunteers for Infantry Units in Korea. UNCLASSIFIED.

	Totals	From Appropriated Funds	From Nonappropriated Funds
	157,353	120,386	36,967[b]
US Department of the Army			
Civilians	5,872	5,239	633
German Resident Personnel	110,444	77,510	32,934
French " "	13,153	10,902	2,251
Other " "	1,377	228	1,149
Labor Service Personnel			
German[a]	23,871	23,871	--
French[b]	2,636	2,636	--

[a]Refers only to place of employment. Both Germans and non-Germans were employed in the Labor Service within Germany. Only non-Germans were so employed in France.

[b]Includes 12,973 resident personnel employed by such activities as Special Services, the European Motion Picture Service, Stars and Stripes, Information and Education, etc., but administered by USAREUR personnel Stars and Stripes offices.

This tabulation does not include the 23,994 employees of the European Exchange Service (EES) who were administered by EES personnel offices independently of USAREUR. Only 3.73 percent of the civilian work force administered by USAREUR were Department of the Army civilians who, in line with Department of the Army directives, were employed only when security regulations, supervisory requirements, or scarce skills precluded the use of local personnel. The balance, or 96.27 percent, of the USAREUR-administered civilian employees were local wage rate (LWR) employees. The complex nature of the administration of this heterogeneous labor force was indicated in the fact that for German employees, who constituted the bulk of the workers, 62 separate pay scales and tariffs were in effect: 45 for the Western Area Command (WACOM) under the Host-Guest agreement, 13 in the U.S. Zone of Germany (including the Bremen Enclave), and 4 in Berlin.[76] Moreover, USAREUR acted as the administrative and personnel agency for many employees over whom it exercised little control, since they were assigned to 12 different agencies in 13 countries. These agencies were the Air Force, the Navy, the Army

[76]Memo, USAREUR G1 Civ Pers Br to USAREUR Dep ACOFS G1, 15 Jul 54, sub: Factual Statements on G1 Activities. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G1 Civ Pers Br Policy & Reg Sec file #37 (1954).

Audit Agency, SHAPE, US EUCOM, the Army Security Agency (ASA), the 7839 Military Liaison Mission, the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP), JCA, the Joint US Military Advisory Group to Greece (JUSMAG), the Joint American Military Mission for aid to Turkey (JAMMAT), and the Special Activities Division.

b. Reductions in Strength, January 1953-June 1954. In consonance with the economy measures of the government, CINCUSAREUR was instructed by the Department of the Army early in 1953 to limit civilian personnel strength to the level of 31 January 1953. Reductions to this level were to be made by attrition rather than by the unpopular reduction in force (RIF) method. Acting on these instructions, USAREUR canceled all local and continental U.S. recruitment except for valid commitments made prior to 6 February 1953. Local recruitments with valid commitments prior to 11 February were to be absorbed within the 31 January employment ceiling through attrition. This freeze on recruitment was applicable to Department of the Army authorized spaces only and not to nonappropriated fund personnel.[77] A downward trend in the number of civilian personnel employed by USAREUR continued through June 1954. Part of the June decrease of 8 percent below May was due to the seasonal release of school teachers. Forecasts, however, indicated the likelihood of a 4.4 percent increase in the number of Department of the Army civilians over the June figure. A continued decrease was indicated in the number of continental wage scale (CWS) and LWR employees because of USAREUR's announced policy of nonreplacement of CWS personnel. An overall percentage comparison of FY 1954 with FY 1953 shows a 40.3 percent increase in LWR employees, a 13.8 percent decrease in German resident personnel, a 3.1 percent decrease in Department of the Army civilians, and a 0.4 percent increase in labor service personnel, making a total decrease of 7.1 percent in civilian employee strength.[78] Effective 15 May 1954 USAREUR ceased all recruitment of Allied/neutral (A/N) CWS personnel. Those on the rolls on that date were to be retained on an attrition basis, but no transfers would be permitted from one command to another. This policy stemmed from the decision that local wage rate employees could be used to replace Allied/neutral personnel. The change in policy was motivated by the fact that circumstances no longer dictated the hiring of CWS-type employees for specialized functions. Furthermore, local wage rate employees could be used to replace CWS employees except perhaps in rare instances where technical or security aspects of the function would require the use of U.S.

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[77] (1) Cable DA-395092, COFSA from ACOFSA G1 to CINCUSAREUR, 6 Feb 53. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Cable SC-12182, CINCUSAREUR to Sub Comds, 11 Feb 53. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) DA 395860, SA from Dir Civ Pers, 11 Feb 53. UNCLASSIFIED. All in USAREUR SGS 230 (1953), Vol. I, Item 5 and atchd.

[78] Analysis of USAREUR Mthly Rept, 30 Jun 54. SECRET.

personnel, either military or civilian.[79] The following tabulation shows strength changes in the several categories of civilian personnel employed by USAREUR from 1 January 1953 to 30 June 1954, and includes all employees for whom administration was provided by USAREUR:[80]

Category of Personnel	1 Jan 53	30 Jun 53	31 Dec 53	30 Jun 54
Aggregate	187,045	168,037	142,396	131,831
DA Civilians	4,044	3,829	4,392	4,344
A/N Civilians				
CWS	218	191	173	161
LWR	8,231	9,667	10,882	13,143
German and non-German residents				
Labor Service Personnel	26,306	23,595	23,438	23,168
Others	99,048	85,080	73,052	73,338
Contractors	37,723	44,498	29,433	16,554
Mandatory	1,575	1,177	1,026	1,123

A steady decline in the over-all number of civilian employees of USAREUR occurred during the period under review. With the completion date of USAREUR's housing program drawing nearer, the greatest reduction was in the number of persons employed by building contractors.

26. Pay and Administration

a. Payroll. During the 6-month period 1 January 1953 to 30 June 1953 the payroll of USAREUR civilian employees paid in dollars amounted to $14,608,802; for FY 1954 it amounted to $35,260,416. The amount paid to employees on the Deutsche Mark payroll totaled DM 229,562,610 and DM 370,740,262 for the same periods respectively.[81]

b. Administrative Control. USAREUR's authority for civilian personnel administration of approximately 157,353 civilian employees

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[79](1) Interv, Mr. R. Sher, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. S. Sutherland, USAREUR G1 Civ Pers Br, 27 Sep 54. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Ltr, Lt Col T. R. Pitts, USAREUR G1 Civ Pers Br, to U.S. Congressman E. P. Boland, 29 Dec 53, no sub. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 230 (1954), Vol. I, Item 2.

[80]Ibid., incl thereto.

[81]Interv, Mr. R. Sher, USAREUR Hist Div with Mr. R. V. Wilson, Jr., USAREUR Off of Compt Prog Review & Analysis Br, 4 Oct 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

had been delegated to CINCUSAREUR by Department of the Army General Order 52, 1952. CINCUSAREUR in turn redelegated authority to area commanders and to the Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ, for the operation of a civilian personnel program in each area of responsibility. Over-all policy determination and program direction was provided by the Civilian Personnel Branch, G1, USAREUR. In each area a central civilian personnel office was established to assist the area commander in the administration of the civilian personnel assigned to his area. Additional offices were also established for the administration of LWR personnel. CINCUSAREUR was designated by US CINCEUR as the coordinating authority for the development of all policy matters concerning the administration of LWR personnel employed by the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force in Germany. Over-all responsibility was exercised in coordination with CINCUSAFE, COMNAVGER, and through tripartite arrangements of the occupation powers with the German Federal Republic. US CINCEUR designated CINCUSAFE as the coordinating authority for the development of all policy matters regarding administration of LWR personnel for the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force in France. Responsibility was exercised by CINCUSAFE in coordination with CINCUSAREUR and US CINCEUR through negotiations with the appropriate agencies of the French Government.[82] In consonance with Department of the Army Circular 86, which was designed to bring about a more effective and economical administration of civilian personnel, CINCUSAREUR delegated to the MDAP control group responsibility for the civilian personnel administration of employees of the following agencies, all located in the Near East; JUSMAG, JAMMAT, and JCA Eastern District.[83] It soon became evident that USAFE was in the best position for assuming responsibility of civilian personnel administration for the agencies located in the Near East. Accordingly an agreement was reached between CINCUSAREUR and CINCUSAFE that the latter would assume all responsibility for U.S. citizens employed in Greece and Turkey, by agencies of the U.S. Government and for civilian personnel administration of LWR personnel, effective 1 August 1954. CINCUSAREUR then requested from US CINCEUR formal release from civilian personnel administration responsibilities for JUSMAG, JAMMAT, and JCA Eastern District.[84]

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[82] Ltr, Lt Col T. R. Pitts, USAREUR G1 Civ Pers Br, to U.S. Congressman E. P. Boland, 29 Dec 53, no sub. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 230 (1954), Vol. I, Item 2.

[83] Cable SC-15421, USAREUR to CINCEUR, 15 Mar 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 7A atchd.

[84] Cable SX-3346, CINCUSAREUR to US CINCEUR for J1, 29 Jan 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

27. Special Problems

a. Court-Martial Jurisdiction. In 1953 Army court-martial jurisdiction was extended to non-German civilians employed by USAREUR. Effective 20 August 1953 civilian employees subject to military law under the provisions of Art. 2(11) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice were to be tried by courts-martial for any offense punishable under the Code and committed within the Federal Republic of Germany or the U.S. Sector of Berlin.[85] Authority had been granted earlier to officers exercising general court-martial jurisdiction, as well as to area and district commanders, to convene summary courts-martial for the trial of non-German civilians accompanying, employed by, or serving with U.S. forces in the U.S. area of responsibility of Germany, for offenses arising from the operation of automotive vehicles.[86] USAREUR's guiding policies, however, concerning the trial of civilian employees and dependents before courts-martial were to restrict such application of the Uniform Code of Military Justice to traffic offenses and to bring such personnel to trial only where this action was required because of the seriousness of the offense and the security of the command. For most cases involving misconduct, administrative action under pertinent civilian personnel regulations was to be taken to bring about the departure of the individual from the command. Because of the complex jurisdictional questions involving the assumption of courts-martial jurisdiction over civilians, CINCUSAREUR directed that all charges against civilian personnel be submitted to the USAREUR judge advocate for review. In cases of civilian employees subject to German law, prior coordination with USAREUR headquarters was directed.[87]

b. Employee Morale. Following a visit to USAREUR late in 1952, the Senate Post Office and Civil Service Committee reported on living and working conditions of U.S. civilian employees in the command. Although the committee undoubtedly painted the picture as they saw it, inaccuracies in their representations resulted in unfavorable publicity impugning the effectiveness and integrity of the Army command in Europe, creating a morale problem among employees. CINCUSAREUR took immediate steps to present accurate data on employment conditions to the Legislative and Liaison

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[85] USAREUR ltr, 17 Sep 53, sub: Exercise of Courts-Martial Jurisdiction over Civilians in the FEDREP and the U.S. Sector of Berlin. AG 250.4 JAG-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[86] USAREUR ltr, 12 Aug 53, sub: Trial of Civilian Personnel by Summary Courts-Martial. AG 250.4 JAG-AGO.

[87] USAREUR ltr, 17 Sep 53, sub: Exercise of Courts-Martial Jurisdiction over Civilians in FEDREP of Germany and the U.S. Sector of Berlin. AG 250.4 JAG-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

Division, Department of the Army, in order to bring to the committee's attention the damaging repercussions of the remarks and to request the issuance of an explanatory statement giving an accurate picture of the USAREUR civilian personnel situation.[88] Answering the specific charges made by the committee, CINCUSAREUR brought the following facts to the attention of the Department of the Army for presentation to the Senate Committee. If, as had been suggested, 50 percent of the USAREUR civilian personnel were discharged, their duties would have to be taken over by military personnel, with consequent increase in troop strength. Obviously such diversion would seriously affect combat readiness of the troops, and would require a considerable increase of officer and enlisted strength. In refutation of charges that civilians employed overseas were grossly overpaid, it was pointed out that employees were paid in USAREUR on the same scale as those with equivalent duties and responsibilities in the United States, and that the criteria used for the establishment of civilian grades were those provided in the Classification Act of 1949, 81st Congress.[89] Statements to the effect that housing provided Army civilian personnel in USAREUR was luxurious were answered by an accurate description of dependent and bachelor housing. Dependent housing, it was pointed out, provided adequate facilities, such as heating, plumbing, lighting, furniture and other appointments, but generally did not equal average American housing in convenience, and could not be called luxurious. Bachelor quarters, except for newly constructed units, offering facilities equal to those provided by dormitory accommodations in an average stateside college, were for the most part less-than-modern German hotels or rooming houses operated by the Army. Accommodations provided for lower-grade bachelor employees were definitely below the standards of space and convenience maintained in the United States. In France, USAREUR provided no housing for civilian personnel. Civilian employees therefore had to attempt to secure housing on the French economy, where an acute housing shortage and accommodations that were generally far below accepted American standards created serious problems. For personnel in France USAREUR authorized housing allowances according to the station, ranging from $450 a year for GS-3, without family, at a low allowance post to $3,000 a year for a GS-14 with a family, at a higher allowance post (only one GS-14 was employed by USAREUR in France). Certain posts received a post allowance, in effect a high cost of living allowance, to offset the inflationary level of the French economy.

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[88]IRS, USAREUR ACOFS G1 to USAREUR COFS, 13 Jan 53, sub: Senator Johnston's Remarks on Overseas Employees. UNCLASSIFIED. GPA 230.368. In USAREUR G1 Div Civ Pers Br Policy and Reg file folder 17 (1953).

[89]Ltr, C/USAREUR PID to DA Leg and Ln Div, 22 Jan 53, sub: Impact of Senator Johnston's Remark on Overseas Employees, and incl. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

A 10 percent post differential was paid to compensate for the "extraordinarily difficult or notably unhealthy conditions, or excessive physical hardships" existing in many areas in France. Personnel living in the Paris area were not paid this allowance.[90] As of the end of the current reporting period there was no follow-up on CINCUSAREUR's letter nor any action, on the part of the Senate Committee, to correct the inaccuracies in the committee chairman's remarks.

28. German Civilian Personnel

Both in Germany and in France, locally hired civilian personnel performed a vital role in assisting USAREUR in performing its mission. For installation-type support missions performed by area commands within Germany, approximately 80 percent of the total personnel employed were LWR civilians and 20 percent were military personnel. In depot-type support missions 83.6 percent of the personnel employed were LWR's and only 16.4 percent were military.[91] Throughout FY 1954, in the interest of economy, USAREUR continued to place emphasis upon the employment of LWR personnel, and such personnel constituted approximately 96 percent of the total civilian work force employed by USAREUR in Germany. Of the hourly paid employees, 35 percent were in the skilled or foreman categories; of the monthly paid employees, approximately 12 percent were in grades comparable to GS-6 to GS-13.[92]

a. Reductions in Force. During the current reporting period USAREUR was faced with the problem of discharging 3,138 labor service personnel and of reducing in force 25,710 workers between 1 January 1953 and 30 June 1954. These moves were made in line with the reduced budgets of both the Truman and the Eisenhower Administrations, and were associated with the curtailment of certain services previously charged to the USAREUR Deutsche Mark budget, such as quarters attendants furnished in dependent-type housing, apartments, billets and hotels. The improved economic situation in Western Germany enabled these workers to be absorbed into the local economy without aggravating the German unemployment situation as USAREUR had feared might happen.

b. Status under German Labor Laws. The second major problem concerning German civilian personnel employed by USAREUR was the relationship of the German labor court system to these employees,

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[90] Ibid.

[91] Cable S-4747, USAREUR to COFSA for ACOFSA G1, 10 Dec 53. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 320.4 (1953), Vol. II, Item 25 atchd.

[92] USAREUR Off of the Compt, Management Improvement Program Report, FY 1954. UNCLASSIFIED.

their status under German labor laws, and the adjustment of USAREUR wage scales to those prevailing in the booming economy of Western Germany. In July 1953 CINCUSAREUR accepted the principle that German labor law applied and that the jurisdiction of German labor courts extended to German civilians employed by USAREUR. This acceptance was contingent upon the provision of proper safeguards for the requirements of the U.S. forces, similar to those already provided for in Article 44 of the Forces Convention of the Contractual Relations.[93] Despite the fact that USAREUR was committed to the payment of wage rates based upon those prevailing in the German economy, the rates in the U.S. Zone as of June 1953 lagged 15 to 20 percent behind German rates. This lag caused a rather high labor turnover and considerable difficulty in obtaining and retaining personnel with desired skills.[94] USAREUR's efforts to bring about a more equitable adjustment in the wage rates of the German employees were blocked for over a year by failure of the German authorities to complete the statistical studies necessary for the revision of German tariff (labor) regulations.[95] Negotiations between USAREUR-HICOG and the Federal Republic hinged on USAREUR's insistence that local-hire personnel should be included under the provisions of Article 44 of the Forces Convention, which afforded the U.S. forces the opportunity to represent, through an Allied Mixed Commission, the necessity for the exemption of U.S. forces activities from the application of German laws that were inconsistent with the military mission of the U.S. forces.[96] In September 1953, as an interim measure to overcome the ill effects of lags in USAREUR-authorized wage levels, and while awaiting the conclusion of a tripartite tariff agreement for all of Western Germany, an across-the-board wage increase of 5 percent for hourly personnel and 7.5 percent for monthly personnel was effected.[97] It was finally determined that German personnel employed by the U.S. forces were not to be defined as members of "the Forces" and, therefore, were not entitled to protection under

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[93] Ltr, Lt Gen C. L. Bolte, CINCUSAREUR, to Dr. J. B. Conant, HICOG, 22 Jul 53, no sub. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS USAREUR 230 Ger (1953), Vol. I, Item 17A atchd.

[94] Memo, USAREUR Dep ACOFS G1 USAREUR to ACOFS G4, 29 Jun 53, sub: Curtailment of Services; Wage Rates for German Employees. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1953), Vol. II, Item 8.

[95] Ltr, Gen Bolte to Dr. Conant, 20 Apr 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 230 (1953), Vol. I, Item 8A.

[96] Ltr, Dr. Conant to Gen Bolte, 12 May 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[97] Ltr, COFS USAREUR, to C/USAREUR Bud Div, 23 Jul 53, no sub. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1953), Vol. II, Item 31.

the terms of the convention.[98] The term "Forces" in the agreement was defined as the forces of the three occupying powers--France, the United Kingdom and the United States. The negotiations, as well as the final agreement, involved tripartite negotiations with representatives of West Germany. Furthermore, all labor requirements of the Forces would be obtained through the German authorities, the terms and conditions of employment to be determined by agreement between the Forces and the Federal Republic. The Forces were to have the right of engagement, placement, training, transfer, and dismissal, subject to the limitations of German labor legislation. German labor law as it applied to German Federal authorities would apply also to employment by the Forces. A mixed commission of Germans and representatives of the Forces was provided to determine to what extent the application of German labor law was inconsistent with the military needs of the Forces.[99] It was evident from an examination of the agreement that USAREUR had retreated somewhat from its original position concerning the status of local-hire personnel before German law. The changes made were necessary in order to assure consistency with the position of the British and French forces and in recognition of the progressively changing relationship with the Federal Republic.

29. French Civilian Personnel

a. Contrast Between Germany and France. In France USAREUR's dependence upon local-hire civilian personnel was considerably less than in Germany, since the ratio of French LWR to military personnel was 26 to 74 percent, respectively. This difference between the French and German situation resulted from several factors. The first was the dissimilarity of funding. Many German employees were paid out of occupation cost support funds, nonexistent in France, rather than out of U.S. appropriated funds. The second, inadequacy of the number of civilian personnel authorized, stemmed from the first. Unavailability of personnel and an abnormal turn-over because of seasonal employment were additional factors. Moreover, the lack of necessary construction precluded the transfer of many logistical missions to France. USAREUR hoped that as additional personnel and funds became available a higher ratio of civilian to military personnel would become possible. On the other hand, although there was a requirement for 5,665 additional direct hire personnel, USAREUR did not anticipate that their hiring would in any way reduce the number of military personnel required for duty in France.[100] A breakdown of the employees in COMZ indicated that

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[98] USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf 10, 24 Aug 54. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

[99] Ibid.

[100] Cable S-4747, CINCUSAREUR to COFSA for ACOFSA G1, 10 Dec 53. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 320.4 (1953), Vol. II, Item 25 atchd.

approximately 20 percent of the hourly paid employees were in the skilled or foreman categories, while approximately 7 percent were in grades comparable to GS-7 through GS-12.[101]

b. French Labor Statute. In January 1954 a French statute, giving French authorities control over employment, working conditions, and wages of USAREUR-employed LWR personnel, went into effect throughout COMZ. At US CINCEUR'S direction, LWR civilian personnel administration for Metropolitan France had agreed to accept this statute. CINCUSAREUR had agreed to the statute in principle when first proposed, but US CINCEUR overruled his request that concurrence be withheld until further information was given by the French to permit a full study of both the impact of the statute on the operation of USAREUR installations in France and the effect on USAREUR's dollar budget. The statute itself was based upon Article 9 of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, which declared that conditions of employment, wages, supplementary payments, and conditions for the protection of the workers should be those laid down by legislation of the receiving state, in this instance, France. Anticipating numerous changes in administrative practices and the wage/salary structure, USAREUR directed the COMZ civilian personnel officer to instruct all subordinate personnel officers to work closely with the local "French Service of Intendance" for mutual exchange of information, to assure speedy and uniform resolution of problems involved in the changeover in responsibility for, and revision of, administrative procedures for LWR personnel.[102]

c. Agreement of March 1954. An agreement reached in March 1954 between representatives of the French Government and US EUCOM inplemented an earlier understanding between the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson, and the French Minister of Defense, Rene Pleven, that the U.S. forces would pay the cost of all administrative services requested and furnished by the French Government in the employment of local-hire personnel for U.S. forces in Metropolitan France.[103] A standing group, composed of not more than two technical representatives each from CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE, CINCNELM, and the French-American Fiscal Liaison Office (FAFLO), was established for the implementation of CINCEUR's agreement with the French. The group's mission was to develop and establish, with appropriate French technical representatives, procedures for provisional payment, credit for overpayment, and readjustments in

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[101] USAREUR Off of the Compt, Management Improvement Program Report, FY 1954. UNCLASSIFIED.

[102] Cable, SC-15732, USAREUR to USAREUR COMZ CPO, 2 Oct 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 230 (1954), Vol. I, Item 4.

[103] Cable, EC-3-1198, US CINCEUR to DA, 22 Mar 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above, Item 4 atchd.

cost, as well as to review cost items and to make appropriate adjustments dictated by economy and sound personnel practices. It was to meet upon call of CINCUSAFE, who was designated the coordinating authority for U.S. forces on matters concerning the employment of indigenous personnel in Metropolitan France.[104] For administrative services performed by the French Government for the 11,000 LWR employees of USAREUR COMZ and the 5,000 employees of the Air Force, the U.S. forces were charged 2½ percent of the gross payroll. This agreement tended to systematize policies on a nation-wide scale and to place the determination of wage rates and conditions of employment in the hands of French authorities, paralleling somewhat the LWR arrangement in Germany.[105]

30. Management Programs

a. Management Improvement Program. At the end of FY 1953 each Class I and II installation in USAREUR had established and organized a management improvement committee which met monthly or oftener, if necessary, to consider problems and methods of management improvement. In addition the deputy commander or executive officer of each installation was designated as management improvement officer and served as chairman of the committee. Officers from the USAREUR Office of the Comptroller Management Branch attended committee meetings, to assist installations in their programs. During the course of the year the management improvement committees became the core of the entire Management Improvement Program (MIP) in that they engaged in prior planning, analyzed problem areas, fixed responsibility for making improvements, set target dates, and evaluated results.[106] The work measurement and personnel yardsticks phase of the program expanded during FY 1953 to include the determination of performance standards for all measurable functions of general hospitals in USAREUR. Technical service depots and ordnance rebuild shops were included in this phase of the MIP. Program data obtained by work measurement and personnel yardstick were exploited by the USAREUR Curtailment of Services Panel established as a result of drastic budget restrictions throughout the services.[107]

b. Reviews of Manpower Usage. During FY 1953 the Department of Army directed that USAREUR make annual on-the-site reviews of

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[104] Cable, EC-3-1336, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 31 Mar 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[105] Interv, Mr. R. Sher, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. S. Sutherland, USAREUR G1 Civ Pers Br, 27 Sep 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

[106] USAREUR Off of Compt, Management Improvement Program Report, FY 1953. UNCLASSIFIED.

[107] Ibid.

manpower usage. The 69 surveys made resulted in the elimination of 1,826 spaces in USAREUR, exclusive of COMZ, which received 3,524 additional spaces for the build-up of the line of communications. In the last quarter of FY 1953 and the first quarter of FY 1954 the survey requirement was suspended, except for local surveys deemed necessary for planning space spreads. Despite initial delays, it was anticipated that all agencies would have completed their adjustment to the new personnel ceilings by the second quarter of FY 1954, at which time it was planned that a survey program would be re-established. The FY 1953 organization management survey was decentralized with certain agencies making their own surveys. For FY 1954, the operation was centralized, with each installation or subcommand surveyed by the next higher echelon.[108]

c. Employee Suggestion Program. Employees' suggestions for improvements in operations increased substantially in FY 1953, because of greater command-wide emphasis at all levels, through exploitation of suggestion boxes, and radio spot announcements over AFN. A total of 2,339 work simplification proposals and employee suggestions, with estimated savings benefits of $2,524,525, were placed into effect during the year, and $35,025 in efficiency awards was paid to employees.

d. Work Simplification Program. With few exceptions all installations in USAREUR had active work simplification programs in effect. Work simplification courses, conducted by personnel from the suboffices of the USAREUR comptroller, trained 2,136 supervisors in work simplification techniques during FY 1953 and 2,193 during FY 1954.[109]

e. Cost Consciousness Program. USAREUR continued to emphasize the cost consciousness program through directives, memorandums, the American Forces Network, and The Stars & Stripes. The concept of cost consciousness was integrated into all training school curricula in the command, and into civilian personnel indoctrination as well.[110]

f. Manpower and Personnel Survey. Further progress was made in FY 1954 in USAREUR's survey of manpower and personnel requirements. A new survey program was initiated during FY 1954 by USAREUR, as directed by the Department of the Army. It covered 35 activities

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[108] Ibid.

[109] USAREUR Off of the Compt, Management Improvement Program Report, FY 1954. UNCLASSIFIED.

[110] Ibid., FY 1953.

of the command, and resulted in a recommended reduction of 1,874 spaces to be made available for redistribution within USAREUR.[111]

31. Changes in Conditions of Employment

During calendar year 1953 the housing provisions of the so-called Hoge Plan permitting use of German tourist-type accommodations were extended to married civilian employees, including employees of nonappropriated fund agencies and the American Red Cross (ARC).[112] Quarters allowances authorized by the Department of State Standardized Regulations of June 1953 concerning government civilians in foreign areas were granted to eligible married Department of the Army civilian employees residing with their families on the German economy under the provisions of that plan. These allowances, however, were not given to nonappropriated fund or Red Cross employees.[113] Greatly reduced maximum leave accumulations were established for government employees by Public Law 102 of the 83d Congress. Under policy and time limitations for liquidating excess leave prescribed by the Department of the Army as a result of this law, individual leave balances in excess of 30 and 45 days, as of the beginning of the 1954 leave year, were to be reduced by not less than 12 percent during that year. Individuals with leave balances of less than 30 or 45 days had to use up the accumulated leave time during the current year or lose the leave accruals, in excess of the established maximums at the end of the leave year.[114] Since, previous to this legislation, employees in overseas commands whose employment agreements provided for their return to the United States at government expense were restricted generally to a 90-day leave accumulation and other employees to 60 days, the reduction was substantial.[115]

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[111] Ibid., FY 1954.

[112] USAREUR ltr, 18 May 54, sub: Utilization of German Tourist Accommodations Pending Availability of Government Quarters. AG 624 GPA-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[113] Ibid.

[114] USAREUR ltr, 4 Jan 54, sub: Reduction of Excess Annual Leave. UNCLASSIFIED. AG 230 GPA-AGO.

[115] EUCOM/USAREUR Comd Rept, 1952, pp. 101-02. SECRET.

Section III: Labor Service Personnel

32. Organization and Strength

a. Trends. Labor service personnel were German and non-German resident civilian employees organized into quasimilitary units and served as liaison, guard, and technical units under the staff supervision of the Labor Services' Division (LSD), Headquarters, USAREUR. An agreement of August 1949 between HICOG and the German Federal Republic authorized the employment by U.S. forces within Germany of 31,000 labor service personnel, not including industrial police. On 6 November 1950, by agreement between the U.S. and French Governments, utilization of Polish labor service personnel in USAREUR COMZ was authorized. The authorized strength of labor services in Germany and France as of 7 January 1953 was 33,236 and the actual strength 32,055 personnel.[116] Budget limitations for FY 1954 resulted in a reorganization and redistribution of labor service units and personnel, effective 30 June 1953, which reduced the authorization for the Army, including COMZ, from 29,194 to 26,559 personnel.[117] On 30 June 1954 the entire command, including USAFE and USNAVGER, was authorized 28,706 labor service personnel and employed 27,770. The U.S. Army in Germany was authorized 23,923 personnel and employed 23,172; USAREUR COMZ was authorized 2,636 and employed 2,478 personnel. USNAVGER was authorized 1,096 and employed 1,090; and USAFE was authorized 1,051 and employed 1,030 personnel.[118] Tables 10 and 11 give the status of USAREUR labor service personnel strengths on 7 January 1953 and 30 June 1954 by military service, with the Army strength broken down by military areas and technical services. Of the total actual labor services strength of 32,055 on 7 January 1953, 21,434 were Germans and 10,621 were non-Germans. Although the majority of non-Germans employed were of Polish origin, the number of countries in which personnel claimed birth and/or antecedents totaled 39.[119] USAFE and USNAVGER employed only German labor service personnel; USAREUR COMZ employed only Polish displaced persons; and the U.S. Army, as of 30 June 1954, employed

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[116] EUCOM/USAREUR Comd Rept, 1952, p. 80. SECRET.

[117] (1) Memo, USAREUR LSD, 9 Oct 53, sub: Notes of USAREUR LSD. In USAREUR SGS 231.4 (1953), Vol. I, Item 23. UNCLASSIFIED.
(2) Personnel strength for the reorganization was based on April 1953 figures.

[118] USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 31 Dec 52 and 30 Jun 54. SECRET.

[119] EUCOM/USAREUR Comd Rept, 1952, p. 80. SECRET.

Table 10--USAREUR Labor Services Personnel Strength, 30 June 1954

	Total		Germans		Non-Germans	
	Auth	Actual	Auth	Actual	Auth	Actual
Aggregate	28,706	27,770	17,912	17,429	10,667	10,341
USAFE	1,051	1,030	1,051	1,030	-	-
USNAVGER	1,096	1,090	1,096	1,090	-	-
US Army	26,432	25,650	15,756	15,309	10,667	10,341
Area Commands Subtotal	15,175	14,924	9,204	9,080	5,971	5,844
Berlin Command	920	854	920	854	-	-
BPE	425	420	425	420	-	-
HACOM	1,708	1,687	208	205	1,500	1,482
SEACOM	400	396	400	396	-	-
SACOM	4,900	4,859	4,300	4,270	600	589
NACOM	3,100	3,078	2,900	2,884	200	194
WACOM	3,638	3,533	8	10	3,630	3,523
Hq USAREUR	84	97	43	41	41	56
Technical Services Subtotal	8,657	8,280	6,561	6,229	2,096	2,051
Engineer	2,180	2,154	1,001	985	1,179	1,170
Medical	140	125	140	125	-	-
Ordnance	273	265	273	265	-	-
Provost Marshal	92	90	92	90	-	-
Quartermaster	883	877	883	877	-	-
Signal	1,815	1,715	1,815	1,715	-	-
Transportation	1,058	998	1,058	998	-	-
Seventh Army	2,150	1,996	1,289	1,161	861	830
WACOM Medical[a]	30	28	10	9	20	19
COMZ Medical[b]	36	32	-	-	36	32
USAREUR COMZ Total	2,600	2,446	-	-	2,600	2,446

[a]Figures represent the strength of a technical service unit attached to WACOM.

[b]Figures represent the strength of the 3335 Labor Service Medical Detachment attached to USAREUR COMZ.

Source: Info from USAREUR LSD Orgn & Tng Br. UNCLASSIFIED.

Table 11--USAREUR Labor Services Personnel Strength, 7 January 1953

	Total		Germans		Non-Germans	
	Auth	Actual	Auth	Actual	Auth	Actual
Aggregate	33,236	32,055	22,612	21,434	10,624	10,621
USAFE	3,110	2,233	2,393	1,542	721	691
USNAVGER	1,096	1,090	1,096	1,090	-	-
US Army	29,030	28,732	19,123	18,802	9,907	9,930
Area Commands Subtotal	17,117	17,178	11,775	11,802	5,342	5,376
Berlin	920	922	920	922	-	-
BPE	700	699	700	699	-	-
SEACOM	200	201	200	201	-	-
HACOM	2,293	2,279	1,351	1,318	942	961
SACOM	6,700	6,769	5,700	5,793	1,000	976
NACOM	3,800	3,811	2,900	2,865	900	946
WACOM	2,504	2,479	4	4	2,500	2,493
Technical Services Subtotal	9,513	9,159	7,348	7,000	2,165	2,159
Engineer	2,789	2,651	1,774	1,636	1,015	1,015
Medical	653	605	569	523	84	82
Ordnance	996	943	369	347	600	596
Provost Marshal	100	203	100	203	-	-
Quartermaster	1,130	1,160	1,130	1,160	-	-
Signal	1,990	1,805	1,990	1,805	-	-
Transportation	406	392	406	392	-	-
Seventh Army	1,449	1,400	983	934	466	466
USAREUR COMZ Total	2,400	2,395	-	-	2,400	2,395

Source: Info from USAREUR LSD Orgn & Tng Br. UNCLASSIFIED.

15,309 German and 10,341 non-German labor service personnel.[120] In order to effect the reduction for FY 1954 all personnel rendered surplus were referred to the Labor Services Division for possible reassignment. All personnel not reassigned by 15 June 1953 were discharged without prejudice, by 30 June, by reason of "reduction in forces." Effective 1 July 1953, personnel serving in grades higher than those authorized by current T/D's were reduced, without prejudice, to the grade authorized. To insure that discharged employees were given priority for reinstatement upon subsequent vacancies in labor service units, commanders prepared and maintained lists of discharged employees who desired such reinstatement, for use at such times.[121]

b. The Labor Services Division. The mission of the Labor Services Division was to provide staff supervision for all USAREUR labor service and industrial police activities. This mission included formulation of policies, coordination of functions, issuance of directives, and maintenance of correspondence pertaining to the administration, organization, operations, training, utilization, and supply of labor service personnel within USAREUR. The division thus was composed of the Organizational Branch, the Training Branch, and the Administrative Branch. The chief of the division was responsible to the USAREUR chief of staff for staff supervision of labor service activities. He coordinated with CINCUSAFE and COMNAVGER on broad policy matters and maintained liaison on labor service matters with HICOG and with the German Federal Republic Ministries of Labor, Finance, and Refugee Control.[122] The Division recommended budget requirements and allocations of funds for labor services to subordinate commands. It also coordinated policies and procedures for securing replacements for labor service units inside Germany and for maintaining appropriate liaison to effect Polish labor service replacements in USAREUR COMZ. The 3331 USAREUR Labor Service Liaison Detachment was assigned to the Labor Services Division for operational control, in order that personnel familiar with the various nationalities represented in the labor services might be available.[123]

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[120](1) USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 31 Dec 52 and 30 Jun 54. SECRET. (2) Interv, PFC R. Blackburn, USAREUR Hist Div, with Miss J. Olliger, USAREUR LSD Orgn & Tng Br, 4 Oct 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

[121]USAREUR ltr, 1 Jun 53, sub: Reorganization of Labor Service Units. AG 322 LSD-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[122]Memo, Col K. P. Brock, C/USAREUR LSD, n.d., sub: Personnel Inventory and Appraisal Report, Supplementary Remarks. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR LSD files (1954).

[123]USAREUR Stf Memo 5, 6 Feb 54, sub: Staff Supervision of USAREUR Labor Services Division. UNCLASSIFIED.

c. Supervisory Units. Supervisory units composed of U.S. personnel consisted of labor supervision centers and companies organized to provide command and administrative, training, and operational supervision of labor service units in the field. They were either assigned or attached to fixed strength units, or were organized into separate units for performing labor supervision as required. During August 1953 these units were reorganized according to Department of the Army T/O&E 20-20, 31 July 1951, resulting in a reduction in the number of units and in personnel. On 30 June 1954 there were 13 labor supervision centers and 35 labor supervision companies. Ten of the centers were each authorized 4 officers and 9 enlisted men; the 110th was authorized 7 officers and 16 enlisted men; the 116th, 4 officers and 8 enlisted men; the 125th, 3 officers and 7 enlisted men. Each labor supervision company was authorized 1 officer and 1 enlisted man.[124] Most labor service guard and technical units were under a labor supervisory company for administrative, and operational supervision, but during this period the trend was toward the withdrawal of supervision at company level and placing the labor service units under the direct control of the labor service supervision centers.

d. Liaison Detachments. Labor service liaison detachments were specifically designed to assist lodger units, in the area commands, in which personnel of labor service units were of different nationalities. The labor service liaison officer of each liaison detachment was responsible to the U.S. commander of the area labor supervision center and advised him on matters pertaining to logistics, personnel utilization, mandatory training, and morale of the lodger units, and on personnel matters pertaining to men of his nationality group. The liaison detachments had no command function, but coordinated their activities with the U.S. Army supervisory units.[125] On 30 June 1953 the 4 labor service liaison detachments had an authorized strength of 109 labor service officers and enlisted men and an actual strength of 114. The 3331 USAREUR Labor Service Liaison Detachment, with an authorized strength of 93 and an actual strength of 101 men, was assigned to the USAREUR Labor Service Division. The 3333 and the 3334 Labor Service Liaison Detachments, with authorized strength of 4 and 2 men respectively, were assigned in Germany; the 3337 Labor Service Liaison Detachment, with an authorized strength of 10 and an actual strength of 7, was assigned to USAREUR COMZ. On 30 June 1953 the 3334 Labor Service Liaison Detachment was discontinued; and on 1 November 1953 the 3336 was organized and assigned to

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[124] USAREUR ltr, 3 Aug 53, sub: Activation and Discontinuance of Labor Supervision Units. AG 322. UNCLASSIFIED.

[125] USAREUR ltr, 28 May 54, sub: Mission of Labor Service Liaison Detachments. AG 322.01 LSD-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

Germany. On 30 June 1954 the 4 labor services liaison detachments in the command were authorized a labor service personnel strength of 108. Of this total, the 3331 was authorized 84; and the 3333, the 3337, and the 3336 were authorized 8 men each.[126]

e. Guard Personnel. Most labor service personnel were organized into guard units and employed as security guards at U.S. installations, thereby freeing U.S. troops for combat training. Most guard units were assigned both to the military post in which they were employed and to labor service supervisory units.[127] Guard companies of 200 men were organized somewhat like an infantry company. Guard centers of 100 men were similar to a battalion headquarters and performed command, operational, administrative, and logistical functions over a group of guard companies.[128] A reorganization and redistribution of guard units from the authorized ceilings for FY 1953, effective 30 June 1953, resulted in a reduction of personnel from the 1953 authorized strength of 19,627 to the 30 June 1954 authorization of 17,775. As of 7 January 1953, 19,627 spaces were authorized for guard personnel; actual strength on that date was 19,573, comprising 11,802 German and 7,771 non-German personnel. The reduction authorized 17,775 spaces, consisting of 9,204 Germans and 8,571 non-Germans, for 1954, but the actual employment, as of 30 June 1954, was 17,370. The trend during the reorganization was to release only German personnel. For FY 1954 USAREUR COMZ was authorized 2,600 Polish guard personnel as compared to 2,400 authorized for 1953.[129] The 4189, 4207, 5087, and 4044 Labor Service Guard Companies were assigned secondary missions as chemical smoke generator companies, effective 30 June 1953.[130] At this time other secondary missions, such as those of an engineer construction, signal construction, ordnance ammunition or searchlight and smoke generating company were assigned to labor service guard companies that were without equipment. However, it was later determined that since effective training and maintenance of equipment for a secondary mission

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[126] Interv, PFC R. Blackburn, USAREUR Hist Div, with Miss J. Olliger, USAREUR LSD Orgn & Tng Br, 1 Oct 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

[127] EUCOM/USAREUR Comd Rept, 1952, p. 82. SECRET.

[128] Memo, USAREUR LSD to USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 17 Jun 53, sub: General Orientation of Labor Service for the Department of the Army. SECRET. In USAREUR LSD files.

[129] (1) USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 31 Dec 52 and 30 Jun 54. SECRET. (2) Interv, PFC R. Blackburn, USAREUR Hist Div, with Miss J. Olliger, USAREUR LSD Orgn & Tng Br, 1 Oct 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

[130] USAREUR ltr, 1 May 53, sub: Transfer of Secondary Missions as Smoke Generator Companies to Labor Service Guard Companies. AG 322 GOT-AGO. SECRET.

would require an estimated 16 hours a week of additional training time, labor service guard units would no longer be assigned secondary missions requiring additional training and equipment.[131]

f. Technical Units. Labor service technical units were almost identical in organization and equipment with corresponding U.S. T/O&E units. A labor service engineer construction company, for example, had a T/O&E similar to a U.S. Army engineer construction company. Personnel spaces for which a labor service unit had no need (e.g., intelligence officer) were dropped and spaces peculiar to a labor service unit were created (e.g., interpreter).[132] The 67 Labor service technical units were organized as chemical, engineer, medical, military police, ordnance, quartermaster, signal, and transportation units. Effective June 1953, the Labor Services Division redistributed the labor service technical units and reduced them from the FY 1953 authorized strength of 9,513 to the 30 June 1954 authorization of 8,605 personnel. On 1 January 1953 the command employed 9,159 (7,000 Germans, 2,159 non-Germans) and as of 30 June 1954 it employed 8,280 (6,229 Germans, 2,051 non-Germans) labor service technical personnel.[133] Supervision of technical units was tailored to meet the particular requirements of the individual units and consisted of both labor supervision centers for large groupings and labor supervision companies for smaller detached units. In some cases supervision was provided by U.S. technical units.[134] Before July 1953, technical units were not assigned to USAREUR COMZ, but the inadequate medical facilities available for the Polish labor service guard personnel resulted in the assignment of the 3335 Labor Service Medical Detachment, with an authorized strength of 36 Polish personnel, to France.[135]

g. Berlin Industrial Police. In Berlin the Army employed industrial police as civilian guards. They differed from labor service personnel in that they were "static indigenous civilians" and did not come within the command labor service ceiling.[136]

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[131] IRS, USAREUR DCOFS for Opns to USAREUR ACOFS G3, 25 May 54, sub: Secondary Missions for Labor Service Guard Companies. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 231.4 (1954), Vol. I, Item 2A.

[132] EUCOM/USAREUR Comd Rept, 1952, pp. 83-84. SECRET.

[133] (1) USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 31 Dec 52 and 30 Jun 54. SECRET. (2) Interv, PFC R. Blackburn, USAREUR Hist Div, and Miss J. Olliger, USAREUR LSD Orgn & Tng Br, 4 Oct 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

[134] Memo, USAREUR LSD, 9 Oct 53, sub: Notes on Labor Service. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 231.4 (1953), Vol. I, Item 23.

[135] USAREUR COMZ GO 60, 30 Jul 53, sub: Organization of 3335 Labor Service Medical Detachment. UNCLASSIFIED.

[136] EUCOM/USAREUR Comd Rept, 1952, p. 84. SECRET.

They were employed only in Berlin and were supervised by the 126th Labor Supervision Center, composed of U.S. personnel. At the beginning of 1953 Berlin was authorized 400 German industrial police and employed 360. As of June 1954, the authorized strength was reduced to 365; actual strength was 294.[137]

h. USAFE and USNAVGER Labor Service Personnel. USAFE and USNAVGER employed only German labor service personnel, within the over-all command labor service ceiling of 31,000 spaces. As of 1 January 1953, USAFE was authorized 3,110 spaces and employed 2,233, but due to budget limitations and Air Force security measures it reduced its total number of labor service employees by approximately 1,500 during the latter part of 1953. On 30 October 1953 the USAREUR Labor Service Division agreed to absorb 625 Polish guards affected by this reduction, in line with its policy of retaining non-German personnel.[138] By 30 June 1954 USAFE was authorized 1,051 and employed 1,030 labor service personnel in Germany; it employed none in France. The Air Force administered its labor service personnel in the same manner as the Army. On 1 January 1953 USNAVGER was authorized 1,096 and employed 1,090 labor service personnel in Germany; it employed none in France. These figures remained constant through 30 June 1954.[139] The Navy also administered its labor service personnel in the same manner as the Army.

33. Conditions of Employment

a. Pay. Labor service personnel were supported from "occupational cost" Deutsche Mark funds, and from dollar appropriated funds for units stationed in France.[140] Personnel in Germany were paid according to the following wage scales:[141]

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[137] Interv, PFC R. Blackburn, USAREUR Hist Div, with Miss J. Olliger, USAREUR LSD Orgn & Tng Br, 4 Oct 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

[138] Cable SC-14450, USAREUR to CINCUSAFE, 11 Sep 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 231.4 (1953), Vol. I, Item 21.

[139] USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 31 Dec 51 and 30 Jun 54. SECRET.

[140] Memo, USAREUR LSD to USAREUR COFS, 25 Feb 53, sub: Fiscal Cost of Labor Service. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR LSD Jnl file (1953), Item 2.

[141] Rept, USAREUR LSD, n.d., sub: Annual per Capita Labor Service Costs FY 1954. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR LSD files (1954).

LSO-6 (Col)	DM 1,000	$238.10
LSO-5 (Lt Col)	850	202.38
LSO-4 (Maj)	700	166.67
LSO-3 (Cap)	600	142.86
LSO-2 (1st Lt)	500	119.05
LSO-1 (2d Lt)	450	107.14
LS-7 (M/Sgt)	400	95.24
LS-6 (SFC)	360	85.71
LS-5 (Sgt)	325	77.38
LS-4 (Cpl)	275	65.48
LS-3 (PFC)	250	59.52
LS-2 (Pvt)	230	54.76
LS-1 (Recruit)	186	44.29

For FY 1954 the average salary for labor service personnel in Germany was $827 per year, average subsistence costs were $273, and the per capita labor service costs $1,489. Labor service personnel in France were paid in converted French francs according to the following scale:[142]

LSO-6 (Col)	$262.00	LS-7 (M/Sgt)	105.04
LSO-5 (Lt Col)	223.54	LS-6 (SFC)	94.45
LSO-4 (Maj)	184.06	LS-5 (Sgt)	85.28
LSO-3 (Capt)	157.65	LS-4 (Cpl)	73.76
LSO-2 (1st Lt)	131.29	LS-3 (PFC)	67.09
LSO-1 (2d Lt)	118.17	LS-2 (Pvt)	61.70
		LS-1 (Recruit)	49.90

For FY 1954 the average salary for labor service personnel assigned in France was $926 per year, average subsistence costs were $310, and the per capita labor service cost was $1,701. Personnel in Germany were paid through the German payroll offices. Their pay was subject to deductions for German social security and income taxes plus a tax for rations and quarters furnished. Personnel in France were paid from a dollar budget. They received $10 a month in military payment certificates (MPC's) for post exchange items, shoe repair, laundry, dry cleaning, etc., and the balance in French francs.[143]

b. Work Hours, Leaves, and Passes. Labor service personnel worked an 8-hour day, and a 48-hour week, but were subject to call

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[142] Ibid.

[143] Memo, USAREUR LSD to USAREUR DCOFS Opns, 17 Jun 53, sub: General Orientation of USAREUR LSD. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR LSD files.

day and night. Sundays and holidays were free, but under unusual circumstances overtime work could be required without the granting of compensatory time. Holidays were the same as for U.S. personnel, but local national holidays were also granted at the discretion of the commander concerned. Personnel were authorized two days leave per calendar month and in accordance with German laws were entitled to special leaves, without charge to annual leave, for the purpose of taking care of personal obligations. A pass system similar to the one applying to American personnel was in effect, with passes up to 72 hours authorized.

c. Orientation Training. Labor service units received a minimum of six hours training a week which included basic courses necessary to their mission. All received T/I&E orientation, character guidance, and English instruction.[144]

d. Quarters and Rations. Labor service personnel in both guard and technical units were housed in quarters identical with those of U.S. troops. Personnel had a ration of 3,400 calories, as compared with the U.S. ration (A) of 3,900 to 4,200 calories; the cost was 75 cents per day in Germany and 85 cents per day in France.

e. Other Provisions. Final decision on labor services officer promotions were made by Headquarters, USAREUR; enlisted men were promoted by unit commanders. All personnel were covered by the German social security system and made the required contributions. Labor service personnel could resign on their own volition after giving 14 days prior notice. Personnel could be discharged immediately "with prejudice," or within 14 days "without prejudice," for disciplinary or other reasons. Replacements were obtained through German labor offices and from displaced persons centers, or by direct application to the USAREUR Labor Services Division. All non-German replacements were documented by the German Government and given German identification cards. Security clearances, physical checkups, etc., were handled by U.S. agencies.

34. Supply and Equipment

During 1953 labor service units were authorized operational equipment under tables of allowances (T/A) issued by Headquarters, USAREUR, and received supplies and equipment similar to those of U.S. Army units. Initial equipment was supplied to labor supervision units under Project Army-Gen-20-51-OP, as amended. Certain

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[144] Ltr, 26 May 53, sub: Training Requirements for Labor Service Units. AG 352.01 LSD-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR LSD files.

difficulties were encountered by the restrictions that barred officers from being made accountable for U.S. equipment.[145] The basis of issue of equipment for labor service units was changed by Department of the Army T/A 77-7, 27 August 1953, which was the first Department of the Army authorization for issuance of such equipment. During the first part of 1954 the USAREUR Labor Services Division issued T/A's for labor service units similar to T/O&E's for infantry companies. This change resulted in a vast improvement in supply and equipment.[146] Labor service men were provided distinctive blue-black or blue-gray uniforms. They were prohibited from wearing distinctive insignia of the U.S. Army, but were authorized to wear emblems indicating their nationality on their sleeves and braid on their caps. In accordance with French-U.S. agreements, labor service personnel in France wore an American uniform, less insignia. Training and familiarization firing with the U.S. Army's .30-caliber M1 rifle was introduced into current labor service training programs without an over-all increase in training time. To allow for this training, weapons instruction and range firing with the carbine were reduced from 24 to 16 hours per week and 8 hours were devoted to familiarization firing with the M1. Medical personnel and chaplains were exempted from this training.[147]

35. Labor Service Personnel In France

a. Strength. Labor service personnel recruited from Polish displaced persons were utilized in France along the U.S. line of communications under the provisions of the "Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of France Regarding the Establishment and Operation of Line of Communications Across France," signed on 6 November 1950. This agreement authorized the utilization of labor service personnel by the forces in France, but specified that the personnel should be non-German and recruited among displaced persons of Polish origin, coming from the American Zone of Occupation in Germany. They were to serve as security guards at vital depots and installations within the line of communications, thereby relieving U.S. personnel of such duties and permitting a maximum number of troops to concentrate their efforts on training for combat missions. Originally, the French Government authorized the United States to employ 750 labor service personnel, but this number was increased to 1,500 in 1951,

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[145] EUCOM/USAREUR Comd Rept, 1952, p. 90. SECRET.

[146] Interv, PFC R. Blackburn, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj A. L. Jones, USAREUR LSD Sup & Equip Br, 1 Oct 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

[147] USAREUR ltr, 11 Sep 53, sub: M1 Rifle Familiarization Training of Labor Service Personnel. AG 353.01 LSD-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

to 2,400 in 1952,[148] and to 2,600 in 1954. Between January 1953 to 30 June 1954 the number of guard personnel increased in authorized strength from 2,400 to 2,600 and declined in actual strength from 2,395 to 2,244.

b. Problems and Policies.

(1) Status of Non-German Returnees. The problem of clarifying the status of displaced persons returning to Germany from labor service employment in USAREUR COMZ continued during 1953 and was nearing a solution by June 1954. The legal status of labor service personnel in France had been established by the Bruce-Parody agreements of 6 November 1950, which stipulated, among other things, that the U.S. Government was responsible for the removal from French territory of labor service personnel upon termination of their mission or employment. The French Government continued to deny resettlement rights to labor service personnel and to insist on their removal from France.[149] This agreement with the French for the removal of labor service personnel to Germany cut across the contractual agreements with the German Federal Republic, which denied entrance to all non-German labor service personnel without proper documentation. To exercise control over non-Germans desiring to establish temporary or permanent residence and/or seek employment in Germany, the German Federal Republic re-enacted, on 7 January 1952, the Aliens Police Ordinance Act of 22 August 1938, which stated that all aliens desiring to enter Germany would have to register with the police authorities and either be in the possession of a valid passport issued by appropriate authorities of his home country or, in the case of refugees and escapees, be documented by German authorities, the documentation to consist of a travel document or a passport. In addition to the Aliens Police Ordinance Act the Federal German Republic on 25 April 1951 enacted the Homeless Foreigners Act, which conferred the status of homeless foreigners upon refugees and escapees who had entered Germany before 30 June 1950 and were residing there on that date, and entitled them to permanent residence and employment on an equal basis with German citizens. However, the enforcement of Article 2 of the latter law would cause homeless foreigners who changed their place of ordinary abode from the Federal Republic to another country to lose their status, together with all rights, if they did not re-establish

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[148] EUCOM/USAREUR Comd Rept, 1952, p. 90. SECRET.

[149] Memo, USAREUR LSD to USAREUR DCOFS for Admin, n.d., sub: Status of Non-German Labor Service Employees who Return to Germany After Termination Employment in France. SECRET. In USAREUR LSD files (1954).

their legal residence in the Federal Republic within two years.[150] While no attempt has been made to implement either of these acts, the Federal Ministry of Interior informed the USAREUR Labor Services Division and HICOG that the West German Government intended to enforce this legislation upon ratification of the contractual arrangements.[151] While the German Federal Republic desired to register all labor service personnel, USAREUR G2 held that for security reasons this was not advisable because the majority of non-German labor services personnel were refugees or escapees. Headquarters, USAREUR, desired a liberal interpretation of the Homeless Foreigners Act so that non-German labor service personnel stationed in France would be exempt from the 2-year regulation.[152] The non-German labor service personnel in USAREUR COMZ who were not in the possession of the proper documentation would otherwise be denied entry into Germany upon termination of their mission. They would therefore be stranded in France unless they found some other country to go to. In the spring of 1954, with the cooperation of the USAREUR Labor Services Division, HICOG conducted a survey of all non-German personnel of the labor service organization in an effort to obtain reliable information on their legal status. Questionnaires were answered by the full complement of 10,068 non-German personnel. The results were as follows:[153]

	Non-German Personnel Stationed in France	Non-German Personnel Stationed in Germany
With Legal Status	1,501	5,710
Without Legal Status	871	1,422
Doubtful	---	693

Almost without exception, the personnel in question were refugees, escapees, or defectors who had fled from Communist-dominated areas in Eastern Europe.[154] In order to work out procedures for documentation a conference was held between CINCUSAREUR and HICOG on 1 June

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[150] German Law Concerning the Legal Status of Homeless Foreigners within the Federal Territory, 25 Apr 51. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR LSD files.

[151] Memo, USAREUR LSD to USAREUR DCOFS for Admin, n.d., sub: Documentation of Non-German Labor Service Employees. SECRET. In USAREUR LSD files (1954).

[152] Interv, PFC R. Blackburn, USAREUR Hist Div, and Mr. R. Populaire, USAREUR LSD Pers Off, 15 Oct 54. SECRET.

[153] Dispatch, HICOG No. 3038 to DA, 17 May 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 231.4 (1954), Vol. I, Item 9A.

[154] Ibid.

1954. At the conference it was agreed that a center to handle labor service documentation would be established in the Kaiserslautern area. The first labor service personnel to be put through this center would be those in Germany. Once the efficiency of the documentation center had sufficiently improved, labor service personnel from USAREUR COMZ would be returned to Germany in increments of from 50 to 100. They would stay at the center over a period of from three to six weeks, and upon completion of their screening and documentation, would be returned to France.[155] At a second conference held on 8 June 1954 to work out procedures for documentation, it was agreed that HICOG would approach the German authorities relative to the immediate dispatch of one or two documenting teams.[156] At the end of June nothing had been settled.

(2) Medical Service in COMZ. The deteriorating morale of Polish labor service personnel in France, because of inadequate medical care, prompted the command to provide for medical treatment in U.S. facilities. The medical care and treatment would include hospitalization in U.S. medical facilities, without reimbursement, for a maximum period of 26 weeks. Moreover, pay rates were reduced on the basis of the current German social insurance deduction rate so that the individual's net pay would not be less than that received in Germany.[157] To implement this plan, the 3335 Labor Service Medical Detachment, composed of Polish personnel, was assigned to France in order to provide non-English speaking personnel with interpreters. Definite over-all improvement in morale resulted, but problems involved in long-term hospitalization remained unsolved.[158]

36. Labor Service Planning

The contractual arrangements between the Western Powers and the West German Government provided for the phase-out of the German labor service within two years after the date of ratification, but permitted renegotiations before the end of the period to insure that the strength and effectiveness of the U.S. forces would not be

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[155] Memo, USAREUR LSD, 2 Jun 54, sub: Documentation of Non-German Labor Service Personnel. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 231.4 (1954), Vol. I, Item 9A.

[156] Memo, USAREUR LSD, 9 Jun 54, sub: Documentation of Non-German Labor Service Personnel. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR LSD files.

[157] USAREUR ltr, 17 Jun 53, sub: Medical Care for Labor Service Personnel in France. AG 700 MED-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[158] Interv, PFC R. Blackburn, USAREUR Hist Div, and Mr. R. Populaire, USAREUR LSD Pers Off, 15 Oct 54. SECRET.

impaired as a result of such disbandment. This plan in no way affected the use of non-Germans employed as labor service personnel.[159] USAREUR, USAFE, and COMNAVGER emergency plans provided for the utilization of labor service personnel. It was estimated that the following percentages of labor service personnel would elect to remain with the U.S. forces on a voluntary basis in an emergency:[160]

	Percent
German Labor Service Guard	35-40
German Labor Service Technical	75
Non-German Labor Service Guard	75-85
Non-German Labor Service Technical	75-85
Non-German Labor Service Guard COMZ	85-95
USAFE Labor Service	35-40
COMNAVGER Labor Service	
BPE	15-25
Rhine River Patrol	60-70

Labor service personnel who elected to remain with U.S. forces would initially retain their civilian status. Labor service units would continue their primary missions of guarding vital installations, controlling refugees, and/or augmenting technical service support.[161]

Section IV: Morale, Welfare, and Discipline

37. General Status of Morale

a. Decline in Complaints. A measurable index of the morale in the command may be found in a study of statistical reports concerning the number of complaints received from military personnel by the inspector general. Complaints per quarter declined steadily throughout the period 1 January 1953 to 30 June 1954, from a high

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[159] Memo, USAREUR LSD to USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 17 Jun 53, sub: General Orientation of Labor Services for the Department of the Army. SECRET. In USAREUR LSD file.

[160] Interv, PFC R. Blackburn, USAREUR Hist Div, and Lt Col J. D. Holland, Dep C/USAREUR LSD, 15 Oct 54. SECRET.

[161] Ibid.

of 1,155, or 4.47 per thousand troops at the beginning of the period to a low of 728, or 2.90 per thousand troops, at its close. Justified complaints during the same period paralleled this decline. Over-all comparison of the record for 1953 with 1952 indicates a 25 percent decline in complaints.[162] Of all types of complaints, those concerning disciplinary matters were highest in frequency, 0.45 per thousand troops for the quarter ending 31 December 1953, and 0.29 per thousand troops for the quarter ending 30 June 1954. Complaints concerning administration, duties, and transfers ranked next. It is interesting to note that units having the largest number of complaints generally had the lowest percentage of justified complaints while units having a small number of complaints frequently had also the highest percentage of justified complaints. For example, the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation generated only 6 complaints to the inspector general for the quarter ending 31 December 1953, and 2 of them were from casuals in transit; but 4 of the complaints were deemed justifiable. The Berlin area produced 38 complaints during the same period, but less than half were found to be justified.[163]

b. Relaxation of Restrictive Regulations. Relaxation of two much-criticized USAREUR-wide regulations contributed greatly to improved morale throughout the command during the period covered by this report. Under the first change, in May 1953, the curfew was dropped by USAREUR; at the same time unit commanders were authorized to use the curfew as a disciplinary measure when such restriction of privileges was deemed necessary in individual cases. The second change in USAREUR policy permitted the wearing of civilian clothing off-duty by military personnel. This change was made by CINCUSAREUR under the provisions of AR 600-32 for "compelling reasons of security and proper performance of (the) military mission," and was effective 1 November 1953.[164]

c. The MOS Problem. USAREUR was faced with a difficult morale problem in the necessity of changing the MOS's of a considerable number of replacements arriving in the command. The MOS changes were made in most instances without prior warning to the men involved that such action might be required on the basis of military necessity. First-three-graders especially resented

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[162] (1) USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 31 Dec 53, 30 Jun 54. SECRET.
(2) Analysis of USAREUR Mthly Stat Rept, 31 Dec 53. SECRET.

[163] Ibid.

[164] (1) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to Dep CINCEUR, 8 Jun 53, no sub. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 330.11 (1953), Vol. I, Item 7A atchd.
(2) USAREUR ltr, 7 Oct 53, sub: Wearing of Civilian Clothing in Germany. AG 332.31 GPA-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

the practice, with consequent deterioration in morale.[165] The unit rotation system recently introduced by USAREUR may help to solve the problem, although a discussion of the effects of this system lies outside the scope of this report.

d. The Re-enlistment Problem. An examination of the reasons for the failure of personnel to re-enlist, revealed by a poll of so-called re-enlistment potentials at the conclusion of their tours of duty in the command, sheds further light on morale problems in USAREUR. Separatees from France indicated that their major reasons for not re-enlisting were poor living conditions, inadequate recreational facilities, poor leadership, and dislike of the Army system, in that order. Separatees completing tours in Germany did not complain about living conditions, but rated the curfew, poor leadership, difficulty of obtaining promotions, lack of personal freedom, and dislike of the Army system as their major sources of discontent.[166]

38. Welfare and Recreation Programs

Considerable adverse publicity and criticism had been directed at USAREUR's recreational facilities by certain segments of the American press and from some congressional circles. In an effort to counteract this criticism, which was believed to have resulted from misinformation, USAREUR during 1953-54 placed great stress on the essential role of the recreational areas and facilities as leave and rest centers. The USAREUR Recreation Area with headquarters at Garmisch-Partenkirchen was redesignated in May 1953 as the Southeastern Area Command (SEACOM), but was known informally as the leave and rest center.[167] Garmisch-Partenkirchen and Berchtesgaden were the only places available to USAREUR military personnel outside their military communities where the individual soldier could spend leave, and recreational time with his comrades at a relatively low cost and still have the comforts to which he was accustomed at home. Commercial facilities in Europe comparable to these centers were far too expensive for the lower grades of enlisted personnel.[168]

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[165] Memo, Col J. L. Chamberlain, Jr., Off of CINFO, to CINCUSAREUR, 2 Jun 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322.01 (1953), Vol. II, Item 32A.

[166] C/N 1, C/USAREUR AFIED to USAREUR COFS, 22 Sep 53, sub: Major Finding of Survey No. 118 on Non-re-enlistment. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Vol. I, Item 19A.

[167] USAREUR GO 45, 27 May 53, sub: Redesignation of USAREUR Recreation Area. UNCLASSIFIED.

[168] C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G1 to USAREUR COFS, 26 Mar 53, sub: Recreation Center at Garmisch. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 353.8 (1953), Vol. I, Item 9, Info Sheet atchd.

a. Garmisch Hotels. Of the two major leave and rest centers, Garmisch led in percentage of total utilization by military personnel, having been used to over 50 percent capacity throughout the year from March 1953-March 1954, except for brief periods in April and October. Utilization was highest on weekends, averaging well over 75 percent. All hotels in Garmisch showed a dollar profit during the period January-March 1954 except for slight losses by the Partenkirchenerhof and the guest houses. One of the hotels, the Opel House, has since been derequisitioned. A comparison of Garmisch operations for the third quarter FY 1954 with those of the second revealed a $62,415 increase in operating profits. This profit was over nine times the amount lost during the previous quarter. Total hotel capacity dropped 50 spaces (or 2.7 percent) during this period.[169]

b. Berchtesgaden Hotels. Berchtesgaden hotel facilities utilization during May 1954 was the lowest since January 1951, when total utilization was 26 percent. Low utilization for the third quarter FY 1954 was responsible for an operating loss over six times greater than that of the previous quarter. These losses, moreover, absorbed 13 percent of the operating profits generated by the Garmisch area. In order to cut losses, total capacity was reduced by 104 spaces (or 8.9 percent) during the third quarter, the bulk of the decrease being in unclassified hotel spaces.[170] Of the hotels in the Berchtesgaden area only the Deutsches Haus and the General Walker showed any profit at all during the period 1 January to 31 March 1954. Weekends during July and August 1953 showed the highest utilization percentages for the area--between 75 and 100 percent of capacity.[171]

c. The Religious Retreat House. In June 1954 the Alpine Inn, Berchtesgaden, formerly an officers' leave hotel, was redesignated the USAREUR Religious Retreat House, with an authorized strength of 2 chaplains and 1 enlisted man. Responsibility for the house, to be operated in accordance with USAREUR Circular 16, 1954, was assigned to the Senior Chaplain, USAREUR.[172] The Religious Retreat House was available for use by USAREUR and USAFE personnel, U.S. civilians serving with the armed forces, and their dependents stationed in Europe. Attendance quotas giving USAFE 25 percent and USAREUR 75 percent were set up. It was hoped that the

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[169] Analysis of USAREUR Mthly Stat Rept, 30 Apr 54. SECRET.

[170] Ibid.

[171] USAREUR Mthly Stat Rept, 30 Apr 54, pp. 68-69. SECRET.

[172] USAREUR GO 66, 17 May 54, sub: Establishment of USAREUR Religious Retreat House. UNCLASSIFIED.

establishment of this house would fulfill a long-felt need for a suitable place for persons seeking religious inspiration and rededication in quiet surroundings.[173]

d. Use of Centers After Contract Ratification. USAREUR did not contemplate release of the leave and rest center facilities following ratification of the contractual arrangements, until such time as the utilization rate no longer justified their retention. If appropriated funds were cut deeply, USAREUR was prepared to allocate nonappropriated funds for the continued operation of leave and rest centers.[174]

e. Recreation and Entertainment. A definite distinction was made between troop entertainment and troop recreation programs. Troop entertainment, such as variety shows, was financed almost entirely from nonappropriated funds generated by the military personnel themselves and distributed through the medium of the Command Welfare Fund. On the other hand, troop recreation was financed primarily from monies appropriated by Congress. Various activities, such as libraries in troop housing areas, craft shops, service clubs, and the vast, well-organized USAREUR athletic program were financed in this manner. Such recreational facilities as golf courses were supported and operated from nonappropriated funds generated by military personnel stationed in Germany.[175] Special services clubs, craft shops, and library facilities all reflected a substantial increase in utilization. Despite an increase in total attendance, service clubs, known as Class A facilities as opposed to such Class B facilities as NCO clubs, did not enjoy wide appeal among enlisted men because of the inherent restrictions on the type of activities which they could sponsor. Nevertheless, Class A facilities, although not fully utilized, were still needed by the armed forces, since they provided wholesome recreation for all interested personnel. Nonappropriated funds provided 76 to 79 percent of the support of the USAREUR Special Services program (including the troop recreation and entertainment programs) during the period 1 July 1953 to 31 March 1954, occupation costs provided 11 to 14 percent, and appropriated funds provided the balance.[176]

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[173]USAREUR Cir 16, 17 May 54, sub: USAREUR Religious Retreat House. UNCLASSIFIED.

[174]Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CINCEUCOM, 6 Feb 53, sub: Recreational Area Facilities in Germany. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 353.8 Amusements (1953), Vol. I, Item 4 atchd.

[175]Ltr, USAREUR AG to TAG, 16 Oct 53, sub: Congressional Inquiry Regarding Recreational Facilities in Europe. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 22, atchd.

[176]C/N 1, USAREUR COFS to C/USAREUR AFIED, 27 Jan 53, sub: Survey of Command Service Club Facilities. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 3B atchd.

39. Relief and Assistance Programs

Despite numerous appeals for support from various charitable organizations both in the zone of interior and in Europe, USAREUR officially sponsored only three full-scale annual fund-raising campaigns for charitable purposes. These were the Army Emergency Relief Program (AER), the American Red Cross Drive and the National Infantile Paralysis March of Dimes. In the past the March of Dimes campaign had been the most highly publicized, but during the period under review USAREUR tended to consider the aims and methods of the AER and the Red Cross closer to its interest.[177]

a. The Army Emergency Relief Program. The USAREUR Army Emergency Relief branch office, was established on 3 December 1952, and the first section office was opened in HACOM at the same time. Under AER procedure, a branch office served as a policy and control center, while the sections functioned as field offices where loans and grants from the AER fund were made. Personnel performing AER functions did so in addition to their regular duties. The growth of AER in USAREUR was rapid, developing from one section in December 1952 to ten sections in Germany and France by April 1953.[178] After a year of operation AER had 18 active sections and had rendered financial assistance in the amount of $340,000 to 2,100 soldiers or their dependents in various types of emergencies.[179] By April 1954, AER activities had expanded to include 24 active sections throughout USAREUR and had extended $589,683.46 in loans and grants to soldiers or their dependents.[180] AER's record of loan repayments was steadily improved and the gap between loan disbursements and loan repayments was narrowed substantially. It was therefore anticipated that by October 1954 loan repayments would equal or surpass loans made.[181] AER performed an important task in rendering emergency financial assistance whenever the Red Cross could not provide adequate help.

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[177] Ltr, Maj Gen C. B. Ferenbaugh, USAREUR COFS, to Maj Gen L. L. Doan, CG, 2d Armd Div, 23 Oct 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 005 (1953), Vol. I, Item 19.

[178] Ltr, Lt Gen C. L. Bolte, CINCUSAREUR, to Gen M. B. Ridgway, US CINCEUR, 21 Apr 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 3A atchd.

[179] Ltr, Gen W. M. Hoge, CINCUSAREUR, to Maj Gen E. F. Mitchell, Dir AER, 8 Dec 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 20 atchd.

[180] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR, to Dir AER, 24 Apr 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 005 (1954), Vol. I, Item 7 atchd.

[181] Memo, Col J. A. McComsey, USAREUR G1 Pers Svcs Br to USAREUR ACOFS, 26 Apr 54, sub: AER Loan and Loan Repayments, March 1954. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 9.

b. The Army Relief Society. The Army Relief Society (ARS), conducted its fund-raising campaigns simultaneously with those of the Army Emergency Relief Program. The society was founded in 1900 and incorporated under the laws of the State of New York. While it was responsible for assisting only the widows and orphans of Regular Army personnel, it also provided assistance to widows and orphans of other than Regular Army personnel on a reimbursement basis.

c. The Red Cross Drive. USAREUR's annual Red Cross drives in 1953 and in 1954 reflected substantial gains, for while there was no great increase in personnel strength in the USAREUR area, total contributions increased from $275,000 in 1953 to $322,897.85 in 1954, an increase of 15 percent. Personnel in the Middle East, North Africa, and England, as well as Europe made contributions.[182]

d. The March of Dimes. In 1952 USAREUR personnel contributed $538,339.50 to the annual March of Dimes drive. It was CINCUSAREUR's opinion, however, that the pressure generated through high-powered publicity was unnecessarily flamboyant as compared with the AER-ARS and ARC drives. USAREUR discouraged such tactics for the 1953 campaign, which consequently yielded $378,651.79 and DM 20,889.70 ($4,093.76), or a total of $386,529.17, considerably less than for 1952. USAREUR's 1954 contributions amounted to $324,400.00, somewhat less than the previous year, although Deutsche Mark contributions were higher, amounting to DM 31,745.91 ($7,558.55).[183]

40. Information and Education Program

The Department of the Army continued to stress the importance of the Troop Information and Education (TI&E) program. Individual unit commanders were instructed to make the program more effective by improving the quality of presentation. Furthermore, the TI&E program was not to be regarded as a special activity but virtually an hourly responsibility of the commander.[184] In an effort to secure Army-wide cohesiveness and parallel action in the

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[182](1) Ltr, Mr. R. C. Lewis, ARC, to Lt Gen C. L. Bolte, CINCUSAREUR, 4 May 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 005 (1953), Vol. I, Item 11. (2) Ltr, Mr. R. C. Lewis to Gen Hoge, 3 Jun 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 005 (1954), Vol. I, Item 2 atchd.

[183](1) Ltrs, Lt Gen M. S. Eddy, CINCUSAREUR, to Mr. B. O'Connor, NFIP, 10 Dec 53, 20 Mar 53. In USAREUR SGS 005 (1953), Vol. I, Items 2 atchd, 1 atchd. (2) Ltr, Gen W. M. Hoge, CINCUSAREUR, to Mr. B. O'Connor, NFIP, 24 Mar 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 005 (1954), Vol. I, Item 2 atchd.

[184]DA ltr, 21 Jun 54, sub: Troop Information Guidance for Regimental and Lower Commanders. UNCLASSIFIED.

administration of the TI&E program, the Department of the Army began transmission of guidance material to commands, including USAREUR, electrically or by airmail. In this manner the TI&E program was to become a more integral part of national and especially foreign policy.[185]

a. Difficulties Encountered. The implementation of the TI&E program in USAREUR encountered several difficulties. In many instances officers misunderstood the basic objectives of the program. The essential objective was to assist junior leaders in explaining to the individual soldier that he belonged to an organization with a vital mission and that the successful execution of this mission depended on every soldier performing his duties to the best of his abilities. Contrary to what so many officers believed, it was not a separate program of indoctrination in the advantages of the democratic system.[186] The Army-wide cutbacks of military personnel required by the budgetary restrictions for FY 1953 and the downgrading of public information and TI&E personnel set back the TI&E program. The downgrading made if difficult to secure and to retain well-qualified personnel for the program and had an adverse effect on TI&E effectiveness in Seventh Army. When this situation was brought to the attention of CINCUSAREUR, General Eddy was quick to direct that the I&E personnel grades be restored in keeping with efforts to provide adequate support for the Public Information and I&E programs in USAREUR.[187]

b. Information Media. The American Forces Network (AFN) and The Stars and Stripes remained, during the current reporting period, USAREUR's most important media for furthering the troop information phase of the TI&E program. During 1953 USAREUR effected an integration of the "command conference" phase of troop information with The Stars and Stripes, the various unit papers, and AFN in order to publicize the materials for the conferences to the troops. The orientation of personnel newly arrived in USAREUR was emphasized in the replacement center at Zweibruecken. The separation series of the USAREUR Information Bulletin was presented to personnel about to return to the zone of interior for discharge or return to inactive duty status.[188]

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[185] DA ltr, 10 Jun 54, sub: US Foreign Policy Information Guidance. CONFIDENTIAL.

[186] Ltr, CINFO to CINCUSAREUR, 22 Dec 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322.01 (1953), Vol. II, Item 65.

[187] (1) Ltr, CINFO to CINCUSAREUR, 9 Jan 53. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CINFO, 20 Jan 53. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in file above, Vol. I, Item 4.

[188] Memo, CINFO TI&E Div to CINCUSAREUR, 2 Jun 53, sub: USAREUR TI&E Program. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Vol. II, Item 32A.

c. The Education Program. Since 1951 the educational phase of the TI&E program had witnessed a shift of emphasis to basic as opposed to voluntary education among the military personnel of the command. Intermediate rather than secondary level education had been stressed, and the primary mission was the raising to eighth-grade level the considerable number of Regular Army first-three-graders below that level.[189]

(1) Basic Education. Actual testing had revealed that the current incidence of "basics" within USAREUR is approximately 12 percent. A check made in January 1953 of a 900-man sampling showed that approximately 17 percent of the replacements had an Aptitude Area I score of below 70, indicating less than five years of schooling. All unit commanders were therefore instructed that the minimum educational level of basics assigned to their units would have to reach fifth grade prior to completion of each man's tour of duty in the command. For this purpose unit basic education schools comprising grades 3 to 5 were maintained, and USAREUR basic education centers in Frankfurt, Nuernberg and Munich provided grades 1 and 2. During 1953 the Nuernberg center was phased out, and grades 1 and 2 were concentrated in the Frankfurt and Munich centers. In FY 1953, 5,485 fifth-grade certificates, or 25 percent of the total, were awarded to NCOs, of whom 1,836, or 9 percent, were first-three-graders. While it was virtually impossible to measure the impact of this accomplishment in terms of improved quality of NCO leadership in USAREUR and throughout the Regular Army, the effectiveness of every unit was undoubtedly greatly strengthened.[190] Estimates based upon test-out results indicated that approximately 35 percent of USAREUR's NCOs of the first three grades were below eighth-grade level. The TI&E program during FY 1953 enabled 1,290 USAREUR personnel to earn eighth-grade certificates, 33.3 percent of whom were first-three-graders.

(2) High School and College Level Education. The high school and college level educational program available to USAREUR personnel was operated on a contract basis by organizations not organic to USAREUR. The United States Armed Forces Institute (USAFI) with headquarters in Madison, Wisconsin, provided correspondence courses and classroom instruction in a wide variety of fields and subjects, at the high school and college levels. USAREUR personnel were able to obtain academic training at the college level through the program offered by the University of Maryland at educational centers throughout the command.[191]

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[189] Ibid.

[190] Ibid.

[191] Ibid.

(3) Supply. USAREUR's wide-spread TI&E program was supported through the supply depot at Hoechst. As a result of excellent supply service from USAFI headquarters in Madison, Wisconsin, operations at Hoechst could be geared to ensure the filling of USAFI requests within 24 hours of the time of receipt.[192]

(4) Disparity in Educational Backgrounds of Personnel. Enlisted personnel in grades E-4 and below who had been assigned administrative duties served very effectively, considering that most of these personnel were inducted for only 24 months. While only a small percentage of inductees became thoroughly experienced in their jobs during the relatively short tour of duty in USAREUR, they learned and performed their duties more efficiently than the average Regular Army enlisted man in the lower grades.[193] This illustrated the problem faced by USAREUR in handling the disparity in educational backgrounds, especially in enlisted grades below E-4. Selective service provided USAREUR with the majority of its replacement personnel of better than average educational attainment. Since selective service personnel had short tours, the command had to rely heavily on Regular Army personnel whose educational attainment level and efficiency records were generally inferior to those of drafted personnel. It is from this Regular Army group that USAREUR had to draw replacements for its NCO corps. By raising the educational level of both the lower grades and the first three grades, the TI&E program assisted the command in coping with this situation.

41. Disciplinary Problems and Procedures

a. The Curfew. The imposition of the curfew in September 1952 aroused perhaps more adverse comment and publicity than any other USAREUR disciplinary action during the current reporting period. Following a storm of criticism from the ranks and from various segments of the zone of interior press, USAREUR subjected the effectiveness of the curfew to careful study. Observations made by the provost marshal indicated that the curfew had not substantially reduced the incidence of crimes and offenses. Even though the number of incidents committed during the curfew hours had decreased, there was a corresponding increase in the number of incidents during precurfew hours. December 1952, four months following the imposition of the curfew, saw the highest incidence of all categories of crimes of violence. In short, the curfew seemed to have had no appreciable effect on the pattern of offenses within USAREUR. Analysis of German press comment indicated that the curfew made

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[192] Ibid.

[193] Ltr, Lt Gen A. C. McAuliffe, CG Seventh Army, to Gen W. M. Hoge, CINCUSAREUR, 15 May 54, no sub. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 320.4 (1954), B/P #4, Tab C.

little difference with regard to favorable or unfavorable comment about U.S. troops. Moreover, the imposition of the curfew had caused a noticeable drop in the troop morale index. On the credit side, the VD rate decreased somewhat.[194] A concensus of the corps and division commanders in Seventh Army indicated that the curfew and bed check should not be imposed at USAREUR or at an army level, but would be more effective if used by lower-echelon commanders as a local restriction of privileges rather than as an over-all command measure.[195] With the views of his subordinate commanders and the provost marshal weighted so heavily against retention of the curfew, CINCUSAREUR ordered the lifting of the curfew in May 1953, nine months after its inception. CINCUSAREUR stated that he preferred individual restrictions of privileges to over-all disciplinary action. Subordinate commanders were reminded, however, that the USAREUR directives requiring a certain percentage of the personnel to be present for duty at all times were not to be relaxed in any way as the result of the lifting of the curfew.[196]

b. Off Limits Restrictions. USAREUR has been particularly anxious to work out, with the cooperation of the German authorities, some means of establishing and enforcing off limits restrictions for certain undesirable establishments and areas. A former German law, the Gaststaettengesetz, of 20 April 1930, amended 24 November 1941, made it unlawful for operators of taverns to serve men in uniform after being informed that their establishments were off limits. USAREUR hoped that HICOG could persuade the Bonn authorities to re-enact this law upon activating the new German armed forces and to make it applicable to U.S. military personnel as well.[197] HICOG agreed to this solution and in November 1953 conferred with representatives of the British and French forces before presenting the suggestion to the German Federal Republic on a tripartite basis.[198] Authorities in Bonn refused to accept the Allied suggestion but agreed to a meeting on 11 December 1953

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[194] Memo, USAREUR SGS to USAREUR DCOFS, 16 Jan 53, no sub. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 330.11 (1953), Vol. I, Item 2 atchd.

[195] Ltr, Lt Gen W. M. Hoge, CG Seventh Army, to Gen C. L. Bolte, CINCUSAREUR, 11 May 53. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above, Item 7A atchd.

[196] USAREUR Cir, 27 May 53, sub: Guidance for the Use of Commanders in Answering Questions Pertaining to the Lifting of the Curfew. UNCLASSIFIED.

[197] Ltr, USAREUR COFS to Dep HICOG, 18 Feb 53, no sub. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 330.11 (1953), Vol. I, Item 1 atchd.

[198] Ltr, Dep HICOG to USAREUR COFS, 30 Mar 53, no sub. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

between the German Federal Republic and the representatives of the three powers in an effort to work out a satisfactory solution to the problem.[199] In August 1954 HICOG delegated to CINCUSAREUR authority to placard off limits establishments, but only after advance notice of the proposed action had been given to the German authorities. Actual placarding of the establishment was to be done by the German police, or in close cooperation with them.[200]

c. Criminal Jurisdiction Under NATO Agreements. Implementation of Article VII of the NATO Status of Forces (SOF) agreement, pertaining to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over military personnel of one state who committed offenses while stationed within the territorial limits of another state, became a matter of USAREUR concern. In August 1953 US CINCEUR delegated to CINCUSAREUR certain operational and administrative responsibilities in France and the BENELUX countries in the implementation of the Senate resolution giving advice and consent to the ratification of the NATO Status of Forces agreement. Among the more important responsibilities of CINCUSAREUR under the Status of Forces agreement was the preparation of a study of the legal system of each receiving state and the submission of copies of such studies to the trial judge advocates of each of the component services, as well as to all officers exercising general courts-martial jurisdiction within those countries. CINCUSAREUR was further given the responsibility of requesting waiver of jurisdiction by the receiving state when, in his opinion, there was danger that the accused would not be protected because of the absence or denial of constitutional rights he would enjoy in the United States. In all matters arising out of the implementation of the Status of Forces agreement CINCUSAREUR was designated as the single point of contact with the U.S. Embassy for all three component services in France and the BENELUX countries.[201]

d. Undesirable Acts.

(1) Crime. Since crimes of force and violence committed by American personnel against Germans, along with traffic incidents, accounted for the bulk of unfavorable comment in the German press

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[199] C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G1 to USAREUR COFS, 26 Nov 54, sub: Placing of German Establishments Off Limits. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 330.11 (1954), Vol. I, Item 6 atchd.

[200] USAREUR ltr, 5 Aug 54, sub: Placing of German Establishments or Areas Off Limits to Military Personnel. AG 250.2. UNCLASSIFIED.

[201] C/N 1, USAREUR JAG to USAREUR DCOFS for Admin, sub: Implementation of Article VII, NATO SOF Agreement. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 250.4 (1953), Vol. II, Item 41 atchd.

concerning Americans, USAREUR took steps to reduce the crime rate among military personnel. The elimination of unfit enlisted personnel through administrative procedures was of some help in reducing by 8 percent, as compared with 1952, the number of crimes committed by Americans against Germans. Crimes of this type increased, however, from 0.32 per thousand troops in December 1952 to 0.39 in December 1953. From December 1953 to June 1954 there was a decrease to 0.33 per thousand troops, but this still compared unfavorably with the 0.32 of December 1952.[202] USAREUR's over-all average monthly crime rate of 1.0 per thousand troops, for 1953, as compared with 0.88 per thousand for 1952, reflected a gradual increase during 1953 which continued thereafter, reaching 1.24 per thousand troops in June 1954. Crime rates by race continued to indicate that Negro personnel of USAREUR were responsible for a disproportionately higher rate, 2.52 per thousand troops, in June 1954, as compared with a 0.77 rate among white personnel.[203] A study of the statistical reports indicated that the combat divisions in the Seventh Army had a generally lower crime rate, although not always a smaller total of incidents, than did the service and supply elements both of Seventh Army and USAREUR.

(2) Absence Without Leave. USAREUR's 1953 AWOL average rate increased by 7.7 percent over the 1952 average, with Seventh Army showing the largest increase, 20.9 percent. Nevertheless, it was well under the zone of interior Army AWOL rate of from 7.2 to 4.9 man-days lost per thousand man-days strength and the total Army AWOL rate of 4.3 to 2.8. From June 1953 to June 1954 USAREUR's AWOL rate declined from 0.73 to 0.47 in man-days lost per thousand man-days strength. Here again the service elements such as transportation and engineer units, showed a disproportionately higher rate than other USAREUR units.[204]

(3) Thefts of Government Property. During 1953 thefts of government property, on a monthly average, were $70,474 as compared to $82,714 for 1952, a reduction of $12,240, or 15 percent, per month. A monthly recovery average of $49,507, or 70 percent, was maintained throughout 1953. The period from January to June 1954, however, reflected a sharp increase in the value of government property stolen, rising from $78,800 in January to $103,154 in June 1954. These thefts included U.S. Army-owned, controlled, and non-appropriated fund properties. Military vehicles constituted the major portion, but the recovery rate in that category was high.[205]

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[202] (1) USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 31 Dec 53, 30 Jun 54. SECRET.
(2) Analysis of USAREUR Mthly Stat Rept, 31 Dec 53. SECRET.

[203] Ibid.

[204] Ibid.

[205] Ibid.

(4) Traffic Offenses. Despite vigorous USAREUR traffic safety campaigns, the average monthly traffic offense rate for 1953 was 10.1 per thousand troops, with 6.8 per thousand for 1952. While over-all traffic offenses decreased by 16.5 percent, sharp increases in reckless driving and speeding offenses made the monthly average exceed that of 1952. Motor vehicle accidents nevertheless remained the largest cause of accidental deaths in USAREUR during 1953, with the first six months of 1954, accounting for 101, or 55 percent, of the fatalities resulting from accidents.[206]

e. Courts-Martial. A comparison of 1952 with 1953 disclosed a 4 percent reduction in the USAREUR courts-martial rate per thousand troops, but an 11 percent increase in the major crime rate, 7 percent in the AWOL rate, and 6 percent in VD cases. Elimination of unfit enlisted personnel through administrative procedures during 1953, under the provisions of AR 615-368, was undoubtedly a factor in the continued decline in the court-martial rate.[207] However, while the courts-martial rate declined during 1953, the total number of courts-martial increased by 1,596, or 6 percent, over 1952. Special courts-martial cases increased by 1,948 (24 percent) and general courts-martial by 361 cases (23 percent). Summary courts-martials, however, decreased by 713 cases, or 4 percent. The decline in the courts-martial rate despite an increase in the total number of courts-martial cases was due in large measure to the increase in the number of divisional troops.[208] From January to June 1954, over-all courts-martial rates decreased from about 8.1 to 7.5 per thousand troops, although there was a marked increase during March. The June 1954 rate was 7.5 percent per thousand, as compared with 10.4 percent for June 1953. Special and summary courts-martial cases showed the greatest decrease in percentage rate: for summary courts-martial, a decrease from 5.9 per thousand troops in June 1953 to 4.4 in June 1954, and for special courts-martial a decrease from 3.8 to 2.5 during the same period. In general courts-martial there was a very slight decrease, from 0.7 in June 1953 to 0.6 in June 1954,[209] reflecting the rather constant average monthly rate of crimes against persons and property. The average rate was 2.96 per thousand troops, beginning in June 1953 with a rate of 3.44 and ending in June 1954 with a rate of 3.26. Crimes of force and violence ranked at the top of the list. As the result of vigorous efforts on the part of the USAREUR Judge Advocate Division, the general courts-martial processing time during 1953 was reduced by 39 percent.

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[206] Ibid.

[207] Analysis of USAREUR Mthly Stat Rept, 31 Dec 53. SECRET.

[208] Ibid.

[209] USAREUR Mthly Stat Rept, 30 Jun 54. SECRET.

This reduction was effected despite an increased workload throughout the year. The average number of days' processing time elapsing between restraint and sentence, was reduced from the 1952 average of 28.7 days to a 1953 average of 20.2. Similar results were reflected in the decrease in the average number of days' processing time between sentence and review, from 23.7 days in 1952 to 16.4 in 1953.[210]

f. Prisons and Prisoners. In the period from December 1952 to December 1953 USAREUR's monthly prisoner commitment rate increased from 2.24 to 2.92 per thousand troops. There was, however, a decrease to 2.30 during the period from January to June 1954. USAREUR's over-all number of prisoners, sentenced and unsentenced, declined steadily from a high of 1,879 in June 1953 to a low of 929 in May 1954, but rose slightly to 983 in June. First offender and repeater rates reflected little change. Of the total number of rehabilitation center prisoners as of June 1954, 83 percent had previous convictions; of these, 30 percent had three or more previous convictions. Returnees to the center comprised 19.4 percent of the prisoners; 35 (or 25 percent) of these returnees had been committed to the center two or more times, while 107 (or 75 percent) were being returned for the first time. The 21-to-24-year age group among white military personnel constituted 48.5 percent of the command enlisted strength and 25.7 of the total prisoner strength. Negro personnel in the same age category constituted 6.8 percent of the total command EM strength, but comprised 23.9 percent of the total prisoner strength. In every age category within the command the Negro personnel constituted a disproportionate share of the prison population as compared with their numerical strength within the total enlisted strength of the command. In COMZ the Orleans area showed a generally higher rate of sentenced and unsentenced prisoners per thousand troops than did the rest of COMZ, although in total numbers of prisoners it ranked below Base Section and Advance Section.[211]

42. Safety Program of the Command

a. Accidents and Their Causes. Traffic accidents involving German and American personnel continued during the reporting period January 1953 to June 1954 to rank among the three principal causes of friction between the civilian population and U.S. armed forces.[212]

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[210] Ibid.

[211] Ibid.

[212] C/N 1, USAREUR PID to USAREUR COFS, 6 Jul 53, sub: Report, Analysis of German Press. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322.01 (1953), Vol. II, Item 40.

Accidents involving military as well as nonmilitary vehicles accounted for the overwhelming majority of injuries and deaths due to accidents throughout USAREUR. During 1953 the cost to the command of accidents and injuries from all causes amounted to $11,015,474. During the same period accidents caused 192 deaths and 7,324 injuries to military personnel, and of this total 3,000 injuries and 121 deaths occurred off duty. Seventy-eight of the fatalities, constituting 41 percent of the total fatalities for the year 1953, were suffered by personnel in the grade of sergeant or higher. Of these 78 fatalities, 48 (or 61.5 percent) occurred off duty. Thirty-two percent of these fatalities occurred as the result of civilian vehicle accidents, and involved NCO's of the first three grades. Fatalities resulting from traffic accidents accounted for 64.5 percent of the total number of off-duty fatalities resulting from accidents.[213] Studies of drivers' attitudes and reactions, as well as the causes of vehicle accidents, throughout USAREUR indicated that stricter enforcement of traffic rules on the part of German as well as U.S. authorities, together with periodic testing of driver proficiency, were the best means of reducing the number of traffic accidents. Speeds unjustified by road conditions, unauthorized assumption of the right-of-way, and driving under the influence of alcohol were found to be the principal causes of traffic accidents among USAREUR personnel.[214]

b. Safety Activities. As a result of intensive USAREUR-wide campaigns during 1953 the military vehicle fatality rate per 100,000,000 miles driven was 32.6 percent below that of the previous year. The military vehicle accident rate, which is the number of accidents per 100,000,000 miles driven, increased by only 5.4 percent over the previous year despite a 27.19 percent increase in the number of miles driven in military vehicles.[215] USAREUR's successful efforts to check and reduce the over-all accident rate received commendation in the form of the Department of the Army's Award of Merit in 1953 for improvement in the over-all safety program for the second consecutive year. An analysis of the results and over-all effectiveness of the 1953 USAREUR traffic safety campaign indicated that three out of four drivers believed the campaign had encouraged safer driving habits, with about 44 percent of them showing interest in the safety campaign. In

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[213](1) Min, USAREUR Character Guidance Council for US Army Elements, 21 Apr 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 330.11 (1954), Vol. I, Item 5. (2) USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 30 Jun 53, 31 Dec 53, 30 Jun 54. SECRET.

[214]USAREUR ltr, 5 Aug 54, sub: Evaluation of Traffic Safety Week. AG 010.8. UNCLASSIFIED.

[215]USAREUR Off of the Compt, Management Improvement Report, FY 1953. UNCLASSIFIED.

determining the degree of understanding of the message of Safety Week, USAREUR found that 35 percent of the drivers in Germany and 44 percent in France claimed to have learned safer driving through the Safety Week campaign. While the importance of defensive driving seemed to have been accepted by the majority of drivers, the generally hostile attitude among American personnel toward European drivers tended to detract from the acceptance of this message. Resentment against bicyclists was manifested by about 60 percent of the drivers. In France, and Germany, 31 and 51 percent respectively, were generally resentful of the European driver and his driving habits, while 19 percent in France and 31 percent in Germany expressed resentment toward pedestrians. Only 8 percent of the drivers in both areas were hostile to other Americans as motorists.[216] Despite the fact that younger drivers tended to have the most accidents and that most of USAREUR's drivers were young men, operating their vehicles under difficult traffic situations, USAREUR's traffic problem was not considered insoluble.

c. Plans for FY 1955. In an effort to increase the effectiveness of the safety program during FY 1955, a Traffic Safety Week was to be proclaimed every six months (e.g., in October 1954 and April 1955). As in the previous year, COMNAVGER, CINCUSAFE, HICOG, and the German Federal Government were to cooperate with CINCUSAREUR in the traffic accident prevention program. In addition, an accelerated program of safety training for all supervisory personnel throughout USAREUR was planned for FY 1955. This training was to include lectures, using visual aids.[217]

43. Dependents in the Command

a. Coordinated and Concurrent Travel, 1954. USAREUR's plans for reinstating coordinated and concurrent travel of dependents of military personnel were made during the period from January to June 1954. In the spring of 1954 the average waiting time for housing in Germany was 7.3 months for officers and 11.7 for enlisted men, while in France the average waiting time was 4.1 months and 8.6 months. By contrast, Air Force average waiting time was 4.7 and 7.0 months for officers and enlisted men, respectively.[218] It was hoped that coordinated travel would be reinstated about 1 September,

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[216] USAREUR AFIED Prelimi Rept No. 121, Jun 54, sub: Traffic Safety in Europe. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322.01 (1954), Vol. I, Item 19 atchd.

[217] USAREUR Off of the Compt, Management Improvement Report, FY 1954. UNCLASSIFIED.

[218] C/N 1, USAREUR G1 to USAREUR COFS, 10 Mar 54, sub: Concurrent or Coordinated Travel of Dependents. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 510 (1954), Vol. I, Item 3A-1 atchd.

upon completion of Phase III of the housing program, and that concurrent travel would become feasible about 1 December 1954, upon completion of Phase V. Sufficient housing was available early in 1954 to permit concurrent travel of general officers and their dependents to USAREUR. The Department of the Army, however, disapproved of CINCUSAREUR's request to permit such travel at that time because concurrent travel for only a select group would have an adverse effect on morale.[219] The housing situation in France remained far more critical than in Germany; consequently the decision was made to continue indefinitely priority list travel for personnel assigned to France. Coordinated travel would not become feasible for France until the completion of the Rental Guarantee Housing Construction Program or until sufficient private rental housing became available.[220]

b. Advance Application Procedure. In April 1954 Brig. Gen. C. C. Sibley, USAREUR transportation officer, was sent to Washington to discuss and to finalize USAREUR's plans for coordinated travel with representatives of the Department of the Army.[221] The Army did not approve of CINCUSAREUR's recommendation for coordinated travel for Germany for the period 1 September 1954 to 1 January 1955, but instead presented an alternative plan, entitled "Advance Application Procedure," which was to be incorporated in the revised SR 55-765-5. The Advance Application Procedure would permanently govern movement of dependents of USAREUR personnel assigned to France and the United Kingdom, but in the case of personnel assigned to Germany it would be a transitional phase between priority list travel and automatic concurrent travel. Consequently USAREUR's plans for coordinated travel as a transitional phase for concurrent travel were replaced by the Advance Application Procedure.[222] USAREUR G1's only objection to the Advance Application Procedure was the time element involved. A minimum of 30 and a maximum of 60 days were required by that office to finalize the assignments of USAREUR personnel before the necessary replies to requests for concurrent travel could be made to officer and enlisted personnel ordered to USAREUR for duty. Success of the new plan would hinge upon the Department of Army's ability to speed up shipments of

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[219] Cable DA-502378, TAG to CINCUSAREUR, 31 Mar 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[220] Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G1 to USAREUR COFS, 19 Mar 54, sub: Implementation of Coordinated or Concurrent Travel. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[221] Ltr, USAREUR ACOFS G1 to ACOFSA G1, 26 Mar 54, no sub. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[222] C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G1 to USAREUR COFS, 26 Apr 54, sub: Transportation of Dependents. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

personnel records so that USAREUR could complete the processing in time for concurrent travel.[223]

c. Plans for Concurrent Travel, 1955. Although in the middle of 1954 there was need for almost 50,000 sets of quarters for dependents, USAREUR's construction plans were expected to provide almost enough quarters to meet the requirements for concurrent travel to Germany early in 1955. Suggestions that requisitioned housing be retained to make up for anticipated slight shortages in quarters in some areas were rejected by USAREUR G1 since, it was pointed out, many if not most of the requisitioned properties were not in areas where the shortages existed, i.e., in the Western Area Command. Despite the fact that 5,000 sponsors living in Germany were awaiting their families, and approximately 1,300 families eligible for housing were living on the German economy, USAREUR was confident that concurrent travel would soon be possible in some areas where housing was available.[224] In July 1954, US CINCEUR delegated to CINCUSAREUR authority to approve concurrent travel to USAREUR consistent with service policy and subject to availability of quarters.[225] Lack of sufficient government housing and commercial-type housing or billeting facilities, however, precluded implementation of the concurrent travel program for personnel assigned by the Department of the Army for duty or to Class II units in France.[226] Department of the Army proposals to permit dependents of E-4's with 7 years' service to come to Europe were opposed by CINCUSAREUR on the ground that housing units for such personnel had not been included in USAREUR's housing program. USAREUR estimated that there were approximately 6,000 men of this category in the command and that about 2,000 of them would require dependent housing. An attempt to meet this additional housing load would disrupt plans for concurrent travel and USAREUR's logistical support estimates would have to be revised upwards.[227] However, the Department of the Army pointed out to CINCUSAREUR that the proposal to permit government transportation of dependents of E-4's and below was designed solely to prevent hardship if an E-4 family should be authorized to enter an overseas command and be

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[223] Ltr, USAREUR ACOFS G1 to ACOFSA G1, 29 Apr 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[224] Remarks by USAREUR ACOFS G1, USAREUR Comd Conf, 29 Sep 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[225] Cable EC-3-3212, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 24 Jul 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[226] Cable COZPA-3455, USAREUR COMZ Orleans to CINCUSAREUR, 30 Jul 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[227] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to VCOFSA, 6 May 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

required to pay for transportation. Transportation at government expense would be authorized for such personnel only after the overseas commander (CINCUSAREUR) had approved entry of the E-4's dependents into the command.[228] Since CINCUSAREUR would not approve entry of this category of dependents unless housing was available, the policy, if approved, would have no adverse effect upon USAREUR's housing and concurrent travel plans. As of 30 June 1954 dependents of E-4's with 7 years service were not authorized government transportation, but were provided with logistical support if and when they arrived in the command.

44. Dependents School Program

a. Increase in Enrollment, Teaching Personnel, and Facilities. USAREUR's dependents schools operations increased steadily since January 1953. An unprecedented rise in the birth rate in the zone of interior was reflected in an increase in USAREUR's minor dependent population, requiring an expanded school building program throughout USAREUR. Additional classroom space had to be provided to cope with enlarged enrollments. Phases III and V of the school building program were planned to meet this need. Phase III was completed during FY 1954, and the completion of Phase V was scheduled for about March 1955, when sufficient additional classroom space was to be available to meet USAREUR's need for several years. This planning was based upon forecasts projected from the continued increase in the birth rate. Even if troop and family strength in the command remained static, it was to be expected that the USAREUR dependents schools enrollment would increase by from 4,000 to 4,000 pupils every year.[229] During the school year September 1953 to June 1954 enrollment in Grades 1-12 increased from 21,251 to a high of 26,980 in March 1954 and dropped to 25,521 in June 1954. The average enrollment for the year was 25,856. Kindergarten enrollment rose from 2,871 in September 1953 to a high of 4,652 in March 1954; then dropped to 4,377 in June 1954. Average kindergarten enrollment for school year 1953-54 was 4,351. Projected forecasts for enrollment throughout USAREUR in Grades 1 to 12 for the school year 1954-55 are 42,496 and for kindergartens 6,978.[230] As of the end of school year 1953, USAREUR operated 97 schools in Germany and France; 89 of these were elementary schools and 8 were secondary. By the end of the school year 1954, the number of elementary schools had increased to 95 and

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[228] Ltr, VCOFSA to CINCUSAREUR, 28 May 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[229] Interv, Dr. E. F. Fisher, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. M. E. Armitage, USAREUR DSD, 5 Oct 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

[230] DSD School Population Rept as of 11 Jun 54, 18 Jun 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

secondary schools to 11, making a total of 106. In the school year 1952-53 a total of 759 American teachers were employed in the kindergarten and grades 1 to 12. These were supplemented by 121 German and French civilians, 105 employed as teachers and 16 as librarians. By the end of the school year 1953-54, the number of Americans employed as teachers in the elementary and secondary schools of USAREUR had risen to 977; 840 of these, including teaching principals as well as teachers, staffed the elementary schools and 137 staffed grades 9 to 12. One hundred and three German and French teachers assisted in the elementary schools and 26 at the secondary level; in addition, 27 were employed as librarians. Generally, indigenous personnel were employed as language and music teachers. Appropriated funds supported the bulk of USAREUR's dependents school system, while nonappropriated funds supported the kindergartens and the foreign language training in the elementary schools.[231]

b. Factors Hampering Recruitment of Teachers. The USAREUR Dependents School Teacher Program was faced with increasing difficulties in recruiting new teachers while dissatisfaction was on the increase among teacher personnel. Both problems grew out of the disparity between employment conditions and practices in the United States and those of the Army in Europe. Civil service regulations and Department of the Army civilian personnel regulations necessitated deviations from traditional stateside school practices, thus hampering the efficient administration of the teacher program and the efforts of the command to maintain professional standards similar to those of public school systems in the United States.[232] Teachers in stateside school systems are ordinarily paid all the year round and can devote summer vacations to further professional study or travel. American educational practices provide for a graduated salary scale, based upon experience and continued professional study, with a much larger range than is currently possible under civil service regulations. Teachers in USAREUR, though given a GS-7 rating at $4,205 per annum, actually received approximately $3,500, for the 9-month school term, and the 3-month vacation in the summer, if taken, was on a leave-without-pay basis. Although the USAREUR Dependents Education Organization (DEO) was planning a limited program of summer employment for teachers, budgetary restrictions would greatly restrict the effectiveness of this program as a solution to the problem. Since in 1952-53 stateside school systems paid a teacher with a bachelor's degree and no experience an average salary of $3,600 per annum and USAREUR's teachers had to have at least two years of teaching experience, the lack of financial incentive to attract competent teachers for

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[231] Interv cited above.

[232] C/N 3, DEO G1, 19 Feb 54, sub: Administration of Dependents School Teachers. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR DSD files.

duty in this command was obvious. Moreover, the continued population growth in the United States had led to a serious shortage of trained teaching personnel there; consequently the recruitment of teachers for the USAREUR dependents school program, was competing with many stateside systems whose employment conditions and standards were far superior to those offered by USAREUR. A further disadvantage suffered by USAREUR was the lack of teacher tenure provisions. In addition, service in the dependents school program was not accepted by the majority of stateside school systems for retirement or promotion purposes. This meant that teachers recruited for overseas service with the dependents schools were penalized for employment by USAREUR. With stateside retirement systems for teachers being governed by the laws of individual states, it seemed highly doubtful that any adjustment would be feasible.[233] The lack of adequate retirement provisions for USAREUR-employed teachers as compared with other civil service employees was another obstacle to recruiting competent personnel.

c. Measures Recommended by USAREUR. The USAREUR DEO recommended in February 1954 that the Department of the Army consider favorably the removal of all teachers from the Classification Act of 1949, as amended, and their placement into an exempt group. This action would have removed the administration of the teacher program from the restricting regulatory and procedural requirements of the Civil Service Commission and permitted a more realistic and efficient administration of the program. The recommendations were forwarded by CINCUSAREUR to the Director, Civilian Personnel Division, Office of the Secretary of the Army, on 27 April 1954. The latter acknowledged receipt of the proposals in May 1954, but indicated that there would be considerable delay before any action could be taken. In view of the adverse effect of current regulations on teacher recruitment, it was hoped that some decision at Department of the Army level could be made before the beginning of the recruitment program in December 1954 for the school year 1955-1956. It was thought that failure to take favorable action before this time would create increasingly difficult administrative and personnel problems for the dependents school program in the period 1955-56.[234]

45. U.S. Army Assistance to the American Youth Program

The increase in the number of dependent children within USAREUR and the urgency of the problem of juvenile delinquency pointed to a definite need for a command policy concerning leisure time activity for American youth and for the establishment of an appropriate program. Some subordinate commands had already

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[233] Ibid.

[234] Ibid.

provided leisure time programs but were hindered by the lack of an established USAREUR policy regarding such activities. Other commands had made no provisions. It seemed that a USAREUR-wide American Youth Activities (AYA) program, providing guidance and motivation, would be required in order to make certain that local programs would be started throughout the entire command.[235] In June 1953 USAREUR G1 proposed the establishment of a council or board to help in the promulgation of over-all AYA policy, to effect the necessary coordination at the USAREUR level, and to provide guidance for operating personnel. On 23 June 1954 the G1 proposal was approved by CINCUSAREUR and the Youth Activities Board was established. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G1, appointed the Chief, Personnel Services Branch, G1 Division, as chairman of the board. Voting members of the board were one representative from each of the following divisions: G4, Special Activities, Provost Marshal, Civil Affairs, Chaplain, and Adjutant General.[236] Other members of the board, but without vote, were the chief of the AYA-GYA Section, Personnel Services Branch, G1 Division, who acted as executive secretary, and the Army representative of the European Advisory Council on Scouting.[237] The mission of the AYA Program as later defined was to assist and promote worthwhile activities for youths who were dependents of U.S. personnel; to emphasize aspects of youth activities which afforded American youths, particularly those between the ages of 7 and 18, the best opportunity to observe and practice sound concepts of citizenship and democratic methods; and to devise procedures for planning and conducting wholesome social, athletic, travel, and other extra-curricular individual and group activities. Other youths from U.S. families receiving any degree of logistical support were to be included in the program, when desired by local AYA governing bodies.[238] The support of parents was to be enlisted in the planning and implementation of the AYA program by means of "parent advisory councils," which were to be established within military communities and were to consist of well-qualified members, one or more members of whom specifically represented the local commander. The young people themselves were to be encouraged to take part in carrying out the AYA program through "advisory youth councils," composed of elected representatives of organized youth groups, such as scouting and teen-age organizations, as well as

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[235] Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G1 to USAREUR COFS, 17 Jun 53, sub: American Youth Activities. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 005 (1954), Vol. I, Item 12A.

[236] USAREUR Youth Actvs Bd Min, 2 Aug 54. GPA 080/e. UNCLASSIFIED.

[237] Ibid.

[238] USAREUR Cir 148, 8 Jul 54, sub: American Youth Activities Program. UNCLASSIFIED.

representatives of the youth at large. However, responsibility for the proper implementation of the program was to remain with the area commanders.[239] Since the AYA program was organized and set in motion only a short time before the end of the current reporting period, the effectiveness of the program could not yet be properly evaluated.

[239] Ibid.

CHAPTER 3

Intelligence Activities

The United States Army, Europe, satisfied its own needs for strategic and tactical military intelligence and fulfilled intelligence requirements for the Department of the Army and US EUCOM as well as intelligence commitments for other national agencies and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.[1] USAREUR was most concerned with those nations or combinations of nations which represented a threat to the security of the command. Therefore, its principal intelligence effort, in close cooperation with other national intelligence agencies, was directed at the USSR and its satellite forces in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.[2] With respect to countries not under Soviet influence but in close geographical proximity to the command, CINCUSAREUR had a strategic interest in their capabilities, readiness, and inclination to resist direct or indirect attack; their strategic vulnerability; the imminent or threatened overthrow of their governments; and the capability of their industries to provide logistical support for themselves and Allied armed forces in the event of a general war.[3] CINCUSAREUR also engaged in extensive counterintelligence activities to thwart intelligence activities directed against it by the Soviet Union and its satellites and to protect the personnel and installations of the U.S. forces in Europe.

46. Functions of the USAREUR Assistant Chief of Staff, G2

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, USAREUR, directed the positive and counterintelligence activities of the command and produced

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[1]Organizational Manual for the USAREUR ACOFS G2, 1 Jan 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G2 Div Admin Br files.

[2]USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file, 1953-54. SECRET. In USAREUR G2 Div Opns Br files.

[3]Ibid.

the intelligence required by CINCUSAREUR and commanders of higher echelons. He prepared operational plans, put policies into effect, and supervised operations within the command. He established and maintained direct contact on intelligence matters with other appropriate U.S. and non-U.S. agencies, within the limits of current joint policies. He provided for and supervised intelligence training within the command, and rendered assistance to the other commands of US EUCOM in the training of intelligence specialists. He developed, and kept up to date, the command's intelligence plans for wartime, including intelligence annexes for NATO defense plans. He also monitored the requirements for releasing USAREUR and U.S. Army information and intelligence to foreign nations and to international commands in Europe.[4]

47. Changes in the Organization of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2

During late 1952 and early 1953 a study made of the organization of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, USAREUR, disclosed several defects.[5] For instance, to some extent the Strategic and Security Section of the Analysis Branch was engaged in political and economic coverage of areas for which the G2 Division had no responsibility. Moreover, the functions performed by analysts and collectors were not mutually exclusive. This condition resulted in a great deal of routine paper work which limited the time that could be devoted to the improvement of collection capability. In addition, responsibility for certain elements of counterintelligence coverage was not definitely assigned; planning for current operations was split between the Plans, Policy, and Training Branch and the Operations Branch; and a number of personnel were engaged in routine operations which were not strictly staff work. To overcome these and other deficiencies, the division was completely reorganized on 1 July 1953 and further changes were made on 9 October and 29 December of that year.[6] The division was organized on a functional basis into four branches, under the normal control of the assistant chief of staff and his deputy.

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[4]Organizational Manual for USAREUR ACOFS G2, 1 Jan 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G2 Div Admin Br files.

[5]Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G2 to USAREUR Dep ACOFS G2, 16 Mar 53, sub: Reorganization Study. SECRET. In USAREUR G2 Div Opns Br files.

[6](1) IRS, USAREUR ACOFS G2 to all USAREUR G2 Div Br Chiefs, 9 Oct 53, sub: Jurisdictional Problems Resulting from Reorganization of Office of ACOFS G2. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR G2 Div 320.3 (1953). (2) IRS, same to same, 29 Dec 53, sub: Establishment of Political-Economic Desk. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G2 Div Intel Br files.

ORGANIZATION OF USAREUR G2 INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

Chart 5

1 JANUARY 1954



Source: Organizational Manual for USAREUR ACOFS G2, 1 Jan 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G2 Div Admin Br files.

Chart 6

USAREUR INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS

30 June 1954



Direct Control ————————

Operational Control - - - - - - - - -

Coordinating Channel —·—·—·—

Source: Compiled from information furnished by USAREUR G2 Div Opns Br. SECRET.

SECRET

SECRET

The branches, in turn, were divided into a varying number of sections as indicated in Chart 5. The Administrative Branch controlled top secret information, distributed correspondence, handled supplies, controlled funds, and reproduced and disseminated information and intelligence. The Intelligence Branch collated, evaluated, and analyzed information collected by the intelligence field agencies and produced finished intelligence. The Counterintelligence Branch supervised and directed the activities of USAREUR counterintelligence agencies, especially in the fields of espionage, sabotage, subversion, security investigations, and the release of classified information. It also formulated plans for carrying out these activities. The Operations Branch supervised, coordinated, and controlled the operation of USAREUR field collection agencies, prepared emergency intelligence plans, and supervised intelligence training in the European theater.[7]

48. Agencies Supervised by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2

USAREUR operated an extensive system of field agencies to fulfill its intelligence functions. During 1952 most of the positive intelligence field agencies were administered directly by the USAREUR G2. On 15 January 1953 the 513th Military Intelligence Service Group was established for the express purpose of administering the USAREUR positive intelligence units and operating the USAREUR Intelligence Center.[8] However, CINCUSAREUR placed the new organization under the direct control of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, who also retained operational control over the 7880 Military Intelligence Detachment (reorganized and redesignated as the 522d Military Intelligence Battalion on 27 July 1954), the 7746 Communications Intelligence Service Detachment, the 1st Military Censorship Organization, and the 4th, 403d, and 461st Strategic Intelligence Detachments. For a graphic presentation of the direct control, coordination, and operational intelligence channels of the command, see Chart 6. The USAREUR G2 also continued to supervise the intelligence responsibilities and activities of the USAREUR chiefs of technical services. The 66th Counterintelligence Corps Group and the 7712 USAREUR Intelligence and Military Police School at Oberammergau were under the direct control of the USAREUR G2. The first-named organization, composed of a headquarters at Stuttgart and seven regional areas of operation, performed the counterintelligence mission in the USAREUR

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[7] Organizational Manual for USAREUR ACOFS G2, 1 Jan 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G2 Div Admin Br files.

[8] (1) USAREUR GO 41, 22 Dec 52. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR Trp Asg No. 2, 23 Jan 53. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR G2 Div Hist Jnl file.

area of responsibility and maintained a central registry of dossiers and personality card files for security and intelligence purposes.[9]

49. Fields of Intelligence Interest

During 1953 and 1954 the principal intelligence efforts of USAREUR were directed toward Eastern Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Zone of Austria, because it was believed that this Soviet satellite complex comprised the logical concentration area for an attack against Western Europe.[10] The command's primary interest was in indications of the imminence of hostilities. This interest extended to the potentialities of the Soviet Union and its satellites for waging war--orders of battle, armaments production, logistical support and operations, scientific and technical research and development--and their general political and economic situation. Specific information was sought on the identification and location of Soviet and satellite military units and installations, troop maneuvers, equipment and material, troop strengths, Soviet troop rotation policy, and principal military commanders, as well as in the broader areas of industrial production, labor problems, economic planning, and general economic progress. Information was also sought on roads, railroads, navigable waterways, cableways, pipelines, landing beaches and ports; the location and description of all man-made structures associated with the lines of communication of the USSR and its satellites; and specifications, standards, and general data relative to planned, programmed, and accomplished construction work. CINCUSAREUR was also interested in the location, identity, and physical description of natural and man-made features normally included on topographic maps, such as relief and drainage, vegetation and land use, lines of communications, telecommunication and electric power lines, and urban and built-up areas. Other items of intelligence interest were the riots of June 1953 in Eastern Germany and the Soviet Sector of Berlin, the deployment of Soviet troops to quell the riots, border incidents, Soviet-inspired moves to impede traffic between Berlin and Western Germany, and intelligence operations of the Soviet Union and its satellites.[11]

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[9] USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file, 1953-54. SECRET. In USAREUR G2 Div Opns Br files.

[10] Ibid.

[11] (1) USAREUR ACOFS G2 Intel Sums 155-192, 30 Jan 53 to 2 Jul 54. SECRET. (2) Notes on LANDCENT Intel Conf 27-28 Aug 53. NATO RESTRICTED. In USAREUR SGS 350.09 (1953), Vol. I, Item 76. (3) Ltr, USAREUR ACOFS G2 to CO 7880 AU, 4 Apr 54, sub: Preparation of Engineer Technical Intelligence Reports. In USAREUR G2 Div 350.09 (1954).

50. Collection Procedures and Problems

Collecting information for intelligence purposes involves four principal steps: determining the kinds of information wanted, preparing a collection plan, issuing orders and requests for information to the pertinent collection agencies, and compiling by the agencies of the information obtained through the exploitation of sources.

a. Determining the Information to be Collected. Basic general guidance for determining the kinds of information that USAREUR was to collect was provided by the National Intelligence Service outline guide. Detailed requirements were contained in the then current Department of the Army collection plan, in its collection memorandums and in its specific requests for information. US EUCOM and other governmental agencies also requested intelligence information from USAREUR. A list of the more critical types of information desired by CINCUSAREUR and the other commanders and agencies was prepared and distributed by the USAREUR G2. This list was known as the USAREUR Essential Elements of Information.[12]

b. Issuing Orders and Requests for Information. Although the USAREUR Essential Elements of Information focused the attention of all collecting agencies and intelligence personnel on the specific information desired, USAREUR headquarters also sent intelligence directives and more explicit requests to the agencies. When the need for a particular type of information was of a continuing nature, as for example, in the case of factory markings, intelligence collection memorandums were sent to pertinent agencies. These memorandums were issued as the need arose, and furnished agencies with detailed requirements. When the information desired was of a one-time or short-term nature, specific requests for information were issued. Periodic instructions giving general policy guidance and instructions for handling specific requests for information were transmitted through command letters and G2 Division letters. When there was insufficient time for the issuance of a written specific request for information, and when the need was urgent, spot requests were made. Spot requests were normally followed by supplemental instructions or by cancellations if the information was no longer needed.[13]

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[12](1) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj A. A. Terris, USAREUR G2 Div Opns Br, 22 Dec 54. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) USAREUR G2 Div Actvs file, 1953-54. SECRET. In USAREUR G2 Div Opns Br. (3) USAREUR ltr, 23 Jun 50, sub: USAREUR Intelligence Directive No. 1. AG 350.09. SECRET. (4) USAREUR ltr, 3 Aug 54, sub: Intelligence Activities. AG 322.011. SECRET.

[13]Ibid.

c. Collection Agencies. The details of the USAREUR intelligence collection system were highly classified. The basic operational element in the system was the collection agency, defined as any person, unit, or instrumentality that acquired information by research, observation, or interrogation. Tables of organization and equipment provided USAREUR with collection agencies under its direction and control. Intelligence specialists such as observers, interrogators, translators, and interpreters were assigned or attached to the agencies, which operated in accordance with methods and techniques developed through experience and scientific analysis.[14]

d. Exploiting Sources of Information. Not all sources of information exploited were under the direction and control of USAREUR. Their development in sufficient numbers and dependability was a long, delicate, and costly process. Moreover, the disclosure of a source, which could be accomplished in many startlingly easy ways, could deprive USAREUR of more vital sources of intelligence than could the opposing intelligence services of potential enemies.[15] Among the most fruitful of USAREUR's sources of information about the USSR and its satellite countries were persons crossing the border from the Soviet sphere of influence to West Berlin and Western Germany. These refugees, defectors, returnees, escapees, evaders, and other border crossers were screened at the border and in the refugee camps established by West Berlin, the German Federal Republic, and the Land governments. Individuals possessing knowledge within USAREUR's fields of intelligence interest were then exploited for information by USAREUR intelligence specialists at interrogation centers. USAREUR personnel and personnel of USAREUR intelligence networks were also extremely valuable sources because of their observations, experiences, and contacts in the USSR and satellite areas.[16] Usually, documents prepared by the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Germany for their own information and guidance were also very reliable sources. By overt and clandestine means, USAREUR obtained several such documents which provided concise, accurate, and valuable information on many subjects of intelligence interest. For example, a copy of a Russian manual that had been distributed to the Soviet troops contained, among other things, explicit instructions for the guidance of troop behavior in the event of an atomic

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[14] Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj. J. C. Pleasant, USAREUR G2 Div Opns Br, 22 Dec 54. CONFIDENTIAL.

[15] Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj R. W. Hodgson, USAREUR G2 Div CI Br, 22 Dec 54. CONFIDENTIAL.

[16] Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj A. A. Terris, USAREUR G2 Div Opns Br, 22 Dec 54. SECRET.

attack. When examined by experienced intelligence analysts, it yielded important information on the state of Soviet atomic warfare knowledge.[17] Equipment and materiel of the Soviet and satellite military forces were frequently obtained and were examined by USAREUR technical intelligence specialists, who thus acquired much valuable information. Moreover, the monitoring of telephone, telegraph, and telecommunications lines by highly specialized communications intelligence personnel provided a lucrative source of information.[18]

e. Collection Problems. Problems encountered in collecting information for USAREUR intelligence purposes included the major difficulty of obtaining adequate personnel qualified for assignment to collection organizations.[19] Minimum requirements were maturity, good judgment, native ability, tact, discretion, integrity and unimpeachable loyalty.[20] In most instances personnel with close relatives in the Soviet sphere of influence were barred. Collection organizations were understaffed and hampered in accomplishing their missions, because screening operations at the USAREUR replacement centers did not produce a sufficient number of qualified persons. Moreover, many men assigned to the field agencies were inexperienced draftees who were no sooner trained and proficient at their tasks than they were eligible for discharge.[21] Another difficulty pertained to the screening of border crossers. The West German security service and the USAREUR positive intelligence field agencies had worked out a system of screening them cooperatively, and collecting information from them, at the border and in the camps. This system had been operating quite satisfactorily for several years, but during 1953 the West German security service decided that it preferred to work alone and to transmit pertinent information to the United States and its Allies.[22] The new procedure would have deprived USAREUR of direct access to important sources of information and would have endangered its right to

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[17] USAREUR G2 Div Actvs file, 1953-54. SECRET. In USAREUR G2 Div Opns Br.

[18] Ibid.

[19] DF, C/USAREUR G2 Div Opns Br to C/USAREUR G2 Div Admin Br, 23 Jun 54, sub: Historical Report, G2. SECRET. In USAREUR G2 Div Admin Br files.

[20] Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj J. C. Pleasant, USAREUR G2 Div Opns Br, 22 Dec 54. CONFIDENTIAL.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ltr, USAREUR ACOFS G2 to USCOB Intel Off, 3 Apr 53, sub: U.S. Position with Reference to Participation in German Refugee Screening. SECRET. In USAREUR G2 Div 350.09 (1953).

collect, without interference, information required for fulfillment of its defense mission. However, USAREUR, through the Allied Directors of Intelligence, was able to avert this threat to the command's intelligence efforts.[23] Still another difficulty resulted from the fact that USAREUR's collection agencies had to contend with the counterintelligence activities of the Soviet bloc. For instance, the Soviet Union and its satellites deliberately distributed false information. Moreover, some of their agents, masquerading as refugees or illegal border crossers, managed to gain admittance to camps in Western Germany and West Berlin, and tried to persuade the inmates not to divulge any information to USAREUR interrogators. These tactics of confusion definitely hampered the command's positive intelligence activities and had to be countered by USAREUR counterintelligence agencies. Nevertheless, Soviet bloc agents sometimes escaped detection in the camps, were given refugee status, and were thereby furnished with an excellent cover for infiltration into Western Germany to engage in Soviet positive intelligence activity.[24]

51. USAREUR Collection Agencies

Every USAREUR subordinate commander was responsible for the overt collection of intelligence information within his area of responsibility, as required by his missions or as directly specified by Headquarters, USAREUR. Collections within friendly areas outside of the U.S. Zone of Germany were to be coordinated with the USAREUR G2. Subordinate commanders were directed to undertake covert collection only on direct authority from Headquarters, USAREUR, and all such covert activities were to be under the supervision, direction, and coordination of the USAREUR G2.[25]

a. Seventh Army. The chief responsibility of the Seventh Army in the field of intelligence collection was the overt collection and production of intelligence, within the U.S. Zone of Germany, related to the physical security of the border between that zone and the Soviet Zone of Germany and Czechoslovakia. In addition, the Commanding General, Seventh Army, was responsible for the collection and dissemination of intelligence relating to activities, conditions, individuals, or agencies within Germany that threatened the security of Seventh Army troops and installations. However, this responsibility did not include the counterintelligence security of the U.S. forces in Germany, which was the

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[23] Ibid.

[24] USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file, 1953-54. SECRET. In USAREUR G2 Div Opns Br.

[25] USAREUR ltr, 23 Jun 50, sub: USAREUR Intelligence Directive No. 1. AG 350.09. SECRET.

responsibility of the Commanding Officer, 66th CIC Group. The Commanding General, Seventh Army, was also responsible for the collection of basic intelligence information and intelligence within his area of responsibility, as required by his missions and as directed by Headquarters, USAREUR.[26]

b. Area Commands. The commanders of area commands within the U.S. Zone of Germany, the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation, and Berlin were directed to engage in overt collection and reporting of intelligence information and intelligence, using authorized personnel and facilities, when and as directed by Headquarters, USAREUR. However, these commanders were specifically cautioned against engaging in any covert intelligence collection activities without such direction.[27]

c. USAREUR COMZ. The Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ, was responsible for coordinating all intelligence activities within USAREUR COMZ in order to provide an adequate and timely warning of existing or approaching danger to installations. He was also responsible for reporting all pertinent information collected to Headquarters, USAREUR, in accordance with applicable directives. His specific intelligence interest was in the general attitude of the French people and the French Government toward the U.S. logistical program in France and the extent of Communist Party influence on French governmental agencies with which negotiations were regularly conducted as a normal part of USAREUR COMZ activities. Headquarters, USAREUR, retained responsibility for all negotiations with French intelligence agencies on matters of positive intelligence and on intelligence matters that concerned the command as a whole. In such cases the Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ, was to be kept fully informed of the negotiations and was authorized to be represented in the discussion of problems which affected USAREUR COMZ.[28]

d. 66th CIC Group. Beginning in early 1949, the 66th CIC Group was responsible for conducting covert positive intelligence operations in support of the USAREUR order of battle requirements. Its collection activities extended over approximately half of the Soviet Zone of Germany and included the collection of intelligence information on approximately half of the Soviet Army of Occupation. It was responsible for collecting intelligence information in that portion of the Soviet Zone of Germany which lay west of an

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[26] Ibid.

[27] (1) Ibid. (2) USAREUR ltr, 3 Aug 54, sub: Intelligence Activities. AG 322.011 G2. SECRET.

[28] USAREUR ltr, 4 May 53, sub: Intelligence Directive (LOFC). AG 322 GID-AGO. SECRET.

imaginary north-south line intersecting the zone in the vicinity of Potsdam. In addition, it was the sole USAREUR agency engaged in positive intelligence collection operations in Czechoslovakia. The 66th CIC Group was relieved of covert positive intelligence operations on 14 June 1954, and these responsibilities were assumed by the Military Intelligence Detachment, 7880 Army Unit. The 66th CIC Group mission remained counterintelligence (see par. 55, below).[29]

e. 513th Military Intelligence Service Group. On 15 January 1953, CINCUSAREUR established the 513th Military Intelligence Service (MIS) Group (reorganized and redesignated as the 513th Military Intelligence Group on 20 October 1953), as a subordinate command of USAREUR under the direct supervision and operational control of the USAREUR G2.[30] The group was given administrative control over the USAREUR positive intelligence agencies and was responsible for providing military intelligence specialist support to USAREUR headquarters and to USAREUR units, and for performing such other specialized intelligence activities as might be assigned by the USAREUR G2. Further, the commanding officer of the group was responsible for organizing, maintaining, and operating the USAREUR Intelligence Center. This included responsibility for the housing and welfare of individuals assigned to the commander's custody because of their special interest to positive intelligence or counterintelligence agencies.[31]

f. USAREUR Intelligence Center. The USAREUR Intelligence Center was an overt intelligence organization formed from personnel of the 513th MIS Group. The center was not only responsible for the collection of information through the exploitation of overt sources within the U.S. Zone of Germany, but for the preparation and the transmission to USAREUR headquarters of reports resulting from such interrogations. It was also responsible for screening and interrogating ex-prisoners of war returned to the U.S. Zone of Germany from Soviet and Eastern European control; interrogating border crossers selected by the USAREUR G2 or by the Intelligence Center itself; interrogating other selected sources consigned to the 513th MIS Group by the USAREUR G2; maintaining contact with official and private organizations within the U.S. Zone of Germany that were essential to the development of the assigned mission, although this authorization did not include the use of paid

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[29] Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G2 to USAREUR ACOFS G3, 4 Feb 53, sub: Intelligence Personnel Savings. SECRET. In USAREUR G2 Div Cen files.

[30] USAREUR GO 41, 22 Dec 52, sub: (1) Activation of the 513th MIS Group; (2) Discontinuance of Hq and Hq Co, 7707 USAREUR Intelligence Center. UNCLASSIFIED.

[31] USAREUR ltr, 28 Jan 53, sub: Operations of the 513th MIS Group. AG 350.09 GID-AGO. SECRET.

informants, agent networks, or informant networks; and providing for the housing, welfare, and disposition of the sources consigned to the center by the USAREUR G2. The mission of the center also included responsibility for collecting and processing into appropriate format the data obtained from the exploitation of overt sources within certain fields of interest. The center was directed to incorporate, in its industrial card file, information transmitted by other intelligence agencies within USAREUR, and those agencies were authorized to forward information directly to the center in accordance with instructions from the USAREUR G2. Responsibility lay with the center for collecting information on transportation and communications within the USSR and the Eastern European countries within the Soviet bloc, and on electric power stations and electric power grids within the same area. Data was to be collected on manpower and labor, including pay grades, scale of wages, and similar items. In providing information, the center was to give priority to areas of interest in the following order: the Soviet Zone of Germany; the USSR; Czechoslovakia; other Eastern European countries within the Soviet bloc; Western Germany. However, any collection activity designed to procure scientific and technical information about Western Germany was to be cleared with the USAREUR G2 prior to initiation. In the field of military activities the center interrogated German ex-prisoners of war as well as other intelligence sources consigned it by G2 in order to obtain military information concerning the ground forces of the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.[32]

g. Military Intelligence Detachment, 7880 Army Unit. The clandestine collection of military intelligence pertaining to the East Zone of Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland was carried out by the 7880 Army Unit, a USAREUR agency which operated in Berlin. This military intelligence detachment collected information concerning order of battle, transportation, telecommunications, scientific and technical developments, and economic affairs. To facilitate the collection effort, the USAREUR technical services furnished the detachment with appropriate technical intelligence specialists. The required information was obtained by means of penetrations, resident agents, and roving observers. Innumerable obstacles to these operations arose throughout the indicated target area because of the tight security measures taken by the Soviet and satellite security agencies. In spite of these obstacles, the collection activity was relatively successful, as was

[32] Ltr, USAREUR ACOFS G2 to CO 513th MIS Gp, 28 Jan 53, sub: Operations of the USAREUR Intelligence Center. 350.09 (GID/PP&T). SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Hist Jnl files (1953), Item 3.

reflected in the production of a reliable military intelligence estimate.[33]

h. USAREUR Technical Services. The intelligence responsibilities and activities of the USAREUR chiefs of technical services were directed, supervised, and coordinated by the USAREUR G2. Each chief was responsible for the production of intelligence within his field of interest, including intelligence concerning the design, manufacture, operational characteristics, and storage of foreign weapons as well as information concerning the military organizations, installations, and techniques pertaining thereto. Within continental France and Western Germany, technical service chiefs performed the overt collection of pertinent technical intelligence information and intelligence under the supervision and coordination of the USAREUR G2. However, requirements of the technical services for the collection of technical intelligence information and intelligence in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Eastern Germany had to be submitted to G2 for processing. Within other areas of strategic interest to USAREUR, the chiefs were directed to maintain a library of general technical reference material and strategic studies of interest to their respective services. Examples of the documents to be so maintained were the National Intelligence Surveys, strategic technical service studies, and dossiers prepared by the technical services chiefs of the Department of the Army and other major headquarters. However, USAREUR chiefs of technical services were authorized to disseminate intelligence information only to elements of the technical services concerned, to the USAREUR G2, or as directed by him.[34]

i. USAREUR Military Liaison Mission, Potsdam. Since 1947, when the commander in chief of the European Command requested the U.S. Military Mission, Potsdam, to develop the potentialities of its strategic location in the Soviet Zone of Germany for intelligence purposes, one of the mission s major tasks has been the collection of intelligence and intelligence information in that zone and the coordination of such intelligence activities with other agencies. Under the terms of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement of 2 April 1947, the personnel strength of that mission was limited to fourteen commissioned and enlisted members, who were accredited to the Commander in Chief, Soviet Forces of Occupation, and who

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[33](1) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Capt J. J. Hagerty, USAREUR G2 Div Opns Br, 22 Jan 55. SECRET. (2) USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file, 1953-54. SECRET. In USAREUR G2 Div Opns Br.

[34](1) USAREUR ltr, 23 Jun 50, sub: Intelligence Directive No. 1. AG 350.09 GID-AGO. SECRET. (2) USAREUR ltr, 3 Aug 54, sub: Intelligence Activities. AG 322.011 G2. SECRET.

carried credentials which permitted them access to, and relative freedom of travel in, the Soviet Zone of Germany. Included in the fourteen were representatives of the U.S. Navy and Air Force.[35] These activities continued during the period under review. For intelligence collection purposes the Soviet Zone of Germany was divided into six areas and in each area the responsibility for coverage was assigned to a specific accredited officer. However, Air Force and Navy representatives were responsible for the coverage of their own peculiar objectives, regardless of location. This area responsibility system had the effect of making each officer a specialist in a relatively small area of the Soviet Zone and of bringing about more intimate contact with all objectives within the area. For better observation, the officers of the mission traveled in pairs. During the course of a week, each officer normally accomplished two tours of his own area and one of a neighboring area. The observing officers considered areas of interest in the following priority order: factors determining the imminence of hostilities; specific requests for information; intelligence collection memorandums; miscellaneous requests. Because observation was firsthand and made by qualified U.S. military personnel, the mission evaluated the information where necessary and disseminated it in the form of comments. The mission personnel, however, were hampered by the fact that observation of both military and civilian objectives was very brief, since mission members could not leave their cars and observation was limited to the few seconds required by a car, moving at 15 to 25 miles per hour, to pass a specific objective.[36]

j. Berlin Document Center. One of the chief sources in Germany for information pertaining to the Nazi Party and its members was a central depository of Nazi Party records located in Berlin and known as the Berlin Document Center. The center was a joint USAREUR and HICOG project, which was operated by the Berlin Command until 1 October 1953. The records were used chiefly by USAREUR, HICOG, and other agencies in checking the party affiliations of German nationals employed or being considered for employment by those agencies. They were also used by agencies of the U.S. State Department in determining whether individuals were eligible for immigration to the United States under the restrictions imposed by law on former members of the Nazi Party. Representatives of similar British, French, and German agencies were

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[35](1) EUCOM/USAREUR Comd Rpt, 1952, pp. 412-13. SECRET. (2) A Survey of Soviet Aims, Policies and Tactics, pp. 290-97, Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1947-48. SECRET. Both in USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

[36]USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file, 1953-54. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br.

granted access to the documents.[37] For other purposes, access was granted on a priority basis to representatives of governmental agencies engaged in historical or scientific research for the U.S. or Allied governments and to individuals in the services on a "need-to-know" basis, determined at the time of the request. Access was denied to private citizens engaged in private research until such time as final disposition of the records was to be made.[38] During late 1952 the USAREUR G2 collaborated with a HICOG committee in making recommendations for the disposition of the captured German records then in the possession of the center. The report of this committee was submitted to the Departments of State and the Army jointly in January 1953. In March the Department of the Army informed CINCUSAREUR that it had proposed to the State Department that HICOG assume all responsibility for the operation of the center and that the recommendations for the disposition of surplus records be implemented without delay.[39] During 1953 it was estimated that the center was being used to the extent of about 15,000 file checks a month. Nevertheless, in May 1953 the Berlin Command recommended closing the center because of a lack of dollar funds to operate it during FY 1954.[40] USAREUR, pressing the Department of the Army for an early decision, pointed out that budget and personnel cuts already required the drastic reduction of employees at the documents center before the end of 1953. Reductions in service were made, but on the basis that requests for intelligence information submitted by USAREUR would be processed before those of other U.S. agencies and foreign governments. On 1 October 1953 exclusive responsibility for controlling and operating the Berlin Document Center was transferred to HICOG.[41]

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[37] Ltr, USAREUR ACOFS G2 to USAREUR DCOFS for Admin, 1 May 53, sub: Berlin Document Center. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 094 Berlin (1953), Vol. I, Item 28A atchd.

[38] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG Berlin Comd, 28 Apr 53, sub: Access to Information in the Berlin Documents Center. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Hist Jnl file.

[39] C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G2 to USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 21 Jul 53, sub: USAREUR HICOG Projects. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 (1953), Vol. I, Item 17A.

[40] Ltr, USAREUR ACOFS G2 to USAREUR DCOFS for Admin, 1 May 53, sub: Berlin Document Center. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 094 Berlin (1953), Vol. I, Item 28A.

[41] (1) Ltr, USAREUR ACOFS G2 to ACOFSA G2, 17 Jul 53, sub: Berlin Document Center. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Hist Jnl file, Item 1. (2) Cable S-3074, CINCUSAREUR to USCOB, 24 Sep 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS SMC. (3) Berlin Comd GO 30, 1 Oct 53. UNCLASSIFIED.

52. Non-USAREUR Collection Agencies

a. Agencies of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany.

(1) Office of Coordinator and Special Adviser. The intelligence mission of HICOG was the responsibility of his Coordinator and Special Adviser for Military Security, Defense, Organization, and Public Safety. During 1953 and 1954 this position was held by Lt. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott. As Senior U.S. Intelligence Representative in Germany, General Truscott coordinated the activities of all U.S. intelligence agencies in the area. He was also the director of all Central Intelligence Agency activities in Germany and was responsible for maintaining necessary liaison with the intelligence services of foreign nations. The Office of Coordinator and Special Adviser overtly collected intelligence information from U.S. sources, Allied officials, and officials of the German Federal Republic and the Laender. It was principally interested in political, economic, sociological, and security intelligence information concerning Western Germany, including information on the area's capabilities and the government's intentions and policies. In addition it gathered biographical information on leading German personalities. It was also interested in information on other European areas that might have an influence on German affairs. The USAREUR G2 obtained all of the foregoing information through his liaison officer at Bonn.[42]

(2) Department of the Army Detachment. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operated in Germany under the cover name of Department of the Army Detachment, but had no direct relationship with USAREUR. Certain USAREUR intelligence activities were coordinated with those of the CIA and there was some cooperation at a few field intelligence installations. Otherwise, CIA activities were carried on independently. CINCUSAREUR was on the CIA distribution list for copies of printed intelligence information prepared by that agency.[43]

(3) Special Detachment USAREUR. The 6966 Special Detachment USAREUR was an intelligence agency operating under the direction and control of the Department of the Army Detachment. It was

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[42](1) IRS, USAREUR Dep ACOFS G2 to C/USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br, 13 Jan 54, sub: Change in Liaison Functions of G2 and 66th CIC Representative at Bonn. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR G2 Div Hist Jnl file. (2) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col A. L. Leonard, Jr., USAREUR G2 Div Ln Off to HICOG, 16 Jul 54. SECRET.

[43]Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Col L. N. Taylor, C/USAREUR G2 Div Intel Br, 17 Jan 55. SECRET.

engaged in the production of intelligence for dissemination to its parent organization and other agencies, and directed the intelligence activities of an affiliated clandestine agency, the so-called Gehlen Group, which was staffed by West German nationals. The chief of the clandestine agency had operational control over his organization, but the Special Detachment USAREUR exercised control over other aspects of its functioning. A liaison officer representing the USAREUR G2 was stationed at the Special Detachment headquarters, and through him regular exchange of information concerning the strength, disposition, and armament of the Soviet and satellite military forces was effected, enabling USAREUR to check its own estimates against the entirely independent estimates of the detachment. Although material produced by the detachment was not incorporated into USAREUR's intelligence production, it did greatly assist USAREUR in evaluating sources, establishing leads, and providing a basis of comparison.[44]

(4) Defector Reception Center. Overtly known as the 7925 Personnel Survey Detachment, the Defector Reception Center was a CIA-supervised interagency installation situated in the Frankfurt area. It was operated under policy laid down by the Interagency Defector Committee in Washington and the Defector Committee in Germany. The committee in Germany was composed of representatives of USAREUR, HICOG, USAFE, USNAVGER, and CIA, with the CIA representative as chairman. Persons classified as defectors during screening operations were sent to the center for processing, debriefing, and interrogation. To be so classified, an individual was supposed to have fled either overtly or covertly from the USSR or countries in the Soviet orbit. In addition, according to requirements he was supposed to be of interest to the U.S. Government because he had valuable new information on the Soviet area, or because he was of operational value to a U.S. agency, or because his defection could be exploited in the psychological field. Between 1951 and 1954 a yearly average of 43 defectors was handled at the center. Most of them were knowledgeable voluntary escapees. Only a small percentage had been induced to leave by the CIA and Army intelligence networks.[45] In practice, any Soviet citizen, regardless of category, was accepted; and any satellite military officer or civilian of comparable rank or background was accepted if he was of interest to two or more of the participating U.S. intelligence agencies. As a rule, no East

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[44](1) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj A. A. Terris, USAREUR G2 Div Opns Br, 22 Dec 54. SECRET. (2) USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs File 1953-54. SECRET. In USAREUR G2 Div Opns Br.

[45]USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs File, 1953-54. SECRET. In USAREUR G2 Div Opns Br.

Germans of any category were accepted, although in 1954 two were exploited. The Defectors Reception Center was the only installation where qualified U.S. Army interrogators could talk with knowledgeable Soviet and satellite intelligence sources as long as desired or on any subject of interest.[46]

(5) Returnee Exploitation Group. During 1946 approximately 3,500 German scientists and technicians who were working for the Soviets in East German research institutes were suddenly transported to the USSR, where they worked under contracts signed voluntarily or through coercion. In succeeding years many of these men began to return to Germany, through defection, escape, or voluntary release. Since they possessed valuable knowledge concerning Soviet installations, laboratories, and scientific research and development, they were excellent sources of technical intelligence information. Acting under the over-all supervision of the Interagency Defector Committee and the Defector Committee in Germany, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency formed the Returnee Exploitation Group (REG), which became responsible for the selection, acquisition, exploitation, welfare, documentation, and resettlement of all German returnee scientists and technicians interrogated by U.S. intelligence agencies. Each returnee was referred to by the code name DRAGON, and to promote interagency participation and over-all guidance, the group formed the DRAGON Committee consisting of the chief of the group as chairman and representatives of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Scientific Detachment of CIA. This committee participated in policy-making and planning and also in selecting DRAGONS, aiding in their defection, and exploiting them. The USAREUR G2 was represented in the group by a liaison officer whose primary responsibility was to gather specifically requested information concerning scientific and technical progress in the USSR.[47] Information was gathered by a 2-man team consisting of a case and reports officer of the Returnee Exploitation Group and a service technician who was a specialist in the same technical field as the DRAGON. The organization and facilities of the Returnee Exploitation Group were capable of providing the U.S. Army with a tremendous amount of Soviet scientific and technical intelligence and at a minimum of expense, since only the pay of the USAREUR liaison officer was involved. Unfortunately, the Department of the Army did not take full advantage of this opportunity. The Department did not furnish the USAREUR representative with proper guidance and it

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[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid.

serviced its requirements through the CIA in Washington. Because of this apparent lack of departmental interest, the USAREUR liaison officer's capabilities were not used fully, and there was duplication of effort. By mid-1954 USAREUR requested departmental guidance to remedy these shortcomings.[48]

(6) International Tracing Service. The Allied High Commission for Germany operated the International Tracing Service, which was situated at Arolsen in the British Zone. In November 1953 representatives of USAREUR G2 surveyed the records of the service to determine their intelligence value and to obtain information for making recommendations as to their future disposition.[49]

(a) Inventory of Records. The files consisted mainly of approximately 17,000,000 locator cards of individuals who had been listed in concentration camps and on deportation records, lists of Jewish immigrants to Israel from June 1948 through December 1950, and approximately 2,385,000 cards taken from the registration records of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Association (UNNRA) concerning displaced persons in Germany at the end of the war. The latter cards listed the background, linguistic ability, residences, and medical history of each person registered. In addition, the files held some 175,000 "Application for IRO Assistance" forms prepared by the International Refugee Organization (IRO) after the discontinuance of UNNRA in the latter part of 1947. These forms listed pertinent facts concerning the families, educational achievements, organizational affiliations, financial status, residences, and desired immigration destinations of each registrant. Other files included records of the Dachau, Buchenwald, Gross-Rosen, and Sachsenhausen concentration camps, and records of the emigration of approximately one million persons, 350,000 of whom emigrated to the United States.[50]

(b) Requests for Information. Between May and October 1953 the International Tracing Service processed 37,638 requests for information and certifications of death, incarceration, residence, and escapee status. The United States, Israel,

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[48] DF, C/USAREUR G2 Div Opns Br to C/USAREUR G2 Div Admin Br, 23 Jun 54, sub: Historical Report, G2. SECRET. In USAREUR G2 Div Admin Br files.

[49] (1) Ltr, USAREUR ACOFS G2 to Mr. A. Cagiati, HICOG, 19 Nov 53, sub: Records of the International Tracing Service. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Hist Jnl file. (2) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col G. L. Wilson, USAREUR G2 Div Opns Br, 21 Dec 54. CONFIDENTIAL.

[50] Ltr, 19 Nov 53, cited above.

and Western Germany each submitted more than 8,000 requests. Requests from U.S. organizations included 7,029 from the U.S. escapee program and 620 from USAREUR intelligence agencies. Throughout 1953 and 1954 USAREUR intelligence agencies used the records for obtaining information concerning the backgrounds of persons involved in espionage cases, for determining whether individuals were displaced persons or escapees, for determining whether documents regarding residence or incarceration had been falsified, for verifying information submitted by visa applicants, and for reviewing information on cases being investigated for the U.S. escapee program.[51]

(c) USAREUR Recommendations. The USAREUR intelligence survey team believed it was inadvisable to transfer the records of the International Tracing Service to the control of the German Federal Republic because they might be used to barter with the Russians for the repatriation of Germans being held behind the Iron Curtain, and because information in the files might be used for extortion purposes. Moreover, the records, which were of historical and intelligence value to the United States and of vital importance to the individuals concerned or their next of kin, might be destroyed either through negligence or intention. The team recommended that arrangements be made to keep the International Tracing Service active during 1954 and 1955; that action be taken to ship all original concentration camp records to the United States before the end of 1955 and make photostats of them for ultimate release to the German Federal Republic; and that at the end of 1955 all resettlement records should be destroyed, but not before further survey by all intelligence agencies.[52] These recommendations were still being considered by USAREUR on 30 June 1954. No concrete action for implementing them had been taken, but the service continued to operate for the benefit of the participating agencies.[53]

b. U.S. Air Force and Navy. The U.S. Air Force in Europe, and to a lesser extent the U.S. Navy, gathered important information required by CINCUSAREUR. This information included Soviet air capability for carrying atomic weapons and Soviet capability for interfering with the safety and movement of USAREUR's airborne troops. USAFE also engaged in aerial reconnaissance and in aerial photographic activities for USAREUR intelligence targeting

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[51](1) Ibid. (2) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj R. W. Hodgson, USAREUR G2 Div CI Br, 22 Dec 54. SECRET.

[52]Ibid.

[53]Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col G. L. Wilson, USAREUR G2 Div Opns Br, 21 Dec 54. CONFIDENTIAL.

and military mapping purposes.[54] USNAVGER's Office of Naval Intelligence, with headquarters in Berlin, rendered certain intelligence support, including naval air reconnaissance, to CINCUSAREUR.

c. Army Security Agency in Europe. The Army Security Agency in Europe (ASAE) functioned under the operational control of the Department of the Army. It furnished communications intelligence and communications security support to USAREUR, not only to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, but throughout the USAREUR intelligence structure. With headquarters in Frankfurt, ASAE had about 4,500 personnel in Germany as of 30 June 1954. Under the direction of the USAREUR G2, ASAE operations were arranged and geared to facilitate the recognition and rapid reporting of early warning indications of the imminence of hostilities. To insure that the information would be received without delay, rapid means of communication were made available and an ASAE special liaison officer was assigned to the USAREUR G2 office. A wealth of other basic intelligence concerning such matters as Soviet order of battle, Soviet and satellite military, paramilitary, police and air activity, transportation, logistics, communications, and political and economic developments affecting the East German and other satellite war potential, flowed into intelligence channels from the operations of the ASAE. USAREUR received this intelligence, on a selective basis, through special channels.[55]

d. German Federal Republic Security Service. The German Federal Republic's security service was the Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz (BfV) or Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. USAREUR maintained liaison with the BfV within the framework of authorization granted by the Allied High Commissioners. The channel of communications with the BfV was through the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany. USAREUR liaison officers assisted the BfV in developing professional standards of operation, rendered technical intelligence advice, protected U.S. intelligence interests, and made arrangements for the mutual exchange of intelligence information. The BfV collected considerable information of value to USAREUR both in the positive and counterintelligence fields.[56]

54Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col P. V. Converse, USAREUR G2 Div Intel Br, 22 Dec 54. SECRET.

55USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs File, 1953-54. SECRET. In USAREUR G2 Div Opns Br.

56(1) Ltr, Brig Gen J. H. Phillips, USAREUR ACOFS G2 to Lt Gen L. K. Truscott, Jr., HICOG Off of Coordinator and Spl Adviser, 8 Jan 54. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) IRS, USAREUR Dep ACOFS G2 to C/ USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br, 13 Jan 54, sub: Change in Liaison Functions of G2 and 66th CIC Representatives at Bonn. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR G2 Div Hist Jnl File, Item 1. (3) Interv, Mr. L.W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj R. W. Hodgson, USAREUR G2 Div CI Br, 22 Dec 54. SECRET.

53. Production of Intelligence

After its collection, information was converted into intelligence by the processes of collation, evaluation, and interpretation. Information so processed was usually synthesized into intelligence studies, reports, and basic documents. The principal basic intelligence documents produced during 1953 and 1954 by USAREUR G2 were order of battle handbooks and summaries concerning the Soviet army in occupied Europe and the Polish, Czechoslovak, and East German armies; Soviet field training area surveys; lists of known military installations occupied by Soviet and satellite forces in Central Europe; a Reichsbahn (East German railways) handbook; and a Soviet equipment identification handbook.[57] The Intelligence Branch also produced periodic intelligence studies and reports, including the USAREUR WEEKA Cable, Intelligence Items of Interest, the biweekly USAREUR Intelligence Summary, the weekly INTEX Cable, and the Quarterly Military Estimate. The last named report, a top secret item, was undoubtedly one of the most significant USAREUR intelligence products. It was an estimate of the military situation in Europe as related to the mission of CINCUSAREUR. It discussed the courses of action open to potential enemies of the United States; the strength, composition, disposition, state of training, and morale of their forces; their communications, and other factors. It also presented a scale of relative probability and basic conclusions.[58]

54. Control and Dissemination of Intelligence

The distribution of intelligence possessed by CINCUSAREUR was strictly controlled, to prevent it from falling into unauthorized hands. The most rigid security control was exercised over information on the command's sources of information.[59]

a. Military Information Control Committee. The joint Military Information Control Committee of the Department of State and Department of Defense determined over-all policy concerning the control and dissemination of U.S. intelligence. The dissemination of intelligence produced within USAREUR, and especially the release

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[57] DF and Incl 1, C/USAREUR G2 Div Intel Br to C/USAREUR G2 Div Admin Br, 6 Jul 54, sub: Historical Report, G2. SECRET. In USAREUR G2 Div Admin Br files.

[58] (1) Ibid. (2) USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file, 1953-54. SECRET. In USAREUR G2 Div Opns Br.

[59] Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj A. A. Terris, USAREUR G2 Div Opns Br, 22 Dec 54. CONFIDENTIAL.

of intelligence to the German Federal Republic, was to some extent subject to the control of this committee.[60]

b. Release of Intelligence to NATO Nations. Intelligence developed for the use of CINCUSAREUR that was made available to the NATO commands was expunged of all information not releasable to foreign nationals. Intelligence items distributed to SHAPE and subordinate commands included the cosmic secret weekly INTEX Cable consisting of excerpts from Items of Intelligence Interest and the USAREUR WEEKA, and an expurgated version of the Quarterly Military Estimate. Certain basic intelligence documents, such as order of battle handbooks, were not released into the general NATO security system, but only to specified foreign nationals in the several NATO headquarters. Special studies and estimates were furnished as appropriate. A considerable volume of USAREUR intelligence passed into NATO channels through a series of intelligence conferences held at Baden-Baden, London, Vienna, Heidelberg, Bad Oeynhausen, and Fontainebleau. These conferences were usually sponsored by the British or by Allied Land Forces in Central Europe (LANDCENT).[61] Intelligence annexes to emergency plans developed in support of defense plans received from higher NATO headquarters were released for circulation within the NATO security system.[62] Furthermore, in accordance with a special requirement imposed by US CINCEUR, the USAREUR G2 made appropriate comments on intelligence reports made available to SHAPE by other NATO nations.

c. Release of Intelligence to the German Federal Republic. CINCUSAREUR was authorized to release information to the German Federal Republic on a need-to-know basis, provided such information was not classified higher than secret. This authority allowed CINCUSAREUR to furnish West German security agencies with intelligence developed by U.S. intelligence agencies concerning the German Communist Party, German Communist fronts, and affiliated organizations. In addition, certain other information on counterespionage and security matters of interest to the German Federal Republic could be supplied. This information included central registry checks on employees of West German governmental entities. However, CINCUSAREUR had serious doubts about the

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[60] Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col A. L. Leonard, USAREUR ACOFS G2 Ln Off to HICOG, 16 Jul 54. CONFIDENTIAL.

[61] Incl 3 to DF, C/USAREUR G2 Div Intel Br to C/USAREUR G2 Div Admin Br, 6 Jul 54, sub: Historical Report, G2. SECRET. In USAREUR G2 Div Admin Br files.

[62] Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col W. P. Brooks, Jr., CENTAG Plans Sec, 28 Jun 54. SECRET.

effectiveness of the internal West German security system.[63] He believed that West German procedures for clearing individuals for access to classified information were inadequate. In addition, West German security measures for the protection of classified information and material did not meet U.S. standards. For these reasons, U.S. classified information furnished to West Germany had to be screened and expurgated. In an effort to make up for the reduction in the quality of the information and to continue the excellent relations existing between the U.S. and West German security and intelligence agencies, USAREUR intelligence agencies tried to increase the quantity of the information furnished.[64]

d. Release of Intelligence to Other U.S. Agencies. A considerable amount of USAREUR information and intelligence was released to other U.S. agencies. The Department of the Army had unlimited access to the command's intelligence resources, and there were practically no restrictions on the release of intelligence to authorized agencies of the other service departments and to the Department of State. In the final analysis, all four departments were jointly responsible for implementing U.S. foreign policy in Western Europe and in furtherance of their missions they required all available information and intelligence. On lower levels of intelligence activity, CINCUSAREUR furnished HICOG with "sensitive" information on the political affiliations and sympathies of German officials and made security checks on prospective HICOG employees. In addition, the eight U.S. consulates in Western Germany were furnished with information on prospective German wives of U.S. military personnel. Most of this information had been gathered during the required premarriage background checks, and the consulates needed it in order to process the wives' requests for U.S. visas. USAREUR released information on individuals to the U.S. escapee program of the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA), to facilitate their processing for immigration to the United States and other countries. In addition, USAREUR G2 personnel assisted the USAFE Office of Special Investigations and the USNAVGER Office of Naval Intelligence in making security checks on individuals being processed for employment by USAFE and USNAVGER.[65]

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[63] Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj R. W. Hodgson, USAREUR G2 Div CI Br, 22 Dec 54. SECRET.

[64] (1) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col A. L. Leonard, USAREUR ACOFS G2 Ln Off to HICOG, 16 Jul 54. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file, 1953-54. SECRET. In USAREUR G2 Div Opns Br.

[65] Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj R. W. Hodgson, USAREUR G2 Div CI Br, 22 Dec 54. SECRET.

55. Counterintelligence

Within USAREUR the counterintelligence mission was assigned to the 66th CIC Group, functioning under the supervision of the USAREUR G2. The group was responsible for the security of USAREUR, including security surveys, inspections of installations, screening of personnel, file checks, security investigations from the point of view of counterintelligence, and for all countersubversion and counterespionage activities. It was also responsible for locating and apprehending specified persons desired for exploitation by the USAREUR G2, and for screening, for immigration purposes, any person designated by USAREUR headquarters. To facilitate the performance of its missions the 66th CIC Group maintained a central registry of intelligence information concerning more than 1,400,000 persons. Dossiers pertaining to approximately 311,000 persons and index references on more than 55,000 impersonal subjects were also in the registry. Early in 1953 it was estimated that the 66th CIC Group processed annually approximately 70,000 investigations, in addition to approximately 1,260,000 requests from other agencies, and that each investigation and request necessitated a central registry check. It was estimated that about 10 percent of the investigative strength of the 66th CIC Group was engaged in such activities.[66] One of the better known categories of counterintelligence activities is counterespionage. In USAREUR the principal counterespionage efforts resulted from leads developed during the methodical file checking, screening, and investigative operations undertaken by the 66th CIC Group in the performance of their routine responsibilities. Counterespionage activities included targeting, in countersubversive files, suspect groups and subversive parties in Western Germany and in the Communist Party and government in the East Zone of Germany. Effective cooperation and liaison in counterespionage was effected with the British, French, and West German counterpart intelligence agencies. In addition, a counterespionage program was conducted by the 66th CIC Group against potential sources of subversion within the command itself. Elements that might seriously jeopardize the current political status in Germany and foster civil disturbances, sedition, sabotage, and espionage existed within communist and rightist political forces in Western Germany and in the official Communist Party in Eastern Germany. The countersubversive activities of the 66th CIC Group were long-range aggressive penetrations of political targets in those areas. The information derived was of interest both to USAREUR and to intelligence agencies in the United States, and was in support of requirements of the State Department as well as those of the Department of the Army.[67]

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[66] Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G2 to USAREUR ACOFS G3, 4 Feb 53, sub: Intelligence Personnel Savings. SECRET. In USAREUR G2 Cen Files.

[67] Ibid.

56. Coordination of Intelligence Activities

Since the U.S. Armed Forces, the Department of State, and CIA conducted intelligence operations in Europe, their efforts had to be well coordinated to avoid duplication and to achieve maximum effectiveness.

a. Office of Coordinator and Special Adviser, HICOG. Responsibility for the coordination of all U.S. intelligence activities in Germany rested upon the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany and was delegated by him to the chief of the Office of Coordinator and Special Adviser. USAREUR G2 maintained a liaison officer at that office.[68]

b. Intelligence Coordinating Committee, Germany. The Intelligence Coordinating Committee, Germany (ICCG), whose representation included USAREUR, USNAVGER, USAFE, US EUCOM, and CIA, had the function of ensuring that the U.S. Government received maximum benefit from the extensive intelligence facilities available in Germany. The committee systematically examined all aspects of intelligence collection and reporting and initiated any indicated action for the improvement of the program. General Truscott, senior U.S. intelligence representative in Germany, was its permanent chairman.[69]

c. Intelligence Coordinating Committee, Berlin. Established near the end of 1952, the Intelligence Coordinating Committee, Berlin (ICCB) was subordinate to the Intelligence Coordinating Committee, Germany. Its mission was to coordinate the work of U.S. covert intelligence agencies operating in West Berlin, so as to eliminate overlapping operations and dual source usage by participating agencies. It also provided the U.S. Commander, Berlin, with an agency for the discussion of incidents affecting the security of Berlin and for the clarification of intelligence developments in that city. The committee was composed of representatives of the 7983 Army Unit, the 7880 Military Intelligence Detachment, the Office of Naval Intelligence of USNAVGER, Region VIII of the 66th CIC Group, the Office of Special Investigations of USAFE, the 7050 Air Intelligence Service Wing of USAFE, and the intelligence officer of the U.S. Commander, Berlin.[70]

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[68] IRS, USAREUR Dep ACOFS G2 to C/USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br, 13 Jan 54, sub: Change in Liaison Functions of G2 and 66th CIC Representatives at Bonn. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR G2 Div Hist Jnl file.

[69] USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file, 1953-54. SECRET. In USAREUR G2 Div Opns Br.

[70] Ibid.

d. Joint Coordinating Panel. The Joint Coordinating Panel, a subcommittee of the Intelligence Coordinating Committee for Germany, coordinated the exploitation of German prisoners of war returning from the Soviet Union. The panel was composed of one representative each from USAREUR, USAFE, USNAVGER, and the Department of the Army Detachment, with the USAFE representative as chairman. Its functions were to insure the efficient screening and interrogation of sources in order to eliminate needless duplication of effort in screening operations, to determine which participating U.S. intelligence agencies had primary interest, and to provide for the efficient interrogation of all sources who were of interest to two or more agencies.[71]

e. Counterintelligence Coordinating Committee. The agency for effecting counterintelligence coordination in Western Germany was the US EUCOM Counterintelligence Coordinating Committee, consisting of representatives of US CINCEUR, CINCUSAREUR, CINCNELM, CINCUSAFE, and the commanding generals of USFA and TRUST. US CINCEUR or his representative was chairman. The purpose of the committee was to facilitate the broad direction and coordination of US EUCOM counterintelligence plans, policies, and operations which were of joint concern.[72]

f. Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority, Germany. As the counterintelligence coordinating authority for Germany as a whole, CINCUSAREUR was empowered to coordinate counterintelligence operations of joint military concern in Western Germany and the U.S. Sector of Berlin. He had authority to require consultation in cases of counterintelligence disagreement between U.S. agencies, but he did not have the right to compel agreement. If he could not obtain essential agreement, he or the subordinate command involved was required to refer the matter to US CINCEUR for final decision.[73]

g. Allied Directors of Intelligence. Neither the charter of the Allied High Commission for Germany nor the administrative agencies established under the charter provide for formal tripartite intelligence machinery. However, after the German Federal Republic established its security service (see par. 52d, above), similar to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, it became evident that the United States, Great Britain, and France would have to

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[71] Ibid.

[72] Ibid.

[73] US EUCOM Policy Dir 40-4, 27 Apr 54, sub: Counterintelligence Responsibilities and Relationships in Germany. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR Hist Div 300 (1954).

arrive at some means of presenting a common front to the West German Government on intelligence and security matters. Consequently, the three directors of intelligence formed virtually a tripartite subcommittee of the HICOM general committees and met about once every two months as the Allied Directors of Intelligence. The meetings were almost exclusively concerned with the organization, staffing, and control of West German agencies for the protection of the German Federal constitution. The agenda for a typical meeting included instructions on West German security, implementation of the intelligence provisions of the contractual agreements, screening of West German officer candidates, German Federal Republic collaboration with the Allies in the security field, and recent developments in the republic's security agency. In morning sessions, the three directors went over the business that had accumulated since the previous meeting and tried to reach agreement on courses of action. In the afternoons West German officials joined them, reported on progress and plans, and were informed of the Allies' decisions in matters of control.[74]

57. Intelligence Training

Formal training in combat intelligence, foreign languages, and aerial photography was given in the USAREUR Intelligence and Military Police School at Oberammergau. In the interests of administrative efficiency this school was under the operational control of the USAREUR G2. The USAREUR provost marshal determined the curriculum of the Military Police School. The Operations Branch, USAREUR G2, determined the curriculum and subject content of intelligence training and allocated student quotas for the school. The USAREUR G2 also initiated the Field Operations Intelligence Program, so that interested personnel might receive instruction and assignments commensurate with their backgrounds, qualifications, and interests. As part of this program, the "intelligence orientation course" was established at the school.[75]

58. Intelligence Requirements for the Contractual Relations Period

On 6 October 1951 the Intelligence Coordinating Committee, Germany, reached agreement on a list of fifteen intelligence requirements for the contractual relations period and, in transmitting them to HICOG, stressed the necessity for satisfying

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[74]USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file, 1953-54. SECRET. In USAREUR G2 Div Opns Br.

[75]DF, C/USAREUR G2 Div Opns Br to C/USAREUR G2 Div Admin Br, 23 Jun 54, sub: Historical Report, G2. SECRET. In USAREUR G2 Div Admin Br files.

these requirements either in open conventions or in secret agreements implementing the conventions. Most of the requirements were satisfied in the conventions of May 1952 and in two secret memorandums of understanding signed on 23 May 1952.[76] On 1 June, in presenting his final report on these intelligence requirements, the Coordinator and Special Adviser for HICOG pointed out the desirability of formulating standing operating procedures for implementing the articles of the contractual agreements and the memorandums that were concerned with U.S. intelligence requirements. Consequently, a committee composed of representatives of the ICCG member agencies developed a set of procedures which were approved by the Intelligence Coordinating Committee early in 1953. However, it soon became apparent that the approved procedures were inadequate because of limitations imposed by West Germany's acquisition of rights and privileges in the overt Rights and Obligations Convention. On 19 August, therefore, the Allied Directors of Intelligence issued instructions for the revision of the procedures, in order to strengthen the Allied position.[77] It was planned that the new procedures would then be formally negotiated with the German Federal Republic. Accordingly, a new committee of U.S. intelligence representatives was given the task of formulating an acceptable U.S. position concerning the establishment of procedures for implementing the intelligence provisions of the contractual agreements. The work of the committee proceeded slowly because of the necessity of obtaining policy decisions on certain problems and maintaining close coordination with the U.S. intelligence agencies concerned. It was practically completed by the middle of 1954. At that time, however, France refused to ratify the EDC treaties and the status of the contractual agreements, including the secret intelligence memorandums, was beclouded. Shortly thereafter, the "Declaration of Intention" of the London Conference committed the United States to a relaxation of its controls over the German Federal Republic, with the ultimate sovereignty of that country in view. Meanwhile, the contractual agreements were being revised, to be effective during the period between the achievement of West German sovereignty and the entrance of the German Federal Republic into the NATO system, since the assumption was that after the entrance of Western Germany into NATO, a status of forces agreement would come into being and the United States would operate under it indefinitely. With USAREUR playing a prominent role, the U.S. intelligence agencies--using the previous intelligence agreements as a basis--immediately began

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[76] Ltr, USAREUR ACOFS G2 to ACOFSA G2, 8 Dec 53, sub: SOP's Implementing Intelligence Requirements for the Contractual Relations Period. SECRET. In USAREUR G2 Div Hist Jnl file.

[77] Ibid.

the formulation of revised intelligence requirements in harmony with the new conditions. The revised undercover memorandums would provide adequate safeguards for the continuation of USAREUR intelligence operations in Western Germany in the period following the achievement of sovereignty.[78]

59. Intelligence Planning

During the first half of 1954 the USAREUR G2 was preparing a new plan for current USAREUR intelligence activities, which was expected to be completed toward the end of the year. The plan provided for the collection of information, the production of intelligence in prescribed fields of interest, the dissemination of intelligence to authorized recipients, and the general coordination of intelligence activities within the command.[79] In 1953 and 1954 the division also prepared intelligence annexes for the USAREUR Emergency War Plan, the Joint Emergency Alert Plan, and CENTAG defense plans. Furthermore, USAREUR intelligence planners reviewed most of the emergency plans developed at all echelons of the U.S. and NATO military structures in order to determine their impact on USAREUR intelligence planning and activities. They also produced intelligence planning and intelligence annexes for USAREUR and NATO command post exercises.[80]

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[78] Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col G. L. Wilson, USAREUR G2 Div Opns Br, 21 Dec 54. SECRET.

[79] Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col T. L. Bryan, USAREUR G2 Div Opns Br, 21 Dec 54. SECRET.

[80] Ibid.

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Chart 7

USAREUR PLANNING RELATIONSHIPS (UNITED STATES AND NATO), 30 JUNE 1954



* After 20 August 1953.
** Before 20 August 1953.

Source: Compiled from information furnished by USAREUR G3 Div Plans Br and CENTAG Plans Sec. CONFIDENTIAL.

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CHAPTER 4

Security Planning, Measures, and Operations

USAREUR emergency planning activities during the period under review were characterized by increasingly close coordination with NATO planning. The major emergency planning commitments of the command fell into four fields of responsibility: war, joint, current, and NATO (Central Army Group) planning. In addition, CINCUSAREUR was responsible for certain special and limited distribution planning, military-political planning, and other minor planning activities. Since the Western European defense planning program was complex and the several plans were interdependent, USAREUR had to make certain that its U.S. and NATO plans were cohesive and directed toward the common goal. This objective could be achieved only by careful coordination of USAREUR planning with that of the other major U.S. commands, the NATO commands, the occupation powers in Germany and appropriate political agencies.[1] The relationship between the various plans is indicated in Chart 7.

60. Coordination of USAREUR Emergency Planning with Other Major U.S. Commands

Since USAREUR was a component command of US EUCOM, its national and uniservice emergency planning supported that of US EUCOM. Moreover, since US CINCEUR had designated CINCUSAREUR as commander of a joint task force for Germany composed of USAREUR, USAFE, and

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[1] (1) Incl 1 to memo, USAREUR DCOFS for Opns to all USAREUR Stf Divs, 18 Dec 53, sub: USAREUR Planning Program. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 322 USAREUR (1953), Vol. I, Item 26. (2) Memo, USAREUR COFS to all USAREUR Stf Divs, 1 Feb 54, same sub. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 322 USAREUR (1954), Vol. I, Item 5. (3) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col G. W. Mason, USAREUR G3 Div Plans Br, 22 Aug 54. CONFIDENTIAL.

USNAVGER, CINCUSAREUR was responsible for the over-all development of the Joint Emergency Alert Plan (JEAP) as well as for the USAREUR Emergency War Plan (EWP). All these plans were carefully coordinated with US CINCEUR, who reviewed them before giving final approval.[2] Coordination with USAFE and USNAVGER was essential to insure mutual support in emergency operations. This coordination was also required in the preparation of plans for the emergency evacuation of noncombatants from Europe to the United States. CINCUSAREUR coordinated plans for the evacuation of the U.S. garrison and U.S. citizens from Berlin with CINCUSAFE. In addition, CINCUSAREUR coordinated certain plans with the Department of the Army: for example, those pertaining to the expansion of USAREUR COMZ and the formulation of the USAREUR budget.[3]

61. Coordination and Review of USAREUR Subordinate Command Planning

Plans developed at USAREUR headquarters usually furnished broad policies and guiding principles for subordinate commands. Seventh Army, USAREUR COMZ, 32d AAA Brigade, Berlin Command, Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation, and the four area commands prepared supporting operational plans, chiefly by 2-way coordination with Headquarters, USAREUR. First, USAREUR headquarters set tasks and objectives that were within the capabilities of the subordinate commands, and then the subordinate commands prepared operational plans in conformance with USAREUR policy and within the scope of responsibility delegated to them. After preliminary plans were fully coordinated, the subordinate commands prepared final drafts and sent them to USAREUR headquarters for review and approval.[4]

62. Coordination of USAREUR Emergency Planning with the NATO Commands

Since the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) would assume operational control of U.S. combat forces in Germany in the event of war, USAREUR developed emergency plans in support of NATO

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[2]Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col L. R. Adams, USAREUR G3 Div Plans Br, 16 Jul 54. SECRET.

[3](1) Incl 1 to memo, 18 Dec 53, cited above. (2) Memo, 1 Feb 54, cited above. (3) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col G. W. Mason, USAREUR G3 Div Plans Br, 22 Aug 54. CONFIDENTIAL.

[4](1) Ibid. (2) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Col W. L. Osborne, C/USAREUR G3 Div Plans Br, 16 Jul 54. CONFIDENTIAL. (3) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col L. R. Adams, USAREUR G3 Div Plans Br, 22 Aug 54. CONFIDENTIAL.

planning.[5] Over-all NATO defense plans were prepared at SHAPE, and coordination was usually achieved internally since all member powers were represented in that headquarters. SACEUR's emergency defense plans were then distributed to the headquarters of the next lower echelon in the NATO command structure, for preparation of supporting plans. The NATO command responsible for the defense of Western Germany after 20 August 1953 was Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCE), a combined headquarters which consisted of three subordinate commands: Allied Land Forces Central Europe (LANDCENT), Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AIRCENT), and Allied Naval Forces Central Europe (NAVCENT).[6] Under the direct supervision of AFCE, the three subordinate commands prepared a Central Europe Joint Emergency Defense Plan (JEDP) which coordinated the operations to be performed by NATO land, naval, and air forces in Western Germany or in an expanded area if the exigencies of war made it necessary. Production of a single plan was a decided improvement over previous procedure, under which each of the three service commands prepared a plan and by subsequent coordination produced a joint plan.[7] Since U.S. representatives were on the staffs of all the aforementioned NATO commands and participated in their planning programs, the ideas of U.S. military forces were incorporated in all these plans. USAREUR came directly into the NATO command structure through the Central Army Group (CENTAG), a combined U.S. and French headquarters which was operational for planning purposes only. CENTAG was immediately subordinate to LANDCENT. In the event of war, USAREUR combat troops would form the U.S. element of CENTAG and CINCUSAREUR would assume command of CENTAG. The CENTAG Plans Section prepared the Central Army Group European Defense plans in support of LANDCENT and AFCE plans. The U.S. Seventh Army and the First French Army, in their roles as NATO forces, prepared operational plans in support of CENTAG emergency defense plans.[8]

63. Coordination of USAREUR Planning with HICOG

A considerable portion of USAREUR planning was concerned with the control of civil affairs in the U.S. Zone of Germany. At the

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[5] Incl 1 to memo, USAREUR DCOFS for Opns to all USAREUR Stf Divs, 18 Dec 53, sub: USAREUR Planning Program. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 322 USAREUR (1953), Vol. I, Item 26.

[6] SHAPE GO 18, 14 Aug 53. UNCLASSIFIED.

[7] (1) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col W. P. Brooks, Jr., CENTAG Plans Sec, 28 Jun 54. SECRET.
(2) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col G. W. Mason, USAREUR G3 Div Plans Br, 19 Sep 54. SECRET.

[8] (1) Ibid. (2) Incl 1 to memo, USAREUR DCOFS for Opns to all USAREUR Stf Divs, 18 Dec 53, sub: USAREUR Planning Program. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 322 USAREUR (1953), Vol. I, Item 26.

same time, the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany was concerned with the political interests of the German people in the American Zone and, with certain exceptions that became effective in an emergency, he was the intermediary between the U.S. military forces and the German Federal Republic. Since many of USAREUR's emergency plans contained annexes for controlling the German civil population in the event of civil disturbance or war, these plans had to be coordinated with the commissioner. This coordination was especially important because some of the plans defined the functions to be exercised by CINCUSAREUR and HICOG during an emergency and the extent to which each was to support the activities of the other. A degree of coordination was achieved at the monthly meetings of HICOG, CINCUSAREUR, and major commanders usually held at Heidelberg. In addition, CINCUSAREUR accomplished considerable planning coordination with HICOG through liaison officers. Military-political problems of a tripartite nature that arose in connection with emergency planning were referred to the Special Security Committee of the Allied High Commission for Germany, which met monthly at Mehlem. The military aspects of this tripartite planning were often coordinated directly at meetings of the three zonal military commanders, but more frequently through liaison missions which the commanders maintained at each other's headquarters.[9]

64. High Commission Emergency Plan

The High Commission Emergency Plan, SECUR/P(50) 4(FINAL), completed on 28 September 1953, was a top secret plan that listed tripartite-approved political and military measures which were to be taken in Western Germany in the event of civil disturbance, the threat of hostilities, or armed attack by unfriendly military forces. The military commanders of the three Western Zones of Occupation in Germany and the High Commissioners of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, concurred in the plan. It was to remain in effect until the contractual agreements went into force.[10]

65. Central Army Group Planning

On 13 April 1953 the name of the Allied Planning Group was changed to Central Army Group Plans Section. The section, maintained by CINCUSAREUR in accordance with instructions of

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[9](1) Memo, 18 Dec 53, cited above. (2) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col H. B. Lane, USAREUR G3 Div Plans Br, 16 Jul 54. CONFIDENTIAL. (3) USAREUR Plng Chart No. 5, n.d. SECRET. In CENTAG Plans Sec Reading File (1953).

[10](1) Interv, 16 Jul 54, cited above. (2) DF, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to C/USAREUR Hist Div, 18 Jul 54, sub: High Commission Emergency Plan. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR Hist Div 371.2 (1954).

CINCLANDCENT, performed the planning function of Headquarters, Central Army Group.[11]

a. Organization. The CENTAG Plans Section was a joint U.S.-French agency superimposed on the USAREUR G3 Division. United States representation consisted of designated officer and enlisted personnel of USAREUR staff divisions. French representation consisted of officer and enlisted personnel accredited to USAREUR for Central Army Group purposes only. The USAREUR Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, was coordinator of the section, a senior French officer was deputy coordinator, and a USAREUR G3 Division staff officer was assistant coordinator. Upon the declaration of the order for reinforced alert the section was to be dissolved and its personnel, both U.S. and French, were to join their respective parent staff divisions.[12]

b. Functions. Although the primary function of the Central Army Group Plans Section was to prepare operational plans to support the plans of CINCLANDCENT, the section also coordinated the plans of subordinate and associated headquarters as required. Furthermore, it served as the monitoring agency for all matters referred to CINCUSAREUR that had CENTAG operational interest, such as the preparation of combined NATO training exercises and participation in Allied planning for the German contingent of the European Defense Community.[13]

c. Plans. The CENTAG Emergency Plan 1-52 issued on 31 December 1952 was in effect throughout 1953. It was superseded by the CENTAG Emergency Plan 1-53 on 31 December 1953, effective for 1954. Each plan and its annexes contained instructions for establishing a command headquarters and for waging land warfare in Central Europe whenever the U.S. and French components of CENTAG were placed under the control of NATO commanders. The two plans were modified as conditions changed; for instance, troop lists were

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[11](1) IRS, USAREUR DCOFS for Opns to USAREUR SGS, 13 Apr 53, sub: Central Army Group Headquarters. NATO SECRET. In CENTAG Plans Sec Reading File (1953-54). (2) CENTAG Plans Sec Memo No. 5, 17 Aug 53, sub: Administrative Standing Operational Procedures. NATO RESTRICTED. (3) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col W. P. Brooks, Jr., CENTAG Plans Sec, 22 Jul 54. SECRET.

[12](1) IRS, 13 Apr 53, cited above. (2) Ltr, COMCENTAG to CINCLANDCENT, et al., 21 Sep 53, sub: Organization of Headquarters Central Army Group. NATO CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 322 CENTAG (1953), Vol. I, Item 9 atchd.

[13](1) CENTAG Plans Sec Memo No. 5, 17 Aug 53, cited above. NATO RESTRICTED. (2) Peacetime Responsibilities of COMCENTAG, Chart No. 2, n. d. NATO SECRET. In CENTAG Plans Sec 320.3 (1953).

modified to reflect current manpower situations. During 1954 the section was preparing CENTAG Emergency Plan 1-54, a plan to support the Central Europe Joint Emergency Defense Plan 1954, and whose completion was expected by the end of the year. All of these NATO defense plans and their accompanying annexes were classified cosmic top secret.[14]

66. USAREUR War Planning

a. USAREUR Emergency War Plan. The EUCOM Operations Plan 1-52, which had been brought up to date in 1953, was superseded by USAREUR Emergency War Plan 1-54, issued on 15 March 1954. It was a top secret unilateral plan for U.S. Army operations in the US CINCEUR area of responsibility, and provided instructions for any combat operations that might occur after 1 March 1954. Derived from and in support of the US EUCOM Joint Emergency War Plan of 1953, it was based on estimated Department of the Army capabilities.[15]

b. Emergency Troop Reinforcement. As an integral part of Emergency War Plan 1-54, USAREUR headquarters developed plans for troop reinforcement of the command in the event of hostilities. Certain major combat troop units stationed in continental United States were designated for shipment to USAREUR whenever a need for them should arise; T/O&E's were established for them; and throughout 1953 and 1954 the units were manned and equipped and underwent rigorous combat training. The combat readiness and training program was scheduled for 85 percent completion by 31 December 1953 and 100 percent by 31 December 1954. In many respects some of the units were ready for combat by the end of June 1954. In a war emergency these combat troops were to be shipped to Europe in a specified order of priority set by CINCUSAREUR. As the units arrived in the European theater they would undergo a thorough inspection and any shortcomings in supply and equipment would be remedied. They would then be moved to their combat or line of communications destinations, turned over to the appropriate headquarters for employment, and serviced by administrative and technical support units. Provision for these support units were made in the USAREUR Emergency Reinforcement Troop List, but at the end of May 1954 plans were

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[14] Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col W. P. Brooks, Jr., CENTAG Plans Sec, 22 Jul 54. SECRET.

[15] (1) Memo, USAREUR DCOFS for Opns to all USAREUR Stf Divs, 18 Dec 53, sub: USAREUR Planning Program. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 322 USAREUR (1953), Vol. I, Item 26. (2) Memo, USAREUR COFS to all USAREUR Stf Divs, 1 Feb 54, same sub. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 322 USAREUR (1954), Vol. I, Item 5. (3) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col F. Lee and Lt Col G. W. Mason, USAREUR G3 Div Plans Br, 30 Aug 54. SECRET.

completed for only the first 90 days of the program. The second 90-day portion of the plans was expected to be completed and approved by the Department of the Army toward the end of 1954. Meanwhile, support units designated in the first portion of the plans were being manned, equipped, and trained for shipment to Europe if necessary.[16]

67. USAREUR Headquarters Emergency Evacuation Plan

The emergency plan for the evacuation of USAREUR headquarters issued on 25 April 1952 was still in effect at the end of June 1954. However, during late 1953 and early 1954 a new plan was being developed. By mid-1954 this new plan, known as Headquarters USAREUR Emergency Evacuation Order 1-54, was in final draft form and was awaiting approval by the USAREUR chief of staff.[17] It provided for the division of the personnel of USAREUR headquarters into ten groups designated by the letters A through J. Individuals were assigned to the groups by the USAREUR chief of staff in accordance with manning tables provided for in the top secret USAREUR war plans.[18] On the declaration of an emergency by the commander in chief, headquarters personnel were to assemble at prescribed locations in Heidelberg for removal at specified times to assigned destinations. Each group, except those with liaison designations, would follow predetermined routes and adhere to a fixed time schedule of movement until arrival at the destination indicated. The evacuation plan also made provisions for protecting headquarters personnel from aerial attack, sabotage, and espionage at headquarters and while on the march.[19]

68. Alert Plans

Alert orders were emergency plans that provided for the immediate and appropriate reaction to a deterioration of relations with the Soviet bloc or to a surprise attack by hostile military forces. Three such plans were in effect between 1 January 1953 and 30 June 1954. All were based on the assumption that an outbreak of hostilities would climax a period of growing tensions and all provided for progressive measures that would permit a transition

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[16] Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col F. Lee and Lt Col L. R. Adams, USAREUR G3 Div Plans Br, 30 Aug 54.

[17] (1) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col T. F. Gordon, USAREUR G3 Div Plans Br, 18 Jul 54. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Draft Hq USAREUR EEO 1-54, n.d. SECRET. In USAREUR G3 Div Plans Br files.

[18] Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col G. W. Mason, USAREUR G3 Div Plans Br, 17 Sep 54. CONFIDENTIAL.

[19] Draft Hq USAREUR EEO 1-54, n.d. SECRET. In USAREUR G3 Div Plans Br files.

from peace to war.[20] US CINCEUR retained authority for calling an alert for all U.S. forces in Europe. In accordance with U.S. policy, he was to obtain political guidance before calling an alert, but in the event of an extreme emergency he could order the implementation of simple and reinforced alerts and certain general alert measures without prior political consultation. If an emergency was so acute as to preclude obtaining instructions from US CINCEUR or HICOG, CINCUSAREUR could exercise delegated authority in Germany and announce various stages of alert or order the implementation of any appropriate measures.

a. Change in the Designation of the Coordinating Hour for Alerts. The announcement of the implementation of an alert plan would be accompanied by the announcement of a specific time called the coordinating hour, from which all operations would stem. Throughout 1953 and the first three months of 1954 the coordinating hours for the several kinds of alerts were designated by different letters of the alphabet. For instance, in the order for simple alert the coordinating hour was designated as S Hour, in the order for reinforced alert it was R Hour, and for the general alert it was A Hour. Since the use of a different letter for each alert was susceptible to misinterpretation and could lead to serious consequences, CINCUSAREUR rescinded the three terms on 1 April 1954, and T Hour became the only term to be used in designating coordinating hours in alert plans or in documents referring to them.[21]

b. Order for Simple Alert. The order for simple alert (OSA) was to be implemented upon development of a period of tension which, while not indicating the imminence of general hostilities, required the initiation of precautionary measures. On the issuance of this order certain service troops would be moved to COMZ and Seventh Army detachments would secure the Rhine River bridges. Seventh Army combat units would remain in their normal area of operations but were to assume an alert status and were to be prepared to take to the field if so ordered. Twelfth Air Force was to conduct border aerial reconnaissance within the U.S. Zone of Germany. Area commanders were to implement the pertinent portions of their internal security plans, prepare secondary mission units for operations, and dispatch specified units and detachments in accordance with directions given in the order. All of these precautionary measures were to be covert and discreet, so as not to compromise any operational plans or alarm the German civilian population. Nevertheless,

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[20] Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col L. R. Adams, USAREUR G3 Div Plans Br, 16 Jul 54. SECRET.

[21] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG Seventh Army, et al., 1 Apr 54, sub: Designation of the Coordinating Hour for Alerts. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 371.2 (1954), Vol. I, Item 16.

commanders of all U.S. forces in Germany would be authorized to take any measures necessary to maintain the security of their forces.[22]

c. Order for Reinforced Alert. The order for reinforced alert (ORA) was to be implemented when the threat of Soviet aggression was imminent or when operations were necessary to meet an impending attack by East German or other satellite forces. Combat troops would be deployed for defense against attack and all necessary preparations would be made to conduct combat operations immediately. Seventh Army would take over control of the area commands, excluding the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation, the Berlin Command, and the Wiesbaden Military Post. The movement of service troops from the U.S. Zone of Germany to USAREUR COMZ would continue. Seventh Army would strengthen the security of the Rhine River bridges, instigate demolition preparations, and move troops to protect the German borders of the U.S. Zone. It would also ensure compliance with precautionary orders issued by HICOG for controlling the movements of the civilian population and closing the borders between the U.S. Zone of Germany and the Russian Zone of Germany and Czechoslovakia. If refugee traffic was hampering the movement of U.S. forces, Seventh Army would force it from the roads and immobilize it. Upon the implementation of the order for reinforced alert, USAREUR COMZ would become operational as a line of communications. It would control all traffic west of the Seventh Army rear boundary and initiate or continue the implementation of internal security plans. Twelfth Air Force would continue border aerial reconnaissance and prepare for joint operations with Seventh Army. The Rhine River Patrol of the U.S. Navy would support Seventh Army, make preparations for the execution of demolition plans, and halt nonmilitary Rhine River traffic as required and divert it to the west bank. Supporting plans of CINCNELM for the operation of ports, control of ship movements, and evacuation of personnel and equipment would be implemented. The operations of the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation would be phased out and personnel and equipment would be withdrawn to the Bordeaux-La Pallice area of France. When the evacuation was completed, the Bremen Enclave would be transferred to the control of British forces. Berlin Command would protect the interests of the United States in its assigned area of responsibility in accordance with separate instructions and tripartite agreements. All U.S. forces would protect themselves from subversive and guerrilla activities.[23]

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[22](1) Seventh Army OSA 1-53, 10 Apr 53. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 371.2 (1953), Vol. I, Item 32A, B/P. (2) Memo, USAREUR SGS to USAREUR Duty Off, 8 Feb 54, sub: Instructions to USAREUR Duty Officer. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 371.2 (1954), Vol. I, Item A-1.

[23](1) Ltr of Instrs and Seventh Army ORA 1-53, 10 Apr 53, SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 371.2 (1953), Vol. I, Item 32A, B/P. (2) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col L. R. Adams, USAREUR G3 Div Plans Br, 16 Jul 54. SECRET.

d. General Alert Order. The general alert order (GAO) was to be implemented when a direct Soviet attack materialized. Upon issuance of this order, war operations would be conducted in accordance with top secret U.S. and NATO defense plans. Pertinent provisions of the order for simple alert and the order for reinforced alert would be executed if not already accomplished.[24]

e. Draft Joint Emergency Alert Plan. On 14 January 1953 CINCUSAREUR was appointed commander of a joint task force to execute U.S. joint emergency plans for Germany whenever an emergency should arise.[25] All U.S. forces in Germany subject to the authority of US CINCEUR would be automatically assigned to the joint task force and would prepare for and carry on joint war operations as a U.S. national responsibility until U.S. forces were placed under the control or command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This new function of CINCUSAREUR included responsibility for preparing the joint alert plan.[26] In fulfillment of the responsibility, current USAREUR alert plans were being rewritten during 1953 and 1954. The new version, a top secret document entitled Joint Emergency Alert Plan (JEAP) 1-54, retained the essential features of the revised EUCOM plans for simple, reinforced, and general alerts but combined them into one plan oriented to the latest capabilities. It delineated responsibilities and furnished over-all instructions to the three service components of the joint task force for Germany, together with certain detailed instructions for Army elements in Germany. The plan covered prehostility preparations by SACEUR and was in harmony with US EUCOM defense plans. By 30 June 1954 the draft of JEAP 1-54 was completed and was being coordinated with the three service components of the joint task force prior to being forwarded to US EUCOM for approval.[27]

69. Test Assemblies and Practice Alerts

From time to time, USAREUR headquarters, Seventh Army, USAREUR COMZ, and the area commands in Western Germany called test assemblies or practice alerts. Test assemblies were usually limited to Headquarters, USAREUR, and were held for the purpose of determining the effectiveness with which personnel assigned to that headquarters

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[24] Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col L. R. Adams, USAREUR G3 Div Plans Br, 16 Jul 54. SECRET.

[25] Ltr, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, CINCNELM, CINCUSAFE, 14 Jan 53, sub: Assigrment of Functions to Component Commanders, Incl 2. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 US EUCOM (1953), Vol. I, Item 5.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col L. R. Adams, USAREUR G3 Div Plans Br, 16 Jul 54. SECRET.

could assemble during off-duty hours.[28] Practice alerts were operational readiness tests to determine the effectiveness of emergency plans.[29] Besides familiarizing personnel with alert procedures, the test assemblies and practice alerts permitted appraisal of the notification system and the speed and efficiency with which personnel could assemble, load equipment, and prepare to operate under extended field conditions incident to general and reinforced alerts. They also tested the adequacy of transportation facilities, the degree to which personnel were familiar with march tables, the coordination of unit movements, and the familiarity of participants with plans for the destruction or disposition of equipment not to be evacuated.[30] During each practice alert, the area commands were supposed to simulate as far as possible the execution of the noncombatant evacuation plans, such as setting up supply points, checking communications, dispatching columns, and operating the block warden system. Dependents did not participate. Considerable confusion was noticeable in many test assemblies and practice alerts. One cause was the inclination of personnel to use their private automobiles, instead of the military transportation furnished, to reach the assembly points, with consequent crowding and disorder at the assembly areas. For example, at a test assembly at USAREUR headquarters in June 1953, eighteen 2½-ton trucks dispatched along scheduled routes to pick up military personnel brought only 71 individuals to the mustering point. Nevertheless, staff officers noticed that 106 private vehicles and taxicabs delivered individuals to Campbell Barracks.[31] Such a circumstance, of course, defeated the purpose of the pick-up plan, because in an actual alert private vehicles would have to be available for dependents to be evacuated under the provisions of the NEO plan.[32] Efforts of USAREUR division chiefs to remedy this undesirable situation were successful during the last half of 1953. However, cooperation in using the pick-up plan declined during early 1954. For instance, in the January 1954 test assembly, not one passenger was carried by truck in 17 trips and only 103 enlisted men and officers out of 375 arrived at Campbell Barracks in authorized transportation. As a consequence, USAREUR division chiefs

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[28] Memo, USAREUR SGS to USAREUR Dy Off, 8 Feb 54, sub: Instructions to USAREUR Duty Officer. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 371.2 (1954), Vol. I, Item A-1 atchd.

[29] (1) Ibid. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG Seventh Army, et al., 6 May 53, sub: Practice Alerts. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G3 Div Cen Files.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Min, CINCUSAREUR's Wkly Stf Conf No. 7, 21 Jul 53. CONFIDENTIAL.

[32] Ibid., No. 8, 4 Aug 53. CONFIDENTIAL.

again took strong action against the use of private vehicles during test assemblies and practice alerts.[33]

70. Plans for the Emergency Evacuation of Noncombatants

In the event of civil war, internal rioting, a major catastrophe, or the imminence of hostilities, American noncombatants would have to be evacuated from Europe and other areas. In addition, the evacuation of certain categories of aliens from danger would be beneficial to the U.S. Government. Considerable over-all planning to fulfill these requirements was done in 1953 and the first half of 1954. Provisions were made for processing noncombatants, with some exceptions, through three stages of evacuation: movement from an initial location to a safe haven, waiting in the safe haven for embarkation, and embarkation and transportation by transatlantic ship or airplane to a final destination.[34]

a. Liaison Groups. The Paris Liaison Group was a joint organization of the U.S. Departments of State and Defense. It was responsible for the over-all coordination of the noncombatant evacuation plans of the chiefs of diplomatic missions and the military commanders in Europe, North Africa, and the Near East, and directly responsible for the central subarea consisting of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland.[35] The London Liaison Group was responsible to the Paris Liaison Group for the northern subarea consisting of Scandinavia, Eire, the United Kingdom, and the USSR. The Rome Liaison Group was responsible to the Paris Liaison Group for the southern subarea consisting of Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, the countries of North Africa and the Near East, and the Mediterranean countries of Europe, with the exception of Spain and France. The Washington Liaison Group, which supervised the activities of the Paris group, coordinated noncombatant evacuation planning and preparations on a world-wide basis and determined what governmental agencies in the United States would arrange for receiving and disposing of evac ees arriving in U.S. ports. The Paris group was composed of a representative of the Department of State, acting as chairman, and representatives of CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE, and CINCNELM. On 10 April 1953, the master noncombatant evacuation plan for the Paris Liaison Group was completed and

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[33] Ibid., No. 2, 2 Feb 54. SECRET.

[34] (1) Master Noncombatant Evacuation Plan for the Paris Ln Gp, 10 Apr 53 (hereafter cited as PLG-MAST-NEP 53). SECRET. (2) USAREUR NEO 1-53, 7 May 53. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1953), Vol. I, Items 21A (B/P) and 8A (B/P).

[35] PLG-MAST-NEP 53, 10 Apr 53. SECRET. In file above, Item 21A (B/P).

distributed. Since the activities of the Paris group were confined to liaison, advice, and coordination, the purpose of this plan was to indicate the major organizations involved in the evacuation of noncombatants in Europe, North Africa, and the Near East, and to show the division of responsibilities between these organizations, together with the agreements reached by them.[36] During the period covered by this report, negotiations were conducted for safe havens in the United Kingdom, Spain, and Portugal; evacuation ports and shipping facilities were surveyed; logistical problems were examined, and USAREUR noncombatant evacuation planning was coordinated with similar planning of other Allied powers.[37]

b. The Noncombatant Evacuation Order. US CINCEUR was responsible for developing and implementing plans for the evacuation of U.S. noncombatants under his control, together with other specified persons, from the geographical region of his command. He delegated this responsibility, for Germany and France, to CINCUSAREUR.[38] In conformity with this obligation the USAREUR NEO 1-53 was completed and disseminated on 7 May 1953 and was amended on 8 March 1954. It superseded EUCOM NEO 1-50 of 1 December 1950, as amended, with the exception of the portion pertaining to the evacuation of sensitive aliens on the "General" and "King" lists.[39] Seventh Army issued a supporting operational plan on 19 June 1953, and USAREUR COMZ issued supporting operational plans on 15 July 1953 and 1 June 1954.[40] NEO plans prescribed the employment of the forces available to CINCUSAREUR for the evacuation of the noncombatants who were his responsibility. NEO 1-53 was formulated on the basis of three cardinal assumptions: there would be little or no warning of the necessity for implementation; all travel on NEO routes would be subjected to disruption during implementation; and civil authorities would provide limited assistance in Germany and France.[41]

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[36] Ibid.

[37] Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col E. H. Murray, USAREUR G3 Div Opns Br, 13 Jul 54. CONFIDENTIAL.

[38] Ltr, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, CINCNELM, CINCUSAFE, 14 Jan 53, sub: Assignment of Functions to Component Commanders. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 US EUCOM (1953), Vol. I, Item 5.

[39] Special Instructions, USAREUR NEO 1-53, 7 May 53. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1953), Vol. I, Item 8A (B/P).

[40] (1) Seventh Army NEO 1-53, 19 Jun 53. SECRET. (2) USAREUR COMZ Opn Order 953, 15 Jul 53. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1953), Vol. II, Items 28(B/P), 28A (B/P). (3) USAREUR COMZ Opn Order 154, 1 Jun 54, Sec I. SECRET. In USAREUR G1 Div Ctl Br files.

[41] USAREUR NEO 1-53, 7 May 53, Annex 1. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1953), Vol. I, Item 8A (B/P).

(1) Evacuation Categories and Priorities. In the U.S. Zone of Germany and the Western Area Command (northern French Zone), CINCUSAREUR was responsible for evacuating dependents of members of the U.S. armed forces, civilian nationals of the United States and their dependents, and hospitalized military personnel unable to return to active duty. CINCUSAREUR was also responsible for evacuating from the U.S. Zone, but not from the Western Area Command, civilian nationals of the British Commonwealth, France, and other NATO powers to whom USAREUR furnished logistical support.[42] American tourists and residents for whom the Department of State was responsible in Germany were to be evacuated by the U.S. High Commissioner or his successor.[43] However, if NEO should be implemented simultaneously with the general alert order, or if commercial transportation was unavailable, CINCUSAREUR would evacuate from the U.S. Zone noncombatants who were the responsibility of the Department of State.[44] At the time of NEO implementation, Allied forces in the other two zones would be implementing similar noncombatant evacuation plans. In that event, any USAREUR-sponsored noncombatants who happened to be in the British Zone or the southern French Zone would be evacuated with the British and French noncombatant columns in accordance with tripartite agreements.[45] USAREUR would be responsible for the evacuation from France of all persons evacuated from Germany to France under its auspices, American civilian personnel employed by the U.S. armed forces in France and their families, and the families of U.S. military personnel residing in France. In addition, USAREUR would evacuate American tourists and residents from the U.S. consular district of Bordeaux. The evacuation of all other Americans in France would be the responsibility of the Department of State. Priorities for U.S. evacuees were not to be established on any basis other than considerations of age, sex, degree of physical fitness, or exposure to danger.[46] Required priorities were to be determined on the spot by the person in charge and as circumstances dictated. The following priorities were established for air evacuation: urgent medical cases; U.S. noncombatant female patients; other medical evacuees; and any remaining noncombatants

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[42](1) Ibid., Annex 3, App. A. SECRET. (2) Cable SX-3458, USAREUR to USAREUR COMZ, 12 Oct 53. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS SMC.

[43]Opn Order, USAREUR NEO 1-53, 7 May 53. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1953), Vol. I, Item 8A (B/P).

[44]IRS, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to USAREUR DCOFS Opns, 18 Dec 53, sub: Evacuation of U.S. Tourists and Residents. SECRET. In file above. Vol. II, Item 38.

[45]Opn Order, USAREUR NEO 1-53, 7 May 53, cited above.

[46]PLG-MAST-NEP, 10 Apr 53. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1953), Vol. I, Item 21A (B/P).

as directed by the Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ. In assigning air evacuation priorities, family integrity was to be maintained.[47]

(2) Evacuation Rates. NEO planning provided for the evacuation of 80,000 noncombatants, 25,000 civilian vehicles, and 2,000 military vehicles from Germany, and 45,000 noncombatants and approximately 14,000 vehicles from France, to a staging area in the Bordeaux-La Pallice port district of France.[48] An additional 3,500 noncombatants were to be evacuated from Berlin directly to Burtonwood Air Force Base in England, but if circumstances were unfavorable, they too would be evacuated to the staging area in France. Approximately 5,000 noncombatants, including military patients, would require evacuation through medical channels. Evacuees were to leave initial assembly points and traverse predetermined routes in accordance with prescribed time schedules. The movement from Germany (not including Berlin) and France would be phased so that all of the 125,000 noncombatants would arrive at the staging area within six days after NEO Hour.[49] The planning figures for the USAREUR dependent population of Germany and France, including correlated planned evacuation rates, were based on estimates for 1 January 1954. However, the plans were to be kept up to date in accordance with current dependent strengths shown in USAREUR monthly statistical reports.[50]

(3) Notification and Execution. Responsibility for announcing the implementation of NEO was delegated by US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR. Simultaneously with the order, he would announce a specific time from which to synchronize coordinated traffic movement. This coordinating designation was at first called N Hour, but to avoid confusion with a similar term used in unrelated plans of other Allied countries it was later changed to NEO Hour.[51] Between the moment of decision to implement the noncombatant evacuation order and the actual NEO Hour there would be an interval to allow for the transmittal of the NEO announcement and for the preparation of personnel for movement. To announce the execution

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[47] USAREUR NEO 1-53, 7 May 53, Annex 3. SECRET. In file above, Item 8A (B/P).

[48] Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 11 Jan 54, sub: NEO and SAFEHAVEN plans. SECRET. In file above, Item 2A atchd.

[49] USAREUR NEO 1-53, 7 May 53, Annex 3, cited above.

[50] Seventh Army NEO 1-53, 28 Jan 54, Change 2. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1953), Vol. II, Item 28.

[51] (1) Ltr, USAREUR to DA, et al., 7 Oct 53, sub: Designation of the Coordinating Hour at NEO. UNCLASSIFIED. AG 371.2 GOT-AGO. (2) USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf 11, 20 Oct 53. UNCLASSIFIED.

of NEO and the NEO Hour, every means of communication could be used. The implementing message would read, "EXECUTE NEO. NEO HOUR IS (time and date)," and the hour would be given in local USAREUR time.[52] If NEO had not been executed before the implementation of the order for reinforced alert or the general alert order, it would be executed concurrently with whichever of those alerts was announced first. In such a case, the coordinating designation would be T Hour.[53]

(4) Implementation Responsibilities. Whenever the order for the implementation of NEO was given, Seventh Army and USAREUR COMZ would have the task of actually evacuating noncombatants from Germany and France. Seventh Army would evacuate the specified categories from the U.S. Zone of Germany and the Western Area Command to crossing points on the German-French border. In order to carry out its assignment it would assume operational control over all area commands with the exception of Berlin and the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation and over all U.S. Air Force and Navy NEO elements in Germany.[54] At the German-French border USAREUR COMZ would assume control of Seventh Army evacuation columns, would move them, together with the USAREUR-sponsored noncombatants residing in France, to staging areas in the Bordeaux-Le Pallice port region, and would then evacuate them from France, either by embarking them on ships in French ports or transporting them to the Spanish border, where they would become the responsibility of the Department of State.[55] Operational control over U.S. Air Force and Navy NEO elements in France would be assumed by USAREUR COMZ. The Berlin Command would evacuate its noncombatants under separate plans. The Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation would put all USAREUR-sponsored noncombatants in the Bremen Enclave aboard ships furnished by NELM, for sea evacuation to a safe haven. NELM would also be responsible for the sea evacuation of noncombatants from the French ports. Its subordinate command, U.S. Naval Forces in Germany, would assist Seventh Army in effecting crossings of the Rhine River. The U.S. Air Forces in Europe would carry out air evacuation assignments in Berlin, France, and the U.S. Zone of Germany in accordance with agreements with USAREUR.[56]

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[52]Special Instructions, USAREUR NEO 1-53, 7 May 53. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1953), Vol. I, Item 8A (B/P).

[53]Seventh Army NEO 1-53, 19 Jun 53. SECRET. In file above, Vol. II, Item 28 (B/P).

[54]Special Instructions, USAREUR NEO 1-53, 7 May 53. SECRET. In file above, Vol. I, Item 8A (B/P).

[55]Special Instructions, USAREUR COMZ Opn Order 953, 15 Jul 53. SECRET. In file above, Vol. II, Item 28A (B/P).

[56]Special Instructions, USAREUR NEO 1-53, 7 May 53, cited above.

(5) Assembly and Processing. Whenever evacuation plans were implemented, the designated categories of noncombatants would report to specified assembly points with the family passenger car, if any, and with the documents, supplies, and clothing indicated in previous instructions. Private vehicles belonging to noncombatants or their sponsors would be requisitioned by the Army and become the property of the U.S. Government.[57] The requisitioning would be accomplished by the officer in charge, who would stamp and sign the vehicle title and registration forms and return them to the original owner or his representative. The stamped registration form would remain with the automobile; the stamped title would be held by the original owner or his representative as a receipt for the car. Every effort would be made to permit evacuees to travel in the car that they had brought to the assembly area, but persons not belonging to families with passenger cars would be assigned to cars available. March units and march serials would be organized at the assembly point in conformity with evacuation plans.[58] At the processing point certain additional supplies would be furnished to individuals and evacuation units, the unit or serial commander would give a final orientation on the evacuation movement, and the column would be dispatched, under the protection of an evacuation detachment, at the time indicated in the march table.

(6) Organization of NEO Evacuation Columns. Noncombatant evacuation columns were to be organized into march units and march serials. A march unit, under the command of an officer or responsible civilian, was to consist of a control vehicle, a supply truck, and thirty passenger cars.[59] A march serial, under the command of a field grade officer, was to be composed of five march units. Each serial was to have a control vehicle for the serial commander, a tow truck for picking up stalled cars and carrying emergency supplies of gasoline and oil, a 1-ton EES panel truck for transporting items of personal necessity, an ambulance or an appropriate substitute, and other vehicles as required. A wrecker was to be assigned to each four serials.[60] Columns were to be accompanied by military evacuation detachments, which would be responsible for

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[57] Seventh Army NEO 1-53, 19 Jun 53, Annex 3. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1953), Vol. II, Item 28 (B/P).

[58] (1) IRS, USAREUR Compt to USAREUR COFS, 13 Feb 53, sub: Advance Documentation and Administrative Processing in NEO of Persons to be Evacuated. SECRET. (2) USAREUR NEO 1-53, 7 May 53, App. B. SECRET. Both in file above, Vol. I, Items 11B and 8A (B/P).

[59] USAREUR NEO 1-53, 7 May 53, Annex 3. SECRET. In file above, Item 8A (B/P).

[60] Opn Order, Seventh Army NEO 1-53, 19 Jun 53. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1953), Vol. II, Item 28.

operations, command, and internal control. USAREUR COMZ would establish servicing and resupply points along the evacuation routes for provisioning the noncombatants and refueling the vehicles.[61]

(7) Evacuation Routes. Seventh Army NEO plans provided for 13 main noncombatant evacuation routes across Germany to France. Only 9 of these routes crossed the French-German border; the remaining 4 joined some of the other routes within Germany. The routes traversing the border converged into six USAREUR COMZ routes, within France, which led to the staging area at Bordeaux. The French itineraries, bearing code names of AXLE, BRAKE, BUICK, DYNAMO, ENGINE, and FLYWHEEL, were not precisely determined by 1 January 1954 because USAREUR COMZ had not completed negotiations for them with the French Government.[62] March serials would enter the main evacuation arteries in Germany and France, throughout their extent, from numerous secondary feeder roads. The itineraries through Germany were as follows:[63]

Code Name of Route	Beginning	Traversing	Destination
AXLE	Wiesbaden	Mainz	Perl
ANTENNA	Giessen	Mainz-Kastel Bridge	Ittersdorf
BODY	Frankfurt	Homburg	Saareguemines
BRAKE	Gross Steinheim	Worms	Bisten
CHOKE	Schwetzingen	Bruchsal	Wissembourg
COIL	Aschaffenburg	Frankenthal	Saarbruecken
EAST DYNAMO	Ansbach	Crailsheim	Route DYNAMO
DYNAMO	Bad Mergentheim	Weinsberg	Neuf Brisach
ENGINE	Ellingen	Chalampe Bridge	Bantzenheim
SOUTH ENGINE	Augsburg	Riedlingen	Route ENGINE
EAST ENGINE	Inning	Turkheim	Route ENGINE
FLYWHEEL	Murnau	Saulgrub	Kembs-Bartenheim
SOUTH FLYWHEEL	Garmisch	Oberau	Route FLYWHEEL

Upon the implementation of NEO, but prior to NEO Hour, designated military police detachments would reconnoiter the chosen routes

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[61] Ibid.

[62] (1) USAREUR COMZ Opn Order 953, 15 Jul 53, Annex 7. SECRET. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG USAREUR COMZ, 14 Dec 53, sub: USAREUR COMZ Operation Order 953. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1953), Vol. II, Items 28A (B/P) and atchd.

[63] Seventh Army NEO 1-53, 19 Jun 53, Annex 2, App. A. SECRET. In file above, Item 28 (B/P).

and select alternate ways around defiles, bridges, and other sensitive positions for use if the columns were threatened by attack or sabotage or if original courses became impassable.[64]

(8) Traffic Control. Seventh Army and USAREUR COMZ were to regulate the flow of traffic in Germany and France respectively, and for that purpose each command was to establish a communications center and network. The actual control of traffic along the evacuation routes was to be the duty of military police units specifically designated in the troop lists of the operational plans. These units were to prevent unauthorized interference with the evacuation columns and were to be armed for carrying out their security duties. Movement of convoys was to be at a speed not exceeding 35 miles per hour but sufficient for the march serials to average 20 miles per hour. The march units were to be kept six minutes apart from the head of one to the head of the one following. All vehicles in serials were to remain in line, with no passing except in individual instances ordered by the military police. There would be 20-minute halts on the even hours; but otherwise, traffic movement was to be continuous until individual serials had cleared control points selected by USAREUR COMZ. Only emergency military traffic and motor vehicles under military police control would be permitted to move against or across the main flow of traffic. Heavily armed flying squads would conduct continuous patrolling of the highways in order to protect the columns. They would remove all refugee traffic from the evacuation routes and use all necessary force to immobilize it. Holding areas provided for in the plans were to be operated by the military police according to instructions from USAREUR COMZ. The German and French civilian authorities were to render assistance in controlling traffic in their respective countries.[65]

(9) Noncombatant Staging Area. USAREUR COMZ was to be responsible for establishing and operating the Bordeaux-La Pallice noncombatant staging area in France and for housing and feeding 125,000 persons in nine tent camps as follows:[66]

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[64] Opn Order, Seventh Army NEO 1-53, 19 Jun 53, cited above. SECRET.

[65] (1) USAREUR NEO 1-53, 7 May 53, Annex 2. SECRET. (2) Opn Order, Seventh Army NEO 1-53, 19 Jun 53, Annex 2. SECRET. (3) USAREUR COMZ Opn Order 953, 15 Jul 53, Annex 9. SECRET. All in file above, Vol. I, Item 8A (B/P); Vol. II, Items 28 (B/P) and 28A (B/P).

[66] USAREUR NEO 1-53, 7 May 53, cited above, Annex 3. SECRET.

Camp Location	Capacity
Crois Chapeau	20,000
Bussac	25,000
Bordeaux	10,000
Ingrandes	20,000
Chinon	10,000
Poitiers	10,000
Perigueux	10,000
Fontenet	10,000
Braconne	10,000

The camps were to be stocked with a 30-day supply of foodstuffs, medical supplies, fuel, sanitary supplies, and infant-care items, and provided with chaplain, postal, and medical services, and EES facilities. After arriving in the staging area, the march serials were to be regrouped and dispatched to the ports for embarkation aboard NELM ships or to airports for transfer to USAFE aircraft or to the Spanish-French border. They would remain under command of COMZ until their out-shipment from France. USAREUR COMZ was also to provision the evacuation ships with sufficient rations and medical supplies for a 72-hour water movement. If the operations went according to plans the staging area would be able to close out in thirty days after NEO Hour.[67]

c. Safe Haven Plans. In 1952, in accordance with international agreements, the Iberian Peninsula was designated as a safe haven for noncombatants sponsored by the United States. In the event of emergency conditions these noncombatants were to be evacuated from Germany, France, and other areas of Western Europe and the Mediterranean region to Spain and Portugal, where they would become the responsibility of the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Ambassadors to those two countries.[68] From there they would be transshipped to the United States by CINCLNELM. CINCUSAREUR was assigned the task of removing most of the evacuees from the staging area in France to the Iberian Peninsula, instead of to the United Kingdom safe haven specified in the 1952 planning. CINCUSAREUR would also render limited assistance to the Department of State in the support, movement, and embarkation of all U.S. sponsored noncombatants arriving in Spain and Portugal. In preparation for these duties, USAREUR headquarters in 1953 developed two safe haven plans, which, in essence, were supplementary to NEO.

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[67] Admin Order, USAREUR COMZ Opn Order 953, 15 Jul 53, cited above, Annex 5. SECRET.

[68] Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 11 Jan 54, sub: NEO and SAFEHAVEN Plans. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1954), Vol. I, Item 2A atchd.

(1) Interim Plan. Since the USAREUR planners at first lacked specific information on the resources of the Spanish Government, they had to prepare an interim plan which would be effective until a more definitive one could be developed. The interim plan was issued on 25 January 1953, and was to be implemented only if NEO was executed between 25 January 1953 and 1 May 1953. It was to have been put into effect without the benefit of stockpiled supplies or a U.S. military organization in Spain. It made broad provisions for approximately 185,000 noncombatants.[69]

(2) Permanent Plan. On 1 July 1953 the interim plan was superseded by a more comprehensive one making general provisions for the establishment of a safe haven in the Iberian Peninsula for 220,000 U.S.-sponsored noncombatants--150,000 in Spain and 70,000 in Portugal.[70] This new plan set forth the procedure for extending the evacuation of the USAREUR noncombatants from France's Bordeaux-La Pallice area into the safe haven in Portugal and northwestern Spain and for furnishing a proportional amount of support to all U.S.-sponsored evacuees in Portugal and Spain. USAREUR COMZ was to dispatch a minimum of twelve march serials a day to each of two border crossing points at Irun and Dancharinea in the western Pyrenees. Rail transportation was authorized if sufficient vehicular transportation was not available. Additional U.S.-sponsored noncombatants would arrive in Spain in accordance with other plans.[71] All evacuees were to be accommodated in provincial towns and cities of both countries at the expense of the U.S. Government. Although the Department of State was charged with over-all responsibility for operations in the safe haven, USAREUR COMZ was to organize and provide eleven staging detachments to assist the appropriate U.S. Ambassadors in processing, supplying, and protecting noncombatants. The staging detachments were to report to Madrid, Santander, Oviedo, Coruna, Lugo, Orense, Pont Vedra, Salamanca, Caceres, Badajos, and Lisbon. USAREUR COMZ was also to provide supplementary supplies for supporting approximately 145,000 U.S.-sponsored noncombatants until they were evacuated to the United States. Evacuation from the Iberian Peninsula was to begin on the 15th day after NEO Hour and the last increment was scheduled for embarkation on the 60th day after NEO Hour.

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[69] USAREUR NEO (SAFEHAVEN-Spain), 25 Jan 53. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1953), Vol. I, Item 2 atchd.

[70] (1) USAREUR NEO (SAFEHAVEN), 1 Jul 53. SECRET. In file above, Item 2 (B/P). (2) Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 11 Jan 54, sub: NEO and SAFEHAVEN Plans. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1954), Vol. I, Item 2A atchd.

[71] Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 11 Jan 54, cited above.

Noncombatants would embark on NELM vessels in the ports of Santander, Musel, La Coruna, Vigo, Lisbon, Cadiz, Algeciras, Malaga, Alicante, Valencia, and Barcelona.[72]

(3) Difficulties with Portugal. The agreement between the U.S. and Spanish Governments for the use of Spain as a safe haven for 150,000 American noncombatants was concluded on 23 July 1952.[73] On the other hand, although negotiations had been under way for more than two years, by 30 June 1954 a formal agreement for the use of Portugal as a safe haven for approximately 70,000 American noncombatants was not yet signed, because Portugal desired to have Portuguese nationals in Western Europe included in the U.S. noncombatant evacuation columns.[74] CINCUSAREUR was unwilling to enter into such an agreement because the Portuguese Government did not specify the amount and kinds of assistance desired in the evacuation of its nationals, and because it was feared that an agreement to evacuate Portuguese nationals would set a precedent which might influence Spain to request similar concessions. CINC-USAREUR was willing to compromise because if the agreement with Portugal could not be ratified, the United States would have to depend solely on the safe haven in Spain.[75] The Department of State believed that the negotiations were being held up because of misunderstandings on both sides, and that since the Portuguese Government had already agreed in principle to the establishment of a safe haven for Americans, the differences would be resolved and the agreement would soon be ratified.[76]

d. Evacuation of Non-Allied Noncombatants. USAREUR had also developed emergency plans for the evacuation of certain non-Allied noncombatants from Germany. Nominations for the inclusion of individuals in these plans were made by U.S. commanders in Europe, the Defense and State Departments, CIA, and other U.S. governmental agencies. These persons included prominent Germans, key scientists, members of Radio Free Europe, members of the American Community for the Liberation of the Free Peoples of Russia, indigenous employees

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[72] USAREUR NEO 2-53-S, 1 Jul 53. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1953), Vol. I, Item 2 (B/P).

[73] Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 11 Jan 54, cited above.

[74] USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf 4, 23 Mar 54. SECRET.

[75] (1) Ltr, Gen W. M. Hoge, CINCUSAREUR to Gen T. T. Handy, Dep US CINCEUR, 11 Feb 54. SECRET. (2) Memo, USAREUR DCOFS for Opns to USAREUR ACOFS G4, 12 Jan 54, sub: NEO 2-53-S. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1954), Vol. I, Item 2A atchd.

[76] Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col E. H. Murray, USAREUR G3 Div Opns Br, 12 Jul 54. SECRET.

of CIA, selected inmates of War Crimes Prison No. 1 at Landsberg, and other individuals whom the United States was morally obligated to evacuate. In some instances dependents of persons included in the lists would also be evacuated. During 1953 and the first half of 1954 several plans of this nature were being consolidated into a single comprehensive top secret plan which would also extend the scope of non-Allied evacuation planning. This new plan was expected to be in final draft form early in 1955.[77]

71. NEO Preparations

United States forces in Germany and France made preparations for the internal, as well as external, implementation of the noncombatant evacuation order. For instance, a block warden orientation and alert system was established and in operation; ten prepunched passport control cards were prepared and distributed to each noncombatant; military units with NEO assignments were trained and equipped; and supplies were stocked near the assembly areas, along the six evacuation routes in France, and in the Bordeaux-La Pallice staging area.

a. Survey of Area Commands. During the spring of 1954 a team composed of representatives of USAREUR headquarters and Seventh Army visited the area commands to investigate the status of NEO preparations. Certain deficiencies were found. For example, there was a shortage of noncombatant drivers, military personnel available to accompany the evacuation columns were insufficient, and in most localities in Germany the block warden system was inadequate. On the other hand, operational plans were satisfactory, the assignment of duties and briefing of personnel were more than adequate, and preparations for advance documentation and the stockpiling program were progressing. On the recommendation of the joint inspection team, steps were taken to remedy shortcomings.[78]

b. Survey of USAREUR COMZ. In January 1954 staff officers of USAREUR COMZ reported that resupply points for Class I and Class III supplies had been established close to the six NEO routes in France, that they were practically 100 percent stocked, and that stockpiling of housekeeping equipment for the tent camps in the staging area was 95 percent completed. Because of lack of

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[77](1) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to US CINCEUR, 8 Apr 53, sub: Evacuation Responsibility of CINCUSAREUR. SECRET. (2) Ltr, Maj Gen R. G. Gard, USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, to Mr. W. C. Dowling, Dep HICOG, 18 Dec 53, no sub. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1953), Vol. II, Items 18A, 37 atchd.

[78]IRS, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 12 Jul 54, sub: Survey of NEO Readiness. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1954), Vol. I, Item 10.

storage space, stockpiling of the 30-day store of Class I supplies for noncombatants in BASEC was only 30 percent completed. However, when additional storage space became available, Class I supplies could be brought forward in a short time from the zone of interior.[79]

72. Phase-out of the USAREUR Special NEO Planning Group

The USAREUR Special NEO Planning Group was established on 20 November 1952 for the purpose of determining deficiencies in NEO plans and preparations and taking corrective action.[80] It was composed of representatives of the four general staff divisions of USAREUR headquarters, Seventh Army, and USAREUR COMZ, and was under the chairmanship of a USAREUR G4 Division representative. Other USAREUR staff agencies provided assistance and advice. After examining the EUCOM plan that had been in effect since 1950, the group decided that a new NEO plan should be prepared, and during the early months of 1953 directed its efforts toward completion of the task. Simultaneously the group surveyed the capabilities of USAFE, NELM, and the area commands to implement the order. It discovered grave deficiencies in supply, movement, liaison, control, accommodations, facilities, and services.[81] While an analysis of these shortcomings indicated that not all of them could be overcome immediately, the group offered recommendations for remedial action and suggested that the plan should be completed and put into effect immediately and the difficulties ironed out later.[82] CINCUSAREUR agreed to this procedure. The NEO 1-53 plan was completed and officially issued on 7 May 1953. Deficiencies were enumerated with the understanding that the order could not be fully implemented until they were overcome. One of the final recommendations of the group was that the feasibility of the plans should be tested in an operational exercise. Having completed the plan, having determined the deficiencies in the ability of the plan to be implemented, and having made final recommendations for solving the difficulties, the Special NEO Planning Group finished its task. The group was therefore dissolved on 17 July 1953, and responsibility for monitoring the plan and keeping it up-to-date was assigned to the USAREUR G3 Division Operations Branch.[83]

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[79]Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 11 Jan 54, sub: NEO and SAFEHAVEN Plans. SECRET. In file above, Item 2A atchd.

[80]USAREUR Stf Memo No. 20, 20 Nov 52, sub: Establishment of USAREUR Special Planning Group. SECRET.

[81]Ltr, USAREUR Spl NEO Plng Gp to CINCUSAREUR, 17 Mar 53, sub: Final Report of Special NEO Planning Group. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1953), Vol. I, Item 13.

[82]Ibid.

[83]USAREUR Stf Memo No. 35, 17 Jul 53, sub: Establishment of USAREUR Special NEO Planning Group. UNCLASSIFIED.

73. NEO Test Exercises

In accordance with the recommendation of the USAREUR Special NEO Planning Group, CINCUSAREUR decided that the NEO 1-53 plan should be tested to determine its feasibility. Consequently, throughout the summer of 1953 preparations were under way for a test named Exercise ROAD BOUND. The Commanding General, Seventh Army, was designated as exercise director. He was responsible for coordinating, supervising, and controlling U.S. Army participation in the exercise and for achieving coordination with USAFE. The Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ, was to supervise the execution of the exercise in France and was to be responsible for coordinating with French agencies.[84]

a. Objectives. The over-all objective of Exercise ROAD BOUND was to determine whether the provisions of NEO could be implemented satisfactorily. Its immediate objective was to test the Seventh Army NEO 1-53 operational plan and the COMZ NEO 1-53 operational plan jointly, with special attention to control, supply, and communications procedures in the movements phase. In addition, the test was expected to give familiarization training to personnel assigned specific duties in the plans.[85]

b. Accomplishment of Exercise ROAD BOUND. The exercise was conducted from 12 to 20 November 1953 and was initiated with the announcement of a USAREUR-wide alert on the morning of 12 November. Approximately 1,000 military personnel and 500 military vehicles were dispatched from home stations in Germany to staging areas in the vicinity of Bordeaux, France. Area commands, districts, and detachments simulated their duties by dispatching a single vehicle to represent each march serial of 150 vehicles and a complete march unit of 30 vehicles on each of the Seventh Army NEO routes. Each of the ten stationary field hospitals dispatched an ambulance-type bus to simulate patient evacuation. The movement of the columns was executed in accordance with time and space factors provided in NEO planning. A communications network was set up and military police participated. On the northern routes, the last column cleared the German-French border 16 hours after T Hour and completed the journey to the staging area in France 49 hours after T Hour.

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[84](1) Cable SX-2870, USAREUR to Seventh Army and USAREUR COMZ, 15 Sep 53. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1953), Vol. I, Item 15. (2) Cable EPOL-5984, CINCUSAFE to CG Seventh Army, 10 Oct 53. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 354.2 (1953), Vol. II, Item 71.

[85](1) Cable SX-2870, 15 Sep 53, cited above. (2) Ltr, CG Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, 4 Jan 54, sub: Final Report on Exercise ROAD BOUND. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 354.2 (1954), Vol. I, Item B.

On the southern routes, the last column cleared the German-French border 26 hours after T Hour and completed the journey 72 hours after T Hour.[86]

c. Operational Problems. Practically no problems arose in Germany or at the border crossing points, but in France, where the movement was conducted under conditions of heavy fog which made driving difficult and hazardous, there was a noticeable lack of communication and control. Failure to furnish the required strip maps caused considerable confusion within COMZ. Instructions from the military police, who were responsible for traffic control operations, were generally vague and as a result some elements were misrouted. These conditions were further aggravated because route markings in the Saar and France were difficult to follow. Holding areas and resupply areas were neither properly marked nor controlled; therefore, some elements missed those points entirely. Rest and resupply areas in COMZ offered no comfort accommodations, but the base camps in the Bordeaux area were efficiently operated. The secret classification of the NEO plans was partially responsible for an overemphasis on security throughout the exercise and probably accounted for the inadequate briefing of personnel and the lack of information on the part of the military police.[87]

d. Evaluation. Exercise ROAD BOUND was evaluated at a critique at Seventh Army headquarters on 3 December 1953. It was decided that, in general, the test operation had been extremely valuable and that the application of lessons learned would result in a more workable NEO plan. More training and closer supervision for all personnel with NEO assignments were clearly required and USAREUR COMZ personnel, especially, needed extensive training in traffic control and communication. Detailed strip maps of all NEO routes should be issued at the processing points. The average speed of the columns should be increased and rest halts should be extended, because female dependents with children could not complete the trip to the staging areas in accordance with the then current movement schedule. The critique disclosed that the French had cooperated excellently and had shown great interest in the operation. A final conclusion was that another NEO training exercise would be valuable and should be held in the fall of 1954.[88]

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[86](1) Cable 6021, Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, 28 Nov 53. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 354.2 (1953), Vol. II, Item 71 atchd. (2) Ltr, CG Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, 4 Jan 54, cited above.

[87]USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf 3, 16 Feb 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

[88](1) Ibid., No. 13, 14 Dec 53. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Ltr, CG Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, 4 Jan 54, cited above.

74. Plans for Phasing Out Dependents and Other Civilians

The U.S. Government might desire to order the evacuation of Americans from Europe during a period of international tension not serious enough to justify the implementation of USAREUR NEO. To provide for this contingency US CINCEUR assigned to CINCUSAREUR the task of formulating a basic plan for the gradual evacuation of noncombatants for whom the Department of Defense was responsible in Germany, France, and the BENELUX area.[89] CINCNELM and CINCUSAFE were assigned responsibility for developing support plans for the water and air movement to the continental United States.[90] But centralized control over the flow of those who were to use airlift, and oceanlift facilities was to be exercised by CINCUSAREUR. Although recognizing the necessity for a close relationship between the plan for the rapid phase-out of dependents and the plan for the emergency evacuation of noncombatants, USAREUR planners decided that the rapid plan should avoid, wherever possible, the upheaval and hardships that would result from implementation of the NEO plan. At the same time, they realized that almost any conditions that required the initiation of the rapid phase-out of dependents would also mean making preparations to implement NEO.[91] On the other hand, in all but the air-transported elements of the phase-out, the purpose of the rapid plan would be defeated if a "slow NEO" were executed. Extensive overland movements of personnel, including hospital patients, would be required outside of normal channels in the NEO plans. Consequently, CINCUSAREUR intended to establish the necessary special facilities for NEO movements, if a period of tension should arise, and at the same time to initiate the rapid phase-out of dependents through accelerated peacetime channels.[92] The rapid phase-out plan developed by the USAREUR G1 Division, issued on 24 September 1953, included statements of policy and assignments of responsibilities for the US EUCOM region and implementing details for the evacuation of Germany. Special instructions also were included for USAREUR COMZ to prepare

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[89] Ltr, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, CINCNELM, CINCUSAFE, 14 Jan 53, sub: Assignment of Functions to Component Commanders. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 US EUCOM (1953), Vol. I, Item 5.

[90] (1) Ibid. (2) USAREUR ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG USAREUR COMZ, et al., 24 Sep 53, sub: Rapid Phase-out of Dependents and Certain Other Personnel. AG 292 GPA-AGO. SECRET.

[91] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CINCUSAFE, 2d Ind (5 May 1953), 26 Aug 53, sub: Rapid Phase-out of Dependents and Certain Other Personnel. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1953), Vol. I, Item 3A atchd.

[92] Ibid.

separate operational plans for the evacuation of noncombatants from France and BENELUX after the evacuation of Germany was completed.[93]

a. Rates of Evacuation. The planned rates of evacuation were based on USAREUR estimates of the noncombatant population in Germany for which US CINCEUR would be responsible on 1 January 1954. It was anticipated that approximately 72,300 women and children would have to be evacuated from Germany. In addition, it was believed that if the phase-out was ordered, 2,000 male civilian employees of the U.S. forces in Germany would resign from their positions to accompany their dependents, and that 3,000 women employees would also be evacuated with the dependents. Moreover, on the average, 500 military sponsors would be due for rotation each month and would be allowed to accompany their dependents during the rapid phase-out. It was estimated also that 4,400 military personnel and 3,200 civilians would have to be evacuated through medical channels. Thus, the over-all plan provided for the evacuation of 83,500 persons from Germany. If sufficient overseas transportation was made available, and the loading schedule of the planners was followed, the phase-out of Germany would be accomplished in 80 days.[94] Approximately 54,500 noncombatants would be evacuated to the United Stated by ship from Bremerhaven and about 29,000 by air from U.S. military airports in Germany. Although the actual number of persons evacuated would vary from day to day, uniform evacuation rates, based on assumed factors of space availability, were decided upon for planning purposes. According to Department of the Army estimates of ship allocations, a daily average of 225 cabin spaces and 1,200 troop spaces would be available for evacuation by water transport, but under the most crowded conditions only about 30 percent of each sailing party could be accommodated in troop class facilities. It was estimated that a daily average of 495 persons would be evacuated by ship.[95] During the first ten days of the phase-out program, air transport would be used for removing an estimated backlog of 1,200 priority medical evacuees. Thereafter, the

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[93](1) USAREUR ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG USAREUR COMZ, et al., 24 Sep 53, sub: Rapid Phase-out of Dependents and Certain Other Personnel. AG 292 GPA-AGO. SECRET. (2) Memo, USAREUR COFS to all USAREUR Stf Divs, 1 Feb 54, sub: USAREUR Planning Program. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 322 USAREUR (1954), Vol. I, Item 5.

[94](1) Incls 1 to 4 to USAREUR ltr, 24 Sep 53, cited above. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to TAG, 30 Sep 53, sub: Rapid Phase-out of Dependents. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1953), Vol. I, Item 3A atchd.

[95](1) Ibid. (2) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col W. W. Quimby, USAREUR G1 Div Ctl Br, 16 Sep 54. SECRET.

aircraft would be released for moving other evacuees, at a daily average of 560 persons, including 520 through regular evacuation channels and 40 through medical evacuation channels. In addition, 40 litter spaces would be available every fourth day for the medical air evacuation of military personnel. The integrity of family groups would be preserved by permitting dependents, civilian sponsors, and military sponsors due for normal rotation during the phase-out period to accompany members of their families who would be evacuated through medical channels.[96]

b. Local Responsibilities. The responsibility for administering and processing, without regard for service component, all persons to be evacuated under the phase-out plan was delegated by CINCUSAREUR as follows: to the Northern Area commander for his own territory; Wiesbaden, and Headquarters Area Command; to the Southern Area commander for his own territory and the Southeastern Area Command; to the Western Area commander for his own territory and all air installations in the northern French Zone; to the Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ, for France and BENELUX; to the Berlin commander; and to the Commander, Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation.[97] The area commanders were to prepare fully coordinated plans in support of the master USAREUR plan. Upon the announcement of the initiation of the phase-out, all outstanding port calls would be canceled. The evacuation of Berlin would begin automatically unless instructions to the contrary were given. All Allied dependents supported by the U.S. forces but not eligible for evacuation to the United States would be instructed to return to their home countries. Noncombatants would be assembled and processed for shipment to Frankfurt or to a designated general hospital if medical evacuation was required. Upon arriving at Frankfurt, personnel being evacuated by air would be transferred by bus to the nearby Rhine-Main Air Base; those being evacuated by water would be taken by rail to the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation.[98]

c. USAREUR Communications Zone. Complying with special instructions in the directive of 24 September 1953, USAREUR COMZ prepared plans, in coordination with CINCNELM, CINCUSAFE, and the

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[96] Incls 1 and 2 to USAREUR ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG USAREUR COMZ, et al., 24 Sep 53, cited above.

[97] Ibid.

[98] (1) Incls 1 to 5 to USAREUR ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG USAREUR COMZ, et al., 24 Sep 53, cited above. (2) Ltr, same to same, 18 Dec 53, sub: Rapid Phase-out of Dependents and Certain Other Personnel. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1953), Vol. I, Item 3A atchd. (3) USAREUR ltr, same to same, 25 Jan 54, same sub. AG 292 GPA-AGO. CONFIDENTIAL.

U.S. element of SHAPE, for the phase-out of all U.S. military dependents and certain other noncombatants in France and BENELUX. Whenever CINCUSAREUR ordered the implementation of the rapid phase-out, the commanding general of COMZ would assume over-all authority for the execution of these coordinated plans. Implementing operational plans were issued on 30 December 1953 and a revised version based on later capabilities was issued on 1 June 1954.[99] With the exception of selected medical cases, the evacuation of France and BENELUX would follow the evacuation of Germany. After MSTS Vessels had completed their task at Bremerhaven, they would stop at ports in France, and possibly in Belgium and the Netherlands, and pick up persons scheduled for evacuation by water transportation. Air evacuation from France was to be from Orly, Chateauroux, and Merignac airfields. On 31 May 1954 there were in France 21,313 dependents, and in BENELUX about 100, for whom the Department of Defense was responsible.[100] In addition, there were slightly over 2,000 Department of Defense civilian employees in the same areas, and it was anticipated that a thousand or more would be phased out with the dependents.[101] Daily shipping quotas were established for planning purposes. A daily average of 495 persons, including 265 cabin class passengers and 230 troop class passengers, was scheduled for water transport evacuation. The air evacuation daily average scheduled was 520, to include 480 by regular and 40 by medical airlift operations. The evacuation policies and priorities established for the evacuation of Germany would apply also to the evacuation of France and BENELUX. USAREUR COMZ evacuees were to be processed, in general, in accordance with peacetime regulations and requirements. Movement from the initial processing centers to the embarkation ports and airfields would be by bus and train.[102]

d. Evacuation of Other United States Citizens. If the U.S. Government should order the evacuation of France and Germany during a period of international tension which required only the implementation of the rapid phase-out plans, the Department of State was

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[99](1) USAREUR COMZ Rapid Phase-out of Dependents and Certain Other Personnel, USAREUR COMZ Opn Order No. 1153, 30 Dec 53. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR G1 Div Ctl Br files. (2) USAREUR COMZ Opn Order 154, 1 Jun 54, Sec. II. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1954), Vol. I, Item 2A (B/P).

[100]DF, USAREUR Compt to USAREUR ACOFS G1, 15 Jul 54, sub: Forecast of Dependent Strength. SECRET. In USAREUR G1 Div Ctl Br files.

[101](1) USAREUR Mthly Stat Rept, 31 May 54, p. 73. SECRET. (2) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col W. W. Quimby, USAREUR G1 Div Ctl Br, 16 Jul 54. CONFIDENTIAL.

[102](1) USAREUR COMZ Opn Order No. 1153, 30 Dec 53, cited above. (2) USAREUR COMZ Opn Order 154, 1 Jun 54, Sec. II, cited above.

responsible for the evacuation of all U.S. citizens who were not the responsibility of the Department of Defense. In this category were employees of the State Department and other nonmilitary U.S. governmental agencies and their dependents, American tourists, local residents with U.S. citizenship, etc. The Department of State would use commercial transportation for its evacuation program, but if adequate commercial transportation was not available for the evacuation of Berlin, the U.S. Air Force was authorized to use military aircraft.[103]

e. Re-evaluation of the Rapid Phase-out Plan. During the first half of 1954 the planners agreed that the basic rapid phase-out plan should be re-evaluated and rewritten, since it appeared that many problems arising under the old plan could be resolved only through a new one.[104] For example, by the end of June 1954 the dependent population in Germany had reached nearly 100,000 and there were an additional 22,000 dependents in France. Forecasts for July 1955 predicted 124,000 dependents in Germany and 39,000 in France. In addition, the rapid phase-out plan would have to make provisions for civilian employees, military medical patients, and normal rotation military personnel with families.[105] At the assumed rates of space availability more than six months might be required to complete the rapid phase-out plans in Germany and France. Since MSTS did not promise any additional shipping space for 1955 under peacetime conditions, and MATS could not foresee additional aircraft spaces, the only apparent solution under the then current plan was to assign a daily average of 1,000 evacuees to troop spaces in the ships.[106] However, this solution was impractical, because the holds of the ships would be so crowded that segregation according to sex would be difficult and lavatory facilities woefully inadequate.[107] Nevertheless, spreading the phase-out over a 6-month period involved too many risks. The

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[103](1) Ibid. (2) Incl 1 to USAREUR ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG USAREUR COMZ, et al., 24 Sep 53, sub: Rapid Phase-out of Dependents and Certain Other Personnel. AG 292 GPA-AGO. SECRET. (3) Ltr, same to same, 18 Dec 53, same sub. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1953), Vol. I, Item 3A atchd.

[104]Memo for rcd, 6 May 54. SECRET. In USAREUR G1 Div Ctl Br files.

[105]DF, USAREUR Compt to USAREUR ACOFS G1, 15 Jul 54, sub: Forecast of Dependent Strength. SECRET. In USAREUR G1 Div Ctl Br files.

[106]DF, USAREUR Trans Div to USAREUR ACOFS G1, 3 Sep 54, sub: Planning for Sea Lift Phase of Rapid Phase-out. SECRET. In USAREUR G1 Div Ctl Br files.

[107]Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col W. W. Quimby, USAREUR G1 Div Ctl Br, 16 Jul 54. SECRET.

planners, therefore, were considering the use of a large amount of commercial transportation for both airlifts and sealifts, and were consulting with MSTS and MATS officials concerning ways to overcome shortages in space availability.[108] CINCNELM suggested that many of the difficulties could be remedied if the plan was considered an emergency one, since in an emergency the Navy and Air Force could assume responsibility for the evacuation from Europe and could furnish sufficient transport for the phase-out operations, but under nonemergency plans the responsibility belonged to the autonomous transport services. Although such a step would seem to defeat the purpose for which the phase-out plan was originally prepared, some merit was seen in the idea if it provided in other respects for peacetime channels of evacuation that circumvented the hardships inherent in NEO operations. By mid-1954 these aspects of the phase-out problems were being studied by USAREUR G1 Division and a new plan was crystallizing.[109]

75. Status of Civilian Employees in an Emergency

a. U.S. Army Reserves. Since the status of civilian employees who were U.S. Army reservists with mobilization assignments with the organizations employing them was already determined, their retention in the command during an emergency was not expected to present problems. In addition, reserve personnel whose mobilization assignments were with different organizations could be retained as long as fifteen days if their services were required, and this period of retention could be extended, on a temporary basis, through special arrangement with USAREUR.[110] Commanders and heads of USAREUR staff divisions were responsible for making certain that the mobilization letters of the reservists were so worded as to permit their temporary retention. Before being released for compliance with their letters of mobilization, these reservists could be used by local commanders to assist in the evacuation of noncombatants.[111] Furthermore, whenever an alert order was announced, U.S. civil service employees who were

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[108] (1) Ibid. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAFE to CINCUSAREUR, 22 Apr 54, sub: USAREUR Plan for Rapid Phase-out of Dependents. SECRET. In USAREUR G1 Div Ctl Br files.

[109] (1) Memo for rcd, 6 May 54. SECRET. In USAREUR G1 Div Ctl Br files. (2) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col W. W. Quimby, USAREUR G1 Div Ctl Br, 16 Jul 54. SECRET.

[110] (1) USAREUR ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG Seventh Army, et al., 14 Apr 53, sub: Policy on Retention of Civilians in an Emergency. AG 371.2 GPA-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR G3 Div Jnl File, 5 Mar 53, Item 1. UNCLASSIFIED.

[111] USAREUR NEO 1-53, 7 May 53, Annex 3. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1953), Vol. I, Item 8A (B/P).

reservists with mobilization assignments or designations were not to be evacuated from France or Germany.[112]

b. Retention of Key Personnel. During a wartime emergency, CINCUSAREUR was authorized to retain Department of the Army civilian employees of both sexes, for use in a civilian capacity, if their services were necessary for operational efficiency.[113] Naval and Air Force commanders possessed the same basic authority for retaining their civilian employees, but no military commander was authorized otherwise to impress or levy employees of other U.S. governmental agencies unless the employees consented. It was USAREUR policy to exercise the right of compulsory retention only for male civilians occupying jobs previously designated as key positions. Most of these positions were technical in nature and were principally in the fields of ordnance, transportation, engineering, and supply. Some were in counterintelligence and were held by specialists familiar with the customs and languages of certain geographical areas. In all cases these men would have to be retained in an emergency because no military personnel with the proper qualifications would be available. Approximately a hundred positions in Germany were designated as key spaces, but practically none in USAREUR COMZ since it was not expected that France would be a combat area.[114] Men without reserve assignments who were in key positions and did not wish to remain voluntarily were to be released whenever hostilities began, unless their retention was urgently required by operational necessity.[115] Nevertheless, U.S. citizens without reserve status in key positions could expect to be retained, irrespective of their wishes, until replacements were secured. Key civilians were not to be retained involuntarily in forward command posts or in any position that required permanent service forward of any rear boundaries of the corps areas. If key civilian employees refused to accept the responsibility inherent in their positions, or declined to participate in necessary alerts and exercises, they were liable to separation or disciplinary action in accordance with appropriate regulations.[116]

c. Retention of Other Civilian Employees. During an emergency, short of war, in which the ordered evacuation of noncombatants was involved, Department of the Army civilian employees of both sexes, not in key positions, who did not wish to remain

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[112] Ibid., App. A.

[113] USAREUR ltr, 14 Apr 53, cited above.

[114] Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col W. W. Quimby, USAREUR G1 Div Ctl Br, 16 Sep 54. SECRET.

[115] USAREUR NEO 1-53, 7 May 53, Annex 3, cited above.

[116] USAREUR ltr, 14 Apr 53, cited above.

in Germany voluntarily, would be released when their services were no longer needed. However, they could be retained to permit the priority movement of evacuees less able to take care of themselves, such as hospital patients or women in late stages of pregnancy. On the other hand, upon the implementation of the order for reinforced alert, male employees of the Department of Defense reporting to ports in France, including those evacuated from Germany, could be used within USAREUR COMZ and reassigned according to instructions from USAREUR headquarters. In the event of a USAREUR COMZ phase-out of employees, men could be retained involuntarily for continued duty until suitable replacements could be secured, but for no more than sixty days.[117] Any USAREUR male civilian employee, regardless of nationality, could volunteer and be retained in Germany or France if his services were required, but local commanders were to see to it that such persons were given proper documentation as noncombatant members of the U.S. military forces. Female civilian employees who volunteered to remain could be retained in USAREUR COMZ. Upon declaration of an emergency, U.S. female civilians such as typists, stenographers, and medical technicians, whose skills were particularly needed, would be encouraged to enlist in the Women's Army Corps.[118]

d. Nonappropriated Fund Employees. Except for critical specialists who volunteered to remain with their organizations, the employment of USAREUR nonappropriated fund employees in Germany was to be terminated on the implementation of the order for reinforced alert. Practically all women in this category were to be evacuated with other noncombatants immediately, but female Red Cross workers assigned to military hospitals, the central communications office, or to the office of the American Red Cross Director of Operations and Staff were to remain on duty and accompany their units if moved. Female Red Cross workers evacuated from Germany, or those already in France, could be retained in USAREUR COMZ for further duty, provided they volunteered and the director of the American Red Cross requested their services.[119] On implementation of the noncombatant evacuation order, male Red Cross workers were to remain with their assigned or attached units unless moved in accordance with other emergency orders implemented concurrently.[120]

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[117](1) Seventh Army ORA 1-53, 10 Apr 53, Annex 2. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 371.2 (1953), Vol. I, Item 32A (B/P). (2) USAREUR COMZ Opn Order 1153, 30 Dec 53. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR G1 Div Ctl Br files.

[118]USAREUR ltr, 14 Apr 53, cited above.

[119](1) Seventh Army ORA 1-53, 10 Apr 53, Annex 2, cited above. (2) USAREUR NEO 1-53, 7 May 53, Annex 3. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1953), Vol. I, Item 8A (B/P).

[120]USAREUR NEO 1-53, 7 May 53, Annex 3, cited above.

e. Disposition of Civilian Employees on Leave. Upon the implementation of the order for simple alert, leaves of all Department of Defense civilian employees would be automatically canceled and the employees recalled to their places of employment.[121] On the other hand, when NEO or the order for reinforced alert was declared, employees on leave in Austria or Germany would report to the nearest U.S., British, or French military installation for evacuation with noncombatant columns. Employees on leave elsewhere in the European theater would report to the nearest U.S. consulate for instructions.[122]

f. Resident Personnel. Whenever an emergency was declared, German and non-German resident employees of USAREUR were to report to their respective civilian employment offices for instructions as to their disposition. In general, however, their employment would be continued until their installations were closed.[123]

76. Plans for a Berlin Airlift

A revised version of the Alternate Operations Plan for a Berlin Airlift (Reduced) was issued by USAREUR on 1 May 1953. Additional corrections were made on 1 August 1953.[124] No further changes were made, nor were any contemplated, because after January 1953 US CINCEUR had made CINCUSAFE responsible for Berlin airlift planning.[125] The over-all purpose of the plan was to provide criteria for the operation of a reduced airlift of supplies and personnel into and out of Berlin if Russian or satellite forces severed the land lines of communication to the city. The plan reflected the latest air capabilities of Twelfth Air Force and eliminated features which USAFE had found objectionable in the previous plan. Detailed operational instructions for the Twelfth Air Force were deleted and in their place was substituted a general statement of objectives. Provisions were made for effecting full coordination among agencies which were to cooperate in the implementation of the plan--USAREUR, USAFE, U.S. Commander Berlin, the

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[121] Seventh Army OSA 1-53, 10 Apr 53. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 371.2 (1953), Vol. I, Item 32A (B/P).

[122] (1) Seventh Army ORA 1-53, 10 Apr 53. SECRET. In file cited above. (2) Seventh Army NEO 1-53, 19 Jun 53. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1953), Vol. I, Item 28 (B/P).

[123] Seventh Army ORA 1-53, 10 Apr 53, cited above.

[124] Alternate Operations Plan for Berlin Airlift (Reduced), 1 May 53, with Corrections of 1 Aug 53 (hereafter cited as Berlin Airlift Plan, 1 May 53). SECRET. In USAREUR G3 Div Plans Br files.

[125] Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col E. C. Carlson, USAREUR G3 Div Plans Br, 30 Oct 54. SECRET.

Allied High Commission for Germany, the Allied Kommandatura, the German Federal Republic, and local governmental agencies of Berlin.[126] The commander in chief of USAREUR had the authority for issuing the implementation order at his discretion. When the order was issued, CINCUSAREUR was to activate the U.S. Army Airlift Support Command (USAASC), which would be responsible for supporting USAFE operations in the U.S. Zone of Germany. The primary duty of USAASC would be getting the supply cargoes to the Rhine-Main air base. There, USAFE would take over and transport the supplies from Rhine-Main to Tempelhof air base in Berlin, using its currently available aircraft on a 24-hour basis. The objective was to attain an airlift capacity of 47,000 tons a month within 60 days after the implementation of the plan.[127] The cooperating organizations in Berlin would be responsible for the distribution of the supplies within the city and also for the delivery of manufactured goods to Tempelhof air base if the airlift became a two-way affair. The plans were designed to be operative for approximately 90 days, but the operations could easily be phased into a full-scale airlift if required.[128] At the end of June 1954 tripartite plans for such an eventuality were in the discussion stage, but could not be completed until each power knew what obligations the other two were willing to assume in the Tripartite Politico-Military Airlift Stockpile Agreement that was being negotiated by the respective governments.[129] Although Great Britain and France recognized a moral obligation to furnish one-third each of any proposed Berlin airlift capacity, their current capability was much less. For instance, a large proportion of French military aircraft was engaged in the Indochina campaign. However, the United States hoped that both the United Kingdom and France would be able to furnish some airlift capacity in support of the USAREUR unilateral plan even while tripartite planning was under way.

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[126] (1) Berlin Airlift Plan, 1 May 53. SECRET. In USAREUR G3 Div Plans Br files. (2) IRS, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 3 Feb 53, sub: Change 3 to Alternate Operations Plan for Berlin Airlift (Reduced). SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 094 Berlin (1953), Vol. I, Item 3 atchd.

[127] Berlin Airlift Plan, 1 May 53. SECRET. In USAREUR G3 Div Plans Br files.

[128] Ibid.

[129] (1) IRS, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to USAREUR DCOFS Opns, 22 May 53, sub: Tripartite Political Talk on Berlin. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 094 Berlin (1953), Vol. I, Item 34. (2) Cable SX-1233, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 16 Jul 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS AG 1820 (1954).

77. Air Evacuation of Berlin

a. Tripartite Air Evacuation of Noncombatants. At Heidelberg in December 1951 the commanders in chief of the three forces occupying Western Germany agreed on over-all measures for the air evacuation of noncombatants from Berlin in an emergency. Each, however, reserved the right to take unilateral action after consultation with the other two. In support of this so-called Heidelberg Agreement, tripartite draft plans were completed on two occasions, but they were in each case deficient because of the omission of detail.[130] Throughout 1953 and the first half of 1954, a new plan, which incorporated detailed annexes, was in preparation. Known as Operation TRIPLE PLAY, it was virtually completed during June 1954 and at the end of the month was being circulated among interested agencies for coordination and approval. Operation TRIPLE PLAY was to be implemented by the three zonal military commanders. They would act only in accordance with national instructions. Each nation could begin the air evacuation of its own noncombatants before entering into a joint effort, but zonal airfields could not be used as destination points without the prior approval of the appropriate zonal military commanders. In implementing the joint plan no actions were to be undertaken without the unanimous agreement of the three zonal military commanders.[131] The plan called for the evacuation of dependents and civilian employees in Berlin for whom the United States, the United Kingdom, and France were responsible, by air and on a non-crash basis directly to destinations in France and Great Britain. In addition, selected German nationals, members of friendly missions and their families, and tourists and local residents who were citizens of the three Allied countries would be evacuated. On the other hand, if noncombatants had to be evacuated from Berlin on a crash basis, French and American nationals would be moved by air to Rhine-Main, and British nationals to Duesseldorf. From those points British noncombatants would be flown to off-continent destinations, French nationals would be moved into France by land routes, and Americans would be transported overland to staging areas in accordance with the current USAREUR NEO.[132]

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[130] Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col E. C. Carlson, USMC, USAREUR G3 Div Plans Br, 30 Oct 54. SECRET.

[131] IRS, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to USAREUR DCOFS Opns, 5 Sep 53, sub: Triple Play. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 094 Berlin (1953), Vol. I, Item 34A.

[132] (1) Draft, Operation Triple Play (Final), n.d. SECRET. In USAREUR G3 Div Plans Br files. (2) Interv, 30 Oct 54, cited above.

b. Unilateral Air Evacuation. A unilateral 2-part operation plan for the USAREUR air evacuation of Berlin was completed on 15 December 1953. Twelfth Air Force issued a supporting plan on 22 March 1954.[133]

(1) Noncombatants. The first part of the USAREUR and Twelfth Air Force plans made provisions for the evacuation from Berlin of noncombatants for whom the United States was responsible and certain selected Germans. It was expected that these plans would be implemented at the same time as similar plans for the air evacuation of Vienna and that the aircraft for both operations would be allocated by US EUCOM. United States noncombatants in Berlin numbered about 1,100 on 31 January 1954, so the supporting plans were formulated on that basis, but with provisions for continuous revision to reflect changing conditions. U.S. CINCEUR was to issue the evacuation order, but if circumstances were too critical for consultation, CINCUSAREUR could issue the order. Upon implementation of the plan, the Air Force would remove U.S. noncombatants from Berlin to Burtonwood, England. However, if bad weather or other unfavorable conditions made this operation impossible, noncombatants would be taken to an airfield near Bordeaux, France. In the event of evacuation to Burtonwood, the London Liaison Group would be responsible for processing, feeding, and lodging the noncombatants. In the event of evacuation to Bordeaux, the Paris Liaison Group would be responsible for coordinating plans in France, and USAREUR COMZ would furnish food, temporary lodging, and medical care. Provisions were made for extending operations, after U.S. personnel were removed, to include aid in evacuating French and British noncombatants if a tripartite evacuation plan was put into effect.[134]

(2) U.S. Garrison. The second part of the plan provided for the unilateral air evacuation of the U.S. garrison from Berlin to Rhine-Main after the removal of noncombatants. Special provisions for carrying out the evacuation without the use of radar and radio communications were incorporated because the Russians were expert at jamming radio channels.[135] Special instructions for the destruction of classified documents and material and the disposal of usable war supplies and equipment were also included.

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[133](1) Operation Plan for the USAREUR Air Evacuation of Berlin, 15 Dec 53. SECRET. In USAREUR G3 Div Plans Br files. (2) U.S. Twelfth Air Force Operation Plan, Serial No. 8-54, Air Evacuation of Berlin, 22 Mar 54. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 094 Berlin (1954), Vol. I, Item 9 (B/P).

[134]Ibid.

[135]Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col E. C. Carlson, USMC, USAREUR G3 Div Plans Br, 30 Oct 54. SECRET.

From the viewpoint of U.S. relations with Great Britain and France, this planning was highly sensitive. It was a firmly announced U.S. policy that the maintenance of the Western position in Berlin was of paramount importance to the Western Powers, and that since Berlin could not be abandoned except at the cost of a major political reversal, the Western Powers should not leave the city because of Russian or satellite pressure, even though the resulting situation might involve the risk of a general war.[136] On the other hand, because of the risk of a general war, Great Britain and France had hesitated to approve the idea of making a stand in Berlin if a communist invasion appeared imminent.[137] Through strong diplomatic persuasion the United States had convinced its two allies of the wisdom of maintaining the Western position in Berlin in the face of a Russian attack. Nevertheless, the U.S. military commanders in Europe, responsible for the safety of their troops, were obligated to plan for any eventuality, including the unilateral air evacuation of its garrison from Berlin.

78. Combat Developments Program

The combat developments program of the command, carried on by the Combat Developments Branch of USAREUR G3 Division, was concerned with atomic warfare, radiological defense, unconventional warfare, phychological warfare, and advances in military science pertaining to materiel, tactics, and techniques. Within these fields, analytical studies were made, plans prepared, tasks set, operational details devised, and military requirements for the employment of new equipment established.[138]

a. Atomic Warfare. Most of the effort in the field of special weapons was directed toward the development of atomic warfare procedures, policies, techniques, and tactics. Other problems investigated included the deployment to Europe of U.S. Army atomic delivery units and atomic support units, the storage and transportation of atomic weapons, and requirements for the use of atomic weapons in land operations for control of Central Europe. In addition, atomic warfare annexes for U.S. war plans were prepared, and problems for simulated atomic warfare in training maneuvers and CPX's were formulated.[139]

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[136] Incl 1 to IRS, USAREUR DCOFS for Opns to USAREUR ACOFS G3, 11 Feb 54, sub: Replacement of Military by Civilian in Allied Kommandatura (The Nash Paper). SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 094 Berlin (1954), Vol. I, Item 4.

[137] Interv, 30 Oct 54, cited above.

[138] Organizational Manual for USAREUR ACOFS G3, 4 Jan 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G3 Div Admin Br files.

[139] Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col L. Griffin, USAREUR G3 Div Combat Devs Br, 15 Jul 54. SECRET.

b. Unconventional Warfare. One of the most significant aspects of unconventional warfare is the employment of special forces in conducting operations within or behind enemy lines. Such operations include the organization and conduct of guerrilla warfare and resistance movements, subversion and sabotage, commando and ranger raids, and infiltration of agents into the enemy's spheres of influence in support of actual and projected special forces operations. In this field the combat developments program was concerned with the delineation of policies and procedures, U.S. and NATO planning, and the organization, training, and current operations of U.S. special forces, such as the 10th Special Forces Group. Targeting requirements were determined, tasks set, and operational details worked out. Annexes for unconventional warfare operations were prepared for inclusion in U.S. and NATO war plans. Among topics under study in 1953 and 1954 were the deployment of special forces troops to Europe, the role of Seventh Army in unconventional warfare, administrative and logistical support of special forces, intelligence support, communications support, and the role of special forces troops in noncombatant evacuations and in simple, reinforced, and general alerts. The escape and evasion phase of unconventional warfare was the responsibility of the USAREUR G2 Division.[140]

c. Psychological Warfare. The US EUCOM Joint Emergency War Plan of 1953 allocated to CINCUSAREUR a specific wartime area of responsibility for psychological warfare. It also provided for the D-Day assumption by US CINCEUR of military control over the facilities and personnel of U.S. governmental and civilian information agencies in Europe and for the allocation of some of those facilities and personnel to CINCUSAREUR.

(1) Plans and Studies. Planning the emergency psychological warfare program was the task of the Psychological Warfare Section of the Combat Developments Branch. This section prepared Appendix C to the civil affairs annex of the USAREUR Joint Emergency Alert Plan of 1954, thus providing for psychological support of refugee control measures. In addition, it prepared the psychological warfare annex to the USAREUR Emergency War Plan of 1954. This annex provided for the D-Day activation of Psychological Warfare Task Force A under the command of CINCUSAREUR and outlined the wartime responsibilities and undertakings of CINCUSAREUR and subordinate commanders. Among projects in progress between 1 January 1953 and 30 June 1954 were the setting of psychological warfare tasks, the development of operational

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[140](1) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col M. F. Sullivan, USAREUR G3 Div Combat Devs Br, 20 Oct 54. SECRET. (2) Organizational Manual for USAREUR ACOFS G3, 4 Jan 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G3 Div Admin Br files.

techniques and procedures, the preparation of standard propaganda leaflets, the study of administrative and logistical support of psychological warfare activities, and the determination of fixed radio stations and printing facilities to be used in psychological warfare operations. A country guide to psychological warfare potentialities in Poland was compiled and was in the final editing stage at the end of June 1954. Meanwhile, research was being done for the preparation of a similar guide for Czechoslovakia.[141]

(2) Operations. The 301st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group was an operational unit subordinate to the Psychological Warfare Section of the Combat Developments Branch. This group trained personnel, gathered information for incorporation into the country plans, and rendered some support to the Voice of America. Linguists, writers, and artists were assigned to the group to prepare leaflets and radio propaganda continuities. It was supplied with nonmobile lithographic equipment, mobile radio broadcasting equipment, and mobile equipment for monitoring radio propaganda broadcasts of adversaries. On 17 May 1953 the reserve designation of the group was returned to the reserve unit in New York City and the group in Europe was redesignated the 7721 Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group. Because of a reduction in the USAREUR troop ceiling ordered by the Department of the Army, the group was inactivated on 15 September 1953. During the period covered by this review, the 5th Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, assigned to the Seventh Army, operated at reduced strength. This company was a completely mobile field-type unit equipped with printing presses and loudspeakers for Seventh Army tactical psychological warfare activities. It participated in all Seventh Army maneuvers.[142]

d. Operations Research Office. The USAREUR Operations Research Office Field Team was an extension of the Department of the Army Operations Research Office (ORO) and was assigned to the Combat Developments Branch. Its function was to undertake analytical studies of military operational problems of interest to the Army, so as to provide a scientific basis for decisions and actions.[143] Between 1 January 1953 and 30 June 1954 the USAREUR Research Advisory Committee assigned three principal work projects to the team. Project 1 was entitled "A Critical Analysis of Land Forces Central Europe Demolition and Retardation Plans." Studies undertaken under this project analyzed existing plans for strategic

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[141] PSYWAR Actvs in USAREUR from 1 Jan 53 to 30 Jun 54, 15 Jul 54. SECRET. In USAREUR G3 Div Combat Devs Br files.

[142] Ibid.

[143] Organizational Manual for USAREUR ACOFS G3, 4 Jan 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G3 Div Admin Br files.

railroad demolition, the tactical plans for retardation and demolition, the amount of petroleum and petroleum products in West Germany and plans for denying them to an invader. Project 3 was entitled "Vulnerability of the Line of Communication." Studies undertaken under this project analyzed the vulnerability of the line of communications to enemy attack by conventional and atomic bombing, to mass movement of refugees, and to sabotage and action by subversive elements. Project A was entitled "A Critical Analysis of the Central Army Group Weapons System for the Defense of the MLR." Studies undertaken analyzed a balanced special weapons system for USAREUR, the use of atomic demolitions in the emergency plans, and interference by German refugees with the tactical plans of the commander of CENTAG.[144]

79. Maintenance of Internal Security in Germany

The internal security directive of 29 July 1952 became obsolete in 1953 because it had been issued as a EUCOM directive and included instructions for Twelfth Air Force and USNAVGER, no longer allocated to USAREUR. Furthermore, it included emergency directions for military occupational duties and for strict control of the civilian population in the U.S. Zone of Germany. By 1953 these directions were inappropriate since the occupational mission of the American forces was evolving into defense against external aggression; moreover, German governmental authorities were able to cope with ordinary instances of civil disorder. In keeping with current conditions, CINCUSAREUR issued on 19 December 1953 a new internal security directive for the U.S. area of responsibility in Germany.[145] Incorporated in it were changes recommended by interested USAREUR staff divisions, Seventh Army, USNAVGER, USAFE, and HICOG. The underlying concept of the new version was the separation of normal command responsibility for maintaining internal security from the responsibility for quelling civil disturbance.[146] The directive established USAREUR requirements for the development of internal security plans for U.S. military

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[144] Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Dr. H. M. Cole, Fld Dir ORO, USAREUR, 15 Jul 54. SECRET.

[145] (1) IRS, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 2 Dec 53, sub: Internal Security Directive-USAREUR (Germany). CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG Seventh Army, et al., 19 Dec 53, same sub. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR SGS 371.2 (1953), Vol. III, Item 48 atchd.

[146] Ltr, Brig Gen R. G. Gard, USAREUR DCOFS for Opns to Mr. Walter Dowling, Dep HICOG, 27 Aug 53, no sub. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

units and installations in Germany and stated USAREUR policy on intervention by U.S. forces during civil disorder in Germany.[147]

a. Protection of Personnel and Property. Normal security measures against fire, sabotage, pilferage, and trespass were excluded from the directive. In the event of civil disturbance in Germany, USAREUR commanders were to protect members of the U.S. forces and of HICOG; citizens of NATO countries who were employed by the United States or whose presence in its areas of responsibility was in the interest of its defense mission; citizens of the United States, Great Britain, and France; and dependents of persons in those categories. They were also to protect real and personal property of the U.S. Government, property requisitioned by it, and property leased to it.[148]

b. Planning Responsibilities. The commanders of areas, districts, and the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation were required to maintain current internal security plans for their respective regions of responsibility. They were responsible for the over-all coordination of the internal security plans for all installations within the geographical boundaries of their commands and for all assigned, attached, and lodger units, with the exception of those belonging to Seventh Army. Acting under instructions of their parent organizations, Seventh Army units, USAREUR administrative and technical service units, and units under operational control of staff divisions of USAREUR headquarters were also required to maintain current internal security plans that had been coordinated with the appropriate area commanders. These various plans set forth the course of action that the commanders intended to take to safeguard U.S. personnel and property in the event of civil discord in Germany.[149]

c. USAREUR Policy on Civil Disturbance. USAREUR policy defined a civil disturbance as a situation arising within a community or state from acts of violence or disorder which were prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order. Disturbances in Germany which were exclusively civilian in nature were to be under the jurisdiction of appropriate German local law enforcement agencies. United States forces were not to help maintain civil order in Germany if their own security was not in jeopardy. On the other hand, when either the magnitude of a civil disturbance was such that the German authorities could not control it or the operational readiness and lines of communications of U.S. troops

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[147] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG Seventh Army, et al., 19 Dec 53, cited above.

[148] Ibid.

[149] Ibid.

were threatened, the U.S. military authorities concerned were to report the facts of the incident and make appropriate recommendations on intervention to CINCUSAREUR. Time permitting, these reports and recommendations were to be coordinated with the local representative of HICOG before being submitted to USAREUR headquarters. However, if a civil disturbance immediately endangered personnel, property, installations, operational readiness, or lines of communications of the U.S. forces, military commanders were empowered to take any prompt action that in their judgment was necessary and reasonable. This direct action was to be limited to what was actually necessary for the protection of U.S. interests in the affected locality. Military commanders were not to assume any functions normally performed by the German authorities. Any action taken upon local initiative was to be reported to USAREUR headquarters as soon as practicable and by the most speedy means of communication. In carrying out their operational missions under the internal security plans, area commanders were authorized to request assistance directly from Seventh Army, which was to provide the required aid so far as the existing tactical situation permitted.[150]

80. Maintenance of Internal Security in USAREUR COMZ

Since USAREUR COMZ lay wholly within France, a sovereign nation, the provisions of the USAREUR internal security directive for Germany were not considered applicable to it.[151] Therefore, a separate directive was issued on 25 January 1954 making the Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ, responsible for the security of all USAREUR units, installations, and personnel in France.[152] It superseded the EUCOM directive of 28 May 1951 for EUCOM elements in France.

a. Security Categories. Details for the maintenance of normal security measures against fire, sabotage, disaffection of personnel, and pilferage were not included in the directive, because those measures were considered to be normal responsibilities of commanders at all echelons. The directive covered additional measures required to protect members of the U.S. forces and their dependents, American civilian employees of the U.S. forces

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[150] (1) Ibid. (2) IRS, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 2 Dec 53, cited above.

[151] IRS, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 31 Jul 53. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 322 COMZ (1954), Vol. I, Item 2 atchd.

[152] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG COMZ, 25 Jan 54, sub: Internal Security Directive, USAREUR Communications Zone. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

and their dependents, members of labor service units, U.S. property under Army control, USAREUR installations, and property leased to the Army.[153]

b. Plans. The commanding general of USAREUR COMZ was required to prepare plans for the protection of enumerated categories of personnel and property in France. All subordinate commanders of USAREUR COMZ elements were required to prepare operational plans for the security of their respective units and installations and to make appropriate preparations for implementation. In addition, all USAREUR units and installations in France that were not assigned to USAREUR COMZ were instructed to prepare security plans and the Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ, or his subordinate commanders were to review them and integrate them into the USAREUR COMZ plans.[154]

c. Implementation. Security plans were to be implemented whenever public disorder in France endangered American lives and property. However, no action was to be taken beyond the confines of any U.S. Army installation except upon instructions from higher headquarters. French authorities retained the responsibility for maintaining law and order outside the limits of U.S. installations.[155] Beside controlling his own forces during such an emergency, the Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ, was to assume command of USAREUR administrative and technical service units and installations in France to the degree required for implementing any plans prepared in compliance with the internal security directive. No other forces would be immediately available.[156]

81. Troop Locations and Troop Movements

With a few exceptions, the USAREUR peacetime troop augmentation program was completed by 1953. Troop units were deployed throughout the command in positions that would permit prompt reaction to invasion by Russian or Russian satellite armed forces. The locations were determined by the provisions of the USAREUR and NATO emergency plans for the defense of Western Europe.[157]

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[153] Ibid.

[154] Ibid.

[155] USAREUR COMZ Opn Order 453, 25 May 53. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 371.2 (1953), Vol. II, Item 43B (B/P).

[156] (1) Ibid. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG COMZ, 25 Jan 54, cited above.

[157] Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Col J. W. Barlow, USAREUR G3 Div Opns Br, 11 Jun 54. CONFIDENTIAL.

a. Deployment of Divisions and Armored Cavalry Regiments. During the period covered by this report, 4 infantry divisions, 1 armored division, and 3 armored cavalry regiments were assigned to the command. The three armored cavalry regiments were substantially the equivalent of a sixth division. Toward the end of June 1954 the 1st Infantry Division was stationed in the Wuerzburg region, the 4th Infantry Division in the general area of Frankfurt and Hanau, the 2d Armored Division in the vicinity of Baumholder, the 5th Infantry Division in the region of Augsburg and Munich, and the 9th Infantry Division in the Stuttgart area. The armored units were concentrated along the borders of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Zone of Germany. The 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment was deployed around Bamberg, the 6th Armored Cavalry Regiment near Landshut, and the 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment in the Hersfeld area.[158]

b. Changes in Location of Troop Units. Troop units were frequently moved from one location to another. Most of these changes, however, were of a temporary nature, incident to training maneuvers, for example. Permanent changes of station to improve the strength of the defense perimeter were less frequent. Some of the principal changes in troop locations were as follows:[159]

Unit	Old Station	New Station	Date
1st Inf Div Arty	Erlangen	Wuerzburg	9 Nov 53
327th QM Gp	Baumholder	Nahbollenbach	14 Dec 53
7th QM Gp	Baumholder	Nahbollenbach	14 Dec 53
102d QM Gp	Idar-Oberstein	Metz	15 Jan 54
1st Med Gp	Landstuhl	Verdun	1 Feb 54
51st Ord Gp	Esslingen	Sandhofen	10 Jun 54
57th Ord Gp	Miesau	Kaiserslautern	24 May 54

c. The 280-mm. Gun Battalions. The U.S. Army had developed a new 280-mm. cannon which could fire atomic shells whose destructive power was approximately equivalent to the atom bomb dropped on Hiroshima. Because of the effectiveness of this weapon, it was considered an excellent means of forestalling a Soviet threat and strengthening U.S. forces in the event of an invasion of Western

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[158] (1) Station List of Organizations in USAREUR, 30 Jun 54. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Seventh Army Unit Location List, 30 Jun 54. CONFIDENTIAL.

[159] Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj W. Chandler, USAREUR G3 Div Opns Br, 22 Dec 54. CONFIDENTIAL.

Europe.[160] Five 280-mm. gun battalions were assigned to USAREUR, and in turn to Seventh Army, during late 1953 and early 1954. The 868th Field Artillery Battalion arrived in the command on 12 October 1953; the 867th on 4 November 1953; the 265th on 22 November 1953; the 264th on 1 April 1954; and the 59th on 28 April 1954.[161] Each battalion had 6 atomic cannon and an aggregate personnel strength of 494.

d. Major Nondivisional Units. There were approximately 60 major nondivisional support units in the command during 1953 and 1954. Except for the addition of the atomic gun battalions, the aggregate of the various types of units was constant. For greater tactical mobility these units were assigned directly to corps commanders rather than to divisional commanders. The following tabulation shows the major nondivisional units in USAREUR during the period:[162]

Battalions	1 Jan 53	1 Jan 54	30 Jun 54
Antiaircraft	18	18	18
Field Artillery	27	30	32
Combat Engineers	10	10	10
Tank	3	3	3

82. Concept C

On 7 August 1952 the Department of the Army instructed CINCUSAREUR to determine the logistical support costs of the command on the basis of phasing down Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation until it served only as a port of entry for nonwar-risk supplies and equipment, while building up the French ports until they were the exclusive entry points for combat and war-risk supplies and equipment. Moreover, CINCUSAREUR was to determine costs on the basis of completely abandoning Bremerhaven and using French ports for entry to the European continent.[163] This study was completed in

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[160] Statement of Gen M. B. Ridgway, COFSA, 1 May 54, quoted in The Stars and Stripes (Eur. Ed.), May 2, 1954, p. 2. UNCLASSIFIED.

[161] (1) USAREUR Troop Assignment No. 12, 21 Oct 53. UNCLASSIFIED. USAREUR Troop Assignments Nos. 1 and 5, 14 Jan and 3 May 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

[162] Compiled from info furnished by USAREUR G3 Div Opns Br, 30 Dec 54. CONFIDENTIAL.

[163] Cable 915448, DA to USAREUR, 7 Aug 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS SMC.

December 1952. As a means of comparison it included an analysis of the costs of the then current operations on the basis of tonnages being received through Bremerhaven and the French ports. For ease of identification, the three parts of the study were referred to as "concepts." Concept A signified the then current method of operations, Concept B the method of operations which would close down Bremerhaven completely, and Concept C the method of operations which would phase down Bremerhaven while the French line of communications was being built up. The comparative costs of the three concepts of operation, in terms of new construction, personnel, and annual operating costs, were as follows:[164]

	Personnel	Construction	Annual Operating Costs
Concept A	113,785	$ 58,481,000	$562,249,820
Concept B	124,090	130,170,300	652,965,522
Concept C	125,172	122,586,000	648,806,948

a. Approval of Concept C. An evaluation of the three concepts was sent to the Department of the Army on 27 December 1952. On 16 June 1953, the Department formally approved Concept C as the peacetime objective for USAREUR, on the basis that it provided best for the necessary adjustment between peacetime economy and operational readiness for war. However, the Army asked for a review of the plan on the basis of more austere criteria, and for a determination of the extent to which the line of communication objectives could be achieved within the then current personnel allotments and construction programs. CINCUSAREUR was also to indicate the additional personnel and construction required for the full implementation of Concept C and prepare an estimate of the additional annual operating costs of the Bremerhaven and French line of communications, once the latter was in full operation.[165]

b. Concept C Study. The re-evaluation requested by the Department of the Army resulted in the preparation of a comprehensive USAREUR plan entitled the "Concept C Study," which was completed on 8 March 1954. This study was virtually an entirely new plan reorienting Concept C to the latest USAREUR logistical

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[164] USAREUR Concept C Study, 8 Mar 54, Tab C. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 COMZ (1954), Vol. I, Item 11 (B/P).

[165] (1) Ibid. (2) Ltr, USAREUR to DA, 27 Dec 52, sub: USAREUR LOFC Study. SECRET. AG 90 GLD. (3) Cable 1556, CINCUSAREUR to COFSA, 22 Jul 53. SECRET. (4) Cable 944879, DA to USAREUR, 29 Jul 53. SECRET. Last 2 in USAREUR SGS 320.2 (1953), Vol. II, Item 24A atchd.

policies and to CINCUSAREUR's responsibilities under the Mutual Defense Assistance and the offshore procurement programs. The plan included requirements in terms of construction in addition to that scheduled through FY 1953, in terms of personnel additions to the military and civilian strengths allocated for FY 1954, and in terms of operational costs to be added to the FY 1954 funding program. According to the estimates in the study, if more military spaces were provided, the full implementation of Concept C would require $101,150,000 for further construction; an increase of $17,750,000 in annual operating costs; and an augmentation of 8,653 military personnel and 189 Department of the Army civilians, with a possible reduction of local wage rate and labor service personnel by 3,972 spaces. If no additional military spaces were provided, the full implementation of Concept C would require $93,150,000 in further construction; an increase of $26,550,000 in annual operating costs; and an augmentation of 189 Department of the Army civilians and 5,681 local wage rate and labor service personnel. Military pay and allowances were excluded from annual operating costs. USAREUR's ability to implement Concept C on the basis of funds and personnel spaces then being made available was estimated at 70 percent in terms of construction, 90 percent in terms of personnel, and 80 percent in terms of dollar operating costs.[166] The implementing plan provided for the establishment of facilities for approximately 700,000 short tons of special reserve and 600,000 short tons of other stocks, and for the in-storage maintenance and rotation of stocks. Only sufficient facilities were provided for in the plan to meet the minimum essential requirements. An important feature of the plan was that some of the issuing depots and depot maintenance facilities in Germany were to be transferred to France. All requirements were balanced to provide a peacetime line of communications capable of furnishing immediate support to the combat elements of USAREUR in the event of hostilities and at the same time to create an expandable logistical foundation to support a post-D-Day troop buildup. It was expected that by the time the plan was fully implemented, all military units would move through French ports, all military casuals through Bremerhaven, all dependents and civilian personnel destined for France through French ports, and all dependents and civilian personnel destined for Germany through Bremerhaven.[167] Detailed work sheets, in the form of standardized charts, were prepared for each required installation which could properly be considered part of the line of communications. These work sheets comprised the bulk of the Concept C study and, in effect, represented individual installation program documents. Part A of the documents indicated the construction necessary for operational purposes, and Part B indicated support requirements.[168]

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[166] USAREUR Concept C Study, 8 Mar 54, Tab C, cited above. SECRET.

[167] Ibid.

[168] Ibid., Tabs E and J.

c. Approval of the Concept C Study. The completed study was sent to the Department of the Army in March 1954 and, subject to some personnel modifications, was approved on 27 May 1954 as the basic plan for implementing Concept C. The full implementation of the concept by providing additional military personnel was not feasible, because the then current troop program objectives would not allow the addition of military spaces for USAREUR COMZ before the end of FY 1956. On the other hand, the employment of additional indigenous personnel, including labor service and type B units, to expand the French line of communications would be acceptable. Any increases in military spaces would have to be within theater troop ceilings.[169]

d. Initial Steps for Implementation. Upon receiving approval of the Concept C plan, USAREUR began a review of its program for developing the line of communications and initiated the first steps for implementing the plan. All interested staff sections of Headquarters, USAREUR, and USAREUR COMZ were instructed to expedite the implementation.[170] By the end of June 1954 the drafting of preliminary instructions to appropriate subordinate commands was under way. These instructions set goals for construction, tonnage, and personnel for both France and Germany and requested those implementing the plan to synchronize the buildup in France with the phase-down in Germany and at the same time to achieve an equitable redeployment of military personnel. Implementation was scheduled to be accomplished in seven stages of six months each, the first stage to be completed by 31 December 1954. By the end of the last stage on 31 December 1957, the French line of communications was to become completely operational and the Bremerhaven line of communications and COMZ-type facilities in Germany were to be phased down or closed out.[171]

e. Major Implementation Problems. Obviously the principal bottleneck in developing Concept C would be the construction situation in France, which continually presented difficulties. In contrast to the relatively simple procedures for acquiring defense facilities in Germany, acquisitions in France were

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[169] Ltr, TAG to CINCUSAREUR, 27 May 54, sub: LOC Study. SECRET. In USAREUR G4 Div Cen Files, Concept C folder (1953-54).

[170] IRS, USAREUR COFS to USAREUR ACOFS G4, 21 Jun 54, sub: Development and Operation of Lines of Communication under Concept C. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 COMZ (1954), Vol. I, Item 9.

[171] (1) USAREUR Logistic Plan for Development of LOFC through France, n.d. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR G4 Div Cen Files, Concept C folder (1953-54). (2) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Col J. S. Robb, C/USAREUR G4 Mgt & Admin Br, 29 Sep 54. CONFIDENTIAL.

accompanied by lengthy negotiations and surveys under centralized controls. The French were understandably reluctant to commit acreage, buildings, rights of way, and transportation facilities to the United States without carefully scrutinizing the impact of the commitment on their peacetime economy and their own plans for mobilization and combat operations. In France the U.S. dollars used were subject to rigid control which reduced flexibility in meeting operational developments. Numerous construction freezes were imposed while USAREUR's programs were reanalyzed and rejustified. Consequently, storage facilities for supplies and equipment were not being built in France as rapidly as expected, and the lack of these facilities resulted in stockpiling in Germany far in excess of what was considered wise. However, the French Government displayed considerable good will and cooperation, with the result that a great deal of progress in expanding the French line of communications was being attained. USAREUR believed that Concept C, as then planned, could be implemented. Nevertheless, it was also realized that Seventh Army and the U.S. Air Forces in Germany--some 600 miles inland from the French coastal ports--were still without a communications zone capable of supporting them in combat operations.[172]

83. Military Transportation Office

a. Antecedents. For the purpose of providing adequate railway transportation for the three Allied Powers in the Western Zones of Germany and to avoid conflicting rail transport requests among the three powers, the tripartite Military Movements Office (MMO) had been established under terms of reference issued by the Special Security Committee of the Allied High Commission for Germany on 16 August 1951. This office was responsible for coordinating requests for railway transport, presenting unified demands, and making plans for controlling the German Federal Railway in the event of an emergency. However, the office had not been given a permanent secretariat, and meetings of the transportation officers of the three occupational forces were infrequent. After July 1952 the agency became dormant because, by then, the economic recovery of Western Germany and a reduction of Allied military forces permitted the railway system to meet the requirements of the three zones without coordinating the requests. Because of shortages in officer personnel, the United States and Great Britain withdrew

[172](1) IRS, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 25 Feb 54, sub: Line of Communications. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) USAREUR Concept C Study, 8 Mar 54, Tab C. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 322 COMZ (1954), Vol. I, Items 9, 11 (B/P). (3) Interv, 29 Sep 54, cited above.

their members in order to assign them to more critical jobs.[173]

b. Steps to Re-establish the Military Movements Office. Hardly had the Military Movements Office been discontinued when, through a change in foreign policy, the Western Allies began to build up their military forces in Western Germany as a bulwark against the threats of a militant USSR. Conflicting requests for railway transport began to descend again on the central offices of the German Federal Railway, especially when the occupying powers were engaged in simultaneous training maneuvers. Coordination of requests became imperative. In addition, the occupying forces of the three West German zones were convinced that the nucleus of a tripartite railway transport organization should function on an active basis, so as to be in a position to take control of the German Federal Railway system quickly when hostilities appeared imminent. Since France, Great Britain, and the United States were not in agreement concerning the degree of control to be exercised over a revived Military Movements Office by NATO, most of 1953 was consumed in unsuccessful attempts to reconcile the differences of opinion. In early 1954 conferences were held on this problem between representatives of the three High Commissioners for Germany and the three occupation forces. An ALFCE official also attended the conferences, but, at CINCUSAREUR's insistence, only as an observer. The Allies still could not agree as to the constitution and functions of the Military Movements Office. They recognized that the divergent points of view could be reconciled only through new terms of reference that would provide for the establishment of a new organization with expanded functions and a new name. The preliminaries of setting up such an organization were substantially completed at a working meeting held at Mehlem, Germany, on 11 May 1954.[174]

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[173](1) Min, Mtg MMO, 26 Jul 52. SECRET. (2) Ltr, Col R. H. Lomer, Q (Mvmts), Hq NAG BAOR 1, to Brig Gen B. F. Hayford, USAREUR Trans Off, 11 Mar 53. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) Ltr, Hayford to Lomer, 8 Apr 53. UNCLASSIFIED. (4) Incl 1 to DF, USAREUR G4 Opns Br to USAREUR Trans Div, 10 Mar 54, sub: Control of Rail Transport in an Emergency. SECRET. All in USAREUR Trans Div Plans & Intel Br files, MMO-MTO (1951-54) folder. (5) Intervs, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col C. F. Manov and Lt Col D. G. Carson, USAREUR Trans Div Plans & Intel Br, 13 Oct 54. CONFIDENTIAL.

[174](1) Ltr, Maj Gen R. G. Gard, USAREUR DCOFS Opns, to Mr. Kenneth Dayton, Dep Dir, HICOG Off of Pol Aff, 19 Feb 54. SECRET. (2) Incl 1 to DF, USAREUR Trans Div to USAREUR DCOFS Opns, 26 Apr 54, sub: Military Movements Office. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 500 (1954), Vol. I, Item 10A. (3) Incl 1 to DF, USAREUR G4 Opns Br to USAREUR Trans Div, 10 Mar 54, cited above. (4) Min, Mtg of Sp Scty Comm of HICOM, 2 Feb 54, sub: Control of Rail Transport in an Emergency. SECRET. (5) Sum rcds, Working Party Mtg held at Mehlem, 11 May 54. SECRET. Last three in USAREUR Trans Div Plans & Intel Br files, MMO-MTO (1951-54) folder.

c. Establishment of the Military Transportation Office. The new agency, called the Military Transportation Office of the Commanders in Chief of the U.S., British, and French Forces in Germany (MTO), was established under terms of reference issued on 28 May 1954 by the Special Security Committee of HICOM.[175] The new organization was tripartite in nature and was composed of the chiefs of transportation of the three Allied forces in Western Germany and their duly designated representatives. Representatives of LANDCENT and the HICOM Transport Subcommittee were to be invited to attend the meetings as observers whenever their presence was required. Unlike its predecessor, the new office was organized with a permanent secretariat and permanent headquarters in Frankfurt. At a preliminary meeting late in June 1954, operating procedures for the working element were standardized. The office became operational on 1 July 1954.[176]

d. Coordinating Function. The Military Transportation Office was the agency for coordinating the rail transport needs of the three military forces occupying Western Germany with the central bureaus of the German Federal Railway. Another responsibility of the Military Transportation Office was to coordinate requests of Allied military offices and other military agencies (e.g., NATO Planning Board for European Inland Surface Transportation) for rail transport information from the German Federal Railway. Unilateral contacts with the central agencies of the railway were normally to be made through the member of the nation concerned. Rail problems domestic to a single zone would continue to be handled on the spot by the appropriate military offices. Only when requests for rolling stocks, train paths, and other railway transport needs were in conflict would they be referred to the Military Transportation Office for coordination. As it turned out, by the end of June 1954 the German railway system was again able to meet demands for equipment and facilities, and coordination was seldom necessary. Acute problems were expected to arise only when the three forces were holding training maneuvers simultaneously.[177]

e. Planning Function. By the time the Military Transportation Office was finally established, it was obvious that coordination would be a minor aspect of the functions and that the bulk of its work would be gathering statistics, making studies of the

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[175] Terms of Ref of MTO, HICOM Sp Scty Comm Doc, SECUR/P(54)5, 28 May 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR Trans Div Plans & Intel Br files, MMO-MTO (1951-54) folder.

[176] (1) Ibid. (2) Min, MTO Prelim Mtg held at Frankfurt, 23 Jun 54. NATO SECRET. In file cited above.

[177] (1) Terms of Ref of MTO, HICOM Sp Scty Comm Doc SECUR/P (54)5, 28 May 54. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col D. G. Carson, USAREUR Trans Div Plans & Intel Br, 11 Oct 54. CONFIDENTIAL.

capabilities of the German railway system, and formulating plans for controlling the system in the event of war with the USSR and its satellites. If an armed attack from Eastern Europe should materialize, the three military forces occupying Western Germany would be confronted immediately with three principal rail evacuation problems. First, stockpiles of military supplies and equipment in Germany would have to be moved to rear areas in France, Luxembourg, Belgium, and the Netherlands. For the United States this task would be particularly difficult because it had unusually large stocks of supplies and equipment in Germany, which in turn was the result of the lagging construction of storage facilities in the French line of communications. Second, the Western Allies would have to evacuate rolling stock, especially tank cars and flat cars, into the countries being used as communications areas, and would have to make arrangements for storing them. Supplies, equipment, and rolling stock that could not be removed quickly would have to be destroyed in order to deny them to the enemy. Third, rail transport would be needed for evacuating noncombatants to ports on the Atlantic seaboard of Europe. This problem was of more interest to Great Britain and France than to the United States. Great Britain expected to move most of its noncombatants by rail, and France expected to move about half by rail and half by highway. On the other hand, USAREUR was planning to evacuate its noncombatants by motor vehicles exclusively, unless an acute shortage of automobile drivers among dependents made partial rail evacuation necessary. Each occupying power had its own plans for handling rail evacuation problems peculiar to its zone, but for an all-out emergency a completed tripartite plan for allocating rail transport equipment and rolling stock and coordinating evacuation procedures would be required. Consequently, the working element of the Military Transportation Office was concerned principally with the formulation of such a plan. It was decided that the unilateral USAREUR plans, such as those for the evacuation of technical service supplies and equipment and the evacuation of German rail equipment, would be used as starting points. France and Great Britain would coordinate their noncombatant evacuation plans for inclusion in the tripartite plan, which could then be modified if the United States should later have a requirement for rail evacuation of noncombatants.[178] Subjects scheduled for study included emergency railway bridging, peacetime storage of railway equipment on trackage west of the Rhine River, operational procedures of the Military Transportation Office in an emergency, demolition preparations on railways, etc.[179]

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[178] Intervs, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col C. F. Manov and Lt Col D. G. Carson, USAREUR Trans Div Plans & Intel Br, 15 Oct 54. SECRET.

[179] Interv, Walker with Carson, 11 Oct 54, cited above.

f. Inclusion of Germany. Although the Military Transportation Office was a tripartite enterprise of the United States, Great Britain, and France, its members were fully aware that on attaining sovereignty the German Federal Republic would have a great deal to say about the disposition and use of German rail equipment in an emergency. Germany might insist legitimately upon sole control of its facilities without the participation of the Allies, or reserve to itself the right to coordinate the allocation of equipment and rolling stock, or, generally, exercise its rights in a manner that would serve its own interests best. However, the Military Transportation Office did not believe that the German Government would take any of these attitudes. It seemed more likely that the office would continue to operate and that the coordination of the rail transport requirements would be achieved through it on a quadripartite basis, after Germany attained its sovereignty. The French members were somewhat reluctant to accept German participation on equal terms but realized they would have to do so and were prepared to cooperate in a quadripartite office.[180]

84. Emergency Map Reserves

For well over a year, USAREUR engineer staff officers were engaged in the preparation of a new emergency map plan, in support of USAREUR war planning, which was designated as the USAREUR Map Stockage Plan. The new plan was approved on 13 July 1954 and superseded the EUCOM Map Supply Plan of 19 July 1951. According to SHAPE policy, the maintenance of map reserves was a national responsibility. These emergency map reserve plans, therefore, made provision for distributing maps only to U.S. land forces in the US EUCOM area of responsibility, and only during wartime military operations. From the point of view of supply it was estimated that approximately 47,600,000 maps would be required in the first 90 days of operations. By the end of June 1954 most of the required number of tactical maps had been printed and were stored in the USAREUR Map Depot at Schwetzingen, the Rhine Engineer Depot near Kaiserslautern, and map depots at St. Ay (near Orleans) and Bordeaux in France. The bulk consisted of tactical maps of the Rhine River valley. A large reserve of maps of other Western European regions was maintained, but only a few hundred maps of such countries as Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR were included. The tactical maps of Germany were based on German war maps that had been drawn in the 1930's and 1940's, and were very good; but, to bring the small-scale 1:25,000 maps up-to-date, the USAREUR engineer mapping service in 1953 initiated a program of redrawing them. By the summer of 1954 this program had made

[180] Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col W. E. Ligon, USAREUR Trans Div Plans & Intel Br, 15 Oct 54. SECRET.

considerable progress and was being accelerated in an effort to complete it by the end of the calendar year. Furthermore, preliminary plans were being made for redrafting the scale 1:50,000 maps of Germany and that work was expected to be under way in early 1955. In order to facilitate the map production program, a large map-printing plant was under construction at Bordeaux, France, during the period covered by this review, and was expected to be in operation by the end of 1954.[181]

85. Demolition Planning and Preparations

Planning by SHAPE for the over-all defense of Western Europe included preparations for destroying certain engineering structures in order to deny their use to an enemy.[182] USAREUR-CENTAG was responsible for making these preparations in the U.S. Zone of Germany and in the Western Area Command. Between 1 January 1953 and 30 June 1954 USAREUR was reviewing its demolition planning, effecting coordination with the operational units, and determining the completeness and adequacy of the program so that any deficiencies might be eliminated.[183] USAREUR demolition plans were included in the several alert plans, the USAREUR Emergency War Plan, and the CENTAG European Defense Plan. With the exception of a few duties assigned to air and naval units and the USAREUR administrative and technical services, most of the responsibility for planning and coordinating the demolition preparations and operations was assigned to Seventh Army.[184] The operational plans of Seventh Army, in conjunction with the area plans supporting them, provided the details for actually carrying out the demolitions if they became militarily desirable.

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[181](1) USAREUR COMZ Briefing, 18 Nov 53. SECRET. In USAREUR G2 Div 337 (1953). (2) USAREUR Map Stockage Plan, 13 Jul 54. SECRET. In USAREUR Eng Div Intel & Mapping Br files. (3) IRS, USAREUR Engr to USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 23 Jul 54, sub: Mobilization Map Stocks and Map Supply in War to Land Forces. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 060 Maps (1954), Vol. I, Item 10. (4) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Col F. O. Diercks, C/USAREUR Eng Div Intel & Mapping Br, 17 Oct 54. SECRET.

[182](1) Ltr, Brig Gen J. F. Uncles, USAREUR DCOFS for Opns to Mr. S. Reber, Asst HICOG, 7 Oct 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 600.6 (1953), Vol. I, Item 1 atchd. (2) Ltr, USAREUR to CG Seventh Army, et al., 19 Apr 54, sub: Demolition Preparations. NATO SECRET. In USAREUR SGS AG 1781 (1954).

[183]Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Col E. O. Peckham, USAREUR G3 Div Opns Br Plans Sec, 28 Jun 54. SECRET.

[184]Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG Seventh Army, 25 May 53, sub: Demolition Plans. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 600.6 (1953), Vol. I, Item 9A-1.

a. Demolition Categories. The three categories of demolitions were economic, strategic, and tactical. Economic demolitions included the destruction of public utilities, refineries, oil wells, and the like. Strategic demolitions were those which, on a theater scale, restricted the ability of enemy forces to move, fight, and communicate. This category embraced the destruction of railways, radio stations, waterways, airfields, ports, fuel and transport facilities, and usable stocks of military supplies and equipment. Tactical demolitions were those carried out to strengthen or supplement strategic demolitions or to influence a local battle by hampering the deployment and movement of enemy combat forces. They would be effected by inundations, the closing of bottlenecks on main routes of advance, and coordinated demolition belts based on natural or artificial obstacles with the object of destroying all means of crossing. Examples of tactical demolition targets would be railway and river bridges and roads and road structures such as tunnels, bridges, and embankments.[185]

b. Demolition Policy. Up to mid-1954 USAREUR was not planning or preparing for the execution of any economic demolitions at any time, nor, in accordance with SACEUR policy, was it planning or preparing for any strategic or tactical demolitions in peacetime.[186] Neither the United States nor its Allies were planning a "scorched earth" policy if a temporary forced retreat was necessary.[187] For humanitarian and psychological reasons, the U.S. Army would not destroy hospitals, medical supplies, or food stocks because it did not want to starve civilians or deny medical services to anyone. Only actual war goods were scheduled for destruction. The United States desired to keep the good will of the civilian population so that it would not be embittered against U.S. forces or engage in sabotage or other hampering actions against American military operations.[188]

c. Demolition Preparations. Demolition targets in the U.S. Zone of Germany and the Western Area Command were selected by the military commanders in coordination with operational and engineering

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[185](1) Ibid. (2) Incl 1 to ltr, USAREUR to Seventh Army, et al., 19 Apr 54, cited above. (3) Interv, Walker with Peckham, 28 Jun 54, cited above.

[186](1) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG Seventh Army, 25 May 53, cited above. (2) Cable LC-1772, LANDCENT to CENTAG and NORTHAG, 21 Jan 54. NATO SECRET. In CENTAG PS Cable File (1954).

[187]Ltr, HICOG to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, 6 Oct 52, sub: Installation of Demolition Chambers in Engineering Structures. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 600.6 (1953), Vol. I, Item 1.

[188]Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Col E. O. Peckham, USAREUR G3 Div Opns Br Plans Sec, 28 Jun 54. SECRET.

personnel.[189] Not all targets, however, had to be prepared for destruction in advance. The engineers examined each selected structure. If they determined that a specific structure could be demolished by merely fastening explosive charges at critical engineering points whenever the occasion for destruction arose, no advance preparations were required. On the other hand, if the inspection indicated that the structure was too intricate or sturdy for destruction by such a simple means, it was marked for advance demolition preparation. In that case, USAREUR engineers decided on the best preparatory method and drew the engineering designs for it. The construction of demolition chambers, required in most instances, was done by German civilian contractors under the supervision of area commanders; the expenses were charged to Allied occupational costs.[190] Although engineering structures were being prepared for demolition, no explosive charges were actually put into chambers or other types of construction at the time of their completion. They would be added only during military operations, if the structure had to be destroyed.

d. Opposition to the Demolition Preparations Program. The demolition preparations program generated hard feelings to an appreciable degree between the local German communities and U.S. forces. Seeing the preparations, many Germans feared that the United States and its Allies were planning on evacuating Germany and leaving their country to its fate.[191] They also felt that much of the anticipated destruction would be unnecessary, even in wartime. They remembered only too well the numerous examples of "stupid actions" involving needless demolitions during World War II.[192] All of these fears were intensified by considerable newspaper agitation,[193] some of which was communist inspired, but much of which appeared in publications otherwise favorable to the United States. Local protest sometimes manifested itself in acts of violence against the German contractors and their employees and equipment. In a few instances USAREUR commanders considered sending troops to forestall interference with projects, but, since such

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[189] (1) Ibid. (2) Text of Agreed Statement of Principles, Incl 1 to ltr, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army, et al., 19 Apr 54, sub: Demolition Preparations. NATO SECRET. In USAREUR SGS AG 1781 (1954).

[190] Ibid.

[191] Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 14 Nov 52, sub: Meeting with FEDREP Concerning Demolitions. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 600.6 (1953), Vol. I, Item 1 atchd.

[192] Ibid.

[193] Ltr, Lt Gen Roger Noiret, CCFFA, to CINCUSAREUR, 23 Jan 53, sub: Construction of Demolition Chambers. SECRET. In file above, Item 2.

measures would have been politically unwise, no action of the kind was ever taken. The public clamor, hand in hand with individual protests by influential persons in the communities, exerted considerable pressure on local officials, who, while not necessarily opposing the demolition projects personally, tended to yield to the pressure and protested to the German Federal Republic. Although Chancellor Adenauer and his ministers agreed in principle with the need for demolition preparations, local opposition and demagoguery were presenting them with almost insurmountable psychological problems.[194] Chancellor Adenauer discussed the situation with U.S. High Commissioner Conant, with particular reference, for instance, to such projects as the chambering of the Old Heidelberg Bridge.[195] Dr. Conant and his assistants favored letting German local governments have their way in specific instances. They believed that the adverse political repercussions that were being generated by the demolition preparations might make the peacetime position of the United States in Germany untenable. From their viewpoint it was better to sacrifice military expediency to political expediency. These views were presented to US CINCEUR, who, to some extent, was inclined to agree with them. US CINCEUR, therefore, suggested that flexible plans be devised.[196] Since some of the opposition undoubtedly had arisen from the fact that local officials had not been taken into the confidence of the U.S. forces with regard to the program--something most difficult to do because demolition planning and preparations were classified projects--CINCUSAREUR, in accordance with the wishes of HICOG and US CINCEUR, embarked upon a program of counteracting local opposition by agreeing not to make any peacetime demolition preparations without consulting local German officials at Kreis and Land levels.[197] The local governments were already being consulted to some extent, but when they objected to a demolition preparations project there was no way of resolving their objections. Under the new arrangements, German local governments were advised whenever a project was initiated within their jurisdictional area, and a set of construction plans was furnished them. This procedure gave the German officials an opportunity to raise objections against a particular project before construction was started. However, if any differences of opinion were unresolved after six weeks of consultation, the USAREUR military commanders concerned were authorized to make

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[194] Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 14 Nov 52, cited above.

[195] Memo, US EUCOM COFS to USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 6 Apr 54, sub: References to Tab B. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS AG 1781 (1954).

[196] Ibid.

[197] (1) Ibid. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG Seventh Army, et al., 19 Apr 54, sub: Demolition Preparations. NATO SECRET. In USAREUR SGS AG 1781 (1954).

final decisions.[198] Even though objections were considered justifiable only when the Germans could clearly demonstrate that an engineering structure would be so seriously weakened by chambering that it might collapse during peacetime, this power of final decision was more theoretical than actual.[199] Vehement objections on other grounds sometimes intimidated the U.S. representatives, especially when Department of State personnel participated in the discussions; thus, many projects were suspended because of political implications. In fact, by mid-1954 so many chambering projects had been canceled at the request of German officials, or were being held in abeyance while undergoing review, that the demolition preparations program in the U.S. Zone of Germany and the Western Area Command was practically at a standstill.[200] On the other hand, the program in the remainder of Western Germany had made much more progress because the British and the French had taken a much stronger stand against local opposition.[201]

e. Progress of Demolition Preparations. By 28 June 1954 the planned demolition chambering program in the U.S. Zone of Germany and the Western Area Command had reached the following stages of completion: Northern Area Command, 60 percent; Western Area Command, 14 percent; Southern Area Command, 66 percent; Headquarters Area Command, 8 percent. German opposition seemed to indicate that the over-all program might be curtailed drastically when the contractual agreements became effective. In order to circumvent any further restrictions, CINCUSAREUR requested each area commander to obligate before 1 October 1954 all available funds intended for approved chambering projects and to complete as many projects as possible before the German Federal Republic obtained its sovereignty.[202]

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[198] Ibid.

[199] Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Col E. O. Peckham, USAREUR G3 Opns Br Plans Sec, 28 Jun 54. SECRET.

[200] DF, USAREUR Engr to USAREUR COFS, 24 Aug 54, sub: Suggested Statement for CINC at Commander's Conference. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 600.6 (1954), Vol. I, Item 10.

[201] Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col G. W. Mason, USAREUR G3 Div Plans Br, 2 Sep 54. CONFIDENTIAL.

[202] Cable SX-1668, CINCUSAREUR to CG's of Area Comds, 11 Aug 54. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 600.6 (1954), Vol. I, Item 4A.

CHAPTER 5

Training

86. Training Programs

a. USAREUR General Program. At the beginning of the period under review, USAREUR training programs for major and subordinate commands were laid down by EUCOM Training Circulars 1 and 4, 1952. On 28 August 1953, these circulars were superseded by USAREUR Training Circular 2, which was still in effect at the end of this reporting period. Except for minor changes and some additions, Circular 2 followed the general outline of its predecessors and stipulated the purpose, length of training week, and types of training for USAREUR and Seventh Army components.

b. Seventh Army Program. Supplementing the USAREUR training program was the Seventh Army program, outlined in detail in EUCOM Training Circular 4, 31 July 1952, which covered the length of the program, standards, and special types of training, including chemical, biological, atomic, special schools, troop information, the use of training areas, joint training with Allied units, and training for the secondary mission.

c. Special Programs. Also supplementing the USAREUR general training program was a special program for USAREUR noncombatant elements, such as COMZ, staff divisions, technical services, and various units. USAREUR Training Circular 1, 17 September 1952 and 16 June 1953, which governed this program, provided for special training in leadership, physical conditioning, character guidance, maintenance, military government, intelligence, supply economy, psychological warfare, counterguerrilla techniques, camouflage, education, and combat techniques as a secondary mission. Because of the increased importance of scientific and technological warfare, USAREUR established a chemical, biological, and radiological training program designed to train officers and men in defense against those types of warfare. This program was outlined in EUCOM Training Circular 3,

25 June 1952 and 25 September 1953, and in the new USAREUR Circular 1 on the same subject, issued at the end of this period. Meanwhile, USAREUR also established a special program for training selected personnel in civil affairs and military government in occupied areas. This program was outlined in EUCOM Training Circular 3, 1951, superseded in August 1953. Because many USAREUR personnel were deficient in general education, it was necessary for the command to conduct a special educational program, for persons who had not completed elementary education through the eighth grade. Participation in the program, requiring 6 hours a week during regular duty hours and 4 hours a week during off-duty time, was mandatory for all such personnel.[1] In order to further the training of specialist personnel, and because full quotas of technical replacements were not being received from the United States, USAREUR maintained a number of specialists schools throughout the command. Other special training programs established were the Army Reserve Training Program, for reserve officers who were in the command in a civilian capacity, and the intelligence program.[2] A very specialized program of training in defense against radio jamming and deception was outlined in Training Circulars 9 and 3, dated 21 July 1950 and 5 August 1954, respectively. Because radio jamming and deception were expected to play a large part in military operations, this training covered techniques of receiving and sending messages by code or voice through high interference levels, changing frequencies when radio channels were jammed, and deception, including attempts at entering radio nets covertly. All training programs, whether general or special, had the common objective of maintaining the command in a state of combat readiness.

87. Types of Training

a. Training of USAREUR Units. The general program of training for USAREUR units provided for a 44-hour, 5½-day training week. Training for USAREUR COMZ, technical services, subordinate commands, and lodger units was also geared to the 44-hour week, with 4 hours devoted to field training. Emphasis was on training in construction, maintenance and repairs, procurement, and supply for the field forces

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[1] EUCOM Tng Cir 2, 7 Mar 52, sub: Special Educational Program. UNCLASSIFIED.

[2] (1) USAREUR Tng Cir 1, 30 Sep 52, sub: The EUCOM School Catalogue. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR Tng Cir 4, 23 Oct 53, sub: United States Army Reserve (USAR) Training. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) USAREUR Tng Cir 5, 31 Oct 53, sub: Intelligence Training. UNCLASSIFIED.

and for their support units and installations.[3] During this report period, most USAREUR units were required to conduct a monthly field training exercise designed to prepare them for the performance of their combat missions. In view of the nature and mission of COMZ units, USAREUR reduced the number of monthly field exercises for those units to a minimum of 6 per year, including 1 overnight exercise per quarter, but held them responsible nevertheless for maintaining an acceptable standard of proficiency in local security, defense against guerrilla infiltration, defense against airborne attacks, chemical, biological and radiological defense, and other pertinent training.[4] Finally, considerable attention was given to the orientation and information of troops arriving from the United States at USAREUR replacement centers, and, especially, to the indoctrination of troops assigned to duty in France. Inspections of new units revealed that personnel were not fully informed concerning their duties and responsibilities as guest troops in a friendly country. Because of the status of the United States as a guest power in France and in the interest of improving relations with the French population, it was felt that U.S. troops should receive effective orientation designed to enable them to win the friendship and respect of the French people with whom they came in contact and, by so doing, contribute to the success of their mission. Conversely, it was felt that poor indoctrination and information were instrumental in causing local resentment, which was difficult to eliminate.[5]

b. Training of Seventh Army Units. Because Seventh Army, as the major and principal component of USAREUR, had the chief responsibility for the accomplishment of the assigned U.S. military - NATO mission, the defense of Western Europe, its training program was designed to give it maximum combat readiness. In contrast to USAREUR, Seventh Army devoted most of the 44-hour working week to field training, training exercises, and special types of training, and much of the normal off-duty time to division, corps, and army maneuvers and other simulated combat exercises. In order to meet physical demands made on personnel by these field exercises, special

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[3](1) USAREUR Tng Cir 2, 28 Aug 53, sub: 1953/54 Training Directive for USAREUR. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR Tng Cir 1, 16 Jun 53, sub: Training Program for USAREUR Subordinate Commands and USAREUR Units. UNCLASSIFIED.

[4]Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG USAREUR COMZ, 21 Jul 53, sub: Modification of Training Program. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br files (1953).

[5]Ltr, USAREUR AG to CG USAREUR COMZ, 2 Feb 53, sub: Orientation of Troops Assigned to France. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1953), Vol. I, Item 6A.

training in physical fitness, supplementing that of ordinary military drills, was given. Athletic contests, games, gymnasium exercises, and out-door obstacle courses were used to bring troops to maximum physical fitness. All officers under 40 years of age were required to pass a physical fitness test twice a year. This rigorous physical training was designed to maintain the command at highest levels of physical fitness and to develop discipline, leadership, and esprit de corps.[6] Seventh Army personnel were also given cold weather training. At the USAREUR Quartermaster School in Germany instruction teams were trained in the best methods of protecting personnel against cold and wet weather in the field; the teams were then assigned to units in which they conducted classes in cold-weather training for unit instructors. This type of training was important in Germany because of the severity of German winters, and served to maintain the morale of troops on winter field maneuvers.[7] Training for an emergency included practice alerts against surprise attacks, and practice in evacuation of civilians and dependents, and in riot and insurrection control. The responsibility for most emergency training as well as for calling alerts for all units except special troops fell on Seventh Army because it would have to operate such plans in actual emergencies.[8] Other types of training in Seventh Army included character guidance; battle indoctrination; map and aerial photography reading; psychological warfare; counterguerrilla tactics, and infiltration and ranger tactics; cover, concealment, deception, and camouflage; wire, mines, field fortifications; marksmanship and sniping; night operations; air defense; and graves registration.[9]

c. Special Training. During this period a number of special training programs in effect applied equally to Seventh Army and USAREUR units. They were designed not only to train specialists in

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[6](1) EUCOM Tng Cir 4, 31 Jul 52, sub: 1953 Training Directive for Seventh Army. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR Stf Memo 1, 1 Jan 53, Sec. LIV, sub: Physical Fitness Testing for Officers, p. 48. UNCLASSIFIED.

[7]Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG Seventh Army, 31 Aug 53, sub: Cold Weather Training. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br files (1953), Vol. I.

[8](1) Ltr, Brig Gen C.A. Rehm, USAREUR DCOFS for Plans, to CINCUSAREUR, 29 Jan 53, sub: Emergency Mission Training for USAREUR. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1953), Vol. I, Item 6A-1. (2) Memo, Col W.E. Kraus, C/USAREUR G3 Tng Br, to C/USAREUR G3 Plans Br, 22 Apr 53, sub: Planning Responsibility for Emergency Operations. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br files (1953), Vol. I.

[9]EUCOM Tng Cir 4, 31 Jul 52, sub: 1953 Training Directive for Seventh Army. UNCLASSIFIED.

new developments in direct combat operations but to increase the knowledge of Army personnel in fields related only indirectly to combat readiness.

(1) Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Defense Training. The objectives of chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) defense training were to establish a minimum standard of proficiency in CBR offense and defense; to instill, in each individual, confidence in his ability to protect himself against CBR hazards; to minimize his fear of CBR warfare agents through knowledge of their characteristics; and to enhance the operational effectiveness of units under conditions involving any one or all of these methods of warfare. To achieve these ends, unit commanders were made responsible for insuring that their personnel met minimum standards of proficiency in defending themselves against CBR warfare. First, selected unit personnel were trained in the use of, detection of, and countermeasures against, chemical agents, such as choking gases, blister agents, blood and nerve poisons, vomiting and tear gases, smokes, and incendiaries. Then training in the biological warfare (BW) field was given to include instruction in the general nature of BW agents, body defense against diseases, BW agents injurious to man, animals, and crops; means of disseminating and collecting BW agents, and the decontamination and destruction of BW agents.[10] Instruction in radiological and atomic warfare (RW) included the following: the structure of matter and radioactivity, effects and explosion phenomena, theory and operation of Radiac (radio activity, detection, indication, and computation) instruments, devices and their calibration, shielding effects of common materials, psychological effects of RW and first aid, special procedures for RW decontamination, field monitoring, and RW surveys. A very important part of the training consisted of drills and gas chamber exercises, the use of miscellaneous equipment, such as protective masks, and practice in the detection and identification of chemical agents, the conduct of assaults through smoke and gas, detonation of chemical agents, and the preparation of unit CBR standing operating procedures. Other courses, comprising 80 hours of instruction, dealt with the field behavior of CBR agents, the tactical employment of casualty gas munitions, and the employment of smoke. Instruction was also given in the use of fire, land mines, and flame weapons defense and the employment of incendiaries and portable flame-throwers, as well as demonstrations of flame weapons and screening smoke. Finally, there were courses in the organization of CBR defense, the collection of CBR intelligence, the conduct of unit CBR training, supply procedures, and the care and maintenance of CBR materials. The minimum annual program of instruction considered necessary for units

[10] USAREUR Tng Cir 3, 25 Sep 53, sub: Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Defense Training, Annex C. UNCLASSIFIED.

consisted of the following: demonstration of the types of masks and drill in the use of masks for all personnel; explanation of the use of smoke and incendiaries; demonstration of types and usages of, and practice in, the use of protective aids; and instruction in the characteristics and uses of munitions made from blister, choking, and other gases, their effects, and protection against them. Additional instruction included explanations of the types of BW agents, their uses, effects, possible methods of attack, and protective measures against them; a demonstration of the appearance and effect of an atomic explosion; explanations of individual protective measures to be taken in accomplishing a mission under enemy atomic attack, and practical exercises in the use of gas masks in actual gas concentration and in the field identification of war gases.[11] A unit achieved minimum standards of proficiency in CBR warfare when each individual in it had the necessary equipment, had achieved a certain standard of effectiveness in taking protective action, and had experienced a planned gas chamber exercise and exposure to simulated CBR attacks throughout a training cycle of field exercises and tactical problems; when the unit had its full complement of CBR personnel, together with Chemical Corps equipment in proper maintenance; when it was capable of carrying out the decontamination of unit equipment and personnel; and when it took proper action upon the sounding of the alarm.[12]

(2) Training with Atomic Weapons and Guided Missiles. As a companion and supplementary program to CBR warfare training, USAREUR introduced during 1953 a new program in atomic artillery and guided missile training, designed for highly specialized units only. As an initial step, the USAREUR Intelligence School in January 1953 established a course in staff planning and procedures in atomic warfare, with a capacity of 20 selected officers, as an intensive, top secret 2-week course given once a month. By June 1954 it had been given 17 times and had trained 275 officers.[13]

(a) Atomic Weapons Training. In October 1953, the first unit equipped with atomic artillery arrived in the command, and on 23 October 1953 atomic field pieces were exhibited at Mainz, Germany before the French, German, and American press.[14] By June 1954,

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[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid., Annex B.

[13] (1) Ltr, CINCEUR to CG Seventh Army, 26 Jan 53, sub: Quotas for Special Weapons Course. SECRET. (2) Ltr, Gen C. L. Bolte to CG Seventh Army, 2 Apr 53, same sub. SECRET. Both in USAREUR G3 Tng Br files (1953).

[14] The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), October 24, 1953.

3 additional units with a total of at least 8 atomic weapons of 280-mm. caliber had arrived. They were used in fall and spring maneuvers in order to give troops practice in simulated atomic attack and defense action. The atomic artillery was also used as regular heavy artillery, firing conventional ammunition.[15]

(b) Guided Missile Training. Supplementing atomic training was the guided missiles program. It began late in 1953 with the arrival in USAREUR of the 1st Pilotless Bomber Squadron, equipped with B-61 Matadors. Arriving on 20 November 1953, the squadron was assigned to Twelfth Air Force at Bitburg Air Base in the French Zone of Germany. A second squadron, the 69th Pilotless Bomber Squadron, arrived in Germany late in 1954, and was assigned to Twlefth Air Force at Hahn Airbase, French Zone of Germany, as part of the U.S. defense forces for NATO. As new squadrons of Matadors arrived in USAREUR, they were to be utilized with those already present to further the atomic warfare training of Seventh Army and Allied forces on maneuvers. The Matador, a surface-to-surface guided missile, could be armed with either an atomic or a conventional warhead. It resembled a small, modern jet aircraft, had wings, and was propelled by a turbojet engine with a range of over 300 miles and a speed of better than 600 miles per hour.[16]

(3) Training of Special Forces. USAREUR had several special forces groups, each of which required a separate training program. One of these was the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), organized for special missions in defense and offense behind enemy lines. Although assigned to Seventh Army, by special arrangement it trained jointly with the Air Force. Specializing in parachute jumps and night air drops, the unit followed a rigorous training schedule. During training exercises the 10th Special Forces Group was not permitted to approach any German civilian or government agency, in order to secure indigenous personnel to participate in its exercises, without specific written approval from USAREUR headquarters. Certain aspects of the unit's training, such as the effect on the security of the command and the impact on the German civilian population, raised problems not easily solved. There was danger, for example, that unannounced parachute drops at night, in areas other than those marked for maneuvers, would cause panic among the German population and result in the shooting of parachutists by the German police. On the other hand, to publicize the jumps in advance would rob them of

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[15] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG Seventh Army, 9 Jun 53, sub: Preparation Training Problems for 280-mm. Gun Battalion. SECRET. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br files (1953).

[16] The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), November 30, 1953; September 30, 1954.

training value. Therefore, instead of being dropped by parachute, troops of the 10th Special Forces Group were transported by truck into those areas where no other soldiers were on maneuvers. This procedure eliminated the risk of provoking incidents. It also served to prevent a surprise enemy air drop that might be mistaken for a 10th Special Forces Group training exercise and remain unreported until too late for positive countermeasures. The training program of this special force was also modified in other ways to eliminate hazards.[17] Another special group with its own training program was the 6th Infantry Regiment in Berlin. Because of its isolation and the nature of its duties, which might include action against riots, sabotage, insurrection or other disturbances, as well as regular defense duties, its training was difficult. Ranges and training areas were limited in the U.S. Sector of Berlin and USAREUR areas in Western Germany allowed for only limited use because of difficulties of transportation in and out of the Soviet Zone. Furthermore, only one of its battalions could be absent from Berlin at any one time. In spite of these handicaps, it accomplished its training objectives during 1953-54. Between 25 May and 7 October 1954, the regiment was able to send all its battalions to train at the Grafenwoehr Training Range in the U.S. Zone.[18]

(4) Intelligence Training. All Army elements of USAREUR participated in a special training program in intelligence, which included courses for individual, unit, and unit intelligence personnel. The program was intended to familiarize personnel with basic intelligence subjects, to increase their intelligence consciousness, and to enhance the organization and effectiveness of combat intelligence. Unit commanders were responsible for training their personnel to the required standards of proficiency, for assuring the incorporation of intelligence training in all field exercises, and for determining the qualifications of unit intelligence personnel for their duties. They were also responsible for instructing personnel liable to capture or isolation behind enemy lines during hostilities with methods of evasion and escape.[19] The subjects

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[17](1)Ltr, USAREUR AG to Seventh Army, 5 Jan 54, sub: Training Directive 10th Special Forces Group. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Ltr,USAREUR AG to CINCUSAREUR, 14 May 54, sub: Special Forces Training. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 353 (1954), Vol. I, Items 2, 19A.

[18](1) C/N 1, USAREUR G3 Tng Br, to USAREUR Trans Div, 3 May 54, sub: Support of the 6th Infantry Regiment Training. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Memo, Col. W.E. Kraus, to Brig Gen Johnson, USAREUR ACOFS G3, 1 May 54, sub: Training of 6th Infantry Regiment at Grafenwoehr. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR G3 Tng Br files (1954).

[19]USAREUR Tng Cir 2, 15 Sep 52, sub: Intelligence Training. UNCLASSIFIED.

presented were combat intelligence, safeguarding of military information, prisoners of war, use of countersigns, foreign army identification, rights and responsibilities of prisoners, and observation and patrolling.[20] Special emphasis was given to training in survival and to escape and evasion. Training for personnel of combat unit intelligence sections was more exacting than for individual soldiers and covered many technical subjects including the organization, operation, and duties of divisional intelligence agencies; military map reading and sketching; aerial photo reading and interpretation; communications, cover, concealment, and camouflage; observation and patrolling; and aerial photographic and visual reconnaissance, and terrain studies. Other subjects covered the examination of documents and prisoners of war; the collection, processing, evaluation, interpretation, use, and dissemination of information; the planning and directing of counterintelligence; the analysis of orders of battle; and the identification of foreign armies.[21]

(5) Training in Civil Affairs and Military Government. To train certain personnel in Seventh Army and USAREUR in controlling and making friends with the civil populations in occupied countries, a special program in civil affairs and military government was established. This highly specialized training dealt with the responsibilities of commanders in training Army units to carry on civil affairs during emergencies; the importance of civil affairs and military government functions as aids to military operations; and the control, screening, and governing of civil populations to prevent interference with military operations. Among specific courses were the history of military government, the organization and operation of civil affairs administrations, military government policy, the rules of warfare; command responsibility; the maintenance of law and order; and the establishment of courts of law. Other courses, relating to the civilian population, involved health, sanitation and welfare; the organization of labor, transportation, communications, and public utilities; the custody and administration of public properties and control of commodities; the issuance of proclamations and ordinances; and the military government experience in Korea.[22]

(6) Troop Information Program. To make training programs more effective, and because a considerable number of soldiers had only a very limited education, USAREUR and Seventh Army were required to carry on a program of troop information and education

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[20] USAREUR Tng Cir 5, 31 Oct 53, sub: Intelligence Training. UNCLASSIFIED.

[21] Ibid.

[22] USAREUR Tng Cir 1, 5 Aug 54, sub: Civil Affairs and Military Government Training. UNCLASSIFIED.

during duty hours, under the direction of the USAREUR Armed Forces Information and Education Division (AFIED). Commands reporting directly to USAREUR headquarters conducted the program within their units, and insured the regular attendance of personnel at scheduled conferences and classes. Officers conducting these programs were required to have a minimum of two years of college education and their aides were high-school graduates trained at Armed Forces schools or the USAREUR TI&E school. Civilians with college degrees and at least two years of valid teaching experience were employed as full-time educational advisers and teachers. The troop information program consisted principally of troop information hours and command conferences, personally supervised by company and unit commanders as a part of military training. All enlisted men present for duty and all officers other than those assigned for duty in staff posts were required to attend. Information and education centers were established at all military installations, and were provided with adequate facilities.[23] New personnel arriving at USAREUR replacement depots were oriented on the reasons for their being in Europe; on the progression of Communist expansion since World War II and its significance; on U.S. world commitment and the defense of Europe; on the postwar history of Europe; on the United Nations, NATO, and SHAPE; on the Marshall and Schuman Plans; and on the BENELUX and Brussels Agreements. There were also lectures on the geography, history, economics, people and customs of Europe; and on the importance of the soldier's personal behavior, appearance, and manners, with stress on the idea that U.S. troops were friends, not conquerors.[24]

d. Inspections and Staff Visits. In order to determine the effectiveness of training programs, courses, and schedules, and to keep units alert and at maximum operational readiness, frequent command inspections and staff visits were made of all USAREUR units in Germany, France, and England during the training year. Inspections were formal examinations of personnel, barracks, equipment, funds, supplies, facilities, and installations, and were conducted under command authority. The purpose of such inspections and staff visits was to discover errors and deficiencies and, by pointing out methods of correction, to achieve the most efficient utilization of personnel, supplies, facilities, and funds.[25]

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[23]USAREUR Tng Cir 115, 3 Jul 53, sub: Troop Information and Education. UNCLASSIFIED.

[24]USAREUR Policy Dir No. 35-4, 27 Oct 53, sub: Military Community Relations-Orientation. UNCLASSIFIED.

[25]USAREUR ltr, 17 Mar 53, sub: Inspection and Staff Visits. AG 333 GOT-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

(1) Command Inspections. USAREUR major commands and units were inspected annually by CINCUSAREUR or his designated representatives, or by heads of staff divisions or their designated representatives. Such inspections included, but were not limited to the status of a unit, installation, or activity, and an evaluation of its operational readiness or the ability to perform its assigned mission; the appearance, discipline, and training of personnel; the appearance and adequacy of quarters; the adequacy of space and facilities; the administrative organization and procedures, including security, fire prevention, safety, police, and general appearance of installations; the capacity of units to perform secondary missions; the adequacy and conditions of supplies including stocks, inventories and accounting; the extent of compliance with organizational maintenance principles, proper utilization and economy of supplies, and operational readiness of equipment; the management improvement program; and the adequacy and efficiency of mess operations.[26] During 1953 CINCUSAREUR representatives made 11 command inspections, and 7 through 30 June 1954.[27]

(2) Training Inspections. The training of troop units directly under the control of area commanders or USAREUR headquarters was inspected by area commanders or USAREUR headquarters representatives. These inspections, made at any appropriate time to satisfy the minimum requirements of the Department of the Army or Army Field Forces, consisted of examinations of the training programs and observations of training methods, including exercises, assemblies, drills, and conferences. If conditions and the status of the troop training were found unsatisfactory, the units in question were given a certain length of time for corrective action and then were reinspected.[28]

(3) Impact of USAREUR Inspections. USAREUR inspections and staff visits improved liaison between staff divisions and field units, resulting in a better understanding by the USAREUR staff of the training problems and difficulties faced by field and unit commanders. Likewise, field and unit commanders acquired a better understanding of the problems faced by USAREUR headquarters in its endeavors to supply training needs.[29] The training deficiencies

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[26] Ibid.

[27] Chart of Command Inspections, 1953-54. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br Inspections Sec.

[28] USAREUR ltr, 17 Mar 53, cited above.

[29] C/N 2, USAREUR ACOFS G1, to USAREUR COFS, 4 Jun 54, sub: Inspection Problems and Complaints. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br files (1954).

that were disclosed involved the failure to hold monthly field exercises and quarterly overnight problems. Moreover, little or no effort was made to fill in or substitute for the training that was missed. Some units executed the manual of arms poorly, while others were inadequately trained in the techniques of CBR warfare. Many did not even have gas masks. The poor appearance of personnel was accounted for in part by the disclosure that the clothing allowances of many noncommissioned personnel were not being used. Maintenance and supply deficiencies included excessive stocking of spare parts, failure to keep prescribed physical inventories, and inefficient reporting procedures. Generally, units were overstocked with vehicles; some units had excessive signal equipment, which was poorly maintained. Some of the training and maintenance and supply difficulties were the result of frequent changes made by USAREUR in the training programs and courses. Others stemmed from budgetary restrictions and from political and economic considerations both in the United States and Germany. The continual rotation of USAREUR-trained personnel to the United States, and the inability of the Department of the Army to furnish all the trained personnel needed by the command also tended to reduce further the efficiency of the training program. Many of the deficiencies mentioned were in fact eliminated during the report period, though others persisted. Viewed over-all, however, the inspections showed that the status of training of the command by mid-1954 was very good and that it was adequate for the accomplishment of the command's mission.[30]

88. Reserve Officers' Training Program

During the period under review, USAREUR headquarters undertook the revitilization of Army Reserve training in Europe. In 1953 the USAREUR Adjutant General Division was made responsible for assembling, consolidating, and keeping current all records of reserve officers in the command. The USAREUR G3 Schools Section was made responsible for training and for funding the activities of reservists in the command. To carry out this responsibility, the section had to keep itself informed concerning attendance and instruction at training meetings of reserve officers.[31] During 1953-54 there were approximately 700 reserve officers and 150 enlisted reservists in USAREUR, including approximately 150 who were

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[30] Rept, USAREUR G3 to CINCUSAREUR, 1953, sub: Common Deficiencies Revealed by 1953 Inspections. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[31] (1) Memo for rcd, USAREUR G3 Tng Br School Sec, 15 Jun 54, sub: Responsibility for Reserve Officers Program. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Memo, Lt Col H. P. Costolo, USAREUR G3 Tng Br School Sec, to USAREUR ACOFS G3, 9 Feb 54, sub: Reserve Officers Training. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR G3 Tng Br files (1954).

residing outside of Germany and France and who had to rely chiefly on active duty training for the accrual of sufficient retirement points each year to maintain their active status. Of the reservists in France and Germany, 220 held mobilization designation assignments in 1953 and were required by regulations to participate in fifteen days of active duty training each year, in order to retain their assignments. By 30 June 1954, 333 mobilization designation spaces and 85 reinforcement spaces had been filled. In order to fulfill its responsibility for training officer reservists, USAREUR required a ceiling of 300 mobilization designation spaces, with a corresponding 4,500 active duty man-day spaces for officers. It also required 4,500 reinforcement active duty man-day spaces for officers and 900 for enlisted reservists, and a fund allocation increase of $30,000.[32] Training for reserve officers was conducted according to USAREUR Circular 139, 1954. Civilian reservists assigned to USAREUR were reassigned to the appropriate USAR control groups in the military districts in which they were stationed. There they made application for tours of active duty training. Those with mobilization designations performed their active duty training with units to which they were assigned. Reinforcement reservists trained with units that would increase their military proficiency most effectively. All reserve officers were required to attend assemblies every two weeks at a centrally located place in the district in which they resided. At these assemblies, which were two hours long, training problems were discussed. By applying formally to USAREUR headquarters reservists could attend such Army schools as were available in the district, or any of the USAREUR schools that pertained to their branch of service. Although much was accomplished by USAREUR during the period under review, much still had to be done before reserve officers' training attained maximum effectiveness.[33]

89. Schools

a. USAREUR Schools. It was the policy of Headquarters, USAREUR, during this report period to provide school training at USAREUR level only when the requirement was of such a nature that proper training of personnel could not be conducted at unit level. Under this policy USAREUR had established, and as of 1 January 1953 was operating in Germany, 10 specialists schools, which offered a total of 101 courses. During 1953 their total combined attendance was 2,845 students. The mission of these schools was to supplement U.S. schools in providing the minimum required number of school-trained specialists; to provide special centralized instruction

[32] Memo, 9 Feb 54, cited above.

[33] USAREUR Tng Cir 2, 9 Aug 54, sub: United States Army Reserve (USAR) Training. UNCLASSIFIED.

necessary to meet command requirements; and to qualify unit instructors. They were located as follows: the Bandsmen School at Dachau, near Munich; the Engineer School at Murnau, 45 miles southwest of Munich; the Finance School at Friedberg, 17 miles north of Frankfurt; the Intelligence and Military Police School at Oberammergau; the Medical Training School at Degerndorf, 40 miles southeast of Munich; the Ordnance School at Fuessen, 65 miles south of Augsburg; the Quartermaster and Adjutant General Schools at Lenggries, 40 miles south of Munich; the Signal School at Ansbach, 25 miles west of Nuernberg; the Troop Information and Education School at Dachau; and the Transportation School at Mannheim.[34] The following table provides statistical data concerning these schools:[35]

School	No. Courses	No. Weeks	Present Capacity	Maximum Capacity	Yearly Cost Present Capacity	Yearly Cost Maximum Capacity
Totals	101		4,297	5,345	$9,075,199	$10,888,648
Band	4	6-12	75	75	56,189	56,189
Engineer	31	1-10	702	750	2,520,500	2,693,000
Finance	3	1-6	75	130	87,922	155,488
Intelligence and Military Police	13	2-24	520	750	1,127,070	1,625,715
Medical	4	2-6	485	585	148,520	179,120
Ordnance	20	2-10	715	715	2,404,440	2,404,440
Quartermaster and Adjutant General	11	3-12	600	900	2,197,673	2,930,231
Signal	9	9-15	960	1,200	446,950	733,765
Transportation	4	2-4	65	125	15,360	29,550
Troop Information and Education	2	1-2	100	115	70,575	81,150

The table shows that the school capacity in 1953 could have been increased by 1,048 students, at an added cost of $1,813,449. Moreover, based on an average of eight graduates for each school space a year,

[34](1) Briefing, USAREUR G3 Tng Br School Sec, 9 Mar 54, sub: USAREUR Schools. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br files (1954). (2) USAREUR School Catalogue, 29 May 53. UNCLASSIFIED.

[35]Statistics on Schools, USAREUR G3 Tng Br School Sec, 18 Dec 53, sub: Maximum School Capacity and Cost of USAREUR Schools. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br files (1953).

increasing the capacity of the schools by 1,048 spaces could provide the command with approximately 8,384 additional trained personnel. This expansion could contribute substantially to the solution of the problem of providing USAREUR with an adequate number of trained personnel. Early in 1954 the need for graduates of the Bandsmen, Finance, and Medical Training Schools was so low that these schools were temporarily inactivated.[36]

b. Seventh Army Schools. Seventh Army operated the NCO Academy at Munich, the Tank Training Center at Vilseck, the Chemical, Bacteriological, and Radiological School at Kirchheim-bolanden, and the Electronic Maintenance School at Karlsruhe. During 1953 approximately 32,000 trainees graduated from these schools. While USAREUR and Seventh Army school training was confined to types that could not be accomplished at unit levels, and to the training of instructors in new methods and the use of new equipment, unit schools taught common educational subjects and simpler Army techniques to thousands of personnel.[37]

90. Ranges and Training Areas

Many of the training programs for USAREUR field forces were implemented through the use of ranges and training areas. Three general types were required and used: known-distance ranges, for firing and target practice; local training areas, for small unit exercises; and major training areas and ranges, for large unit exercises. During the period under review, all unit requirements for known-distance ranges were fully satisfied. By June 1954 the requirements for local training areas and ranges in the U.S. Zone of Germany had practically been met. However, several such areas were still required by U.S. units in the north French Zone of Germany and in COMZ in France. With regard to major ranges and training areas, 2 antiaircraft artillery and 2 tank ranges were needed in the U.S. Zone or elsewhere. Negotiations for these ranges had gone on for two years, and a number of sites had been suggested by both USAREUR and the West German Government, but by mid-1954 no definite selection had been made. The density of population and the scarcity of vacant land areas made finding an area in Western Germany nearly impossible. The removal of inhabitants from villages and towns selected as a training ground, and their relocation elsewhere in West Germany, presented formidable and

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[36](1) Ibid. (2) Memo, USAREUR G3 Tng Br School Sec, 1953, sub: Policy School Training. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[37](1) Ibid. (2) Memo for rcd, USAREUR G3 Tng Br School Sec, 1953, sub: Space Allowance in Seventh Army Schools. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

costly problems, involving serious political repercussions.[38]

a. Small Ranges and Training Areas. All U.S. Army field units in Germany utilized known-distance ranges for training in small weapons and in marksmanship. These ranges included machine-gun, rifle, carbine, and pistol ranges; hand-grenade courts; rifle-grenade ranges; and miniature submachine and subcaliber rifle ranges. They were built at practically all U.S. installations throughout the U.S. and north French Zones of Germany. A regimental or smaller size unit generally had a 30-point known-distance range, with firing lines up to 500 yards and 100-yard lines permitting carbine firing; .22-caliber indoor ranges, with 5 firing points for each battalion and a maximum of 10 points for each caserne, or for several casernes within a 1-mile radius; a rifle transition range in conjunction with the known-distance range; a 20-point, 1,000-inch range; a 15-point pistol range; a rocket-launcher range; a live grenade court; and a bayonet-assault course. Ranges of these types, but less extensive, were used also for separate infantry or engineer battalions and for field artillery, antiaircraft, tank, and reconnaissance battalions.[39]

b. Local Field Unit Training Areas. Local field unit training areas, close to duty stations, were requisitioned or confiscated for the use of troop units up to regimental size. The areas ranged in size from 40 or 50 acres, when close to the casernes, to 300 to 1,500 acres, if distant from the stations. Units up to battalion size used them for close order drill, while battalions and regiments used them for simulated combat and other problems. Infantry regiments usually required tracts of 1,200 or more acres; infantry, tank, engineer, reconnaissance, artillery, and antiaircraft battalions used tracts up to 600 acres; and tank companies used areas of 300 acres.[40]

c. COMZ Training Areas and Ranges. No training areas or ranges were available in France in early 1953 for the exclusive use of U.S. troops. Small-arms firing was conducted on French ranges on a joint-use basis. However, negotiations with the French authorities for three training areas of 1,000 acres each, for the exclusive use of U.S. forces, were completed during the year. One of the areas served troops in the La Rochelle-Niort-Poitiers-Perigueux-Bordeaux area, another was used by troops in the

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[38] Interv, Dr. G. Tays, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col W. F. Woodward, USAREUR G3 Tng Br, 18 Jul 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

[39] USAREUR ltr, 5 Mar 54, sub: USAREUR Training Areas and Ranges Standards. AG 353 GOT-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[40] Ibid.

Chartres-Pithiviers-Bourges-Blois area, and the third served the Verdun-Metz-Nancy-St. Dizier area. At each area the training facilities included a rifle range with 50 firing points and lines at 100, 200, 300 and 500 yards; a pistol range with 10 firing points; a submachine-gun range with three lines; a 1,000-inch machine-gun range; a miniature antiaircraft range; a hand-grenade range, and an infiltration course. Other training facilities included an obstacle course, a skeet-course range, a gas chamber, and a range house. The following French facilities were available: at Fontainebleau, a range with 10 firing points for pistol and carbine, available 1 day a week; at Verdun, a 20-point range for pistol and carbine, available every week day; at Trois Fontaines, a range with 20 firing points for pistol and carbine, available through local arrangement; at Bordeaux, a 4-point pistol and carbine range, available 6 days a week until withdrawn during 1953; at Rochefort, a 15-point pistol and carbine range, available through local arrangement. In practically all cases these French ranges were in a poor state of repair.[41]

d. Major Training Areas and Ranges. Six large areas covering thousands of acres and containing all types of topographical features were used for the training of USAREUR divisional infantry, artillery, antiaircraft artillery, and armor. Three of these areas--Grafenwoehr, Hohenfels, and Wildflecken--were in the U.S. Zone; 1 was at Baumholder, in the French Zone; and 2 were at Putlos and Todendorf, in the British Zone.[42]

(1) Grafenwoehr Training Area. This area, approximately 20 kilometers west of Weiden and 30 kilometers from the U.S.-Soviet zonal boundary, was rectangular in shape, measuring 14 by 23 kilometers, and comprising 56,678 acres. It was the largest training area in the U.S. Zone and was used exclusively for infantry, artillery, and tank training. There were 2 troop camps, 1 at Grafenwoehr in the north perimeter of the reservation, and the other at Vilseck on the south central edge. Grafenwoehr could house approximately 1,000 men in permanent barracks and 20,000 in tents. Vilseck likewise had permanent installations and billets for approximately 1,000 men, and additional tent camps. The area could accommodate 12 battalions at one time, billeting the bulk of the troops in regimental camps, consisting of squad tents, in the vicinity of Grafenwoehr. Hardstands, instead of sheds, were provided for trucks and guns. Only the permanent barracks were suitable for winter quarters. Nevertheless, the camp was fully utilized

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[41] EUCOM ltr, 1 Jul 52, sub: Troop Training Area Program for COMZ. SECRET.

[42] Memo for rcd, USAREUR G3 Tng Br, 7 Jul 53, sub: Major Training Areas. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br files (1953).

for troop training throughout the entire year. Its recreational facilities included sports fields and equipment, bowling alleys, and theaters. The camp employed a large number of German personnel as kitchen help. Railheads for the area were at Grafenwoehr and Vilseck, and there were rail connections in small towns nearby. Two main highways ran north and south, and another east and west along the southern boundary. Numerous secondary roads, most of them unimproved, were available. The terrain, though generally rolling, was varied. With forests in the northern and southern sections, numerous small lakes in the north central and southwest sections, and a pronounced ridge running up the center from southeast to northwest, the area was suited to most types of training, and especially for regimental combat team problems and divisional exercises. In addition, several small-arms and mortar ranges, a moving target tank range, several transition and field firing ranges, a mock-village infiltration course, and an artillery range approximately 16,000 yards long and 10,000 yards wide, were constructed.[43] For several years negotiations had been proceeding, without success, between USAREUR and German authorities for a large section of land to enlarge the Grafenwoehr training area and provide tank and antiaircraft artillery ranges. Several difficulties stood in the way. Approximately 15,000 persons, out of an area population of 148,500, would be displaced. Any combination of the large ranges would mean that from 40 to 60 percent of the existing smaller ranges and observation posts would be blocked off and portions of one major railway cut off. Mining and crystal manufacturing industries, as well as large summer and winter resorts, would be in the danger area. Furthermore, tow planes for air targets might overfly the Czechoslovak border. In view of these obstacles, the enlargement of the Grafenwoehr training area appeared to be impractical.[44]

(2) Hohenfels Training Area. This training area, located approximately 30 kilometers northwest of Regensburg, had an area of 40,378 acres and could accommodate 2 regimental combat teams. Permanent billets were available for 10,000 men and tent space convenient to ranges, for 7,000 more. Although most of the training at Hohenfels took place from April to October, the area was in constant use throughout the year. It was suited primarily for large tactical units, but its facilities included the following small-arms ranges: a .30-caliber machine-gun range; a 1,000-inch range; a submachine-gun range; a 500-yard known-distance range; a

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[43](1) EUCOM memo, 4 May 51, sub: Description of Grafenwoehr Training Area. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Memo for rcd, USAREUR G3 Trp Tng Sec, 7 Jul 53, sub: Major Training Areas. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR G3 Tng Br files (1953).

[44]Ltr, USAREUR AG to CINCUSAREUR, 8 Jan 54, sub: Tank and Antiaircraft Artillery Range Sites. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above (1954).

hand-grenade court; a demolition area; a flame-thrower area; a rifle-grenade range; a rocket-launcher range; an infiltration course; and a combat-in-cities area. There were also 7 platoon and company combat ranges, 6 tank gunnery ranges, 2 antiaircraft artillery ranges for .50-caliber machine guns or 37-mm. antiaircraft guns, 3 transition ranges, 2 mortar ranges, four 1,000-inch carbine and rifle ranges, and 2 pistol ranges.[45] This area's suitability for armor maneuvers, however, was limited. Because of restrictions on the firing of shot ammunition, the ranges could not be used for tank gunnery training. Moreover, no moving target range for tanks was available. Antiaircraft ranges were not suitable for ammunition of larger caliber than 37-mm., nor artillery ranges for guns of larger caliber than 105-mm. howitzers. When the antiaircraft ranges were in use, the remaining training space was reduced to 50 percent of its normal capacity.[46] The enlargement of the Hohenfels training area so as to establish full-size tank or antiaircraft artillery ranges which would accommodate guns of calibers up to 90- and 100-mm. was considered. However, the proposal was abandoned because it was beset by so many difficulties, such as the moving of population, highways, and railroads, and the fact that the establishment of such large-caliber ranges would reduce the usefulness of the other training sites by an estimated 60 percent.[47]

(3) Wildflecken Training Area. Wildflecken, in a mountainous region approximately 30 kilometers southeast of Fulda, not far from the Soviet Zone, covered 17,670 acres and could accommodate a regimental combat team and a light artillery battalion. Housing, however, was available for the combat team only; other troops were housed in squad tents. Nevertheless the area was very extensively used by U.S. and French troops throughout the year. Eighteen ranges of a possible 29 were built. In 1954, range facilities included a 20-point, 1,000-inch machine-gun range; a 20-point pistol range; a miniature range for .30-caliber machine guns or subcaliber tank guns; a moving target range for subcaliber tank gunnery or rocket launchers; a 25-point, 500-yard known-distance range; an 11-point, 300-yard known-distance rifle range; a rocket-launcher range, a squad-size close-combat course; 2 demolition areas; 2 squad combat-firing ranges; a company combat-firing range; and 13 platoon combat-firing ranges. Divisional field artillery could

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[45] Cable SC-18209, USAREUR to ACOFSA G3, 20 Apr 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above (1954)

[46] C/N 1, USAREUR G3 Tng Br to USAREUR G4, 17 May 54, sub: Organization and Administration of Ranges. SECRET. In file cited above.

[47] Ltr, USAREUR AG to CINCUSAREUR, 8 Jan 54, sub: Tank and Antiaircraft Artillery Range Sites. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

fire on several ranges; 75-mm. tank guns could fire with high explosive Superquick ammunition on 2 ranges; 90-mm. tank guns could fire with high explosive Superquick fuze on only 1 range. An airstrip was available for light aircraft.[48] However, the field artillery range was small, approximately 5,000 yards wide by 7,000 yards long, and the area was not suitable for antiaircraft artillery firing. Only a minimum of tank and artillery firing and maneuvering was possible, and some of the ranges were in rugged, mountainous terrain. In winter the area did not meet minimum standards for any type of firing except small arms. For these reasons it was used primarily for the training of infantry battalions or of units similarly armed.[49] During 1953, range facilities at Wildflecken were considered inadequate for Seventh Army units.[50] Nevertheless, during the training year 1953-54 USAREUR allowed French Army units stationed in the northern part of the U.S. Zone to share Wildflecken facilities with Seventh Army. In June 1954 the French requested permission to use the area again in 1955; the two periods being considered as suitable were March-April and August-September.[51] Although the facilities of Wildflecken were considered inadequate, the area was nevertheless in constant use as a training center. A plan to increase the size of the Wildflecken area so as to accommodate an aerial target range was considered, and several small parcels of land were added; but here, as in other major training areas, obstacles stood in the way of the acquisition of a sufficiently large area. At the end of this report period it seemed unlikely that the area would be expanded.[52]

(4) Baumholder Training Area. This major training area was a French installation, shared on an equal basis by French and U.S. forces in Germany. It was 40 kilometers north of Kaiserslautern, in the northern French Zone, and covered approximately 24,000 acres of diversified wooded hills and cleared farming land suitable for armor and ground-to-air gunnery training. Baumholder's maximum capacity was sufficient to accommodate a combat command of 3 mixed battalions of infantry, armor, tanks, or reconnaissance, in any

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[48] Cable SC-18209, 20 Apr 54, cited above.

[49] Memo for rcd, 7 Jul 53, cited above.

[50] C/N 2, USAREUR G3 Div to USAREUR Engr Div, 29 Sep 53, sub: Wildflecken Range Construction. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br files (1953).

[51] Ltr, CCFFA to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Jun 54, sub: Allotment of Training Period in Wildflecken. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above (1954).

[52] Ltr, USAREUR to CG NORTHAG, 20 May 53, sub: Procurement of Aerial Target Range at Wildflecken. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above (1953).

combination, plus approximately 8 battalions of divisional or corps artillery. Housing was sufficient to billet 3 battalions; other troops lived in squad tents. The area was in constant year-round use.[53] Range facilities included a 50-point, 500-yard known-distance rifle range; a 15-point pistol range; a 45-point, 1,000-inch machine-gun range; a rocket launcher and grenade range; a hand-grenade court; a submachine-gun range; a 500-yard rifle transition range; a village fighting course; and an 850-yard competitive machine-gun range. The area also provided a 1-lane individual tank course for machine guns and 90-mm. tank guns, modified in 1954 to permit the firing of tank ammunition. There were machine-gun ranges for Tables I-IV; a range for tank gunnery courses DATC 36; a 1,500-yard, 90-mm. fixed target high-explosive range for Table V; a 3,000-yard fixed and moving high-explosive target range for Tables VI, VII and VIII; a tank combat course; and sites for artillery, mortar, rifle, and machine-gun firing exercises. Although Baumholder was a fine training area it had many shortcomings. It was far from most USAREUR combat units and was available to USAREUR for only six months of the year, and during part of that time it was shared with Twelfth Air Force. During the other six months it was used by the French. In winter the weather frequently impeded training activities. Antiaircraft artillery gunnery practice was possible only when the area was not in use for other purposes, and when divisional antiaircraft target practice was in progress, the area was completely closed to other firing. Only a limited arc of fire was possible. A running tank battle, using shot, was impossible. Maneuver space for nonfiring exercises and position and impact areas for corps artillery were very limited.[54] In order to eliminate some of these limitations efforts were made to expand the Baumholder area, but without success. During 1953 Twelfth Air Force and USAFE requested additional time at Baumholder, but because French forces and Seventh Army already used all available time, the request was denied.[55] Because the range was under joint use, Allied Land Forces Central Europe tried, likewise without success, to have Baumholder recognized as a NATO infrastructure training area. SHAPE requested the use of Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels for its forces, but both USAREUR and French Army headquarters opposed the proposal.[56]

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[53] Cable SC-18209, 20 Apr 54, cited above.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Ltr, USAREUR to USAFE, 10 May 54, sub: Baumholder Range Use. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1954), Vol. I, Item 22.

[56] (1) Msg SX-1295, USAREUR to CINCLANDCENT, 13 Jul 53. (2) Msg LC-70996, ALFCE to SHAPE, 13 Jul 53. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 353 (1953), Vol. I, Item 35.

(5) Todendorf Antiaircraft Artillery Range. Since the British forces in Germany decided to abandon their antiaircraft artillery range at Putlos at the end of 1952, and because USAREUR had been unable to acquire a suitable range area in the U.S. Zone, negotiations with the British for an area along the north German Baltic Coast at Todendorf were undertaken. The agreement concluded on 10 November 1952 provided that the British would requisition the required area and make it available to the United States by legal transfer. The latter would construct and maintain camp and firing facilities entirely at its expense, but operational control of the range would be a British responsibility, since the British were charged with the security of that area. Maintenance of the 8-mile access road from the railhead was to be a joint responsibility. Furthermore, the British were to make land available for U.S. facilities without payment of rental.[57] The construction and operation of this facility presented no major problems, partly because the British gave excellent cooperation. The construction cost of DM 3,175,000 was funded entirely from the U.S. occupation costs budget. The USAREUR share of the cost of repairing the access road was one million Deutsche Marks. The average cost of moving one battalion of AAA artillery to Todendorf by rail was DM 27,934, paid out of Deutsche Mark funds, while the cost of gasoline consumed was $1,640, paid out of appropriated funds. However, because the upkeep of the camp was a joint operation with the British, the expense of maintaining it was not very high. Logistically, the installation was a satellite of the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation, but was maintained by the British on a reimbursable basis. Seventh Army was responsible for ammunition supply, but all other logistical support was furnished by Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation. Although the support of the camp was difficult because of the distances involved, the troops were provided with adequate services and supplies.[58] The area, which opened on 15 June 1953, consisted of the camp, with a capacity of 900 billets (equivalent to one 90-mm. gun battalion) and the firing points on the shore, which accommodated one AAA battalion. It had very serious limitations. The U.S. and NATO ranges were close together, requiring joint use of the air space. No facilities could be made available for the firing of field artillery or the adoption of a box formation; all guns had to be in line. Firing on an incoming course was very limited. The distance to be traveled and the time required by U.S. units to reach Todendorf were very definite limitations, as was the fact that its ranges were governed by regulations established by NATO. However, the most severe limitation was that

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[57] Memo, Brig Gen F.A. Henning, ACOFS G4, to USAREUR COFS, 17 Aug 53, sub: Antiaircraft Artillery Facilities, Todendorf. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 17.

[58] Ibid.

the range could be used economically only in good weather, from April to early October, and no firing on it could be planned beyond the end of September.[59]

e. Search for New Major Training Areas. In view of the need for additional training areas, USAREUR had long been in search for a suitable site in the U.S. Zone or in the French Zone west of the Rhine, and had suggested certain locations, such as the hilly area west of Heilbronn, along the Neckar River, an area in the vicinity of Sonthofen in southern Bavaria, the hilly area bounded by Crailsheim-Schwaebisch Hall and Ellwangen, in Wuerttemburg, and the hill country southeast of Kaiserslautern. Each suggestion had to be abandoned either because the German State or Federal authorities were reluctant to move the resident population, or for other reasons. The site southeast of Kaiserslautern, for example, was disapproved because of the heavy air traffic over the area.[60] Similar difficulties were encountered in the search for a training area where heavy tanks, such as the M47, with a maximum main gun range of 30,000 yards, could fire their largest weapons. For such training, U.S. tank units were dependent upon the limited use of the British tank range at Belsen-Hohne in the north British Zone. Because of increased demands on the British from NATO, the use of that range by U.S. units had been greatly restricted. However, exhaustive search of the U.S. Zone failed to find a safe tank training area.[61] Early in 1953 USAREUR learned of a possible tank-range site in the Jutland area of Denmark, which might satisfy the command's requirements, but a request for permission to send a team of officers to inspect the area was not approved.[62] For many months USAREUR also negotiated with the German Federal Republic for a large training area west of Mainz for the 2d Armored Division,

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[59](1) Cable SC-18209, 20 Apr 54, cited above. (2) ALFCE Range Regulations for AAA Ranges, Todendorf, 30 Mar 54. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR G3 Tng Br files (1954).

[60](1) Msg S-3856, USAREUR to CINCLANDCENT, 17 Apr 53. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1953), Vol. I, Item 12A. (2) Ltr, USAREUR DCOFS for Opns to CCFFA, 23 Apr 54, sub: Antiaircraft Artillery Firing Range in Area Southeast of Kaiserslautern. NATO SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1954), Vol. I, Item 15A.

[61](1) Ltr, Seventh Army AG to CINCUSAREUR, 16 Dec 53, sub: Infrastructure Tank Firing Range. SECRET. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br files (1953). (2) C/N 1, USAREUR G3 Div to USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 13 Feb 53, sub: Major Range Problems of the Command. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1953), Vol. I, Item 5.

[62]Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CINCEUR, 18 Feb 53, sub: Danish Tank Range. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1953), Vol. I, Item 5.

but the U.S. High Commissioner, Dr. Conant, advised General Hoge that the Bonn government was unable to make the area available.[63] At the close of this report period the difficult problem of finding an additional site for a major training area for USAREUR units remained unsolved.

91. Marksmanship Training

Training in marksmanship was intensified during this report period. During 1953 the USAREUR marksmanship team and teams from other Army components, at home and overseas, made a very poor showing at the national matches in the United States. This circumstance aroused the concern of Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Mathew B. Ridgway, and at his direction the Chief of Army Field Forces issued a letter to all commands, recommending that small-arms marksmanship should be made a part of the effective training of all field units.[64] In another letter, General Ridgway expressed his concern lest the prestige of the Army be adversely affected by the poor marksmanship of its units, especially when such training was closely allied to the soldier's primary mission, fighting. He suggested that all units be encouraged to train and compete in marksmanship and that the best men in the command be sent to compete in the National Championship Matches at Camp Perry, Ohio.[65] The interest in marksmanship shown by the Army Chief of Staff gave new impetus to such training in USAREUR units. Following the return of the USAREUR teams from the national matches in 1953, USAREUR headquarters appropriated $18,000 from the Central Welfare Fund to provide prizes for the winning teams in subsequent matches between USAREUR teams. Training by unit teams began at once. Intra-regimental matches were held to select regimental teams, and the latter competed against each other in late 1953 and early 1954, to select divisional and major command teams, which competed in turn for places on teams to represent USAREUR in the United States against representatives of other commands and services. Seventh Army was designated to conduct all matches and the competition was to take place at Grafenwoehr.[66] At the USAREUR finals, held 7-14 June 1954, the

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[63] Ltr, Gen W.M. Hoge, to HICOG Conant, 30 Dec 53, sub: Acquisition of Training Area in Vicinity of Mainz. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br files (1953).

[64] OCAFF ltr, to all U.S. Comds, 1 Feb 54, sub: Competitive Small Arms Marksmanship. ATTNG-86/6-1 353.1/12. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br files (1954).

[65] Ltr, COFSA to CINCUSAREUR, 8 Jan 54, sub: Competitive Small Arms Marksmanship. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[66] Ltr, Gen C.L. Bolte, CINCUSAREUR, to maj unit comdrs, n.d., sub: USAREUR Marksmanship Program. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above (1953).

best fifty marksmen who had more than three months to serve in the command were selected as a USAREUR team to train for the all-Army rifle and pistol shoot at Fort Benning, Georgia, and later at the national championship matches at Camp Perry.[67] In 1954 the USAREUR rifle and pistol teams gave a far better account of themselves at Fort Benning than during previous years, and were about to compete at Camp Perry when this report period closed.

92. Air Defense Training

USAREUR air defense training also received increased emphasis during this report period. This highly technical type of defense demanded close cooperation between ground and air forces in air-ground operations, with special attention to planning and communications.[68] In general the training was divided into two main parts, air support and ground defense.

a. Air Support Training. Air support training, conducted by Twelfth Air Force, consisted of the establishment of a long-range radar detection and tracking screen throughout the area to warn against surprise air attacks. This kind of practice had been a weak link in the training program due to the lack of sufficient radar posts to make the screen highly effective. Spotter and plotting procedures to detect the type and nationality of aircraft and their location, as well as training in providing accurate and prompt information to the ground forces, were now emphasized. Personnel were trained to operate the joint operations centers and tactical air control parties for liaison work and to operate the equipment for air-to-ground communications.[69] Training was also given in the support of ground troops, smoke screening, and interception of enemy bomber and fighter aircraft. As a result, after 1 January 1953 great improvement was made in training for air-ground operations.[70]

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[67](1) Ibid. (2) Memo for rcd, USAREUR G3 Tng Br School Sec, 22 Mar 54, sub: USAREUR Marksmanship Program, 1954. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) Ltr, Gen Bolte to USAREUR comds, 11 Sep 53, sub: USAREUR Competitive Marksmanship Program 1954. UNCLASSIFIED. All file above (1953-54).

[68]Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CINCUSAFE, 1 Mar 54, sub: Air-Ground Training. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br files 354.2 (1954).

[69]EUCOM Tng Dir 1, 1 Jan 52, sub: Air Defense Training Program. UNCLASSIFIED.

[70]USAREUR G3 Tng Br Rept of USAREUR Ground-Air Operations, 1953. SECRET. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br files (1953).

b. Ground Support Training. Training of ground forces in air defense took the form of close cooperation between elements of the ground forces. Communications were provided by signal operations battalions, but considerable difficulty was encountered in obtaining sufficient equipment, and procedures were not altogether satisfactory.[71] The Engineer Corps was responsible for camouflage training against air detection. The principal responsibility for ground defense against air attacks rested upon antiaircraft artillery units. They received intense training in gunnery practice on aerial targets towed by the Air Force. Late in 1953, these units were equipped with the newest AAA guns, the radar-controlled Skysweepers. They were trained also in the use of smoke screens.[72] Early in 1954, USAREUR received new antiaircraft units equipped with radar-guided, ground-to-air rockets of the Nike type. For at least two hours a week all AAA units practiced tracking missions, consisting of low-level tracking and early warning exercises against jet fighter aircraft and tests of speed in assuming "battle alert" posture, with very satisfactory results.[73]

c. Status of Training. While the general status of air defense training throughout USAREUR was satisfactory, many deficiencies still needed correction. There was need for better air-ground communications and cooperation; radar facilities were poor; planning was not as effective as it should have been; teamwork between ground units was poor; the employment of air support by ground units was unrealistic; and there was a lack of smooth teamwork between the echelons of the air and ground commands that comprised the air-ground defense operations system.[74]

93. Training Activities of the 32d AAA Brigade

The 32d Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade, a USAREUR subordinate command stationed in Britain, had its headquarters at Mildenhall, Suffolk, England, during this report period. Its strength as of 30 June 1954 was 217 officers, 32 warrant officers, and 3,814 enlisted men. The brigade was under operational control of the

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[71] Ibid.

[72] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to Jt Air Def Bd, Ent AFB, Colo., 13 May 53, sub: Joint Air Defense Training. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br files (1953).

[73] (1) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to ACOFSA G3, 30 May 53, sub: Antiaircraft Artillery Instructor Teams. SECRET. (2) 32d AAA Brig Mthly Rept of AAA Tng, for Jul 53. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR G3 Tng Br files (1953).

[74] USAREUR G3 Tng Br Rept of USAREUR Ground-Air Operations, 1953. SECRET. In file cited above.

British Fighter Command, exercised through the British Antiaircraft Command.[75] Each AAA unit was on "alert status" when its base was occupied by Strategic Air Command (SAC) aircraft; at such times it conducted a 34-hour training week. The alert was on a 30-second basis, from first morning light until last evening light, as long as SAC planes were on the base. When no SAC aircraft were present, a base was on a "stand-down" basis, and AAA units present conducted a 44-hour training week.[76] Because the disposition of SAC aircraft from base to base was constantly changing, the brigade's tactical deployment plans had to be flexible, so that AAA units could be moved from their home fields to other locations, on temporary-duty status, to give added protection to SAC aircraft. Only minimum living and training facilities could be provided for units at temporary locations, and the constant redeployment was not only uneconomical but detrimental to the morale and training of brigade personnel. However, during this period a new plan was developed, known as the "home base-satellite base" concept, under which a unit at its home base defended only a nearby satellite base.[77] The conversion of the brigade's AAA units to 75-mm. guns (Skysweepers) began in April 1954. The training course required 4½ months, divided between 3 training courses - Skysweeper employment and gunnery course, 5 weeks; Army training program, 9 weeks; and service, practice and unit training tests, 3 weeks. In addition a system of centralized training was maintained throughout the year, at Langham Camp, Norfolk, England. By relieving entire batteries from their tactical responsibilities and sending them to Langham three times each calendar year for two weeks of intensive training, followed by a week of antiaircraft artillery practice firing, the difficulty of training tactically deployed units was partially overcome. The system was highly successful from the standpoint of both training and morale. Training for chemical smoke generator companies in covering tactics and techniques of AA smoke defense, was also conducted at Langham. Automatic weapons (AW) units fired at both tow and radio-controlled airplane targets. The brigade made use of the British Army's Stanford Practical Training Area, Thetford Small Arms Range, and the small-arms range at RAF Station, Uxbridge, for practice firing of small arms and rocket launchers. A total of 2,060 persons attended the Brigade School Center at Brigstock Camp, Northants. During the review period 865 completed the AW firing control and materiel course; 138, aircraft recognition and advance spotting; 148, the chemical smoke generator mechanics course; 22, CBR defense; 144, medical field training; 462, the NCO academy; and 281, basic education. In

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[75] 32d AAA Brig Comd Rept, Oct 54, p. 1. SECRET.

[76] Ibid., p. 17.

[77] Ibid., p. 18.

addition, 256 brigade personnel, attended courses conducted by USAREUR schools, and 69 attended courses at British installations.[78] The brigade also participated in a number of British defense exercises, including an RAF eastern sector exercise during 1951, four training exercises during 1952, the British air defense exercise for 1953, and a similar exercise in 1954. In general, 32d AAA Brigade training during this report period was very successful.[79]

94. ODEX Field Operations

In June 1952, USAREUR COMZ conducted the first over-the-beach unloading operation in accordance with a Department of the Army directive issued in late 1951. The project was designed to develop experience in unloading supplies from ships to beaches without the benefit of port facilities. It involved training in establishing an effective organization, in the use of equipment, and in actual unloading operations. Its success depended largely on the place selected, the sea conditions, the type of beach and, most of all, the weather. Other factors were the methods of packaging the supplies and the care with which they were strapped on pallets and unloaded. In the event of hostilities, this training would facilitate the unloading of supplies as an adjunct to port operations or to compensate for the destruction of port facilities. The ultimate objective of the operations and the training was the establishment of an organization capable of handling 8,000 tons of supplies a month in peacetime and from 100,000 tons per month during actual combat.[80] From June through December 1952 the exercises had been held monthly as scheduled by the Department of the Army. Their length ranged from 2 to 5 days. In January 1953, however, USAREUR requested permission to reschedule the exercises on a bimonthly basis because of personnel difficulties, which could not be alleviated at the time.[81] Since preparations for the February ODEX shipment had already been made in the United States, the Department of the Army notified USAREUR that two ships would have to be accepted during March, both at the same unloading site, in order to simplify operations. Another ship would have to be received in April, but from then on shipments would be on a bimonthly schedule.[82]

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[78] Ibid., pp. 19-20.

[79] 32d AAA Brig Exercise Schedule, Sum of Jt Air Def Tng Exercises. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br files (1953-54).

[80] EUCOM/USAREUR Comd Rept, 1952, pp. 210-11. SECRET.

[81] Ltr, DCOFSA for Admin and Opns, to USAREUR COFS, 24 Jan 53, sub: Over-the-Beach Operations. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381.3 (1953), Vol. I, Item 1 atchd.

[82] (1) Cable DA-031229, COFSA from ACOFS G4 to CINCUSAREUR, 12 Feb 53. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Cable SX-2402, CINCUSAREUR to COFSA for ACOFS G4, 25 Feb 53. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in file cited above.

The Schedule of ODEX training operations for USAREUR COMZ BASEC in 1953 was as follows:[83]

Type	Name	Date
FTX	Over the Beach	20 Jan 53
FTX	Over the Beach	10-14 Mar 53
FTX	ODEX Pers Ship	13 Apr 53
FTX	ODEX Gamb #11	20 Apr 53
FTX	ODEX Gamb #12	17 Jun 53
FTX	Open Air	20-24 Jul 53
FTX	ODEX #13	20-22 Aug 53
FTX	ODEX #14	25-29 Oct 53
FTX	ODEX #15	6-11 Nov 53

No exercises were held during 1 December 1953-30 June 1954, for the reasons that the value of the exercises was being reassessed by the Department of the Army, the areas obtained for their execution had been extremely limited, and nothing more could be learned from areas already used too often.[84]

95. Command Post and Field Training Exercises

Training designed to coordinate the operations of a unit with those of other units in a larger command was normally conducted by means of exercises such as command post exercises (CPX) and field training exercises (FTX) or maneuvers. Field exercises to perfect specific phases of training were conducted at frequent intervals throughout the training season. Large-scale field maneuvers, to exercise the command as a whole and to perfect its execution of operations that had been studied and practiced throughout the training cycle, were usually conducted at the end of the training season.[85] Command and field exercises in which USAREUR units, Seventh Army, and its major components participated during this 18-month period were so numerous that only selected exercises will be described.

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[83] Chart of Exercises, 1 Jan 53-30 Jun 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br files (1954).

[84] Interv, Mr. J. R. Moenk, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. A. C. Kyle, USAREUR Trans Div Mvmts Br, 27 Apr 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

[85] Briefing, USAREUR G3 for CCFFA, 19 Jul 54, sub: Objectives of Field Training Exercises, Command Post Exercises, and Special Exercises. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br file 001 (1954).

a. Representative Corps- and Division-Type Exercises. A typical CPX held by USAREUR during 1953 was ON GUARD, conducted 4-7 May by VII Corps, Seventh Army. Its concept was similar to that of the war game STEEL CHAIN, held in April, which involved the headquarters of all VII Corps units down to and including regiments and separate battalions. The exercise was conducted throughout the entire VII Corps area of Bavaria, and Wuerttemberg-Baden, from Nuernberg to Karlsruhe.[86] A division-type CPX, designated as GRAND SLAM, held 8-12 June 1953, included all elements of the 43d Infantry Division, Seventh Army. Its purpose was to test river crossing procedures and plans for an infantry division under simulated combat conditions. It was conducted within the limits of the divisional area in Augsburg-Donauwoerth, and was directed by 43d Division headquarters. An FTX type of maneuver was KEYSTONE II, conducted 20-29 August 1953 by the 28th Infantry Division, Seventh Army, to demonstrate a two-sided maneuver with attacking and defending forces. It incorporated plans for a delayed withdrawal across a river, with a mobilization to defend a river line followed by a counterattack and the reorganization of the defending forces. The exercise was conducted within the geographic limits of east and west lines through Mannheim and Karlsruhe, and north and south lines through Landau and Kuenzelsau. GRAPE LEAF was another division-type FTX conducted by the 43d Infantry Division, Seventh Army, 26 September-6 October 1953, within the limits of an area bounded by Hohenfels, Beilngries, Ingolstadt, Freising, Neustadt, and Riedenburg. The problems involved a two-sided divisional attack, with units 2 abreast and included an assault crossing of 2 rivers and the supply, by air, of 1 battalion. The attack which followed called for the seizure and organization of an objective, a repulse, and a counterattack.[87]

b. Interallied Maneuver MONTE CARLO. Illustrative of another type of FTX in which USAREUR commands participated was a full-scale war game known as MONTE CARLO--an interallied free maneuver conducted in the Frankfurt-Kassel area of West Germany, 10-13 September 1953. The Commanding General, Seventh Army, was assigned the responsibility of conducting this maneuver. Preliminary planning was initiated by USAREUR in December 1952, and detailed planning was begun by Headquarters, Seventh Army, in July 1953. Representatives of Twelfth Air Force and of participating units of the Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) assisted in the planning. Movement of supplies and troops into the maneuver area began about a week prior to the exercise date, and on 9 September units moved into concentration areas ready for action. The total strength of

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[86] Chart of CPX's, 1953. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br files (1953).

[87] Ibid.

the forces in the maneuver was approximately 182,000 men. The purpose of Exercise MONTE CARLO was to test the accomplishments of the training year, with emphasis on air-ground liaison and inter-allied training. Specific objectives were to test the liaison between Allied commands, to emphasize principles and tactics of offensive operations, to improve techniques of atomic warfare and atomic weapons employment, to perfect air-ground procedures, to develop procedures for the employment in mass of available armor units, and to improve the emplacement, maximum employment, and removal of mines and other demolition charges.[88] In the exercise, an Allied Force, WESTLAND, composed of units from Seventh Army, French 2d Corps and Belgian 1st Corps, attacked to the northeast against a decidely weaker force, EASTLAND, likewise composed of elements of the preceding commands. EASTLAND forces were under the operational control of U.S. 4th Infantry Division headquarters. WESTLAND forces had a superiority of approximately 3 to 1 on the ground and 2 to 1 in the air. Twelfth Air Force supported opposing forces of CENTAG, and the 83d Group (United Kingdom) supported opposing forces provided by NORTHAG. Opposing forces maneuvered against forces of their own nationality. In general, MONTE CARLO was considered a most successful exercise, because it demonstrated the progress achieved during the training year and indicated tactical and logistical lessons that needed further study and emphasis. The training objectives were attained, but it was determined that, in the future, planning should be completed as early as possible so that subordinate units would have time to complete arrangements for coordination and to publish their plans and orders.[89]

c. List of Command and Field Exercises Held by USAREUR. During the 18 months covered by this report, USAREUR headquarters and its component commands and units held a total of 74 exercises. By type, 31 were command post; 31, field training; 5, signal; and 7, staff.[90] A list of USAREUR training exercises and maneuvers during the period under review appears in Appendix A.

96. Joint Training With U.S. Air Force and Navy

The principal objective of the joint training of USAREUR ground forces with U.S. Air Force and Navy elements was to increase their combat effectiveness and their coordination in executing

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[88] Seventh Army Rept on FTX MONTE CARLO, 23 Nov 53. NATO RESTRICTED. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br files (1953).

[89] Ibid.

[90] Chart of Exercises, 1 Jan 53-30 Jun 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br files (1954).

their primary missions. In this training USAREUR units worked with the U.S. Twelfth Air Force and the U.S. Naval Forces in Germany. Plans and a schedule of joint exercises were drawn up at a conference held once a year between representatives of the three armed services. Participation in joint exercises was purely voluntary on the part of each command. Thus Twelfth Air Force or USNAVGER participated in Seventh Army exercises only when they saw fit and when such participation did not interfere with their own training schedules. In practice, joint training exercises were held as often as the commands could arrange them, generally 6 or 8 times a year. The training took the form of command post exercises between USAREUR Staff divisions and the Twelfth Air Force Staff; field training exercises in which Seventh Army units down to battalion level took part and received Twelfth Air Force tactical support; and exercises with USNAVGER, which took the form of Rhine River crossings, bridge-building exercises, and amphibious landings. Officers of each command accomplished units of the other forces as observers and attended briefings and courses in liaison work to practice coordination and cooperation between commands.[91] Joint training was conducted under the basic provisions of EUCOM Training Directive 1, the object of which was to develop a fully prepared Army-Navy-Air Force combat team. Joint training of Seventh Army with Twelfth Air Force consisted of air support of army units in combat operations by bombers, fighter-bombers, fighter planes, and air drop of supplies to advance units; air defense training in radar enemy detection, air interception, and towing of targets for Seventh Army AAA units; and air transportability training, in which Army units and supplies were bulk-loaded and airlifted to combat positions. Courses were also given to train personnel for joint operations centers (JOC), tactical air control centers (TACC), and tactical air control parties (TACP), as ground liaison officers (GLO) and air priority personnel, and for other liaison work.[92] During 1953 progress was made in ground-air operations of USAREUR commands. Most of the major recommendations made by the training team in 1952 were implemented, and Twelfth Air Force cooperated fully by providing air support sufficient to satisfy Seventh Army training requirements. Twelfth Air Force also organized a combat operations section, containing both fighter and reconnaissance elements, capable of performing the functions of a JOC if necessary. This section had constant direct communication with Seventh Army, all major Air Force units, and the tactical air control centers. It included two officers from G2 and G3 Headquarters, Seventh Army, permanently assigned to it. These two

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[91] Interv, Dr. G. Tays, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col L. Barneby, USAREUR G3 Tng Br, 5 Aug 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

[92] EUCOM Tng Cir 1, 28 Mar 52, sub: EUCOM Training Program. UNCLASSIFIED.

officers cooperated in directing combat operations, coordinated Army photographic interpretation center activities, and processed day-to-day requests for air support received from Seventh Army units.[93] For large-scale maneuvers Army G2 and G3 air liaison, plus other Army headquarters personnel, moved into the JOC and manned the air-ground operations section. In addition, ground liaison officers were permanently assigned to each fighter-bomber and reconnaissance wing, and air liaison officers to each Army corps and division. During this period the major deficiencies in air-ground operations were in the field of communications and were caused by insufficient equipment in both Twelfth Air Force and Seventh Army. Twelfth Air Force did not have sufficient sets of very high frequency (VHF) and ultra high frequency (UHF) to equip either the required number of tactical air control parties or air liaison officers. Seventh Army units did not have the authorized number of AN/ARC-3 radios nor any of the authorized AN/TRC-7 radios.[94] A conference on air transportability training held by Seventh Army and Twelfth Air Force resulted in the development of new methods designed to overcome deficiencies. In 1953-54 training was conducted at a unit's station by unit personnel who had been trained at an air transportability school in latest techniques and methods of packaging, lashing, and loading planes, and proper parachute fittings. In addition, mobile training units, using the latest equipment and training aids, were organized.[95] During this period the following joint air-ground training exercises were held by Seventh Army and Twelfth Air Force:[96]

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[93] USAREUR G3 Tng Br Rept of USAREUR Ground-Air Operations, October 1953. SECRET. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br files (1953).

[94] Ibid.

[95] Twelfth AF-Seventh Army Program, Air Transportability Training. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br files (1953).

[96] Schedule, Seventh Army-Twelfth AF, 1953, sub: Summary of Joint Air Defense Training Exercises in USAREUR. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

Name	1953	Remarks
GRAND ALLIANCE II	18-23 January	Combined NATO Army and Air Force CPX with JOC and TACC
SPRING TIME	26-29 May	Combined NATO Army and Air Force CPX with JOC and TACC
CORONET	20-31 July	Air Maneuver with JOC and TACC
ACK-ACK II	20-31 July	Army AAA exercise concurrent with Air Force maneuver
JURA SQUABE	3-7 September	Combined NATO Army and Air Force maneuver with JOC and TACC
MONTE CARLO	17-24 September	Combined NATO Army and Air Force maneuver with JOC and TACC
HARVEST MOON	12-17 October	VII Corps maneuvers, Seventh Army and Twelfth Air Force provided JOC
POWER PLAY	24-28 October	V Corps maneuver, Seventh Army and Twelfth Air Force provided JOC

After an inspection visit to USAREUR in October 1953, the Chief of Army Field Forces reported definite improvement in air-ground operations over the previous year, and recommended increased emphasis on air-ground training, with special attention to joint planning through preparation of premaneuver programs.[97] During 1953-54 joint air-ground training was successful, and during the 18-month period of this report, cooperation between commands improved very decidedly.[98]

97. Combined Training of U.S. and Allied Land Forces

In order to insure competency of USAREUR forces in the accomplishment of their mission as part of the NATO forces, more and more combined field exercises became necessary. To effect economies in funds and training time, this training was combined whenever possible with national training exercises. Throughout 1953

[97] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CINCUSAFE, 1 Mar 54, sub: Air-Ground Training. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br 354.2 (1954).

[98] Interv, Dr. G. Tays, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col K. Barneby, USAREUR G3 Tng Br, 5 Aug 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

and half of 1954 USAREUR units participated in a number of such exercises, which centered around training in the use of, and defense against, atomic weapons, guided missiles, and CBR warfare. The specific purposes of the exercises were to train commanders and staffs in their responsibilities in the employment of the new weapons; to perfect joint planning for their use and for defense against them; to carry out exercises in the delivery of atomic weapons; to develop the capacity to recognize situations which might present proper targets for atomic weapons, and to instill "atomic-mindedness" in the forces so as to dispel misconceptions among troops concerning atomic and CBR weapons.[99] Once each year a conference on combined training, attended by representatives of USAREUR and the affected NATO commands, was held. A schedule of combined training exercises, in which USAREUR took part in compliance with its NATO commitments, was drawn up after the coordination of national training schedules, at CENTAG or NORTHAG level, in such a way that each force could participate in at least one of each type of field exercise each year and thereby increase coordination of communications and interunit cooperation. An early step in each exercise was the designation of an exercise director, whose duties included planning the exercise, making provisions for umpiring, and arranging for support and services from higher or adjacent commands and for support from other services. He directed and controlled the exercise during its execution and at its conclusion prepared reports for his own and for higher headquarters.[100] USAREUR units took part in combined training with NATO units from French, British, Belgian, and Canadian forces, but principally with the French First Army, the U.S. Seventh Army's NATO partner in CENTAG. Several combined CPX's and FTX's of components of Seventh Army and the French First Army were held. USAREUR, operating as CENTAG, and NORTHAG also conducted combined training, but only once a year. All groups exchanged observation and liaison officers and attended joint briefings, but liaison and communication between USAREUR (as CENTAG) and NORTHAG were not as close as they should have been to make operations fully effective.[101] At the request of the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Northern Europe

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[99] ALFCE Tng Memo 7, 17 Jun 53, sub: Employment of Atomic Weapons in Interallied Combined Exercises. SECRET. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br files (1953).

[100] Briefing, USAREUR G3 Div for MDAP Gp, Jul 54, sub: Combined Training. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above (1954).

[101] Interv, 5 Aug 54, cited above. UNCLASSIFIED.

(CINCNORTH), USAREUR, in its NATO role, held combined training with groups of staff officers from the forces of Denmark and Norway.[102]

98. Joint and Combined Training with Forces of Other NATO Nations

During the period under review USAREUR participated in joint and combined training exercises of Allied forces in Western Europe, under the direction of SHAPE. In 1953 USAREUR forces took part in extensive joint and combined field exercises and maneuvers, in cooperation with and in support of Twelfth Air Force, the French First Army, and Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force (4th ATAF), NORTHAG, and naval forces on the Rhine, as well as with British, Canadian, and Belgian air elements. Participating commands coordinated their communications, exchanged groups of observers at their respective command posts and in the maneuver areas, and exchanged liaison officers in the field.[103] Other methods of joint and combined training were used. For example, officers from NATO forces visited USAREUR schools and training centers as observers and students, and USAREUR personnel visited certain NATO training centers. The Interallied Tactical Study Group was assembled to discuss methods of umpiring, directing, and controlling interallied exercises. The group drew up umpire regulations for ground exercises, for assessing the effect of air attack or its support of ground forces, and for assessing the effect of antiaircraft defense. It agreed to use both the U.S. Army unit system and the pool system of umpiring employed by other forces, the choice to be left to the exercise director. It adopted a method of assessing casualties based on a simplified U.S. concept, and agreed that atomic exercises should be umpired in general accordance with ALFCE Training Instructions 10 and 11.[104] Because joint and combined training was very expensive, and because of the difficulty of coordinating national training schedules, this type of training was held only once a year.

99. Training Program for NATO Personnel

Since the United States had furnished a large portion of the materiel with which NATO forces were equipped, NATO personnel had to learn U.S. training methods and the use of U.S. equipment. In

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[102] (1) Ltr, ALFCE to CINCUSAREUR, 3 May 54, sub: Participation by Staff Officers of Allied Land Headquarters in U.S. Army Maneuvers, 1954. NATO SECRET. (2) Ltr, FFA COFS to CINCALFCE, 1 Jun 54, sub: Training Directive for 1955. NATO SECRET. Both in USAREUR G3 Tng Br file 354.2 (1954).

[103] Interv, 5 Aug 54, cited above. UNCLASSIFIED.

[104] ALFCE Rept on Interallied Tactical Study Group, 10 Mar 54. NATO. SECRET. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br file 221 (1954).

USAREUR the training of NATO personnel took two forms, Mutual Defense Assistance Program schooling and observer training.

a. MDAP Training. The training of foreign military personnel under MDAP auspices was begun by USAREUR in May 1950. The objective of this training was to provide, in MDAP countries, a nucleus of instructor-type military personnel who were oriented in the operation, care, maintenance, and supply of the military equipment furnished to them by the United States. USAREUR acted as the agent of the Department of the Army in providing overseas training courses, in addition to the training provided in the United States.[105] MDAP countries applied to USAREUR headquarters, through the MAAG units, for the number of spaces they required in USAREUR schools. USAREUR forwarded the requests to the Department of the Army for approval. When a request was approved, the training was scheduled at the appropriate school or training installation. From the beginning this training was very effective, and by 30 June 1953 approximately 4,000 students had completed their training in USAREUR. During FY 1953, an allotment of 515 spaces in USAREUR schools was assigned to MDAP students. The greater part of the instruction involved attendance at regular courses, but a few special courses in infantry weapons and artillery equipment were arranged with troops units. Non-English-speaking students were accommodated in many courses, through the use of interpreters at a 1 to 4 ratio. In addition to those who attended the schools, approximately 500 other foreign nationals visited USAREUR during 1953, for periods varying from 3 to 30 days, and at no expense to the United States, for orientation outside of the MDAP program. The program for FY 1954 made 350 school spaces available; and the program for FY 1955 raised the number of spaces to 500. The MDAP schedule also provided for attendance of USAREUR personnel at foreign schools.[106]

b. Observer Training. Observer training for foreign nationals was a nonbudgeted project, distinct from the budgeted MDAP school program, carried on by USAREUR under instructions from the Department of the Army. Under this program, groups of foreign officers, mainly from NATO countries, were assigned to USAREUR units, in positions comparable to those held by them in their own armies, for periods of from three weeks to several months, during which time they performed the work required by the jobs to which they were

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[105] Briefing, USAREUR G3 Div to MDAP Gp, Jul 54, sub: Training of Foreign Personnel. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br files (1954).

[106] (1) Ibid. (2) Memo, USAREUR G3 Tng Br School Sec to USAREUR ACOFS G3, n.d., sub: MDAP Training in USAREUR. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above (1953).

assigned and received training in those jobs. Approximately 1,700 officers received observer training each year. Except for Spain, Turkey, Greece, and Iran, the training was paid for by the countries sending the officers. During the first half of 1954, approximately 500 foreign officers trained with combat units for period of from 1 to 4 weeks. Because the program was very successful, USAREUR was under constantly increasing pressure, from the countries concerned, to increase the number of spaces available. However, USAREUR had recommended to the Department of the Army that spaces be kept at the 1,700-a-year level to avoid serious interference with USAREUR's primary mission.[107]

100. Training Relationships with Other NATO Nations

During the period of this report several programs, partly military and partly social, were undertaken by USAREUR to bring NATO military personnel into closer companionship and to develop mutual understanding. All of the programs were on a purely voluntary and individual basis and none entailed any expense to the governments concerned.

a. Invitations to Allied Officers to Seventh Army Unit Maneuvers. For the purpose of developing understanding and good will among Western Allies by closer contacts, CINCUSAREUR authorized Seventh Army to invite officers of other NATO army headquarters to visit during training exercises. Seventh Army in turn delegated similar authority to its corps and division commanders. Each unit that invited visitors furnished them with accommodations, mess facilities, transportation, and entertainment, but at its own, not USAREUR's expense.[108] Soon Allied armies took up this practice and invited Seventh Army officers to their exercises. By 1954 this practice had become general and Seventh Army officers had been invited by British, Belgian, French, and Netherlands units.[109]

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[107] Briefing, USAREUR G3 Div Tng Br for MDAP Gp, 9 Mar 54, sub: On-the-Job Training. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above (1954).

[108] Ltr, Gen C. M. Bolte, CINCUSAREUR, to Lt Gen W. M. Hoge, CG Seventh Army, 11 Aug 53, sub: Inviting Allied Officers to Observe Maneuvers. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above (1953).

[109] Memo, USAREUR G3 Tng Br Maneuver Sec to USAREUR Hq, 11 May 54, sub: Invitation to Seventh Army Officers to Attend Foreign Maneuvers. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) ALFCE ltr, to maj comds, 5 Jul 54, sub: NATO Officer Visits to Seventh Army Exercises. NATO CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR G3 Tng Br 350.07 (1954).

b. Companion Units Program. In 1953 a voluntary program for the development of mutual understanding and friendship among units of Allied armies was initiated. Under this program a USAREUR unit would select a comparable unit of the same arm, in the British, Belgian, or other Allied forces in Germany, and make arrangements through liaison officers to have their personnel visit each other. The units, known as Companion Units, encouraged their members to continue to invite and visit each other on a voluntary basis, on such occasions as Organization Days or national holidays, demonstrations, parades, or other activities of a combined military and social nature. In this manner many members of the British, Belgian, French, and other forces in Germany became acquainted with members of USAREUR units and their families. In order to further the program, lists of volunteering regimental- and battalion-size units were made up at Seventh Army headquarters, the British Army of the Rhine, the Belgian 1st Corps and the French First Army, and exchanged through their liaison officers. The lists were sent to all interested units and each unit picked an appropriate unit as its "companion." Since the program was on a voluntary basis, the expenses of carrying it on were borne by the units and by the officers doing the entertaining.[110]

c. Au Pair Exchange Program. Another development was the initiation of the Au Pair or pairing-off program, under which American officers of USAREUR units were paired off with officers of equal rank in British, French, or Belgian units and exchanged positions with them for periods of varying lengths. Purposes of the program were to furnish a medium for the exchange of information on training matters, and to study the methods, organization, and training of the Allied armies, so as to increase mutual understanding of tactics and doctrines.[111] All administrative expenses incurred by the officers from the time they left their units to the time of their return were borne by their commands. Where mess facilities existed, basic rations, accommodations, heat and light, etc., were provided free. Ordinary medical care also was provided without charge. By the end of this report period, Allied officers taking part in the exchange Au Pair were very pleased with the program and with their visits.[112]

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[110](1) Memo, Lt Col D.P. Yeuell, Jr., Sr USLO to NORTHAG, to USAREUR G3, n.d., sub: Companion Units Program. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br files (1953). (2) USAREUR ltr, 1 Feb 54, sub: Informal Visits Between USAREUR, BOAR, FFA, Etc. AG 690.2 GOT-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[111]Memo, USAREUR G3 Tng Br, 6 Aug 53, sub: Exchange Au Pair. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br files (1953).

[112]Ibid.

101. Visits by Teams from Office, Chief of Army Field Forces

On 21 September 1953 USAREUR was visited by an Army Field Forces inspection team, consisting of Maj. Gen. Charles D. Palmer, as chief, and thirteen officers of field rank. The team was to determine the adequacy of training standards and doctrines, as used within the continental United States, to meet the requirements of USAREUR. During its two weeks in USAREUR, the team visited all the major units and observed several field exercises of Seventh Army and its component units. Particular attention was paid to joint training in air-ground operations training centers and facilities, schools, depots, personnel assignments, and shortages of ammunition, parts, and equipment. At the end of the visit, the team met with CINCUSAREUR and his staff, reported its findings, and indicated the recommendations it would make to the Department of the Army.[113] The team noted existing shortages in certain types of technically-trained personnel and specialists in combat units, and the overstrength in NCO's of the first three grades in non-combat MOS's. It found also a considerable overstrength in the grade of captain, but an acute shortage in lieutenants.[114] Also noted were certain deficiencies in intelligence training, such as inadequate survival training, lack of photo reconnaissance, an inadequate number of intelligence unit cells along the border, shortages of German linguists, and poor enemy detection. It found inadequacies in the training of replacements for tank drivers and gunners, because of the lack of a tank gunnery range. Personnel arriving from Fort Knox were not satisfactorily trained and training standards for infantry replacements were not being met. There was a need for the conversion of light weapons infantry personnel into armored reconnaissance crewmen. Seventh Army and corps artillery units were well trained and were prepared to carry out their missions. Ordnance, signal, and engineer support of the command was generally satisfactory. Army aviation was employed very well for visual and photographic reconnaissance, but was hampered by a critical shortage of aviator personnel and of spare parts; also tactical air reconnaissance support lacked communications equipment for a spot-receiver system. The engineer-trained replacements appeared to meet theater requirements in large measure, because stateside training emphasized military subjects. Increased emphasis, however, would have to be placed on mine

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[113] IRS, USAREUR G3 to USAREUR Stf Divs, 21 Sep 53, sub: Office, Chief of Army Field Forces Inspection Team. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br files (1953).

[114] Rept, OCAFF Team to CINCUSAREUR, Oct 53, sub: Findings of the Chief of Army Field Forces Team. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

warfare training in the United States, for both officers and replacements of all branches. Equipment deficiencies and supply difficulties were items discussed most frequently by unit personnel. However, service schools were operating in an excellent manner. Technical units were following prescribed training programs and were organized to become operational in the field; technical services training at all echelons was considered to be satisfactory.[115] USAREUR attempted to correct as many of these deficiencies as possible. In July 1954 another Army Field Forces team of fifteen field-grade officers, headed by Maj. Gen. E. W. Ridings, spent more than two weeks visiting all important units in the command. It reported to CINCUSAREUR that, in general, most of the deficiencies reported by the 1953 team had been, or were in the process of being, corrected or eliminated. A few new deficiencies were discovered, but the team was of the opinion that stateside training standards and doctrines had met and were meeting the personnel requirements of USAREUR.[116]

102. Operational Readiness of the Command

All USAREUR training programs and methods had the objective of maintaining operational readiness. Although the command was in a good state of preparedness, several factors contributed to the difficulties of maintaining a high level of operational readiness.[117] First was the continuing large turnover of trained personnel and the arrival of inexperienced replacements, which meant field units had to repeat basic training for replacements at the expense of more advanced training. In many cases the training situation was like a treadmill, on which the units constantly labored but did not advance beyond a certain point. In some important technical MOS's there were few, if any, trained replacements.[118] Second was the serious shortage of training ammunition, which applied to all arms from pistols to heavy artillery. Especially critical were shortages in such items as chemical grenades of the M5, M14, and M15 types, 37-mm. shells, antiaircraft high explosive projectiles for 75-mm. guns and 105-mm. howitzers, training projectiles for 90-mm. tank guns, and time-set and point-detonating fuses for

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[115] Ibid.

[116] Rept, CAFF Team to CINCUSAREUR, 20 Aug 54, sub: Findings of Army Field Forces Team. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above (1954).

[117] Ltr, USAREUR AG to CAFF, 27 Jan 53, sub: Quarterly Narrative Report, Operational Readiness of Major Units, USAREUR. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1953), Vol. I, Item 4A.

[118] Seventh Army Quarterly Rept of Operational Readiness, 16 Apr 53. SECRET. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br files (1953).

155-mm. and 8-inch howitzers. Some of these shortages were made up but they occurred again; others were not relieved during the period.[119] A third handicap was the severe shortage in spare parts and tools, which affected M47 tank battalions and transportation units, and the maintenance of T18 armored personnel carriers, combat and general purpose vehicles. Shortages in engineering equipment occurred with respect to cranes, sniperscopes, generators, lighting equipment, water purification sets, and certain bridge equipment. There was also a lack of sufficient signal equipment, especially radio communication sets and radar. Water trailers, 3/4-ton cargo trailers, and 500-gallon gasoline trailers were in short supply; the same was true of spare parts and tools for combat and general purpose vehicles.[120] An irremediable deficiency was the lack of large training areas of division size for heavy armor and AAA units.[121] A fifth handicap was critical shortage of medical and dental officers, company-grade engineers, ordnance officers, army aviators, chaplains, unit administrative warrant officers, first-three-graders, and enlisted technicians.[122]

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[119](1) Ibid. (2) Ltr, Maj Gen R. G. Gard, USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, to CAFF, 5 May 53, sub: Quarterly Narrative Report of Operational Readiness. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1953), Vol. I, Item 4B-1.

[120]Ibid.

[121]Ltr, Gen Gard to CAFF, 28 Jul 53, sub: Quarterly Report of Operational Readiness. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1953), Vol. I, Item 37.

[122](1) Rept, Gen Gard to C/ALFCE, 2 Feb 54, sub: Combat Effectiveness Report. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1954), Vol. I, Item 5A. (2) Rept, Gen Gard to CAFF, 3 Nov 53, sub: Quarterly Report of Operational Readiness. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1953), Vol. III, Item 57.

CHAPTER 6

Logistical Support of the Command

Section I: Planning

103. USAREUR Supply Distribution Plan

Logistical planning for 1953 centered around the EUCOM Supply Distribution Plan, which had been revised and published early in 1952. This plan departed radically from previous EUCOM planning in that it envisaged placing depots in COMZ on an operational basis for the support of U.S. forces in France, as well as shifting the emphasis for the receipt of supplies from the Bremerhaven line of communications (LOFC) to the LOFC through France. It was based on the following concepts: the receipt of Classes I and III stockage objective, Class V training ammunition, and nonrisk materiel through Bremerhaven; the receipt of special reserve supplies and Classes II and IV combat-type materiel for the stockage objective through French ports; the stockage of the special reserve in COMZ depots, with 45 days in BASEC depots and 15 days in ADSEC depots; the storage of the 60-day stockage objective for troops in France in ADSEC depots; and the storage of 30-day stockage objective in ADSEC depots and 30-day stockage objective in WACOM depots for troops in Germany. The USAREUR technical services were to receive all special reserve supplies, project items, and Classes II and IV supplies for the USAREUR Stockage Objective through the French ports. The technical services were also to provide for the movement of these supplies to troop units under the same procedures as would be used in actual combat conditions; and they were to transfer the mission

for the supply support of U.S. forces in France from depots in Germany to the COMZ depots.[1]

104. USAREUR Logistics Planning Board

On 13 February 1953, the USAREUR Logistics Planning Board was established to assist in logistical planning for the command. Its principal duties were to study all available planning data; to review the USAREUR Logistics Planning Forecast, the 5-year USAREUR master plans, and the construction programs presented to USAREUR for approval and implementation; to assume all applicable duties and responsibilities outlined in USAREUR Circular 128, 1952; and to assume responsibility for the publication of the annual USAREUR Logistics Planning Forecast. The board was to be presided over by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, USAREUR, and was to be composed of representatives of USAFE, USNAVGER, Seventh Army, the Assistant chiefs of staff of G1 and G3, the USAREUR comptroller, the USAREUR engineer, and staff officers from the Installations and Plans Branches of USAREUR G4.[2] It remained in existence until 1954, when circumstances dictated a complete revision of the board, as well as its missions, and its responsibilities. On 17 March 1954 it was abolished and the USAREUR Construction Programming Board was established in its stead. The new board was concerned primarily with the USAREUR construction program in Germany; it was also responsible for the preparation and review of the 5-year master plans for USAREUR and the other component services in Germany.[3]

105. Logistical Planning Forecast, 1 July 1953

By mid-1953, the EUCOM Supply Distribution Plan was no longer a sound basis for planning within USAREUR although it represented the only plan previously approved by both EUCOM and its successor, USAREUR. In the preparation of the Logistical Planning Forecast for 1 July 1953, the USAREUR Logistics Planning Board suggested that the policies set forth in that plan be revised to conform more nearly with USAREUR logistics requirements. Since such a revision, however, would delay the publication of the

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[1](1) C/N 1, Dir EUCOM Log Div to EUCOM Chiefs of Tech Svcs, 4 Jan 52, sub: EUCOM Supply Distribution Plan. SECRET. In USAREUR G4 Div Cen Files 400 Gen (1952), Vol. I, Item 1. atchd. (2) USAREUR Log Plng Forecast, 1 Jul 53, pp. 7-8, SECRET.

[2]USAREUR GO 20, 13 Feb 53, sub: Establishment of the USAREUR Logistics Planning Board. UNCLASSIFIED.

[3]USAREUR GO 31, 17 Mar 54, sub: Establishment of the USAREUR Construction Programming Board. UNCLASSIFIED.

Logistics Planning Forecast and since the requested revision was already being undertaken by appropriate staff divisions of USAREUR, a 1 July 1953 edition of the forecast based on the old criteria would be published, which would be valid until the revised supply distribution plan received the approval of the USAREUR chief of staff.[4] In addition to the distribution of supplies within USAREUR according to the provisions of the EUCOM Supply Distribution Plan, the revised planning forecast covered the provision of supply support in the area commands and field and depot maintenance. The area commands were to continue to furnish supply support, with the exception of that already assumed by Seventh Army, to all units stationed within their respective boundaries. The responsibility for field maintenance was to remain as then assigned for the area commands, the USAREUR technical services, and USAREUR COMZ, except when specifically transferred to Seventh Army. The performance of depot maintenance predominantly in the U.S. Zone of Germany would be continued until appropriate Army and commercial facilities were developed in WACOM and along the LOFC in France. This continuance was necessary to keep full combat-serviceable equipment in the hands of troops, recover unserviceable stocks, complete the MDAP maintenance programs, and keep noncombat equipment serviceable. The technical services, however, planned to phase down, eliminate, or transfer depot maintenance facilities during 1953-54, according to definite timetables. For example, the ordnance rebuild program in Germany would phase down during 1953 as the MDAP program was completed. Reductions in shop space were expected to continue during 1954 through the substitution of commercial contracts and the establishment of a depot maintenance facility at Fontenet, France. The phase-down of the engineer rebuild program in the U.S. Zone of Germany had been initiated early in 1953 and was expected to continue through 1954. Engineer rebuilding west of the Rhine River was to be performed at Kaiserslautern and by commercial contract at Bordeaux, France, and an additional rebuild facility was planned for establishment at Foret de Chinon, France, sometime in late 1953 or early 1954. The only change contemplated in the performance of transportation maintenance activities was the addition of a depot maintenance facility for marine equipment at Bussac Transportation Depot. Quartermaster maintenance was expected to continue at established facilities within the U.S. Zone of Germany and at a facility to be established late in 1953 at Ingrandes, France. All signal depot maintenance was to be performed at Pirmasens in WACOM and at Verdun and Saumur, France,

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[4]Memo, Lt Col W. S. Schlotzhauer, USAREUR G4 Sup Br, to Recorder, Log Plng Bd, 24 Jun 53, sub: Proposed Revision to Logistics Planning Forecast. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Div Cen Files 381 (1953), Vol. I, Item 16.

when those facilities were developed in 1953 and 1954, respectively. All chemical depot maintenance was to be performed at facilities already established at Sampigny and Landes de Bussac. Medical depot maintenance was to be performed at the established facilities at Rhine Medical Depot, Fontainebleau, and La Roche sur Yon, France. The latter two depots were to be phased out when the COMZ medical depots were established at Croix Chapeau and Vitry le Francois, in either late 1953 or early 1954.[5]

106. Revision of the USAREUR Supply Distribution Policy

According to the original planning for the EUCOM COMZ, all depots along the line of communications were to be static storage depots and not operating issue depots. The changes made in January 1952, however, contemplated making COMZ depots operational only for troops in France. By 1953 USAREUR sentiment was that COMZ should be fully operational and that the operating issue missions of USAREUR depots in Germany should be transferred to COMZ depots as soon as practicable. The USAREUR Supply Distribution Policy Directive, published as a result of this change in logistical planning, was intended to establish policies of supply and objectives of distribution with reference to command stocks of materiel within USAREUR. It provided for the preparation of supporting plans by the USAREUR technical services, for the phasing out of supply installations and facilities in Germany, for the development of LOFC installations, and for the preparation of dollar and Deutsche Mark budgets for the accomplishment of these objectives. The prime objective of the directive was the assignment of the active distribution mission in support of U.S. troops, both in France and in Germany, as soon as possible; the assignment was to be consistent with the principles of operation as outlined in FM 100-10 and integrated with the completion of the programmed facilities along the line of communications.

a. USAREUR Supply Mission. The USAREUR Supply Distribution Policy Directive clearly defined USAREUR's logistical supply mission. USAREUR was responsible first of all for the supply support of Army-purchased common-user-type items and POL products to all U.S. forces located in France, Germany, and the BENELUX nations (with the exception of responsibility for quartermaster Classes II and IV and ordnance and chemical Class V supplies required by USAFE); to international headquarters and the U.S. elements of SHAPE and its subordinate headquarters within Central Europe; to U.S. Forces, Austria, within agreed limits; and to any other miscellaneous agencies as directed by the Department of Defense. USAREUR was responsible, secondly, for the supply

[5] USAREUR Log Plng Forecast, 1 Jul 53, pp. 7-8. SECRET.

support of all Army items peculiar to USAREUR forces (with the exception of USAREUR units located in the United Kingdom). Finally, USAREUR was responsible for the storage and in-storage maintenance of certain MDAP stocks in accordance with instructions from the Department of Defense. In addition, supply missions assigned to the chiefs of technical services had as their objectives the overall planning and development of a supply system which would insure effective support of USAREUR, USAFE, and USNAVGER both in peacetime and in the event of an emergency.

b. Distribution of Supplies. One of the main purposes of the directive was the definition of categories of supplies and the delineation of distribution plans for their stockage. The Special Reserve No. 1 (Project Army-EUCOM-GEN-102-50-OP), consisted of stocks authorized by the Department of the Army to support the USAREUR combat mission during the first sixty days of an emergency. These stocks were to be received through French ports and moved to depots in both BASEC and ADSEC for storage. During peacetime they were to be rotated, to prevent deterioration, and were to be maintained for issue in the event of an emergency. The USAREUR Stockage Objective was the maximum quantity of supply authorized for stockage to sustain current USAREUR operations for the day-to-day support of assigned forces. In general it was a 60-day level of supply, consisting of a 30-day operating level and a 30-day safety level. Class V training ammunition and combat-type materials of the stockage objective were to be received through French ports, as facilities became available, and shipped thence to depots in USAREUR COMZ and Army supply installations in Germany. However, dependent support and nonrisk materials, for the support of forces in Germany, would continue to be received through Bremerhaven. The ultimate USAREUR objective for all combat-type materials was a combination of the special reserve (Section 14-Project EUCOM-GEN-102-50-OP) and stockage objective stocks computed generally on the basis of a 60-day wartime replacement factor and a 30-day peacetime consumption rate. Long stocks consisted of the quantity of stocks on hand in USAREUR over and above the 6-month requisitioning objective authorized for retention in USAREUR. The level of long stocks authorized for temporary retention in USAREUR was to be based on computations as of 1 July 1953, and similar stocks were not to be requisitioned until the long stock level had been reduced to zero. In general, up to a 1-year level could be stocked in ADSEC depots and a level not to exceed 2 years in BASEC depots. Authorization was given to vary this level in order to take advantage of existing facilities as long as the total amount retained did not exceed a 3-year level. Such authorization was not to be construed so as to retain a 3-year level of stocks permanently. The technical services were directed to screen and review long stocks in such a manner that within a period of three years from 1 July 1953 this stock category would be reduced, and for all practical purposes eliminated, except for stocks that might be generated by subsequent reductions in command levels or exchange of equipment.

Stocks on hand that exceeded the authorized 3-year retention level, as well as nonmission and obsolete stocks for which USAREUR had no requirements, were considered as excess. Excess property that had been determined to be surplus to the U.S. Government's world-wide requirements by an authorized agency of the Department of Defense was defined as "surplus stocks." Combat-type excess and surplus stocks, both serviceable and unserviceable, were to be moved to USAREUR COMZ only in the event that disposition instructions from the Department of the Army were appreciably delayed. Items of combat materiel on which rapid disposition was anticipated could be retained at depot locations in Germany. Normally, noncombat-type excess and surplus stocks were to be disposed of in the areas where generated, except when local conditions made such action inadvisable or when consolidations would contribute to efficient processing.

c. Depot Development. The change dictated by the new command policy for the distribution of command stocks of materiel necessitated similar changes in depot planning and development in USAREUR. The new levels of stock retention and the shift in location of depots required new construction and planning criteria for depot development, particularly in COMZ. The chiefs of the USAREUR technical services were informed that henceforth the considerations governing all depot planning would be the projection of troops to be supported; the ability to expand rapidly, preferably by the use of additional dispersed areas, in the event of war; the use of existing facilities in lieu of new construction, where desirable and possible; the rental or lease of required facilities, wherever economically desirable; the maximum use of temporary-type construction for LOFC facilities; and the application of storage factors as outlined in FM 101-10, except as otherwise approved by Headquarters, USAREUR.[6]

107. Department of Defense Controls over Deutsche Mark Expenditures

Early in 1953 the U.S. Bureau of the Budget informed USAREUR that beginning 1 July 1953 Deutsche Mark funds provided for USAREUR, either for defense or occupation costs, would be reapportioned by Congress and allocated by the Department of the Army. Their use would be subject to all regulations applicable to the use of dollar-appropriated funds, and dollar amounts allocated to USAREUR would be reduced in direct proportion to the Deutsche Mark funds made available.[7] These regulations on Deutsche Mark funding stemmed from the provisions of Section 1415 of the 1953

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[6]USAREUR ltr, 5 Sep 53, sub: USAREUR Supply Distribution Policy Directive. AG 400 GLD-AGO. SECRET.

[7]Ltr, USAREUR Compt Div Bud Br, 26 Jan 53, sub: Tentative FY 1954 Funding Distribution for Planning Purposes. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1953), Vol. I, Item 7.

Supplemental Appropriation Act (PL 547, 82d Congress), which stated: "Foreign Credits owed to or owned by the U.S. Treasury will not be available for expenditure by agencies of the U.S. after 30 June 1953 except as may be provided for annually in appropriation acts, and provisions for the utilization of such credits for purposes authorized by law are hereby authorized to be included in general appropriations acts."[8] For the purpose of this Act, the Bureau of the Budget defined the term "foreign credits" to include "all foreign currencies or credits which have been, or will be, obtained by the U.S. Government, or any agency thereof, without requiring a dollar purchase...."[9] While the House of Representatives included in the Department of Defense FY 1954 appropriation bill provisions exempting the military departments from the provisions of Section 1415, the Office of the Secretary of Defense decided to require complete justification of the use of all Deutsche Mark funds by U.S. forces in Germany and directed the military departments in July 1953 to furnish complete funding programs for FY 1954 for both dollars and foreign currency and credits.[10] Congress adopted in Section 1313 of the Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1954, the proposal in the President's budget for FY 1954 requiring agencies of the government to deposit appropriated dollars in the Treasury for all foreign currencies and credits accruing to them. It was only after extensive discussion on the situation in Germany that Congress exempted the military departments from the restrictions on the use of foreign credits insofar as real property, the use of real property, services, and commodities were concerned. Congress severely criticized the Department of the Army for not exercising adequate control over funds made available to it by foreign governments. After a statement to Congressional committees by the Secretary of the Army that Deutsche Mark budgets received the same controls from the Department of the Army as did U.S. dollar budgets, the Department of Defense decided to require the submission of Deutsche Mark budgets to the Department of the Army and the Department of Defense for approval, in order to carry out the intent of Congress that such funds be subjected to the same controls as dollar budgets. The Department of Defense therefore established, and communicated to the appropriate committees of Congress, the policy that budgetary controls of obligations and expenditures in Germany would extend to all sources of funds, including Deutsche Mark support of U.S. forces.[11]

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[8] US BOB Bul No. 53.6, 12 Sep 52, sub: Special Instruction for the 1954 Budget. UNCLASSIFIED.

[9] Ibid.

[10] C/N 1, USAREUR Compt to USAREUR COFS, 9 Jul 53, sub: Status of Section 1415. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1953), Vol. I, Item 7 atchd.

11 Cable DA-947254, COFSA to CINCUSAREUR, 1 Sep 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 8 (B/P).

a. Policy for the Control of Deutsche Mark Funds. In October 1953 a new policy on the control of Deutsche Mark funds went into effect. All Deutsche Mark fund usage in the future was to be screened in a manner comparable to the screening of dollar fund usage.[12] This screening policy would also apply to those items (mainly mandatory) that could not be fitted into the U.S. code, but would nevertheless be treated as falling within the criteria of fund usage as applied to dollar appropriated funds. The major objective in the screening of the Deutsche Mark contribution was to restrict the use of Deutsche Mark funds for the benefit of U.S. Army forces to uses of the same type and character for which dollar appropriated funds could be provided. In December the Secretary of Defense directed that after 1 January 1954 no obligations were to be incurred against Deutsche Mark support from the German Federal Republic or the Berlin Magistrate until the fund program of the military departments concerned had been approved by the Department of Defense. Following such approval, minor adjustments could be made within the total approved program for Deutsche Mark support to the same extent permissible in the case of dollar appropriations. Whether classified as "occupation" or "mandatory" costs, any item that could not be funded under U.S. budget criteria was to be identified and full particulars furnished concerning its inclusion in the proposed program. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) or his designated representative was authorized to approve the funding programs involving the use of foreign credits of the respective military departments.[13]

b. Congressional Provisions for FY 1955. Because of the objections of the military departments to the application of Section 1415, new provisions were inserted in the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1955, by the House of Representatives. Section 727 of that act, as passed by the House and subsequently enacted, read as follows:

> During FY 1955 agencies of the Department of Defense may accept use of real property from foreign countries for the United States in accordance with mutual defense agreements or occupational arrangements and may accept services furnished by foreign countries as reciprocal international courtesies or as services customarily made available without charge; and such agencies may use same for support of U.S. forces in such areas without specific appropriation therefor.

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[12] See SR 35-210-54, 20 May 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

[13] (1) Cable DA-951546, COFSA from COA to CINCUSAREUR, 30 Oct 53. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Cable DA-954266, COFSA to CINCUSAREUR, 11 Dec 53. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in file cited above.

In addition to the foregoing, agencies of the Department of Defense may accept real property, services and commodities from foreign countries for the use of the United States in accordance with mutual defense agreements or occupational arrangements and such agencies may use same for the support of U.S. forces in such areas without specific appropriation therefor, provided: that within thirty days after the end of each quarter, the Secretary of Defense shall render to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the Bureau of the Budget a full report of such property, supplies and commodities received during such quarter.[14]

108. USAREUR Deutsche Mark Budget and Monthly Appropriations

The conferences that drew up the contractual arrangements with the German Federal Republic predicated the effective date of the provisions of the Finance Convention as 1 July 1952, the anticipated effective date of the arrangements. When it was realized that ratification by that time would be impossible, arrangements were made with the West German Finance Ministry for the support of the Allied forces in Germany on the basis of a monthly allocation of DM 600,000,000. HICOG, however, suggested that for budgetary purposes an effective date of 1 January 1953 should be used in implementing the contractual arrangements.[15] Since on that date ratification was still in the distant future, by agreement between the Allied High Commission and the West German Finance Ministry, the monthly allocation of DM 600,000,000 was continued until the effective date of the contractual arrangements. On 10 April 1953 the Economic and Finance Committee of the Allied High Commission and the West German Finance Minister reached a series of agreements on occupation costs. The monthly allocation of DM 600,000,000 per month would be extended to 31 December 1953 or to the date of entry into force of the contractual arrangements, if earlier. The payment of occupation damages would be made in a regular and orderly manner, so as to prevent an accumulation of claims to be paid by the West German Government after ratification. The Allies would keep the German Federal Republic informed as to their construction programs and would consider that government's suggestions concerning them. Funds under the DM 600,000,000 limitation that were not fully

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[14]Cable DA-961053, DA from Compt-B to CINCUSAREUR, 5 May 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1954), Vol. I, Item 19.

[15]EUCOM/USAREUR Comd Rept, 1952, pp. 224-27. SECRET.

expended by 31 December 1953, or by the entry into force of the contractual agreements, would remain available for twelve months thereafter for the liquidation of prior obligations. Unused expenditure allocations carried forward would not be chargeable to the defense contribution of the German Federal Republic. Finally, the Allied forces would finance within the monthly limitation, an infrastructure program of approximately DM 282,000,000, the U.S. share of which would amount to less than DM 10,000,000 per month.[16] In December 1953 the Allied High Commission negotiated with the West German Federal Ministry of Finance to extend the 31 December 1953 limitation established for the monthly allocation of DM 600,000,000 per month.[17] On 29 December 1953 agreement was reached to extend the April 1953 understanding on occupation costs until 30 June 1954 or to the effective date of the contractual agreements, whichever occurred earlier. The Minister of Finance, however, requested from the Allies a statement of their intention to expend larger amounts than heretofore for the construction of dependent housing and for the payment of damage claims.[18] Table 12 shows in dillars, the FY 1954 Deutsche Mark funding program for USAREUR-Western Germany as approved by the Department of the Army and the amounts obligated as of 30 June 1954. The Army portion approved for USAREUR use in Germany totaled DM 2,343,081,363. Of this amount USAREUR obligated DM 2,314,813,057 before the close of FY 1954.[19]

109. USAREUR Dollar Budget for FY 1954

In addition to the Deutsche Mark budget for occupation costs in Germany, USAREUR required certain dollar appropriations to cover expenditures, which, under international law, could not be included in the occupation costs budget. Chief among these was the pay of U.S. military and civilian personnel and certain maintenance and operation expenditures. The dollar budget approved by the Department of the Army and allocated by the Bureau of the Budget for USAREUR use in Germany totaled $118,199,457. Of this amount, USAREUR obligated $111,923,804 before 30 June 1954.

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[16] USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf 4, 14 Apr 53, p. 3. SECRET.

[17] Ltr, HICOG to CINCUSAREUR, 18 Dec 53, sub: Continued Deutsche Mark Support from the Federal Republic. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1954), Vol. I, Item 1 atchd.

[18] Cable 274, HICOG to State Dept (2096), 30 Dec 53. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1953), Vol. II, Item 42.

[19] C/N 1, USAREUR Compt Div Bud Br to USAREUR Hist Div, 3 Aug 54, sub: Funding Programs and Obligations FY 1954 (Dollars and DM). UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

Table 12--Deutsche Mark Funding Program for Army, Navy, Air Force, and MSTS (in dollars)

Appropriation	DA Funding	Obligations, 30 June 1954
Total	$718,421,514	$709,594,861
Army	557,876,515	551,145,966
Military Pay	9,064,905	8,943,663
Maintenance and Operations	307,021,617	304,252,427
Military Construction	231,853,293	228,406,025
Procurement and Production	7,719,000	7,328,198
Reserve Personnel Requirements	2,000	1,009
Preparation for Sale or Salvage of Military Property	15,000	14,167
Claims (DM Support)	2,200,700	2,200,477
Air Force	153,259,718	151,727,299
Navy	6,426,281	5,925,958
MSTS	859,000	795,638

Source: USAREUR Compt Div Bud Br.

Table 13 presents a breakdown of the USAREUR dollar budget for FY 1954 by appropriation as approved by the Department of the Army and the amounts obligated before the end of FY 1954.[20]

[20] Ibid.

Table 13--Dollar Funding Program USAREUR-
Western Germany, FY 1954

Obligations and Funding as of 30 June 1954

Appropriation	Funded	Obligated
Total	$118,199,457	$111,923,804
Military Pay, Army, 2142010	42,704,800	41,055,174
Maintenance and Operations, Army, 2142020	73,232,900	68,644,290
Reserve Personnel Requirement, 2142070	65,600	63,031
Procurement and Production, Army, 21X2030	647,100	636,406
Military Construction, Army, 21X2050	1,499,246	1,499,246
Preparation for Sale or Salvage of Military Property, Army, 1954, 2145371	41,800	23,811
Research and Development, Army, 21X240	8,011	1,846

Source: USAREUR Compt Div Bud Br.

110. USAREUR FY 1954 Deutsche Mark Budget, Berlin

The USAREUR budget for operations in Berlin was separate from that for the remainder of Germany, since the funds for that budget were contributed by the Berlin Magistrate. Deutsche Mark expenditures for Berlin were subject to the same scrutiny and approval by the Department of the Army as was the USAREUR budget for operations in West Germany. The FY 1954 Deutsche Mark budget for Berlin, as approved by the Department of the Army, amounted to DM 71,341,531. Of this amount USAREUR, through the Berlin Command, was able to obligate DM 66,346,425 before 30 June 1954. Table 14

presents a breakdown of the Deutsche Mark budget for Berlin for USAREUR, USAFE (Tempelhof), and USNAVGER, with a further breakdown of the Army portion, both as approved by the Department of the Army and as obligated by USAREUR. Because the budget was submitted to, and approved by, the Department of the Army, all amounts are expressed in dollars.[21]

Table 14--Deutsche Mark Funding Program for Berlin Command

Appropriation	DA Funding	Obligations, 30 June 1954
Total	$18,304,721	$16,874,182
Army	16,986,079	15,796,768
Military Pay	62,288	54,530
Maintenance and Operations	12,225,716	11,293,626
Military Construction	4,539,809	4,436,844
Claims (DM Support)	158,266	11,768
Navy	25,772	21,952
USAFE (Tempelhof)	1,292,870	1,055,462

Source: USAREUR Compt Div Bud Br.

111. Curtailment of Services by Budget Restrictions

The requirement for the submission of the Deutsche Mark budget to the Department of Defense for approval on the basis of dollar budget criteria, together with the reduction in the civilian personnel ceiling for USAREUR imposed at the beginning of 1953, made it evident to USAREUR that certain services within the command would have to be curtailed. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, USAREUR, recommended that a panel consisting of representatives of G1, G3, G4, the Comptroller, and Seventh Army be appointed for the purpose of studying and making recommendations. This panel would decide which services constituted definite requirements that could not be curtailed, which services could be performed by troop units or by contract, and which services should be declared nonessential.[22]

[21] Ibid.

[22] Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 23 Mar 53, sub: Curtailment of Services to Meet Budgetary Restrictions. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1953), Vol. I, Item 19 (B/P).

On 24 March 1954, the panel was appointed and instructed to insure that reductions imposed on all echelons were fair to all categories of personnel and that curtailment of services would be uniform between areas and commands. The report of the panel was to be submitted before 5 April 1953.[23]

a. Command Policy on Curtailment. The policy for curtailment of services recommended by the USAREUR panel provided that all nonessential services would be eliminated. Services for which troops were trained, or which would contribute to troop training, would be performed by troops. Nonappropriated fund activities would be self-supporting in accordance with Department of the Army criteria. Services and functions performed by storage and shop facilities, communication centers, and maintenance and repair facilities would be consolidated to effect maximum economy in personnel. The criteria governing such services as grounds maintenance, repairs, and utilities, preventive maintenance cycles, janitorial service, and firemen service would be revised to effect maximum coverage from available personnel. Wherever applicable, the standards of service to be rendered would be governed by zone of interior staffing standards. Finally, employees would be used for their full "payroll time" by appropriate adjustment of supervisory schedules. The panel compiled a list of functions that would be eliminated, those that would be performed by lodger units, and those that would be curtailed. Functions not included in the report were to be continued in conformity with established USAREUR standards.[24]

b. Restoration of Certain Categories of Services. In July 1953 it became evident that the provisions of Section 1415, PL 547, 82d Congress, would not apply to the USAREUR Deutsche Mark budget for FY 1954. USAREUR thereupon appointed a committee to review the reductions in personnel and services already imposed, with a view to determining which reductions should be canceled and the level on which services should continue during the availability of Deutsche Mark contributions. The committee was instructed to include in its recommendations action to reinstate no more than 25 percent of the personnel space cuts effected by earlier USAREUR measures and to consider the advisability of reinstating any services that would provide substantial morale benefits at a relatively minor cost.[25] On 7 August 1953, USAREUR reinstated the

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[23]USAREUR Stf Memo 15, 24 Mar 53, sub: Establishment of USAREUR Panel to Recommend Curtailment. UNCLASSIFIED.

[24]USAREUR ltr, 17 Apr 53, sub: Curtailment of Services. AG 200.3 GLD-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[25]USAREUR Stf Memo 34, 16 Jul 53, sub: Establishment of Committee to Review Reductions in Personnel and Services. CONFIDENTIAL.

following services that had either been eliminated or curtailed by USAREUR in April 1953: quartermaster laundry and dry cleaning pick-up service, commissary package carriers, maintenance of quarters-type furnishings, household maintenance--including minor repairs of utilities, furnishings and equipment, packing and crating, custodians for public areas in dependent housing and BOQ's, and clothing sales stores (fixed).[26]

112. Department of the Army Expenditure Controls

Late in August 1953 President Dwight D. Eisenhower defined the objective of the executive branch of the government as one of effecting maximum efficiency and economy in government operations. Accordingly, the Department of the Army instructed CINCUSAREUR to exercise strictest surveillance and control over the obligations and expenditures of his command in order to insure that USAREUR missions were carried out with the absolute minimum of personnel, money and materiel. Activities within USAREUR were to be reviewed frequently; those determined to be of relatively low priority were to be eliminated, deferred, or curtailed to minimum levels. Specific controls would have to be exercised within the fields of procurement, logistical services, construction, travel and transportation, and civilian personnel, to insure efficient and economical operations. In addition, based on factors peculiar to USAREUR, the following areas would be made the subject of management improvement reviews: manpower and personnel, distribution, maintenance, service operations, facilities, administrative services, and general management. USAREUR subordinate commanders were to direct their staffs and management improvement advisory committees to make full use of reports and recommendations resulting from command inspections, budgetary reviews, performance analyses, internal audits, statistical studies, work simplification and employee suggestion programs, and management and manpower surveys.[27]

113. Financial Property Accounting

Financial Property Accounting was the name given to a Department of the Army project under which modern, double-entry accounting systems and records were to be installed world-wide to provide modern fiscal controls over all Army stocks. The project was needed because the Army had had no means of regularly ascertaining

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[26] Cable SX-1980, USAREUR to all Area Comdrs, 7 Aug 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1953), Vol. I, Item 8 (B/P).

[27] (1) DA ltr, 4 Sep 53, sub: Command Surveillance and Control of Obligations and Expenditures. AGAC-C (M) 130 (4 Sep 53) COMPT-B. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR 1st Ind, 9 Oct 53, same sub as above. AG 130 COM-AGO (4 Sep 53). UNCLASSIFIED. (3) App, SR 11-110-1, 5 Jun 53. UNCLASSIFIED.

the value of its inventory assets and, hence, no fiscal means of relating supply to demand. The need was indicated by Congress in 1950 when it provided in Section 410, Title IV, PL 216, that, "the Secretary of Defense shall cause property records to be maintained, so far as practicable on both quantitative and monetary bases." To initiate the system, the Secretary of the Army authorized the engagement of six firms of certified public accountants to devise and install the accounts in all depots in the United States and to supervise their installation in all other areas in the world. Late in 1953 a task force of USAREUR accountants was dispatched to depots in the United States for training. Later, representatives from U.S. depots were to assist USAREUR in accomplishing the complete coverage of all stocks by early 1955.[28] At a conference of USAREUR and Department of the Army representatives held in Washington 16-25 January 1954, plans were approved that would permit the extension of Financial Property Accounting and the Medical-Dental Stock Fund to USAREUR by 1 July 1954.[29] On 8 March 1954 the Department of the Army directed USAREUR to install the Medical-Dental Stock Fund in USAREUR by 1 July 1954 and the stock fund programs for all other technical services by 1 July 1955. The extension of the stock fund programs, which differed from Financial Property Accounting, met with immediate objections within USAREUR technical services. While the program of Financial Property Accounting was required by law, and was scheduled for implementation in USAREUR on 1 July 1954, the stock fund program was a variation installed at the option of the Department of the Army. It involved direct funding and citation of funds by requisitioning stations, while Financial Property Accounting was merely the addition of the dollar sign to each transaction, both debit and credit, down to and including depot level transactions.[30] In March 1954 the Department of the Army limited the extension of the Medical-Dental Stock Fund operation in overseas commands after 1 July 1954 to depot operations. Data developed during the first year of operation would be the basis for determining the scope of the extension of the program to station level,

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[28] Memo, USAREUR Compt to USAREUR COFS, 5 Feb 54, sub: Financial Property Accounting (FPA), Incl 1, Transcript of 18 December 1953 Meeting of Industry Accounting Advisory Committee. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 400.3 (1954), Vol. I, Item 2A atchd.

[29] Ltr, DCOFSA Admin and Opns to CINCUSAREUR, 1 Mar 54, sub: Financial Property Accounting Program in USAREUR. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[30] C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 26 Mar 54, sub: Extension of Stock Fund to USAREUR. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

with such extension scheduled for 1 July 1955.[31] Since this move on the part of the Department of the Army contemplated using the Medical-Dental Stock Fund as a test that would prove or disprove USAREUR's contention that the program would have an adverse effect on the command's ability to prepare for combat operations, USAREUR decided to withhold its objections until definite documentary and experience data were available.[32]

Section II: Procurement

114. U.S. Army Offshore Procurement Program in Europe, 1953-54

The U.S. Army offshore procurement program (OSP) in Europe during 1953 and 1954 was of three distinct types: Department of the Army-directed procurement for general Army requirements; USAREUR dollar procurement for locally generated requirements; and Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) procurement under the provisions of the Mutual Security Act. Some of the objectives of offshore procurement were to meet time-phased essential military requirements more effectively through savings in costs and/or delivery time; to use available European productive capacity and broaden Europe's industrial base; to increase European self-sufficiency, particularly in the production of recurring U.S.-type items; to supplement U.S. production and alleviate production bottlenecks in the United States; and to assist in the supply of dollar exchange to Europe according to military and economic needs. Offshore procurement contracts were placed in 21 countries, with France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Belgium receiving the largest amounts. Offshore procurement was of economic benefit to each of the countries receiving contracts, and thus fulfilled one of the major objectives of the MDAP offshore procurement program. During both years the greatest part of the procurement was MDAP and the largest portion of expenditure was for ordnance items, both under Defense Department-directed and MDAP procurement.[33]

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[31] Cable DA-502384, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 31 Mar 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[32] C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 19 Apr 54, sub: Extension of Stock Fund to USAREUR. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[33] (1) USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf 9, 27 Aug 53, p. 2. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR Mthly Review of Log Actvs, 31 May 54, pp. 63-65. CONFIDENTIAL.

115. Dollar Procurement for U.S. Forces

A summary of dollar procurement obligations by USAREUR agencies during FY 1953 indicated that more than one billion dollars had been obligated during that period--approximately twice the amount reported for FY 1952. During the period 1 January-30 June 1953, $891,294,000 of the total of $1,008,976,000 was obligated. Of this amount, $882,001,000 was obligated for supplies, $8,866,000 for services, and $427,000 for construction. Obligations for MDAP offshore procurement amounted to $913,300,000, or approximately 91 percent of the entire FY 1953 obligations. Of this amount, over $868,000,000 was obligated for ordnance items. Department of the Army-directed procurement for the Department of Defense amounted to $15,000,000 or approximately 1.5 percent of total obligations. Procurement for local USAREUR requirements amounted to $80,500,000, or approximately 8 percent of total obligations. Half of the latter amount was obligated by quartermaster agencies.[34] During FY 1954 $298,000,000 was obligated by USAREUR procurement agencies. Of this total, approximately $186,000,000, or 64 percent, was accounted for by the USAREUR Ordnance Division, 15 percent by the USAREUR Quartermaster Division, 11 percent by the USAREUR Signal Division, 6 percent by USAREUR COMZ, and 3 percent by the USAREUR Engineer Division. The balance was accounted for by the USAREUR Medical Division, Detachment R, the USAREUR Armed Forces Information and Education Division, and the USAREUR Special Activities Division. Obligations for local requirements for USAREUR amounted to approximately $71,000,000, or about 25 percent of the total. MDAP offshore procurement amounted to approximately $217,000,000, or about 75 percent of the total. Department of the Army-directed procurement for defense requirements amounted to $888,000, which was less than one-half of 1 percent of the total. The total FY 1954 obligations were a little more than half of FY 1952 obligations and about 29 percent of FY 1953 obligations. The over-all procurement obligations of USAREUR have always been governed by the size of MDAP offshore procurement since in each year the MDA program involved the major portion of the obligations. The most significant change in the country of placement over previous years was evidenced in contracts awarded in France. During FY 1953 contracts amounting to $488,000,000, or approximately 48 percent of total USAREUR obligations, were let in France. During FY 1954 only $43,000,000 worth of contracts amounting to 15 percent of total USAREUR obligations, were placed in that country. The drastic reduction could be attributed to either or both of the following factors: (a) in the FY 1954 MDA program there were no noncompetitive items, such as the Budget Support Program and the Pleven Commitment, as

[34] USAREUR Mthly Review of Log Actvs, 30 Jun 53, pp. 44-45. CONFIDENTIAL.

there had been in previous years; (b) because of the follow-on procedure, there was no 105- or 155-mm. artillery ammunition in the FY 1954 program. Table 15 shows the placement of offshore procurement contracts for FY 1953 and FY 1954 by types of funds and participating countries.[35]

116. Deutsche Mark Procurement in Germany

A total of DM 2,500,000,000 was obligated by USAREUR and allied procurement agencies during the period 1 April 1952-30 June 1953 (from the start of German FY 1953 to the close of U.S. FY 1953). Air Force agencies reported obligations of DM 490,700,000, or approximately 20 percent of the total for all services; Navy obligations amounted to DM 37,700,000. During 1 January-30 June 1953 USAREUR and allied agencies obligated DM 934,520,000, of which DM 285,856,000 was obligated for services, DM 295,281,000 for supplies, DM 302,842,000 for construction, and DM 50,541,000 for real estate within the German Federal Republic.[36] Total Deutsche Mark obligations for FY 1954 amounted to nearly DM 2,500,000,000, of which approximately DM 900,000,000, or 36 percent of the cumulative obligations, was obligated during June 1954. USAREUR area commands obligated DM 1,185,000,000, or 48 percent of the cumulative obligations, as compared with DM 705,000,000 obligated by USAREUR technical services. The Air Force and the Navy together obligated DM 594,000,000, or approximately 24 percent of the DM 2½ billion total.[37]

117. U.S. Army Procurement in Berlin

Procurement in Berlin was effected by a special procurement team of technical services representatives organized by EUCOM in January 1950 to stimulate the market for small manufacturers, in response to a request for such assistance by the U.S. Commander, Berlin.[38] Between 1 January and 30 June 1953, DM 5,581,000 were obligated under the current procurement program, bringing the total obligations since the inception of the program in January 1950 to DM 42,700,000.[39] During FY 1954 both the U.S. State and Defense Departments emphasized the necessity of increased procurement in West Berlin in order to ameliorate the political and financial situation and to decrease unemployment. The goal for contract awards in Berlin for FY 1954 was set at $25,000,000 (or the

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[35] Ibid., pp. 66-69. CONFIDENTIAL.

[36] Ibid., p. 47. UNCLASSIFIED.

[37] Ibid., pp. 70-71. UNCLASSIFIED.

[38] EUCOM/USAREUR Comd Rept, 1952, p. 259. SECRET.

[39] USAREUR Mthly Review of Log Actvs, 30 Jun 53, p. 47. UNCLASSIFIED.

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Table 15--Offshore Procurement Obligations by Country and Type of Funds

(in Thousands of Dollars)

Country of Contract Placement	FY 1953 Contracts Placed				FY 1954 Contracts Placed			
		Type of Funds				Type of Funds		
	Total	MDAP	DA Rqmts	Local Rqmts	Total	MDAP	DA Rqmts	Local Rqmts
Total	1,001,962	906,327	15,149	80,486	289,781	217,546 a/	888 a/	71,347
Austria	705	0	0	705	1,192	0	0	1,192
Belgium	49,849	41,456	6,616	1,777	37,551	36,121	648	782
Denmark	24,337	9,749	0	14,588	14,006	1,380	1	12,625
France	488,011	453,540	15	34,456	43,401	21,233	0	22,168
Germany	14,277	2,677	3	11,597	20,563	7,977	99	12,487
Greece	23,132	23,132	0	0	1,057	1,057	0	0
Italy	136,618	135,405	0	1,213	52,891	49,154	0	3,737
Luxembourg	6	0	0	6	483	458	0	25
Netherlands	15,738	3,494	16	12,228	14,873	1,798	0	13,075
Norway	11,751	11,657	0	94	5,309	5,095	0	215
Portugal	13,856	10,424	3,030	402	110	0	0	110
Sweden	704	0	0	704	51	0	0	51
Switzerland	5,707	0	3,862	1,845	635	11	0	624
United Kingdom	199,765	198,187	1,395	183	77,621	74,192	0	3,429
United States	504	0	126	378	421	0	35	386
Other b/	17,002	16,606	86	310	19,617	19,070	105	442

a/ $1,196 removed from DA Requirements (cumulative) and transferred to MDAP (cumulative).

b/ FY 1953 "Other" includes Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Spain, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and classified projects. FY 1954 does not include Ireland and Turkey.

Source: Info compiled from data in USAREUR G4 Div.

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Deutsche Mark equivalent) with the expectation that solicitations for bids to the value of $100,000,000 would be made. Procurement in Berlin by the U.S. Army during FY 1954 amounted to $21,500,000, approximately 25 percent of the $84,500,000 for which bids were solicited. In addition, U.S. solicitations amounting to $11,600,000 were made and contract awards amounting to $600,000 were let by the Air Force and the Navy. USAREUR and HICOG anticipated a decrease in the rate of military procurement in Europe during FY 1955, which would mean that the amount of solicitation in Berlin might decrease accordingly. To maintain the value of contract awards in Berlin during FY 1955 at about the same level as that of FY 1954, the Secretary of Defense authorized USAREUR to use special measures and techniques in the awarding of contracts and requisition demands whenever Berlin suppliers were involved. To implement this procedure immediately, and to expedite it on a case-by-case basis, a Berlin procurement officer was appointed in the Procurement Branch of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, USAREUR.[40]

118. Procurement of Small Items in Europe

During FY 1954 the Department of the Army laid great stress on procurement by local purchase, open-end contracts, and call-type contracts, in order to save substantial sums of money through the elimination of depot and transportation costs. In April 1954, CINCUSAREUR learned that USAREUR requisitions arriving at the Overseas Supply Depot, New York Port of Embarkation, had been screened to determine whether some small items could have been procured locally in Europe, more cheaply and quickly. USAREUR was directed to eliminate such items from requisitions on depots in the United States in the interests of economy and efficiency.[41] Prior to the receipt of these instructions, however, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, USAREUR, had initiated the monitoring of requisitions on U.S. depots. By April 1954 USAREUR had developed an aggressive program of procurement by local purchase through call-type and open-end contracts. The USAREUR chiefs of technical services, moreover, were instructed to complete as soon as feasible, but not later than 26 May 1954, the screening of all items currently on requisition to continental United States and the canceling of insignificant items and quantities that might be procured or produced locally in Europe; the cabling of a list of the canceled items to the continental United States; and the installing and policing of a procedure to insure that insignificant quantities and items were not requisitioned on continental United States in

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[40] Ibid., p. 72. CONFIDENTIAL.

[41] Ltr, ACOFSA G4 to CINCUSAREUR, 12 Apr 54, sub: USAREUR Procurement of Certain Items in Europe. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 400.12 (1954), Vol. I, Item 34A.

the future. In addition, the Engineer, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Medical and Signal Divisions were instructed to screen a list of requisitioned items, which had been compiled by the New York Overseas Supply Depot, to ascertain whether any of the items were authorized for local procurement and to determine why such insignificant quantities had been requisitioned from the United States.[42] By 1 May 1954 a program for using local procurement and open-end, call-type requisition demands had been instituted by USAREUR for such items as spare parts for office machines, refrigerators, ranges and ovens, vehicle spare parts, including tires and tubes, and industrial gases.[43]

119. Irregular Procurement Procedures in Western Area Command

In 1952 investigations by the USAREUR comptroller and provost marshal into the activities of the firm known as Consolidated Engineering Limited, indicated that numerous irregularities had occurred in the procurement program in WACOM. Consolidated Engineering Limited had been organized in May 1951 by Robert E. Bowan while employed as a Department of the Army civilian engineer at Nuernberg Military Post, under the supervision of Lt. Col. A. E. Eschbach. Colonel Eschbach was later transferred to Kaiserslautern, where he served as chief of the Construction Branch of Rhine Military Post (the previous designation of WACOM). According to audit records, the value of construction in progress or already completed in WACOM in March 1953 was DM 784,540,500. During the same period contracts totaling about DM 26,000,000 were awarded to 22 architect-engineer firms, or their agents, for services involving planning, supervising, and inspection of construction. The investigators desired to find out why Consolidated Engineering Limited and its associated firms had been awarded architect-engineer contracts in excess of DM 8,000,000, when the estimated cost of construction under such contracts was approximately DM 219,000,000.[44] As a result of the investigation of this company's activities, USAREUR initiated a full-scale

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[42](1) C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 23 Apr 54, sub: Requisitioning of Insignificant Items and Quantities from CONUS. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR Tech Svcs, 23 Apr 54, same sub. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in file above, Item 34A atchd.

[43]Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to ACOFSA G4, 1 May 54, sub: Requisitioning of Small Items and Quantities on CONUS. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[44]Ltr, US GAO Eur Br, to CINCUSAREUR, 16 Jun 53, sub: Irregularities in Western Area Command Procurement. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 333.5 (1954), Vol. I, Item 1 atchd (B/P). Unless otherwise indicated, footnote material in this paragraph is in the same file.

investigation of all irregularities in the purchasing and contracting office of WACOM, with particular reference to the construction program. The combined facilities of the USAREUR provost marshal, the USAREUR inspector general, and the 7756 USAREUR Audit Agency were made available for this investigation. At the same time, the European Branch of the U.S. General Accounting Office initiated a parallel investigation. At the suggestion of the director of this branch, the two investigations were coordinated and the findings of each were discussed at conferences held in Heidelberg.[45]

a. Irregular Procurement Practices. The investigations uncovered numerous instances of irregular procurement practices, including the improper solicitation of bids, unauthorized opening of bids for construction contracts, improper contract awards, unauthorized modification of contracts, unwarranted bonus payments to contractors, overcharges by contractors, violation of employment ceilings set by higher echelons, employment of persons without compensation, and assumption by the WACOM Construction Branch chief of duties normally assigned to a purchasing and contracting officer. In particular, criticism was centered on the accelerated obligation of Deutsche Mark funds during 13-14 May 1952. Contracts totaling about DM 137,000,000 were awarded by the WACOM post engineer between the afternoon of 13 May and the early morning of 15 May, a period of approximately 36 hours. The entire matter was "unusual" and represented a departure from practices generally followed in the award of contracts. In many instances bidders were given specifications that only approximated actual requirements and then were allowed only a few minutes in which to submit their bids, with the result that awards for buildings of the same type varied by as much as DM 36,000. An official of Consolidated Engineering Limited played an active part in the procedure, and later admitted that he had sold confidential information to "preferred" contractors. Other alleged irregularities warranting investigation concerned activities of personnel of the WACOM post engineer's office, including the use of a German contractor's automobile by the area engineer for Kaiserslautern, West, in the pursuance of his official duties, and the excessive fraternization of the assistant chief of the construction branch with German contractors.[46]

45(1) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to Dir US GAO Eur Br, 1 Jul 53, sub: Irregularities in Western Area Command Procurement. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Ltr, Dir US GAO Eur Br to CINCUSAREUR, 25 Aug 53, same sub. CONFIDENTIAL.

46(1) Ltr, Dir US GAO Eur Br to CINCUSAREUR, 28 Sep 53, sub: Procurement Irregularities in Western Area Command, incl 1, Procurement and Contracting Practices in Western Area Command. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Ltr, same to same, 5 Oct 53, incl 1, same sub. CONFIDENTIAL. (3) Ltr, same to same, 13 Oct 53, incl 1, same sub. CONFIDENTIAL.

b. USAREUR Course of Action. A number of mitigating factors tempered the findings. For example, the construction program had been large and the time allotted for its completion extremely short. The organization to which the program was assigned was new and inexperienced, since the Rhine Military Post had just been established. Because of its newness and the general manpower situation in USAREUR at the time, the organization was understrength. During 1953, however, USAREUR took corrective actions, such as removing firms from the bidders' lists, withholding payments from contractors suspected of irregularities, conducting audits, rewriting a number of pertinent regulations, and recommending disciplinary actions in such cases as those of Robert E. Bowen, head of Consolidated Engineering Limited, and Leonard Armbruster, WACOM assistant chief of construction. A number of firms and individuals involved in the WACOM construction program were prohibited from entering into contractual or requisitional relationships with USAREUR after 18 September 1953. USAREUR also instituted corrective actions to insure that only fair payments had been made in the past or would be made in the future.[47]

c. Project HE-194-51. Most of the investigating activities centered around the performance of the Sonderbauverwaltung (SBV), an official West German Government construction agency which acted as the prime contractor for the greater share of the construction within WACOM. The most important single, irregular construction project with which the SBV, as a principal, was concerned was project HE-40136-194-826-51, more commonly referred to by the investigators as Project HE-194-51. This project, amounting to DM 500,000, was approved by USAREUR headquarters as an emergency project on 7 March 1951. A requisition demand (6GA) was thereupon issued to the SBV for the approved amount, divided into DM 400,000 for services and DM 100,000 for materials. About three months later, the 7756 USAREUR Audit Agency reported possible irregularities in the handling of funds at the Rhine Military Post. An investigation conducted by the USAREUR inspector general concluded that "no fraudulent practices existed in the purchasing and contracting activities at Rhine Military Post and that no further action should be taken by Headquarters, USAREUR." However, a further investigation of the same project conducted by the USAREUR provost marshal from 23 October 1953 through 15 March 1954 disclosed that, while the original requisition demand had allocated DM 400,000 for services and DM 100,000 for materials, the

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[47](1) Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 28 Sep 53, sub: Irregularities in Procurement Activities, Western Area Command. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to CINCUSAREUR, 7 Dec 53, sub: Visit of Mr. H. R. Domers, Dir GAO Eur Br. UNCLASSIFIED.

first nine partial payments by the Rhine Military Post amounted to approximately DM 225,000 for materials and DM 130,000 for services. At the same time, invoices submitted by the SBV amounted to DM 81,000 for materials and approximately DM 335,000 for services. The SBV submitted billings in support of the invoices, which were certified by personnel assigned to the Engineer Section of Rhine Military Post, but the supporting bills were not forwarded to USAREUR along with the invoices. The SBV had submitted invoices for services when, in fact, materials in the nature of quartermaster items, including typewriters, office machines, and basic office furniture, had been furnished. There was affirmative evidence that the false invoices had been certified by Capt. J.S. Crocker, Kaiserslautern area engineer, Maj. L. A. Wagner, Worms resident engineer, and Mr. Leonard Armbruster, Rhine Military Post assistant chief of construction. Specific false certifications occurred on 19 September and 2 October 1951 and on 12 March 1952. Evidence later developed showed that the practice of obtaining quartermaster-type materials was generally approved and directed by Brig. Gen. (then Colonel) D. H. Tulley, of USAREUR headquarters, and Col. G. E. Pickett of Rhine Military Post. No evidence, however, indicated that any of the funds involved accrued to the personal benefit of any of the Army personnel involved. The first investigative progress report of the provost marshal was submitted to USAREUR headquarters on 25 March 1954. USAREUR studied it with a view to correcting irregularities and initiating disciplinary action if warranted. Consideration was given to the fact that the program was of a "crash" nature and that many things of an emergency nature might have been necessary to get the job done. The provost marshal's investigation failed to disclose that any military or civilian employee profited personally by the irregularities. It was concluded, however, that violations in the form of false certifications might form the basis for disciplinary action against Captain Crocker and Colonel Pickett if such action would be appropriate under the circumstances. The evidence tended to show that the activities in question were conducted under the general authority and at the direction of General Tulley as chief of construction for the USAREUR engineer. In September 1954 a statement was received from General Tulley that showed affirmatively that as the representative of USAREUR and because of the urgency of the situation, he generally authorized the use of construction funds for materials and services not covered by the project.[48]

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[48] Memo, USAREUR JA to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Sep 54, sub: Status of Investigations and Prior Actions Taken Relative to Procurement Irregularities in Western Europe. CONFIDENTIAL.

d. "Free Balances" in Western Area Command Funding. Another irregularity uncovered by USAREUR investigations in WACOM and with which the SBV was integrally concerned, involved "free balances" in WACOM construction funding. This irregularity occurred in February 1952 when an unobligated balance of approximately DM 144,000 was discovered in the funds for Project HE-194-51. In an apparent effort to keep this balance from reverting to the West German treasury, an agreement was made between Captain Crocker of the WACOM area engineer office and one Otto Jeckel, an official of the SBV. Under this agreement the SBV was to submit an invoice covering the full amount of the balance and later deliver materials in that value. An invoice in the amount of DM 144,241.62 was submitted by SBV and certified by Captain Crocker, and the sum was paid to the SBV and held by it as a "free balance." This balance was to be expended from time to time, by informal arrangements between the SBV and post engineer personnel, to purchase items and materials not authorized by USAREUR and to supplement allotments for projects which cost more than the sum originally allotted. The USAREUR provost marshal and the European Branch of the U.S. General Accounting Office, conducting parallel investigations of these balances, found that apparently a sum in excess of DM 3,600,000 had been at one time on the books of the SBV as a "free balance" credit to the Army, set up apparently through the false certification of invoices. During 1954 action was taken by WACOM, under the direction of USAREUR headquarters, to recoup the entire "free balance" total of DM 3,680,590.57 from the SBV through set-offs against payments due that agency on subsequent projects. In addition, on 30 June 1954 representatives of USAREUR discussed with the Oberfinanzdirektion-Koblenz, Landesbauabteilung Mainz, the immediate West German administrative headquarters over the SBV, the views of the German Federal Republic concerning the "free balances." As a result of this discussion, USAREUR requested the Bundesrechnungshof (the German Audit Court) to initiate as soon as possible an audit of the records of the SBV, which had originally been requested by USAREUR in December 1953 to determine the actual amount of "free balances" still outstanding on the records of the SBV. Prior to 30 June 1954 the balances had been reduced by USAREUR in two separate actions which had resulted in the recovery of approximately DM 3,000,000. The first of these actions recouped DM 2,149,775.81 and the second, completed shortly before 30 June 1954, recouped DM 800,000. The audit of SBV records by the Bundesrechnungshof was begun on 1 August 1954, and the results were to be made known before the end of the calendar year.[49]

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[49](1) Ibid. (2) C/N 1, USAREUR Compt to USAREUR COFS, 13 Jul 54, sub: Procurement Procedures at Western Area Command. COM 161.1. CONFIDENTIAL. (3) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to Dir US GAO Eur Br, 13 Jul 54, sub: Irregular Procurement in Western Area Command. CONFIDENTIAL.

e. Irregular Activities of German Firms. In addition to irregular procedures on the part of purchasing and contracting and area engineer personnel in WACOM, the USAREUR investigations revealed irregular activities of certain German firms and individuals concerned with the construction program in that area. Seventeen German firms and individuals were discovered to have apparently violated occupation law in connection with the solicitation and performance of procurement orders. USAREUR initiated suspension action against the firms and individuals involved. In addition, a number of individuals were tried in German courts for violation of German fair trade laws. USAREUR took further steps to permanently debar such individuals, and the firms that they represented, from the USAREUR procurement program. This action and a similar action in the Northern Area Command (NACOM) were being coordinated with the interested USAREUR staff divisions at the close of the period covered by this study. Coordination was necessary to insure that the actions, covering a rather wide segment of the construction potential of German industry, would not have a deleterious effect upon the projected USAREUR construction program.[50]

120. Deutsche Mark Procurement Claims and Appeals

Late in 1953, USAREUR became concerned over the number of unsettled accounts and procurement claims, particularly those growing out of Deutsche Mark contracts. Delays in the settlement of claims had resulted in unfavorable publicity for the U.S. forces. In many instances suppliers did not know who the proper official was to whom they should submit questions concerning the settlement of EC Forms 6 GA (Requisition Order-Demand) and, as a result, had approached other officials and unnecessarily delayed settlement of accounts. USAREUR, therefore, in November 1953 directed that appropriate steps be taken to accomplish the speedy processing of invoices from suppliers; special attention was to be given to the adjustment of disputes. Suppliers should be furnished with a mimeographed form, at the time and EC Form 6 GA was placed, advising them that any questions stemming from the form should be referred to the procurement officer whose name and address appeared thereon. The same information was to be disseminated to all individuals in USAREUR headquarters or in USAREUR agencies concerned with procurement.[51] In order to determine the number of disputed or otherwise unsettled procurement

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[50] Memo, USAREUR JA to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Sep 54, sub: Status of Investigations and Prior Actions Taken Relative to Procurement Irregularities in Western Europe. CONFIDENTIAL.

[51] USAREUR ltr, 7 Nov 53, sub: Outstanding Procurement Claims or Disputed Accounts. AG 400.12 GLD-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

claims then outstanding, and to insure that aggressive action was being taken to reduce them to a minimum, beginning in March all USAREUR procurement agencies were directed to prepare the Quarterly Procurement Claims Report, which would contain the following information on each disputed or otherwise unsettled procurement claim over 30 days old, resulting from the placement of an EC Form 6 GA: (a) the number of the EC Form 6 GA; (b) the supplier's name and address; (c) the amount of the EC Form 6 GA; (d) the amount of the dispute or claim; (e) the type of dispute or claim; (f) the date the claim was originally submitted by the supplier; (g) if the original claim or dispute was revised by the supplier, the date of the last revision and submittal; (h) reasons for delay in excess of 60 days between the dates indicated in (f) and (g) above; (i) the estimated date of settlement; (j) reasons why the claim or dispute was not settled in accordance with the previous estimated date of settlement; and (k) the Deutsche Mark total of the outstanding dispute or claim.[52] While this procedure hastened the settlement of outstanding Deutsche Mark procurement claims and unsettled accounts, approximately 355 procurement claims, totaling DM 17,200,000, were still pending in USAREUR as of 30 June 1954. Thus, even though the area commands had been expediting the settlement of claims as directed by USAREUR, the over-all total for the command was still high. Most numerous were construction claims, and most of the construction claims were in WACOM and NACOM.[53]

Section III: Supply and Maintenance

121. USAREUR Depot Forecast, 1 July 1953

The USAREUR Logistical Planning Forecast for 1953 provided for the continued downward phasing of USAREUR technical services depots east of the Rhine. The plans envisioned that Giessen and Munich Quartermaster Depots, Mannheim and Karlsfeld Ordnance Depots, and the Ordnance Automotive Center, with headquarters at

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[52] USAREUR ltr, 31 Mar 54, sub cited above. AG 150 GLD-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[53] Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 10 Aug 54, sub: Processing of Deutsche Mark Procurement Claims. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Div Cen Files, 158 (1954), Vol. III, Item 2.

Esslingen, would remain temporarily east of the Rhine, but that all other USAREUR depot operation would be confined to WACOM and the LOFC through France. There were seven depots in WACOM; the remainder were planned for USAREUR COMZ, predominantly in BASEC. The phase-down of USAREUR depot maintenance facilities east of the Rhine would also continue, and with respect to three technical services, Chemical, Medical and Signal, would be completely phased out in that section by the end of calendar year 1953.[54]

122. USAREUR COMZ Missions and Instructions

During the early part of 1953 USAREUR COMZ was charged with a three-fold mission, developed as a result of revision in USAREUR planning for USAREUR COMZ. Its major mission was the planning, establishment, development, and operation of the USAREUR Communications Zone. In addition, it was assigned the command of, and responsibility for, all LOFC personnel, units, installations, and activities in France, except those designated as exempt. USAREUR headquarters retained responsibility for over-all planning for theater technical service, to include allocation of troops and personnel to COMZ and the preparation of theater maintenance and supply programs; for theater stock control functions, including determination of supply requirements, establishment and maintenance of supply and stock levels, and requisitions on the United States; for procurement within the theater for depot stocks; and for assignment of technical service depot missions. Finally, USAREUR COMZ was charged with facilitating the development of the LOFC by coordinating aspects that involved negotiations with the French governmental, military, and civil agencies at the French National Government and French Liaison Mission levels.[55] The revision of the USAREUR supply distribution policy simplified the supply mission of USAREUR COMZ but enlarged its supply support responsibility. Beginning September 1953 the new supply mission made the Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ, responsible for the development of supply and maintenance installations along the LOFC across France, which would be capable of providing for complete peacetime logistical support to all U.S. Army forces in Europe and to all U.S. Air and Navy forces as directed, except for nonrisk and dependent-type supplies required by U.S. personnel in Germany. All COMZ facilities were to be capable of rapid expansion into a fully operational COMZ as set forth in FM 100-10, with the ability to render full wartime support to the planned U.S. forces in Western Europe.[56] This mission was elaborated

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[54]USAREUR Log Plng Forecast, 1 Jul 53, p. 20. SECRET.

[55]USAREUR COMZ ltr, 30 Jun 53, sub: Letter of Instructions (USAREUR COMZ Major Subordinate Commands). AG 322 OT. UNCLASSIFIED.

[56]USAREUR ltr, 5 Sep 53, sub: USAREUR Supply Distribution Policy Directive. AG 400 GLD-AGO. SECRET.

several weeks later, in a special logistical directive for the LOFC across France prepared by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, USAREUR. The Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ, was instructed to develop an LOFC across France along the Bordeaux-Poitiers-Tours-Orleans-Verdun-Metz axis, in order to provide logistical and administrative support to U.S. Army forces in France, and support of elements of the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy, joint U.S. headquarters, international headquarters, and specified U.S. governmental agencies, in accordance with the provisions of current agreements and directives; peacetime logistical support of U.S. forces in Germany, as directed; the receipt, storage, and maintenance of all stocks (stockage objective, long stocks, special stocks, and reserve), as directed; and the basic structure of an LOFC capable of being expanded into a Communications Zone to support U.S. forces in Central Europe in the event of an emergency. Special logistical instructions to USAREUR COMZ were outlined in connection with the special reserve, organizational maintenance of equipment, and construction in France. Stocks held in Special Reserve No. 1 were not to be used without the prior approval of USAREUR headquarters. The Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ, upon request would provide organizational maintenance for the equipment of any U.S. Army units or detachments present in the USAREUR COMZ area, although not attached to USAREUR COMZ, when such detachments or units lacked the capability for organizational maintenance. The Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ, was to maintain close liaison with the Director, Joint Construction Agency, to assist in carrying out the construction program in France, which became the responsibility of that agency on 15 April 1953.[57]

123. Department of the Army Stockage Objectives

During 1953 the need for increased economy and good management in supply activities, as well as proper control of inventories, became increasingly important to the Department of the Army because of budget limitations. Since information in Washington indicated that overstockages existed in overseas commands, the Department of the Army outlined criteria to be observed by overseas commanders in the control of stockages. Thus, no materiel was to be requisitioned or purchased that would result in inventories in excess of established levels. All unfilled procurement orders and requisitions were to be reviewed immediately for possible cancellation of those no longer required, or downward reassessment of the quantities needed. Authorized substitutes were to be used in lieu of purchasing to meet current needs, in order to reduce inventories at all levels more rapidly and to avoid

[57] USAREUR ltr, 16 Sep 53, sub: Logistical Directive (LOFC) France. AG 400 GLD-AGO. CONFIDENTIAL.

large current expenditures. Commanders at all levels were directed to emphasize the policies enunciated by this directive and to adhere strictly to the letter of Department of the Army publications prescribing stockage criteria and specified maximum number of days of storage for the various categories of stockage in overseas commands.[58] The 1 January 1954 edition of the Department of the Army "Logistics, Policies and Priorities," carried changes reflecting this attitude on stockage in overseas commands. Subject to certain disposal criteria, the commands were authorized to retain material to the extent that stocks were available, in accordance with specific provisions. First, stock on hand would be retained to meet the balance of initial issue replacement and consumption and the command supply level through 30 June 1957, reserve and operational projects as authorized by the Department of the Army in support of overseas command emergency plans, and foreign military and civilian aid programs to the extent that supplies were specifically directed for retention by the Department of the Army. Second, the foregoing provisions for retaining stocks would not constitute authority to requisition the difference between actual stock levels on hand and the maximum quantity authorized for retention. Third, where overseas commanders desired the retention of quantities on hand in excess of, or less than, the provisions indicated above, appropriate recommendations with justification therefor would be submitted to the Army Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, for prior approval.[59]

124. Special Theater Reserve No. 1

The Special Theater Reserve No. 1 was an operational project established under the provisions of SR 730-5-1, titled "Project ARMY-EUCOM-GEN-102-50-OP," in numbered sections covering specific quantities of supplies needed to implement USAREUR emergency plans. Except in an emergency, stocks in this project could not be used without prior approval of the Department of the Army. As of 1 January 1953 Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8 and 10 of the project were considered as 100 percent complete.[60] Section 1 (equipment to establish communication facilities along the LOFC), Section 2 (equipment to establish a mobile communications center), and Section 3 (radio sets and allied equipment to control evacuation

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[58] DA ltr, 24 Nov 53, sub: Stockage Objective Within Overseas Commands. AGAC-C (M) 400 (12 Nov 53), UNCLASSIFIED.

[59] Cable DA-956388, DA from G4/H3 to CINCUSAREUR, 1 Feb 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 400.3 (1954), Vol. I, Item 6.

[60] USAREUR Mthly Review of Log Actvs, 31 Jan 53, p. 22. SECRET.

traffic) were canceled by the Department of the Army in March 1953 and the tonnages on hand for these sections were absorbed into command stocks. Section 6 (for vans with carrier terminals for use as relay stations along the LOFC), and Section 11 (L-5 aircraft spare parts) had been canceled in April 1952. Spare parts for aircraft were later included in Section 14. Section 12, originally a Signal Corps project for the rehabilitation of signal equipment in armored vehicles, was erroneously included in Project 102 by the Department of the Army, but was canceled in April 1952.[61]

a. Critical Shortages. Sections 8 and 14 of the special reserve project include requirements for a 105-day ammunition reserve to support a troop strength of 242,000, while Section 9 provided for demolitions to establish a barrier line. Critical shortages in the ammunition reserve as of 30 June 1954, are shown in Table 16.

b. Status of Special Reserve No. 1. There were no available figures for the status of the Special Theater Reserve No. 1 as of 30 June 1954, since status reports were submitted on a quarterly basis, and the closest report quarter ran from the beginning of May through July. During that quarter, however, the special reserve target requirements, consisting of depot stocks, prestocks, and basic loads, were increased from 755,400 to 802,200 short tons. During the same period, stocks on hand for the project decreased from 687,400 to 659,500 short tons. At the end of July 1954, 82 percent of the total requirements for completion of the project was on hand, as compared with 86 percent as of 1 January 1954 and 90 percent on 30 April 1954. Although stocks on hand in depots were the lowest reported for any year, target requirements were the highest. As of 31 July 1954 approximately 80 percent of the target requirements were on hand. Prestocks on hand had increased to 94,300 tons and, with the increase in target requirements, approximately 93 percent of the prestock requirement was filled. Both the tonnages on hand and the target requirements for basic loads had gradually increased, and as of 31 July the fill for basic loads was 100 percent of the requirements. Stocks in excess of requirements in WACOM were sharply reduced during the last quarter, so that only a 7 percent excess remained on 31 July.[62] Table 17 gives a breakdown of the Special Reserve No. 1 as of 31 July 1954, by technical services and classes of stockage, including reserve stocks, prestocks, and basic loads. Table 18 shows the location of special reserve stocks (exclusive of prestocks and basic loads) within the USAREUR area of responsibility.

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[61] Ibid., 31 May 53, pp. 21-23. SECRET.

[62] Ibid., 31 Jul 54, pp. 28-34. SECRET.

Table 16--Special Theater Reserve No. 1

Shortages in Special Theater
Reserve Ammunition,
30 June 1954

Item	Authorized	On Hand	Remarks
Barrier Plan			
Mine, AP, M14	2,343,788	2,035,135	ETA Aug 54
105-Day Reserve			
Shell, WP, 81-mm. mortar	79,758	51,550	*
Cartridge			
HEAT, 90-mm. gun	39,816	26,472	*
HEP-T, 105-mm. rifle	29,862	9,671	*
Shell, Smoke FS, 4.2" mortar	16,380	7,965	ETA Aug 54
Shell, Illum, 4.2" mortar	5,620	0	ETA Aug 54
Shell, HE, 155-mm. gun	201,758	93,355	*
Shell, WP, 155-mm. gun	16,538	7,399	*
Charge, Prop, 155-mm. gun	231,525	104,484	*
Shell, Illum, 155-mm. gun and how	25,137	13,356	*
Shell, WP, 155-mm. how	97,461	65,644	*
Shell, Smoke Green, 155-mm. how	1,911	695	ETA Jul 54
Shell, Smoke Yellow, 155-mm. how	1,911	607	ETA Jul 54
Shell, HE, 8" how	352,800	204,264	*
Charge, Prop, GB, 8" how	74,088	48,310	*
Charge, Prop, WB, 8" how	292,352	184,267	*
Shell, HE, T-122, 280-mm. gun	24,696	4,775	*
Shell, HE, T-123, 280-mm. gun	504	125	*
Charge, Prop, T-44, 280-mm. gun	25,931	4,710	*
Charge, Prop, T-43, 280-mm. gun	529	125	*
Fuze, VT, T-226 or M97	1,018,440	460,555	*
Fuze, VT, T-227 or M96	466,338	202,223	*
Fuze, PDSD, 90-mm. (AA)	12,075	0	*
Fuze, MTSQ, M501	53,792	41,229	*
Primer, Percussion, M2A4	2,149,875	1,401,519	*
Mine, HEAP, Bounding	1,176,000	0	*
Mine, HEAP, M14, Nonbounding	588,000	0	*
Mine, HEAT, Hv Nonmetallic	68,800	0	*
Grenade, Rifle, Illum	14,700	10,500	*
Kit, Demolition, M37	12,495	5,100	*
Dynamite	36,750	4,710	*

Table 16--Special Theater Reserve No. 1--(continued)

*This listing is based on revised computation of requirements due to change in ground day of supply. ETA for the shortages is November 1954, depending partly on the ability of this command to store the increased quantities.

Source: USARMUR Mthly Rev of Log Actvs, 31 Jul 54. SECRET.

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Table 17--Special Theater Reserve No. 1

Summary of Special Reserve
Stocks and Targets
31 July 1954

Technical Service	Class of Supply	Total		In Depots		Prestocks		Basic Loads	
		Target	On Hand	Target	On Hand	Target	On Hand	Target	On Hand
Total a/	-	802,163	659,454	678,480	542,263	100,824	94,332	22,859	22,859
Total b/	III, IIIA	(83,765)	(55,268)	(81,322)	(52,806)	(2,443)	(2,462)	0	0
Chemical	II, IV	2,480	2,169	2,445	2,134	35	35	0	0
	V	3,865	3,865	511	511	2,547	2,547	807	807
Engineer	II, IV	212,095	176,567	193,831	162,437	18,264	14,130	0	0
Medical	II, IV	6,432	6,432	6,432	6,432	0	0	0	0
Ordnance	II, IV	60,716	54,630	60,716	54,630	0	0	0	0
	V	373,021	274,570	285,067	188,974	68,954	66,596	19,000	19,000
Quartermaster	I	76,140	76,049	62,386	62,295	11,024	11,024	2,730	2,730
	II, IV	8,754	8,429	8,754	8,429	0	0	0	0
	III c/	(76,608)	(49,770)	(74,298)	(47,460)	(2,310)	(2,310)	0	0
	III d/	(5,827)	(4,641)	(5,742)	(4,546)	(85)	(95)	0	0
	IIIA c/	(1,260)	(821)	(1,215)	(767)	(45)	(54)	0	0
	IIIA d/	(70)	(36)	(67)	(33)	(3)	(3)	0	0
Signal	II, IV	12,663	11,281	12,663	11,281	0	0	0	0
Transportation	II, IV	45,997	45,462	45,675	45,140	0	0	322	322

a/ Excludes Classes III and IIIA stocks. Figures in short tons.
b/ Figures for Classes III and IIIA stocks in parentheses in thousands of gallons. Class III includes both Army and Air Force requirements; Class IIIA is for Army requirements only.
c/ Bulk.
d/ Packages.

Source: Info compiled from data in USAREUR G4 Div.

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Table 18--Location of Special Reserve Stocks in Depots,
Excludes Prestocks and Basic Loads,
31 July 1954

Technical Service	Class of Supply	BASEC Target	BASEC On Hand	ADSEC Target	ADSEC On Hand	WACOM Target	WACOM On Hand	U.S. Zone Target	U.S. Zone On Hand
Total a/	-	331,987	247,612	204,287	144,974	97,281	104,429	44,925	45,248
Total b/	III, IIIA	(25,954)	(28,511)	(42,071)	(8,080)	(13,297)	(16,215)	0	0
Chemical	II, IV	1,828	1,773	617	361	0	0	0	0
	V	383	383	128	128	0	0	0	0
Engineer	II, IV	112,284	77,362	69,205	59,965	12,342	25,110	0	0
Medical	II, IV	4,305	1,608	2,127	4,824	0	0	0	0
Ordnance	II, IV	44,661	39,847	15,392	14,120	658	658	5	5
	V	104,787	74,791	96,002	41,451	84,278	72,732	0	0
Quartermaster	I	45,135	37,816	16,339	18,084	0	5,483	912	912
	II, IV	6,604	4,243	2,139	3,409	5	446	8	331
	III c/	(24,276)	(26,670)	(38,514)	(7,182)	(11,508)	(13,608)	0	0
	III d/	(1,257)	(1,605)	(2,917)	(561)	(1,568)	(2,380)	0	0
	IIIA c/	(400)	(225)	(608)	(332)	(207)	(210)	0	0
	IIIA d/	(21)	(11)	(32)	(5)	(14)	(17)	0	0
Signal	II, IV	10,354	8,654	2,309	2,627	0	0	0	0
Transportation	II, IV	1,646	1,135	29	5	0	0	44,000	44,000

a/ Excludes Classes III and IIIA stocks. Figures in short tons.
b/ Figures for Classes III and IIIA stocks in parentheses in thousands of gallons. Class III includes both Army and Air Force requirements; Class IIIA is for Army requirements only.
c/ Bulk.
d/ Packaged.

Source: Info compiled from data in USAREUR G4 Div.

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125. Cancellation of Section 14, Special Theater Reserve No. 1

During June 1954 the Department of the Army directed cancellation of Section 14 of the Special Theater Reserve No. 1, which had been based on wartime consumption rates and replacement factors, and which contained a 60-day maintenance and replacement reserve for the technical services of the Army and for Classes I and III of the Air Force. At the same time, the Department of the Army authorized the maintenance of a 60-day combat reserve at USAREUR level in its stead. This equipment was still to be considered part of the Department of the Army mobilization reserve stock. Under previous procedures, i.e., under Section 14, it had been necessary for USAREUR to submit lengthy bills of materials to the Department of the Army for approval and to revise them frequently in order to keep pace with the changing troop basis and to stock new items. The new procedure was flexible and had the inherent advantages of having eliminated preparation of lengthy bills of materials and associated administrative duties; of enabling the requisitioning of authorized levels and materials without prior approval of the Department of the Army; and of keeping the USAREUR combat reserve modernized and receiving equipment much more quickly. The new procedure was adopted so near the end of FY 1954, however, that it was impossible to ascertain by that time how these advantages would affect USAREUR in practice.[63]

126. Reduction of Special Reserve No. 3

In addition to the Special Theater Reserve No. 1, which was stocked in USAREUR proper, a second reserve known as Special Reserve No. 3 was stocked in the zone of interior for automatic shipment to USAREUR in the event of an emergency.[64] In April 1954 the Department of the Army was considering the desirability of reducing the line items in Special Reserve No. 3 to those absolutely vital to combat. The reasons for the desired changes were that current shipping capabilities would probably limit deployment overseas of personnel and cargo during the emergency phase of a general war, USAREUR might be unable to receive the shipments currently scheduled for Europe during the first thirty days of a general war, and formidable administrative problems were involved in a timely revision of Special Reserve No. 3 in accordance with

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[63](1) Memo, C/USAREUR G4 Div Sup Br, to USAREUR ACOFS G4, 22 May 54, sub: Combat Reserve Level in Lieu of Section 14. SECRET. In USAREUR G4 Div Cen Files, 400 Gen (1954). (2) DA ltr, 15 Jun 54, sub: Change 63 to Project ARMY-EUCOM-GEN-102-50-OP. AGAC-C (M) 400 (8 Jun 54). SECRET.

[64]EUCOM/USAREUR Comd Rept, 1952, pp. 235-36. SECRET.

changes in the USAREUR troop list. The Department of the Army envisaged the substitution of a "hard core" list containing no more than several hundred items that could be developed and used as a basis for materiel support of Europe until the resumption of normal supply procedures. No change, however, was contemplated in Special Reserve No. 1.[65] The proposed reduction met with immediate objection from the USAREUR technical services, all of which felt that the deletion of items from Special Reserve No. 3 would result in deletion of the same items from depots in the zone of interior, thereby causing the supply of the items in Special Reserve No. 1 to be exhausted long before resupply of those items from the United States could be effected. The only alternative to the Department of the Army proposal, according to the technical services, would be the stockage of such items in USAREUR proper, with a resultant increase in stockage targets for Special Theater Reserve No. 1.[66] No action, however, had been taken on this proposal at the Department of the Army level prior to 30 June 1954.

127. Seventh Army Prestocks in USAREUR Depots

USAREUR planning for Seventh Army in the event of an emergency provided for prestock points, to insure replenishment of Seventh Army basic and prescribed loads of Classes I, III, and V and to enable all Seventh Army units to cross the Rhine with one-half of their basic and prescribed loads. The establishment of additional prestock points west of the Rhine and prestocks for field fortifications for a barrier line were included in the plan. By October 1953 all construction for the planned prestock points was complete; their stockage percentages were as follows: Class I, 90 percent; Class III, 100 percent; Class V, 95 percent; and barrier line, 95 percent. This stockage was included in the USAREUR stockage for the Special Theater Reserve No. 1. USAREUR intended to increase the prestock point stockage to a full 100 percent for all categories immediately upon receipt of additional stocks.[67]

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[65] Cable DA-960454, DA from G4 to CINCUSAREUR, 23 Apr 54. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381.3 (1954), Vol. I, Item 18.

[66] (1) C/N 2, USAREUR Sig Div to USAREUR ACOFS G4, 10 May 54, to C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR Tech Svcs, 30 Apr 54, sub: Reduction of Line Items in Special Reserve No. 3. SECRET. (2) C/N 1, USAREUR QM, to USAREUR ACOFS G4, 17 May 54, sub: Special Reserve No. 3. SECRET. Both in USAREUR G4 Div Cen Files, 400 Gen (1954).

[67] USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf 11, 20 Oct 53, p. 3. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

128. Prescribed Loads for Classes I and III

In April 1953 Seventh Army requested USAREUR to revise its directives concerning the basic loads of Classes I and III prescribed for all (including labor service) units within USAREUR, but excluding units stationed in England. Comprehensive studies conducted by Seventh Army units for a year had indicated that revision of Vehicle Fuel and Lubrication Data Tables was needed because the new interim-type vehicles received from the zone of interior consumed more fuel than did the World War II-type vehicles that had been replaced. Seventh Army thereupon drew up a new Vehicle Fuel and Lubrication Data Table and submitted it to USAREUR for approval. In the interests of economy of transportation and in order to enable units equipped with tracked vehicles to transport prescribed loads on organic and attached transportation, the new table revised operational requirements for tracked vehicles downward and increased prestocks accordingly. The revised directive for prescribed loads of Classes I and III set forth a change in USAREUR policy, in that it established a firm Class III prescribed load requirement for all COMZ units, reduced the prescribed load requirement for tracked vehicles, and established an accounting procedure for certain components of the prescribed load.[68] The revised letter of instructions, published by USAREUR on 21 April 1953, expired on 21 April 1954, but was replaced on 4 May 1954 by a similar letter with a few minor changes. The prescribed loads of Class I supplies set for all units within USAREUR included a 3-day supply of Type C individual combat rations of the latest authorized date of pack and certain additional ration supplies for medical service units. The Class I rations were to be consumed only in the event of a declared emergency or when no other means of feeding was available, and only to prevent hardship to troops. The requisition basis for prescribed loads of Class I was the authorized T/O or T/D troop strength. The prescribed loads for Class III established firm loads for all COMZ units, all other units in USAREUR, and all units with attached aircraft. COMZ units were directed to stock Class III supplies so that there would be sufficient POL products to move all organic and attached vehicles 200 miles or to the unit emergency mission location, whichever distance was less; and a minimum of 3 days' supply of POL products in bulk or packaged form in unit motor pools or POL source, based on the estimated consumption under emergency conditions of 50 miles per day. All other units in USAREUR were directed to stock sufficient POL products to move all organic and attached wheeled vehicles 300 miles and all tracked vehicles 130 miles. The balance of POL products for tracked vehicles, to move approximately 170 miles, was to be

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[68] C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 7 Apr 53, sub: Prescribed Loads Class I and III. AG 430.2 GOT-AGO. In USAREUR SGS 400.3 (1953), Vol. I, Item 10. UNCLASSIFIED.

prestocked in strategically located storage points. Finally, all units to which Army aircraft were assigned were directed to maintain sufficient quantities of POL products for 25 hours of aircraft operation. The unit commanders in USAREUR were made responsible for storage, security, maintenance, and rotation of the prescribed loads of Classes I and III supplies provided for their respective units.[69]

129. Supplies on Hand in USAREUR Depots

In addition to the Special Theater Reserve No. 1, command stocks in USAREUR included the stockage objective, which was the maximum quantity of supply authorized for stockage to sustain current operations for the day-to-day support of assigned U.S. forces predicated on a 60-day level, and a series of other types of stockage consisting of long stocks, excess stocks, surplus stocks, scrap, unserviceable stocks, unclassified and unidentified stocks, MDAP stocks, development and operations projects, and a miscellaneous category. In October 1953 a new series of reports, indicating the total tonnages of command stocks on hand, was initiated by the USAREUR technical services. The initial report in October 1953 showed a total of nearly 1,200,000 short tons of command stocks on hand in USAREUR depots, 630,200 short tons of special reserve stocks, and nearly 74,000,000 gallons of bulk POL products.[70] During the remainder of the reporting period, the total tonnages of command stocks continued a downward trend. At the end of July 1954 command stocks totaled slightly more than 1,000,000 tons, a decrease of approximately 37,000 tons during the quarter. Approximately 47 percent of these stocks were in the U.S. Zone of Germany, 28 percent in WACOM, 13 percent in BASEC, USAREUR COMZ, and the remaining 12 percent in ADSEC, USAREUR COMZ. Stocks on hand for the USAREUR Stockage Objective totaled 280,900 short tons and comprised 28 percent of the total command stocks. They reflected a decrease of about 44,000 short tons from the stocks reported on 30 April 1954, the major portion of the decrease being in ordnance Class V supplies. However, the 280,900 short tons on hand in USAREUR depots exceeded the authorized 260,758 short tons. In addition, USAREUR had 719,670 short tons of other command stocks on hand, broken down into long stocks, 301,623 tons; excess stocks, 166,092 tons; surplus stocks, 37,688 tons; scrap, 26,967 tons; unserviceable stocks, 155,999 tons; unclassified and unidentified stocks, 2,612 tons; MDAP stocks, 23,621

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[69] USAREUR ltrs, 21 Apr 53, 4 May 54, sub: Prescribed Loads (Class I and III). AG 430.2 GOT-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[70] USAREUR Mthly Review of Log Actvs, 31 Oct 53, pp. 6, 16-18. SECRET.

tons; development and operations project stocks, 19,815 tons; miscellaneous stocks, 9,523 tons. USAREUR also had approximately 78,600,000 gallons of Classes III and IIIA stocks on hand, the lowest total reported during a year, distributed as follows: 58 percent in the U.S. Zone of Germany; 25 percent in BASEC; 1 percent in ADSEC; and 16 percent in base storage and in the United Kingdom.[71]

130. Disposition of Stockpile A

USAREUR Stockpile A consisted originally of 227,000 measurement tons of supplies and equipment earmarked for the use of U.S. forces in Austria but stored in technical service depots in Western Germany and along the French LOFC for political and security reasons. The bulk, approximately 200,000 tons and including 5,000 vehicles, was stored in the Fontenet Ordnance Depot in France.[72] During January 1953 an inspection of these vehicles revealed that deterioration in storage necessitated complete replacement of the bodies of 122 2½-ton trucks and 400 3/4-ton weapons carriers. The replacement was effected through the shipment of steel bodies from Germany at a cost of approximately $105,000.[73] In February 1953, for all practical purposes the shipment of items for Stockpile A from the United States to USAREUR had ceased. Item-wise, the project was 87 percent complete; items to make up the remaining 13 percent would trickle into the ordnance, signal, and engineer accounts, but monthly tonnages would be negligible and the over-all tonnages exceedingly small.[74] In July 1953 the Department of the Army directed USAREUR and USFA to remove the supplies and equipment in Stockpile A to the USFA Italian LOFC. USFA developed and obtained Department of the Army approval for a new list of requirements, which substantially reduced the tonnages that would have to be shipped from USAREUR to USFA. Items thus rendered surplus were reprogrammed by the Department of the Army to MDAP countries. By 11 May 1954 the shipment of Stockpile A items to USFA, Project GEORGE, was considered 95 percent complete. All engineer, quartermaster, medical, and chemical warfare supplies had been shipped. Still remaining to be shipped were 119 ordnance vehicles that required special

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[71] Ibid., 31 Jul 54, pp. 34-36. CONFIDENTIAL.

[72] USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf 6, 11 May 54, p. 3. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

[73] C/N 1, USAREUR Ord Off to USAREUR ACOFS G4, 22 Jan 53, sub: Maintenance of Stockpile A. SECRET. In USAREUR G4 Div Cen Files, 400 Gen (1953), Vol. I, Item 19 atchd.

[74] Memo, C/USAREUR G4 Div Sup Br, to USAREUR ACOFS G4, 11 Feb 53, sub: Receipt of Stockpile Items from the Zone of Interior. SECRET. In file above, Item 23.

routing, 110 carloads of ordnance parts, and 1 carload of signal parts that were being reprocessed by USAREUR. All of these items were expected to be shipped by the end of July.[75]

131. Establishment of Stockpile B

Early in 1952 the Department of the Army announced plans for the establishment of Stockpile B in USAREUR to provide MDAP supplies for the countries of the proposed European Defense Community (EDC). The major items in this stockpile were to be approximately 1,500 tanks, artillery, ammunition for tanks and artillery, and approximately 6,000 wheeled vehicles. The total tonnage estimated for storage was 1,800,000 measurement tons, valued at approximately $600,000,000. USAREUR did not have the capability for receiving, storing, and maintaining the large amounts of tonnages involved in Stockpile B. Consequently, all items generated within the United States for that purpose, were to be stored in depots adjacent to the eastern seaboard for direct shipment to the recipient country. The Department of the Army also required USAREUR to store items declared excess in USAREUR and earmarked for Stockpile B.[76] By February 1953 all items then held unmarked within USAREUR stock levels could be boxed and identified as Stockpile B materials. In addition, all such supplies were to be prepared for a long period of storage.[77] In May 1953 the Department of the Army again expressed a desire to ship all items destined for Stockpile B to USAREUR for storage in Europe. US EUCOM objected to this plan on the grounds that the status of the EDC Treaty was indefinite, and that the anticipated build-up of the West German EDC Army contingents did not appear to necessitate physical location of the equipment within the US EUCOM area. US EUCOM recommended that all stocks intended for Stockpile B be retained in the United States until such time as the ratification of the EDC treaty was imminent and the machinery for the receipt, storage, and turn-over of equipment to the recipient forces had been set up and was prepared to function effectively.[78] USAREUR also objected to the

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[75]USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf 6, 11 May 54, p. 3. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

[76](1) USAREUR G4 Stf Study, 2 Jun 53, sub: Stockpile B. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381.3 (1953), Vol. II, Item 22. (2) Stf Study, USAREUR G4 Sup Br Distr Sec (MDAP), 26 Jun 53, same sub. SECRET. In USAREUR G4 Div Cen Files, 400 Gen (1953), Vol. III, Item 42.

[77]C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR Chiefs Tech Svcs, 24 Feb 53, sub: Stockpile B. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Div Cen Files, 400 Gen (1953), Vol. I, Item 45.

[78]Cable 151712Z, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 15 May 53. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381.3 (1953), Vol. II, Item 18.

proposal on the grounds that problems of personnel and facilities for the rehabilitation, storage, and maintenance of excesses being generated in USAREUR, as well as problems arising from the rentention of certain Stockpile A assets, were already serious. The assignment to USAREUR of additional responsibilities for Stockpile B would require additional personnel, MDAP funds for instorage maintenance, and MDAP funds for the construction of depot maintenance facilities.[79] Nevertheless, in February 1954 the Department of the Army charged USAREUR with the responsibility of storing and maintaining all offshore procurement materiel and ammunition destined for Stockpile B. USAREUR, again protesting against the requirement for storage of Stockpile B material, maintained that no storage facilities adequate for this requirement existed in USAREUR except east of the Rhine. USAREUR added that it had consistently pointed out the danger and vulnerability of such storage prior to the ratification of the EDC Treaty and the creation of the German EDC contingent. US EUCOM recommended reallocation of the ammunition in question to other recipients as long as possible and suggested that the Department of the Army inform USAREUR of the date by which such reallocation would absorb the ammunition originally destined for Stockpile B. The Department of the Army approved the US EUCOM recommendation and directed the command to examine carefully the ammunition requirements of all NATO nations, including FY 1955 forces, with a view to recommending additions to the maximum authorized quantity for each and absorbing the types of ammunition scheduled for offshore procurement for Stockpile B. All such increases would be accomplished by the Department of the Army out of funds then available for current offshore procurement programs. For types of items for which NATO recipients could not be designated, the Department of the Army would consider world-wide reallocations on a case by case basis as the ammunition became available. USAREUR would still have to accept the responsibility for storing the remainder of the ammunition after the application of this procedure. Storage of the existing residual quantity in depots east of the Rhine was authorized, if required.[80] As of 30 June 1954, no materiel from the offshore procurement programs had been stored in USAREUR depots. As of the same date, storage of items for Stockpile B consisted of items generated as excess in USAREUR proper. The following tabulation shows the status of USAREUR Stockpile B on 30 June 1954:[81]

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[79] USAREUR G4 Stf Study, 2 Jun 53, sub: Stockpile B. SECRET. In file above, Item 22.

[80] C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 26 Apr 54, sub: Storage of Ammunition Program for FED-REP-GER. SECRET. In USAREUR G4 Div Cen Files, 400 Gen (1954).

[81] C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 16 Jul 54, sub cited above. SECRET. In file cited above.

Technical Service and Item	Units	Tons
Total		16,787
Ordnance - Total		16,666
Vehicles (Wheeled)	179	1,014
Machine Guns	5,283	135
Launchers, Rocket, M7	100	1
Howitzers, 105-mm.	272	816
Tanks, M47 (Dual Purpose as a part of Special Reserve No. 1)	289	14,450
Spare Parts		250
Signal - Total		121
Radio Sets	935	
Reel Units	215	
Switchboards	99	
Telephone Terminal Sets	24	

132. Combat Equipment in Short Supply

On 1 January 1953 critical items of equipment in short supply in USAREUR included engineer, ordnance, quartermaster, and signal materiel. No critical items for chemical, medical or transportation stocks were so reported. Items in short supply for engineer were sniperscopes and 20-ton truck mounted motor cranes; ordnance, tank mounting bulldozers; quartermaster, gas heaters and gas water heaters; and signal, operation centers, radar sets AN/MPQ-10, radar sets AN/TPS-1D, sound ranging sets GR-8, test equipment TE-9, and test sets AN/MPM-2.[82] By 30 June 1954 the list of items in short supply that were considered critical to the accomplishment of the Seventh Army mission had so decreased that only 4 signal items and 1 ordnance item were so reported. The status of critical combat equipment in short supply as of 30 June 1954 is shown in the following tabulation:[83]

[82] USAREUR Mthly Review of Log Actvs, p. 18. SECRET.

[83] Ibid., 30 Jun 54, p. 44. CONFIDENTIAL.

Technical Service	Item	Number Authorized	Number On Hand	Remarks
Ordnance	Bulldozer, tank mounting, M3E1	114	0	ETA - Sep 54
Signal	Sound ranging set, GR-8	6	3	ETA - Sep 54
Signal	Radio sets, AN/ARC-27	76	0	Due-in date contingent on receipt of maintenance parts for which ETA is Sep 54
Signal	Facsimile Equipment, AN/TXC-1	37	14	ETA of dues in Jul 54
Signal	Mobile, Photo lab, AN/TFQ-7	10	1	ETA - Aug 54

133. Divergence from Army Stock Level Regulations

While the basic purpose of established stock levels was well known to all commanders within the Army, it was becoming increasingly evident that overstockages existed on a wide scale and seemed to be accepted as the rule rather than the exception. This state of affairs, according to the Department of the Army, indicated a serious lack of command attention to good supply economy and to sound and efficient logistical operations. Defining the basic purpose of stock levels as the assurance of an adequate supply to supported operations, while recognizing the exceptions as to properly established reserves and stockpiles, the Department directed that immediate and continued command attention be given to the review and reestablishment of a sound stock level for each item of authorized supply, the reduction of all overstockages through the most practicable and economical means (attrition, redistribution, return, etc.), and the elimination of the requisitioning or procurement of supplies for delivery in advance or in excess of needs. In addition, major commanders were to pursue this program vigorously by every available means, and all inspection personnel were to include inquiry into all phases of supply economy in each inspection

during FY 1954. USAREUR instructed all USAREUR commanders to comply to the utmost with the Department's directive.[84]

134. Remedial Action on Stock Levels

Even before receipt of the Department of the Army letter, USAREUR had been aware of the unrealistic stock levels being maintained. Almost without exception, inspector general reports, as well as depot liaison visits to station accounts, indicated that quantitative levels of supply established by station commanders were far in excess of the actual supply authorized by EUCOM Circular 98. A cursory check by representatives of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, indicated that immediate aggressive action was required to reestablish realistic levels.[85] Maj. Gen. E. T. Williams, USAREUR chief of staff, on a visit to the Munich Quartermaster Depot discovered that the stockage of 115,000 tons of supplies for the stockage objective far exceeded USAREUR needs. He thereupon ordered a thorough examination of the USAREUR prescribed levels of supply with a view to reducing them.[86] CINCUSAREUR directed all subordinate commanders to take immediate and aggressive action to reestablish realistic quantitative levels of supply. Furthermore, the heads of all USAREUR technical services were to place renewed emphasis on the review of quantitative levels in order to insure strict adherence to the principles of supply control in the future.[87]

135. Sale of Surplus Property in Foreign Countries

The USAREUR property disposal program was delayed in numerous instances by administrative procedures and limitations imposed by Army Regulations and related directives. CINCUSAREUR, therefore, sought relief from certain procedural requirements in order that a

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[84](1) DA ltr, 1 Jul 53, sub: Violation of Stock Level Regulations. AGAC-C (M) 400.211 (26 Jun 53) G4. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4, to USAREUR Tech Svcs, 27 Jul 53, same sub. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Div Cen Files, 400 Gen (1953), Vol. III, Item 1 atchd.

[85]Memo for rcd, Mr. L. G. Becker, USAREUR G4 Sup Br Distr Sec, 15 Jan 53, sub: Levels of Supply. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Div Cen Files, 400 Gen (1953), Vol. I, Item 17.

[86]Memo, C/USAREUR QM Div Sup Br to USAREUR ACOFS G4, 2 Jan 53, sub: Quartermaster Stocks, SECRET. In file above, Item 2A.

[87]USAREUR ltr, 21 Jan 53, sub: Levels of Supply. AG 400-GLD-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

more expeditious property disposal program could be accomplished in USAREUR.[88] Department of the Army approval, for example, was required before offering property for sale at any one time and place when the acquisition cost was $250,000 or more. CINCUSAREUR requested amendment of this provision to permit immediate sale without such approval, regardless of acquisition cost, provided HICOG did not object to the sale. Second, the Department was requested to reduce the 90-day screening requirement to 60 days when the property had to be determined as technical services excess by the chief of the technical service concerned, and to 45 days when the property was reported direct to the Surplus Material Board for screening. A third request was for permission to transfer obsolete and nonstandard items (including those assigned local stock numbers and unidentifiable in current stock catalogs) direct to property disposal channels, without screening in the United States, regardless of serviceability. Fourth, CINCUSAREUR desired authorization for all USAREUR technical services to submit machine records excess listings direct to the chief of the appropriate Department of the Army technical service, who would then issue pertinent shipping instructions and forward the corrected listing to the Surplus Material Board without further reference to USAREUR. Finally, CINCUSAREUR wanted the exemption from reporting small lots increased from $500 to $1,000.[89] In May 2 of the USAREUR recommendations were rejected but the other 3 were accepted with certain reservations. The Department of the Army could not permit the sale of property without prior approval because conformity to the foreign policy of the United States for such sales was required by law (Section 401 (a), PL 152, 81st Congress). Moreover, the 90-day screening period could not be reduced because the time was necessary to effect the maximum use of such property within the Department of Defense. However, USAREUR was granted authority to transfer obsolete and nonstandard items directly to property disposal channels without prior screening in the United States, provided that such items had been determined as excess to the command and that the nonstandard items could not be substituted for standard items. Also accepted was CINCUSAREUR's recommendation for the

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[88] C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4, to USAREUR COFS, 6 Apr 54, sub: Disposal of USAREUR Excess Stocks. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 400.3 (1954), Vol. I, Item 10A atchd.

[89] (1) Cable SC-17340, CINCUSAREUR to DA for G4, 8 Apr 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above. (2) AR 755-10, 25 Jan 52, and C 1, thereto. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) Cable, DA-359169, 13 Sep 52. UNCLASSIFIED.

submission of machine records excess listings, but only for technical services spare parts. A suitable format for forwarding such records would be worked out later. Finally, USAREUR received authority to increase to $1,000 the exemption from reporting small lots; such authority, however, was not applicable to certain specified items.[90]

136. Policy for Sale of Scrap and Salvage Property

Closely connected with the problem of the sale of surplus and excess property in foreign countries was the problem of the disposal of scrap and salvage property in USAREUR. Since property of this kind was not reported for screening by the technical services before disposal, it was not possible for USAREUR to submit a request for its sale simultaneously with the excess property screening report. CINCUSAREUR considered a simultaneous report impossible in any instance, since regulations required the incorporation of comments of the interested diplomatic mission. Therefore, CINCUSAREUR recommended that authority for sale, subject to the concurrence of the interested diplomatic mission, be given to the command at the same time that the property in question was determined to be foreign excess property.[91] The Department of the Army approved the recommendation, effective until 31 October 1954 unless sooner rescinded, provided that formal clearance for the sale of scrap and salvage property with an acquittal cost of $250,000 or more was to be obtained by USAREUR through the diplomatic mission of the country in which the property was located. The policy was established on a trial basis and USAREUR was requested to submit comparisons of this policy with the former policy before 1 October 1954.[92]

137. Disposal of World War II Spare Parts

A major problem concerning the disposal of surplus and excess property within USAREUR was that of spare parts for World War II-type vehicles. Although the greater percentage of such vehicles had been replaced by 1954, no substantial allocations to permit disposition of the related spare parts had been received from the Department of the Army. In April 1954, USAREUR recommended that it be granted authority to ship the parts in question to MDAP countries on a percentage basis governed by the number of

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[90]Cable DA-511755, DA from G4/D4 to CINCUSAREUR, 3 May 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[91]Cable SC-18128, USAREUR to DA for G4, 19 Apr 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[92]Cable DA-510848, DA from G4/D4 to CINCUSAREUR, 29 Apr 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

World War II vehicles on hand and programmed for each country. This procedure had been employed by USAREUR in the disposition of M26 tank spare parts and had proved a very effective and rapid means of disposal. In effect USAREUR sought a method of distribution that would place World War II spare parts in the hands of MDAP countries that needed them, and thereby relieve USAREUR of the costly responsibility of maintaining and storing these parts.[93] USAREUR made further recommendations for expediting the spare parts disposal program, for alleviating the problems that had arisen concerning facilities, storage, security, personnel, funds, etc., and for providing MDAP recipients with a stock of needed spare parts without delay. The Department of the Army, however, disapproved the recommendations because the problem and program were worldwide and even though the proposals might save USAREUR a little time, the over-all program would suffer from a piecemeal approach.[94]

138. Sale of Ferrous Scrap

Sales of ferrous scrap by USAREUR were based on negotiated sales previously approved by the Department of the Army. Thus, USAREUR was able to negotiate the sale of accumulations of ferrous scrap from 1 January through 30 June 1953, estimated at approximately 150,000 tons, to the British Iron and Steel Corporation, provided that the purchaser guaranteed that the scrap would be shipped to and used in steel production in the United Kingdom and that the sale would be made for dollars only. Dollar sales were specified because the British official policy permitting the free conversion of pounds sterling into dollars in cases of this nature might be terminated without notice, which would leave the United States with an excess of sterling. Further, if a price agreement could not be reached with the British Iron and Steel Corporation, USAREUR was to sell the scrap by competitive bidding for dollars and/or Deutsche Marks, under authority previously granted for the acceptance of Deutsche Marks.[95] In addition, future sales of ferrous scrap by USAREUR to Germany, to other foreign nations, or to foreign firms would be in accordance with existing German

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[93] Cable SC-17340, CINCUSAREUR to DA for G4, 8 Apr 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[94] (1) Cable SX-2785, USAREUR to DA for G4, 20 May 54. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Cable DA-962048, DA from G4 to CINCUSAREUR, 25 May 54. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in file cited above.

[95] See AR 755-10, 25 Jan 52, par. 28. UNCLASSIFIED.

exchange control and import licensing regulations and would be made under appropriate safeguards to insure that the materials would not come into the possession of any agency whose interests might be inimical to the United States. The property would be either used in Germany or reported for use only at a destination acceptable to the United States.[96] Under these terms, a contract was concluded with Van Heyghen Freres of Ghent, Belgium, for the disposal of USAREUR ferrous scrap through 31 December 1953. As of 30 June 1954, no contract had been signed for the disposal of ferrous scrap generated in USAREUR during the period 1 January-30 June 1954.[97]

139. Depot Maintenance Operations

During FY 1953 more than $363,400,000 worth of unserviceable but reparable Army property was repaired in the depot maintenance facilities of the USAREUR technical services. Ordnance shops accounted for approximately $295,000,000 worth, or about 81 percent of the total. During the period 1 January-30 June 1953, $132,500,000 worth of property was repaired. At the end of FY 1953, the value of unserviceable but reparable stocks on hand in USAREUR depots was $136,500,000. About $58,000,000 worth, or 42 percent of the total, was scheduled for repair during FY 1954, while the remainder (over $78,000,000 worth) was classified as inactive, that is, not scheduled for repair within the current fiscal year.[98] During FY 1954 unserviceable but reparable Army property valued at $197,200,000 was repaired in USAREUR technical service depots; this was approximately 54 percent of the amount repaired during the previous fiscal year. The value of such materiel in depots at the close of FY 1954 was $110,700,000, the lowest amount reported during the entire fiscal year. Almost $89,000,000 worth, or 81 percent of the total, was in ordnance depots, and another $11,000,000 worth, or approximately 10 percent of the total, was in signal stocks.[99] Most of the stocks were repaired in depot maintenance facilities in the U.S. Zone of Germany or in WACOM. During September 1953 the continued use of depot maintenance facilities east of the Rhine was authorized by USAREUR, pending the development of new and adequate Army and commercial facilities west of the Rhine and in France. In addition, USAREUR authorized the continued use of facilities east of

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[96] Cable DA-934955, COFSA from ACOFS G4, to CINCUSAREUR, 27 Mar 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 9 atchd.

[97] USAREUR Mthly Reviews of Log Actvs, 30 Sep 53, p. 14; 30 June 54, p. 44. UNCLASSIFIED.

[98] Ibid., 30 June 53, pp. 6, 27. SECRET.

[99] Ibid., 30 June 54, pp. 26-27. CONFIDENTIAL.

the Rhine whenever necessary to keep fully combat-serviceable equipment always in the hands of troops, with the least drain on the USAREUR budget and national resources; to keep noncombat-type equipment serviceable; to repair, rebuild, and reclaim unserviceable stocks; and to recover as much equipment as possible for use in other national programs, such as the Mutual Defense Assistance Program.[100]

140. Port Operations

a. Port Planning. Plans for USAREUR port operations during FY 1954 provided for the receipt of both cargo and passengers through a three-fold series of port operations--the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation, French ports, and USAREUR offshore discharge exercises (ODEX). Bremerhaven would handle the Class I stockage objective for troops in Germany until COMZ became fully operational, Class III stockage for troops in Germany, plus a small portion of Class III reserve stocks, items of Class V training ammunition not included in the special reserve stocks, and Classes II and IV nonrisk items. The estimated tonnages to be discharged at Bremerhaven included approximately 70,000 long tons of dry cargo and 50,000 long tons of bulk POL per month. The French ports would handle all Class I special reserve shipments and the Class I and Class III stockage objective for troops in France, plus a major portion of the Class III reserve stocks destined for storage in France, Class V training items to replace rotated items used for training in USAREUR, and Classes II and IV military items. The estimated tonnages to be discharged at French ports were approximately 40,000 long tons of dry cargo and 10,000 long tons of bulk POL per month. Dry cargo tonnages included approximately 20,000 long tons of coal, which would be received during the second quarter of FY 1954. To provide training in moving support cargo over the beaches and in widely dispersed areas, USAREUR COMZ had begun training in the conduct of offshore supply discharge exercises in June 1952. To insure commensurate training value, each shipment was intended to present new problems in cargo handling. USAREUR plans called for the discharge of one vessel with approximately 4,000 long tons of general cargo every two months at selected bases in France.[101]

b. Additional French Ports. The COMZ port complex initially consisted of the ports of Bordeaux and La Pallice. Early in 1952 negotiations were conducted with the French for the inclusion of the ports of Nantes and St. Nazaire in the LOFC. A satisfactory verbal agreement was reached in April 1953 for the use of

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[100] Ibid., 30 Sep 53, p. 6. CONFIDENTIAL.

[101] USAREUR Log Plng Forecast, 1 Jul 53, pp. 9-10. SECRET.

St. Nazaire, the facilities to include two berths, transit sheds, and ample outdoor storage space. The new port was opened officially on 1 May 1953, although the first U.S. ship to unload at that port since World War II had begun unloading operations on 10 April 1953.[102]

c. Tonnages and Passengers Handled. During 1 January-30 June 1953, USAREUR ports processed 202,127 passengers, 199,103 passing through the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation and the remaining 3,024 through the BASEC ports of USAREUR COMZ. The movement of personnel through the 7703 Transportation Major Port in France was extremely irregular; practically all of the 3,000-odd persons were handled during two months, January and April. From 1 January to 30 June 1953 a total of 826,900 long tons of cargo was handled by the same USAREUR ports. While it had been predicted that the use of Bremerhaven would decrease and that of the ports in USAREUR COMZ would increase, 697,300 long tons of cargo was handled by BPOE during the last six months of FY 1953 while only about 129,600 long tons were handled by the COMZ port complex.[103] During FY 1954 approximately 380,000 passengers were processed through BPOE and the 11th Transportation Port Command B in France. Of this number only 301 passed through French ports, and almost all of these were handled during October 1953. More than 326,000 military personnel or 86 percent of the total number of persons handled were processed for embarkation and debarkation at BPOE. At the same time nearly 50,000 dependents were processed at BPOE. Slightly more than 53 percent of the persons processed were returning to the United States. Military personnel who left the command through BPOE numbered 20,000 more than those processed for entrance through that port. During FY 1954 approximately 1,400,000 long tons of cargo were processed through the same ports, about 348,000 fewer tons than during FY 1953. Approximately 79 percent of the total, or a little more than one million tons, was handled at BPOE. Approximately 50 percent of the activity at BPOE was in the handling of general cargo, about 35 percent was in bulk POL activities, about 10 percent consisted of the off-loading of cargo, and the remaining 5 percent was in the handling of reefer or cold-storage tonnage. The 11th Transportation Port Command B handled approximately 290,000 long tons of cargo, approximately 95 percent being in cargo discharge operations.[104]

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[102] (1) Cable SX-4018, USAREUR to COFSA for ACOFS G3, 24 Apr 53. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 COMZ (1953), Vol. I, Item 2 atchd. (2) Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), April 23, 1953, p. 8.

[103] USAREUR Mthly Review of Log Actvs, 30 Jun 53, pp. 40-41. SECRET.

[104] Ibid., 30 Jun 54, pp. 61-62. CONFIDENTIAL.

141. Movement of USAREUR Supply Control Agencies to France

A major logistical change in USAREUR during 1953-54 was the movement of USAREUR technical service supply control agencies to France. This move had been planned for 1952, but had been deferred by USAREUR because of a Department of the Army reduction of $20,000,000 in allocations for COMZ construction. In October 1952 Gen. M. B. Ridgway, US CINCEUR and SACEUR, directed that this project be reviewed and restored to the approved list of projects for implementation by USAREUR at the earliest possible date.[105] Accordingly, CINCUSAREUR directed the Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ, to prepare to receive the technical services supply control units prescribed by previously approved plans, which, among other things, provided for the erection of prefabricated barracks for 500 enlisted women (WAC). COMZ was directed also to expedite action to establish the USAREUR Supply Control Center at Maison Forte, as a Class I activity under the jurisdiction of the Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ. However, the technical services supply control units that would man this center were to remain as Class II activities under the control of their respective chiefs of technical services, Headquarters, USAREUR. Since the supply control units were not self-supporting in messing, vehicle maintenance, and other post-type activities, the Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ, was directed to provide such facilities in planning for the establishment of the center.[106] Because of the construction freeze applied by the Department of Defense in February 1953, USAREUR COMZ was unable to complete construction in time to meet the planned, phased movement schedule. It was, therefore, decided that the supply control units of the Quartermaster, Medical, Chemical, and Transportation Divisions would move to France on 31 October 1953, and those of the Engineer, Signal, and Ordnance Divisions on 31 January 1954.[107] Adequate signal facilities, however, would be available at Maison Forte after 31 March 1954 to handle all USAREUR supply control operations. Furthermore, as a result of the construction program at Maison Forte, supply control units could occupy facilities there commencing on 31 January 1954. The USAREUR signal and ordnance officers and the engineer were

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[105] USAREUR Hist Div, The Line of Communications through France, 1952-1953, pp. 292-93. SECRET.

[106] 2d Ind, USAREUR to CG USAREUR COMZ, 16 Feb 53, sub: Movement of Technical Service Stock Control Units to France. SECRET. In USAREUR G4 Div Cen Files, 322 Gen (1953), Vol. I, Item 20 atchd.

[107] (1) Ltr, USAREUR to CG USAREUR COMZ, 30 Apr 53, sub cited above. SECRET. (2) 2d Ind, same to same, 16 Jun 53, same sub. SECRET. Both in file above, Vol. II, Item 51 atchd.

directed to transfer their respective supply control agencies to Maison Forte during 31 January-30 April 1954. Detailed plans for phasing the transfer were to be coordinated with the Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ, with advance detachments as necessary, and housekeeping arrangements were to be effected so that the moves could be made with a minimum of interference with normal supply control operations. The closing date, 30 April 1954, was established to permit each technical service chief to effect the move in echelons, if desirable, and when normal supply control operations were at a minimum level.[108]

142. POL Consumption

From 1 January to 30 June 1953, USAREUR units and using agencies including USAFE, consumed 53,400,000 gallons of gasoline. Of this amount 47.5 percent, or 25,400,000 gallons, was used by the Seventh Army; 6,170,000 gallons were used by COMZ units. During FY 1954 106,600,000 gallons of gasoline were consumed by USAREUR units and using agencies, including USAFE. The periods of greatest expenditure were the maneuver months, September and October, during which 11,500,000 and 10,800,000 gallons, respectively, were used. Again the greatest single user was Seventh Army, which consumed 56,900,000 gallons, or approximately 53.4 percent of the total. COMZ consumed about 12,537,000 gallons, which averaged a little more than 3,100,000 gallons per quarter as compared to a little more than 1,000,000 gallons for the highest quarter during 1952. Civilian gasoline consumption in the command for 1 January 1953-30 June 1954 averaged between 47 and 75 gallons per car per month, varying with the time of the year. The number of civilian vehicles registered in USAREUR varied between 45,000 and 55,600. The higher number of registrations occurred during April 1954, and during the same month the average consumption of gasoline was 60 gallons per car. The lowest monthly average of consumption occurred during February 1954, when with a total of 55,500 cars registered, average consumption was 42 gallons per car.[109]

143. Commissary Operations

Commissary operations in USAREUR continued to increase steadily throughout the period 1 January 1953-30 June 1954. The arrival of thousands of new dependents resulted in a corresponding increase in the number of commissary accounts. USAREUR

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[108] C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR Sig Off, Ord Off, and Engr, 8 Jan 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Div Cen Files, 322 (1954), Vol. I, Item 3.

[109] USAREUR Mthly Review of Log Actvs, 31 Jan 53-30 Jun 54. SECRET. Items UNCLASSIFIED.

began 1953 with a total of 79 commissaries, including 59 USAREUR-operated commissaries within Germany, 11 Air Force commissaries supported by USAREUR, and 9 commissaries operated in France by USAREUR COMZ. During 1 January 1953-30 June 1954, 12 new commissaries were opened and 6 closed, making a total of 85 operating in USAREUR at the end of the reporting period. Fifty-seven commissaries were operated by USAREUR in Germany, 14 by USAREUR COMZ in France, and 14 by the Air Force--9 in Germany and 5 in France. The number of accounts increased by approximately 18,000, from 36,198 to 54,404. Strangely enough, the increase in the number of accounts and commissaries did not greatly effect the volume of monthly sales and issue. While the monthly volume for January 1953, with 79 commissaries and 36,198 accounts, was $12,069,000, the monthly volume for May 1954, with 85 commissaries and 54,404 accounts, was $12,422,000.[110]

Section IV: Transfer of Support Responsibilities to the Seventh Army

144. USAREUR Planning for Transfer of Support Responsibilities

USAREUR logistical planning for 1953-54 provided for Seventh Army to continue toward the objective of becoming self-sufficient through the establishment of a number of supply and maintenance activities for the support of its own units. A target date of 1 July 1954 was set for this self-sufficiency, except in the case of hospitals and certain other static installations. The plan for supply and maintenance activities for the Seventh Army was that chemical supplies were to be issued from the Seventh Army Chemical Depot at Kirchheimbolanden through two forward supply points at Muenster and Stuttgart-Vaihingen, with field maintenance performed at the depot by maintenance units assigned to Seventh Army. Engineer supplies were to be issued by a Seventh Army depot company from the Seventh Army issue section of the Rhine Engineer Depot at Kaiserslautern to four supply points located at Hanau, Schwetzingen, Stuttgart, and Munich, with field maintenance performed by maintenance companies and detachments assigned to Seventh Army at Hanau, Schwetzingen, and Stuttgart. Ordnance (Classes II and IV) supplies were to be issued from a Seventh Army depot at Boeblingen to three depot companies at Ober Ursel, Illesheim, and Esslingen, while Class V supplies were to be issued from the Rhine Ammunition Depot and the supply point

[110] Ibid.

at Muenster. Quartermaster (Classes I and III) supplies were to be issued from the existing area command facilities, and Seventh Army depot companies were to receive on-the-job training at Nahbollenbach Quartermaster Depot. Signal supplies were to be issued from Seventh Army supply points at Boeblingen and Hanau, with field maintenance performed by the same installations, using maintenance units assigned to Seventh Army. Seventh Army medical depot units were to be continued in on-the-job training at the Rhine Medical Depot, for issue to Seventh Army units, and field maintenance was to be provided by USAREUR depot facilities pending assumption of this function by Seventh Army. Transportation supply support, except for Army aircraft support organic to Seventh Army at Illesheim and Echterdingen, was to be afforded through Seventh Army engineer supply points, backed up by the theater transportation depots.[111]

145. Status of Technical Services Supply Support of Seventh Army

By mid-January 1954 the Seventh Army was considered self-sufficient for chemical, engineer, ordnance, and signal troop supply support. Moreover, Seventh Army was rendering chemical troop supply support to all non-Seventh Army units in Germany. Beginning 1 February, engineer troop supply support to non-Seventh Army units was rendered. The development of facilities and the provision of on-the-job training for Seventh Army issue units was being continued by the other technical services, except the Medical Corps, which was contemplating no change in military area and district medical supply channels. The development of organic supply and service support within Seventh Army to a point of self-sufficiency had a USAREUR G4 priority, second only to the development of COMZ's ability to bring the materiel forward.[112] Seventh Army self-sufficiency in logistical support as of 30 June 1954 was practically the same as at the beginning of the year.[113]

146. Transfer of USAREUR Functions to Seventh Army

The proposed budget restrictions in early 1953 required the imposition of additional personnel cuts in all USAREUR units, except Seventh Army. To make these personnel savings possible,

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[111] USAREUR Log Plng Forecast, 1 Jul 53, pp. 3, 16. SECRET.

[112] C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 15 Jan 54, sub: Status of Technical Services Supply Support in Seventh Army. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR G4 Div Cen Files (1954), Vol. I, Item 3.

[113] Interv, Mr. J. R. Moenk, USAREUR Hist Div, with Col W. R. Lawson, Exec Seventh Army G4, 21 Jul 54. CONFIDENTIAL.

CINCUSAREUR planned to transfer to the Commanding General, Seventh Army, a number of logistical responsibilities previously assigned to area commanders. Only such functions would be transferred as could be assumed by Seventh Army without reducing its combat efficiency or mobility. USAREUR planning considered the transfer of all chaplain functions, all military police functions, and all intelligence collection and missions, including those of the 66th Counterintelligence Corps. In addition, quartermaster support was to be performed by Seventh Army for its own units insofar as practicable. Cross-servicing between USAREUR area and Seventh Army unit commanders was encouraged in order to enable maximum savings in area command personnel without unduly affecting Seventh Army tactical capabilities. The functions of barracks coordinators were to be expanded, if resulting economies in caserne management could be effected. The S5 sections in all area commands were to be eliminated and the functions thereof assumed by Seventh Army units.[114] However, in August 1953 it was ascertained that the proposed budget cuts and personnel reductions would not be as large as anticipated. Certain curtailed functions were subsequently restored in the area commands, and plans for the transfer of functions to the Seventh Army were held in abeyance.[115] In the meantime, both the Engineer and Chemical Divisions had been directed to develop plans for transferring to Seventh Army, as soon as practicable, all support functions peculiar to those divisions. The approved Chemical Support Plan was divided into two phases, the first to begin on 1 July 1953 and the second on 1 January 1954. During the first phase, the Seventh Army Chemical Depot was to be enlarged, to serve as the distribution depot for chemical materiel for all requisitioning agencies in Germany. Troop items of supply were to be issued to both Seventh Army and non-Seventh Army using units in Germany, through supply points at Darmstadt and Boeblingen and the issue section of the chemical depot at Baumholder. All industrial and commercial chemicals would continue to be supplied to industrial activities by the area commands. During the second phase the distribution of industrial and commercial chemicals was to be integrated into the Seventh Army supply system; and the area command chemical support facilities were to be phased out. This plan was approved by the USAREUR chief of staff on 13 July 1953 and was put into effect immediately.[116] A new USAREUR Engineer Troop Supply Distribution

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[114]USAREUR ltr, 20 Jan 53, sub: Additional Personnel Savings. AG 320.2 SGS-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[115]Cable SX-1980, USAREUR to all Area Comds, 7 Aug 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1953), Item 8 (B/P).

[116](1) C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 8 Jul 53, sub: Additional Personnel Savings (Engineer and Chemical Supply Distribution Plans). SECRET. (2) C/N 2, USAREUR SGS to USAREUR ACOFS G4, 13 Jul 53, to C/N 1, cited above. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 320.2 (1953-54), Item 6A (B/P 2), Tab E.

Plan approved a few weeks later provided for the phasing-out of area command engineer troop supply facilities in conjunction with the assumption by Seventh Army supply points at Hanau, Schwetzingen, Stuttgart, and Munich, of the supply mission for all Seventh Army and non-Seventh Army units east of the Rhine. The Seventh Army issue point at the Rhine Engineer Depot was to expand its functions to provide support for all Seventh Army and non-Seventh Army units in WACOM. The supply point at the Rhine Engineer Depot, however, continued to receive its support from that depot. It was estimated that thirty-three personnel spaces could be saved for USAREUR through implementation of this plan.[117]

147. The Heilbronn Experiment

Seventh Army, in connection with its assumption of certain USAREUR functions, suggested the possibility of the consolidation of some area command detachment headquarters with the headquarters of tactical units stationed in the area. A meeting was held on 20 March 1953 in Heilbronn to determine whether such a plan could be implemented there as a trial project prior to attempting similar procedures elsewhere in the U.S. Zone of Germany.[118] Representatives of Seventh Army, SACOM, and the USAREUR G3 and G4 Divisions agreed at the meeting that Seventh Army should assume control of the Heilbronn Detachment on a trial basis. The plan for the experiment was prepared by the Commanding Officer, 112th Infantry Regiment, who was to assume command of the Heilbronn Detachment.[119] The proposal was approved by Headquarters, USAREUR, on 4 May 1953, as a means of determining the extent of personnel savings that could be effected. CINCUSAREUR directed that the commander conducting the experiment assume all functions except those retained by SACOM in agreement with Seventh Army. Upon completion of the experiment, appropriate comments, reports, and recommendations reflecting the results achieved were to be submitted to Headquarters, USAREUR.[120] Seventh Army and SACOM

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[117](1) C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 20 Jul 53, sub: Additional Personnel Savings (Engineer Troop Supply Distribution Plan). SECRET. (2) C/N 2, 21 Jul 53, to C/N 1, cited above. Both in file cited above.

[118]C/N 1, USAREUR DCOFS for Admin to USAREUR ACOFS G3, 2 Mar 53, sub: Consolidation within Area Commands. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 320.2 (1953-54), Item 6A (B/P) 2, Tab C. Unless otherwise indicated, footnote material in this paragraph is in the same file.

[119]C/N 2, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to USAREUR DCOFS Admin, 24 Mar 53, to C/N 1, cited above. AG 322 GOT.

[120]USAREUR ltr, to CG Seventh Army, 4 May 53, sub: Additional Personnel Savings. AG 322 GOT. UNCLASSIFIED.

ivided responsibilities for the Heilbronn area as follows: the Commanding Officer, 112th Infantry Regiment, would be appointed the Commanding Officer, Heilbronn Detachment, 7822 Station Complement; the functions of post transportation, staff and command, and post signal would be performed by lodger units; and personnel remaining in the Heilbronn Detachment would continue to perform post quartermaster and engineer, provost marshal, civilian personnel, and medical dispensary functions. In addition to using tactical personnel in support missions, tactical units in the Heilbronn area would contribute personnel to augment the station complement for commissaries, dispensaries, clubs and messes, civilian gas stations, the provost marshal, and area security guards.[121] The Commanding General, Stuttgart District, SACOM, and the Commanding Officer, 112th Infantry Regiment, determined that during a 30-day period of phasing out the personnel of the Heilbronn Detachment, lodger unit personnel would receive on-the-job training and detachment personnel would be gradually reduced as the former became qualified replacements. A target date of 30 June 1953 was established for the completion of the phase-out. By that date all detachment personnel included in the experiment had been reported to the Stuttgart District as excess to the Heilbronn Detachment. By 31 July all German civilian employees whose spaces had been declared excess as a result of reorganization and/or replacement by lodger unit personnel had been released or given the 30-day notice of release required by law. Since no further changes in the Heilbronn Detachment were contemplated, the experimental stage of the plan was considered completed as of 15 September.[122] On 1 October CINCUSAREUR directed the submission of a final report and detailed recommendations at the earliest practicable date.[123]

a. Recommendations of the Commander, 112th Infantry Regiment. In his final report on the experimental stage of the project, the 112th Regiment commander, outlined a number of recommendations that should be adopted if other tactical units were required to assume similar operational responsibilities. The

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[121](1) C/N 2, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to USAREUR COFS, 5 Feb 54, to C/N 1, USAREUR SGS to USAREUR ACOFS G3, 21 Dec 53, sub: Heilbronn Experiment. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR Cir 140, 31 Oct 52, sub: Relationship between Area Commands and Lodger Units. UNCLASSIFIED.

[122]Final Rept, 112th Inf Rgt, 28th Inf Div, 31 Aug 53, sub: Heilbronn Detachment Experiment. 331.3. UNCLASSIFIED.

[123]5th Ind, USAREUR to CG Seventh Army, 1 Oct 53, sub: Progress Report. AG 319.1 GOT (31 Jul 53). UNCLASSIFIED.

plan and organization adopted should be determined by local conditions and not made to fit zone-wide standards. Implementing directives should be issued in sufficient detail and to all headquarters concerned, to insure complete coordination and cooperation. One unit in the designated area should be assigned the detachment command responsibility and the commander of that unit should continue as detachment commander, without regard to subsequent transfers or changes in the relative rank of the unit commanders in the area. The detachment commander should not be designated by name but by virtue of his status as commanding officer of the unit assigned the mission. Implementing directives should include a definition of the relationship between the headquarters assuming the responsibility and the technical service elements providing local logistical support. The detachment should not be required to assume responsibility for transportation activities, but such activities should be operated under the appropriate technical services section, as in the case of the functions of engineer and quartermaster sections. The detachment should be authorized and furnished personnel in excess of its T/O, so as to provide a continuing and functioning headquarters, as well as the required support for dependents and other lodger units when the detachment would be in the field.[124]

b. Further Recommendations. In the final report on the Heilbronn Experiment, the 28th Infantry Division headquarters stated that the plan had resulted in personnel savings of 4 officers, 10 enlisted men, and 17 German civilian employees. The Division supported the recommendation that tactical lodger units should be authorized to carry overstrength to cover full-time duty personnel carrying out the support mission. Such overstrength would not affect total personnel savings but would merely represent personnel of the tactical lodger units who were engaged in Heilbronn area support functions and who should be replaced in the units from which they were, in effect, borrowed. The Heilbronn plan should be placed in effect at Goeppingen, Ulm, and Leipheim, provided that authority was granted for each tactical organization to carry an excess to its T/O, equal to the number of military personnel it would be required to furnish for area support functions, and that all support personnel not assigned to the organization controlling support should be placed on detached service to that organization.[125] Headquarters, VII Corps, did not concur in the recommendation of the lower headquarters and stated that

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[124] Final Rept, cited above.

[125] 9th Ind, 28th Inf Div through CG VII Corps and CG Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, 10 Dec 53, sub: Final Report. TEDGD-RS 141.8 (31 Aug 53). UNCLASSIFIED.

for the present, the plan should be confined to the Heilbronn area.[126] Headquarters, Seventh Army, however, supported the recommendations originally made by the 112th Infantry Regiment. These recommendations were that the Heilbronn experiment be implemented, as a zone-wide program for the saving of personnel spaces, in those areas which were suitable for such implementation; that a panel consisting of appropriate representation from USAREUR headquarters, the area commands concerned, and Seventh Army be appointed to determine the suitable areas; and that the extent of the implementation of the program be based on the availability of funds for hiring German civilian employees--i.e., that military personnel should replace German civilian employees only when necessary.[127]

c. Curtailment of the Experiment. The USAREUR comptroller concurred in the recommendation to attach the Heilbronn Detachment permanently to Seventh Army for operational control. He pointed out, however, that this experiment had been conducted in a period of across-the-board reductions in funds and personnel, which greatly complicated attempts to assess the results directly attributable to the experiment. Determining the suitability of the application the Heilbronn principle to other areas would depend on whether the savings in military and civilian spaces that would result would outweigh the disadvantages of requiring Seventh Army to absorb the workload through part- or full-time use of tactical personnel. The USAREUR comptroller opposed the use of tactical personnel to achieve a reduction in the number of German indigenous employees currently employed by the detachment.[128] Maj. Gen. C. B. Ferenbaugh, Chief of Staff, USAREUR, took an entirely different view. Since the 112th Infantry Regiment required an overstrength of 39 military personnel in tactical units to replace the number of men assigned to support duty with the detachment, no actual savings in manpower had been demonstrated, although 14 military and 17 German civilian personnel spaces were saved.[129] The Heilbronn experiment demonstrated that the assumption by Seventh Army of administrative functions assigned to SACOM would result in the substitution of military

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[126] 10th Ind, VII Corps to CG Seventh Army, 14 Dec 53, sub: Final Report. CVIIB 141.8 (31 Aug 53). UNCLASSIFIED.

[127] 11th Ind, Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, 17 Dec 53, sub: Final Report. ASECS-DP 331.3 (31 Aug 53). UNCLASSIFIED.

[128] Memo, USAREUR Compt to USAREUR ACOFS G3, 3 Feb 54, sub: Heilbronn Experiment. UNCLASSIFIED.

[129] 9th Ind, 28th Inf Div through CG VII Corps and CG Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, 10 Dec 53, sub: Final Report. TEDGD-RS 141.8 (31 Aug 53). UNCLASSIFIED.

personnel for indigenous personnel, in manpower losses to the primary tactical missions of the Seventh Army, and increased payroll costs. Moreover, no compensatory returns in the form of improved services to lodger units were apparent. For these reasons General Ferenbaugh announced that the experiment was concluded and directed that the support functions that had been transferred to the Seventh Army in the Heilbronn area be restored to SACOM.[130] The activities and functions performed by the 112th Regiment during the experiment were transferred to the Heilbronn Detachment, 7822 Station Complement Unit, on 29 April 1954, ending the experiment and closing the door on attempts to transfer USAREUR support-type functions to Seventh Army.[131]

148. Relocation of Seventh Army Strategic Ammunition

War games experience in late 1953 and early 1954 indicated to Seventh Army the necessity for relocating the theater strategic ammunition stocks from the Rhine Ordnance Depot to the Rhine Ammunition Depot, in order to minimize loss from bomb strikes or air drops. Ammunition tonnages at both depots were practically the same--67,000 tons of reserve stocks for Special Theater Reserve No. 1 at Rhine Ordnance Depot and 62,500 tons of ammunition, including all training ammunition, at Rhine Ammunition Depot. All operational interests of USAREUR in the Rhine Ordnance Depot were to be phased out by 1 July 1954, when the depot was scheduled to be transferred to Seventh Army control. In January 1954 Seventh Army requested USAREUR permission for the proposed relocation, a movement that would consist mostly of a paper transfer of the ammunition stored in the two depots. USAREUR approved the request on 22 April 1954 on condition that no additional construction, personnel, or equipment would be required to accomplish the transfer.[132]

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[130] C/N 4, USAREUR COFS to USAREUR ACOFS G3, 22 Mar 54, to C/N 1, USAREUR SGS to USAREUR ACOFS G3, 21 Dec 53, sub: Heilbronn Experiment. UNCLASSIFIED.

[131] 3d Ind, SACOM to CINCUSAREUR, 7 May 54, sub: Heilbronn Detachment Experiment. SACSC-OT 353.8 (27 Mar 54). UNCLASSIFIED.

[132] (1) C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 14 Apr 54, sub: Relocation of Strategic Ammo Stocks. 471 GLD. SECRET. (2) 1st Ind, USAREUR to CG Seventh Army, 22 Apr 54, same sub. AG 471 GLD (14 Jan 54). SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 381.3 (1954), Item 9B atchd.

Section V: Construction

149. Construction in Germany

a. General. The major objective of USAREUR long-range construction planning in Germany was to provide housing for most of USAREUR's activities in rent-free installations and for the majority of its personnel in USAREUR-constructed communities near military installations. This objective was not to be construed as indicating the necessity for major construction and rehabilitation for the sole or major purpose of moving activities out of rented properties. However, where it could be shown that construction costs would be amortized in a period of three years, USAREUR was disposed to give consideration to the initiation of new construction or to the consolidation of activities within USAREUR-constructed or other rent-free properties.[133] In keeping with these criteria, the basic concepts for all USAREUR construction programs were to provide for the military, operational, and morale and welfare requirements of the U.S. forces, and to effect the greatest possible reduction of future dollar requirements. The categories under which all USAREUR construction programs were grouped were: operational facilities required for the military forces because of changes in armament; troop and dependent housing and support requirements; reduction of atomic and conventional air attack vulnerability for supply installations; air facilities dispersal requirements; and replacement of requisitioned industrial and commercial facilities.[134]

b. Delegation of Construction Authority to CINCUSAREUR. The Secretary of the Army, as executive agent of the Secretary of Defense for construction within the US EUCOM area of responsibility, delegated to US CINCEUR the responsibility for the management and supervision of a combined and coordinated military construction program in the US EUCOM area. Emphasis was placed on the elimination of duplication of facilities, on coordination between component services to prevent overlapping of functions, on assurance that the austerity construction standards and criteria were not exceeded, and on the determination that types of line items within programmed or reprogrammed construction were actually essential. US CINCEUR was assigned responsibility for all phases of construction, from initial planning to actual occupancy by the using agency.[135]

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[133] USAREUR Log Plng Forecast, 1 Jul 53, p. 11. SECRET.

[134] Cable SX-3037, CINCUSAREUR to DA for VCOFSA, 8 Jan 54. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1954), Vol. I, Item 16 atchd.

[135] Ltr, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 15 Dec 53, sub: Delegation of Authority, Construction in Germany. LCB 322.011. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1953), Vol. III, Item 100 atchd.

However, US CINCEUR desired that responsibility for all U.S. construction in Germany be retained by CINCUSAREUR in the interest of continuity and because USAREUR had the necessary experience and organization. Accordingly, in August 1953, US CINCEUR recommended the redelegation to CINCUSAREUR of supervision of all construction in West Germany in preference to transferring this responsibility to the Joint Construction Agency. On 9 December 1953 the Assistant Secretary of the Army approved this recommendation providing that, if the expenditure of U.S. funds for construction in West Germany became necessary, the question of the utilization of the Joint Construction Agency would be reexamined and further recommendations made.[136] Within a few days US CINCEUR redelegated to CINCUSAREUR complete responsibility for the military construction program in Germany, to include a budget program review on 15 December 1953.[137]

c. Deutsche Mark Construction Programs, FY's 1954 and 1955. The FY 1954 Deutsche Mark construction program for Germany, as formulated by USAREUR, originally totaled $28,379,700, and consisted of $11,870,700 for Category I projects and $16,509,000 for Category II projects. The program was forwarded to the Department of the Army on 3 June 1953 for approval within the availability of Deutsche Mark funds and with the provision that approval for Category II projects should be given only if there were no dollar implications to construction in Germany for FY 1954. At the same time, USAREUR was determining the means of alleviating the critical shortage of family housing in Germany. Construction requirements for family housing were to be forwarded to Washington for inclusion in the FY 1954 program for Germany as soon as critical requirements that could be met by other means had been determined.[138] In September 1953, Brig. Gen. W.A. Carter, Chief, Services Division, Office of the Army Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, visited Heidelberg to review the USAREUR FY 1954 construction program. Since the program was still in the process of formulation, General Carter examined the method of formulation and review and the general categories of approval that USAREUR headquarters would require. A memorandum of understanding between the chief of the Installations Branch, USAREUR G4 Division and the USAREUR comptroller provided a basis

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[136] Cable EC-9-2634, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 10 Dec 53. SECRET. In file above, Item 100.

[137] Ltr, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 15 Dec 53, cited above. Item 100 atchd.

[138] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to COFSA for ACOFS G4, 3 Jun 53, sub: USAREUR FY 1954 Construction Program for Germany. AG 600 GLD. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1953), Vol. II, Item 50 atchd.

for USAREUR to fund and initiate, within certain limits, approved construction projects before final review by the Department of the Army.[139] Pending such review, USAREUR was authorized to proceed with its construction program. This agreement provided for zone-wide expenditures of DM 40,000,000 for dependent support facilities, and DM 30,000,000 for other than dependent housing and support facilities. The latter figure was broken down by area commands as follows: Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation, DM 300,000; NACOM, DM 8,000,000; WACOM, DM 9,500,000; SACOM, DM 9,000,000; HACOM, DM 2,500,000; and SEACOM, DM 700,000. The detailed construction program for USAREUR, within these limitations, was to be submitted to the Department of the Army as soon as it was completed.[140] The FY 1955 and the revised FY 1954 construction programs for Germany were formulated concurrently by USAREUR, with the projects assigned arbitrarily to the two programs, based upon the availability of Deutsche Mark funds. Funds available for construction at the time of formulation of the programs totaled DM 420,702,000, which had to be obligated prior to 31 December 1953. The USAREUR Logistics Planning Board reviewed all projects for essentiality and priority, and also reviewed the expected obligation data. Approved projects of high priority that could be obligated before 31 December 1953 were assigned to the FY 1954 program, and the remaining projects were included in the FY 1955 program and arranged in a priority sequence based on the date on which obligation could be expected if approved on 1 January 1954, and the urgency of the construction requirement. For this reason the FY 1955 program contained many items that were immediate USAREUR requirements but that had been deferred because of the time necessary to accomplish obligation of funds. Certain of the FY 1954 projects might be incapable of obligation prior to 31 December 1953, while certain high-priority FY 1955 projects might become available for obligation by that time. In such an event USAREUR intended to bring the FY 1955 projects forward and fund them before 31 December 1953, as part of the FY 1954 program. By the same device FY 1954 projects incapable of obligation would be deferred and added to the FY 1955 program in appropriate priority sequence. If additional Deutsche Mark construction funds became available after 1 January 1954 and prior to 30 June 1954, USAREUR anticipated that projects in the FY 1955 program would be funded in priority sequence. Because dollar-appropriated funds could not be used for dependent housing in Germany, USAREUR desired to give a high priority to prefunding

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[139] Memo for rcd, Maj W. Wade, USAREUR G4 Div Proj Sec, Oct 53, sub: Administration of the FY 1954 Construction Program for Germany. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Div Cen Files, 600.1 (1953), Vol. V, Item 37.

[140] Memo of Understanding, USAREUR, 26 Sep 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

dependent housing from the FY 1955 program during FY 1954.[141] The combined FY's 1954 and 1955 construction programs for Germany are shown in the following tabulations:[142]

	FY 1954	FY 1955
Totals	$100,167,142	$89,305,999
Family Housing	83,657,142	67,191,999
Other Than Family Housing	16,510,000	22,114,000
BPOE	25,000	405,000
SEACOM	134,000	7,000
HACOM	1,821,000	2,526,000
SACOM	3,263,000	7,432,000
NACOM	4,437,000	7,937,000
WACOM	6,830,000	3,807,000

The FY 1954 program was approved by the Department of the Army on 20 November 1953 and CINCUSAREUR was authorized to proceed with the construction of all of the projects therein provided that Deutsche Mark funds were available. At the same time, the FY 1955 construction program, which USAREUR planned to begin after 31 December 1953, was also approved and USAREUR was authorized to proceed with this construction if, and when, Deutsche Marks became available. Also USAREUR was authorized to substitute FY 1955 projects for FY 1954 projects that could not be obligated prior to 31 December 1953. Changes within individual projects without reference to the Department of the Army could be made provided that Army criteria were observed and that the over-all cost of the approved program was not exceeded. The Department of the Army, however, would have to be notified of such changes through previously specified quarterly progress reports.[143]

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[141] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to DA for ACOFS G4, 14 Nov 53, sub: USAREUR FY 1955 Construction Program, Germany. AG 600.1 GLD. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1953), Vol. III, Item 80C atchd.

[142] (1) C/N 1, USAREUR Engr to USAREUR COFS, 23 Nov 53, sub: Units in Phases I and II, FY 1954 Construction Program. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to DA for ACOFS G4, 14 Nov 53, sub: USAREUR FY 1955 Construction Program, Germany. AG 600.1 GLD. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1953), Vol. II, Item 50. atchd; Vol. III, Item 80C atchd.

[143] Cable DA-953087, COFSA from ACOFS G4 to CINCUSAREUR, 20 Nov 53. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above, Vol. II, Item 50A atchd.

(1) Dependent Housing Construction. The original USAREUR housing construction program for Germany, initiated in January 1950, was virtually completed by 31 October 1953. By that date this program had provided 18,158 family apartments and 4,194 BOQ spaces, and an additional 476 BOQ spaces in WACOM were completed during November.[144] Early in 1953, CINCUSAREUR proposed a new construction program, expected to provide sufficient housing and community support facilities to accommodate all authorized personnel in USAREUR. On 3 August 1953 Gen. C. L. Bolte, CINCUSAREUR, directed the construction of sufficient housing to accommodate all anticipated USAREUR requirements and, as a long-range mission, to permit the release of all requisitioned homes. The program as approved by General Bolte called for the construction of about 10,800 additional apartments in USAREUR to enable concurrent travel of sponsors and their dependents (estimated at 105 percent of availability) to the command, an additional 1,700 units to offset the release of a like number of higher-cost properties, and 600 additional apartments for the Air Force in Germany. It was planned in 5 phases, the first 3 of which were to be scheduled for FY 1954 construction and for obligation by 31 December 1953. At the time of General Bolte's directive, funds were available for Phase I of the program, which consisted of 4,578 units, including 600 for the Air Force. Phases I and II totaled approximately 8,000 units, and would bring the availability of dependent housing in Germany to about 98 percent of forecast requirements. The program also included the construction of support facilities to meet all local requirements. Priorities for housing construction were established as follows: BOQ's, regarded as necessary as indicated by current studies; dependent housing to 95 percent of the requirement in each area, but if funds were insufficient to accomplish this goal, the most critical areas were to be raised to 95 percent on a priority basis; 1,700 replacement units, so located as to compensate for the loss of high-cost units, although actual releases were to be deferred until 105 percent of availability had been reached or until such release was dictated by financial conditions; additional increments of the family housing program to raise availabilities in all areas to 105 percent; and additional housing to enable the dereqisitioning of all privately owned property. The standard design for this program was a 3-story, 18-unit building containing an equal number of 2-, 3-, and 4-bedroom apartments.[145] In order

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144USAREUR Mthly Review of Log Actvs, 31 Oct 53, p. 6. UNCLASSIFIED.

145(1) C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR ACOFS G1, 7 Aug 53, sub: FY 1954 Housing Construction, Germany. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 18 Aug 53, sub: Dependent Housing Construction, FY 1954. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR G4 Div Cen Files, 600.1 (1953), Vol. IV, Items 34, 63 atchd.

to expedite the provision of family housing in USAREUR and to insure the initiation of Phase III of the dependent housing program and the issuance of contracts under this phase before 31 December 1953, CINCUSAREUR authorized a number of deviations from normal competitive procedures outlined in USAREUR Engineer Bulletin No. 5. These deviations were necessary in order to obligate the required funds prior to that date since funds not obligated by that time would lapse. Procurement officers were authorized to select and negotiate with only a sufficient number of contractors and construction firms necessary to insure a fair price to the government. This authorization, moreover, could be interpreted as authority to negotiate with a single firm or supplier on a "sale source" basis, if such action should become necessary. Negotiations were to be conducted aggressively with a view to obtaining the best price possible for the government, and if the procurement officer was unable to obtain a price that he considered fair under the circumstances, he was directed to negotiate with additional sources.[146] Finally, in addition to other considerations governing the selection of construction firms, procurement officers were to be guided by the supplier's known ability and capacity to perform, and his familiarity with the site in question.[147] Phases I (3,978 Army units), II (3,006 units), and III (1,800 units), together with certain Phase IV projects, had been initiated by 31 December 1953. With the completion of these projects the over-all housing availability in USAREUR would be raised to approximately 95 percent of coordinated travel requirements. Phases IV and V, which completed the initially planned program, consisted of 2,916 units, estimated as sufficient to raise the total housing inventory in USAREUR to 100 percent of the estimated 49,000 units required for coordinated travel. Phases VI and VII of the program, added late in 1953, consisted of 4,248 units and were intended primarily for the release of requisitioned properties. Phase VIII, the final phase, was planned to consist of 7,002 family units and 5,270 BOQ rooms. The completion of the eight phases would result in rent-free housing units in USAREUR equal to the forecast number of families present in January 1954, or about 95 percent of the number of units required for the coordinated travel of sponsors and dependents. The remaining 5 percent was to be provided through the retention of certain requisitioned properties. BOQ construction

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[146] Procedures for conducting negotiations for contracts are outlined in APP 3-101.b (3). UNCLASSIFIED.

[147] C/N 2, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR Engr Div, 10 Nov 53, to C/N 1, USAREUR Engr Div to USAREUR ACOFS G4, 9 Nov 53, sub: Obligation of Phase III, FY 1954 Dependent Housing in Germany. ENG 600.1 CON. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Vol. V, Item 75.

under the program would provide rent-free housing, including previous Deutsche Mark construction and confiscated units, equal to the forecast number of bachelors in USAREUR, plus the known requirement for transient housing.[148] By May 1954, the status of the program and the progress by the area commands in obligating necessary funds were excellent.[149]

(2) BOQ Construction. On 8 January 1954, Gen. W. M. Hoge, CINCUSAREUR, approved a plan for the construction of 5,270 BOQ rooms--4,896 in the U.S. Zone of Germany and 374 in Berlin. Designed as an element of Phase VIII of the USAREUR housing construction program, the plan was intended to enable the release of all requisitioned BOQ properties held by U.S. forces. Funds in the amount of $9,800,000 were released by the Department of Defense for the construction of 4,896 BOQ rooms, excluding construction planned for Berlin. By April 1954, USAREUR revised the BOQ program downward to 4,742 rooms--4,528 in the U.S. Zone of Germany and 214 in Berlin. Based on a USAREUR estimate that probably only funds for the construction of 2,000 rooms could be obligated by 30 June 1954, the Office of the Secretary of Defense reduced the BOQ funding to a corresponding amount and increased the funds available for dependent housing construction accordingly. The remainder of the USAREUR BOQ program was deferred to the regular FY 1955 construction budget.[150] The BOQ construction program encountered difficulties because the size of the buildings planned exceeded approved current housing specifications. They called for two types of BOQ buildings--a 4-story, 70-man type, and a 2-story, 34-man cantonment type with a corrugated asbestos roof. The 70-man BOQ exceeded US EUCOM building criteria by 64 square feet per officer and by one story; the 34-man standard BOQ met all applicable criteria. However, it not only required 2½ times as large a site as the 70-man building, but was considered

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[148] (1) C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 7 Jan 54, sub: FY 1954 (Supplemental) Deutsche Mark Housing Construction, Germany. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1954), Vol. I, Item 7. (2) C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR Engr Div, 13 Jan 54, sub: Deutsche Mark Housing Construction, Germany. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Div Cen Files, 600.1 (1954), Vol. I, Item 7.

[149] C/N 1, USAREUR Engr to USAREUR COFS, 18 May 54, sub: Construction Program. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1954), Vol. I, Item 9A atchd.

[150] (1) C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR Engr Div, 17 Feb 54, sub: Construction to Replace Requisitioned Properties. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR G4 Div Cen Files, 600.1 (1954), Vol. I, Item 11. (2) Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 28 Apr 54, sub: BOQ Construction, Germany (Phase VIII). UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1954), Vol. I, Item 9A atchd.

undesirable for metropolitan areas and was objected to by German authorities for reasons of architectural harmony and maintenance of housing-area standards. However, the Department of the Army had previously authorized the use of standard family housing plans in excess of US EUCOM criteria, in order to enable the obligation of all available funds prior to 30 June 1954.[151] The same principle was now applied to BOQ construction, and the Chief of Staff, USAREUR, authorized the use of the standard 70-man BOQ after 30 June 1954 for any locations where conditions warranted its use.[152]

d. German Alternate Housing Construction. Early in 1953 the West German Government tentatively agreed to a CINCUSAREUR proposal for the construction of alternate housing from German governmental construction funds, for the express purpose of releasing an equal number of requisitioned private units. The text of the proposal was developed in close coordination between the pertinent German authorities and USAREUR, so as to safeguard the interests of the U.S. forces and to reduce the possibility of embarrassment or expense. On 4 May 1953, USAREUR announced a plan for the construction of 1,506 units in the U.S. Zone of Germany according to plans and specifications agreed upon by the German Federal Ministry of Finance and the U.S. forces. The agreement specified that, immediately upon acceptance and occupancy of the alternate dwelling units, the appropriate U.S. commander would release a corresponding number of requisitioned, privately owned dwelling units, in towns selected by the Ministry of Finance. The selection of the units to be released was to be determined by the respective U.S. area commanders and the finance ministers of the Laender in the U.S. Zone of Germany.[153] In July 1953 the Federal Ministry of Finance proposed a second program of alternate housing, similar to the first, which provided for the construction of approximately 1,614 apartments in the U.S. Zone of Germany and 120 apartments in WACOM. The apartments were to be similar to those under the first program, but certain minor changes were proposed by the German authorities to reduce costs to correspond with funds actually available to the West German Government for such construction.[154] This program was formally accepted by CINCUSAREUR in

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[151]Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 23 Apr 54, sub: Army BOQ Construction in Germany. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Div Cen Files, 600.1 (1954), Vol. II, Item 69 atchd.

[152]C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR Engr Div, 30 Apr 54, sub: Construction of USAREUR Standard 70-man BOQ Buildings. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 69.

[153]USAREUR ltr, 4 May 53, sub: Alternate Housing Construction by German Authorities. AG 600.1 GLD-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[154]Ltr, USAREUR to HACOM, 27 Jul 53, sub: Alternate Housing Construction, Second Program. AG 600.1 GLD. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Div Cen Files 600.1 (1953), Vol. IV, Item 21.

November 1953. It was in two phases, the first consisting of 1,740 dwelling units in the U.S. Zone of Germany, and the second of 132 units in WACOM. Specific provision was made in the second program for alternate construction in Land Rheinland-Pfalz because the first program of alternate housing had not provided for alternate construction in that area.[155] The combined programs provided a total of 3,378 dwelling units, intended primarily to permit the release of company-grade and NCO quarters. On 28 November 1953, the Ministry of Finance proposed an addition to the second program of 606 units, approximately half of which would be apartments suitable for field-grade officers and would enable the release of comparable requisitioned quarters.[156] However, because of delays in developing a mutually acceptable field-grade design, the West German Government in April 1954 proposed either to build the entire 606 units according to the company-grade design used previously in the alternate construction program, or to build the company-grade portion immediately according to existing designs. The construction of the remaining apartments (approximately 325), would be deferred pending the development of an acceptable design for field-grade officers' housing.[157] CINCUSAREUR and the Federal Ministry of Finance agreed tentatively to use the USAREUR Standard Type VI (Apel) apartment design for all 606 units, with minor changes primarily in the exterior design.[158] Implementing

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[155](1) USAREUR ltr, 10 Nov 53, sub: Second Program of German Alternate Housing Construction (US Zone). AG 600.1 GLD-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR ltr, 14 Nov 53, sub: Second Program of German Alternate Housing Construction (French Zone). AG 600.1 GLD-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[156](1) C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR Engr Div, 16 Dec 53, sub: German Alternate Construction of Field-Grade Housing. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Div Cen Files, 600.1 (1953), Vol. VI, Item 14. (2) Ltr, USAREUR to HACOM, 12 Feb 54, sub: Supplement to Second Program of Alternate Housing Construction. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Div Cen Files, 600.1 (1954), Vol. I, Item 65 atchd.

[157]C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR Engr Div, 19 Apr 54, sub: Field and Company Grade Housing Design. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above (1954), Vol. II, Item 50.

[158](1) C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR Engr Div, 29 Jun 54, sub: Design of German Alternate Housing Construction. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Memo for rcd, Mr. W. M. Pool, C/USAREUR G4 Instls Br Real Estate Sec, 29 Jun 54, sub: Design of German Alternate Housing Construction. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in file above, Vol. III, Item 60.

directives for the supplemental program had not been issued by USAREUR as of 30 June 1954. Certain other proposals of a local nature were also being readied during June 1954. For example, the German Federal Republic had made DM 7,000,000 available to Land Bavaria for alternate construction to enable the release of pensions, guest houses, and similar tourist accommodations, primarily in resort centers, and properties occupied by smaller detachments stationed along the Austrian, Czechoslovakian, and Soviet Zone borders. Area commanders were to maintain contact with the appropriate German agencies in order to expedite all alternate housing projects and any such other proposals as might be offered by German authorities. Arrangements for alternate programs of less than zone-wide scope would normally be negotiated between the appropriate area commanders and the comparable German agencies, rather than by USAREUR headquarters. Upon completion of such negotiations, however, and before a final commitment was made to the German interests, all properties to be so released would be cleared with USAREUR headquarters.[159]

150. Construction in France

a. General. From the very inception of the line of communications through France, construction of required facilities in Metropolitan France was beset with difficulties. Following the transfer of construction responsibility to the Joint Construction Agency in April 1953, it was of paramount importance that US EUCOM take steps to remove all impediments to efficient administration of the construction program, that programming and fund controls be removed, and that there be no further delay in obtaining sites for LOFC facilities. At the time of the transfer of jurisdiction, the construction difficulties in France that would have to be overcome included the freeze, then in force, on the awarding of contracts, the non-receipt of FY 1953 funds for construction, the lack of authority to make minor variations among station ceilings, and the termination of authority to approve acquisition of facilities and installations.[160] Other factors that had caused delays in the COMZ construction program were the emergency nature of the work begun in 1950 with the attendant premature shipment of troops and supplies; the failure of the initial concept that the French would largely plan and carry out the program; the lack of sufficient qualified construction personnel in Headquarters,

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[159] USAREUR ltr, 23 Jun 54, sub: German Alternate Construction Proposals of a Limited Scope. AG 602 ENG-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[160] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to US CINCEUR, 13 Apr 53, sub: Restrictions in Development of USAREUR Installations in France. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 EUCOM (1953), Vol. I, Item 11 atchd.

USAREUR COMZ; the delays in placing contracts through French service agencies; the shortage of qualified architect-engineer firms; the delays in the acquisition of the necessary real estate; the two construction freezes, 29 September to 13 December 1952 and 7 February to 24 April 1953; and the failure to allocate funds for the FY 1953 program. By June 1953, these obstacles were largely overcome or about to be removed. At the same time, however, two new problems appeared that would have an adverse effect on construction for the LOFC in France. First, USAREUR lacked authority to exceed budget estimates for any construction project and, second the Department of the Army placed a $55,000,000 expenditure limitation upon USAREUR for FY 1954.[161] In answer to an inquiry by the Department of the Army in June 1953 as to the reasons why construction in France was lagging and why operational objectives established for the LOFC were not being met, CINCUSAREUR stated that the frequent restrictions imposed by the Department itself had impeded the efficient execution of the program. Since the construction program had never been fully developed, such periodic stoppages caused serious delays. Between 1 July 1952 and 30 June 1953 approximately six months were lost and most of the stoppages occurred during good construction weather. Moreover, by June 1953 funds from the FY 1953 budget were not yet allocated for construction in USAREUR, despite the fact that nearly a year had passed since Congress had appropriated the money.[162]

b. Establishment of the Joint Construction Agency. The need for a single construction agency in France was emphasized in 1952 when defense construction in France began to reflect the requirements of the U.S. Air Force. In September 1952, General Ridgway, US CINCEUR, directed the Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ, to plan for the assumption of responsibility for all U.S. military construction in continental France. On 20 November 1952 the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the establishment of the Joint Construction Agency (JCA), initially at a lower level (USAREUR COMZ), but later as an element of Headquarters, US EUCOM.[163] The Joint Construction Agency was established in USAREUR COMZ on 15 January 1953. US EUCOM had directed the

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[161] Stf Study, USAREUR ACOFS G4, 2 Jun 53, sub: Action by EUCOM to Eliminate Delays in Construction in France. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1953), Vol. II, Item 48A atchd.

[162] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to ACOFS G4, DA, 3 Jun 53, sub: Construction Difficulties in France. SECRET. In file above, Item 48A.

[163] EUCOM/USAREUR Comd Rept, 1952, p. 275. SECRET.

establishment of JCA in two phases, the first phase extending from 15 January 1953 to on or about 15 April 1953, the second following. During the first phase JCA was directly subordinate to the Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ, with the chain of command and channels of communication extending from the Director, JCA, through the Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ, and CINCUSAREUR to US CINCEUR. However, US EUCOM, authorized certain exceptions. Thus, all major construction policy matters, major organizational changes within JCA, and recommended changes in the JCA areas of responsibility were to be referred directly to US CINCEUR by the Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ, who could also communicate directly with component commanders of US EUCOM on routine technical matters affecting JCA. The agency was also responsible for formulating its own T/A requirements and necessary revisions to its T/D. These were to be forwarded directly to US CINCEUR for approval, after appropriate coordination with th service components. During the second phase, JCA was directly subordinate to US EUCOM.[164] The establishment of JCA, particularly under COMZ jurisdiction, seriously affected CINCUSAREUR's responsibilities for construction in France. Those responsibilities had to be delineated by US CINCEUR during both phases. The transfer of construction responsibilities from CINCUSAREUR to the Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ, were to be phased as necessary and as agreed upon by the two commanders. Between 15 January 1953 and 15 April 1953, CINCUSAREUR was responsible to US CINCEUR for that portion of the USAREUR construction in France not yet transferred to JCA; the Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ, was responsible to US CINCEUR for that portion of USAREUR construction in France previously transferred to JCA. The Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ, however, was directly responsible to US CINCEUR for all Air Force construction in France as its execution became the responsibility of the Joint Construction Agency. After 15 April 1953 neither CINCUSAREUR nor the Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ, had any responsibility for the execution of either Army or Air Force construction in France. Instead the Director, JCA, became directly responsible to US CINCEUR for all construction matters in Metropolitan France.[165]

c. Allocation of Funds. Unlike the operations of the U.S. Army in occupied Germany, the entire construction program in France was of necessity financed by dollar appropriated funds, subject to the usual annual budgetary action at Washington. During 1 January 1953-30 June 1954 USAREUR COMZ was operating under

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[164] Cable 081516Z, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE, CINCNELM, and USAREUR COMZ, 8 Jan 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1953), Vol. I, Item 3 atchd.

[165] Cable 121622Z, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 12 Jan 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

the Military Construction-Army (MCA) budgets of FY's 1951, 1952, and 1953. Obligations were still being made during 1953 against FY 1951 funds, for projects that had been deferred. The FY 1951 budget had been firmed at $51,500,000; that for FY 1952 had been set at $99,773,500. Even before the end of 1951, the FY 1952 budget had been reduced by $20,000,000 because the slow rate of obligation of FY 1951 allocations. At the same time, planning was under way for a FY 1953 budget of $113,885,000.[166] Shortly after 1 January 1953 figures were revised to cover USAREUR dollar construction programs in France for FY's 1951, 1952, and 1953 and for a supplemental FY 1953 budget. The FY 1952, 1953, and supplemental 1953 programs were firm and had previously been approved by the Department of the Army, but some of the items held over from FY 1951 and not yet obligated were under review by USAREUR headquarters and would have to be reprogrammed. Under the revised budgets, COMZ projects for which funds were obligated subsequent to 27 December 1952 could not vary from the stipulated unit amounts for the various line items, or subline items, without the previous approval of USAREUR headquarters.[167] The FY 1954 USAREUR construction program totaled $74,836,000: $52,942,000 for the completion of known construction requirements in USAREUR COMZ; $20,886,000 to replace the funds deferred by the Department of the Army from the USAREUR FY 1952 construction ceiling; $1,008,000 for the completion of known construction requirements of the 7961 USAREUR Detachment for the support of the U.S. elements of SHAPE at Paris and Fontainebleau. But even before January 1953, a reduction in appropriations from $74,000,000 to $25,000,000 was being considered because of the slow rate of obligation in USAREUR COMZ.[168]

(1) Delay in Allocation of FY 1953 Funds. By April 1953, about nine months after the inception of FY 1953, no construction funds from the fiscal year had been allocated to USAREUR because of the Department of the Army practice of regulating allocations of such funds according to obligation rates of funds already allocated. However, because of certain delays in the COMZ construction program caused by Department of the Army reprogramming directives for certain types of construction, USAREUR

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[166] USAREUR Hist Div, Establishment of Communications through France, 1950-51, pp. 41-47. SECRET.

[167] USAREUR ltr, 22 Jan 53, sub: USAREUR Dollar Construction Program, FY's 51 through Supplemental 53 (Revision as of 1 Jan 53). AG 600.1 ENG-AGO. CONFIDENTIAL. (For complete revised construction budgets, see Table 19.)

[168] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to COFSA, 7 Nov 52, sub: USAREUR FY 1954 Construction Program. AG 600.1. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1952), Vol. III, Item 102 atchd.

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Table 19--LOFC Construction Budgets

Type Installation	Totals	FY 1951	FY 1952	FY 1953	Supplemental FY 1953
Totals	$298,149,000	$57,658,000*	$79,778,000	$101,000,000	$59,713,000
POL pipeline	57,778,000	9,080,000	4,779,000	25,188,000	18,731,000
Depots	103,292,000	34,886,000	52,333,000	9,850,000	6,223,000
Medical and hospital facilities	42,658,000	2,030,000	7,975,000	28,653,000	4,000,000
Billets, headquarters and troop facilities	59,008,000	9,939,000	12,481,000	22,677,000	13,911,000
Replacement and staging areas	1,992,000			1,992,000	
Port facilities	5,978,000		495,000	2,609,000	2,874,000
Base maintenance and rebuild shops					
Ordnance	23,804,000	723,000	319,000	8,788,000	13,974,000
Engineer					
Signal (including radio and photo)	3,079,000	748,000	1,096,000	1,235,000	
Quartermaster	560,000	252,000	300,000	8,000	

*This amount includes R&U dollar funds and French contributed funds. MCA funds amount to $52,711,600.

Source: USAREUR ltr, 22 Jan 53, sub: USAREUR Dollar Construction Program, FY's 1951 through 1953 Supplemental (Revision as of 1 Jan 53). AG 600.1 ENG-AGO. CONFIDENTIAL.

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was able to use some FY 1951 and FY 1952 funds to initiate several FY 1953 projects. By April 1953, that practice was no longer feasible. Consequently, many COMZ projects threatened to fall still further behind in the construction schedule unless FY 1953 funds that had been authorized and appropriated for USAREUR COMZ were received without further delay.[169] Although Congress had approved projects within the FY 1953 construction program amounting to approximately $94,000,000, expenditure of these funds was governed by certain limitations placed on USAREUR by the Department of the Army. The first 1953 funds were released by the Department of the Army on 2 July 1953 when $3,443,000 was allocated for the construction of headquarters facilities for US EUCOM at Camp des Loges, France.[170] Not until October 1953 did the Bureau of the Budget make its first allocations for LOFC facilities from FY 1953 funds. The amount allocated was $48,524,000, and USAREUR was authorized to advertise for bids for all items for which funds had been provided. A few days later, USAREUR learned that the actual apportionment of funds by the Bureau of the Budget was $1,958,000 less than the $48,524,000 which the Office of the Secretary of Defense had first announced. All of the reduction was in amounts for medical facilities in COMZ.[171]

(2) FY 1954 Expenditure Ceilings. In May 1953 the Department of the Army placed expenditure ceilings on all military construction during FY 1954, regardless of the funding source. Accordingly, the "base" expenditure ceilings for USAREUR to be used in revising the FY 1954 MCA Execution Program were $55,000,000 for FY 1954 and $55,000,000 for FY 1955.[172] All construction projects in USAREUR that had not been started or that were not more than 20 percent completed were to be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for review and reprogramming. In April 1953 all such projects for the LOFC that had been certified by USAREUR as essential were approved for immediate construction. Authority to proceed with the construction of these

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[169] Stf Study, USAREUR ACOFS G4, 1 Apr 53, sub: Relaxation of Construction and Real Estate Control by Department of the Army. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 EUCOM (1953), Vol. I, Item 11 atchd.

[170] (1) C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 22 Jul 53, sub: Restriction on Development of USAREUR Installations in France. SECRET. (2) Cable 942681, COFSA from ACOFS G4 to CINCUSAREUR, 2 Jul 53. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in file cited above.

[171] (1) Cable DA-950405, COFSA from ACOFS G4 to US CINCEUR, 15 Oct 53. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Cable DA-950765, COFSA from ACOFS G4 to CINCUSAREUR, 20 Oct 53. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1953), Vol. II, Item 39 atchd.

[172] Cable DA-939100, COFSA from ACOFS G4 to CINCUSAREUR, 16 May 53. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

projects, totaling $55,272,000, was granted by the Department of the Army; but since an expenditure ceiling of $55,000,000 had already been imposed on USAREUR for FY 1954, little more than this program could be initiated during that fiscal year. In fact, the initiation of this program obviated the possibility of undertaking any further construction from FY 1954 funds.[173]

(3) Troop Housing Conditions. Troop housing conditions in France during the period of this report had improved slightly over previous years, although 11,332 spaces for enlisted men were available in tent camps for use during the winter of 1953-54. This figure was based on billeting 12 men to a tent but, since COMZ was understrength during the early months of 1953, the average tent occupancy was 8 men. A typical tent-camp in COMZ consisted of a number of similar company-sized areas, each consisting of company administrative, billet, and latrine areas. The company administrative area consisted of two metal prefabricated buildings housing the company headquarters, the supply room, and the mess hall. The billet area consisted of squad tents provided with floors, halfwalls, roof frames, stoves, and lights. Each tent contained cots, one foot locker per man, and wall lockers wnerever space permitted. The latrine area consisted of a heated and lighted wooden building, with box latrines, and a heated and lighted shower building. In addition, each camp was supposed to have roads, hardstands, lights, water, and stoves for heating.[174] In mid-1953 JCA forecast the adequate housing of personnel stationed at bases and camps in France in permanent-type buildings, prefabricated buildings, or winterized tent camps by 1 November 1953. One exception was the Signal Corps Depot at Saumur, which had only improvised hot water and bathing facilities and no hardstands, roads, or sidewalks. The JCA completed plans for adequate housing at Saumur on 1 July 1953; construction was scheduled for completion by 1 January 1954. Installations that did not have (and would not have by the end of 1953) minimum recreational facilities were: Toul Engineer Depot, Sampigny Chemical Depot, Braconne Ordnance Depot, Bussac Combined Depot Facility, Ingrandes Quartermaster Depot, the Poitiers facility, Saumur Signal Depot, Vassincourt Hospital, and the Toul-Jeanne d'Arc Hospital.[175]

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[173] 2d Ind, COFSA to CINCUSAREUR, 6 Jun 53, sub: Restrictions on Development of USAREUR Installations in France. SECRET. In file above, Item 48A atchd.

[174] Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 30 May 53, sub: Estimates of Troops to be in Tents During Winter of 1953-54. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 620 (1953), Vol. II, Item 28.

[175] Cable 141442Z, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 14 Jul 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 40.

(4) POL Pipeline. One of the major USAREUR construction projects for which negotiations and planning were completed during the period of this review was the USAREUR POL pipeline, which was to extend from Donges on the Loire Estuary to Metz near the Franco-German border. Negotiations begun in 1951 and continued through 1952 brought no concrete results. The American Embassy in Paris reopened negotiations with the French in January 1953, with the assistance of Special Representative, Europe, and US CINCEUR.[176] No progress in the negotiations were made until Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson met personally with the French Minister of National Defense, M. Rene Pleven in April 1953. The two agreed that the French were to construct and operate the pipeline, and the United States was to determine specifications and establish the planning board that would control the input of products. The opinion of that board would prevail in the event of disputes. Special equipment could be furnished by the United States but French-supplied equipment would meet U.S. prices. The French could be assured of an average of approximately 5 percent of the input for military uses, so long as this did not interfere with U.S. military requirements. A separate subsidiary or brand of TRAPIL (Societe des Transports Petroliers par Pipeline) would be established, with separate accounts, exclusively for operating the USAREUR pipeline. Finally, American technicians could be employed by subsidiaries, as requested by the United States.[177] Final draft agreements were drawn up by the negotiators on the basis of these concessions and were presented for final approval and comment to the agencies concerned. On 30 May 1953 the American Embassy was authorized to sign the governmental level agreement. Maj. Gen. L. W. Matthewson, Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ, was to sign the technical agreement, subject to several minor changes.[178] After the signing of the agreement, but before the allocation of any funds by the Department of the Army, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had to reaffirm the need for the pipeline and the appropriate congressional committees had to approve both the agreement and the construction costs.[179] On 9 June 1953 U.S. Ambassador to France,

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[176] Cable (SMC-In 4614 Jan), State Dept to Paris for AMEMB and SRE (3907), 16 Jan 53. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381.3 (1953), Vol. I, Item 3 atchd. Unless otherwise noted, remaining footnote material in this subparagraph (4) is in the same file location.

[177] Cable NFM-363, USDOCO SOUTH, Naples sgd Wilson to OSD for Kyes, 29 Apr 53. SECRET.

[178] Cable (SMC-In 880B, May), State Dept to Paris (5811), 30 May 53. SECRET.

[179] Cable DA-940723, COFSA from ACofS G3 to US CINCEUR, 5 Jun 53. SECRET.

James Dunn was authorized to sign the pipeline agreement. The French text on supplies was subject to French acceptance of the U.S. position that the French would explicitly authorize use of surplus Moroccan equipment and the use of other items in U.S. stocks.[180] Ambassador Dunn and French Foreign Minister G. Bidault signed the pipeline agreement on 30 June 1953; General Matthewson and M. Francois Leduc, Chief of the French Central Liaison Mission signed the technical agreement on the same day.[181] The Joint Construction Agency completed by the end of July its estimates of the time needed for construction of the segments and facilities of the pipeline. In the Donges dock area, work was scheduled to begin on the docks and trestle by January 1954, with a target completion date of July 1954, while the dredging of the channel and mooring basin had already been begun in May 1953 (prior to the signing of the agreement) and was scheduled for completion by October 1953. Construction of the various sections of the pipeline proper and the necessary storage tank farms and feeder lines was also scheduled for various dates with the earliest construction to begin in October 1953 and the entire pipeline and facilities to be completed by December 1955.[182] Original plans called for a 12-inch line from Donges to Melun and a 10-inch line from Melun to Metz. However, late in 1953 it was proposed that the size of the pipeline from Melun to Chalons be changed from 10 to 12 inches because the proposed manner of distribution of POL had been altered by interim developments. Approximately 80 percent of all products were to move forward as far as Chalons, where jet fuel was to be transferred from the U.S. line into the NATO system. The latter, in turn, would distribute the jet fuel directly to U.S. air bases. A 12-inch line as far as Chalons would eliminate the need for an operational transfer of jet fuel, motor gas, etc., into storage at Melun and a flexible and efficient distribution system would result.[183] On 23 December 1953 the Department of the Army approved in principle the increase in size. However, the 10-inch requirement had been presented to and approved by Congress; therefore, Congress had to approve the proposed change. Such approval could be obtained only when Congress considered the proposed FY 1955 legislation, which contained the USAREUR pipeline project.[184] Funds authorized by congressional action before 1954

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[180]Cable 151, State Dept to Paris (5925), 9 Jun 53. SECRET.

[181]Cable (SMC-In 1125 Jun), Paris to State Dept (6693), 30 Jun 53. SECRET.

[182]Cable JCA-474, JCA to CINCUSAREUR, 25 Jul 53. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381.3 (1953), Vol. II, Item 24 atchd.

[183]Cable EC-9-2688, US CINCEUR to COFSA, 15 Dec 53. SECRET.

[184]Cable DA-954734, COFSA from ACOFS G4 to CINCUSAREUR and US CINCEUR, 23 Dec 53. SECRET.

for the construction of the pipeline amounted to $15,211,000. However, bids received by JCA for the first portions of the pipeline, less pumping stations and communications system, far exceeded the original cost estimates, which had to be revised. In April 1954 the JCA-revised estimates raised the cost of the entire project (including pumping stations, communication systems, government costs, and appropriate contingencies) by over $8 million to $23,438,420. The 12-inch line from Donges to Melun would cost $12,766,600; the 12-inch pipeline from Melun to Chalons, $5,352,940; and the 10-inch pipeline from Chalons to Metz, $5,318,880.[185]

(5) Status of the Military Construction Program, 30 June 1954. Of the $231,855,000 made available to USAREUR for military construction in France as of 30 June 1954, $225,967,000 was in MCA funds appropriated by Congress, $3,171,000 in contributions from the French Government under international agreements, and $2,987,000 in R&U funds. Of the MCA funds, $192,955,000 had been apportioned,[186] and $121,138,389 was obligated by the end of FY 1954, leaving approximately $72,000,000 still to be obligated. The value of work in place, representing construction accomplished and/or material delivered to the construction site under obligated contracts, was $71,401,000 at the end of FY 1954. Of this amount, $57,259,065 was paid to the contractors, either through reimbursements to the French Government for franc expenditures or for the satisfaction of other dollar costs.[187]

d. Dependent Housing. In April 1953 the Office of the Secretary of Defense issued the initial policy guidance for developing family housing agreements in Europe under the rental guarantee program provided by Section 302, Public Law 534, 82d Congress. According to this law the United States would guarantee 95 percent occupany of projected units, for a period of approximately five years, at a contract rental not to exceed an average of $125 per month per family. The United States, moreover, would reserve the right to continue occupancy of the units after the expiration of the guarantee period. The sponsor of the project would have to

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[185] Cable JCA-603, Dir JCA to US CINCEUR, 3 Apr 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 381.3 (1954), Vol. I, Item 5 atchd.

[186] DF, USAREUR Hist Div to USAREUR DCOFS Opns, 15 Jul 55, sub: Review of Annual Historical Report, Headquarters, USAREUR, 1 January 1953-30 June 1954, Tab A, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to C/USAREUR Hist Div, 13 Jun 55, same sub. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Master files HIS 314.7 (1955).

[187] USAREUR COMZ Mthly Prog Rept, 30 Jun 54, p. 51. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

assume managerial responsibility as well as all financial obligations, such as taxes and other costs, incident to ownership. The proposed projects to be built would consist of 2- and 3-bedroom units that would conform, as far as practicable, to American standards, although residual use of the projects provided for integration into the indigenous economy. The Congressional Armed Services Committee required the filing of a certificate of necessity before contracting for such housing. Congress approved initially six projects, not to exceed a total of 2,010 units. Approximately 400 units were planned at Chateauroux, 300 at Orleans, 400 at St. Nazaire, 300 at Chaumont, 400 in the Nancy area, and 200 at Bordeaux. The Department of Defense established two phases for the finalization of the projects. Phase I consisted of the issuance of a letter of intent, which, in effect, was a commitment to guarantee a provisional project when satisfactorily completed. This letter was to cover all conditions relative to the development of the project. Phase II was the signing of the guarantee document, which would formalize the letter of intent.[188] On 29 May 1953 the Department of the Army delegated authority to US CINCEUR to execute, on behalf of the United States, contracts necessary to implement the rental guarantee program. US CINCEUR on 17 June 1953, in turn, redelegated this authority to CINCUSAREUR for projects to be used by USAREUR personnel and by the personnel of two or more U.S. services for which USAREUR had been designated by US EUCOM as the primary user.[189] Dependent housing projects submitted to Congress for clearance would have to be accompanied by the appropriately executed certificate of need, an analysis of the family housing requirements for a given installation over the projected guarantee period, and a brief summary of the project.[190]

(1) Additional COMZ Housing Requests. The first housing plan for France that was presented to Congress for approval specified 300 units at Orleans, 69 at Bordeaux, and 95 at Nancy for the exclusive use of USAREUR COMZ--a total of 464 units out of the over-all total of 2,010 in the joint Army-Air Force program.[191] In July 1953 USAREUR COMZ requested the construction of an additional 1,091 units, as necessary, to provide housing for

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[188] Cable 141550Z, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 14 May 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 620 (1953), Vol. I, Item 21.

[189] Ltr, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 17 Jun 53, sub: Delegation of Authority, Rental Guarantee Program. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 620 (1953), Vol. I, Item 21 atchd.

[190] Cable 111606Z, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 11 Jul 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1953), Vol. III, Item 58.

[191] Cable 141550Z, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 14 May 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 620 (1953), Vol. I, Item 21.

dependents of American personnel assigned to or employed at major COMZ installations and headquarters. The number of units requested for each location was based upon a detailed analysis of the family housing requirements at that location for the duration of the projected guarantee period and upon consideration of the troop basis requirements, reduced by the number of suitable indigenous family housing units available in the area. An allowance for strength fluctuation and various local conditions was also included.[192] In October 1953 General Matthewson, COMZ commander certified that 100 additional housing units in the vicinity of Orleans were needed to augment the 300 units previously cleared under Phase I of the rental guarantee program.[193]

(2) Pilot Projects. CINCUSAREUR on 1 August 1953 signed the first contract for housing in France under the rental guarantee program. A 300-unit project was to be built at St. Jean de Braye, Orleans, for the use of personnel at COMZ headquarters.[194] The ground-breaking ceremony marking the initiation of construction on 16 September 1953 was attended by French and American officials and other guests, including Senators Francis Case and John Stennis of the Senate Armed Services Committee.[195] This project, however, was the only one begun in France for use by COMZ during the period under review. Since its estimated completion date was late in 1954, no U.S. family in France was housed in units provided under the rental guarantee program or under any other program, before 30 June 1954. The only other housing construction projects begun in France under the rental guarantee program during the same period were a 410-unit development for the Air Force at Chateauroux, and a 300-unit community for US EUCOM near Camp des Loges, Paris.[196]

(3) Housing Criteria and Standards for France. On 4 November 1953 the Department of Defense established criteria and standards for the construction of projects under the rental

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[192] Cable COZ-C-602, USAREUR COMZ to CINCUSAREUR, 18 Jul 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1953), Vol. III, Item 58 atchd.

[193] Cable EC-9-1320, US CINCEUR to COFSA for ACOFS G4, 7 Oct 53. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above, Item 83.

[194] The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), August 2, 1953.

[195] Cable EC-9-1320, 7 Oct 53, cited above. CONFIDENTIAL.

[196] Interv, Mr. J. R. Moenk, USAREUR Hist Div, with Col R. B. Carlton, C/USAREUR COMZ G4 Div Plans Br, 3 Feb 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

guarantee program in France. The average monthly rental established for these projects was a maximum of $125, including the customary project management, operating and maintenance services, heat, and unlimited hot and cold water. As an alternative, the monthly rental for a particular project could be calculated on the basis of $100, including project services and cold water, but excluding heat and hot water. The minimum and maximum floor spaces were established as follows: for a 1-bedroom unit, a minimum of 550 and a maximum of 700 square feet; for a 2-bedroom unit, a minimum of 700 and a maximum of 825 square feet; and for a 3-bedroom unit, a minimum of 825 and a maximum of 950 square feet. At each base, a maximum of 5 units for senior officers could exceed these limitations but might not exceed 1,250 square feet per unit. The guarantee assured 95 percent occupancy for a period of 5 years and an extension of the guarantee period up to 7 years was authorized only when a feasible housing project could not otherwise be achieved. For projects requiring a 7-year guarantee, the maximum floor area allowable was reduced to 600 square feet for a 1-bedroom unit, 750 square feet for a 2-bedroom unit, and 875 square feet for a 3-bedroom unit.[197]

(4) Difficulties Created by Rental Guarantee Plan. In January 1954 General Handy, Deputy US CINCEUR, raised the question of whether the units made available under the rental guarantee program would be sufficiently attractive to induce personnel to occupy them to the extent necessary to meet the 95 percent guaranteed occupancy. Because many officers and men had invested personal funds in rehabilitating their occupied quarters and in purchasing furniture, moving to the new units would occasion additional expense. Personnel nearing the completion of their tour of duty, especially, would be reluctant to move under such circumstances. Even though new personnel might choose the new units in preference to housing "on the economy," it was doubtful that USAREUR could fill the units initially. The United States, consequently, would be liable for the cost of the 95 percent rental payments under the guarantee. At the same time, French families would be permitted to enter those projects and would thus alter the nature of the program and would seriously affect its future.[198] In March the Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ, stated that the program was endangered by the fact that no furniture was provided with the apartments and that individuals could not be ordered to occupy them. Furthermore, the rigid space limitations imposed by the Department of Defense made the

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[197] Cable EC-9-2060, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 10 Nov 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 620 (1953), Vol. II, Item 55.

[198] Ltr, Dep US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 12 Feb 54, sub: Rental Guarantee Housing Program. MWD 600.1. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 620 (1954), Vol. I, Item 9A.

apartments even less attractive. The most serious complication that had developed was the reduction in station allowances effective 1 April 1954, which would prevent most enlisted men and junior grade officers from occupying the apartments. Since procurement of furniture presented the most serious difficulty, USAREUR COMZ recommended that officers be given assignment orders prior to departure from the United States in order to permit them to ship the necessary furniture as part of their household goods.[199] CINCUSAREUR sought Department of the Army approval to assign personnel to Europe after 1 September 1954, in three increments--to England, to Germany, and to France. This plan would permit personnel who were to be stationed in France to be so informed before their departure from the United States.[200]

(5) Apparent Failure of the Rental Guarantee Program. By the end of FY 1954, it appeared that the Rental Guarantee Housing Program was doomed to failure. Although approximately two years had passed since congressional approval of the program, not one American family was living in housing provided by it, notwithstanding all the efforts that had been exerted. A relatively small amount of housing was expected to become available shortly after 1 July 1954, but it was evident that the program in France had been far from productive. In addition, no new contract for such housing had been signed since October 1953. Because of congressional directives and commitments, however, it would have to be shown conclusively that the Rental Guarantee Program would not produce the desired results before a change to some other plan could be made. To remedy the situation US CINCEUR directed that all possible effort be made to increase the attractiveness of the rental guarantee concept within the 5-year guarantee limitation. The preparation of special leasing legislation was proposed for introduction in Congress at the start of its next session. The proposed legislation provided for renegotiation of the existing rental guarantee contracts. Efforts were continued to obtain authority to furnish the rental guarantee projects with government furniture.[201]

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[199] 2d Ind, USAREUR COMZ to CINCUSAREUR, 22 Mar 54, sub: Rental Guarantee Housing Program. AG 624 LG (12 Feb 54). UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 9A atchd.

[200] 3d Ind, USAREUR to US CINCEUR, 8 Apr 54, sub cited above. AG 624 GPA (12 Feb 54). UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[201] Ltr, Dep US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 1 Jun 54, sub: Housing in France. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1954), Vol. I, Item 48A atchd.

151. USAREUR Hospital Construction Program

The hospital construction program in Germany had been approved originally on the basis of providing 4,974 beds east of the Rhine River and 3,200 beds west of the Rhine in the French Zone of Germany. All major hospital construction east of the Rhine was completed during March 1954, with the completion of the 300-bed expansion project at the 97th General Hospital in Frankfurt.[202] The 3,200 beds to be provided west of the Rhine in WACOM were in hospitals under construction at Neubruecke, Muenchweiler, and Landstuhl. The facilities at Neubruecke and Landstuhl were completed on 1 February 1954, and those at Muenchweiler were 88 percent complete as of 30 June 1954.[203] The peacetime requirement for France consisted of approximately 700 beds; 460 were available by 30 June 1954 in COMZ--250 at La Chapelle, 35 at Landes de Bussac, 100 at La Rochelle, 50 at Verdun, and 25 at Fontainebleau.[204]

152. Restrictions on Construction

a. Department of Defense Restrictions. The assumption of office by a new national administration in January 1953 occasioned a new construction freeze throughout the armed services that was more thoroughgoing than the one in late 1952. As of 2400 hours on 7 February 1953, no contract for the construction of military public works of the Department of the Army establishment, including reserve components, Wherry housing, and construction related to Army procurement programs, would be awarded from appropriated funds, irrespective of previous approval, except upon the specific approval of the Department of the Army. After that date a thorough review and specific clearance by the Office of the Secretary of Defense would be required for all projects which had been delayed under the provisions of this directive. In addition, there would be a review of all projects then authorized, regardless of the status of funds, including projects less than 20 percent complete as of 10 February 1953.[205] The Secretary of the Army was directed to halt immediately all construction on any

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[202] USAREUR Mthly Review of Log Actvs, 31 Mar 53, p. 6. SECRET.

[203] Interv, Mr. J. R. Moenk, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. R. W. Robinson, Hist Off, USAREUR Med Div, 13 Sep 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

[204] USAREUR COMZ Mthly Prog Rept, 30 Jun 54, p. 14. UNCLASSIFIED.

[205] Cable DA-394506, COFSA from ACOFS G4 to US CINCEUR and CINCUSAREUR, 4 Feb 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1953), Vol. II, Item 20.

project not deemed essential, irrespective of its completion status, and to report any such action to the Secretary of Defense.[206] All construction projects were to be reviewed and submitted to the Department of the Army in order of priority. Category A comprised projects not actually under way as of 2400 hours, 7 February 1953, but for which funds had been apportioned and bids were actually on hand, or which had been advertised for bids as of 7 February, and projects that were to be executed by means other than contracts and that could be initiated before 1 March 1953. Category B contained projects actually under way but less than 20 percent completed as of 10 February. Category C was composed of projects for which funds were apportioned but which had not been started or for which bids had not been advertised as of 7 February, in the order of their readiness for commencement. Category D contained projects in approved construction programs for which funds had not yet been apportioned, in the order of their readiness for commencement.[207] These restrictions on construction applied to all types of work funded under Maintenance and Operations Projects 2914 and 2915. The ground rules for review, certification as to essentiality, or cancellation as previously directed were applicable to all such work performed on Army R&U construction projects.[208] CINCUSAREUR immediately informed the Department of the Army that the ability to support troops stationed in France and Germany was seriously jeopardized by failure to develop the necessary support facilities in France. The lack of facilities in France interferred with the ability of USAREUR to receive and properly store shipments from the United States, which were essential to Army and Air Force support in the event of an emergency in Europe. Any further delay in the development of COMZ facilities would aggravate the situation to serious proportions. CINCUSAREUR emphasized that the full combat readiness of both the Army and the Air Force in Europe would be delayed every day that the construction freeze remained in effect.[209] On 17 and 18 February the entire USAREUR dollar construction program was reviewed by a committee composed of representatives of Headquarters, US EUCOM, USAREUR, USAREUR COMZ, and JCA. A certificate of essentiality on critical projects which had been affected by the suspension was dispatched by

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[206] Cable DA-396044, COFSA from ACOFS G4 to US CINCEUR, 11 Feb 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 20 atchd.

[207] Cable DA-396044, COFSA from ACOFS G4 to US CINCEUR, 11 Feb 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[208] Cable DA-396961, COFSA from ACOFS G4 to CINCUSAREUR, 16 Feb 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[209] Cable SX-1962, CINCUSAREUR to US CINCEUR, 9 Feb 53. SECRET. In file cited above.

US CINCEUR to the Chief of Staff, Department of the Army. On 13 March the remaining projects that required clearance were certified as essential by US CINCEUR and a report thereof was forwarded to the Department of the Army, completing the review actions of Headquarters, US EUCOM and USAREUR. As of 1 April 1953 construction projects vital to the logistical mission of USAREUR, amounting to approximately $16,290,000, were being delayed by the suspension, although CINCUSAREUR could see no reason for delaying work on projects that had previously been confirmed as essential through review of the budget programs by Headquarters, USAREUR, the Department of the Army, the Bureau of the Budget, and Congress itself, and had been included in the construction program.[210] On 24 April 1953 the Department of the Army stated that all LOFC projects that had been certified as essential but were not actually under way had been approved by the Secretary of Defense. Authority was granted to proceed with projects amounting to $55,272,000 for which funds had already been apportioned. This action, however, did not constitute a lifting of the freeze and did not eliminate the requirement that all projects had to be referred to Washington for final approval.[211] Neither the Defense nor Army Department intended to restrict construction of depot and maintenance facilities being provided along the LOFC for wartime support required under Concept C. They intended, rather, that all such construction should be completed as soon as possible. However, because of expenditure limitations and proposed reductions in strength, CINCUSAREUR was directed to insure that troop housing in France (including hospital nuclei and troop support facilities along the LOFC) did not exceed the requirements for proposed FY 1954 strength of USAREUR.[212]

b. Department of the Army Restrictions. By April 1953 it was evident in USAREUR that the numerous restrictions that had been placed on construction and site acquisition by the Departments of the Army and of Defense were seriously delaying the development of the USAREUR LOFC. First and foremost among the restricting factors was the failure to allot FY 1953 funds for construction, although funds had been authorized and appropriated for use in

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[210] Stf Study, USAREUR G4 Div, 1 Apr 53, sub: Relaxation of Construction and Real Estate Control by the Department of the Army. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 EUCOM (1953), Vol. I, Item 11 atchd, Tab A.

[211] 2d Ind, COFSA to CINCUSAREUR, 6 Jun 53, sub: Restriction on Development of USAREUR Installations in France. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1953), Vol. I, Item 48 atchd.

[212] Cable DA-946395, COFSA from ACOFS G4 to CINCUSAREUR, 19 Aug 53. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above, Vol. II, Item 20 atchd.

USAREUR COMZ by Congress. USAREUR had been able to initiate several FY 1953 projects by reprogramming, using FY 1951 and FY 1952 funds, but by April 1953 this practice was no longer feasible. Another factor was the Department of the Army's restriction on the transfer of funds between stations in the budget and on the increase of station totals up to 10 percent, within the over-all program fund ceiling. Contracts were awarded only where the total costs of any contract did not exceed the total budget estimate of items covered by the contract. A third delaying factor was the termination in March 1952 of CINCUSAREUR's authority to acquire existing installations within appropriated funds, through rental or lease. Future acquisition of such installations, as well as renewal on facilities then held, would have to be approved by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.[213] Accordingly, in April 1953 CINCUSAREUR requested US CINCEUR to assist in obtaining relief from the restrictions affecting construction along the LOFC. He desired removal of the suspension of construction then in effect; nonimposition of suspensions on programs previously approved by the service departments and by Congress; allocations of FY 1953 construction funds for USAREUR; and authority for USAREUR to construct facilities at stations within the fund ceilings approved for such stations. CINCUSAREUR also requested restoration of authority to vary costs of construction up to 10 percent of the programmed station number cost and within the total ceilings for the entire program; and of authority to acquire or lease existing facilities, as and when needed, within fund availabilities.[214] By mid-1953 CINCUSAREUR achieved moderate success in obtaining relief from or modification of the restrictions on construction in France. In April 1953 the Secretary of Defense lifted the suspension on obligations of FY 1951 and 1952 funds. In June, Congress approved the USAREUR FY 1953 construction program for approximately $94,000,000. However, FY 1953 funds were to be apportioned only in accordance with the expenditure limitation of $55,000,000 that had been imposed for FY 1954. The Secretary of Defense also approved variations in station costs up to 10 percent, but any upward revisions in the scope of individual projects would have to be submitted to the Department of the Army for approval. Finally, the requirement that lease arrangements be submitted to Washington for approval had previously been modified

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[213] Stf Study, USAREUR G4 Div, 1 Apr 53, sub: Relaxation of Construction and Real Estate Controls by the Department of the Army. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 EUCOM (1953), Vol. I, Item 11 atchd, Tab A.

[214] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to US CINCEUR, 13 Apr 53, sub: Restrictions on Developments of USAREUR Installations in France. AG 600.1 GLD. SECRET. In file above, Item 11 atchd.

to include only leases for commercial- and industrial-type facilities within the Army supply system. No further modification was effected before 30 June 1954. Efforts were being made, however, to eliminate the requirement entirely.[215]

[215] C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 22 Jul 53, sub cited above. SECRET. In file cited above.

CHAPTER 7

Participation in Western Defense

Section I: Relations with SHAPE and with other NATO Agencies

153. NATO Functions of CINCUSAREUR

Commanders subordinate to US EUCOM had specific NATO responsibilities. The functions assigned to CINCUSAREUR included exercise of command, excluding such operational command or control as is exercised by NATO, Allied, or other U.S. commanders, over all U.S. Army forces allocated to US CINCEUR, except those assigned to U.S. Forces Austria, Trieste U.S. Troops, Joint American Military Mission for and to Turkey, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group to Greece, and Title I Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG's). CINCUSAREUR was to support NATO commanders within the limits of available resources and in accordance with JCS and US CINCEUR policies and was to draw appropriate service plans in support of U.S. joint, NATO, and Allied plans, and other service plans as needed. CINCUSAREUR would provide logistical and administrative support to forces of other component commands and to other U.S. and Allied agencies, in accordance with interservice support agreements or directives. For the execution of the U.S. joint emergency plan or portions thereof, CINCUSAREUR was designated commander of a joint task force. All U.S. forces in Germany subject to the authority of CINCEUR would be assigned to this force upon implementation of such plans. CINCUSAREUR was also required to prepare joint plans for Germany, in conformance with US EUCOM and NATO plans for use in the event of an emergency and prior to the assumption of full operational command or control by NATO commanders.[1]

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[1] USAREUR ltr, 7 Apr 53, sub: Functions Assigned CINCUSAREUR. AG 322-GOT-AGO. SECRET.

154. Establishment of Allied Forces Central Europe

On 14 August 1953, SHAPE announced the establishment of Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) and named Marshal Alphonse Pierre Juin of France as commander in chief. Under the new organization Allied Land Forces Central Europe (LANDCENT), Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AIRCENT), and Allied Naval Forces Central Europe (NAVCENT) were assigned to AFCENT as subordinate commands (see Chart 8). Lt. Gen. Marcel M. Carpentier of the French Army was named commander of LANDCENT. These changes were effected 20 August 1953.[2]

155. USAREUR Support of SHAPE

a. Redesignation and Reorganization of 7961 USAREUR Detachment. As in 1952, USAREUR continued to provide major logistical and administrative support to the U.S. and international elements of SHAPE.[3] The 7961 USAREUR Detachment, which provided this support, was redesignated on 30 September 1953 as the 7961 Army Unit, Station Complement, with an authorized strength of 67 officers, 3 warrant officers, and 473 enlisted men, for a total of 543 personnel. The mission of the redesignated organization remained the same.[4]

b. Support of U.S. Element, SHAPE. The proposed T/A of the U.S. element of SHAPE was inadequate for publication. Consequently a new T/A had to be prepared after discussions with representatives of the U.S. element of SHAPE and USAREUR G3. The new T/A, providing administrative support for U.S. personnel assigned to SHAPE, was published by the Department of the Army in December 1953.[5]

c. USAREUR Support of International Headquarters. USAREUR support of SHAPE included support of the headquarters of the Central Europe subordinate commands, the NATO Defense College, and the European Long Lines Agency (ELLA). Under USAREUR planning, requisitions for logistical support peculiar to the Air Force in Europe would be filled by USAFE within the limits of its supply capabilities. CINCUSAFE would submit properly supported billings for logistical support rendered international military headquarters through CINCUSAREUR, who would act as agent in processing such

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[2]SHAPE GO 18, 14 Aug 53. UNCLASSIFIED.

[3]EUCOM/USAREUR Comd Rept, 1952, pp. 277-82. SECRET.

[4]USAREUR COMZ GO 74, 30 Sep 53, sub: Redesignation and Reorganization of 7961 USAREUR Detachment. UNCLASSIFIED.

[5](1) Cable SC-12357, CINCUSAREUR sgd Eddy to U.S. Element SHAPE, 12 Feb 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 SHAPE (1953), Vol. I, Item 5. (2) T/A 84-1, 22 Dec 53. UNCLASSIFIED.

ALLIED FORCES CENTRAL EUROPE COMMAND STRUCTURE



Source: CENTAG Plans Sec reading file (1953-1954). SECRET.

Command ———————
Support - - - - - - - -

Chart 8

billings. Requests for logistical support peculiar to the U.S. Navy were to be coordinated with COMNAVGER. A forecast requirements report was to be submitted by international headquarters semiannually, the first of which was due on or before 1 July for the period 1 January through 30 June of the following year; the second, on or before 1 January for the period 1 July through 30 December of the same year. Each report was to cover all logistical support anticipated from USAREUR during the report period. The forecast was not expected to be exact and inflexible, but rather to indicate anticipated changes or modifications that would affect planning.[6] All requests for logistical support directed to any U.S. military activity other than the 7961 USAREUR Detachment would be forwarded without action to that detachment. Finally, USAREUR would continue to provide logistical support to the NATO Defense College, the European Military Communications Coordinating Committee (EMCCC) and the European Long Lines Agency. To ensure efficient and systematic support, USAREUR enumerated specifically the major duties and responsibilities of the commanding officer of the 7961 USAREUR Detachment. On receiving forecast requirement reports, the latter would forward to USAREUR G4 copies of reports applicable to USAREUR. Copies of requirement forecasts for supplies and equipment peculiar to the Navy were also to be sent to the USAREUR G4 for coordination with COMNAVGER. Copies of requirement forecast reports pertaining to the Air Force were to be sent directly to the 73d Depot Wing, Chateauroux, France. The 7961 USAREUR Detachment commander would review requisitions to determine whether the type of support requested conformed with current regulations. Local procurement was to be utilized when possible and all requisitions that contained items not normally available through U.S. military supply channels were to be returned without action. The 7961 Detachment was to make certain that requisitions for supplies, services, and facilities furnished to international military headquarters were documented properly and that reimbursement action was initiated.[7]

d. Financing of Equipment Furnished International Headquarters. The support of SHAPE international headquarters during the period under review involved the problem of the financing of equipment. International headquarters desired to lease certain U.S. Army equipment, which, under Army regulations, could be bought, but not leased. However, SHAPE had taken for granted that the equipment could be leased (under NATO C-R (53) 27), and its Budget and Finance Committee and certain of the NATO countries, favored such a policy because of financial considerations. The rental cost would be less than that of outright purchasing and would

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[6] USAREUR ltr, to CG USAREUR COMZ, et. al., 24 Jul 53. AG 140-COM-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[7] Ibid.

minimize problems of obsolescence and maintenance, which were especially difficult because of the lack of ready maintenance facilities at headquarters.[8] Pending clarification of the issue CINCUSAREUR maintained that no equipment could be leased. CINCNELM and CINCUSAFE concurred, noting that their commanders were reluctant to assume logistical and funding responsibility for the maintenance of leased equipment or that which, for technical or security reasons, could not be leased from commercial sources. Equipment furnished in the past had been subject to hard usage primarily because not all technicians were trained according to U.S. standards. A further reason for opposing the lease policy was that USAREUR and other U.S. headquarters would be constantly requested to replace used with new equipment. The responsible U.S. military services then would have to repair unserviceable equipment or dispose of it.[9] US CINCEUR recommended, with CINCUSAREUR's concurrence, that international headquarters be given proper and adequate support,[10] but agreed that no authority to lease equipment to that headquarters existed. If leasing was necessary to fulfill U.S. commitments, legislative authority should be requested; if approved the practice should be confined to equipment for which international headquarters lacked maintenance facilities and spare parts and which could not be repaired or maintained by commercial contracts because of security considerations. Also, rentals received should be credited to the U.S. annual contribution and, if possible, reimbursement to service appropriations should be made. Finally, the equipment should be leased on a basis permitting title to pass to international headquarters upon payment of specified rentals.[11] At the close of the report period no definite action had been taken.

156. Coordination Between USAREUR and LANDCENT

a. Standardization of Antiaircraft Procedures. USAREUR continued during 1953-54 to work in close coordination with LANDCENT. In March 1953 COMLANDCENT requested comments from CINCUSAREUR on a draft of SHAPE's antiaircraft standing operation procedures.[12] The proposed SOP, if adopted, would cancel the

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[8]Cable EC-9-1054, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, CINCNELM, and CINCUSAFE, 22 Mar 54, sub: Financing Equipment Furnished International Headquarters. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 400.336 (1954), Vol. I, Item 2A.

[9]Ibid.

[10]Cable SK-2175, USAREUR to US CINCEUR, 1 Apr 54, sub: Policy for Financing Equipment Furnished Allied Headquarters. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above, Item 2A atchd.

[11]Cable EC-9-1054, 22 Mar 54, cited above.

[12]Cable LC-70440, COMLANDCENT to CINCUSAREUR, 21 Mar 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 381 SHAPE (1953), Vol. I, Item 21A atchd.

AIRCENT and LANDCENT standing instructions for AAA in field army areas. The object of the new SOP was to enable antiaircraft units of any service of any NATO nation to participate in the antiaircraft defense for which any other nation might be responsible. Although the objective of the plan was acceptable to LANDCENT, its incorporation into the proposed new SOP would require extensive operational retraining in U.S. AAA units. Moreover, the plan was not sufficiently flexible.[13] An army commander should be given every reasonable opportunity to defend himself and for this reason control of antiaircraft should be decentralized below army level. Centralized control of antiaircraft at tactical air force level was slow and did not allow the full exploitation of antiaircraft artillery. These deficienceis would be especially dangerous in an atomic war since in most cases interception of enemy raiders by friendly aircraft before the raiders reached the combat zone would be impossible. Finally, to "hold fire" for the protection of friendly aircraft was neither necessary nor desirable. Given normal information from the tactical air force centers or sector operations centers, artillery commanders would be capable of protecting friendly aircraft while engagine enemy raids in the same general localities. The new plan, according to COMLANDCENT, would substantially reduce the ability of the army commander to protect himself by imposing unnecessary inflexible control procedures on his antiaircraft artillery. Therefore, careful consideration of the plan should be made before any decisions were reached.[14] CINCUSAREUR supported the LANDCENT position with additional reasons. The SHAPE antiaircraft SOP, for instance, did not consider that antiaircraft units were organized under T/O&E's that provided the most effective means for transmitting fire orders in the operational control of their fire units. Organic communication facilities within an antiaircraft organization were designed to operate independently, if necessary, in accomplishing their mission; and antiaircraft effectiveness and its ability to accomplish its mission depended on the immediate transmission of orders to firing units. If controls that delayed the immediate issuance of fire control orders were imposed, antiaircraft artillery defense would be jeopardized. CINCUSAREUR concluded that the proposed SOP would be acceptable if the undesirable provisions were eliminated.[15]

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[13] IRS, USAREUR G3 to USAREUR DCOFS, 25 May 53, sub: SHAPE Antiaircraft Standing Procedure Instructions. NATO SECRET. In file cited above.

[14] Draft of ltr, LANDCENT to SACEUR, Apr 53, sub: Operational Procedures for Antiaircraft Artillery in the Field Army Area. NATO SECRET. In file cited above.

[15] Ltr, USAREUR DCOFS Opns to COMLANDCENT, 9 Jun 53, sub: SHAPE Antiaircraft Standing Operation Procedure Instructions. NATO SECRET. In file cited above.

After considering the different approaches to antiaircraft procedures, SACEUR decided that prearranged operational control of AAA fire in air battle within field army areas would be the joint responsibility of the field army commander and the supporting Air Force commander. When AAA units were in communication with air control centers through AAA operations rooms, minute-to-minute control of AAA fire would be vested in the supporting air commander, who would exercise control through a duty air controller. SACEUR directed COMAIRCENT and COMLANDCENT to issue joint directives clearly defining the responsibility and authority of air controllers.[16] According to the USAREUR representative at the meeting of the SHAPE subcommittee on standardization of antiaircraft procedures on 26-27 May, this group had previously made good progress on the draft of antiaircraft standard operation procedure instructions. However, the proposed SHAPE plan, if adopted, would circumvent the instructions of SACEUR. The representative recommended that CINCUSAREUR request COMLANDCENT to issue a directive covering SACEUR's decision on the operational control of AAA in field army areas and that he furnish copies of joint COMLANDCENT and COMAIRCENT instructions to air controllers. Finally, the decisions of the SHAPE subcommittee should not be made a directive for compliance by field armies, because SACEUR instructions included clear provisions under which field army commanders and supporting air force commanders could operate.[17] CINCUSAREUR accepted these recommendations and submitted them to COMLANDCENT in July 1953. The SHAPE SOP attempted to define in detail the responsibilities and authority of air controllers, even though General Ridgway's instructions had authorized CINCAIRCENT and CINCLANDCENT to issue the necessary joint directive for the guidance of air operation controllers.[18] A proposed new SHAPE SOP on air defense was received in USAREUR in May 1954. The new SOP was admittedly better than the old one but was still regarded as unduly restrictive. Under the new proposal, responsibility for the antiaircraft defense of military installations on national territory outside the land combat zone might be changed, giving the United States the added burden of providing antiaircraft defense for all U.S. installations in France, although current U.S. responsibility was limited to providing light antiaircraft defense for airfields. In anticipation of increased USAREUR responsibility, G3 explored the possibilities of providing antiaircraft defense for all U.S.

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[16] Ltr, SHAPE to COMAIRCENT and COMLANDCENT, n.d. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

[17] Rept by USAREUR Rep on Conf at SHAPE, 26-27 May 53, on AA Procedures. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

[18] Ltr, USAREUR DCOFS Opns to COMLANDCENT, 8 Jul 53. NATO CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

installations in France.[19] USAREUR was also planning to recommend to the Department of the Army the designation of the USAREUR representative to the SHAPE Antiaircraft Defense Committee as the U.S. national representative because the United States was not represented although the committee was presumed to be composed of national representatives.[20]

b. LANDCENT Proposal to Establish Antiaircraft Teams. Because certain NATO countries could not provide specialist training necessary to operate effective antiaircraft defenses, LANDCENT suggested that the Northern and Central Army Groups establish antiaircraft training teams of at least 4 or 5 officers to conduct a 7- to 10-day course in any country requiring their services. A country receiving the instruction would provide accommodations for and pay the travel expenses of the team. Shortly after the suggestion was made, CINCUSAREUR learned that Seventh Army was already providing on-the-job training to interested countries.[21] After careful consideration, CINCUSAREUR declined to furnish the proposed antiaircraft teams because sufficient U.S. opportunities and facilities for training NATO antiaircraft personnel were already available. Since MDAP had been established, for example, 471 spaces for training in the United States had been allocated. In addition, on-the-job training with USAREUR antiaircraft units was offered to any interested NATO power each year from May through August. Language barriers, difficulties in providing and transporting realistic training aids, and the nonstandardization of international antiaircraft defense systems would limit effectiveness of team instruction and override the advantages that would be derived.[22]

157. Reports to LANDCENT

a. Wartime Movements and Transport. During the period under review, U.S. forces continued to report their land movement requirements to LANDCENT. The report was drawn so that LANDCENT and other NATO forces could present movement requirements to the French Government, which would then allocate movement capacity to forces

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[19] IRS, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to USAREUR DCOFS Opns, 15 May 54, sub: Meeting of SHAPE Antiaircraft Defense Committee. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381 SHAPE (1954), Vol. I, Item 21.

[20] Ibid.

[21] (1) IRS, USAREUR G3 to USAREUR DCOFS Opns, 12 Dec 53, sub: Provision of Training Antiaircraft Teams. NATO SECRET. (2) Cable 6072, Seventh Army sgd McAuliffe to CINCUSAREUR, 18 Dec 53. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 381 SHAPE (1953), Vol. II, Item 88 and atchd.

[22] Cable SX-4990, CINCUSAREUR sgd Hoge to COMLANDCENT, 26 Dec 53. NATO SECRET. In file cited above.

in need of it. Currently, USAREUR had sufficient allocation of movement capacity to satisfy requirements, but there were indications of insufficient allocations for bulk POL.[23]

b. Action Concerning French Airborne Division under CENTAG. USAREUR was requested in March 1953 to provide the chief signal officer of LANDCENT with a list of NATO signal documents, excluding CRYPTO, which were to be issued by CENTAG to a French airborne division when it came under the command of CENTAG. LANDCENT also desired the plans for the required training of the division's signal troops and for effecting liaison between the division signal officer and the appropriate chief signal officer of the organization to which it was assigned.[24] CINCUSAREUR replied that the French unit would receive CENTAG signal operations instructions and pertinent extracts of CENTAG emergency plans by letter of instructions, as well as current CENTAG telephone directories and teletype diagrams. Furthermore, no special training would be necessary except for intensive training in agreed NATO procedures. The method of effecting liaison would be by wire or radio net. No signal problems were foreseen if the unit had normal equipment allowances and adequate notification of assignment.[25]

158. Support of Headquarters, Allied Land Forces, Southeast Europe

Logistical support of the U.S. element of Headquarters, Allied Land Forces, Southeast Europe (LANDSOUTHEAST), had been assigned to the U.S. Navy.[26] In order to carry out this assignment, the Commander, Subordinate Command, Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (COMSUBCOMNELM) at Naples had to obtain supplies from the United States and deliver them to Turkey. This procedure required the establishment of a long, complex, and costly supply line for a small group. CINCUSAREUR's position on this problem was that the stockage of Army items in the Naples area for the support of the U.S. element of LANDSOUTHEAST was not warranted. He recommended that COMSUBCOMNELM obtain the required items from USFA or USAREUR technical services and that shipment be arranged directly with LANDSOUTHEAST.[27]

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[23]USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf 6, 16 Jun 53, pp. 2-3. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

[24]Cable 70450, COMLANDCENT to CINCUSAREUR, 24 Mar 53. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381 SHAPE (1953), Vol. I, Item 25.

[25]Cable S-3286, CINCUSAREUR sgd Eddy to COMLANDCENT, 22 Mar 53. SECRET. In file above, Item 28 atchd.

[26]USAREUR G4 Div Jnl, 3 Dec 53. UNCLASSIFIED.

[27]Cable SC-19887, USAREUR to US CINCEUR Frankfurt, 4 Dec 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 SHAPE (1953), Vol. I, Item 24.

In December 1953 CINCUSAREUR informed service components responsible for supporting an international headquarters that they could use cross-servicing if it was to the best interests of the United States. However, each request for cross-servicing would have to specify the method of reimbursement.[28]

159. Review of SHAPE Infrastructure

As NATO plans were developed by SHAPE, it became evident that fixed installations would have to be built in certain countries to provide support for NATO military forces. As a result, the NATO powers initiated an infrastructure program of two types. One type was called national infrastructure whereby nations provided, at their own expense, support for their forces, including those to be assigned to Allied Powers Europe. The second type, known as NATO common infrastructure, was restricted to multination, common-use facilities or facilities whose provision was not primarily the responsibility of any one nation.[29] Installations built under this program included command headquarters, airfields, signal communications, jet fuel storage depots, and distribution facilities.[30] An annual infrastructure program known as a "slice" was planned and carried out by the NATO signatories.[31] Each year CENTAG is called upon by LANDCENT to submit projects for inclusion in SHAPE's annual infrastructure program. The USAREUR G4 requested all interested staff divisions to submit projects that might qualify for common infrastructure funding. Submitted projects were screened to determine whether they met NATO infrastructure criteria. Those projects believed to qualify were prepared for submission to LANDCENT in accordance with procedures established by the Infrastructure Committee and approved by the NATO Council. USAREUR guided the host nation in preparing a cost estimate for each project. After NATO and SHAPE approved the proposed projects, USAREUR G4 monitored developments in connection with each and assisted in the completion of the projects.[32] During the report period, CINCUSAREUR assisted in preparing and execution of the SHAPE Fifth Slice NATO Common Infrastructure Program. This program allotted 9.95 million pounds

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[28] Cable ED-3-1178, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, CINCNELM, CINCUSAFE, USFA, TRUST, and USNMR SHAPE, 15 Dec 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 24 atchd.

[29] Briefing for Maj Gen H. P. Storke, USAREUR ACOFS G4, prepared by Lt Col Robert E. Phelps, USAREUR G4 Div Instls Br, 26 Jul 54. NATO SECRET. In USAREUR G3 Div Tng Br files.

[30] NATO Doc C-M (1953) 63, 11 May 53, sub: Definition of Common Infrastructure. NATO CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR G3 Div Tng Br files.

[31] Briefing for Gen Storke, 26 Jul 54, cited above.

[32] Ibid.

sterling for projects within Germany and 81.65 million pounds sterling for projects outside Germany. Of the 9.95 million pounds, 9.63 million were to be used for training installations, 0.23 million pounds for POL installations, and 0.09 million pounds for radio navigational aids. The United States, the United Kingdom, and France were to consult on the financing and execution of the German area portion of the program.[33]

160. Location of Headquarters, Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force

In December 1952 Twelfth Air Force had requested CINCUSAREUR to approve an amendment to an agreement reached by U.S. and French military representatives on 2 March 1951 pertaining to the exchange of facilities and the stationing of troops within their respective zones.[34] The proposed amendment, submitted by the Commanding General, Twelfth Air Force, and approved by the Commanding General, First Air Division, would transfer the Forces Auxilliaires du Genie (FAG or Engineer Auxiliary Forces), barracks at Trier, Germany, from French to U.S. control and provide for a future agreement on the utilization of the Trier-Euren airfield. In exchange, Twelfth Air Force would transfer DM 2,000,000 of its GFY 1953 budget to the French, to pay the cost of relocating French troops stationed at the FAG barracks. Twelfth Air Force would make the installation available for use as the peacetime headquarters of the Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force (FOURATAF), and international headquarters under operational control of Headquarters, AIRCENT. Located at Landsberg, Germany, AIRCENT headquarters in late 1952 consisted of 98 United States, 5 French, and 2 Canadian personnel. Twelfth Air Force strongly urged that the action be taken, pending approval by the NATO Standing Group of infrastructure funds for Headquarters, FOURATAF. Funds for the establishment of FOURATAF wartime headquarters at another location had been included, but the eligibility of the FOURATAF's wartime headquarters had not yet been determined, so that approval of the infrastructure funds for the peacetime headquarters was extremely doubtful. The expenditure of DM 2,000,000 of U.S. procured funds for the project would be tantamount to a U.S. contribution to an infrastructure-type project that should be considered by other countries when the United States was requested to contribute to infrastructure projects. The French had contributed DM 2,000,000 for rehabilitation of the barracks and were prepared to expend DM 2,500,000 at the airfield, which would be used jointly by the nations concerned. The Twelfth Air Force position was that

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[33] SHAPE ltr, 23 Dec 53, sub: Approved SHAPE 1954 Fifth Slice NATO Common Infrastructure Program. AG 6100/5/E-1285/53 LOG. NATO SECRET.

[34] IRS, Dir USAREUR Log Div to CINCUSAREUR, 9 Dec 52, sub: Peacetime Location of Headquarters, 4th Allied Tactical Air Force. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 SHAPE (1953), Vol. I, Item 3 atchd.

the proposed amendment would be very advantageous if considered purely as a real estate transaction. Moreover, if the Trier installation was not used as FOURATAF headquarters, it could be utilized as a headquarters for one of the U.S. air divisions programmed for Twelfth Air Force. The Commander in Chief, French Forces in Germany (CCFFA) was prepared to sign the proposed agreement; the Twelfth Air Force commander recommended that CINCUSAREUR also give his approval. Twelfth Air Force would also require authority from CINCUSAREUR for the transfer of DM 2,000,000 to the French and for the assignment of the installation to FOURATAF, provided U.S., French, and Canadian forces agreed on a cost sharing plan to cover logistical support, maintenance, and operating costs of the FOURATAF headquarters and the Trier-Euren airfield.[35] In January 1953 CINCUSAREUR agreed to the transfer of the FAG barracks in Trier to Twelfth Air Force, but stipulated that since the amendment did not provide a terminal date for the completion of all construction by the French, every effort should be made to insure against French failure to expend all of the DM 2,000,000 so that USAREUR or Twelfth Air Force would not be liable for the liquidation of the unexpended balance.[36]

161. Interallied Tactical Study Group

One of the organizations designed to bring about closer harmony and liaison between Allied commands was the Interallied Tactical Study Group, established by LANDCENT, with representatives from the major Allied commands in Europe, including USAREUR. The fields of study of this group included the integration of national forces, the coordination of diverse tactical regulations, the establishment of basic doctrine in harmony with the doctrine of the allies, the guidance of major commanders in selecting tactical procedures outlined by their national doctrines, the definition of practical procedures for interallied liaison, and the establishment of controls for the operation of German formations. In a report to CINCUSAREUR, the USAREUR representative noted that, apart from developing mutual understanding between commands, the group helped promote a grasp of underlying complex issues on which compromises might be achieved. There was a definite need for careful study and cooperation in interallied command, liaison, and communications, and in tactical concepts; the study group would serve as a healthy arena for the exchange of ideas, opinions, and techniques in the fields of command, staff, and tactics. The representative's recommendations to CINCUSAREUR, therefore, were that close and continuous liaison with the group should be maintained. Continuity

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[35] Ibid.

[36] Ltr, USAREUR to CINCUSAFE, 27 Jan 53, sub: Headquarters, 4th Allied Tactical Air Force (Peacetime Site). SECRET. In file cited above.

of liaison could best be maintained by the appointment of a qualified officer who could devote considerable time to the group's work. Such a representative should have access to specified senior officers in order to formulate USAREUR policy on appropriate matters; he should possess a military background combining formal education in service schools and personal combat experience.[37]

162. USAREUR Participation in European Defense Community Planning

a. The European Defense Community Interim Committee. During the report period the Western Allies continued to participate in planning for the proposed European Defense Community (EDC). Delegations that participated in drawing up the EDC treaty continued to meet as an interim committee known as the European Defense Community Interim Committee (EDCIC), which was to function until the EDC treaty was ratified and was to attempt to solve certain problems that might arise before ratification. The interim committee was to be responsible also for drawing up preparatory studies and plans, so that EDC could begin to operate immediately after ratification.[38]

b. USAREUR's Responsibility. CINCEUR had been assigned the responsibilities of administering the military aspects of the Mutual Security Program in Europe and of making interim plans for military assistance activities for Western Germany. The task of providing training facilities for key personnel and specialists who would be required by Western Germany in the operation, employment, and maintenance of equipment furnished by the United States as end-item aid was delegated to US CINCEUR's component commanders, CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE, and COMNAVGER. Although the plan had not been completely worked out, these component commanders, particularly CINCUSAREUR and CINCUSAFE, were expected to provide assistance in support of the German EDC contingents during the early days of EDC. CINCUSAREUR was also responsible for releasing facilities for German EDC contingents.[39]

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[37] Ltr, Maj Alfred L. Toth to CINCUSAREUR, n.d. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381 SHAPE (1953), Vol. I, Item 11C atchd.

[38] (1) IRS, USAREUR G3 to USAREUR DCOFS Opns, 11 Jun 53, sub: Summary of Conference on "Equipping and Training of German Contingents of the EDC" held at Headquarters, USAREUR, 23 March 1953. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381 EDF (1953), Item 1 atchd (B/P). (2) S. Doc., Execs. Q and R, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., Convention on Relations with the Federal Republic of Germany and a Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty, p. 231. UNCLASSIFIED.

[39] IRS, 11 Jun 53, cited above.

c. Planning for EDC. In order to implement the EDC program effectively, working groups were set up by CINCUSAREUR and CCFFA to study the availability of installations, facilities, and training areas for German contingents. CENTAG exercised general supervision, with emphasis on operational matters, while the detailed work was to be accomplished by CINCUSAREUR and CCFFA. CENTAG monitored the work and kept LANDCENT, the EDC Interim Committee, and other agencies concerned informed of progress.[40]

d. USAREUR Working Committee. Organized on 27 January 1953, the USAREUR Working Committee was responsible for working out a plan with the German Federal Republic whereby the latter would station cadres in the vicinity of USAREUR training areas or other suitable locations, for designating and making plans for the release to the German army of installations under the control of USAREUR, and for studying the procedures by which the Germans would plan to organize and train cadres. The committee included representatives from USAREUR G3 and G4, the German Federal Republic, and Seventh Army. Observers from the EDC Interim Committee, LANDCENT, NAG, FFA, USAFE, US EUCOM, and USNAVGER were invited to attend meetings. German representatives at the first meetings outlined Germany's plans for organizing and training its army when EDC was ratified. They introduced plans for locations and requirements for troop housing, operational and administrative headquarters, and service installations and facilities, including training areas. The committee made plans for the establishment of schools for the German cadres so that they could begin training soon after EDC was ratified. Since available training facilities were barely sufficient for U.S. and French forces in Germany, the USAREUR committee began to plan additional facilities to provide training space for the six German groupments in CENTAG. Two new major training areas were considered adequate. Installations were also needed to house the German army. After conducting a command-wide survey to determine what installations could be made available, USAREUR planned to turn over to the German Federal Republic a large number of installations which it would be permitted to rehabilitate or within which it could begin new construction.[41] The Bonn government planned a 2-phase over-all buildup of its Army, the first to consist of initial cadre organization and the second of the

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[40] USAREUR ltr, 27 Mar 53, sub: Minutes of the Central Army Group Conference Conducted at Heidelberg on 17 March 1953 Relative to Initiation of Studies on the Stationing of EDC (German) Land Forces in the United States and French Zones of Germany. AG 092.2 GOT. NATO CONFIDENTIAL.

[41] (1) Incl 1 to USAREUR ltr, 6 Jul 53, sub: Summary of USAREUR Working Committee on EDC (German Deployment). AG 092.2 GOT. NATO CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Ibid., App F.

organization and establishment of complete divisions through conscription.[42] Problems of providing adequate installations and training areas for the German EDC Army were foremost and the committee continued to devise means by which these problems could be met. CINCUSAREUR assisted by stating that several additional installations could be released to the Germans through the consolidation of U.S. troop installations.[43] At the end of the report period the German Federal Republic revealed a plan that would accommodate the entire German contingent. Dependent on several factors, such as the total number of spaces made available by USAREUR and FFA, the acquisition of necessary land, and the availability of construction funds, the plan included the utilization of destroyed Wehrmacht facilities and possibly the building of tent camps, after the cadres were trained, to house troops near the training areas.[44] The representatives of the German Federal Republic studied the Reutlingen training area and agreed that it would be satisfactory. It was explained to them that the adequacy of Hammelburg and Schwarzenborn, proposed as EDC training areas, would depend on EDC approval after ratification and the granting of necessary funds. Until the Germans had their own training areas, it was hoped that USAREUR could fill the gap.[45] In meetings in late 1953 and during the first six months of 1954, the USAREUR Working Committee continued to anticipate and solve problems that would arise with the implementation of EDC.

163. Planning Board for European Inland Surface Transport

a. Purpose and Functions. On 24 July 1952 the Planning Board for European Inland Surface Transport (PBEIST) was created by the NATO Council. SHAPE had seen the need for such an organization to formulate systematic plans to provide the greatest possible transportation capability to NATO forces in the event of an emergency. The functions of this newly created board were to plan during peacetime for the coordination of inland transport in the

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[42] Incl 1 to USAREUR ltr, 28 Mar 53, sub: Report of First Meeting of Central Army Group (USAREUR and CCFFA) Working Committees on EDC (German) Deployment. AG 092.2 GOT. NATO CONFIDENTIAL.

[43] Incl 1 to USAREUR ltr, 30 Jul 53, sub: Report of Sixth Meeting of USAREUR Working Committee on EDC (German) Deployment. AG 092.2 GOT. NATO CONFIDENTIAL.

[44] Incl 1 to USAREUR ltr, 4 Jun 54, sub: Report of Tenth Meeting of USAREUR Working Committee on EDC (German) Deployment. AG 092.0 GOT. NATO CONFIDENTIAL.

[45] Incl 1 to USAREUR ltr, 29 Jun 54, sub: Sub-report of Eleventh Meeting of USAREUR Working Committee on EDC (German) Deployment. AG 092.2 GOT. NATO CONFIDENTIAL.

event of war, and for transport requirements of SHAPE and the countries involved, and to propose an organization to be established in time of war or emergency for coordinating surface transport among the NATO nations.[46]

b. Organization. All the members of NATO were given representation on the planning board. In addition, SACEUR and the NATO Standing Group sent representatives who became members. The Steering Group was made responsible for preparing the work of the board and was given authority to act as an executive body and to supervise the activities of subordinate elements. Under the Steering Group, working groups were created to undertake projects concerned with railway, road, inland bulk POL, and inland water transport, and beaches. The Port Emergency Planning Group was given the special mission of determining the ports that would be needed. The working groups handled projects for the entire European area while the subgroups concentrated on more limited areas, designated as northern, central, and southern regions.[47]

c. USAREUR's Responsibility. In 1953 CINCUSAREUR was directed by CINCEUR to furnish U.S. representation on the planning board working groups and subgroups, and was also given authority to call upon CINCUSAFE and CINCNELM for assistance in furnishing representatives to any working groups or subgroups that might be formed later.[48] CINCUSAREUR was also requested to furnish an adviser to the U.S. member of the board, and to seek to coordinate U.S. subgroup activities of the northern and southern regions of Europe.[49]

d. Coordination of Inland Transport in Central Europe. Each working group and subgroup made considerable progress during the report period by obtaining information concerning transport facilities that would be needed and by devising ways and means of meeting these needs. Perhaps the greatest achievement of the planning board during this period was the creation of the Authority for the Coordination of Inland Transport in Central Europe (ACITCE). One of the functions that had been assigned the planning board was the creation of an organization which, in time of war or emergency, would coordinate surface transport among the Western Allies. The proposed authority would begin to function not later than the beginning of open hostilities at which time its membership would

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[46] Briefing on PBEIST by Lt Col W. E. Ligon, Chief of PBEIST, Dec 53. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR Trans Div files.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Cable 1114442, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE, CINCNELM, 11 Feb 53. SECRET. In USAREUR Trans Div files.

[49] Briefing on PBEIST, Dec 53, cited above.

be composed of representatives from Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, the United States, the United Kingdom, and SHAPE. Western Germany would also be given representation in accordance with whatever wartime status she might be granted. The authority would be responsible for the coordination of inland surface transport, including port operations, of the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, and Western Germany.[50] On 12 May 1954 the NATO Council approved the work accomplished by the planning board.[51]

Section II: USAREUR Participation in the Mutual Security Program

164. USAREUR Mutual Security Responsibilities

The Mutual Security Program initiated in October 1951 included the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP), the Defense Support Program, and the Technical Assistance Program. During the period of this report USAREUR was concerned primarily with MDAP.[52] US CINCEUR delegated to CINCUSAREUR the responsibility for budgeting, funding, and fiscal and civilian personnel administration, along with other related reporting activities pertaining to dollar and local currency operating expenses of MDAP, as applied to the MAAG's and the military missions.[53]

165. The Mutual Defense Assistance Materiel Program

In 1952 a program was initiated under which U.S. forces in Europe would turn over older equipment to countries participating in MDAP, and replace it with newer equipment. Beginning in February or March 1954, shipments of M-48 tanks were scheduled for

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[50] NATO Doc Annex B to C-M (1954) 40, 26 Apr 54, sub: Draft Terms of Reference of an Organization Responsible for the International Coordination of European Inland Surface Transport in Time of War in the Central European Region. NATO CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR Trans Div files.

[51] Cable POLTO-1833, USRO Paris sgd Hughes to Washington, 12 May 54, sub: NAC Meeting, May 12. SECRET. In USAREUR Trans Div files.

[52] EUCOM/USAREUR Comd Rept, 1952, pp. 296-97. SECRET.

[53] Cable EC-3-32, CINCEUR to DA and others, 8 Aug 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 400.336 (1953), Vol. II, Item 33 atchd.

Europe at the rate of 100 the first month and approximately 175 per month thereafter, until all requirements for USAREUR, TRUST, and USFA were filled. The 1,895 M-47 tanks on hand would be used to fill MDAP requirements or stored for the future German EDC contingent. MDAP requirements were to be filled whenever possible, so that the number of tanks that would have to be stored would be held to a minimum.[54] CINCUSAREUR wanted to turn the M-47 tanks over to MDAP recipients in their current condition, eliminating the necessity of their rehabilitation by USAREUR, and giving the recipient countries valuable training and experience in working on the M-47 tanks. USAREUR offered to supply spare parts and tools, within its capacity. If USAREUR had to rebuild the tanks, the work would have to be done on a dollar contract basis, with funds provided by the Department of the Army, at an estimated cost of $16,035,688. CINCUSAREUR also recommended that no large stocks of tanks be stored in Germany until the Germans could man them.[55] However, in January 1954 the Department of the Army postponed the exchange program because of design deficiencies in the M-48 tank which made their shipment to Europe at the scheduled time impossible. M-47 tanks needed by countries participating in MDAP would be supplied from the United States.[56]

166. <u>The World War II Vehicle Exchange Program</u>

The World War II Vehicle Exchange Program was initiated in 1951 for the purpose of replacing all World War II-type vehicles still utilized by U.S. military forces. Under this plan the older vehicles were rebuilt and turned over to MDAP recipients. The program consisted of two parts, the Wheeled Vehicle Program and the Tracked Vehicle Program. By 1953 the Tracked Vehicle Program practically had been completed. The Wheeled Vehicle Program continued, however, through an agreement between USAREUR and the Air Force whereby 1 "M" series tank was traded for 3 World War II tanks. USAREUR was to repair the old tanks from its own funds, and was to be reimbursed when they were delivered to the MDAP nations. USAREUR was to receive 14,000 tanks, to be rebuilt in the United Kingdom, Berlin, and Italy. Those rebuilt in the United Kingdom were to be used in that country, those rebuilt in Berlin were to be given to MDAP participants in central and northern Europe, and those rebuilt in Italy were to go to southern European recipients.[57]

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[54]Cable DA-948430, COFSA from ACOFSA G4 to CINCUSAREUR, 18 Sep 53. SECRET. In file above, Item 37A atchd.

[55]Cable S-3705, USAREUR to ACOFSA G4, 22 Oct 53. SECRET. In file cited above.

[56]Cable 956175, DA from COFSA to CINCUSAREUR, 27 Jan 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 400.366 (1954), Vol. I, Item 2 atchd.

[57]Interv, Cpl Robert Bolt, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. E. Russell Baldridge, USAREUR G4 Div Sup Br Distr Sec, 20 Oct 54. SECRET.

167. Mutual Security Offshore Procurement

a. Purpose of Offshore Procurement. The Offshore Procurement Program (OSP) in Europe was established by the U.S. Government as a national contribution to the combined defense production of the NATO countries and the proposed European Defense Community, and also to provide a means of increasing the dollar earnings of the countries participating. Under OSP the United States procured selected materiel, services, supplies, and equipment appropriate either for the Mutual Security Aid Program or for direct use by U.S. forces.[58] The program, however, was in no case intended as a substitute for a participating country's own military production program. Moreover, although the contracting responsibility was given to U.S. procurement officers, the U.S. Government gave full consideration to recommendations of NATO international staffs so that the program could be carried out in conjunction with NATO planning.[59]

b. The Facilities Assistance Program. Under the provisions of Public Law 118, 83d Congress, the Department of Defense was authorized $35,000,000 for the FY 1954, MDA Facilities Assistance Program, the object of which was to encourage the development of defense production bases in Title I MAAG countries and in Greece and Turkey. In the development of these bases it was intended that available indigenous sources would be used to the maximum and that, in the event of hostilities, close-up support would be provided from indigenous sources soon enough to be effective. The primary specific objective of the Congressional appropriation for this program was the expansion of the manufacturing capacity of propellants and explosives industries. The obligating of funds was to be preceded by a thorough military assessment and by engineering surveys in order to assure the best location of the plants strategically and a maximum return on a minimum investment. The U.S. contribution was to be in the form of production equipment and technical know-how, while the participating countries were to provide the necessary real estate, the "bricks and mortar," the labor, and, to the extent feasible, the indigenous production equipment. Agreements between the United States and the participating countries for the implementation of this program were to be predicated upon an equitable financial contribution by the participating countries and on commitments by them that they would maintain facilities financed with U.S. aid in an operating or a stand-by condition; that they would not discriminate against any

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[58] Cable 2, AMEMB Brussels sgd Cowen to State Dept, 15 Dec 52. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 400.12 (1953), Vol. I.

[59] Airgram to certain diplomatic missions, n.d., sub: Intergovernmental Understanding on OSP. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 16A atchd.

NATO country with respect to price, quality, delivery dates, or priority in obtaining a fair share of the production; that they would not use the facilities or equipment for purposes other than those originally intended, without the consent of the United States; and that such facilities would be a net addition to the total facilities already in existence in the participating country.[60]

(1) Designation of USAREUR for Program Implementation. On 27 October 1953 Mr. Tracy S. Voorhees. Director of Offshore Procurement in Europe, discussed his concept of implementation of the program with Mr. W. Slezak, Assistant Secretary of the Army. Mr. Voorhees considered the program to be basically an extension of Army Offshore Procurement Program in Europe and desired CINCUSAREUR to act for him, in conjunction with the Production Planning Division of his office, both in developing detailed projects as bases for country agreements and in implementing the approved program through existing USAREUR OSP channels. Mr. Slezak agreed with Mr. Voorhees' concept and approved USAREUR's participation in the program.[61] On 15 February 1954 CINCUSAREUR was designated by the Department of the Army as the operating agent for the Director of Offshore Procurement in implementation of the Facilities Assistance Program directly under US CINCEUR's staff supervision.[62]

(2) USAREUR Responsibilities. CINCUSAREUR was made responsible for participating, in an advisory capacity to the U.S. embassies, in the negotiation of acceptable bilateral memorandums of understanding with the countries concerned; for arranging contract negotiations, awards, and administration; and for conducting and coordinating the required detailed engineering in connection with the program.[63] USAREUR received copies of the drafts of the bilateral, technical, and cost reimbursement arrangements from the Director of Offshore Procurement, with the advice that the bilateral arrangements would be negotiated with the assistance of CINCUSAREUR and signed by the U.S. ambassadors concerned and that the technical arrangements and contracts would be negotiated and signed by the pertinent USAREUR contracting officers. On 23 February 1954 the Department of the Army amended CINCUSAREUR's responsibilities by adding the responsibility

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[60] Cable POLTO-CIRC-A-44, Paris to all European NATO capitals, 5 Nov 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 400.12 (1954), Vol. I, Item 3 atchd.

[61] Cable DA-462655, COFSA from ACOFSA G4 to CINCUSAREUR, 27 Oct 53. UNCLASIFIED. In file cited above.

[62] Cable DA-489556, DA from ACOFSA G4 to CINCUSAREUR, 15 Feb 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 16 atchd.

[63] Ibid.

previously assigned to the contracting officers for the negotiation and signature of the technical arrangements that would be authorized in the bilateral memorandums of understanding. Representatives of the Secretary of Defense, the Judge Advocate General, the Director of Offshore Procurement, and CINCUSAREUR agreed in conference that if the program was to be consummated by 30 June 1954, deviations would be necessary in all three of the proposed types of documents.[64] The Department of the Army authorized CINCUSAREUR on 17 March 1954 to omit and to deviate from portions of prescribed Armed Service Procurement Regulations (ASPR) and Army Procurement Procedures (APP) only in contracts for the Facilities Assistance Program, wherever such action was necessary to accomplish the objectives of the program. Other procurement contracts negotiated by CINCUSAREUR were specifically excluded.[65] CINCUSAREUR was also authorized to proceed with the necessary procurement under the conditions set forth in Department of the Army instructions; CINCUSAREUR was provided $32,000,000 for this purpose.[66]

(3) USAREUR Implementing Instructions. The implementation of the program fell to the USAREUR technical services and particularly to the USAREUR Ordnance Division. CINCUSAREUR's implementing instructions authorized the pertinent technical services to execute Facilities Assistance Program contracts, subject to current limitations on approval of contract awards, after approval of the project studies by the Army Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, without waiting for the consummation of either the bilateral or the technical arrangements. The technical services, through procurement representatives, were to strongly urge the countries concerned to complete and submit their project studies without delay. Where it was impossible to execute Facilities Assistance Program contracts on a fixed price basis before 30 June 1954 because of lack of detailed data and studies, the technical services were to exploit fully the use of cost contracts on the basis of estimated costs and general descriptions of the scope of the project in order to place the program completely before 30 June 1954.[67] The Department of Defense informed CINCUSAREUR, that

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[64] C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR Ord Off, 25 Mar 53, sub: Facilities Assistance Program. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Cen files, 620 (1954), Vol. I, Item 7 atchd.

[65] Cable DA-958515, DA from ACOFSA G4 to CINCUSAREUR, 17 Mar 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 400.12 (1954), Vol. I, Item 16 atchd.

[66] Cable DA-958503, DA from ACOFSA G4 to CINCUSAREUR, 17 Mar 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

[67] C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR Ord Off, 29 Apr 54, sub: Facilities Assistance Program. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Cen files, 620 (1954), Vol. I, Item 7 atchd.

FY 1954 MDAP funds would be available for expenditure at least through FY 1957. Therefore, no objection existed at Washington to entering into contracts obligating FY 1954 funds for equipment scheduled for delivery during FY 1957. Accordingly, instructions to the USAREUR technical services were amended to provide for the availability of funds for the Facilities Assistance Program through FY 1957, and for delivery dates up to, but not later than, 30 June 1957.[68]

c. Storage of OSP Ammunition for Western Germany. On 16 February 1954 the Department of the Army delegated to CINCUSAREUR the responsibility of storing and maintaining OSP ammunition for the future use of the German Federal Republic.[69] Soon thereafter CINCUSAREUR informed US CINCEUR of the lack of adequate storage capability for this ammunition west of the Rhine River. Ammunition stored east of the Rhine would be in a very vulnerable position until EDC was ratified and a German armed force was created. CINCUSAREUR therefore recommended the reallocation of all OSP ammuniton scheduled for Germany to other recipients until the ratification of EDC or until the creation of a German army. Failing this, the ammunition should be stored in the United States.[70] Acting on these recommendations, the Department of the Army directed an examination into the requirements of each NATO country so that additions might be made to the maximum authorized quantity of OSP materiel originally scheduled from OSP for Germany. Types of ammunition for which NATO nations could not be designated would be considered for worldwide reallocation on a case by case basis. CINCUSAREUR was to accept responsibility for storing any remaining ammunition, east of the Rhine, if necessary.[71] CINCUSAREUR thereupon made plans to rehabilitate the Luebberstedt area, where an estimated 25,000 tons could be stored; CINCUSAREUR was also directed to retain control of storage sites with an estimated capacity of 18,000 tons in the vicinity of Bamberg.[72]

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[68](1) Cable DA-959909, DA from G4 to CINCUSAREUR and USRO, Paris, 14 Apr 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 400.12 (1954), Vol. I, Item 3 atchd. (2) C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR Ord Off, 3 May 54, sub: Facilities Assistance Program. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 620 (1954), Vol. I, Item 7 atchd.

[69]IRS, USAREUR ACOFS, G4, to USAREUR COFS, 22 Apr 54, sub: Storage of OSP Ammunition Program for FED-REP-GER. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 400.12 (1954), Vol. I, Item 10 atchd.

[70]Cable S-1808, USAREUR to US CINCEUR, 6 Mar 54. SECRET. In file cited above.

[71]Cable DA-960272, DA from ACOFSA G4 to US CINCEUR, 20 Apr 54. SECRET. In file cited above.

[72]IRS, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 27 Apr 54, sub: Storage of OSP Ammunition Program for FED-REP-GER. SECRET. In file cited above.

d. Recovery of Profits from OSP Contracts. During 1954 the problem arose of recovering profits realized by foreign governments from OSP contracts. In a memorandum of understanding concluded with the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, agreed that any profits made by their governments on government-to-government OSP contracts would be returned to the United States.[73] The problem resulted from differing concepts of the term "government-to-government contract." CINCNELM, CINCUSAFE, and US CINCEUR interpreted the "no profit" clause as pertaining only to direct government-to-government contracts. In view of this interpretation, the three commanders recommended to the Department of Defense the exemption, except in special cases, of the clause for contracts made directly with partially or wholly government-owned or commercial-type concerns, whether or not organized as corporations under authority of local laws.[74] CINCUSAREUR disagreed with this view because any profits realized by a foreign government through OSP should be refunded, irrespective of the form of contract employed. Furthermore, having signed a contract, a foreign government should not be exempted from refunding to the U.S. government any profits that resulted. CINCUSAREUR referred to the recognition by Canada, in the Canadian Commercial Corporation agreement, and by Britain and France in memorandums of understanding to the principle of no profits on U.S. contracts. These countries also understood that any accrued profits would be returned to the United States. CINCUSAREUR also drew an analogy between the realization of profits and the payment of taxes, both of which constituted financial benefits to foreign governments; an existing agreement whereby the United States was exempt from paying taxes on OSP contracts applied to contracts fulfilled by private firms as well as through government-to-government contracts. In FY's 1952 and 1953 MDA programs contracts amounting to $194,094,000 had been entered into by CINCUSAREUR with agencies believed to be wholly or partially government-owned although they contracted as a private entity. If the profits on those controls were not returned, the United States would suffer a substantial financial loss.[75] If efforts to determine profits proved administratively impracticable under certain circumstances, the return of profits might be waived, but questions as to feasibility did not warrant departure from the principle that no profits

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[73] IRS, ACOFSA to COFSA, 2 Apr 54, sub: Establishment and Transmittal to DA of CINCUSAREUR's Position with Respect of Recovery of Profits Realized by Foreign Governments from OSP Contracts. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 400.12 (1954), Vol. I, Item 6 atchd.

[74] Cable EC-3-485, US CINCEUR to DD, 2 Feb 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[75] Ltr, USAREUR to ACOFSA G4, 9 Apr 54, sub: Profit Refunding Provision of OSP Memorandum of Understanding. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

should accrue to a foreign government as a result of U.S. contracts.[76] At the end of the report period, no decision had been reached. However, the Inter-Service Advisory Group supported the application of the "no profits" principle to contracts, whether prime or subordinate, without regard to whether they were signed by government officials in their official capacities.[77]

e. Status of OSP Program at end of FY 1954. Of the $474,000,000 allocated for MDAP in FY 1954, $244,000,000 was to be used for continuing the procurement program in the next fiscal year. All other items of the program were procured during the fiscal year except minor ones that were regarded as unprocurable because they were ordered in quantities too small for economic production or for other reasons. The procurement was achieved at a cost of approximately $190,000,000, although the Department of the Army had estimated and programmed $230,000,000 for this purpose. Procurement at $40,000,000 less than the programmed amount may be attributed at least in part to competition as well as the fact that European contractors had gained in experience and production capacity since the previous year. The difference was larger than anticipated and much larger proportionately than in FY 1953.[78]

168. MDAP Training in USAREUR

Initiated during 1950 under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, the program of training foreign students was continued during this report period and emphasized on-the-job training.[79] Discussions with country representatives indicated that instead of more book learning, the countries now wanted a chance to see how U.S. units operated. There should be no change in the plan of financing the program by which the cost of training was paid by the country receiving it. In order to keep training costs down, the Department of the Army desired that USAREUR do as much of it as possible. Thus USAREUR's training load was expected to

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[76](1) Cable EC-3-485, US CINCEUR to Dept of Defense, 2 Feb 54. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Ltr, USAREUR to ACOFSA G4, 9 Apr 54, sub: Profit Refunding Provision of OSP Memorandum of Understanding. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in file cited above.

[77]Cable EC-3-1546, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE, and others, 14 Apr 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[78]Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 2 Jul 54, sub: Status of Procurement at End of Fiscal Year. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 400.12 (1954), Vol. II, Item 56.

[79]IRS, USAREUR G3 to USAREUR DCOFS Opns, 14 Apr 53, sub: On-the-Job Training of Allied Military Personnel. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 350.2 (1953), Vol. I, Item 9 atchd.

be approximately the same as during the previous year, even though over-all MDAP training had been curtailed considerably. The following tabulation indicates, by countries, the number of students programmed for FY 1954:[80]

Country	Number of Students
Total	493
Iran	0
Norway	22
Turkey	72
France	27
Greece	152
The Netherlands	22
United Kingdom	10
Italy	10
Yugoslavia	17
Portugal	28
Denmark	22
Spain	73
Belgium	24
Luxembourg	14

Most of the training would be on-the-job, except the training of students from Greece, Turkey, and Spain.

a. Pooling of Technicians. Technical representatives had to be pooled as much as possible, in order to derive maximum benefit from them and to save the cost of returning them to the United States when one country was through with their services. The Department of the Army planned to pool technical representatives at US EUCOM and send them out to the countries when and where needed. When their services were not required by a Military Assistance Advisory Group, the technicians would be available for use by USAREUR. Most of the MAAG's approved this plan, except in the case of signal technicians, who were in constant demand.

b. Standardization of Training. During the period under review several MAAG's stressed the need for standardization in the schools, in part because in some countries students were released from the army or disciplined if they returned from a school with

[80] Incl 1 to memo, Col W. E. Kraus C/USAREUR G3 Tng Br, to Maj Gen C. B. Ferenbaugh, USAREUR ACofS G3, 16 Mar 53, sub: Army MDAP Training Conference 10-13 March 1953, Frankfurt, Germany. SECRET. In file above, Item 2A-1 atchd.

a certificate of attendance instead of a certificate of graduation. The USAREUR G3 Training Branch recommended that, because of the problem brought about by nonstandardization in the schools, USAREUR grant each foreign student a certificate of graduation for Allied students. The appropriate MAAG should receive a report showing the student's record and his comparative standing in the class. All on-the-job training in USAREUR, except depot and technical training, should be confined to the time of year when units were in the major training areas. USAREUR should obtain from Seventh Army the total number of spaces available each year and forward them to the Military Assistance Division (MAD), US EUCOM, for allocation to the respective countries. Foreign nationals selected to participate in USAREUR maneuvers should be accompanied by a member of the MAAG concerned. The officer accompanying the students should report to USAREUR in sufficient time to be completely briefed as an escort officer, and, after being briefed, he should escort the foreign nationals for whom he would be completely responsible. This last recommendation would guarantee that the foreign students from each country would receive the type of training they needed.[81]

169. MDA Stockpiling Program

During 1952 the Department of the Army had been requested to approve a plan that would transfer stocks in Stockpile A from EUCOM to USFA or to other Western European countries.[82] During the period covered by this report, all stocks except 119 vehicles, were transferred to Leghorn, Italy, under the supervision of USFA. Stockpile B was redesignated FED-REP-GER (Federal Republic of Germany). Most of its items were stored in depots in the United States from which they could be shipped to Germany on short notice. Items stocked in Germany included 550 bulldozers, 5,000 machine guns, 1,229 tanks, and approximately 200 tons of radio equipment.[83]

170. USAREUR Support of Military Assistance Advisory Groups

USAREUR continued its support of the MAAG's established in nearly all of the countries that received military assistance from the United States. Each MAAG was a joint organization headed by an officer of either general or flag rank and usually consisted

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[81] Memo, 16 Mar 53, cited above.

[82] EUCOM/USAREUR Comd Rept, 1952, p. 309. SECRET.

[83] Interv, Cpl Robert Bolt, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. E. Russell Baldridge, USAREUR G4 Sup Br Distr Sec, 20 Oct 54. SECRET.

of Army, Navy, and Air Force sections.[84] USAREUR had the responsibility for the supply, training, funding, and personnel of these advisory groups.[85] However, USAREUR had no responsibility for their operations except for coordinating the assistance given by them to contracting officers for offshore procurement. USAREUR provided logistical support to Title I MAAG's when this type of support was not available through embassies or locally. USAREUR furnished no logistical support to Title II MAAG's (in Greece, Turkey, and Iran). With regard to training assistance, USAREUR provided for enrolling students from both Titles I and II countries in regular courses at USAREUR schools; specialized training, such as the commander's course at the Seventh Army Tank Training Center, was also available. CINCUSAREUR was also responsible for budgeting, funding and fiscal activities, and civilian manpower control, including various (dollar, contributed, and counterpart) funds for Title I MAAG's. For the Title II MAAG's in Greece and Turkey CINCUSAREUR was responsible for budget preparation in dollars and local currency but he was not responsible for their personnel. CINCUSAREUR also had the responsibility for requisitioning from the Department of the Army military personnel needed to fill the Title I MAAG manpower needs. He performed military personnel services for these MAAG's, and exercised court-martial jurisdiction over their personnel. Finally, USAREUR provided transportation for Title I MAAG personnel and their dependents, as well as schooling for dependents.[86]

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[84] Rept by Gen T. T. Handy, Dep US CINCEUR, sub: U.S. Military Organization and Procedure for Handling Military Aspects of Military Assistance in Western Europe. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 400.336 (1953), Vol. I, Item 21A atchd.

[85] C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 14 May 53, sub: Support of MAAG, France. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 21.

[86] Incl to C/N 2, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to SGS, 6 Apr 53, sub: USAREUR Responsibility for MAAG's. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 20 atchd.

CHAPTER 8

Relations with Other U.S. Commands

Section I: U.S. European Command

171. US EUCOM Terms of Reference

Until the middle of 1952 EUCOM was the senior U.S. military headquarters in Europe. It was a joint Army-Air Force-Navy command, originally responsible for administration and operations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but after April 1951 responsible for operations to the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers in Europe. In the summer of 1952, when General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower was succeeded as SHAPE commander by Gen. Mathew B. Ridgway, plans were made for the appointment of the latter as commander in chief of all U.S. forces, with certain exceptions, in the European area. This planned centralization of authority over several U.S. commands required a new headquarters, which was created 1 August 1952 under the name U.S. European Command and was temporarily established at Frankfurt, Germany, under a deputy commander in chief, Gen. T. T. Handy. The commander in chief (US CINCEUR) of the newly established US EUCOM assumed certain responsibilities previously held by the Commander in Chief, EUCOM including the unification of U.S. military service elements in continental Europe, the United Kingdom, North Africa and Turkey; the command of the Joint American Military Advisory Group (JAMAG), the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group to Greece (JUSMAG), and the Joint Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (JAMMAT); the role of executive agent for the coordination of offshore procurement in Europe; the performance of the duties of the U.S. Military Representative for Military Assistance in Europe (MILREP); the joint planning and action on behalf of U.S. military interests in Europe for all U.S. Government agencies, including those of the State Department; and the role of JCS Representative, Europe (JCSRE). All responsibilities not specifically transferred

to US CINCEUR were retained by CINCUSAREUR. These included provision of troops for SHAPE and other NATO organizations, exercise of responsibility for military affairs in Germany, performance of the functions of the senior U.S. Army headquarters in Europe, and command of the U.S. military headquarters for Germany. U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean were terminated as separate JCS commands and, together with USAREUR, became component commands of the newly created US EUCOM (Chart 9). CINCUSAREUR, however, retained his responsibilities to JCS with reference to Berlin, while both CINCUSAFE and CINCNELM continued to have responsibilities to JCS for activities outside the US EUCOM area of responsibility.[1]

172. Relationship of the Component Commands

Throughout 1952 CINCUSAREUR participated in planning designed to specify functions that would be assumed by US CINCEUR and those that would be assumed by the component commands. This planning resulted in a US EUCOM directive dated 14 January 1953, which outlined the responsibilities and duties of the commanders of the three component commands of the new joint headquarters, CINCUSAREUR, CINCNELM, and CINCUSAFE. The directive was divided into four parts, one of which delineated the common functions of the three component commanders, while the other three gave specific separate assignments to each of the commanders. The three component commanders were assigned the following common functions:

1. To exercise command, excluding such operational command or control as was exercised by NATO, Allied, or other U.S. commanders, over all forces of their respective services that had been allocated to US CINCEUR, except those assigned to USFA, TRUST, JAMMAT, JUSMAG Greece, and the Title I MAAG's;
2. To support NATO commanders within the limits of available resources and in accordance with policies of JCS and US CINCEUR;
3. To support, in their missions, the other component commanders, JCS commanders, and other U.S. commanders operating within or adjacent to US CINCEUR's area of responsibility;
4. To prepare or complete certain portions, as directed, of US CINCEUR's Joint Emergency War Plan and such other U.S. joint plans as might be directed or required;
5. To prepare appropriate service plans in support of U.S. joint, NATO, and Allied plans and such other service plans as might be directed or required;

[1] EUCOM/USAREUR Comd Rept, 1952, pp. 1-10. SECRET.

Chart 9

COMMAND STRUCTURE, U. S. EUROPEAN COMMAND



Source: US EUCOM Compt. UNCLASSIFIED.

6. To provide logistical and administrative support to the forces of other component commands and other U.S. and Allied agencies in accordance with interservice support or other agreements or directives;
7. To insure the security of his forces in coordination with NATO, Allied, or other U.S. commands concerned;
8. To represent US CINCEUR in relations with U.S. embassies and agencies of foreign governments as directed;
9. To discharge such other functions as might be directed by US CINCEUR or other component authority; and
10. In the discharge of assigned functions, to coordinate closely with all other component commanders on all matters of common concern.[2]

a. Particular Functions Assigned to CINCUSAREUR. CINCUSAREUR was assigned the particular responsibility for making plans and preparations for the evacuation of all noncombatants for whom US CINCEUR was responsible within Germany, as well as for the evacuation of certain other specified noncombatants from France and the BENELUX nations, to appropriate ports of embarkation or safe-haven areas. CINCUSAREUR was also assigned responsibility for the implementation of such plans, on order of US CINCEUR. In view of USAREUR's predominance in Germany and its responsibility for all logistical support within that area, CINCUSAREUR was assigned responsibility for developing, for the approval of US CINCEUR, interservice support agreements for Germany as required.[3]

b. Functions Assigned CINCUSAREUR with Regard to Germany. US CINCEUR designated CINCUSAREUR as the commander of a joint task force for the execution of U.S. joint emergency plans, or portions thereof, in Germany. All U.S. forces in Germany that were subject to the authority of US CINCEUR were assigned to the joint task force upon the implementation of such plans. In addition, CINCUSAREUR was directed to prepare, in consonance with US EUCOM and NATO plans, joint plans for implementation in Germany in the event of an emergency and before the assumption of full operational command or control by NATO commanders. In the event that prior instruction from US CINCEUR was unobtainable, CINCUSAREUR was to be permitted to exercise US CINCEUR's authority to announce the stages of alert or the individual measures contained therein. In such instances, CINCUSAREUR's decisions would prevail, pending instructions from US CINCEUR or other competent authority. In addition, CINCUSAREUR was

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[2] US EUCOM ltr, 14 Jan 53, sub: Assignment of Functions to Component Commanders, Incl 1. PPD 322. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 EUCOM (1953), Vol. I, Item 5.

[3] (1) Ibid. (2) USAREUR ltr, 7 Apr 53, sub: Functions Assigned CINCUSAREUR. AG 322 GOT-AGO. SECRET.

assigned Germany as an area of responsibility and was designated Area Commander, Germany, for the discharge of certain functions. He was directed to discharge, except in respect to intelligence matters (including CIC), unconventional warfare, and psychological warfare matters of a joint nature, the following area-type functions of a joint concern relating to Germany:

1. To plan for the evacuation of U.S., Allied, and other specified noncombatants from Germany to appropriate ports of embarkation or safe-haven areas, and to implement such plans on order of US CINCEUR;
2. To coordinate and direct security measures of joint concern for all U.S. forces in Germany;
3. To act as the single point of contact for all U.S. forces in Germany in their relations with HICOG or his successor, with the government of the German Federal Republic and with the Soviet forces stationed in Germany, and for matters of joint concern with the Allied forces stationed in Germany;
4. To maintain law and order and to support U.S. policy in Germany upon the request of HICOG or his successor;
5. To implement those directives of HICOG or his successor that apply to the U.S. forces in Germany;
6. To advise HICOG or his successor on matters affecting the U.S. forces in Germany, or having a military implication;
7. To coordinate, consolidate, and defend the requirements of the U.S. forces in Germany to be met by the German economy and included in the budget of the German Federal Republic;
8. To establish policies and procedures applicable to the U.S. forces regarding procurement, administration, and allocation of indigenous labor, services, facilities, and supplies from the German economy;
9. To establish administrative policies and procedures respecting matters peculiar to Germany to insure uniformity of practices and conduct of the U.S. forces in Germany; and
10. To render to the offices of HICOG or his successor and to other agencies of the U.S. Government in Germany general administrative and logistical support on a reimbursable basis, within available resources and to the extent requested.[4]

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[4](1) Ibid. (2) US EUCOM ltr, 14 Jan 53, cited above, Incl 2. SECRET.

173. Changes in USAREUR Policies and Procedures

The majority of the functions assigned to CINCUSAREUR by the US EUCOM command directive of 14 January 1953 were those for which he had been responsible in the past. Consequently, major changes in USAREUR policies, procedures, and channels of communication were required only for those functions that formerly affected Twelfth Air Force and U.S. Naval Forces, Germany while they were component commands of USAREUR's predecessor, EUCOM. The US EUCOM directive instructed both CINCNELM and CINCUSAFE, the Navy and Air Force components of US EUCOM, to designate appropriate commanders to report to CINCUSAREUR for the discharge of the functions assigned to that commander as Area Commander, Germany.[5] It was assumed by USAREUR that Twelfth Air Force and USNAVGER, as the commands of the two services located in Germany, would remain subordinate to CINCUSAREUR in the performance of his responsibility as Area Commander, Germany. The change in the status of Twelfth Air Force and USNAVGER occurred on 22 January 1953 when CINCUSAREUR was designated Area Commander, Germany, for the discharge of area-type functions of joint concern to all U.S. forces in Germany in connection with the discharge of U.S. military responsibilities with regard to Germany, including Berlin, as outlined in international agreements. All directives of Headquarters, USAREUR, pertaining to the functions outlined in the US EUCOM command directive would remain in force for all U.S. forces in Germany. However, directives of Headquarters, USAREUR, to both Twelfth Air Force and USNAVGER, pertaining to functions other than those outlined in the US EUCOM command directive, would no longer be applicable.[6]

174. Assignment of Support Responsibilities to USAREUR

With the establishment of Headquarters, US EUCOM, in Frankfurt, CINCUSAREUR assumed responsibility for the logistical and administrative support of that headquarters in line with JCS directives. This arrangement was necessary since the new headquarters possessed neither the requisite technical services nor separate support unit, but had to lean on one of the three component commands of US EUCOM for furnishing support requirements. USAREUR was selected as the agency to support Headquarters, US EUCOM, since neither NELM nor USAFE were in a position to assume

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[5] US EUCOM ltr, 14 Jan 53, cited above.

[6] (1) USAREUR Stf Study, 15 Jan 53, sub: Major Changes Required in Policy, Procedures and Channels of Communication Resulting from the US EUCOM Command Directive, 14 January 1953. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 EUCOM (1953), Vol. I, Item 5 atchd. (2) USAREUR GO 10, 22 Jan 53, sub: Designation of CINCUSAREUR as Area Commander, Germany. UNCLASSIFIED.

this function.[7] Quantitative and qualitative support criteria, were to be established by Deputy US CINCEUR or his designated representative. In the event that the supporting armed services were not able to fulfill requirements, or if an acceptable substitute was not available, Deputy US CINCEUR, through the administrative service, could authorize temporary or indefinite relief as determined in each case. The requirements included, but were not necessarily limited to, the following categories of support:

1. The preparation and presentation of Headquarters, US EUCOM, budgets to the Department of the Army;
2. The arranging for dollar and local fund support and civilian manpower spaces;
3. The administration of an annual financial plan as required;
4. The administration of MDAP funds in accordance with departmental directions and supplemental instructions from US EUCOM;
5. The provision of fiscal and cost accounting as required;
6. The establishment of property accounting procedures in accordance with requirements and objectives established by US EUCOM;
7. The auditing of property and appropriated and non-appropriated fund accounts as requested;
8. The furnishing of authorized expendable supplies based on USAREUR consumption factors;
9. The furnishing of nonexpendable supplies and equipment;
10. The maintenance of accountable property records;
11. The provision of field, depot and other maintenance support;
12. The handling of property disposal;
13. The provision of emergency evacuation and administrative movement support;
14. The furnishing of logistical services in accordance with forecasts of strength;
15. The furnishing of personnel services; and
16. The provision of civilian personnel administration.

All civilian employees of Headquarters, US EUCOM, were to be administered by CINCUSAREUR, who would maintain close liaison with

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[7] Memo, US EUCOM Dep ACOFS J4 to US EUCOM ACOFS J4, 31 Dec 52, sub: Review of Actions Taken to Secure Paris Sites for Headquarters EUCOM, 27 July-23 December 1952. CONFIDENTIAL. In US EUCOM SJS 322 (1953), Vol. I, Item 19.

Air Force and Navy agencies in Europe to facilitate the transfer or recruitment of qualified available civilian personnel.[8]

175. Relocation of US EUCOM to the Paris Area

When the establishment of Headquarters, US EUCOM, was planned, it was intended that it should be moved from Frankfurt to the Paris area as soon as possible in order to be near the NATO headquarters of US CINCEUR, who was also Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. In November 1952 Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett informed General Ridgway, US CINCEUR, that US EUCOM headquarters, because of the logistical functions assigned to it, should be moved at the earliest practical date to a location close to the critical area of logistical activity, namely, the vicinity of Paris. Moreover, JCS felt that a location near Paris would be militarily more advantageous to US EUCOM.[9] General Ridgway also thought that the Frankfurt location was too far removed from his NATO headquarters. CINCUSAREUR was informed that the move was to be made as soon as practical and provisions to that effect, therefore, should be made in the USAREUR FY 1954 budget.[10] US EUCOM could outline its requirements for a location in the Paris area, establish criteria, assess the relative suitability of the various sites offered, and prepare movement plans for its echelons, but it had to depend on one of its three component commands for surveys, estimates, rehabilitation, construction, and support.[11]

a. LOFC Budget Requirements. In September 1952, at the direction of the Department of the Army, budget requirements for the relocation of Headquarters, US EUCOM, were included in the USAREUR dollar budget for the LOFC across France. At that time no funds were available within any military appropriation for the purchase of real estate in France, but the headquarters could be considered a part of the LOFC. Therefore, the same arrangements

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[8] US EUCOM Policy Dir 68-1, 16 Mar 53, sub: Administrative and Logistic Support for US EUCOM. UNCLASSIFIED. This general policy directive superseded US EUCOM Log Policy Dir 50-10, 4 Dec 52.

[9] Cable 271030Z, PAREP to US CINCEUR, 27 Nov 52. CONFIDENTIAL. In US EUCOM SJS 322 (1952-53), Vol. I, Tab L.

[10] (1) Cable 281616Z, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 28 Oct 52. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 322 EUCOM (1953), Vol. I, Item 3 atchd. (2) Cable 081540Z, US CINCEUR to PAREP, 8 Dec 52. CONFIDENTIAL. In US EUCOM SJS 322 (1952-53), Vol. I, Tab M.

[11] Memo, US EUCOM Dep ACOFS J4 to US EUCOM ACOFS J4, 31 Dec 52, cited above.

for the provision of real estate would apply as in the case of any normal LOFC requirement.[12] In April 1953 Congress granted the necessary clearance for the US EUCOM headquarters project, with the provisos that funds available for the LOFC in France would be adequate and that no additional funds would be required.[13] However, the inclusion of the US EUCOM headquarters project in the USAREUR dollar MCA budget for France had repercussions within USAREUR. The final USAREUR estimate for the construction of facilities at Camp des Loges, near Paris, the site selected, totaled $4,595,000. Upon revision of its dollar construction program on 1 January 1953, USAREUR had provided $2,948,000 (Item 101), for the construction of US EUCOM headquarters, and $1,000,000 (Item 91), for the construction of troop housing, roads, hardstands, etc.[14] Thus $647,000 had not previously been programmed. To cover this amount CINCUSAREUR requested the Department of the Army to approve changes in the USAREUR FY 1954 (Supplemental FY 1953) priority listings including the transfer of Item 21.4, Armament Shop, in the amount of $888,000 to FY 1955; the restoration of Item 90.7, Utilities, in the amount of $240,000 on the FY 1954 list; and the addition of $647,000 to Item 101, to bring the total for that item, plus the $1,000,000 programmed under Item 91, to the required amount for the project.[15]

b. Use of USAREUR Engineer Troops. In January 1953 USAREUR COMZ announced that all possible steps, including the use of engineer troops for site preparation, road and hardstand work, and other appropriate preliminary jobs, would be taken to expedite the construction of the US EUCOM headquarters at Camp des Loges. Accordingly, authorization was requested from CINCUSAREUR to prepare a battalion of construction troops for movement to Camp des Loges, contingent upon approval of the plan and availability of funds.[16] On 1 April 1953 CINCUSAREUR granted USAREUR COMZ

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[12] Cable DA-918767, COFSA from ACOFSA G4/C2 to US CINCEUR, 18 Sep 52. SECRET. In US EUCOM SJS 322 (1952-53), Vol. I, Tab C.

[13] Pursuant to Sec 407, PL 534, 82d Cong.

[14] USAREUR ltr, 22 Jan 53, sub: USAREUR Dollar Construction Program, FY's 1951 through 1953 Supplemental (Revision as of 1 Jan 53). AG 600.1 ENG-AGO. CONFIDENTIAL.

[15] Cable SX-2208, CINCUSAREUR to COFSA for ACOFSA G4, 17 Feb 53. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 EUCOM (1953), Vol. I, Item 3 atchd.

[16] (1) Cable COZ-C-48, USAREUR COMZ to CINCUSAREUR, 12 Jan 53. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Cable COZ-C-310, same to same, 25 Mar 53. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in file cited above.

authority to assign a reinforced engineer construction company to this project.[17]

c. Services Furnished by USAREUR. In the relocation of Headquarters, US EUCOM, from Frankfurt to Paris, USAREUR furnished site surveys, construction cost estimates, emergency support and billeting plans, and troops. The camp itself was inventoried and accepted by USAREUR COMZ on 25 June 1953 under the procedures set up for the acceptance of LOFC installations by that command. Since the Joint Construction Agency was responsible for all construction in France, USAREUR had no further responsibility for either the MCA funds required or the actual construction. Funds were released by the Department of the Army directly to JCA. USAREUR, however, retained authority for the procurement of $600,000 worth of signal equipment included in the budget for the US EUCOM project.[18] In November 1953 USAREUR's support requirements for Camp des Loges were to furnish: third echelon maintenance for 66 sedans and 15 trucks; to provide bus service on six routes serving Camp des Loges, the Paris American School, and the US EUCOM dependent housing area; to prepare travel warrants and to process travel vouchers; to pay claims from dollar funds; to provide photo service, to include 2 photography and 2 laboratory technicians, for the processing of approximately 400 negatives and 2,000 prints per month; to reproduce required forms, policy directives, booklets, and photostats; and to provide printing and to make graphic reproductions, which in Germany would cost DM 60,000 annually.[19]

176. Activities in the Logistics Field

One of the major functions of US EUCOM was to provide coordination and cooperation in the logistical field so as to prevent duplication of activities among the component commands. In June 1953 US EUCOM published Policy Directive 66-1, which delineated the coordinating responsibilities of the subordinate commands

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[17](1) C/N 2, USAREUR SGS to USAREUR ACOFS G3, 1 Apr 53, to C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to USAREUR DCOFS Opns, 30 Mar 53, sub: Movement of Engineer Construction Company to Camp des Loges. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Cable SX-3390, CINCUSAREUR to USAREUR COMZ, 1 Apr 53. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in file cited above.

[18]USAREUR ACOFS G4 Stf Study, 29 Jun 53, sub: Status of Move of Headquarters US EUCOM to Camp des Loges. SECRET. In file cited above.

[19]Cable EC-3-891, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 20 Nov 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 EUCOM (1953), Vol. II, Item 26 atchd.

for general logistical services. The twofold purpose of the directive was to prescribe subordinate command responsibilities within US EUCOM for developing and submitting for approval the necessary US EUCOM policy directives pertaining to specified logistical services and to prescribe policy guidance to be followed within US EUCOM in developing, submitting, and applying such policy directives. The directive designated a "coordinating authority" for each of the categories of logistical support functions, according to geographic areas, within the US EUCOM area of responsibility. The subordinate commander was directed to develop coordinated subordinate command viewpoints and recommendations with respect to the logistical support functions assigned as his responsibility. In addition, the coordinating authority was to insure that the requisite support was provided without unwarranted duplication or overlapping between the subordinate commands. US CINCEUR directed that all existing arrangements or agreements for logistical support would remain in force until superseded by numbered US EUCOM policy directives.[20] A US EUCOM staff study (12 August 1953) on the accomplishments of the command in the logistics field indicated that interservice responsibilities remained to be assigned in several significant fields. On 19 August 1953 the study was forwarded to the component commanders, accompanied by a request to conduct similar studies within their commands.[21] Six policy directives for the component commands had been completed by 30 June 1954; directives on 19 categories of logistic support functions remained to be completed. Chart 10 indicates the status of the policy directives as of 30 June 1954, listing, for each directive both the percentage and the estimated date of completion, wherever available. Chart 11 summarizes US EUCOM's accomplishments in the development of policy directives under the provisions of US EUCOM Policy Directive 66-1, dated 2 June 1953, relating to the provision of logistical support by the most effective and economical means.[22]

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[20] US EUCOM Policy Directive 66-1, 2 Jun 53, sub: Logistics Services, General; Subordinate Command Coordinating Responsibilities. UNCLASSIFIED.

[21] Ltr, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 19 Aug 53, sub: Accomplishments in the Logistics Field. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 400.3 (1953), Vol. I, Item 21B.

[22] C/N 1, US EUCOM ACOFS J4 to Dep US CINCEUR, 2 Jul 54, sub: Accomplishments in the Logistics Field. CONFIDENTIAL. In US EUCOM J4 Div files.

Chart 10

STATUS OF US EUCOM POLICY DIRECTIVES FOR COMPONENT COMMANDS

PERCENT COMPLETED AS OF 15 JUNE 1954



Note: Policy directives apply throughout US EUCOM area.

* Includes France, Germany, and Benelux only.
EDC Estimated date of completion.
NEA No estimate available.
100% Indicates completed staff action though not necessarily publication.

Source: US EUCOM J4 Div. CONFIDENTIAL.

INTERSERVICE LOGISTICAL RESPONSIBILITIES US EUCOM

Logistical Functions	Germany		France Benelux		U.K. Norway Denmark		Italy Sicily Sardinia		Austria Trieste		Greece		Turkey		Eastern Mediterranean Islands		Spain & Portugal		N.W. Africa		N.E. Africa	
	C	S	C	S	C	S	C	S	C	S	C	S	C	S	C	S	C	S	C	S	C	S
Medical																						
Finance																						
Mail and Courier																						
Records Depository																						
Real Estate																						
Morale and Recreation																						
Noncombatant Evacuation																						
Mortuary and Graves																						
Claims																						
Laundry and Dry Cleaning																						
Police and Provost Marshal																						
Personnel Centers																						
Surface Transportation																						
Air Transportation																						
Depot Level Supply & Disposal																						
Maintenance and Repair																						
POL																						
Procurement																						
Construction																						
Communication & Electronics																						

LEGEND: C - Coordinating Responsibility
S - Support Responsibility

US EUCOM — ARMY: USAREUR USFA — NAVY: NELM — AIR FORCE: USAFE

Source: US EUCOM J4 Div. CONFIDENTIAL.

Chart 11

177. Military Police Support for US EUCOM in the Paris Area

When Headquarters, US EUCOM, was located in Germany, it was furnished normal military police support as a routine function by the Northern Area Command. When plans were being made for the move of the headquarters to Paris, US EUCOM requested the dispatch of a detail of military police to the Paris area to perform security guard functions at Camp des Loges on an emergency basis during the construction period. One platoon, together with the necessary housekeeping equipment, transportation, and communication for roving patrols would be required. Arrangements were made to alert one platoon from the Frankfurt District, Northern Area Command, to be prepared to perform this mission on call from the Paris Representative, US EUCOM.[23] In the meantime, US EUCOM directed USAREUR to provide a security detachment for US EUCOM Detachment A in the Astoria Hotel, Paris. However, at the time that US EUCOM was established the component services had agreed that USAREUR would provide security within the limits of the I.G. Farben Building in Frankfurt, but that NELM would assume responsibility for the security of US EUCOM following the move of that headquarters to the Paris area. CINCUSAREUR thought that the Navy should be held to that agreement and should provide the guard requested.[24] At the same time, USAREUR complied with US EUCOM's request for emergency military police support at Camp des Loges, by placing a composite platoon of 36 men from the 709th Military Police Battalion on detached service with the 7750 US EUCOM Support Group. The stationing of this platoon at Paris left the 709th short one platoon urgently needed within NACOM.[25] Since US EUCOM's original request had specified a 30-day duty period, CINCUSAREUR requested the return of this platoon on 1 October 1953, about 3½ months after their arrival in Paris. There were no spaces for additional MP's within the USAREUR personnel ceiling, and existing USAREUR MP units were still inadequate for the performance of their mission. Since USAREUR had been directed to provide logistical support for Headquarters, US EUCOM, in the

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[23](1) Cable 131526Z, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 13 Jan 53. SECRET. (2) C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to USAREUR DCOFS Opns, 17 Jan 53. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 322 EUCOM (1953), Vol. I, Item 3 atchd.

[24](1) C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to USAREUR DCOFS Admin, 26 May 53, sub: Security Guards for Detachment A, Hq US EUCOM. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) 2d Ind, Hq USAREUR to Dep US CINCEUR, 29 May 53, sub: Security Guards. AG 380.01 GOT (13 May 53). UNCLASSIFIED. Both in file above, Item 16 atchd.

[25]Ltr, CO NACOM to CINCUSAREUR, 28 Aug 53, sub: Transfer of Personnel. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

Paris area, it was recommended that one of the other services provide the security necessary at Camp des Loges, and that the platoon from the 709th MP Battalion be returned to its home station.[26] With the return of this platoon US EUCOM assumed responsibility for its own security.

178. Support of the Joint Construction Agency

With the establishment of JCA as an agency of US EUCOM, the primary responsibility for the provision of administrative and logistical support to that organization, over and above its organic capacity, was assigned to CINCUSAREUR, with CINCUSAFE and CINCNELM assisting as directed by US CINCEUR. In addition, CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE, and CINCNELM were made responsible for furnishing administrative and logistical support of a housekeeping nature to the central office of JCA and to its field elements on or near their respective installations in France, as provided in the Interservice Logistic Support Agreement, Metropolitan France.[27] CINCUSAREUR objected to the blanket assignment to USAREUR of primary responsibility for the support of JCA because of the uncertainty as to which service should provide support if JCA extended its activities beyond Metropolitan France. The service that had been assigned the responsibility for developing interservice agreements in a specific geographical area should be designated as the service that would provide administrative support for JCA in that area.[28] US CINCEUR later defined the term "administrative support" to include interim funding of all JCA nonpersonnel requirements by the command to which the specific responsibility had been assigned. The manner and method of reimbursement (if any) of such costs were to be determined by US EUCOM in the JCA Accounting Manual. However, except for direct support costs such as TDY travel, normal logistical support costs were not to be reimbursed.[29] In July 1953 US CINCEUR directed all supporting services to render support to the JCA, on a nonreimbursable basis, for all capital equipment such as

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[26] 1st Ind, Hq USAREUR to Dep US CINCEUR, 1 Oct 53, sub: Transfer of Personnel. NACOM, AG 200 GOT (28 Aug 53). UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[27] (1) Cable 081516Z, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE & CINCNELM, 8 Jan 53. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Cable 121410Z, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE & USAREUR COMZ, 12 Jan 53. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1953), Vol. I, Item 3 atchd.

[28] USAREUR ACOFS G4 Stf Study, 6 Jan 53, sub: Support of US EUCOM JCA. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[29] Cable 231506Z, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, CINCNELM, CINCUSAFE and USAREUR COMZ, 23 Jan 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

(but not limited to) administrative vehicles, the cost of rehabilitating the headquarters building, the installations of switchboards and similar facilities, office furniture and equipment, etc; and for all nonexpendable and expendable items authorized to JCA by its approved T/A or by interim authorization pending inclusion in the T/A's. At the same time, US CINCEUR defined USAREUR's responsibility as extending only to Metropolitan France; with respect to other areas the degree and scope of responsibility for the provision of support to JCA would be defined by Headquarters, US EUCOM, as necessary, in coordination with the supporting services affected in the geographical areas where JCA had, or would have, construction responsibilities.[30] In September 1953 the Department of the Army requested USAREUR to provide the following additional specific support functions for JCA: two 24-hour standing guard posts at the Central Office, JCA; an enlisted driver for the Director, JCA; the services of 3 mechanics and 1 signalman for the central office, JCA; and 1 standing guard post at the port district headquarters during off-duty hours.[31]

179. USAREUR Support of Military Assistance Advisory Groups

Included in the transfer from USAREUR to US EUCOM of the JAMAG and the several national MAAG's was CINCUSAREUR's responsibility for their logistical and administrative support. As of 30 June 1954 the problem of developing a policy directive for their more advantageous support was still under study in US EUCOM. No definitive policy directive assigning support responsibility to any particular service was expected before 30 September 1954. In the meantime any changes in the support responsibility for any of the various national MAAG's were made on the basis of emergency or expediency subject to the concurrence of US CINCEUR.[32] An example of such a change in responsibility occurred in Spain, where JCS directed the Department of the Army to monitor an interservice agreement on logistical support responsibilities and services. Effective 1 July 1954, CINCUSAREUR's responsibility for providing logistical support to both JUSMAG, Spain, and MAAG,

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[30] Cable 021616Z, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE, CINCNELM, & Dir JCA, 2 Jul 53. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1953), Vol. III, Item 54A.

[31] Cable DA-948790, COFSA from ACOFSA G1 to US CINCEUR & CINCUSAREUR, 23 Sep 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1953), Vol. I, Item 8 atchd (B/P).

[32] Interv, Mr. J. R. Moenk, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. W. M. Prentice, US EUCOM J4 Intersvc Support Br Policy Sec, 28 Aug 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

Spain, was to be transferred to the Department of the Air Force.[33] In the majority of cases, however, responsibilities for the support of the national MAAG's remained the same as when jurisdiction over these organizations was assumed by US CINCEUR.

Section II: U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Twelfth Air Force

180. Relationships of USAREUR with USAFE and Twelfth Air Force in Germany

Upon his assignment of functions to component commanders on 14 January 1953, US CINCEUR directed CINCUSAFE to designate an appropriate commander to report to CINCUSAREUR for the discharge of the functions of the Area Commander, Germany, with regard to the U.S. Air Force in Germany.[34] On 2 February 1953 CINCUSAFE designated his deputy as this commander. Since the directive did not include the assignment of Twelfth Air Force to the operational command of CINCUSAREUR, the CINCEUR-CINCUSAFE agreement of 2 February 1951 was considered as abrogated. CINCUSAFE intended, however, that Twelfth Air Force should continue to work in close coordination with Headquarters, Seventh Army, with respect to matters affecting their joint U.S. national and SHAPE tactical missions. In this connection, appropriate implementing instructions were to be issued to Twelfth Air Force. CINCUSAFE requested, through US CINCEUR, that CINCUSAREUR collaborate with the Deputy CINCUSAFE in the establishment or modification of administrative policies and procedures that might affect the U.S. Air Force in Germany, in order to insure the effectiveness of the joint application of such procedures and policies and their dissemination to all U.S. Air Force units and agencies concerned. In routine housekeeping matters, which were in implementation of established policies and procedures, CINCUSAFE believed it desirable that existing direct relations between appropriate elements of

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[33] C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to all USAREUR Stf Divs, 2 Feb 54, sub: Agreement Concerning the Logistical Support Responsibilities of the Services in Spain. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

[34] US EUCOM ltr, 14 Jan 53, sub: Assignment of Functions to Component Commanders. PPD 322. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 EUCOM (1953), Vol. I, Item 5.

USAREUR and USAFE should be retained, unless it became evident that changes were necessary.[35]

181. USAREUR Command Directives Applicable to Air Force Elements in Germany

The assignment of Twelfth Air Force to USAREUR was officially terminated on 22 January 1953. Twelfth Air Force then reverted to the jurisdiction of USAFE for both administrative and operational control. Headquarters, USAFE, however, was not fully cognizant of the directives previously published by Headquarters, USAREUR (and its predecessor, EUCOM), which were applicable to the Air Force elements stationed in Germany. In February 1953, therefore, CINCUSAFE requested that Headquarters, USAFE, be furnished with a complete listing of USAREUR circulars, manuals, directives and multiple addressee letters applicable to all Air Force elements stationed in Germany. USAREUR complied by transmitting a complete list of all such materials published from 5 December 1952 to 6 February 1953.[36]

182. Proposal for a USAFE Liaison Officer with USAREUR

The US EUCOM directives assigning functions to the component commanders in Europe, particularly with reference to the designating of CINCUSAREUR as Area Commander, Germany, indicated a need for greater liaison in certain administrative matters between CINCUSAFE and CINCUSAREUR. To this end the USAREUR Civil Affairs Division proposed that a USAFE liaison officer be stationed at USAREUR headquarters.[37] On 21 April 1953 a formal invitation to appoint a liaison officer to CINCUSAREUR was extended to CINCUSAFE. The primary functions of such a liaison officer would be to expedite decisions and actions affecting USAFE within the responsibilities assigned to CINCUSAREUR for Germany, but this officer

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[35]Ltr, CINCUSAFE to US CINCEUR, 2 Feb 53, sub: Assignment of Functions to Component Commanders. SECRET. In file above, Item 5 atchd.

[36](1) USAREUR GO 10, 22 Jan 53. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAFE ltr, CINCUSAFE to CINCUSAREUR, 24 Feb 53, sub: USAREUR Command Publications Applicable to AF Elements in Germany. ECAGE 461. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR memo, 28 Feb 53, sub: Command Directives Applicable to AF Elements in Germany. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 USAFE (1953), Vol. I, Item 11.

[37]Memo, C/USAREUR G3 Emerg Plans Br to USAREUR ACOFS G3, 3 Apr 53, sub: USAFE Liaison Officer to USAREUR. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 EUCOM (1953), Vol. I, Item 5 atchd.

could also be of valuable assistance to the USAREUR staff in various joint matters, such as air-ground operations and joint exercises and maneuvers. CINCUSAREUR did not intend to use such a liaison officer to perform USAREUR staff responsibilities.[38] While agreeing with USAREUR's premises, CINCUSAFE saw no reason for changing the existing channels of relationship between CINCUSAFE and CINCUSAREUR. The desirability of cementing and facilitating coordination between USAREUR and USAFE was self-evident, particularly in respect to such matters as joint air-ground operations and joint exercises and maneuvers, but such a relationship belonged at Seventh Army and Twelfth Air Force level, where it was maintained through regular channels and with a minimum of personnel. CINCUSAFE recognized the continuing need for the stationing of Air Force officers at Headquarters, USAREUR, to perform liaison duties in connection with logistical matters, but did not consider the establishment of command liaison between CINCUSAREUR and CINCUSAFE necessary in peacetime, because the existing system of reliance on correspondence, staff visits, and attendance at monthly commanders conferences had proved highly satisfactory. However, if future developments should make the exchanging of liaison officers between the two headquarters desirable, recommendations to that effect would be forwarded to CINCUSAREUR expeditiously.[39]

183. Activation of the Air Materiel Force, Europe

Early in 1954 USAFE headquarters announced an organizational change within its command structure which would affect USAFE-USAREUR channels of relationship. Effective 1 March 1954 the Air Materiel Forces, Europe (AMFE), was established within USAFE, with headquarters at Wiesbaden, adjacent to Headquarters, USAFE. The commander of the new organization was responsible for command of logistical activities within CINCUSAFE's area of responsibility and for providing logistical support to all U.S. Air Forces in the European area. Simultaneously the air depot wings at Nouasseur, French Morocco; Chateauroux, France; and Burtonwood, England, were designated as the Southern, Central, and Northern Air Materiel Areas (AMA's), respectively, and together with the 7920 Procurement Squadron, were assigned to the Commander, Headquarters, AMFE. Full technical supervision over depot support for all USAFE activities was delegated to the Commander, AMFE, but CINCUSAFE retained responsibility for all logistical planning and policy

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[38] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CINCUSAFE, 21 Apr 53, sub: USAFE Liaison Officer to USAREUR, AG 210.3 GOT. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[39] Ltr, CINCUSAFE to CINCUSAREUR, 9 Jun 53, sub: USAFE Liaison Officer to USAREUR. EOPL 370.05. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAFE ACOFS Opns Cen Files, PD 211 (7 May 53).

matters. Characteristically, general materiel matters and fundamental agreements involving the Department of the Air Force, SHAPE, US EUCOM, AIRCENT, etc., would come under the purview of Headquarters, USAFE, whereas technical materiel dealings with USAREUR, CINCNELM, and the Air Materiel Command, USAFE would be handled by the Commander, AMFE.[40] A study by USAREUR of the effect of the activation of the new command on USAFE-USAREUR relationships indicated that the only changes would be in the point of contact for day-to-day logistical operations, in that henceforth such matters would be taken up with AMFE rather than with Headquarters, USAFE. USAFE would remain the point of contact for all policy matters and logistical planning.[41]

184. AMFE Liaison at USAREUR Stock Control Center

With the transfer of the USAREUR technical services stock control units to Maison Forte, France, and with the establishment of the consolidated USAREUR Stock Control Center as a function of USAREUR COMZ, USAFE had to alter its liaison with regard to these stock control units. On 6 April 1954, Headquarters, AMFE, requested authority to attach Detachment 1, 7373 Supply Group (USAF) to the USAREUR Stock Control Center, 7962 AU, for logistical support, effective 1 May. It was that headquarters' intention to organize the detachment, upon the discontinuance of three Air Force liaison detachments (the engineer and signal detachments at Hanau, and the ordnance detachment at Sandhofen, which were then attached to their related Army components) and to relocate it concurrently with the movement of the Army detachments to the USAREUR Stock Control Center.[42] CINCUSAREUR granted permission for such a move on 16 April 1954. The move of the pertinent USAREUR stock control agencies to Maison Forte was to take place according to the following schedule: the 7743 Engineer Supply Control Office, 1 April 1954 to 30 April 1954; the 7849 Ordnance Stock Control Center, 26 April 1954 to 25 May 1954; the 7795 Signal Supply Control Agency, 10 April 1954 to 10 June 1954.[43]

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[40] Ltr, CINCUSAFE to CINCUSAREUR, 4 Mar 54, sub: AMFE (ECINC). UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 USAFE (1954), Vol. I, Item 11A.

[41] C/N 2, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 2 Apr 54, to C/N 1, USAREUR DCOFS Opns to USAREUR ACOFS G4, 26 Mar 54, sub: AMFE. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 11A atchd.

[42] Cable MFPRM-16591, AMFE to CINCUSAREUR, 6 Apr 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 21A.

[43] Cable SC-17990, USAREUR to AMFE, 16 Apr 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

185. Emergency Supply Support of the Air Force

USAREUR was responsible for the receipt, storage, issue, and depot maintenance of common Army purchase items for the Air Force in France and Germany, excepting items for which the Air Force had previously assumed responsibility. By the beginning of 1953 the Air Force had assumed responsibility for quartermaster Classes II and IV supplies and chemical and ordnance Class V supplies. To enable USAREUR to carry out its responsibilities in an emergency, Army common-user supplies and equipment had to be stockpiled for the support of Air Force elements in France and Germany until resupply could be effected from the United States. In February 1953 the Special Theater Reserve No. 1 provided rations and POL (under Section 14) to support an Air Force strength of 52,000 and Classes II and IV supplies and equipment (under Section 15) to support an Air Force strength of 15,000. In December 1952 CINC-USAREUR had requested revision of the authorization for rations and POL to provide support for an Air Force strength of approximately 100,000, which was the Air Force end strength for FY 1954. Previously, the Department of the Army had been requested to authorize revision of Section 15 to support an Air Force strength of 52,000. However, the Department of the Air Force, advised that it had not funded for Army common-use equipment items (as distinguished from common-use supplies) in the Special Theater Reserve No. 1, to support an increased Air Force strength of 52,000 in FY 1952. On 31 January 1953 the Department of the Army informed CINCUSAREUR that the Department of the Air Force was considering plans concerning common-user equipment and supplies for the support of an increased Air Force strength of 52,000. At the same time, Air Force policy indicated that there would be provision in the FY 1954 budget for common-user supplies for a phased increase of 100,000 personnel. The intent to support common-user equipment items, as distinguished from common-user supplies, for the phased increase to 100,000 personnel was also under consideration.[44] In November 1953 CINCUSAFE was directed by the Department of the Air Force to provide information to CINCUSAREUR for preparing bills of material and/or requisitions necessary to increase the supply of Army purchased Classes II and IV supplies and equipment for Special Theater Reserves No. 1 in USAREUR and No. 3 in the United States, from the end position FY 1952 strength to the end position FY 1954 strength.[45]

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[44] USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf 2, 10 Feb 53, pp. 2-4. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

[45] C/N 1, USAREUR ACofS G4 to USAREUR Tech Svcs, 14 Nov 53, sub: Revision of AF Reserves 1 and 3. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR G4 Div Cen files, 400 Gen (1953), Vol. IV, Item 2.

186. Curtailment of Military Air Transport Service

In April 1954 USAFE announced the curtailment of service in Europe by the Military Air Transport Service (MATS). The return of two MATS squadrons--the 41st at Wheelus Field and the 86th at Rhein-Main Air Base--to the United States on 1 April and 1 May, respectively, had been determined by the Department of the Air Force to be essential in the consolidation of MATS' capability to support EUCOM war plans. Subsequent to the withdrawal of the two units, MATS intratheater support was to be limited to essential air evacuation, passenger, and mail service: 2 flights per week between Rhein-Main Air Base and Wheelus Field; 2 flights per week between Wheelus Field and Daharan; and 1 flight per week between Rhein-Main Air Base, Madrid (Spain), and Nouasseur (French Morocco). Since USAFE's airlift capacity in Europe was limited to three troop carrier wings, its capability for the logistical support mission was limited by the requirements of its NATO support role, tactical training, and maneuvers. USAFE stated, however, that within the limits imposed by these commitments it would provide all possible support for the airlift of cargo and mail to replace the curtailed MATS operations.[46]

187. Emergency Support of Small Air Force Units in Germany

By agreement with USAFE in February 1952, USAREUR changed its policy concerning the support of small Air Force units having the status of lodger units on military posts. The support furnished was to be restricted to supplies normally available at the post level, providing that the quantity was sufficient to meet all Army requirements before satisfying those of Air Force units.[47] By the end of 1952, because of the advanced state of the USAREUR vehicle conversion program, it became impractical for USAREUR to furnish spare parts for World War II vehicles in the possession of Air Force units and USAFE was informed that in the future such supplies would not be furnished. Headquarters, USAFE, consequently suggested that the Interservice Logistic Support Agreement for Germany (which was then being revised by USAREUR) incorporate the provision that spare part support for World War II vehicles would not be furnished by USAREUR military posts but would be requisitioned on Air Force property accounts. However, this change was not to relieve military posts of the responsibility of assisting in the organizational and field maintenance of Air Force

[46] Cable EMTP-12570, CINCUSAFE to SACEUR, 3 Apr 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 322 USAFE (1954), Vol. I, Item 20.

[47] EUCOM/USAREUR Comd Rept, 1952, pp. 262-63. SECRET.

World War II vehicles.[48] On 6 June 1953 vehicle spare parts support for World War II vehicles was suspended for small Air Force units, in accordance with the terms of the February 1952 agreement, since the parts were no longer normally carried as items of supply at military posts. Organizational and field maintenance of support of Air Force vehicles was an Air Force and not an Army responsibility, in accordance with the provisions of AR 750-11/AFR 66-14, dated 17 April 1953. In certain cases, however, where small Air Force units were located at a great distance from available Air Force maintenance facilities, it might be desirable to use Army maintenance facilities, and in such cases, the commanders concerned were authorized to work out suitable maintenance arrangements as in the past, and to submit them for the approval of both USAREUR and USAFE.[49]

188. Relationships with USAFE in France

The Interservice Logistic Support Agreement, Metropolitan France, had been completed between USAREUR (then EUCOM), USAFE, and NELM before the establishment of US EUCOM.[50] The terms of reference of the latter command called for such agreements to be replaced by definitive command directives. However, it was necessary for the agreements to remain in effect until appropriate policy directives could be adopted. In the first statement of policy, disseminated to the component commands on 7 February 1953, US CINCEUR directed that component commanders would remain responsible for providing logistical services to other component commands in accordance with interservice support agreements or directives then in force. US CINCEUR reserved to himself the responsibility for developing all such agreements for France, but in other areas the function was delegated to subordinate commands. US CINCEUR directed that the provisions of the Interservice Logistic Support Agreement, Metropolitan France, and any other such agreement then in effect or subsequently approved, should be incorporated into US EUCOM policy directives for implementation. Accordingly, US EUCOM initiated action early in 1953 to convert the Interservice Logistic Support Agreement, Metropolitan France, into the proposed directives. In order to effect coordination and to insure that the technical aspects were adequately

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[48] Ltr, CINCUSAFE to CINCUSAREUR, 20 May 53, sub: Emergency Supplies and Equipment for Small AF Units, Germany. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Div Gen Files, 400 Gen (1953), Vol. II, Item 78 atchd.

[49] 1st Ind, Hq USAREUR to CINCUSAFE, 6 Jun 53, sub: Emergency Supplies and Equipment for Small AF Units, Germany. AG 400 ORD (20 May 53). UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[50] EUCOM/USAREUR Comd Rept, 1952, pp. 260-63. SECRET.

represented in the directives, the service components were requested to develop certain portions of the agreement in directive form. The draft directives prepared by the respective services were to be forwarded to Headquarters, US EUCOM, for final review and adoption.[51]

189. The Paris Visitors' Bureau

The responsibility for scheduling briefings, transportation, hotel reservations, and other courtesies rendered to military, civilian, and congressional VIP's in the Paris area passed from SACEUR to US CINCEUR, effective 23 August 1953. As an interim measure, US CINCEUR established a Paris Visitors' Bureau under the operational control of USAFE, with the other services providing pro rata shares of both personnel and funds. CINCUSAREUR was directed to furnish 2 officers (1 male field-grade officer and 1 company-grade WAC), 2 senior NCO's, and 1 Department of the Army civilian secretary, to be placed on TDY at the USAFE Paris office no later than 9 September. At the same time, CINCUSAREUR was asked to reimburse the Air Force for 40 percent of the cost of renting transportation from a private firm, estimated at $1,200 per month.[52] CINCUSAREUR agreed to provide the personnel, but requested that for reasons of economy, they be furnished by USAREUR COMZ and be assigned to the Seine Area Command.[53] In January 1954 Headquarters, USAFE, completed a draft policy directive making USAFE responsible for the establishment and operation of the Paris Visitors' Bureau. The services to be provided included generally, local transportation, hotel reservations, currency exchange, rail and air travel reservations, general information for TDY personnel. Local transporation, however, was to be provided only to VIP's, and individuals on TDY in the Paris area would have to obtain transportation from the agency being visited. USAREUR was to provide 2 officers, 2 enlisted men, and 1 Department of the Army civilian for the bureau. On the assumption that all unspecified requirements pertaining to the establishment, organization, and operation of the bureau were the direct responsibility of USAFE, USAREUR concurred in the

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[51] Cable 071016Z, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE, 7 Feb 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 EUCOM (1953), Vol. I, Item 5 atchd.

[52] Cable EC-9-584, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE, CINCNELM, 3 Sep 53. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 322 EUCOM (1953), Vol. II, Item 22 atchd.

[53] Cable SX-2695, USAREUR to US CINCEUR, 8 Sep 53. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

proposed agreement since it merely formalized previous commitments.[54] In addition, USAREUR concurred in the recommendations that the personnel commitments be subject to the same review and adjustment provided for the 3-way sharing of contract costs; that the personnel requirements be reviewed after a reasonable period of operating experience, with a view toward possible strength reduction and the replacement of the Army civilian and enlisted personnel with French nationals; and that the proposed agreement be published as a US EUCOM policy directive.[55]

190. Budgeting for Air Force POL Requirements in France

During 1953 the Departments of the Army and the Air Force held opposing views with regard to responsibility for budgeting and funding purchases of POL products for the Air Force in France. The Department of the Air Force maintained that the Army was responsible for the receipt, storage, and distribution of all POL products in France and USAREUR had provided for this expenditure in its FY 1954 budget. The Budget Advisory Committee in Washington, however, removed the item from the USAREUR budget, indicating to CINCUSAREUR that coordinated action had been taken at the departmental level. At the time of this action it was believed that Department of Defense budgetary guidelines placed responsibility for budgeting and funding aviation gas storage upon the Department of the Air Force. However, on 9 October 1953, the Department of the Air Force informed CINCUSAFE that in the opinion of the Air Force the Army had budgetary and funding responsibility for costs incident to the handling and distribution of POL products in France. Therefore, CINCUSAFE was to make no funds available to the Army nor assume responsibility for funding, service, contract, or other costs incurred by the Army in the handling or distribution of aviation or ground POL products for USAFE in France. This policy created a serious problem for USAREUR, because service contracts for aviation gas had been signed on the assumption that the costs would be funded by USAFE and consequently USAREUR incurred obligations daily for which it had no funds. It was estimated that USAREUR would require an

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[54](1) C/N 1, USAREUR ACofS G1 to USAREUR CofS, 14 Jan 54, sub: Paris Visitors' Bureau, Proposed Interservice Support Agreement. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Memo, USAREUR Compt to USAREUR CofS, 13 Jan 54, same sub. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR SGS 322 EUCOM (1954), Vol. I, Item 1A and atchd.

[55]1st Ind, Hq USAREUR to CINCUSAFE, 22 Jan 54, sub: Joint Armed Forces Visitors' Bureau in the Paris Area. AG 322/a GPA (24 Dec 53). UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

additional $875,000, during FY 1954, to cover this contingency.[56] The situation worsened in November 1953, when Esso Standard Francaise advised USAREUR that it would have to discontinue service to both the Army and the Air Force in France if current bills were not paid immediately. These bills had been held in USAREUR because of the nonavailability of Air Force funds and included Army and Air Force POL handling that could not be separated. In order to avoid delay, CINCUSAREUR proposed, as an interim measure, that all payments due Esso Standard Francaise be effected from Army funds. At the same time CINCUSAREUR requested settlement of the distribution problem on the Washington level at the earliest practicable date in order to avoid further complications. The Department of the Army concurred in USAREUR's proposal and provided for $2,600,000, under Project 1124, in a reapportionment request to the Bureau of the Budget. After justification of the reapportionment request to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Bureau of the Budget, the matter was resolved, with all charges becoming the responsibility of CINCUSAREUR.[57]

191. Administration of Local Wage Rate Personnel in France

The Interservice Logistic Support Agreement, Metropolitan France, dated 6 May 1952, transferred responsibility for development of policy for the administration of local wage rate (LWR) personnel in France from the Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ, to a joint civilian personnel policy board composed of representatives of the three services.[58] In February 1953 US CINCEUR assigned to CINCUSAFE the responsibility for developing a US EUCOM policy directive. This assignment was confirmed by US EUCOM Policy Directive 66-1, 2 June 1953.[59] The USAFE directive designated the previously established Joint Army-Navy-Air Force Civilian Personnel Policy Board as the authority to develop and

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[56]Cable SX-3617, USAREUR to COFSA for COA, 19 Oct 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1953), Vol. II, Item 40 atchd.

[57](1) Cable SX-4164, CINCUSAREUR to COFSA for COA, ACOFSA G4, QMG, 1 Nov 53. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Cable DA-952758, COFSA from COA to CINCUSAREUR, 18 Nov 53. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in file cited above.

[58]USAREUR Hist Div, The Line of Communications Through France, 1952-1953, pp. 25-27 MS. SECRET.

[59](1) Ltr, CINCUSAFE to CINCUSAREUR, 14 Mar 53, sub: Administration of LWR Personnel in France. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 230 (1953), Vol. I, Item 9A. (2) US EUCOM Policy Directive 66-1, 2 Jun 53, sub: Logistics Services, General; Subordinate Command Coordinating Responsibilities. UNCLASSIFIED.

recommend, with due regard to appropriate intergovernmental agreements, a uniform U.S. forces' policy for the administration of LWR personnel in France. The board was to be composed of the civilian personnel chiefs of the three component services, each of whom would act as chairman on a semiannual rotating basis. In addition, 2 permanent members and 2 alternate members could be selected from each component command. CINCUSAREUR concurred in the directive and its subsequent publication by US EUCOM.[60]

192. Phase-out of Air Force Support in the Fontainebleau Area

Late in 1952 CINCUSAFE proposed, with the concurrence of CINCUSAREUR, that he take over all support functions in the area of Fontainebleau, France, in accordance with the terms of the Interservice Logistic Support Agreement, Metropolitan France. The proposed change would eliminate duplication of effort in the Fontainebleau area and would provide greater economy and efficiency in logistical support operations and arrangements. Since the USAFE contingent in the Fontainebleau area was expected to be the largest, and since USAFE was willing to provide essential common-type service support in that area, both CINCUSAFE and CINCUSAREUR considered that the assumption of this responsibility by CINCUSAFE was in the best interests of the commands and the services concerned and of the international headquarters receiving support.[61] After intensive study of the problem, US CINCEUR informed CINCUSAREUR that the primary responsibility for providing or arranging support for U.S. elements in the Fontainebleau area would remain with CINCUSAREUR, as had been directed by the Departments of Defense and the Army. However, to the extent practicable and economical, all U.S. forces in that area were to be supported collectively for each type of support function, with a minimum duplication of functions or facilities. CINCUSAREUR was directed to arrange with CINCUSAFE and CINCNELM for accomplishment of mutually agreeable support functions in the Fontainebleau area and was directed to put the arrangements in written form similar to US EUCOM policy directives. The directive was to be definitive and explicit with respect both to functions and to scope of operations to be performed by each service component in the area.

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[60](1) Incl 1, to ltr, 14 Mar 53 cited above. (2) 1st Ind, Hq USAREUR to CINCUSAFE, 12 May 53, sub: Administration of LWR Personnel in Metropolitan France. AG 230.033/c (14 Mar 53). UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 230 (1953), Vol. I, Item 9A atchd.

[61](1) Cable 211056Z, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE, 21 Nov 52. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to US CINCEUR, 24 Dec 52, sub: Transfer of Logistic Support Responsibilities in Fontainebleau Area from USAREUR to USAFE. AG 400 COM. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 322 USAFE (1953), Vol. I, Item 5 atchd.

The component commanders were directed to take unilateral action with their respective service departments to implement the support functions allocated to them. The resulting arrangements, when approved by US CINCEUR, would replace the pertinent provisions of the Interservice Logistic Support Agreement, Metropolitan France.[62]

a. USAFE Objections. CINCUSAFE did not concur in the proposed policy directive. He objected to provisions requiring him to furnish certain items of common service support to the international headquarters at Fontainebleau while not providing for funding or manning this support. Since US CINCEUR had reaffirmed the responsibility of CINCUSAREUR for providing or arranging for the support of that international headquarters, CINCUSAFE could not continue to justify the diversion of USAFE manpower and funds to the performance of a mission specifically charged to CINCUSAREUR. USAFE planning was based on the premise that USAREUR preparations were sufficiently advanced to permit the discontinuance of the 7495 Headquarters Support Group at Fontainebleau at an early date and USAFE was proceeding with arrangements to discontinue the unit on or about 1 September 1953.[63]

b. USAREUR Assumption of Support Functions. The action taken by USAFE to discontinue its support unit at Fontainebleau prevented formulation of an agreement to provide support services in that area. Consequently, a policy directive on the subject was not then feasible. Unilateral action on the part of USAREUR was necessary if support of the international headquarters in Fontainebleau was to be continued without interruption.[64] Furthermore, since USAFE intended to withdraw the 7495 Headquarters Support Group from Fontainebleau, additional support requirements would have to be forwarded by COMZ to USAREUR before the 1 September deadline imposed by USAFE.[65] CINCUSAREUR informed CINCUSAFE that COMZ would take over all support functions in the

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[62] Cable 100800Z, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE, 10 Feb 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[63] Ltr, CINCUSAFE to CINCUSAREUR, 30 Jun 53, sub: US EUCOM Policy Directive for Logistic and Administrative Support, Fontainebleau Area. EMLP. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[64] C/N 2, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to CINCUSAREUR, 22 Jul 53, to C/N 1, USAREUR SGS to USAREUR ACOFS G4, 6 Jul 53, sub: US EUCOM Policy Directive for Logistic and Administrative Support, Fontainebleau Area. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[65] Cable SX-1363, USAREUR to USAREUR COMZ, 15 Jul 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

Fontainebleau area for USAREUR units and for the U.S. elements of the international headquarters in the area. However, he reserved the right to reconsider this decision if USAFE units or personnel not members of an international headquarters were to be located in the designated area.[66] USAREUR COMZ was directed to assume all support responsibility in the Fontainebleau area on or about 1 September 1953 and to assign the additional support functions to the 7961 USAREUR Detachment. USAREUR COMZ was instructed that support in the Fontainebleau area would be limited to international headquarters, the US elements thereof, and USAREUR units.[67]

193. Support of the 32d AAA Brigade

Late in 1953 the USAREUR 32d AAA Brigade and the USAFE Third Air Force jointly developed a proposal for the establishment of an Army support system in the United Kingdom, using Army-operated facilities at Camp Cranwich in East Anglia and the former Royal Air Force base at Shellingford. All Army units in the United Kingdom would receive from one of these two facilities complete field-level supply and maintenance support for all technical services classes, with the exception of ordnance and chemical Class V and engineer Class IV (construction items). CINCUSAFE did not concur in the proposal because it was contrary to the world-wide Department of Defense austerity program, it was not in consonance with the expressed desires of the Department of the Army to have Army units in the United Kingdom receive maximum support from USAFE, and it was not in accord with the policies of US EUCOM pertaining to the establishment of logistical systems. The proposal touched off a reappraisal and analysis of U.S. logistical arrangements in the United Kingdom as a result of which CINCUSAFE concluded that since all operating units of the 32d AAA Brigade were located on or near Air Force bases, USAFE should be responsible for providing and arranging both field- and depot-level supply and maintenance support for all Army activities in the United Kingdom, in accordance with appropriate Army-Air Force directives on common or cross-servicing arrangements. USAFE,

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[66] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CINCUSAFE, 24 Jul 53, sub: Assumption of Support in the Fontainebleau Area. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[67] (1) Cable SX-1764, USAREUR to USAREUR COMZ, 31 Jul 53. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAFE to CINCUSAREUR, 10 Aug 53, sub: Assumption of Support Responsibilities in Fontainebleau Area by USAREUR. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR SGS 322 USAFE (1953), Vol. I, Items 5 and 29 atchd.

however, did not contemplate any expansion of Air Force facilities in the United Kingdom.[68]

a. Position of the 32d AAA Brigade. In opposing the position taken by CINCUSAFE, the 32d AAA Brigade pointed out that although its units were located at or near Air Force bases no additional Air Force personnel had ever been provided for the additional supply and maintenance load on any one base, and that most of this support was provided by Army technical services units. Inasmuch as 5 of the 6 bases supporting the major portion of Army equipment were under the command of Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, it was doubtful that any additional Air Force support could be expected in the future. Moreover, if, as already stated by the Air Force, no expansion of programmed Air Force facilities was contemplated, maintenance provided by the Army technical services units in the past would have to be obtained through contract. The brigade strongly objected to contractual maintenance because of unsatisfactory experience with automotive equipment and engineer generators. It was extremely doubtful that civilian personnel and adequate facilities could be provided through contract for such technical equipment as the AN/TPS-1D radar sets and the 75-mm. Skysweeper guns. Finally, supply economy and the maximum use of critical spare parts could not be effected if such parts were spread throughout 6 different Air Force bases in the United Kingdom rather than concentrated in 1 or 2 locations. The brigade considered that its position was justified because USAFE proposals would seriously affect the ability of the brigade to perform its primary mission.[69]

b. USAREUR Proposals. Although CINCUSAREUR considered the matter to be strictly a USAFE problem, he had a primary interest in obtaining adequate support for Army units in the United Kingdom. Since both the 32d AAA Brigade and Third Air Force had indicated that their experience with contractual maintenance in the United Kingdom had proven unsatisfactory, CINCUSAREUR felt that no further attempts should be made to provide maintenance on that basis. CINCUSAREUR strongly recommended the acceptance of the proposal by Third Air Force and the 32d AAA Brigade, but at the same time he agreed to keep the Army support units at existing strength until a joint USAFE-USAREUR team could survey the proposed support and determine the spaces that would have to be furnished by USAFE and USAREUR respectively, under the responsibilities assigned to each command by AR-750-11/AFR-66-14.

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[68] Cable EMLP-55196, CINCUSAFE to CINCUSAREUR and Third AF, 18 Jan 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 USAFE (1954), Vol. I, Item 5.

[69] Cable AAAGD-01028, 32d AAA Brig to CINCUSAREUR, 22 Jan 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 5 atchd.

CINCUSAREUR also recommended that a suitable base somewhere in the Midlands area, be provided for the proposed support unit.[70]

c. USAFE Decisions. CINCUSAFE remained firm in his decision that the proposal of the 32d AAA Brigade and Third Air Force was unacceptable and announced that he was taking action that would permit CINCUSAREUR to reduce the Army service units in the United Kingdom to the size necessary to perform only the mission placed on the Army by the Joint Army-Air Force directives and agreements. CINCUSAFE directed both Third Air Force and the Seventh Air Division, SAC, to arrange a time-phased schedule of acceptance for base (field) level supply and maintenance responsibilities for Third Air Force and Seventh Air Division bases on which Army units were located, and to designate 2 existing Air Force bases, 1 in the Midlands area and 1 in East Anglia, to accommodate Army service units for the purpose of performing field maintenance of Army items used by Army units in those areas.[71]

194. Emergency Reserve Stocks in the United Kingdom

In mid-1953 CINCUSAREUR became concerned over the fact that units stationed in the United Kingdom did not have a balanced reserve authorized for retention, comparable to the Special Theater Reserve No. 1 in USAREUR. Third Air Force, the requisitioning agency for Army-purchased supplies in the United Kingdom, was authorized the retention of a 60-day stockage objective for Classes I, II, III and IV supplies. The absence of a reserve for emergency support made mandatory the raising of the stockage objective level to 90 days in order to assure uninterrupted operations of the Army units until resupply from the United States could be reestablished. In this connection it was pointed out that Third Air Force was actually operating on a 90-day level of stockage objective except for Army-peculiar items governed by the 60-day limitation imposed by the Department of the Army "Logistics Policies and Priorities." In order to place Army units in the United Kingdom on a logistical basis comparable to that of Air Force units in the same area, CINCUSAREUR recommended to the Department of the Army that the "Logistics, Policies and Priorities," be amended to authorize a 90-day stockage objective level for Third Air Force, this level to include a 30-day operating level and a 60-day safety level.[72] The Department of the

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[70]Cable SC-13460, USAREUR to CINCUSAFE, 17 Feb 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[71]Cable EMLP-36904, CINCUSAFE to CINCUSAREUR, 12 Mar 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[72]Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to TAG, 23 Jul 53, sub: Third Air Force Stockage Objective for Support of the U.S. Army in the United Kingdom. SECRET. In USAREUR G4 Div Cen Files, 400 Gen (1953), Vol. III, Item 23.

Army concurred in the proposed increase in the stockage objective levels for Classes II and IV supplies, and announced that this increase would be reflected in the next regular revision of "Logistics, Policies and Priorities," and advised CINCUSAREUR that the Class IV levels were applicable only to requirements computed on a "day of supply" basis. The Department of the Army nonconcurred in the increase of Classes I and III supplies, stating that such increases did not appear justified.[73]

195. Support of the Royal Canadian Air Force in Europe

In 1952 the Department of the Army assigned to CINCUSAREUR responsibility for providing logistical support to units of the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) to be stationed in Germany and France. This support was to be furnished through USAFE and was to be considered as part of the cross-service support of the Air Force. It was to include rations; POL products for aviation, motor transport, and heating purposes; medical and dental service above wing-base level; and intratheater U.S. military-operated transportation facilities.[74] CINCUSAREUR was authorized to issue subsistence items to units and installations of the RCAF, and to sell commissary items in bulk, on a reimbursable charge-sale basis, to the RCAF for resale to authorized individuals and organizations through RCAF canteens. While USAREUR provided the logistical support in question, all billing for such support was the responsibility of CINCUSAFE. Army Shipping Documents (DA Form 450) were prepared by USAREUR for all logistical support so provided and forwarded to CINCUSAFE for proper billing to the Canadian Government.[75]

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[73] 1st Ind, TAGO to CINCUSAREUR, 10 Sep 53, sub cited above. AGAC-C 400 (23 Jul 53) G4. SECRET. In AMFE Plans and Policy Div.

[74] (1) Cable DA-918756, COFSA from ACOFSA G4 to CINCUSAREUR, 18 Sep 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 USAFE (1952), Vol. II, Item 48. (2) USAREUR Log Plng Forecast, 1 Jul 53, pp. 17-18. SECRET.

[75] USAREUR ltr, 14 Jun 54, sub: Supply of Subsistence to RCAF Units in France and Germany. AG 430 CQM-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

Section III: Commander in Chief, Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic Mediterranean; and Commander, Naval Forces, Germany

196. Relations with Naval Forces, Germany

The letter from US CINCEUR, dated 14 January 1953, delineating the functions assigned to the component commands of US EUCOM provided that operational control over U.S. Naval Forces, Germany, formerly exercised by CINCUSAREUR be assumed by the Commander in Chief, Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean. Both CINCUSAFE and CINCNELM were directed to designate appropriate commanders to report to CINCUSAREUR for the discharge of functions assigned to that commander as Area Commander, Germany. In compliance, CINCNELM designated COMNAVGER, as the commander who should perform this function. Despite this change, COMNAVGER's mission, the essence of which was to provide naval support to other U.S. military forces in Germany, remained substantially unchanged throughout 1953 and 1954. On 30 March 1954, Rear Adm. B. J. Rodgers relieved Rear Adm. Howard E. Orem as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Germany. Early in 1953, the U.S. Navy Rhine River Patrol, whose principal mission was to support U.S. Army forces in Germany, was redesignated as the U.S. Navy Rhine River Patrol and U.S. Naval Facility, Schierstein. USNAVGER internal organizational structure during 1953-54 is shown on Chart 12.[76]

197. Planning in Conjunction with CINCNELM

As a component commander of US EUCOM after 1 August 1952, CINCNELM, along with CINCUSAREUR and CINCUSAFE, was subordinate to US CINCEUR for operational and administrative control in a designated European area. In addition CINCNELM was also a specified JCS commander for the Middle East and as such he was on the same level as US CINCEUR for all U.S. military matters concerning the Middle East and was responsible to JCS for the preparation of the joint emergency war plans for that area. In the development of these plans he was authorized to assign certain missions to CINCUSAREUR when such missions were specified by JCS or US CINCEUR. CINCUSAREUR was responsible for the preparation of the Army portion of such plans and in the performance of that responsibility to CINCNELM acted in the same manner as in fulfilling his responsibility to US CINCEUR for the development of the joint emergency war plans for the European area. That is, he forwarded the Middle East Army level plans to CINCNELM for coordination and

[76] Ltr, COMNAVGER to CINCUSAREUR, 4 Nov 54, sub: Annual Narrative History, Hq USAREUR, 1 January 1953-30 June 1954. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES, GERMANY

1953



Source: Info from Hq USNAVGER. SECRET.

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inclusion in the over-all joint emergency war plans for the area. CINCNELM, as NATO commander for the Middle East, also represented the United States in combined Allied planning for the defense of that area. In addition to CINCUSAREUR, US CINCEUR and CINCUSAFE were also represented in this planning. All plans on the part of CINCUSAREUR for inclusion in the over-all emergency war plans had to be developed in close cooperation and coordination with CINCNELM. Finally, CINCUSAREUR developed the Army portion of the parts of the US EUCOM joint emergency war plans for which CINCNELM was made directly responsible by US CINCEUR.[77]

198. Suspension of Agreement for Separate Housing Policy

Since the U.S. Navy had customarily regarded a tour in Germany as shore duty, naval personnel could normally be expected to be accompanied by their dependents. This policy was complicated at times by the fact that the naval tour of duty in Germany was 2 years, in contrast with the 3-year tour of Army and Air Force personnel. In May 1952, to compensate for this shorter tour of duty during the period of an extreme housing shortage, CINCUSAREUR instructed billeting officers to maintain separate rosters of naval personnel within each dependent housing group (with the exception of the Schierstein Facility of the Rhine River Patrol), and to give naval dependents priority at the rate of 1½ days' credit for each day of waiting, commencing with the sponsor's date of departure from the United States.[78] The Deputy US CINCEUR in December 1952 suspended the applicability of this policy to naval personnel assigned to Headquarters, US EUCOM, because of inequities it created within US EUCOM headquarters. Moreover, early in 1953 the Deputy US CINCEUR informed CINCUSAREUR of his desire to suspend throughout USAREUR the separate policy for naval personnel because of its inequities and its contrast with the treatment accorded naval personnel assigned to US EUCOM. Accordingly, on 2 April 1953 CINCUSAREUR requested COMNAVGER's comments regarding the rescission of such a policy. COMNAVGER did not concur in the proposed rescission of policy, but his position was weakened by a Department of the Navy announcement that personnel in Germany joined by their dependents would be required to serve 12 months in Germany subsequent to the arrival of their dependents, even if such requirement necessitated an extension of the normal 24-month tour of duty. This new policy was tantamount to an extension of the naval tour of duty and, as such, removed COMNAVGER's only basis of objection to the rescission of

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[77] Interv, Mr. J. R. Moenk, USAREUR Hist Div, with Comdr J. K. Davis, USN, USAREUR G3 Div Plans Br, 6 Oct 54. SECRET.

[78] EUCOM/USAREUR Comd Rpt, 1952, p. 264. SECRET.

the special USAREUR housing policy for naval personnel.[79] On 6 July 1953 COMNAVGER reluctantly concurred in the rescission of the separate housing policy, while reserving the right to bring attention to those cases meriting special consideration.[80]

199. Establishment of the Naval Security Group, Bremerhaven

Both USAREUR headquarters and USNAVGER were concerned with the problem of establishing the Naval Security Group Detachment at Bremerhaven in accordance with the JCS decision in November 1952 to maintain such a detachment in Western Europe. The Navy desired the detachment to be located at Bremerhaven in conjunction with the Naval Advanced Base there. At the request of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Department of the Army directed CINCUSAREUR to furnish for the proposed detachment support for 7 officers and 107 enlisted men; 60 to 100 acres of land suitable for a radio receiving station; an operations building of approximately 2,500 square feet and other buildings required for logistical support; a single radio teletypewriter channel, through U.S. controlled facilities, to Washington; dependent housing; and utilities and services.[81] Due to a shortage of dependent housing in the Bremerhaven area, CINCUSAREUR suggested that the detachment be located at either Bad Aibling or Landsberg, where facilities could be made immediately available at minimum cost.[82] Neither USNAVGER nor the Department of the Navy considered these sites favorable, indicating that Bremerhaven was required because of certain technical considerations. In view of the urgency of the request, the fact that military facilities were available in Bremerhaven, and that the shortage of dependent housing in Bremerhaven was not as acute as in other USAREUR areas, CINCUSAREUR granted authority to COMNAVGER to station the detachment in Bremerhaven. Dependent housing was to be furnished to detachment personnel as it became available, in

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[79] C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G1 to USAREUR COFS, 2 Jun 53, sub: Dependent Housing for Personnel of U. S. Naval Forces in Germany. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 620 (1953), Vol. II, Item 28A.

[80] Ltr, COMNAVGER to CINCUSAREUR, 6 Jul 53, sub: Current Policy for Assignment of Dependent Housing for Personnel of U.S. Naval Forces, Germany. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 28A attached.

[81] (1) Ltr, CNO to COFSA, 6 Nov 52, sub: Establishment of a NAVSECGRUDET in Western Europe. SECRET. (2) Cable DA-924597, COFSA from ACOFSA from ACOFS G4 to CINCUSAREUR, 24 Nov 52. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 045.7 (1953), Vol. I, Item 1 atchd.

[82] Cable SX-6193, CINCUSAREUR to COFSA for ACOFS G4, 23 Dec 52. SECRET. In file cited above.

accordance with established USAREUR procedures.[83] The Department of the Navy announced that the detachment would be established in February 1953 and that full strength would be reached by 1 July 1953.

a. Increase in the Detachment. In January 1954 COMNAVGER requested authority to increase the Naval Security Group Detachment to 16 officers and 249 enlisted men in order to meet "urgent operational requirements" as desired by the Chief of Naval Operations. This increase would necessitate the provision of additional dependent housing for 9 officer and 85 enlisted families, as well as school facilities for an additional 57 children. CINCUSAREUR noted that the arrival of approximately 100 family units in Bremerhaven would result in extending the waiting period there to 6 or 7 months, at a time when efforts were being made to restore concurrent travel command-wide and that the increased burden that would be imposed on the administrative personnel of the Bremerhaven command was highly undesirable since Army support forces and funds were being systematically reduced.[84] Nevertheless, CINCUSAREUR approved the request, with two provisos: the furnishing of dependent housing for the augmentation would not be possible for a period of 9 months to a year, and that the augmented detachment would be expected to provide a proportionate share of the administrativ support of the Bremerhaven command.[85]

b. Effect of Further Increases on Bremerhaven. In April 1954 CINCUSAREUR received a second request for augmentation of the Naval Security Group Detachment--this time for an additional 9 officers and 238 enlisted men, to bring the strength of the detachment to 25 officers and 487 enlisted men. Together with the increase granted in January 1954, approval of this request would necessitate additional family housing for 16 officer families and 200 enlisted families and school facilities for a total of 158 grammar school and 16 high school pupils. The Bremerhaven command could furnish billets and messing for the requested increase in enlisted strength and could also meet the additional housing requirement, provided it was phased in gradually after the completion of the FY 1954 Army housing construction program.

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[83](1) C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR DCOFS Admin, 19 Jan 53, sub: Location of NAVSECGRUDET at Bremerhaven. SECRET. (2) Cable 261428Z, CNO to COMNAVGER, CINCNELM, CINCUSAREUR and US CINCEUR, 26 Jan 53. SECRET. Both in file cited above.

[84]C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to USAREUR COFS, 6 Jan 54, sub: Location of NAVSECGRUDET at Bremerhaven. SECRET. In file cited above.

[85]Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to COMNAVGER, 13 Jan 54, sub: Location of NAVSECGRUDET at Bremerhaven. AG 628 GOT. SECRET. In file cited above.

The construction of the additional housing could be included in the FY 1954 supplemental housing program for the command and would be provided if funds were made available. Alterations to the school in Bremerhaven made necessary by the increase in student load could be accomplished from existing R&U funds within USAREUR, without involving construction funds. On the basis of this information, CINCUSAREUR approved the second augmentation request on approximately the same basis as the January 1954 request.[86]

200. Support Problems in Bremerhaven

The question of furnishing cross-service support for common-user items to naval units stationed at Bremerhaven became a problem after the publication of US EUCOM Policy Directive 65-1, which specified that such cross-service support would take place at the USAREUR depot level. Because of the distances between Bremerhaven and USAREUR depots, the naval units in question desired to continue the policy of obtaining support through the Bremerhaven command. To this end, the Commanding General, Bremerhaven POE, requested authority from CINCUSAREUR to draw up cross-servicing agreements with the naval units in his area. CINCUSAREUR did not object to cross-service support at the station level and pointed out that the determination of whether the support was to be rendered at depot or station level depended largely upon the ability of the station to absorb the additional workload involved. CINCNELM had previously directed COMNAVGER to provide CINCUSAREUR with the pertinent supply planning data in order that such a determination could be made and appropriate supply action taken. Since the request of the Bremerhaven command did not include the required planning data, CINCUSAREUR recommended that such data be secured from the naval units in the Bremerhaven area. This information would enable the Bremerhaven command to determine whether the support requested could be rendered within its existing capabilities. After such a determination was made, it would be feasible to draft the proposed cross-servicing agreements.[87]

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[86] (1) C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to USAREUR DCOFS Opns, 9 Apr 54, sub: Dependent Housing and Schooling Requirements, Bremerhaven. AG 628 GOT. SECRET. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to COMNAVGER, 13 Apr 54, same sub. AG 628 GOT. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in file cited above.

[87] (1) Ltr, CG Bremerhaven Comd to CINCUSAREUR, 12 Mar 54, sub: Cross-Servicing of Army Purchased Common-User Items. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) 1st Ind, Hq USAREUR to CG BPOE, 18 Mar 54, same sub. AG 400 GLD (12 Mar 54). UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR G4 Div Cen Files, 400 Gen (1954), Vol. I, Item 71.

Section IV: Special Support Problems in France

201. Support of U.S. Commands and Agencies in France

CINCUSAREUR support responsibilities and problems in the Paris area were complicated by the location there of several U.S. military commands and agencies. In accordance with interservice agreements, as well as with directives from the Departments of the Army and Defense, CINCUSAREUR was responsible for the support of elements of the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Air Force, joint U.S. headquarters, international headquarters, and certain specified U.S. governmental agencies, as well as for the logistical and administrative support of all U.S. Army units and agencies in the area. During 1953-54 CINCUSAREUR was responsible for the support of the following international military headquarters of NATO and the U.S. elements thereof: SHAPE; Allied Forces, Central Europe; Allied Land Forces, Central Europe; Allied Air Forces, Central Europe; Allied Naval Forces, Central Europe; the NATO Defense College; the European Military Communications Coordinating Committee; and the European Long Lines Agency. At the same time CINCUSAREUR was responsible for the support of Headquarters, US EUCOM, and the Joint Construction Agency. In accordance with directives of the Departments of the Army and Defense, as well as interservice logistics support agreements, CINCUSAREUR also supported the USAFE Paris representative; the USRO Deputy for Defense Affairs; the MAAG, France; the Army, Navy, and Air Force attache staffs of the U.S. Embassy, Paris; and Orly Field. Military or quasimilitary agencies supported included the Red Cross, the European Motion Picture Service, and the American Battle Monuments Commission.[88]

202. US EUCOM Directives on Support in the Paris Area

In June 1953 US CINCEUR issued a policy directive outlining the duties and responsibilities of his component commanders for support operations in the Paris area. The purpose of this directive was to describe briefly the logistical and administrative support requirements which, in the interest of economy and operational effectiveness, required coordinated action and to fix clearly the responsibilities of the respective service components for arranging or acquiring such support. Under the provisions of the directive each of the component services was made responsible for the logistical support of its own forces, except when logistical support was otherwise provided for by agreements or assignments as to common cross-servicing, common servicing, or joint servicing at force, theater, military department, or Department of

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[88] USAREUR ltr, 16 Sep 53, sub: Logistic Directive (LOFC), France. AG 400 GLD-AGO. CONFIDENTIAL.

Defense level. Each of the component commands was responsible for the prevention of unnecessary duplication or overlapping of services by using the available facilities, equipment, supplies, and services of the other component commands in all cases so that military effectiveness and the economy of resources would be increased. The service designated by US EUCOM as the "coordinating authority" was made responsible for developing local agreements wherever possible and for the prompt referral to Headquarters, US EUCOM, of matters that could not be resolved. On the other hand, services designated by US EUCOM as "supporting service" were directed to plan, program, establish, maintain, operate, supervise, and administer specified support functions. Commercial-type facilities of each of the military departments, such as warehouses, repair shops, bakeries, and laundry and dry cleaning plants, were to be made available to all military departments to the maximum extent possible. US CINCEUR directed that activities in the Paris area would be limited to functions that had to be so located because of operational necessity and, for that reason, the assignment of military and civilian personnel to military agencies in the Paris area would be on an austerity basis. While the component command or agency receiving support in the Paris area was directed to keep the coordinating authority fully acquainted with its support needs, the provision of the Interservice Logistics Support Agreement, Metropolitan France, of 6 May 1952, concerning the computation and dissemination of personnel strengths in the Paris area for logistical planning purposes, was to continue in effect.[89]

203. Transfer of Support Responsibility to USAREUR COMZ

Shortly after the establishment of SHAPE in 1951, CINCEUR (after 1 August 1952, CINCUSAREUR) was assigned the responsibility for the support of international headquarters in France. Initially, this support function was assumed by the 7966 EUCOM Detachment until facilities and units were provided SHAPE for its own direct support. Later the 7961 SHAPE Liaison Detachment (redesignated the 7961 USAREUR Detachment) was activated for the purpose of coordinating, facilitating, and expediting the administrative and logistical support of SHAPE and its subordinate headquarters.[90] This detachment was originally placed under Headquarters, USAREUR (then EUCOM), for three main reasons. First, the 7966 Detachment (as distinct from the later 7961 Detachment) had been activated with limited personnel and had been

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[89] US EUCOM Policy Directive 68-2, 23 Jun 53, sub: Unit Support, Responsibilities in the Paris Area. UNCLASSIFIED.

[90] (1) EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 345-48. SECRET. (2) USAREUR Hist Div, Establishment of Communications Through France, 1950-51, pp. 118-20. SECRET.

given the mission of developing an LOFC capable of immediate expansion into a full-fledged wartime COMZ. Since the detachment's chief task was a construction program to accomplish these objectives, CINCUSAREUR determined that it should not be burdened with the support of international headquarters in France. Secondly, USAREUR desired to keep the new and untried budgetary methods and procedures separate from those of the LOFC. Third, CINCUSAREUR discouraged COMZ units from filtering into the Paris area. By 1953, however, the situation had changed. Having greatly expanded in organization and strength, COMZ had been designated a major subordinate command. Thus COMZ tended to increase its capability to absorb additional functions. Moreover, COMZ had in the Paris area many small detachments and units for which it was providing support, which duplicated activities of the 7961 USAREUR Detachment, whose sole duty was the provision of support to international headquarters, and the U.S. elements thereof, in Metropolitan France. By 1953 USAREUR COMZ was providing the 7961 USAREUR Detachment with much of the required back-up support in the Paris area.[91]

a. Reasons for the Transfer. The reasons for the proposal to transfer the 7961 USAREUR Detachment to the jurisdiction of USAREUR COMZ were many and varied. Since the support of international headquarters and the U.S. elements thereof in Central Europe was expected to continue and since CINCUSAREUR's responsibilities for the support of commands, units, and agencies of the U.S. forces in the Paris and Fontainebleau area were expected to increase, the original mission of the 7961 USAREUR Detachment (i.e., support of international headquarters) was becoming secondary to the support being rendered in the Paris and Fontainebleau area. The transfer was in line with a USAREUR policy announced early in 1953 to transfer to COMZ as many as possible of the COMZ functions being performed by USAREUR.[92]

b. Final Decision. Notwithstanding the reasons presented by CINCUSAREUR to support the proposed transfer of the 7961 USAREUR Detachment to COMZ, SHAPE headquarters took a negative attitude. Because the 7961 Detachment existed primarily for the support of the international headquarters and the U.S. elements thereof in Central Europe, the proposed transfer would result in less efficient support of SHAPE headquarters.[93] Nevertheless the

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[91]Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 28 Apr 53, sub: 7961 USAREUR Detachment. SECRET. In USAREUR G4 Cen Files, 322 Gen (1953), Vol. II, Item 24.

[92]Ibid.

[93]Ltr, SHAPE Hq Comdt to USAREUR COFS, 30 Apr 53, sub: Transfer of the 7961 USAREUR Detachment, Paris, to COMZ. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 COMZ (1953), Vol. I, Item 11A atchd.

7961 USAREUR Detachment was transferred to the jurisdiction of the Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ, effective 1 July 1953.[94] After that date all support operations performed by USAREUR in France were performed through USAREUR COMZ.

204. Division of Responsibilities with USAFE

CINCUSAREUR was of the opinion that US CINCEUR's assignment of support responsibilities in the Paris area did not provide for an equitable distribution of the support workload in that area.[95] A USAFE-USAREUR conference in June 1954 agreed that in the interest of economy and efficiency one service should provide common-type service support to all U.S. elements in the Paris area. Further, US EUCOM Policy Directives 68-2 and 69-1 should be revised and consolidated into a single policy directive that would include all support functions. The new directive should recognize CINCUSAREUR's responsibilities for the support of international headquarters in that area; should make CINCUSAREUR responsible for furnishing common-type support to all U.S. military forces and to other activities authorized support in the Paris area, over and above the capabilities of the agencies concerned; and should direct USAFE to furnish USAREUR with the manpower required to provide support in proportion to the U.S. population in the Paris area for which USAFE was responsible. In order to compute manpower requirements an accord was reached on the categories of population in the area for which each of the two services were responsible. Army responsibility would include all U.S. personnel in international activities (NATO), with the exception of the Advisory Group for Aeronautical Research and Development (AGARD); Army and Navy personnel of JCA located in Paris; and Army and Navy personnel in Headquarters, US EUCOM, with duty stations at Paris. USAFE responsibility would include all U.S. personnel stationed at Orly Field, Paris; all Air Force personnel assigned to Headquarters, US EUCOM; all U.S. personnel in AGARD; personnel of the USAFE Paris office; all Air Force personnel of the JCA located in the Paris area; and all Air Force personnel stationed at Paris.[96] This agreement was reached too late for definitive action before 30 June 1954.

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[94] USAREUR GO 41, 6 May 53, sub: Redesignation of USAREUR Class II Installations in France. UNCLASSIFIED.

[95] Memo for rcd, Lt Col C. M. Delameter, USAREUR G4 Div Opns Br, 22 May 54, sub: Logistic Support in the Paris Area. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Div Cen Files, 400 (1954), Vol. I, Item 76 atchd.

[96] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG USAREUR COMZ, 8 Jun 54, sub: Logistic Support in the Paris Area. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 76.

Section V: Relations with U.S. Forces, Austria

205. Logistical Support of U.S. Forces, Austria

After 1952 USAREUR logistical support of U.S. Forces Austria, was limited to supply items and other items specifically defined by the USFA Support Agreement of 2 April 1952.[97] However, USFA could request USAREUR to furnish locally procured items that could not be obtained from the United States or locally by USFA, or that could be procured more economically by USAREUR. In addition, both USFA and USAREUR agreed to provide each other with items available from stock on hand required to meet unforeseen or emergency requirements. Reimbursement, when required, would be made in kind as soon as practicable. CINCUSAREUR maintained a stock of spare parts required for the maintenance specified in the agreement as a USAREUR responsibility. CINCUSAREUR provided field maintenance for chemical items, Army aircraft and allied equipment, engineer reproduction equipment, mapping and surveying equipment, medical equipment, and any other items requiring specialized maintenance personnel and equipment. USAREUR also provided maintenance at the depot level beyond the capabilities of USFA facilities. In certain cases USAREUR dispatched maintenance teams to USFA. In turn, USFA furnished USAREUR with data on end-item populations of the equipment for which the latter was responsible. Within the logistical services field, USAREUR provided USFA with services normally available in USAREUR but uneconomical or impractical to establish in USFA. With regard to budgeting and funding, all support to USFA specified as a responsibility of USAREUR was budgeted for and funded by that command.[98] USAREUR concurrence in the USFA support plan on 2 April 1952 did not include Annex V, concerning transportation support, but the revised transportation annex was concurred in by USAREUR on 20 October 1952 and remained in force for one year.[99] On 10 November 1953 Annex V of the original USFA support plan was rescinded and replaced by a revised annex, previously coordinated by the pertinent USFA and USAREUR staff divisions.[100] In May 1954 USAREUR received for review a completely revised USFA support plan; USAREUR comments and recommendations were forwarded to USFA on 25 June 1954 for further

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[97] EUCOM/USAREUR Comd Rept, 1952, pp. 264-65. SECRET.

[98] Hq USFA, USFA Support Plan, 8 Aug 51. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR G4 Cen Files.

[99] EUCOM/USAREUR Comd Rept, 1952, pp. 264-65. SECRET.

[100] Ltr, USFA to USFA Sub Comds, 10 Nov 53, sub: USFA Support Plan. AG 500 GDL. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Cen Files, 400 Log Support (1953).

coordination. This matter was not finalized before the end of the period under review.[101]

206. Release of Stockpile A

Stockpile A consisted originally of about 227,000 measurement tons of supplies and equipment stored in USAREUR technical services depots in Western Germany and along the French LOFC. Although it was earmarked for USFA, it had been stored in USAREUR for political and security considerations. In July 1953 the Department of the Army directed the transfer of these supplies and equipment to the Italian LOFC depots. Rather than receive the entire tonnages intended for their use, USFA obtained Department of the Army approval of a new list of requirements substantially reducing the tonnages that would have to be transferred. The balance remaining from this revision was reprogrammed for shipment, by the Department of the Army, to MDAP countries. By 1 May 1954 the project for the shipment of supplies and equipment to USFA, known as Project GEORGE, was approximately 95 percent complete. As of that date all engineer, quartermaster, medical, and chemical warfare service supplies had been shipped. To be shipped were 110 carloads of ordnance parts and 1 carload of signal parts, as well as 119 ordnance vehicles requiring special routing. This materiel was processed by USAREUR during May and June 1954, with a target date of 30 June set for completion of the entire project.[102]

207. CINCUSAREUR Responsibility for War Planning in Austria

Under the provisions of the US EUCOM Joint Emergency War Plans, 1953, CINCUSAREUR was responsible for all Army service matters within the European theater comprising US CINCEUR's area of responsibility. The Commanding General, USFA, therefore, was subordinate to CINCUSAREUR for all planning purposes relating to Army service support in the event of an emergency. For planning activities the Commanding General, USFA, reported to CINCUSAREUR for all Army service planning, and to CINCNELM, in his capacity as Commander, Joint Task Force, Mediterranean (COMJTFMED), for operational planning in the event of a delay in the assumption of operational control by NATO commanders. As the headquarters and U.S. element of Allied Forces, Austria, USFA also reported to the

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[101] (1) Memo for rcd, Lt Col E. W. Reynolds, USAREUR G4 Sup Br, 23 Jun 54, sub: USFA Support Plan. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) 1st Ind, Hq USAREUR to CG USFA, 25 Jun 54, same sub. AG 600.12 (13 May 54). UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR G4 Cen Files, 381 (1954), Vol. I, Item 31 and atchd.

[102] USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf 6, 11 May 54, p. 3. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

Commander, Allied Land Forces, Southern Europe (COMLANDSOUTH), for all NATO planning. In like manner, in an emergency the Commanding General, USFA, would become subordinate to CINCUSAREUR for all wartime troop support activities, to include technical services support, personnel replacement, financing, etc. Following the general alert, the Commanding General, USFA, would report to CINC-USAREUR for all Army service matters and to CINCNELM in his capacity as COMJTFMED for operational control pending the assumption of operational control by NATO commanders. USFA would become the U.S. element and headquarters of Allied Forces, Austria, which in turn would report for operational control to COMLANDSOUTH upon his assumption of command.[103]

[103] Interv, Mr. J. R. Moenk, USAREUR Hist Div, with Col W. S. Osborne, C/USAREUR G3 Plans Br, 6 Oct 54. SECRET.

CHAPTER 9

Relations with the U.S. High Commission for Germany

208. Delineation of Responsibilities of CINCUSAREUR and the U.S. Ambassador to Germany

a. Background. A unique problem for the United States was the establishment of a clear distinction between the authority of its diplomatic representative and its military commander in a foreign area. It arose from the fact that for the first time a large U.S. military establishment was being maintained on the territory of a "friendly" power in time of peace. The problem was further complicated by the tripartite relationship of the U.S. forces with those of the United Kingdom and France on all matters affecting the Federal Republic of Germany. On 9 June 1953 US CINCEUR received from the Department of the Army a draft executive order, prepared by the State Department, which proposed to transfer to the U.S. Ambassador to Western Germany, subject to contractual limitations, the authority of the former U.S. High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG) and to delineate the areas of authority between HICOG and CINCUSAREUR. US CINCEUR designated CINCUSAREUR as his representative in negotiations with HICOG to revise the draft.[1] Previously the Secretaries of Defense and State had agreed that US CINCEUR should collaborate with HICOG in developing a mutually satisfactory draft of an executive order, to become effective upon implementation of the contractual agreements.[2]

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[1]Stf Sum, 24 Oct 53, sub: Background of Events for Drafting Executive Order. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1953), Vol. I, Item 2 atchd.

[2]Ltr, US EUCOM COFS to CINCUSAREUR, 5 Jun 53, sub: Drafting of Executive Order. SECRET. In file cited above.

b. Differing Points of View. In establishing a joint US EUCOM-USAREUR position concerning the proposed executive order, the military representatives were faced with a military-political controversy which seemed to arise from differing interpretations of two Presidential messages, one delineating the powers and responsibilities of the State Department in matters of foreign policy and the other those of the Defense Department in matters of national defense. In the statement concerning the responsibility for the development and control of foreign policy, the President had called attention to the "slackness, confusion, blurred authority and clouded responsibility" that could defeat "the noblest purposes of any foreign policy." He had directed that the various chiefs of diplomatic missions must provide foreign policy direction to U.S. Government activities abroad. In another statement, however, the President had declared that all functions of any part of the Department of Defense should be under the "direction, authority and control of the Secretary of Defense."[3] In the light of CINCUSAREUR's important role in the implementation of American policy in Western Germany and in view of the difficulties in distinguishing between policies solely political and those solely military, conflicting interpretations were inevitable.

c. Negotiations. Initial discussion between HICOG and CINCUSAREUR began 31 July 1953. CINCUSAREUR negotiated from the position established by a draft executive order prepared earlier, with US CINCEUR's concurrence.[4] The position was that since the mission assigned the U.S. forces and the broad outlines of foreign policy had previously been coordinated at the departmental level in Washington, the military mission was not subject to reexamination by the Ambassador for conformity to his concept of foreign policy. Also, since the military were to support U.S. policy abroad, there was no need for the Ambassador to act as arbiter regarding its application.[5] After extended negotiation between CINCUSAREUR and HICOG, during which working parties had failed to produce a mutually agreeable draft, it was decided simply to define the major areas of disagreement and turn the problem over to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, USAREUR, and the Deputy High Commissioner who would work out a solution. The resulting drafts of the executive order would be submitted to the High Commissioner

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[3]Extracts, Presidential Msgs to Congress, 30 Apr, 1 Jun 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1954), Vol. I, Item 2 atchd.

[4]Cable S-2246, CINCUSAREUR to US CINCEUR, 19 Aug 53. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1953), Vol. I, Item 2 atchd.

[5]Stf Sum Sheet, USAREUR JAG, Draft EO, 19 Nov 53, p. 6. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above, Item 2 atchd.

and CINCUSAREUR for final decision.[6] The latter took the position that the executive order would have to invest all responsibility for the command, security, and stationing of U.S. forces in Germany in the military commander alone, and that consultation between the military commander and the Ambassador on matters within their respective spheres of responsibility would be essential only in the interest of uniformity of U.S. policy.[7]

d. Draft Status. Representatives from USAREUR and HICOG met on 8 January 1954 in a final effort to reduce the area of disagreement before submitting the drafts to CINCUSAREUR and HICOG. After several conferences in Mehlem and in Heidelberg, agreement in principle but not on paper was reached. General Hoge and Dr. Conant took over the discussions and reached agreement on a final draft on 16 April.[8] The CINCUSAREUR-HICOG disagreement, after almost two years of negotiations, had been narrowed to one sentence--line 3, paragraph 4 in the draft executive order, which read, "...If action by the Commander or any representative of the Commander, pursuant to the authority herein conferred, affects the foreign policy of the United States or involves relations or negotiations with non-military German authorities, such action shall only be taken after consultation with and agreement by the Ambassador or pursuant to procedures previously agreed to between the Ambassador and the Commander or his representative."[9] The phrase "and agreement by" was the critical point during the entire period of negotiations for, if adopted, it would have provided the High Commissioner with a definite measure of control over the military commander in the fulfillment of his mission in Western Germany. The Department of the Army objected to the inclusion of this phrase. CINCUSAREUR pointed out, however, that it was only by the inclusion of the phrase that agreement could be reached with HICOG, and that an impasse would result if the Defense Department insisted upon the phrase's deletion. Further discussions would have to be carried on at the departmental level.[10] The State Department approved the draft executive order, but as of 30 June 1954, final action had not been taken by the Department of Defense.[11]

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[6]Memo, USAREUR Dep ACOFS G3 to USAREUR ACOFS G3, 24 Nov 53, sub: Drafting the Executive Order. SECRET. In file above, Item 2 atchd.

[7]Memo, to USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 15 Dec 53, sub: Essential Military Characteristics of Executive Order. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1953), Vol. I, Item 2 atchd.

[8]Cable EC-9-1500, US CINCEUR to DA for SD, 19 Apr 54. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1954), Vol. I, Item A atchd.

[9]Ibid.

[10]TELECON TT-7559, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 8 Jul 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

[11]Interv, Dr. E. F. Fisher, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. H. P. Fales, USAREUR, POLAD, 20 Jul 54. CONFIDENTIAL.

209. Military Liaison with HICOG

a. Coordination of Correspondence with Russians. Throughout the period, CINCUSAREUR was particularly anxious to keep all matters of a military nature under his direct control. For this reason he informed HICOG that communications from any Soviet source concerning military matters not within the cognizance of the military commander of Berlin would be answered from USAREUR headquarters, with, of course, appropriate coordination with HICOG.[12] CINCUSAREUR's point of view concerning communications "from any Soviet source" would obviously involve military-political questions over which HICOG could quite correctly claim control. HICOG took exception to CINCUSAREUR's position and pointed out that, while there was agreement as to the desirability of coordinating replies to Soviet communications on military problems, the U.S. High Commissioner would have to reply over his own signature to communications addressed to him by the Soviet High Commissioner when political implications were the dominant factor. Such correspondence would be brought to the attention of CINCUSAREUR.[13] CINCUSAREUR accepted HICOG's position, but since most of the problems that arose relative to relations with the Russians were military as well as political in nature, prior coordination with USAREUR headquarters would have to be achieved. Such a procedure would permit the establishment of a joint HICOG-USAREUR approach in relations with the Soviet authorities. On 9 September 1953 an effective and mutually satisfactory agreement concerning replies to military-political communications from the Russians was worked out.[14] The agreement, entitled "Procedures for Processing Communications with the Soviets Concerning Military Matters and Air Protests," embodied essentials previously agreed upon by HICOG and USAREUR.[15]

b. Liaison with Special Security Committee. Further progress toward close and effective liaison between CINCUSAREUR and HICOG was made in the establishment of a HICOG-USAREUR position for the guidance of the U.S. representative on the Special Security Committee of the Allied High Commission. This joint position merely

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[12] Ltr, USAREUR DCOFS for Opns to HICOG Off of Pol Aff, 27 Jul 53, no sub. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322.01 (1953), Vol. I, Item 24 atchd.

[13] Ltr, HICOG Off of Pol Aff to USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 28 Jul 53, no sub. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[14] (1) Ltr, HICOG Off of Pol Aff to USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 2 Sep 53, no sub. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Ltr, USAREUR DCOFS for Opns to HICOG Off of Pol Aff, 8 Aug 53. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in file cited above.

[15] USAREUR CAD Jnl, 15 Sep 53, pp. 7-8. SECRET.

set forth general lines of policy, but did not concern itself with specific details. The Special Security Committee acted in an advisory capacity to the Allied Council, composed of the High Commissioners of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States. It was evident to CINCUSAREUR that the Special Security Committee's function as a tripartite staff agency overlapped the responsibility of CINCUSAREUR as military adviser to the U.S. High Commissioner. Both HICOG and CINCUSAREUR were in agreement that close contact should be maintained through visits by members of both staffs "to insure that the best interests of the United States effort in Germany were adequately served in the deliberations of the Special Security Committee."[16] A special USAREUR representative was delegated to advise the U.S. member at the meetings of the Special Security Committee. This representative was not authorized however, to commit USAREUR on or to any position. CINCUSAREUR would decide on each issue after an interchange of opinion between staff divisions of USAREUR and HICOG action agencies. All final USAREUR concurrences or recommendations as to joint USAREUR-HICOG action on Security Committee matters would be processed through the office of the deputy chief of staff for operations. USAREUR would then coordinate its position with the Deputy High Commissioner who, on the other hand, agreed not to act on matters having military implications in the Special Security Committee until there was an agreement between both headquarters.[17]

c. Additional Liaison. Anxious to implement the agreements with USAREUR, HICOG requested a liaison officer to be permanently assigned to Mehlem to work on military-political problems. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, USAREUR, replied that the multiplicity of specialized problems to be dealt with would make it impractical to assign such a representative to HICOG. However, USAREUR would send staff officers to HICOG whenever they were needed as members of working committees. The chiefs of all USAREUR staff divisions were instructed to indoctrinate officers for such assignments.[18] The chief of the HICOG Civil-Military Liaison Office, was informed that requests for officers from USAREUR should be forwarded to the Secretary of the General Staff, USAREUR. The latter office would then direct the interested staff section to send a representative to HICOG.[19]

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[16] Memo, USAREUR DCOFS for Opns to all Stf Divs, 22 Dec 53, sub: Special Security Committee of the Allied High Commission. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1953), Vol. I, Item 10 atchd.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Memo, USAREUR DCOFS for Opns to all Stf Divs, 28 May 54, sub: Politico-Military Liaison with HICOG. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 322.01 (1954), Vol. I, Item 25.

[19] Ltr, USAREUR Asst DCOFS for Opns to Mr. Z. Garett, HICOG Civ Mil Ln Off, 8 Jun 54, sub: Requests for Working Committee Representatives. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above, Item 25 atchd.

d. Ad Hoc Working Committee. In another step toward closer liaison between the two headquarters, Dr. Conant suggested to General Hoge, that an ad hoc working committee comprising a responsible officer from the headquarters of each of the three services in Germany be created. This committee would meet monthly to discuss matters of mutual interest with a member of the Public Affairs Division of HICOG. It was Dr. Conant's hope that such a committee would help meet the obvious need for the U.S. civil and military agencies to be aware of each other's ideas and attitudes concerning issues of mutual concern. CINCUSAREUR agreed to Dr. Conant's suggestion and appointed the Chief, USAREUR Public Information Division, as USAREUR's representative. The committee was given the responsibility of establishing and maintaining interservice coordination on problems of psychological warfare and troop relations with German civilians, as well as of coordinating U.S. efforts in the public information field.[20]

210. Public Information Liaison with HICOG and Bonn Press Corps

During the first years of the occupation, contact with the American and foreign correspondents corps had been maintained through the command's press office in Frankfurt. With the establishment of USAREUR headquarters in Heidelberg, the transfer of the bulk of the German Federal Republic's operations to Bonn, and the move of US EUCOM to Paris, USAREUR's contacts with the press were less than satisfactory. Press liaison was maintained either through the USAREUR Press Center in Frankfurt or by telephone from Heidelberg, but neither method was satisfactory. Since the more important newspaper correspondents maintained their offices in Bonn, the establishment of a Public Information Division liaison office at HICOG seemed desirable. The Bonn press corps pointed out that this step would enable USAREUR to bring newsworthy military activities and events taking place throughout USAREUR, to the immediate attention of the correspondents.[21] Following a formal request of U.S. press correspondents stationed in Bonn and with the encouragement and backing of the HICOG Office of Public Affairs, the Mehlem Press Liaison Office was opened on 1 June 1954. Manned by a full-time secretary, this office maintained contact with the USAREUR Press Center in Frankfurt and,

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[20](1) Ltr, HICOG to CINCUSAREUR, 31 Mar 54, sub: Ad Hoc Working Committee. SECRET. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to HICOG, 30 Apr 54, sub: Ad Hoc Working Committee. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1954), Vol. I, Item 3 and atchd.

[21](1) Ltr, Bonn U.S. Press Corps to USAREUR PID, Col R. V. Shinn, 21 Dec 53, no sub. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR PID Stf Study, 23 Apr 54, sub: Establishment of PID Liaison Office at HICOG. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR SGS 322.01 (1954), Vol. I, Item 18 and atchd.

through that center, with the USAREUR Public Information Division at Heidelberg. A staff member of the Public Information Division or an officer from the USAREUR Press Center was also on duty in the Mehlem office at least two days a week.[22] USAREUR-HICOG press liaison was maintained by means of direct teletype between the USAREUR Public Information Division and the HICOG Press Office at Mehlem. The USAREUR Press Center in Frankfurt did not maintain direct contact with HICOG or Bonn but served primarily as USAREUR's contact with the major wire services, such as Reuters, Associated Press, and United Press, as well as with the major German news services, all of which maintained their central operating facilities in Frankfurt. The USAREUR Public Information Division maintained contact with the HICOG Press Office on such matters as defectees, border incidents, offshore procurement contracts awarded to German firms and friction in USAREUR-Federal Republic relations.[23]

211. Implementation of the Forces and Finance Conventions and Negotiations for Royal Canadian Air Force Base

a. Establishment of RCAF Negotiation Committee. An aide-memoire from the Canadian Government requesting the United States to act as the "power concerned" and as Canada's representative in negotiations with the Federal Republic for the purpose of establishing a Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) base in Germany, set the stage for a new phase of HICOG-USAREUR relations. HICOG requested comment from CINCUSAFE and CINCUSAREUR before initiating negotiations with the Bonn authorities. This action was contrary to the principle that CINCUSAREUR was the single point of contact for all U.S. forces in Germany and that the establishment of a coordinated U.S. military policy, whenever necessary, should be brought about by consultation between USAREUR and USAFE before advising HICOG on matters affecting the military forces.[24] The latter procedure was followed in reaching an interservice position concerning the projected negotiations. CINCUSAFE recommended that the United States assume the role of the "power concerned" for the RCAF units located in the French Zone when the contractual agreements became effective, since the British had indicated their unwillingness to

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[22] USAREUR PID, Info to press, 27 May 54, sub: Establishment of Press Liaison Office in Bonn (Mehlem). UNCLASSIFIED.

[23] Interv, Dr. E. F. Fisher, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj W. A. Penninon, USAREUR PID, 26 Aug 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

[24] Memo, USAREUR Dep ACOFS G3 to CINCUSAREUR, Jan 53, sub: Contract between U.S. Forces Germany and HICOG. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1953), Vol. I, Item 5 atchd.

assume this role.[25] CINCUSAREUR, on the other hand, was reluctant to act as agent of the "power concerned," insisting that the additional burdens and responsibilities involved far outweighed the advantages. The decision, made in Washington, was that US CINCEUR would participate in negotiations with HICOG and the RCAF in respect to the Forces and Finance Conventions, since the United States had agreed to act, as the "power concerned," for Canada.[26] On 22 April 1953 US CINCEUR directed CINCUSAREUR to assist HICOG in the negotiations. This directive was the basis for the creation of the RCAF Negotiation Committee, established by USAREUR on 12 May 1953.[27]

b. Determination of HICOG and USAREUR Roles. One of the problems faced by HICOG and USAREUR relative to the negotiations was the determination of the roles to be played by the representatives of the respective headquarters. HICOG was, and it was envisioned that the future embassy would be, the U.S. agency responsible for representing and implementing U.S. policy vis-a-vis West Germany. Therefore, HICOG's direct responsibility was to establish and maintain under the conventions, implementing arrangements, satisfactory to all concerned. Yet HICOG was aware that the U.S. forces had an important stake in such negotiations, since they would have to operate under them, and proposed, therefore, that all negotiations for the implementation of the conventions should be conducted jointly by HICOG and USAREUR representatives.[28] Negotiations concerning the RCAF contingent that was to be stationed in the French Zone were, in effect, conducted in accordance with the convention that required the Three Powers "to obtain the consent of the Federal Republic before bringing into the Federal territory contingents of the armed forces of any nation not now providing such contingents."[29] HICOG's viewpoint regarding CINCUSAREUR's role in the negotiations was based upon

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[25] Cable SX-2359, CINCUSAREUR to COFSA for ACOFSA G3, 24 Feb 53. SECRET. In file cited above.

[26] (1) Cable S-1954, CINCUSAREUR to CINCUSAFE, 9 Feb 53. SECRET. (2) Memo, ACOFSA G4 to USAREUR COFS, 22 Dec 53, sub: Forces and Finance Convention in Relation to the RCAF in Germany. SECRET. Both in file cited above.

[27] USAREUR Stf Memo No. 22, 12 May 53. UNCLASSIFIED.

[28] Ltr, HICOG to CINCUSAREUR, 22 Apr 53, sub: Negotiations concerning Canadian Forces in Germany. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1953), Vol. I, Item 5 atchd.

[29] Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany and Related Conventions (hereafter cited as Convention on Relations), General Convention, Art. 4, par. 3, p. 2. UNCLASSIFIED.

the concept of joint responsibility. CINCUSAREUR did not concur, basing his action on the contention that the development of the necessary agreements was HICOG's responsibility, and that it was CINCUSAREUR's function to assist HICOG in the negotiations, as stipulated in the directive of 22 April.[30]

c. Proposed Agreement. After coordination with HICOG, USAREUR, USAFE, and the RCAF, drafts of a proposed agreement were prepared by HICOG and presented informally to CINCUSAREUR on 19 November 1953.[31] CINCUSAREUR concurred in the draft agreement with the exception that Canada should be the "power concerned" (paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 34), that certain provisions (Articles 15, 17, 18, 25, and 30) were to be subject to bilateral agreements, and finally that certain other provisions (Articles 34 and 35) were subject to further arrangements under tripartite discussion.[32] The draft agreement was forwarded to US CINCEUR for concurrence and then submitted to Washington, Ottawa, Paris, and London for approval.[33]

212. Implementation of Provisions of the Contractual Agreements Pertaining to Border Control

a. Background. In line with the policy of the U.S. Government to ease occupation restrictions as much as possible, steps were taken to implement certain articles of the Forces and Finance Conventions before the expected ratification of EDC and the implementation of the contractual agreements.[34] Articles 34 and 35 of the Forces Convention, concerning customs treatment of members of the Forces, became subjects of considerable discussion between USAREUR and HICOG.

b. Conflicting Points of View. HICOG contended that "gentlemen's agreements" were made during the contractual negotiations with the Federal Republic authorities, and that these agreements assured the German representatives of the opportunity of reopening negotiations on the interpretation of any article whose terminology

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[30] Min, 1st Mtg of USAREUR RCAF Negotiating Comm, 12 May 53. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1953), Vol. I, Item 5 atchd.

[31] Memo, ACOFSA G4 to USAREUR COFS 22 Dec 53, sub: Forces and Finance Convention in Relation to the RCAF in Germany. SECRET. In file cited above.

[32] Cable SC-21507, CINCUSAREUR to HICOG, 29 Dec 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1953), Vol. I, Item 5 atchd.

[33] Memo, 22 Dec 53, cited above.

[34] Cable, SGS (SMC-In 5910) State Dept sgd Smith to HICOG, 14 Apr 53. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1953), Vol. I, Item 11.

was found to be lacking in precision. CINCUSAREUR, however, held that such sub rosa agreements could not be considered legally binding nor form a basis for negotiations to modify the articles concerned. If such a principle were accepted in this case, the implemantation of all the articles of the contractual agreements might become subject to renegotiation.[35] CINCUSAREUR insisted that Articles 34 and 35 should be implemented simply on the instructions of the authorities of the Forces, and that there was no need to negotiate supplementary agreements with the German Federal Republic except as specifically required by the terms of the contractual agreements.[36] Nevertheless, CINCUSAREUR suggested to HICOG that an attempt be made to establish a tripartite position before negotiating with the German authorities.[37] Dr. Conant replied to General Bolte, that the Forces could not reject the German interest in certificates of authorization of imports under Paragraph 3 of Article 34 any more than they (the Forces) could expect the Germans to reject their interest in "normal German customs control" under Paragraph 5 of the same article. Since Articles 34 and 35 dealt especially with the importation of such items as coffee and tea, which were subject to heavy German taxation, the negotiations would necessarily be extremely sensitive and feelings would be strong on both sides.[38]

c. Working Party Deliberations. The U.S. Working Party of the Allied High Commission was requested to develop a basis for negotiations with the German authorities. This group proceeded on the principle that only minimum requirements should be imposed on either the civilian or military personnel of the Forces when entering or leaving Federal Republic territory. The basic difficulty, however, seemed to be associated with the problem of providing proper identification for civilian personnel accompanying the Forces. Failure to provide this identification would deny them the privileges of Allied High Commission Law No. 43.[39] The essential point of difference between HICOG and CINCUSAREUR seemed

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[35] Memo, USAREUR JAG to USAREUR ACOFS G1, 12 Feb 53, sub: Customs Treatment of Members of the Forces. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 091.311 (1953), Vol. I, Item 3B atchd.

[36] USAREUR ltr, 9 Mar 53, sub: Customs Treatment of the Forces. AG 019.3 GPA. SECRET.

[37] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to HICOG, 23 Mar 53, sub: Implementation of Articles 34 and 35 of Convention. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 091.311 (1953), Vol. I, Item 5A.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Ltr, Mr. R. Levy, HICOG, to Brig Gen J. F. Cassidy, USAREUR DCOFS for Admin, 23 Apr 54, sub: Customs Treatment of U.S. Forces. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 091.311 (1954), Vol. I, Item 11.

to be that HICOG logically focused attention upon the political sensibilities of both the Germans and the Allies. HICOG believed that any attempt to adhere to a literal application of the written language would cause considerable bitterness on the part of Federal Republic officials. Moreover, in order to reach an agreement on the contractual agreements, "language was often accepted which seemed to be final but which, in fact, was recognized by the negotiators as leaving the practical solution of the problem to implementing agreements."[40] CINCUSAREUR was particularly disturbed over the fact that HICOG's position regarding the implementation of the contractual agreements seemed to have changed since late 1952. The HICOG-endorsed idea of supplemental agreements with the Federal Republic first appeared in discussions early in 1953. Before that time no fundamental difference in views respecting implementation had existed between HICOG and CINCUSAREUR.[41] CINCUSAREUR's arguments were weakened somewhat by HICOG's disclosure of a secret verbal agreement, made between Mr. McCloy and Chancellor Adenauer, in which HICOG agreed that the language of Article 35 should be relaxed in favor of the Germans and that objectionable features would be eliminated through subsequent negotiations implementing the agreement. Col. J. F. Hanley of the EUCOM Liaison Group to HICOG also added that his group had knowledge of such an agreement and had acquiesced in it.[42]

d. Final Agreement. After extended negotiations, a joint HICOG-USAREUR position was developed at the staff level without raising the problem to the CINCUSAREUR-HICOG level. A willingness on the part of both HICOG and CINCUSAREUR to consult with one another for the purpose of establishing mutually agreed upon positions in relations with the Allied High Commission, as well as the German Federal Republic, apparently facilitated staff level agreement even when differences were sharp and fundamental.[43] As a result, and except for several details, CINCUSAREUR and HICOG agreed in substance on the implementation of Articles 34 and 35. Toward the end of FY 1954, however, budget restrictions, and resulting reductions in military personnel manning important border crossing points for U.S. forces, necessitated a complete

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[40] Ltr, HICOG to CINCUSAREUR, 22 Apr 53, sub: Implementation of Articles 34 and 35. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 091.311 (1953), Vol. I, Item 5A atchd.

[41] Memo, to USAREUR JAG, 25 Apr 53, sub: USAREUR-HICOG Discussions Concerning Articles 34 and 35. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

[42] Ibid.

[43] (1) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to HICOG, 6 May 53. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Ltr, HICOG to CINCUSAREUR, 27 May 53. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1953), Vol. I, Item 5 atchd.

reexamination of customs treatment.[44] Implementation of the convention would give German customs authorities a larger measure of control over members of the Forces. According to Article 35, members of the Forces would be subject to normal German customs control. At border crossing points where USAREUR personnel participated in border control of members of the Forces, they would continue to exercise such control in cooperation with German customs authorities. At other crossing points, USAREUR personnel would be subject to German customs control. Article 25 of the convention continued the unrestricted exit and entry privileges of members of the Forces and provided for participation of the Forces in control of travel documents. Members of the Forces, while allowed duty free importation of personal property under Article 35, would however, be required to obtain import certificates as well as to comply with certain provisions regarding rationed goods, such as coffee, tea, and tobacco. German customs authorities would also be represented in Army post offices for customs examinations. However, any criminal action arising from customs violation would continue to remain within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Forces.[45]

213. Establishment of the Mixed Clemency Board

a. HICOG's Recommendation. As the delay in the ratification of EDC, and consequently the contractual agreements, extended into its second year, HICOG and the State Department made efforts to develop the implementation portions of the agreements in order to alleviate the growing impatience in Western Germany over the continuing occupation. Article 6 of the Forces Convention provided for the establishment of mixed clemency boards, composed of 1 representative from each of the 3 Allied Powers and 3 members from the Federal Republic, to review the sentences of German war criminals held in Allied prisons. Since efforts to obtain French agreement to the implementation of this article had been fruitless, HICOG recommended to the State Department that the United States establish a mixed clemency board in its own zone, since approximately 20 percent of the war criminals were held by the United States and only 6 percent by the French. Moreover, Chancellor Adenauer was willing to accept a U.S.-German board as a compromise if the Allied powers failed to agree.[46]

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[44] DF, 8 Jul 54, sub: Contractual Relations. AG 322.011 AGO-E. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1954), Vol. I, Item 22.

[45] USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf 10, 24 Aug 54. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

[46] Cable 824, HICOG to State Dept, 1 Apr 53. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (1953), B/P 4.

b. USAREUR's Objections. CINCUSAREUR objected to HICOG's efforts to implement this portion of the contractual agreements. It was CINCUSAREUR's view that HICOG's action was motivated by German pressure, and that the establishment of such a board at the time would meet with considerable criticism from both the French and American public. Moreover, the concept of parole was not reflected in German law or German penological practices and would be difficult to enforce.[47] The objections offered by CINCUSAREUR were weakened by the fact that the Forces Convention, already signed by the Allies and the German Republic, provided for the establishment of a parole system, under which a unanimous decision of the clemency board concerning a recommendation for parole would be binding on the power that had imposed the sentence.[48] A second apprehension on CINCUSAREUR's part was that the formation of a mixed clemency board would tend to cast doubt on the legality and justice of the War Crimes Tribunals.[49] Article 6 of the Forces Convention clearly stated that the actions of such a board would not call the validity of the judgments into question, but there seemed to be no doubt that release of a war criminal from confinement on any ground or through the employment of any release procedure would be in effect a moral victory for the West German Government, which had repeatedly denied the validity of the Allied judgments.[50] CINCUSAREUR objected further that such a clemency board would result in divided responsibility, since the Allies would retain custody of the war criminals, while the German authorities would participate in and influence parole actions without having any responsibility for their custody.[51]

c. Final Decision. Political rather than military considerations influenced the final decision to establish the joint clemency board. The issue was carried to the President, for it was evident that eventually the fundamental, albeit unavoidable, contradiction between the United States' role as victor, an occupying power, and an executor of Allied justice and its increasingly important role as Germany's ally and friend would

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[47] Cable SX-3585, CINCUSAREUR to COFSA, 8 Apr 53. SECRET. In file cited above.

[48] Convention on Relations, Forces Convention, Art. 6, pars. 3a, 3b, p. 14. UNCLASSIFIED.

[49] Memo, USAREUR to US EUCOM COFS, 10 Jun 53, sub: Proposed Reply to DA Cable. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 000.5 (1953), Vol. I, Item 18 atchd.

[50] Memo, HICOG to US EUCOM, n.d., sub: War Crimes and War Criminals. SECRET. In file cited above.

[51] Memo, 10 Jun 53, cited above.

become more apparent.[52] The State and Defense Departments decided on 23 June 1953 that one more attempt should be made to persuade the French authorities to accept the mixed boards as provided for in the Forces Convention. Failing this, the parole system would then be established for the war criminals in American custody. HICOG and CINCUSAREUR were instructed to coordinate with one another and to consult with the German authorities in the preparation of plans for the establishment of a mixed board. Executive Order 10144, 21 July 1950, conferring parole power upon HICOG and CINCUSAREUR respectively, was cited as still governing the relationship between the two headquarters in the war criminals problem.[53]

(1) USAREUR Objections. In a series of conferences, HICOG and USAREUR proceeded to draft outlines of a parole system that followed rather parallel lines except for two fundamental differences arising from CINCUSAREUR's earlier opposition to the entire concept of a mixed clemency board. In the first place, CINCUSAREUR opposed German membership on the proposed board, although German participation in the administration of the parole system was accepted. German membership on the board, with the necessary right to examine the full trial records of the prisoners, would be an invitation to controversy over the administration of the War Crimes Tribunals.[54] In the second place, CINCUSAREUR favored establishment of two boards, the first a board of officers appointed by CINCUSAREUR which would review the cases under CINCUSAREUR jurisdiction. The second board, consisting of civilians appointed by HICOG, would concern itself only with personnel under HICOG jurisdiction. The appointment of an all-civilian board reviewing the military as well as the civilian war criminals was regarded by CINCUSAREUR as implied criticism of the Army's conduct of the war crimes trials. It favored, therefore, a parole board of Army officers, since the Army held the bulk of the war criminals, 280 as against HICOG's 29. Any German representation at this time was opposed by CINCUSAREUR.[55] CINCUSAREUR's objections, however, were overruled by the Department of Defense on the basis that German membership in the mixed clemency board was fully contemplated in the President's decision of 23 June 1953.[56]

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[52]Memo, HICOG to US EUCOM, n.d., cited above.

[53]Cable 161, State Dept sgd Dulles to US EUCOM (Jt Def-State Msg), 25 Jun 53. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 000.5 (1953), Vol. I, Item 18 atchd.

[54]Cable 14, HICOG sgd Conant to State Dept, 6 July 53. SECRET. In file cited above.

[55]Cable 14, HICOG sgd Conant to State Dept, 6 Jul 53. SECRET. In file cited above.

[56]Cable DEF-943660, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 10 Jul 53. SECRET. In file cited above.

(2) Final Action. On 29 August 1953 a mixed clemency board, consisting of 5 members, 3 of whom were appointed by the U.S. government and 2 by the German Federal Republic, was created. The American representation included 1 Army major general and 2 civilian lawyers. Two German jurists represented the Federal Republic.[57] Shortly afterward British and French authorities followed suit with decisions to form similar mixed clemency boards in their respective zones. On 1 September 1953 the texts of the decisions and appointment of the boards were made public by the Allied High Commission. This announcement provoked only slight comment in the press, since the decisions to form clemency boards had already been made public in mid-July.[58] The Allied High Commission's publication of the texts of the decisions did not come any too soon, for a confluence of events bearing on the war crimes issue had created public dissatisfaction over the long-delayed action. A speech by Pope Pius XII concerning prisoners of war still in communist hands, the observance of prisoner-of-war memorial week throughout the Federal Republic, the return of some German prisoners from Russian captivity, and the reported tightening of prison regulations at the British-controlled prison at Werl, all stirred up considerable discussion in the press on the whole issue of war criminals as martyrs of the "victors' justice."[59]

214. Discontinuance of Deutsche Mark Programming

On 8 June 1953 the Economics and Finance Committee of the Allied High Commission notified Dr. L. Erhard, Federal Minister of Economics, that with submittal of the Deutsche Mark program for the third quarter of 1953 to the German Federal Government the practice of submitting quarterly programs for the procurement of supplies and services for the armed forces of the Allied powers would be discontinued.[60] With this decision, the major function of the USAREUR detachment assigned to the Defense Requirements Branch, HICOG, was eliminated, since this group had had the responsibility of receiving, monitoring, and presenting USAREUR's Deutsche Mark material requirements to the Occupation Requirements

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[57] (1) Order concerning Interim Mixed Parole and Clemency Board, Hq USAREUR and HICOG, 29 Aug 53. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) HICOG Order No. 408, 22 Oct 53, sub: Interim Mixed Parole and Clemency Board. UNCLASSIFIED. Both file cited above.

[58] West German Pol Wkly No. 35, 3 Sep 53, p. 11. CONFIDENTIAL. In Hist Div Ref Lib.

[59] Ibid., No. 42, 22 Oct 53, p. 7.

[60] Ltr, AHC Econ & Fin Comm, to Prof. Dr. L. Erhard, Fed Min of Econ. 8 Jun 53, sub: Consolidated Forecasts of Mandatory Requirements. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1953), Vol. I, Item 6A atchd.

and Charges Subcommittee of the Economic and Finance Committee.[61] Accordingly, with HICOG's concurrence, CINCUSAREUR decided to phase out the detachment and transfer personnel on duty there to vacancies elsewhere within USAREUR.[62]

215. Transfer of Trial Jurisdiction to USAREUR

a. Transfer of U.S. Civilian Personnel to Court-Martial Jurisdiction. The prospects of a gradual phasing out of the HICOG court system, as the probable date for the implementation of the contractual agreements drew near, raised the question of trial jurisdiction for U.S. civilian personnel who were subject to military law under the provisions of Article 2 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.[63] In view of the negligible caseload of civilian criminal cases and the additional personnel and fiscal requirements entailed in the establishment of special military commissions, the USAREUR judge advocate recommended, and CINC-USAREUR concurred, that civilian personnel serving with or accompanying the U.S. forces in Germany be placed under the USAREUR courts-martial jurisdiction. By CINCUSAREUR's later decision, the proposed transfer was delayed pending the implementation of the contractual agreements.[64] However, as new budgetary restrictions forced HICOG to reduce the personnel in its court system, CINC-USAREUR had to reverse its decision postponing the transfer of jurisdiction and to agree with HICOG that persons subject to concurrent criminal jurisdiction of HICOG and courts-martial would be prosecuted before courts-martial only.[65]

b. Liquidation of HICOG Courts. The publication of an amendment to HICOG Law No. 20, 1 January 1954, initiated the orderly liquidation of the HICOG court system. A skeleton court was retained

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[61] Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to COFS USAREUR, 28 Jul 53, sub: Withdrawal of Four Military Spaces from US HICOG. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[62] Ltr, USAREUR DCOFS for Admin to C/HICOG Off of Econ Aff, 30 Jul 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[63] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to COMNAVGER, 18 Apr 53, sub: Concurrence in Publication of Proposed Changes to Command Directive covering Trial of Civilians by Courts-Martial. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 250.4 (1953), Vol. I, Item 21 atchd.

[64] (1) Memo, USAREUR JAG to CINCUSAREUR, n.d. sub: Military Commissions and Provost Courts. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Ltr, USAREUR to CINCUSAFE, 23 May 53, sub: Concurrence in Publication of Proposed Changes to Command Directive. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in file cited above.

[65] Cable SMC-IN 2533, HICOG sgd Conant to State Dept, 10 Aug 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Vol. II, Item 39.

with criminal jurisdiction concurrent with that of German courts, which were competent to try all criminal cases involving offenses committed by local inhabitants against U.S. forces and personnel. German courts, however, did not have jurisdiction over cases involving security. Such cases were filed only in HICOG courts. Military personnel retained immunity from criminal persecution in German courts, but were subject to civil litigation in these courts, as authorized by HICOG. HICOG authorization was still required for the trial in German courts of German personnel employed by U.S. forces, for offenses other than traffic violations committed during their employment.[66] There still remained a role for the greatly reduced HICOG court system. CINCUSAREUR did not consider it advisable to file suit or enter appearance as party plaintiff in German courts, and, consequently, informally requested amendation of HICOG Law No. 38 so as to authorize the initiation of civil suits in HICOG courts in the name of or on behalf of the United States.[67]

c. Jurisdiction of German Courts. Civil jurisdiction of the German Federal Republic concerning members of the Forces under the terms of the contractual agreements were to be similar in some respects to the NATO Status of Forces Agreement. German courts would have more extensive jurisdiction than under HICOG law. Up to implementation of the contracts no civil suit involving USAREUR personnel could be entertained in the German courts without the express grant of jurisdiction by the U.S. High Commissioner. HICOG's practice was to secure CINCUSAREUR's permission in each case before taking action. Under the terms of the contractual agreements, German courts were granted jurisdiction over members of the Forces in all noncriminal proceedings. Article X of the contractual agreements required the Forces, within the framework of existing service regulations, to take appropriate measures to enforce German civil judgments, decisions, and orders. The phrase "within the framework of existing service regulations," however, made this provision of doubtful effectiveness concerning USAREUR personnel, since U.S. Army regulations would necessarily limit cooperation to permitting German officials to enter military installations to carry out court orders and judgments.[68]

216. Transfer of Housing from HICOG to USAREUR

The problem of the return of HICOG-controlled housing to military control had been a subject of HICOG-CINCUSAREUR

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[66] USAREUR Stf Sum Sheet, USAREUR JAG to USAREUR COFS, 11 Dec 53, sub: Jurisdiction of German Courts. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 39 atchd.

[67] Cable SC-11180 USAREUR to SAC, 18 Jan 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 250.4 (1954), Vol. I, Item 5.

[68] USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf 10, 24 Aug 54, pp. 8-15. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

correspondence for a long time. Although the number of HICOG-occupied housing was not large, in some areas the shortage of housing for military personnel was so acute that USAREUR had to recover as many of the properties as possible.[69] Under the terms of the contractual agreements, all privately owned requisitioned property occupied by the embassies and consulates of the three occupying powers was to be released in October 1953, unless tenancy arrangements were made with the owners. If the contractual agreements were not ratified by that date, the release date was not binding. Since CINCUSAREUR was anxious not to lose such properties, HICOG was requested to return the properties to military control or to make arrangements for leasing them in order that they would not be lost by default. A tripartite agreement to negotiate with the German Federal Republic, a 6-month extension, following ratification, to permit negotiation of leases with the owners, held out hope that the housing would remain under military control until the alternate housing program provided the needed accommodations.[70] As the alternate housing program progressed, HICOG was able to implement the HICOG-CINCUSAREUR agreement of January 1952 and begin transferring to USAREUR the control of requisitioned housing formerly occupied by personnel of the State Department and other accredited civilian agencies throughout Germany. In the Frankfurt area HICOG made a considerable amount of housing available to USAREUR. As of 18 January 1954, some 134 apartments were assigned for the use of military personnel and 126 apartments for personnel of the 7997 Composite Group--a total of 260 units. HICOG informed CINCUSAREUR that although the HICOG agreement with the Frankfurt municipality precluded transfer of this housing to a third party on a permanent basis, for planning purposes this number of apartments could be considered available for the permanent continued housing of military personnel. As additional alternate housing became available to HICOG, further requisitioned units would be released to USAREUR.[71] Quite a few of the HICOG-released properties, such as the Opel House in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, were in the high-cost category, and had to be released by USAREUR at any event.[72]

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[69] Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 21 Dec 53, sub: HICOG-occupied Housing. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 602 (1953), Vol. I, Item 23.

[70] Memo, Maj P. D. Pavick, USAREUR SGS to Maj Gen C. B. Fehrenbaugh, USAREUR COFS, 18 Dec 53, sub: Release of Embassy and Consulate Housing. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[71] Ltr, Mr. H. J. Heureux, HICOG to Brig Gen J. F. Cassidy, USAREUR DCOFS for Admin, 18 Jan 54, sub: Transfer of Housing in Frankfurt Area to USAREUR. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 620 (1954), Vol. I, Item 5A.

[72] Ltr, Maj Gen J.B. Murphy, USAREUR ACOFS G1, to Mr. G. G. Wolfe, HICOG, sub: Transfer of Housing to USAREUR. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 620 (1953), Vol. I, Case I, Item 12.

217. Support of Accredited Civilian Agencies

a. Background. Between the defeat of Germany in 1945 and the drastic currency reform of 1948 nonmilitary agencies providing essential services to the armed forces were virtually incapable of operating without logistical support. By 1949 the economic situation in Germany had improved so much that civil airlines, military surplus property purchasers, U.S. businessmen dealing with the local economy, and U.S. tourists did not require such support. Since that time USAREUR had sought to reduce the support program gradually and on a voluntary basis in an effort to encourage civilian agencies to adjust themselves to a normal relationship with the local German economy. In 1952 CINCUSAREUR concurred in HICOG's request for continuation of the logistical support of accredited civilian agencies, but reserved the right to review the support program if ratification of the contractual agreements was further delayed.[73] Later, under the impact of a restricted budget and reduced military and civilian personnel spaces, as well as continued delay in the effective date of the contractual agreements, CINCUSAREUR decided to review the entire support program for the purpose of making plans to terminate it.[74]

b. Proposals for Termination. In March 1953 CINCUSAREUR proposed to HICOG that a joint USAREUR-HICOG position concerning termination be established. It was agreed that withdrawal of support should no longer wait on the ratification of the contractual agreements. CINCUSAREUR further planned to provide support for only twelve agencies, this support to be limited to the provision of real estate, vehicle registration, Army postal service, and the use of military payment certificates. Such support, agreed to personally by Mr. McCloy and the German authorities during the negotiations for the contractual agreements, was considered not only essential to the welfare of the U.S. forces in Germany but the minimum under the provisions of Article 36 of the Forces Convention.[75] A tentative cutoff date of 1 July 1953 was decided upon. Almost immediately members of the U.S. press corps in Germany protested. USAREUR pointed out to the press associations that the Cold War situation could not be considered sufficient reason for continued support of U.S. correspondents in Germany and that goods and services were at least as abundant in the Federal Republic as elsewhere in the world. Moreover, Article 36 of the Forces Convention would not permit

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[73] EUCOM/USAREUR Comd Rept, 1952, p. 332. SECRET.

[74] Stf Study, USAREUR ACOFS G4, 19 Feb 53, sub: Reasons why Support of Civilian Agencies Should be Reduced. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 400 (1953), Vol. I, Item 5 atchd.

[75] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to HICOG, 10 Mar 53, no sub. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

assimilation of the press by the Forces after ratification, and the correspondents would therefore have to try to carry on their work in Germany as in other areas of the world, without depending upon the Armed Forces.[76] CINCUSAREUR's position, however, was reversed by instructions from the Department of the Army, stating that the press was to be considered in a separate category from that of businessmen and would therefore have to be given the same support as that provided for civilian employees of the State Department. The Department of the Army Chief of Information, reacting quickly to press criticism, added that he wished to avoid having the Army labeled as the agency that made the decision to reduce the facilities furnished the press.[77] A second setback to CINCUSAREUR's plans came in May, when a joint State-Defense directive postponed the projected 1 July cutoff date to 1 September 1953. CINCUSAREUR, however, was instructed to assist agency personnel whenever possible, in making tenancy arrangements and, if unsuccessful, to order the agency to vacate the property by 1 September 1953. Medical and dependent school facilities were to be made available to personnel of accredited agencies on a full-payment basis only when CINCUSAREUR determined that local facilities were inadequate. HICOG was instructed to open negotiations with the German Federal Republic in an effort to obtain favorable POL treatment for personnel of the various welfare agencies operating in West Germany. It was planned to exploit the political value of this decision by making a public announcement of the plan prior to the forthcoming German elections.[78] The curtailment program was accordingly made public by CINCUSAREUR and HICOG, and on 12 June 1953 the Department of the Army directed continued support of the U.S. press corps and of the voluntary relief organizations accredited to HICOG until the ratification of the contractual agreements. In view of this decision CINCUSAREUR thought that it was not feasible to withdraw support from some agencies and not from the others and therefore recommended to the Department of the Army the continued support for all nonmilitary agencies until the ratification of the contractual agreements. The Department of the Army concurred in this recommendation and authorized CINCUSAREUR to continue the program. Continuance, however, depended upon the availability of funds and personnel spaces, and as the budgetary limitations of FY 1953 became increasingly restrictive, CINCUSAREUR again pressed Department of the Army for a new cutoff date,

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[76] Ltr, USAREUR COFS to Maj Gen G. C. Mudgett, CINFO, 24 Feb 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 400 (1954), Vol. I, Item 4 atchd.

[77] Cable DA-933805, CINFO to CINCUSAREUR, 13 Mar 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 400 (1953), Vol. I, Item 1 atchd.

[78] Cable 138, State Dept sgd Dulles to CINCUSAREUR, 6 May 53. SECRET. In file cited above.

suggesting 1 April 1954 as the date for withdrawal of logistical support, barring prior ratification of the contractual agreements, for the U.S. press corps and the relief agencies accredited to HICOG.[79] As of 30 June 1954 no action had been taken on this recommendation, and the support program was continued through the end of the current reporting period without change.

[79] Ltr, USAREUR AG Div to CINCUSAREUR, 4 Nov 53, sub: Logistical Support of Nonmilitary Agencies and Individuals. In file above, Vol. II, Item 18 atchd.

CHAPTER 10

Relations with the German Federal Republic

218. Effects on USAREUR of German Political Developments

a. Restoration of the Treaty of Friendship. From January to September 1953 USAREUR's relations with the German Federal Republic were influenced profoundly by the prospect of the September national elections throughout West Germany. Most decisions pertaining to these relations were made in the light of their possible influence on the forthcoming elections, since the United States was extremely anxious to avoid any action that might undermine the Adenauer-led coalition's chances of being returned to power in the new Bundestag. The months preceding the elections witnessed a steady improvement in relations between the United States and the Federal Republic, highlighted by the signing on 3 June of an agreement to restore the 1923 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Consular Rights. This action was hailed by the West German press as the first commercial treaty signed by Germany with any major power since the end of the Second World War and as a symbol of the restoration of normal legal and economic relations between Germany and the United States. Certain changes in the 1923 treaty, particularly with reference to U.S. forces stationed in Germany would have to be made, and negotiations would be initiated as soon as possible for drafting a treaty adapted to current conditions.[1] On the same date, 3 June 1953, the Bundestag voted to change the name of the Bundestag Committee for Foreign Affairs and Occupation Matters to the Committee for Foreign Affairs, thus dropping terminology belonging to the occupation era.[2]

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[1] West German Pol Wkly No. 23, 11 Jun 53, p. 5. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR Hist Div Ref Lib.

[2] West German Pol Wkly No. 22, 4 Jun 53, p. 6. CONFIDENTIAL.

b. Reestablishment of the German Handicraft Code. Another occupation restriction on West Germany was removed early in 1953 when the Bundestag established a Uniform Federal Handicraft Code throughout the Republic. This action eliminated the so-called Gewerbefreiheit (freedom of trade) established by American authorities in the U.S. Zone in 1949 with the intention of destroying in Germany the traditional, restrictive, guild-type policies that had characterized the training and practice of trades and handicrafts throughout most of Western Europe.[3] Although the new German code restored the traditional pattern of organization, the guild-type system, and training for handicrafts, the American-sponsored effort toward reform was not entirely fruitless, for the code provided that craftsmen who had entered their trades and established their businesses under the period of Gewerbefreiheit would be licensed to continue their trades under the code. The reform period had provided opportunities during the unsettled postwar years for many individuals to enter the traditional trades who might never have been able to do so under the former restrictive practices.[4]

c. Significance of the German Elections in September 1953. In the September elections the Adenauer-led coalition was returned to power, with an overwhelming vote of confidence in the pro-Western orientation of the chancellor's policy. The first Bundestag had been elected under far different circumstances. Many Germans were then still disenfranchised as a result of denazification procedures and the government itself was limited by an incomplete basic law.[5] The September 1953 elections brought a transitional period in postwar German history to a close and the victory won by the erstwhile "Chancellor of the Allies" constituted an overwhelming German demonstration in favor of a policy of cooperation with the neighboring peoples of Western Europe.[6] The United States sought to take advantage of this favorable atmosphere by pressing toward the prompt ratification of the EDC Pact, for American policy planners realized that a delay in the ratification of that plan and of the contractual agreements might easily change the favorable political atmosphere into one in which nationalist extremists, aided by the republic's new feeling of national self-confidence following the elections, could exert considerable influence. There was widespread

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[3] West German Pol Wkly No. 13, 2 Apr 53, p. 8. CONFIDENTIAL.

[4] Ibid.

[5] German Federal Elections of September 6, 1953. Dispatch 998, HICOG, Bonn, to Dept of State, 18 Sep 53, p. 21. CONFIDENTIAL. In West German Pol Wkly folder (Sep 53 to Mar 54), USAREUR Hist Div Ref Lib.

[6] C/N 1, USAREUR POLAD to USAREUR SGS, 21 Oct 53, sub: Current Foreign Relations, Incl 1, 7 Oct 53, Current Prospects for EDC. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 319.1/6 (1953), Vol. III, Item 63.

belief in Germany that the electoral returns were sufficient proof of German political maturity and that therefore the occupation would have to be promptly ended.[7] As 1953 drew to a close without either French or Italian action toward ratification of EDC, American policy continued to liberalize the occupation in the U.S. Zone in many directions. By the end of June 1954, when it appeared that the French National Assembly would continue to delay ratification of EDC, the United States and the United Kingdom reluctantly considered a national German army as an alternative to the integrated defense contingent planned under EDC. If this alternative was accepted, USAREUR would be required to drastically revise its planning to meet the new circumstances.

d. Extremist Elements in the U.S. Zone. While the Bonn authorities had the communist elements firmly under control throughout the republic, the British uncovered a relatively small, but potentially dangerous neo-Nazi underground organization in their zone. This group, the Deutsche Fuehrung, composed of middle-elite former Nazis, was centered primarily in the British Zone. Although it had extended its operations into the American Zone, as of 30 June 1954 it had made relatively little headway and did not constitute a security threat. Of the radical nationalist and neo-Nazi groups in the U.S. Zone only the Deutsche Gemeinschaft (DG) was of any consequence. It had, however, neither the financial backing, the quality of leadership, nor the internal cohesion of the Deutsche Fuehrung. Furthermore, in contrast to the Deutsche Fuehrung, it was an overt organization that was carefully watched by CIC and by the security agency of the Federal Republic, as were all radical-nationalist groups in the U.S. Zone. In effect, these groups did not constitute a security threat to USAREUR.[8]

219. Participation in Planning for the German European Defense Force Contingent

a. Basic Situation. The delay in the long-planned-for implementation of the EDC pact and the contractual agreements produced a certain amount of unfavorable comment in the German press and public opinion.[9] German resentment over the delay in ratification was manifested in mounting attacks upon Adenauer's foreign policy not only by the leftwing opposition, represented by the Social

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[7] West German Pol Wkly No. 41, 15 Oct 53, p. 2. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR Hist Div Ref Lib.

[8] Stf Sum, USAREUR ACOFS G2 to USAREUR SGS, 17 Jan 53. SECRET. In SGS 350.09 (1953), Vol. I, Item 3 atchd.

[9] Min, CINCUSAREUR's Mthly HICOG-Comdrs Conf, Mar 54. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (1954), B/P 3.

Democratic Party (SPD), but also from the rightwing parties of the Chancellor's own coalition. The atmosphere of public opinion in the Bundesrepublik favorable to West European integration was being clouded by frustration and disillusionment. It was against such a background that USAREUR approached the manifold problems of liaison with the Federal Republic in the fulfillment of its mission to be prepared to fight in defense of Western Europe against an aggressor from the east.

b. USAREUR's Role in Training the German Contingent. The important problem of establishing liaison between CINCUSAREUR and Dienststelle Blank, the planning section for the Federal Republic's European Defense Force (EDF) contingent, was raised by former Colonel von Bonin, chief of the planning section of Dienststelle Blank, in a letter to General Eddy, CINCUSAREUR, in February of 1953. This liaison was desired for coordinate plans for the proposed German EDF contingent.[10] General Eddy turned to US CINCEUR for policy guidance, pointing out that CINCUSAREUR had avoided direct contact with the Germans up to this time because of the sensitive political implications involved. Colonel von Bonin's approach, however, opened up the entire question of the proper channel of training assistance to the German contingent as well as the question of CINCUSAREUR's relationship with the German military organization being planned in Bonn.[11] In reply US CINCEUR advised CINCUSAREUR to avoid direct contact between U.S. and German officers, as such contacts would violate JCS policy. The possible adverse effect of such contacts upon the ratification of EDC by the French National assembly undoubtedly weighed heavily in the adoption of this position. US CINCEUR pointed out that Colonel von Bonin should properly direct his questions through the EDC interim committee rather than through CINCUSAREUR.[12] No action was taken until March when it was decided at a conference of the Central Army Group that CINCUSAREUR, in his capacity as Commanding General, Central Army Group, would be in a position to work with the Federal Republic on plans for the deployment of the German EDF contingent. On the other hand, CINCUSAREUR was not authorized to deal with the Federal Republic, on a bilateral basis, with regard to the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. US CINCEUR pointed out that MAAG Germany would report

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[10] Ltr, Col von Bonin, Dienststelle Blank, Bonn, to CINCUSAREUR, 20 Feb 53, no sub. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 381 (1953), Vol. I, Item 1 atchd.

[11] Ltr, USAREUR COFS, to US EUCOM COFS, 28 Feb 53, no sub. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[12] Ltr, EUCOM COFS, to USAREUR COFS, 12 Mar 53, no sub. SECRET. In file cited above.

directly to US EUCOM and would be administered by that headquarters rather than by USAREUR, and that all liaison with the Federal Republic concerning military matters would be through HICOG or his successor.[13] A JCS directive assigned to US CINCEUR responsibility for interim military planning activities related to U.S. military assistance to Western Germany. Planning for a MAAG Western Germany was to be conducted through the U.S. observer group to the EDC Interim Committee, under the over-all direction of Ambassador Dunn, American observer to EDC. It was contemplated that CINCUSAREUR would be kept fully informed concerning the extent and scope of military assistance planning for the Federal Republic and that his views would be considered, when appropriate, with respect to the development of these plans.[14] Although aware that U.S. assistance to the training of the German EDF contingent would be handled through a MAAG, USAREUR was nevertheless convinced that it would eventually be called upon to provide some training assistance. However, there was no satisfactory delineation by US CINCEUR of CINCUSAREUR's responsibility in this task, and initially USAREUR was not invited to send a representative to the US CINCEUR-HICOG conference on military assistance.[15] Since USAREUR had neither funds nor personnel available for logistical support in behalf of the German contingent of EDF, USAREUR did not plan for such a mission. On the other hand, USAREUR G3 pointed out that in the release of housing for the German contingent there would undoubtedly have to be direct liaison between USAREUR and the Federal Republic. This proved to be the case when the German authorities began to plan for the caserne requirements of their EDF contingent.[16] Both HICOG and CINCUSAREUR expressed concern over the inadequate military-political coordination among U.S. policy agencies in Western Europe regarding the planning for the integration of the projected German military formations into EDF.[17] It was clear that a more frequent exchange of information between US CINCEUR, the U.S. observer to the EDC Interim Committee, HICOG, and CINCUSAREUR was required, for although

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[13](1) USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf, 10 Mar 53. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br. (2) Conf Sum, 23 Mar 53, CENTAG Tng and Equip of Ger EDF Contingent, 18 Jun 53. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381 EDF (1953), Vol. I, Item 1 atchd (B/P).

[14]Ltr, US EUCOM to CINCUSAREUR, 23 Jun 53, sub: Responsibility with Respect to U.S. Military Assistance to Western Germany. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 092 (1953), Vol. II, Item 19A.

[15]Memo, USAREUR for USAREUR COFS, n.d., sub: Reduction in Time Between Ratification of EDC and Creation of Operational German Contingents. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381 (1953), Vol. II, Item 1 atchd.

[16]Memo, USAREUR for COFS from USAREUR G3, 26 Sep 53, sub: Relationship of USAREUR with Certain Other Agencies After the Ratification of EDC Treaty and the Contractual Agreements. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 092 (1953), Vol. II, Item 19A.

[17]Sum, USAREUR G3 Plans Br, 28 Nov 53. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381 (1953), Vol. II, Item 1 atchd.

the German EDF contingent was intended to play a major role in the defense planning for all of Western Europe, U.S. planning agencies had less direct contact with the Federal Republic on defense matters than with any other country in Europe at the time.[18] During this period, caution on the part of U.S. authorities not to jeopardize the chances of French ratification of the EDC treaty by establishing active liaison between German and U.S. authorities on military matters, had much to do with the lack of coordination which caused HICOG and CINCUSAREUR such grave concern.

c. Housing Requirements of the German Contingent. While USAREUR's role in the training or support of the projected German EDF contingent was not clearly stated, CINCUSAREUR was given complete freedom to deal directly with the Germans concerning the fulfillment of their military housing and training area requirements, when the Secretary of Defense directed U.S. forces stationed in the Federal Republic to facilitate the use of barracks, depots, training grounds, and similar installations by German EDF units.[19] This assignment was regarded as logical, for if the Germans were to procure such facilities, they would have to negotiate with CINCUSAREUR who physically controlled most of the installations that the Germans would require. In this case US EUCOM would not be the channel for negotiations with the German authorities.[20] USAREUR was confronted with a number of problems in deciding on the disposition of unoccupied casernes under its control. Both the local authorities and the Federal Republic desired them to house the steady flow of refugees from Eastern into Western Germany. However, CINCUSAREUR feared that if these properties were released to satisfy civil requirements considerable difficulty would be encountered later in recovering them for housing the German troops. Since the Federal Republic had no confiscation law, the onerous task of re-requisitioning the properties and removing the refugees would fall upon USAREUR. Dienststelle Blank had agreed, moreover, that USAREUR should retain control of all confiscable property of potential military value even though the U.S. forces might not still be using them. The situation placed USAREUR in an untenable public relations position. CINCUSAREUR therefore suggested to US HICOG the establishment by the Federal Republic of a high-level control authority to whom USAREUR could release these properties without

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[18] Memo, 29 Oct 53, sub: German Defense Contribution and Build-up. SECRET. In file cited above.

[19] Cable DA-941379, COFSA to CINCEUR, 15 Jun 53. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1953), Vol. I, Item 1 atchd.

[20] Sum of Conf on Equipping and Training of the German Contingent to EDC, 23 Mar 53, p. 7. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381 (1953), Vol. I, Item 1 atchd, B/P (CAG 6/465).

jeopardizing their future availability.[21] Dr. Conant agreed that properties of future military value should be retained by USAREUR or, if requested by the Federal Chancellery, should be released to the Federal Republic only with the understanding that they would be made readily available when needed by the German EDF contingent.[22] Later, Dienststelle Blank began to plan the housing requirements of the German contingent and established active liaison with CINCUSAREUR's representatives to determine, by negotiation, what facilities would be available.[23]

d. Training Area Requirements of German EDF Contingent and USAREUR. Range requirements of the newer weapons, such as guided missiles and the 280-mm. cannon, together with plans for raising German EDF units, created the problem of finding additional training areas and expanding old ones.[24] CINCUSAREUR held that with the ratification of EDC, the procurement of major training areas for the German EDF contingent would be largely a German responsibility. CINCUSAREUR believed that it was not possible in the foreseeable future to turn over any of the major training areas of Grafenwoehr, Hohenfels or Wildflecken to the Germans.[25] The German authorities, however, citing the provisions of Articles 74 and 101 of the EDC treaty, maintained that the procurement of large additional training areas would be an EDC problem and would therefore have to be presented to all the members of EDC for consideration. The latter approach would to some extent free the Federal Republic from the burden of providing additional training areas.[26] Despite the efforts of HICOG to assist CINCUSAREUR in enlarging existing or requisitioning new training areas, the German authorities steadfastly maintained that, except for a divisional training area near Vogelsang-Elsenhorn, no additional areas would be available in Western Germany.[27] The Allied forces, including USAREUR, recognized

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[21] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to HICOG, 7 Mar 53, no sub. SECRET. In file above, Item 1 atchd.

[22] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to HICOG, 23 Mar 53, no sub. SECRET. In file cited above.

[23] USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf Notes, 17 May 54. NATO CONFIDENTIAL.

[24] Cable 272, COMNORTHAG to COMLANDCENT for Gen Servais, 30 Dec 53. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1953), Vol. II, Item 48.

[25] Rept, 1st mtg of CENTAG (USAREUR and CCFFA) Working Comm on EDC (German) Deployment, Jan 53, p. 3. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381 (1953), Vol. I, Item 6A atchd.

[26] Interv, Dr. E. F. Fisher, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col W.F. Woodward, USAREUR G3 Div Tng Br, 15 Jul 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

[27] Cable 214, HICOG to CINCUSAREUR, 19 Nov 53. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1953), Vol. II, Item 48 atchd.

reluctantly that any further requisitions of large tracts of land in Germany for training purposes would involve the transfer of thousands of people and the loss of valuable agricultural land. They therefore decided to limit themselves to the improvement of existing facilities. At the close of the report period possible sites of ranges for 280-mm. guns and guided missiles, outside the territory of the Federal Republic, possibly in French North Africa, were under consideration.[28]

e. Disposal of Wehrmacht Personnel Files. Another problem associated with the creation of an EDF German contingent was the disposal of approximately 300 boxes of Wehrmacht personnel files held in USAREUR adjutant general custody at Hoechst.[29] Since all the important documents had been microfilmed, CINCUSAREUR saw no reason for retaining the original materials. He therefore advised the Department of Army G2 that USAREUR was willing, with British concurrence, to return the records to German custody.[30] Since the British and the French strongly objected to the return of these files to the Federal Republic, pending final implementation of EDC, the Department of the Army denied USAREUR's request.[31] In March 1954, however, the Departments of Defense and State instructed CINCUSAREUR to make the files available for exploitation by German personnel in connection with the German EDF contribution. This directive did not permit the files to be transferred to Federal Republic custody, but it met British and French objections and at the same time gave the German authorities complete access to the records.[32]

220. Relations with the German Border Police

a. German Border Police. The mission of the German Federal Border Guard or the Bundesgrenzschutz (BGS) was essentially that of an armed alert border patrol, equipped to handle routine border

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[28](1) Stf Study, 15 Dec 53, sub: Submission of Estimate of Future Infrastructure Requirements (6th and 7th Slices) LANDCENT. SECRET. (2) Cable LC-71620, COMLANDCENT to SACEUR, 19 Dec 53. SECRET. Both in file cited above.

[29]Stf memo, USAREUR POLAD to USAREUR DCOFS for Admin, 15 Jan 54. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 014.1 (1954), Vol. I, Item 1.

[30]Cable SX-1187, USAREUR ACOFS G2 to ACOFSA G2, 18 Jan 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above, Item 1 atchd.

[31]Cable DA-955882, ACOFSA G2 to CINCUSAREUR, 21 Jan 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

[32]Cable SMC-IN 6033, State Dept to HICOG, 20 Mar 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

control problems, such as illegal crossings of a nonmilitary nature by East German and Czechoslovak nationals. United States units established liaison with BGS units for the purpose of supplying them with information pertaining to actual or possible border violations. The Federal Border Police unit was the action unit in such cases, and the U.S. units were prepared to support the border police if necessary.[33] While Seventh Army was responsible for the military security of the eastern frontier of the U.S. Zone, Germany, operational control of German BGS units, including Bavarian border police (Bayerische Grenzepolizei) along the Bavarian-Czechoslovak border, was to be assumed only under the conditions outlined in the HICOG-EUCOM agreement (German Implementation of the HICOG-EUCOM Policy on Border Operations, 18 August 1952) involving crossings of the border in strength by Russians or Soviet-controlled persons or forces.[34]

b. Proposals for Increase. During the first half of 1953 there was considerable agitation in the Bundestag for authority to increase the size and armament of the BGS, but when the Chancellor requested this authority, the Allied High Commission, fearing adverse repercussions on French public opinion, agreed to defer action on the matter.[35] As late as 1 June 1953 the Commission refused to alter its stand.[36] The dramatic uprising on 17 June of East Zone workers against their communist-dominated regime prompted the West German Bundestag to bring the matter up again by overwhelmingly approving a coalition motion to increase the size of the BGS from 10,000 men to 20,000. The Allied High Commission again rejected the proposal although it recognized that under the circumstances disapproval of the Bundestag's action was not an easy matter.[37] It was not anticipated by HICOG that events similar to the uprisings in the East Zone would occur in West Germany. To strengthen the West German police force to the point where it could cope successfully with such civil disturbances would be, in HICOG's opinion, uneconomical and, at the same time, contrary to the Council of Foreign Ministers' decision of 1950

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[33] Annex A to Status of Border Opns, 31 Jan 53, sub: Special Instructions, U.S. Forces. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 091.311 (1953), Vol. I, Item 4.

[34] USAREUR ltr of instrs, 4 Jun 53, sub: Border Operations. SECRET. In file above, Item 9A.

[35] Cable SMC-2047, HICOG to State Dept, 28 Mar 53. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 231.4 (1953), Vol. I, Item 1A.

[36] Cable SMC-2400, HICOG to State Dept, 1 Jun 53. SECRET. In file above, Item 5.

[37] West German Pol Wkly No. 25, 25 Jun 53, p. 5. CONFIDENTIAL.

and the prohibition envisaged in article 11 of the EDC treaty. CINCUSAREUR was in accord with HICOG on the undesirability of allowing the Federal Republic to increase its border police force. Such an increase of strength, CINCUSAREUR stated, would transform the border police into a paramilitary organization, which the Federal Republic had no authority to maintain.[38]

c. The Wildflecken Exercise. On 26 March 1953 elements of the BGS conducted an exercise at Wildflecken, with the U.S. 373d Armored Infantry Battalion furnishing certain fire support. The maneuver appeared to have been arranged between BGS units in that area and officers of the 373d Battalion and was observed by Maj. Gen. J. M. Gavin, VII Corps commander; Maj. Gen. K. F. Cramer, SACOM commander; and General Grasser, CG of Kommando Sued of the German Border Police. In view of CINCUSAREUR's firm opposition to any attempt by the Federal Republic to change the character of the BGS to that of a paramilitary organization, this participation of U.S. military personnel in what appeared to be a purely military exercise, involving units of the German Border Police, was extremely embarrassing. When the incident was brought to the attention of Maj. Gen. E. T. Williams, USAREUR chief of staff, specific instructions were given Seventh Army chief of staff, Brig. Gen. E. B. Gjelsteen, that there would be no further participation in joint exercises of this nature.[39] This incident indicated inadequate coordination between Headquarters, USAREUR, and its subordinate commands--in this case, Seventh Army--concerning matters of policy regarding the Federal Republic. The German and French press reacted strongly to this incident.

221. Problems Pertaining to German Civilian Employees

a. Effect of Budgetary Restrictions. Both the outgoing Truman and the incoming Eisenhower administrations made heavy cuts in the FY 1953 budget for the Department of Defense. The impact of the cuts on USAREUR would necessitate a reduction of approximately 55,000 employees in the German civilian labor force employed by the U.S. Army in Germany. This was based on USAREUR's expectation that Congress would require Deutsche Mark expenditures to be justified to the same extent as dollar expenditures.[40] It was thought that

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[38](1) Cable SMC-727, HICOG to State Dept, 1 Jul 53. SECRET. (2) Ltr, USAREUR DCOFS to Dep HICOG, 29 Apr 53, sub: Armament of German Police. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 231.4 (1953), Vol. I, Item 4.

[39]Ltr, Seventh Army COFS to USAREUR COFS, 6 Apr 53, sub: Bundesgrenzschutz-Seventh Army Joint Exercises. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 2.

[40]Memo, USAREUR Compt for CINCUSAREUR, n.d., sub: Impact of Application of Section 1415 of PL 547 to DM Expenditures This Command. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1953), Vol. II, Item 31.

these large-scale lay-offs of German employees would have two important and undesirable effects. The first was that military personnel would be required to assume many of the housekeeping and administrative duties previously performed by the German employees. Grave concern was expressed by CINCUSAREUR over the adverse affect of this requirement on troop-combat readiness, since time spent in performing these duties would be lost for military training.[41] The second effect would probably be upon the Federal Republic. Its economy was already laboring under the heavy burden of having over a million unemployed, and USAREUR feared that the additional number of workers released in the German labor market would effect the labor situation adversely. HICOG was therefore informed of the contemplated action prior to its implementation.[42] In order to bring about the reduction in personnel strength with minimum disruption in the essential services of installations, USAREUR created a point-credit system for determining an employee's retention or release, and at the same time provided affected employees with uniform rights of appeal. The directive covering the point system and appeal procedure was published 5 October 1953.[43]

b. Status of German Employees in the Labor Courts. In May 1953 the Chancellor suggested to HICOG that disputes concerning German employees of the U.S. forces in Germany should be admitted to the German labor courts. An agreement to enforce the rights of workers before the labor courts in the U.S. Zone would constitute an interim procedure until the contractual agreements came into force. Such an agreement, the Chancellor stated, would aid greatly in securing the active cooperation of the powerful German trade union organizations in negotiating adjustments in the wage rates of the German employees.[44] HICOG passed the Chancellor's proposals to CINCUSAREUR who at first, refused to consider them. Later, however, he decided to accept in principle the application of German labor law and the jurisdiction of German labor courts in matters relating to the employment of German personnel, with the proviso that the interests of the U.S. forces would have to be safeguarded

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[41] Cable S-4495, CINCUSAREUR to COFSA, 15 May 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1953), Vol. II, Item 7.

[42] Memo, USAREUR Compt to USAREUR COFS, 8 Apr 53, sub: Curtailment of Services to Meet Budgetary Restrictions. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above, Item 19 atchd (B/P).

[43] USAREUR ltr, 5 Oct 53, sub: Reduction in Force Procedure-German and non-German Resident Civilian Employees. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 230 Ger (1953), Vol. I, Item 28.

[44] Ltr, FEDREP Off of Chancellor to HICOG, 29 May 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 17A.

in any arrangement made. In practice the contractual agreements, if implemented, would not greatly change the relationship of USAREUR to its German civilian employees. By definition these employees would not be considered members of the Forces entitled to special status under the terms of the contractual agreements. Subject to the limitations of German labor legislation, USAREUR retained the rights of engagement, placement, training, transfer, and dismissal. A mixed commission of Germans and representatives of the Forces would determine to what extent German labor laws were inconsistent with the needs of the Forces.[45]

c. Adjustment of Wage Rates of German Civilian Employees. Despite USAREUR's commitment to pay wage rates based upon those prevailing in the German economy, in mid-1953 the rates in the U.S. Zone lagged 15 to 20 percent behind those in German industry. This discrepancy had grown steadily greater since April 1951, when the last general wage increase throughout the American Zone had been granted and had resulted in a high turnover of workers, lowered employee morale, and difficulty in obtaining and retaining personnel of desired skills. At the same time, the trade unions and the Federal Republic were increasing their efforts for an immediate adjustment of wage rates of German civilian employees of the U.S. armed forces in the American Zone. Since a wage increase would automatically result in a reduction of personnel, CINCUSAREUR was reluctant to effect the increase and thereby add to the number of unemployed workers in the German economy.[46] After months of study and negotiations by German and U.S. authorities, a straight 15 percent across-the-board wage increase, to become effective 1 September 1953, was agreed upon. With the ratification of EDC and the implementation of the contractual agreements an additional 12 percent increase would be required to cover social security payments for German employees.[47]

d. The Karlsfeld Situation. While USAREUR sought to observe German labor laws to the maximum extent possible, the maintaining of U.S. security measures with regard to German employees of the U.S. forces in Germany presented the command with a number of difficult labor-relations problems, which remained unsolved during the period covered by this report.[48] The problem was well

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[45]USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf 10, 24 Aug 54, pp. 14-15. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

[46]Memo, USAREUR Dep ACOFS G1 to USAREUR ACOFS G4, 29 Jun 53, sub: Wage Rates for German Employees. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1953), Vol. II, Item 8.

[47]Ltr, USAREUR COFS to C/USAREUR Bud Div, 23 Jul 53, sub: Deutsche Mark Funds and German Employees. SECRET. In file above, Item 31.

[48]Min, CINCUSAREUR's Mthly HICOG-Comdrs Conf, Mar 54, pp. 1-2. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (1954), B/P 3.

illustrated by a bitter dispute between the German trade unions and the U.S. military authorities that arose following the discharge as security risks of 40 employees of the Bavarian Motor Works (BMW), the Karlsfeld Ordnance Depot. The 40 workers were screened from a list of 135 employees of the Karlsfeld Ordnance Depot investigated by the 66th CIC Group to determine whether they were security risks within the meaning of current regulations. When the depot commander had ascertained that the investigation had established that 40 workers could no longer be employed at the depot without endangering the security of the U.S. forces, he dismissed them immediately.[49] The workers were ordered to leave the plant by 1700 hours the same day. It was most unfortunate that the problem of security dismissals should have come to a head at the Karlsfeld plant, for there had been a prolonged period of tension there between the military officials in charge of the depot and the plant management. The military officials had discontinued such traditional fringe benefits as canteen and housing subsidies, on the ground that the wage rates established by German law were generous enough to make such subsidies unnecessary. Travel allowances and wage differentials for hazardous work were authorized in appropriate cases, by German law, but the military officials reserved the right to determine what constituted hazardous or undesirable work.[50] Thus the discharge of the employees took place against a background of mounting ill-will of the workers toward the military management. At the request of the Bavarian State Government, a meeting was held in Munich on 2 April 1954 between U.S. Army ordnance representatives and Bavarian State officials, in an attempt to iron out the differences which had arisen from the incident. The Bavarian Minister of Labor contended that the discharged workers were trustworthy individuals and insisted that the Army show proof that they constituted security risks. Under current security restrictions the U.S. representatives were not able to provide the German officials with the information they desired.[51] The entire matter was then referred to USAREUR for review. USAREUR found itself in an extraordinarily difficult public relations position. The German trade unions, the Social Democratic Party in the Bundestag, large elements of the German press, and international representatives of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) were strongly critical of the military authorities'

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[49]Resume of Facts Concerning Removal of Employees of BMW, Karlsfeld Ord Dep, Mar 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 230 Ger (1954), Vol. I, Item 11 atchd (B/P).

[50]TELECON, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 5 Apr 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

[51]Min, Conf between U.S. Reps and Bavarian State Officials, 2 Apr 54, with Regard to BMW Dispute. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

handling of the case. USAREUR's problem was to convince the German officials that procedures and the decisions in the individual cases had been just; this had to be achieved without violating regulations concerning the dismissal of security risks.[52] The BMW management arranged final settlement of wage claims with 13 of the 40 workers dismissed. The remaining 27, however, refused to accept a settlement, preferring to take their cases before the German labor courts. USAREUR decided to review the cases and invited the Bavarian Labor Minister to submit a list of employees whose separation he believed to be unjustified.[53] After a study of the reports submitted to USAREUR G2 by the CIC detachment in Munich, General Fehrenbaugh, USAREUR chief of staff, decided that one of the discharged employees, a Hungarian refugee, should be reinstated with full rights and privileges. This move was made primarily as a political gesture on the part of USAREUR to help quiet adverse publicity.[54] The results of USAREUR's reinvestigation of the BMW dispute were turned over to Washington for study and discussion between representatives of the Department of Defense and of the international labor unions.[55]

e. Recruitment of German Scientific Personnel for Project 63. Project 63, identical with Project PAPERCLIP, was the program designated by the JCS for the recruitment by CINCUSAREUR of 135 German and 85 Austrian scientific specialists for military research in the United States.[56] Under the terms of the project, the selected specialists fulfilled an initial 6-month contract after which they were offered 3-year contracts or given the opportunity of applying for U.S. citizenship.[57] This recruitment program brought forth a strong protest from the chairman of the German Research Association, Professor Ludwig Raiser, to Dr. R. T. Arnold, HICOG scientific adviser. Professor Raiser complained that this transfer of skilled scientific personnel from Germany to the United States would adversely affect the material and intellectual rehabilitation of Germany and Europe. He compared the recruitment of specialists to the discredited dismantling program that followed

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[52]Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to HICOG, 17 Apr 54, no sub. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

[53]Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to HICOG, 30 Apr 54, no sub. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

[54]Memo for recd, USAREUR Off of COFS, 28 Apr 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

[55]Cable DA-531001, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 12 Jul 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[56]Memo, USAREUR to USAREUR ACOFS G2, 27 Apr 51, sub: Approval of Project 63 Contracts. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 230 Ger (1953), Vol. I, Item 18.

[57]TELECON, USAREUR DCOFS to Lt Col A. R. Hercz, USAREUR G2 Div, 25 Feb 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 18 atchd.

the war and protested against what he termed the exploitation for foreign purposes of everything of value in Germany.[58] To what extent this protest expressed a genuine feeling of concern in German scientific circles was difficult to say. It did draw attention, however, to an apparent eagerness on the part of German scientists, when given the opportunity, to cooperate with the U.S. forces and to seek broader opportunities in the United States.

222. Labor Service Division (German)

a. Liaison with the Federal Republic. In view of the important role of the labor services organization, CINCUSAREUR recognized the need for improved liaison between that organization and the Federal Republic. Accordingly a lieutenant colonel from the Labor Services Division was assigned as USAREUR representative to the Federal Ministry of Finance.[59] The Chief, Labor Service Division, was also expected to maintain liaison on labor service activities with the Federal Ministries of Interior, Labor, and Refugee Control.[60] During the early part of 1953, the German authorities were interested in clarifying the status of labor service units employed by the three occupation powers. For this purpose a conference between the representatives of the labor services organizations of the Allied powers, officials of interested German ministries, and representatives of the leading political factions in the Bundestag was held at Bonn on 29 January. Primary topics were the mission, organization, and utilization of labor service personnel within the framework of the contractual agreements, but no definite decisions were reached. The German trade union officials expressed considerable interest in extending compulsory trade union membership requirements for labor service personnel, which the British supported in their zone, to the U.S. Zone. Union membership for labor service personnel was entirely voluntary in the U.S. Zone. Apparently little interest in joining was shown, for the German authorities claimed that they knew of no members in the U.S. Zone.[61] Later in 1953 a visit to USAREUR LSD by a representative of the Federal Finance

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[58] Ltr, Chm German Research Assoc, to Dr. R. T. Arnold, Scientific Adviser, HICOG, 13 Feb 53, no sub. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[59] Memo, USAREUR LSD to USAREUR COFS, 13 Apr 53, sub: Assignment of Liaison Officer to Bonn. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 231.4 (1953), Vol. I, Item 8A atchd.

[60] Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G3, n.d., sub: Staff Supervision of USAREUR Labor Services. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 28 atchd.

[61] Memo, USAREUR LSD, 2 Feb 53, sub: Report of Bonn LSD Conference. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 2B.

Ministry, designated by the Chancellor as the coordinating agency for all labor service units, evidenced increased interest at the highest governmental level, in the welfare of labor service personnel. The visit resulted from an invitation extended to the Federal Ministry of Finance by HICOG, on 28 July 1953, at a HICOG-Federal Republic conference of civilian service organizations.[62]

b. Legal Status of Labor Service Personnel. Since at least 40 percent of the labor service personnel in the employ of U.S. forces were non-German nationals, the Federal Republic was very interested in clarifying their status under German law. CINCUSAREUR was inclined to defer consideration of the problem until after the ratification of the contractual agreements, but HICOG thought that the subject was politically too delicate for delay. The essential matters involved were the status, the documentation, and relationship to local German authorities of the non-German elements of the labor service organization.[63] CINCUSAREUR's desire to defer the problem of registration of labor service personnel under the provisions of German law was based primarily upon considerations of security. CINCUSAREUR agreed, nevertheless, that labor service personnel, both German and non-German, must comply with German law regarding proper registration and documentation, but insisted that as a security precaution HICOG arrange a compromise with German authorities permitting labor service personnel to withhold detailed information concerning their employment with labor service units.[64] CINCUSAREUR, moreover, was keenly interested in the ultimate disposition of the labor service organization, for labor service units formed an important part of USAREUR's effective strength. Their efficiency rating was generally equal to or higher than that of corresponding U.S. units, and CINCUSAREUR considered that if they were relieved by American combat units, at least 15 additional battalions would be required to take their place, with a consequent reduction in the immediate operational effectiveness of Seventh Army.[65] While the terms of the contractual agreements called for the discontinuance of labor service units within two years following ratification, they permit reopening of negotiations between the

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[62] Memo, USAREUR LSD, 29 Oct 53, sub: Visit to LSD by Members of FEDREP. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 24 atchd.

[63] Ltr, HICOG to USAREUR COFS, 12 Aug 53, sub: Labor Service Units. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 20.

[64] Memo, C/USAREUR LSD to USAREUR COFS, 26 Aug 53, sub: Registration and Documentation of LSD Personnel. SECRET. In file cited above.

[65] Memo, USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 18 Jun 53, sub: General Orientation on Labor Service for the Department of the Army. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 14.

Allied Forces and Federal Republic, before the end of the 2-year period, to assure that the over-all strength of the Forces will not be impaired by their discontinuance.[66]

223. USAREUR-Federal Republic Occupation Costs Agreement

At the beginning of 1953 USAREUR was faced with the possibility of a cut-off of Deutsche Mark fund support sometime during FY 1954 if EDC was ratified and the contractual agreements became effective. This would mean that the liquidation date for several million Deutsche Marks obligated for construction projects and other troop support activities would probably have to be carried over from FY 1953 into FY 1954. Since there was considerable doubt that Congress would provide for FY 1954 the dollar support for the liquidation of such obligated Deutsche Mark expenditures, USAREUR planners sought to reduce the Deutsche Mark carry-over into FY 1954 to the lowest possible figure.[67] The attitude of the German Finance Ministry concerning the use of carry-over funds was that no portion of Germany's defense contribution to EDC should be used for support of military forces of other nations stationed in Germany when those nations were not members of EDC.[68] Since, according to the German concept, U.S. forces in Germany would not be under EDC, USAREUR's Deutsche Mark support funds would be terminated upon ratification of EDC and with it the possibility of using Deutsche Mark carry-over funds for liquidation of earlier obligations, unless an agreement was reached for an extension of these funds into the period following ratification. The Bureau of German Affairs of the U.S. State Department had previously been reluctant to permit HICOG to negotiate with the Federal Republic concerning the unexpended balance of the occupation cost funds, lest the German authorities take the opportunity to reopen negotiations concerning the Finance Convention of the contractual agreements. However, in February 1953 the State Department permitted HICOG to begin negotiations with the Federal Republic to effect an arrangement whereby U.S. forces could use the unexpended portion of the Deutsche Mark support funds, the so-called carry-over funds, for the liquidation of previously programmed projects

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[66] C/USAREUR LSD, Notes on Labor Service, 9 Oct 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 23.

[67] Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 21 Feb 53, sub: GFY 1953 Construction Program. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1953), Vol. I, Item 11A.

[68] Cable 753, HICOG to State Dept sgd Conant, 26 Feb 53. SECRET. In file above, Item 1.

following the ratification of EDC.[69] The negotiations were conducted against the background of the decision of the Foreign Ministers at the Lisbon meeting to hold the occupation costs of the Allied Powers in West Germany to a minimum. This decision was supported by Washington's conviction that a reduction in occupation costs was essential to the achievement of American political objectives in Western Germany. In keeping with this decision, the requirement was established that USAREUR's Deutsche Mark budget for FY 1954 be subjected to review by both Defense and State Departments before being passed to HICOG for negotiation with the German Finance Minister.[70] In March 1953 the Allied High Commission began negotiations with the Federal Republic for an agreement concerning limitation of costs of the tripartite occupying forces. During the course of the negotiations the German Finance Minister insisted that the long delay in the ratification of EDC and, consequently, the end of the occupation, had given the Allied Powers an important financial windfall, in the form of facilities and services valued at millions of Deutsche Marks, which otherwise would have been unobtainable.[71] However, on 10 April 1953 the HICOG Economic and Finance Committee and Mr. Schaefer, the Federal Finance Minister, concluded an informal agreement covering occupation costs, which provided for a monthly allocation of DM 600 million for the Allied Powers represented on the Allied High Commission--this allocation to be extended through 31 December 1953 or to the entry into force of the contractual agreements, if earlier. Second, funds under the DM 600 million limitation, which were not utilized by 31 December 1953, would remain available for 12 months thereafter for the liquidation of obligations made prior to the cutoff date. Finally, expenditures made under this arrangement would not be chargeable to the Federal Republic's defense contribution. These provisions meant that USAREUR had until 31 December 1954 to liquidate its Deutsche Mark obligations.[72] For practical purposes, any portion of the total contribution not obligated by 30 June 1954 could not be obligated subsequent to that date. On 25 April 1953 the Allied High Commission and the German Chancellor approved the informal agreement in the hope that it would enable USAREUR to reduce the impact of

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[69]Memo, US EUCOM to CINCUSAREUR, 13 Feb 53, sub: Deutsche Mark Support for U.S. Forces, Conference with German Section of State Department. SECRET. In file cited above.

[70]Cable 112, State Dept sgd Smith to HICOG, 10 Mar 53. SECRET. In file above, Item 9.

[71]Cable SMC-IN1094, State Dept to HICOG, 1 Apr 53. SECRET. In file above, Item 1.

[72]Memo, USAREUR Compt to USAREUR COFS, 21 Apr 53, sub: Occupation Cost Funds. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (1953), B/P 4, Tab A.

the carry-over through savings in the monthly allocations to the U.S. forces.[73]

224. Delay in Obligating Deutsche Mark Funds

The lag of Deutsche Mark expenditures below the DM ceiling caused USAREUR considerable concern as FY 1954 drew to a close. This lag amounted to DM 1.2 billion on 31 March 1954 and rose to DM 1.4 billion a month later. Unless USAREUR succeeded in greatly reducing this lag, future negotiations with the Federal Republic for continued Deutsche Mark support would be jeopardized.[74] German Finance Ministry officials argued that failure to expend available funds was having a deflationary effect on the German economy. The Federal Republic, operating on an expenditure-type budget, was required to hold in the treasury the unexpended funds for all the occupying powers. As of 31 March 1954, these funds amounted to DM 2.5 billion. The effect of this situation was that USAREUR had to contend with two different and somewhat conflicting desires of the Federal Republic. The first was to construct sufficient housing to enable the forces to release requisitioned housing. The second was to expend funds rapidly enough to free the Deutsche Mark funds from treasury control. It was virtually impossible for USAREUR to satisfy both of these desires, adhere to the fiscal controls governing USAREUR operations, and maintain sound business practices by making payments only when a finished product was delivered according to specifications.[75] The basis of the command's difficulties lay in the lack of finalized planning for many of the construction programs. CINCUSAREUR insisted that if the DM 600 million monthly allotment could be extended for a 6-month period beyond the cutoff date of the 30 April 1953 occupation cost agreement, a sufficient number of the programs could be planned, funded and obligated to fully utilize the Deutsche Mark ceiling. HICOG, however, was concerned with the political issues involved in extending the date for another 6 months, for it was believed that EDC, or some alternative, would be in effect by September 1954. HICOG therefore recommended to the State Department that negotiations for only a 3-month extension be authorized.[76] The State

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[73]Memo, USAREUR Compt for USAREUR COFS, 11 May 53, sub: Deutsche Mark Financial Situation. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 337/2 (1953), Vol. I, Item 12 atchd.

[74]CINCUSAREUR Mthly HICOG-Comdrs Conf Notes, 4 Jun 54, p. 3. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

[75]USAREUR Sum Sheet, Apr 54, sub: Obligations and Expenditures of Occupation Cost and Mandatory Expenditure DM Funds. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (1954), Vol. I, Item 4 atchd (B/P 4).

[76]Min, CINCUSAREUR Mthly HICOG-Comdrs Conf, 18 May 54, pp. 11-12. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (1954), Vol. I, Item 6 (B/P 6).

Department accepted HICOG's recommendation and directed the initiation of negotiations with the Federal Republic for a 3- instead of a 6-month extension of the Deutsche Mark support ceilings.[77]

225. Derequisitioning of Property

a. Movable Property. As the alternate housing program moved nearer its final phase, CINCUSAREUR developed plans for derequisitioning considerable property holdings in Western Germany. The problem of movable property presented one of the most difficult aspects of the planning, for a USAREUR study disclosed that a substantial portion of such property had been lost, damaged or destroyed during the period of U.S. occupancy. Estimates of possible claims were in the neighborhood of 75 to 100 million Deutsche Marks.[78] Under the provisions of Paragraph 3, Article 8, of the Finance Convention of the contractual agreements, the date of the derequisitioning of the property was to be considered the date of the damage. For property derequisitioned during the 3-month period before ratification of the contractual agreements the claims would be chargeable to U.S. support funds. Claims arising after the 3-month period were to be paid by the Federal Republic. USAREUR anticipated that considerable German criticism would arise if large-scale derequisitioning was delayed until the claims liability became a German responsibility. Accordingly, USAREUR planned to approach the Federal Republic, through HICOG, to negotiate a lump-sum settlement on the basis of which the West German Government would assume responsibility for all potential claims with respect to rental payments on requisitioned furnishings and furniture.[79] Lengthy negotiations between HICOG-CINCUSAREUR and representatives of the Federal Finance Ministry began at Mehlem in June 1953, but all attempts to arrive at a negotiated settlement by payment of a lump sum were rejected by the Finance Ministry because of the anticipated political impact of such a settlement in the Federal Republic.[80] Undoubtedly the principal difficulty lay in the discrepancies between the Army inventories of property, often made many months after the original date of occupancy, and the inventory of property made by owners before the forces' requisitioning action; for, in the period

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[77] Ibid., 14 Jun 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above, Item 9, (B/P 6).

[78] Memo, USAREUR JAG to USAREUR ACOFS G4, 14 Apr 53, sub: Requisitioned German Movable Property. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 602 (1953), Vol. I, Item 5A-1 atchd.

[79] Ibid.

[80] USAREUR memo for recd, 7 Jul 53, sub: Conference with HICOG and FEDREP at Mehlem. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above. Item 5A atchd.

immediately preceding and following the collapse of the Third Reich, properties, especially private dwellings, were requisitioned and occupied in a rather haphazard manner and the disposition and care of their movable contents were more or less matters of the occupants' discretion. Later when proper inventories were made by the engineers, in many instances, much of value had been removed in one way or another. Consequently, claims aggregating millions of Deutsche Marks, filed with German authorities, were often without legal basis in the eyes of the U.S. forces. The Federal Republic, however, negotiated on the basis of claims filed by its nationals, while USAREUR negotiated on the basis of inventories made by the engineers. In an effort to find a way out of the impasse, HICOG invited USAREUR representatives to another conference with officials of the Federal Finance Ministry in Mehlem, 7 October 1953, for the purpose of setting up a compromise procedure.[81] As a result of the conference, USAREUR's proposals for a lump sum payment were rejected and a system of specific payment in each case was adopted. Derequisitioning of movable property was carried out by USAREUR on a case-by-case basis according to USAREUR instructions of 30 October 1953. Claims for damaged or missing property were paid by the Federal Government out of the occupation costs funds.[82]

b. General Derequisitioning Programs. Despite the construction of an increasing number of alternate housing units for U.S. forces in Germany, USAREUR was still far short of its goal of sufficient units to permit zone-wide adoption of concurrent travel of dependents to West Germany. Consequently the derequisitioning of individual private dwellings was much slower than the German authorities had anticipated in 1953. USAREUR nevertheless released some high-cost units in an effort to forestall criticism from local as well as from American sources concerning unnecessarily luxurious facilities for certain military personnel.[83] At the same time, USAREUR adopted a program for the release of high-cost commercial and industrial properties, used generally by the technical services, and for the consolidation of troop housing whenever possible by moving personnel from requisitioned properties into rent-free installations. The deadline date set for this

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[81] Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR DCOFS for Admin, 13 Oct 53, sub: Derequisitioning of Movable Property. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 5A-1 atchd.

[82] USAREUR ltr, 30 Oct 53, sub: Movable Household Furniture and Furnishings. AG 601 C2M-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[83] USAREUR ltr, 27 Jun 53, sub: High-cost Housing. AG 620 SGS-AGO. CONFIDENTIAL.

program was 30 June 1954.[84] In a further effort to release additional housing, USAREUR decided early in 1953 to end the off-post or "remote" housing plan, which had been in effect for almost a year and had resulted in more unfavorable reaction than its limited benefits to the command warranted. Under that plan, in an effort to provide housing for dependents at the earliest date, USAREUR assigned housing in the Munich area, for example, to personnel stationed in the Western Area Command. Frequently, by the time a family actually arrived, quarters became available in WACOM, causing the house originally assigned in Munich to remain vacant for an extended period, and resulting in much adverse criticism from local German quarters in view of the extremely difficult housing situation.[85]

c. Derequisitioning Under the Contractual Agreements. USAREUR's housing needs seemed to have been adequately provided for under the terms of the contractual agreements. If USAREUR had accommodations under requisition and still had a need for them they could be retained, and if new requirements developed they would be met. Under reasonable interpretation, the recreational facilities controlled by USAREUR in the Southern Area Command could be retained. Facilities for which no need existed would have to be released and any property not used for a 6-month period would have to be returned to its owner. Requirements would have to be submitted to the Federal Republic in the form of periodic programs, and German authorities were to enact legislation to insure the provision of accommodations during and after the 1-year period following the ratification of the contractual agreements.[86]

226. The Alternate Housing Program

a. USAREUR-Federal Republic Bilateral Understanding. In January 1953 officials of the Federal Finance Ministry proposed to CINCUSAREUR, through HICOG, the construction of a certain number of housing units for the U.S. forces. In return, USAREUR would release to the Germans an equal number of requisitioned units, largely of 1- and 2-family size. In preliminary discussions the Federal Republic wanted priority in the release of properties to be determined on a hardship basis, while USAREUR insisted that priority be given to the release of substandard, poorly located, or high-cost units.[87] The formal German offer

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[84]Min CINCUSAREUR Mthly HICOG-Comdrs Conf, 25 Nov 53, p. 1. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (1953), B/P 11.

[85]Ibid., 2 Feb 53. SECRET. In file above, B/P 2.

[86]CINCUSAREUR Wkly Stf Conf 10, 24 Aug 54, p. 14. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

[87]Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 9 Feb 53, sub: Construction of Alternate Housing by FEDREP. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 602 (1953), Vol. I, Item 1A atchd.

was transmitted on 14 April. CINCUSAREUR concurred and on 21 April HICOG forwarded USAREUR's acceptance to the German authorities. Funds for this project were to be provided directly from the German budget instead of from occupation support funds.[88] The alternate housing project was essentially a bilateral expression of policy by the Federal Republic and CINCUSAREUR, since CINCUSAREUR was not empowered to enter directly into an agreement with Federal Republic authorities. Contemplated for the first phase of the project was the construction of 1,506 apartments throughout the U.S. Zone, with the exception of WACOM in the French Zone and Berlin.[89] Release of requisitioned property through the alternate housing program was to be entirely separate from the release of real estate through existing channels, and had no connection with the construction program supported by occupation support funds to fulfill the requirements of the U.S. forces.[90] The first phase of the program was most satisfactory to USAREUR, but it still fell far short of meeting the needs either of the Federal Republic or of the U.S. forces. USAREUR, therefore, continued to negotiate with German authorities with a second alternate housing program in view.[91]

b. The German Governmental Construction Agency. For some time the Federal Republic had been interested in performing a larger share of Deutsche Mark construction, especially family-type housing, for the U.S. forces. In September 1953 the Federal Ministry of Finance requested HICOG to arrange with CINCUSAREUR for all construction supported from Deutsche Mark funds to be turned over to a construction agency organized by the Federal Government. CINCUSAREUR countered with a proposal to place approximately 30 to 40 percent of the USAREUR housing program with the Federal Republic's construction agency.[92] In thus accepting the Federal Republic's proposal in part, CINCUSAREUR was motivated by several considerations. The proposal was essentially in line with USAREUR's policy of cooperating with the Federal Republic

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[88] Min, CINCUSAREUR Mthly HICOG-Comdrs Conf, 4 Apr 53, p. 13. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (1953), B/P 4.

[89] Ibid., 27 Apr 53. SECRET. In file above, Item D, B/P 4.

[90] Incl 3, Draft of an Arrangement for Construction of Alternate Accommodations for U.S. Forces, to C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 9 Feb 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 602 (1953), Vol. I, Item 1A atchd.

[91] C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 22 Jul 53, sub: Oberbuergermeister of Weinheim, Request for Release of Property. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 24 atchd.

[92] Min, CINCUSAREUR Mthly HICOG-Comdrs Conf, 2 Feb 54. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (1954), B/P 2.

whenever possible. This action was also politically expedient, in that it would assist CINCUSAREUR in negotiations with the Federal Republic on the occupation budget. Moreover, the agency would be capable of completing at least 30 or 40 percent of the program for the U.S. forces and, in so doing, would build up an organization capable of completing the housing program when the Germans were to take it over from the U.S. forces following ratification of the contractual agreements.[93]

c. The Bremerhaven Incident. In general, USAREUR's construction program for dependent housing as well as the alternate housing program, functioned smoothly. However, controversies of one type or another were inevitable whenever the regular pattern of negotiation and agreement was interrupted. In the Bremerhaven Enclave a dispute rather embarrassing to USAREUR developed over a requisitioned site. USAREUR required the construction of several hundred dependent and BOQ housing units in that area to implement the concurrent travel program. Late in November 1953 German authorities were asked to secure land for the project. The first site offered proved, upon study by German and American engineers, to be unsuitable because of its swampy nature. Bremerhaven officials then offered the "Am Blink" site of approximately 43 acres. This site was approved by USAREUR and the German authorities were instructed to procure the land, but when the German authorities sought to purchase it they found that several property owners in the rather sparsely settled area refused to sell. Because German law does not provide for eminent domain, the Land officials requested U.S. military authorities to use their requisition rights under occupation law to expedite the process. Since court action would take 18 to 20 months, and the funds for the project had to be obligated by 30 June 1954, USAREUR agreed to requisition the land on or about 15 April 1954.[94] As the time to evict the inhabitants drew near, German authorities, from municipal to federal level, encountered a storm of protest. Under the pressure of unfavorable publicity and adverse public reaction, U.S. officials in the Bremerhaven area recommended to CINCUSAREUR that consideration of the Blink area be dropped and that the Army utilize the original site, despite an additional projected cost of approximately 2½ million dollars.[95] CINCUSAREUR, however, refused to reconsider the decision for several reasons, the most important being that the concurrent

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[93] Ibid., Jan 54, p. 1. SECRET. In file above, B/P 1.

[94] Memo for rcd, Col J. H. Kerkering, USAREUR G4 Div Instl Br, to USAREUR COFS, 22 Jul 54, sub: Conference at HICOG concerning Blink Housing Project. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1954), Vol. II, Item 61 atchd.

[95] Cable BPE-1223, BPE sgd Ostenberg to CINCUSAREUR, 24 Jun 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

travel plans would have to be postponed if the project was further delayed and that no funds were currently available to meet the additional costs that acceptance of the original site would entail.[96] German authorities at municipal and Land level accepted CINCUSAREUR's decision to go ahead with the Blink project, but at the same time urged the Federal authorities to commence immediate and adequate payment of claims, with attendant publicity, in the belief that the controversy would soon collapse if adequate compensation and accommodations were provided. As of the end of the current reporting period, 30 June 1954, the dispute was still smoldering and not yet settled to the satisfaction of all involved.[97] The Blink dispute, like the Karlsfeld incident, illustrated the extraordinary difficulties encountered by USAREUR in handling the public-relations aspects of military-political problems connected with the fulfillment of its mission in Western Germany. In each case the evidence seemed to indicate a need for a greater awareness of the public relations problem by military authorities at lower echelons and a consequent alertness to anticipate and forestall such incidents and disputes.

227. The Civil Affairs Program

Since 5 June 1952, when USAREUR (then EUCOM) assumed responsibility for the conduct of civil affairs in Germany at Kreis level (also at Land level beginning 1 July), a successful troop-community relations program had been developed by German-American advisory councils under the sponsorship of the Civil Affairs Division. There were altogether 53 German-American advisory councils meeting regularly on a monthly or bimonthly basis. From January to June 1953 these councils, composed of German community and professional leaders and representatives of the local U.S. forces, strove to remove points of friction between the forces and local communities. Agreements were reached locally on such problems as traffic control, the rerouting of heavy military vehicles, the protection of farmers' crops from meneuver damage, and the utilization of summer camp areas and municipal swimming pools by American personnel. The councils also achieved cooperation in various projects, leading to closer and better understanding between the German and American communities. In many instances U.S. Army chaplains worked closely with German clergymen in conducting religious services and conferences. German choirs sang in post chapels and chaplains were frequently invited to address German congregations. Public health committees, composed of German and American physicians and organized by the advisory councils, met regularly for the exchange of professional

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[96] Cable SC-24011, USAREUR to BPE, 24 Jun 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[97] Cable 106, AMCG Bremen, sgd McLaughlin to HICOG, 15 Jul 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

information and the discussion of health problems of mutual interest. Both German and U.S. Army fire marshals entered into mutual assistance agreements. The implementation of a hunting and fishing agreement brought about better understanding between German and U.S. personnel concerning hunting and fishing practices. Local committees of the councils publicized the observances, parades, and open house programs of the U.S. Army in connection with the annual Armed Forces Day activities. During the 1953 Christmas season the advisory councils assumed leadership of joint German-American holiday activities. They were the official clearing houses for thousands of invitations from Germans to American military personnel to attend holiday parties in private homes. Charitable activities connected with the Christmas season, such as collection of presents for needy children and orphans, and the organization of parties for children in orphanages and for the aged, were handled through the advisory councils.[98] On the whole, German-American troop relations indicated increasing improvement in every area for which comparative findings were available. American-sponsored cultural exchange, German Youth Activities, and American assistance given to community projects were the three major areas attracting the most favorable comment in the German press.[99]

228. Partial Discontinuance of Support of GYA Activities Program

a. Extent of Discontinuance. In January 1953, some 73 GYA centers were being operated by the U.S. forces in the American Zone. Logistical support for these centers came from the U.S. Army and Air Force. For FY 1953 HICOG provided one million Deutsche Marks, including funds for the payment of salaries for German employees of the centers and the purchase of needed supplies. As FY 1953 drew to a close it became apparent that funds for these purposes would no longer be made available by HICOG nor from any other source, and that, therefore, the program would have to be either discontinued or operated on a different basis. The decision was made in 1953 to transfer as many centers as possible to the sponsorship and control of German communities. Under this plan 34 centers were transferred; sponsorship of 16 other centers was assumed by troop units willing to finance the program out of self-generated funds; and 7 others were maintained jointly by troop units and local German communities. The remaining 16 centers were closed and their supplies and equipment redistributed to centers still in operation. In June 1954 the GYA activities section was

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[98] Interv, Dr. E. F. Fisher, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. C. D. Winning, USAREUR CAD, 28 Sep 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

[99] Trends in West German Appraisal of the U.S. Forces in Germany, HICOG Rept 198, Series 2, 15 Jun 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322.01 (1954), Vol. I, Item 18A atchd (B/P 2).

transferred from G3 to G1, where it was administered jointly with the American Youth Activities section created at the same time. By that time 2 of the 16 centers sponsored by troop units had been turned over to the Germans. Special congressional action had also made possible the payment of salaries of German employees of GYA centers out of Deutsche Mark funds for FY 1955. Gasoline allocations, transportation for special events, and payment of rent, light, and fuel for buildings were provided out of Deutsche Mark funds; and the General Clay Fund for GYA provided some supplies and financial assistance.

b. Cooperation of German Communities. Generally the troop-sponsored or jointly sponsored centers were the most successful from the standpoints of youth interest, attendance, programming, and participation in USAREUR-wide events. Many of the centers sponsored by the Germans were very well operated, with little difference resulting from the transfer. Some of the communities, however, did not employ sufficient help to maintain as broad a program of activities as the centers had formerly enjoyed. Since one of the principal values of GYA was the promotion of German-American friendship and cooperation, it seemed desirable to list certain German-sponsored centers as "cooperating centers." An agreement was prepared stating that a cooperating center would adhere to the "open-door" policy and would make proper use of the supplies furnished by the General Clay Fund. All centers signing this agreement became eligible to receive supplies from the General Clay Fund, to participate in USAREUR-wide activities, such as the handicraft and *Meistersinger* contests, and to receive certain logistical support from troop units. Seventy-seven German-sponsored youth centers were enrolled as cooperating youth centers under this plan.[100]

229. Implementation of Hunting and Fishing Rights Agreement

a. The Hunting Agreement. Since Article 46 of the Forces Convention, concerning hunting and fishing privileges of members of the Forces, was essentially a vague statement of good intentions on the part of the Federal Republic, CINCUSAREUR was particularly anxious to implement the article in order to prevent denial of hunting rights to U.S. forces by *Laender* authorities. Maj. Gen. J. E. Dahlquist, Seventh Army judge advocate, who had represented CINCUSAREUR in negotiations for the original agreement in 1952, was given the assignment of negotiating the implementation with Hesse, Baden-Wuerttemberg, and Bavaria, the three *Laender* of the American Zone. An implementation agreement between CINCUSAREUR

[100] Memo, Lt Col J. W. Norviel, USAREUR G1 Div Pers Svcs Br AYA-GYA Sec, to Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, 17 Sep 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

and the three minister presidents was signed 10 November 1952.[101] Hunting by American personnel became subject to strict control by German and U.S. authorities. For the hunting year beginning 1 April 1953, each applicant for a hunting license was required to pass successfully a huntsman's examination before a competent German or American authority. Area commanders were instructed to establish standing boards of examiners and instructors to assist applicants to obtain the certificates of proficiency required for the annual German hunting licenses. Area commanders, through local U.S. rod and gun clubs, endeavored to develop close liaison with the German hunting organizations at Kreis level, and English-speaking members of German hunting organizations were encouraged to act as members of the boards of examiners for license applicants.[102] USAREUR welfare funds were used to support much of the cost of the hunting program. Consequently, when it became apparent that only a small proportion of the military personnel were availing themselves of the hunting program, USAREUR was placed in an embarrassing position vis-a-vis the Laender authorities, in view of the high priority that the command had originally given to the matter. Continued support of the program by the welfare fund became difficult to justify.[103] CINCUSAREUR urged unit commanders to encourage greater use of these privileges, but the problem remained. In the autumn of 1953 CINCUSAREUR again pointed out that U.S. personnel had failed to use their quota of game for the past year, a factor which would make renegotiation of hunting and fishing rights extremely difficult.[104]

b. The Fishing Agreement. An agreement concerning fishing in the Laender of Hesse, Bavaria, and Baden-Wuerttemberg and completing the implementation of Article 46 of the Forces Convention was signed on 26 February 1953 by Maj. Gen. E. T. Williams, USAREUR chief of staff and representatives of the three Laender. This agreement took effect without regard to the ratification of the contractual agreements. However, it was planned that when the contractual agreements became effective the agreement would be considered as valid within the spirit of Article 46, and that it would remain in effect until 31 December 1954, and thereafter until terminated or revised. After 31 December 1954, if either party wished to revise the agreement in any way a 3-month notice would

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[101] Interv, Dr. E. F. Fisher, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. Zinn Garrett, HICOG-USAREUR Ln, 10 Aug 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

[102] USAREUR ltr, 27 Feb 53, sub: Hunting Instructions and Examination. AG 680.4 CAD-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[103] Min, CINCUSAREUR Mthly HICOG-Comdrs Conf, 3 Mar 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (1953), B/P 3.

[104] Ibid., 26 Oct 53, p. 5. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, B/P 10.

have to be given. If agreement on a proposed revision was not reached within 6 months, either party could terminate the fishing agreement in its entirety, on 31 December next ensuing, by giving at least a month's notice.[105]

[105] Incl 1, Agreement Concerning Fishing, 26 Feb 53, to USAREUR ltr, 12 Mar 53, sub: Fishing Code for U.S. Forces Personnel. AG 680.4 CAD-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

CHAPTER 11

Relations with the Soviets and Their Satellites

230. Areas of Friction with the Soviets

a. General. During the period of this report USAREUR relations with the Soviet authorities in East Germany and East Berlin and with the East German and Czechoslovak satellites were characterized by numerous border incidents. These took the form of illegal border crossings, raids, kidnappings, shootings across the border, espionage, and other acts. Other difficulties stemmed from unprovoked attacks by Soviet or satellite aircraft upon U.S. or Allied transport planes and reconnaissance aircraft along the zonal border or within the air corridors to Berlin; the closing of highway and railway border crossing points by Soviet authorities; frequent harassment by East German customs police of private and commercial motor traffic along the Autobahn from West Germany to Berlin; refusal of Soviet authorities to allow courtesy patrols of the other three occupation powers to aid Allied motorists in need of assistance on the Autobahn; Soviet interference with the activities of the U.S. Military Liaison Mission accredited to the Soviet headquarters in Potsdam; and illegal activities of the Soviet Military Liaison Mission, at Frankfurt, accredited to USAREUR.

b. Friction in the Berlin Area. Although Soviet forces controlled only the East Sector they were continually trying to influence politics and policies in the Western Sectors of Berlin by applying economic pressure on Allied authorities and on the German population. Security for West Berlin was a very vexing problem. Heavily armed Soviet and East German police parties frequently encroached upon the sector and interfered with the flow of traffic at border crossings. Soviet anti-American propaganda directed at Berlin was a source of considerable annoyance. The stifling of the economy of Berlin by the closing of the Rothensee shiplift on the Mittelland Canal, as well as the interference with

truck traffic from Berlin to the west, were other sources of friction.[1] The constant Soviet curtailment of intracity transportation facilities on the Berlin subway (U-Bahn) and elevated lines (S-Bahn) and streetcars and the harassment of the passengers greatly irritated the Western Powers as well as Berlin citizens.[2] Even more irritating was the severance, by the Soviet authorities of Berlin, of telephone communications between West and East Berlin, inconveniencing the social and economic life of the people. Although the Allied authorities in Berlin repeatedly protested to Soviet authorities that the cutting of wire communications violated quadripartite agreements, the Soviet authorities in Berlin made no effort to restore the telephone service to full operation.[3] Other irritating actions included kidnappings, by Soviet police and agents, of prominent West Berlin residents and occasionally U.S. servicemen. The most notorious of these kidnappings was that of Dr. Walter Linse, in 1952, inquiries into which were still being made in late 1953.[4] Considerable friction was created between the Soviet authorities in Berlin and USAREUR over the refusal of the Soviets to remove their tank memorial, located in the U.S. Sector, the delaying tactics of U.S. authorities in not allowing them to keep the memorial in repair, and attempts of the West Berlin population to deface the memorial.[5]

231. The USAREUR Soviet Relations Advisory Committee

During the period under review the original composition of the USAREUR Soviet Relations Advisory Committee, established on 7 October 1952, remained unchanged. It had three permanent members:

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[1](1) Cable SMC-IN 1803, HICOG Bonn sgd Conant, 4 Mar 53. SECRET. (2) Cables 129-133, Berlin sgd Lyon to HICOG Bonn, 26-28 Mar, 1 Apr 53. CONFIDENTIAL. All in USAREUR SGS 094 Berlin (1953), Vol. I, Items 24, 26 and atchd.

[2](1) Cable 107, HICOG Berlin sgd Lyon to HICOG Bonn, 27 Jan 53. SECRET. (2) Cable SMC-IN 615, HICOG Bonn sgd Conant, to State Dept, 26 Feb 53. SECRET. Both in file above, Items 11, 19A.

[3](1) Msg, Berlin sgd Lyon to HICOG Bonn, 14 Sep 53. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Cable SMC-IN 2445, State Dept sgd Smith to Bonn, 6 Nov 53. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR SGS 094 Berlin (1953), Vol. II, Item 43 atchd.

[4]Cable 102, HICOG Berlin to State Dept, 16 Jan 53. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 094 Berlin (1953), Vol. I, Item 6.

[5](1) Cables 105, 155, Berlin sgd Lyon to HICOG Bonn, 23 Jan, 6 Jun 53. SECRET. In file above, Item 1 atchd. (2) Ltr, Maj Gen A. Yarazov, COFS, Gp of Soviet Occupation Forces in Ger, to Maj Gen C. B. Ferenbaugh, USAREUR COFS, 10 Jul 54, sub: Removal of Russian Tank Memorial from U.S. Sector to East Berlin. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 094 Berlin (1954), Vol. I, Item 14.

the Chief, Civil Affairs Division, chairman; the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2; and the Chief, Public Affairs Division. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, was a member on call. A member ex officio, representing the Office of the Political Adviser, was on call by the chairman; two additional members from each staff division were represented by a permanent member.[6] The committee met at the call of the chairman and all permanent members or duly designated alternates attended each meeting. Whenever the Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, or the Political Adviser were not called to attend, the chairman informed them of the action taken by the committee. All committee reports and recommendations were submitted to the USAREUR deputy chief of staff for operations for approval.[7] The general purpose and duties of the committee remained unchanged from 1952. Beside preparing USAREUR policy in matters affecting relations with the Soviet occupation authorities in Germany and assuming jurisdiction for all incidents involving Soviet and USAREUR personnel, the committee formulated a series of plans within that policy, to counter any actions the Soviets might take. When necessary it prepared replies to letters of protest received from the Soviet authorities as well as appropriate news releases on incidents. The committee also submitted recommendations concerning incidents involving U.S. personnel and Soviet forces in the Berlin area whenever CINCUSAREUR desired to take action. As a rule, incidents occurring in Berlin were considered within the competence of the U.S. Commander in Berlin, and only such cases as he could not settle were turned over to the committee.[8] The committee also received problems referred to it by heads of general staff divisions. All matters involving USAREUR policy, together with implementing action concerning relations with the Soviet military authorities, were channeled through the committee chairman by the USAREUR agencies concerned. The committee was competent to act in all zonal border incidents on land or in the air, as well as in the Berlin sector, if they involved USAREUR military or civilian personnel with Soviet military personnel. It also could act on cases of Soviet military personnel who entered the U.S. Sector of Berlin whether by accident or with intent to defect, and on all cases of USAREUR military personnel or civilians defecting to the Soviet Zone of Germany. All incidents concerning the Soviet Military Liaison Missions accredited to USAREUR or the French forces in Germany and which involved USAREUR personnel were within its

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[6] EUCOM/USAREUR Comd Rept, 1952, pp. 417-19. SECRET.

[7] (1) C/N 3, C/USAREUR CAD to USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 23 Dec 52, sub: Informal Letter from Chief U.S. Military Liaison Mission, Potsdam. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 250.2 (1953), Vol. I, Item 7A. (2) USAREUR Stf Memo 9, 12 Feb 53, sub: Soviet Relations Advisory Committee, for USAREUR. UNCLASSIFIED.

[8] Ibid.

competence.[9] However, it was not competent to act in incidents involving East Zone residents who fled to the U.S. Sector of Berlin, since such cases were handled by USCOB or HICOG. It was also not authorized to act in incidents involving USAREUR military or civilian personnel and military personnel of Czechoslovakia along the U.S. zonal boundary or in cases of Americans defecting to Czechoslovakia. Such incidents were handled by HICOG, through the Department of State and the U.S. Embassy in Prague, because CINCUSAREUR had no direct liaison with Czechoslovak military authorities. The committee could investigate and make recommendations to HICOG but could take no further action.[10] In order to deal more effectively with incidents involving USAREUR personnel who fell into Soviet hands, the committee divided the incidents into two categories. The first included incidents in which U.S. military personnel inadvertently crossed the border into the Soviet Zone or were kidnapped and taken into the East Zone by force. The second category consisted of cases of individuals who deliberately crossed into Soviet-occupied territory for the purpose of deserting the U.S. military service or eluding justice.[11] The committee acted promptly in incidents pertaining to the first category. Each case was thoroughly investigated and a strong protest was made to Soviet authorities demanding the return of the persons being held. Cases in the second category were treated more cautiously. After ascertaining that the persons in question were deserters, the committee made inquiries as to whether they were in Soviet-controlled territory and, if so, why they were there, and requested permission from the Soviet authorities to interview them to ascertain whether they wished to return. Negotiations for their return were then carried on in as deliberate and friendly a manner as possible.[12]

232. Incidents Along Boundary of U.S. and Soviet Zones

The most dangerous area of friction in USAREUR-Soviet relations was the long and poorly marked boundary line separating the U.S. Zone of Germany from the Soviet Zone and Czechoslovakia.

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[9] Interv, Dr. G. Tays, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col F. M. Clark, USAREUR Soviet Relations Advisory Comm, 7 Sep 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

[10] (1) Ibid. (2) C/N 1, C/USAREUR CAD to USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 1 May 53, sub: Incidents Involving East Zone Germans. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 250.2 (1953), Vol. I, Item 24.

[11] C/N 1, USAREUR CAD to USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 6 Aug 53, sub: Procedure for Recovery of Army Personnel Detained in Soviet Occupied Territory of Germany. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322.01 Ln Arrangements (1953), Vol. I, Item 23 atchd.

[12] 1st Ind, USAREUR to TAG, 13 Aug 53, to C/N 1, cited above.

Friction along this border took the form of numerous incidents, provoked by the East German border police, Soviet military patrols, or Czechoslovak military border patrols. Most of the incidents took place at or near border-crossing checkpoints and near towns. In general they consisted of raids across the boundary by East German police or Czechoslovak soldiers attempting to obtain information or to arrest persons fleeing from Soviet satellite nations. The most serious incidents from the USAREUR point of view, were those involving U.S. soldiers on border patrol at isolated points. During this report period there were numerous minor border incidents, but only 24 serious incidents. Of the latter, 12 took place in 1953 and 12 during the first half of 1954. Most of the incidents involved shooting across the border by Soviet or satellite personnel.[13] The handling of all border incidents followed a specified routine established by a US EUCOM policy directive, which required the unit nearest the point of an incident to make an immediate investigation of the circumstances and submit a spot report to its superior headquarters. That headquarters then reported to Headquarters, USAREUR. A follow-up report was to be made within 24 hours after the spot report, and a complete report within 10 days. These reports were to contain all pertinent information obtained by U.S. investigators at the site of the incident, the accounts of the persons involved, if living and available, and the depositions of witnesses. At USAREUR headquarters this evidence was evaluated and a complete report was transmitted to the Army Chief of Staff. If U.S. Army personnel were involved a report was made also to The Adjutant General, giving the status of the individuals, whether dead, missing, detained or released.[14] Headquarters, USAREUR, determined whether a protest should be made and, if so, its nature. If the incident involved American personnel, the USAREUR Soviet Relations Advisory Committee took jurisdiction of negotiations at once.

a. Examples of Incidents Involving Germans. On 1 June 1953, at 1140 hours, while West German customs policeman Walter Uhl was patrolling the border of the U.S. Zone in the vicinity of Ramback, he was shot and killed by two unidentified assailants. At the time of the shooting, Uhl was armed with a carbine and was walking at least 3 meters inside the U.S. Zone. However, the road he was patrolling crossed the zonal boundary at two points in the immediate vicinity and the exact line of demarcation was uncertain. A thorough investigation failed to determine whether Uhl crossed into the Soviet Zone at any time or whether his assailants were in the

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[13] Seventh Army G2 Intel Dets Repts, 1953-54. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR G2 Div Admin Br files.

[14] C/N 2, USAREUR DCOFS for Opns to USAREUR ACOFS G2, 22 Jan 54, sub: EUCOM Policy Directive No. 40-2, Incl 1, n.d., same sub. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 250.2 (1954), Vol. I, Item 3A.

West Zone at the time of the shooting. A stern protest over this unwarranted murder was made to Soviet authorities by USAREUR.[15] Another shooting incident, but without fatal consequences, occurred on 18 March 1954 at approximately 1655 hours, in the vicinity of the border barrier on the road leading from Bebendorf to Wanfried. Two West German customs patrolmen, while on duty and observing the border area, were fired upon by four members of a Czechoslovak patrol. One of the patrolmen retaliated by firing over the heads of the Czechoslovak patrol, which then withdrew to the woods. After a thorough investigation CINCUSAREUR, through HICOG, asked the State Department to protest against any recurrence of such incidents.[16]

b. Examples of Incidents Involving USAREUR Personnel.

(1) The Hirschberg Incident. On 13 January 1953 the USAREUR chief of staff received a protest from the chief of staff of Soviet forces in East Germany claiming that the border had been violated twice by U.S. military personnel. He alleged that on 9 January 1953 two U.S. jeeps and 3 U.S. Army trucks, containing 6 officers, 16 enlisted men, and 4 German border policemen, approached the border in the vicinity of Hirschberg, southeast of Plauen. According to the Soviet chief of staff, two of the trucks were equipped with machine guns and a third had a loudspeaker. He alleged further that the Americans aimed the machine guns in the direction of some East German houses and turned on the loudspeaker for 20 minutes, indulging in "unbridled propaganda hostile to the Soviet armed forces in Germany." On the same day, 2 jeeps, carrying 1 officer and several enlisted men of the U.S. Army, crossed the boundary in the region of the Toepen-Dormholy road, penetrated into the East Zone territory, made observations for some time, and then drove back into the American Zone in the direction of Toepen. On the basis of these allegations the Soviet forces chief of staff lodged a strong protest and asked USAREUR authorities to avoid further incidents of this nature in the future.[17] An investigation by USAREUR found that while U.S. patrols had been in the vicinity, no border violations had

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[15] Cable S-4838, USAREUR to COFSA for ACOFSA G2, 2 Jun 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS files 250.2 (1953), Vol. II, Item 34 atchd.

[16] 316th Mil Intel Det Rept of Informal Investigation of Category "B" Border Incident, 22 Mar 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR G2 Div Admin Br files (1954).

[17] Ltr, Maj Gen N. Trusov, DCOFS, Gp of Soviet Occupation Forces in Ger, to Brig Gen R. G. Gard, USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 13 Jan 53, sub: Protest of U.S. Soldiers Violation of East Zone Border. UNCLASSIFIED. In 7893 USMLM/SOZ Unit Hist, Supporting Docs, Jan 53, Item 13.

occurred, and that Soviet authorities were simply making accusations to counter USAREUR protests of their own violations--a device that they frequently employed. The protests were disavowed.[18]

(2) The Ober Flandungen Incident. A more serious incident, involving the kidnapping of two U.S. soldiers, occurred on 5 April 1954. Sgt. W. Young and Pvt. L. Wood of F Company, 2d Battalion, 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment, while patrolling a wooded area near Ober Flandungen, along the boundary of the Soviet Zone, were seized by Soviet soldiers and held in the Soviet Zone for more than 24 hours before being released.[19] Because the American officer, into whose custody the men passed, signed a release document acknowledging their presence in Soviet Zone territory when seized, USAREUR was unable to protest, although investigation proved that the seizures had taken place inside the U.S. Zone.[20] The Department of the Army expressed concern that the incident was an indication of a lack of tactical alertness on the part of U.S. troops. USAREUR assured the Department that such was not the case. However, Seventh Army immediately reviewed its border patrol directives and reemphasized instructions that U.S. personnel on such patrols should not submit to arrest by Soviet, Czechoslovak, or East German personnel in the U.S. Zone.[21] All border patrols and U.S. transients were instructed to remain inside the U.S. Zone at all times. USAREUR took steps to insure that troops arriving in the theater, as well as those moving to training areas near the border, were indoctrinated in the consequences of border crossing. The border was marked by identification signs at all main crossing sites. Seventh Army was authorized to designate the commanding officers of its armored cavalry regiments as the U.S. representatives to receive U.S. personnel from Soviet authorities within their respective areas, but the formulation of a standard release receipt that would be acceptable at all times was not considered feasible.[22]

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[18] Ibid.

[19] 205th CIC Det Rept of Abduction of U.S. Personnel by Soviets, 14 Apr 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR G2 Div Admin Br file (1954).

[20] (1) Cable 071010Z, 14th Armd Cav Regt to CINCUSAREUR, 7 Apr 54. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Cable SX-2348, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 16 Apr 54. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR SGS 250.2 (1954), Vol. I, Item 15 and atchd.

[21] (1) Ltr, Maj Gen J. M. Gavin, ACOFSA to Maj Gen C. B. Ferenbaugh, USAREUR COFS, 3 Jun 53, sub: Handling of Border Incident. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Ltr, USAREUR COFS to ACOFSA, 16 Jun 54, sub: Border Incident: U.S. Patrol Capture by Russians. SECRET. Both in file cited above.

[22] (1) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG Seventh Army, 25 Jun 53, sub: Border Incidents. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Cable S-1271, USAREUR to US CINCEUR, 20 Jun 54. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in file above, Items 20 and 15.

233. Incidents on the Boundary of the U.S. Sector, Berlin

a. Routine Incidents. Located as it was within the Soviet Zone of Germany, Berlin was an unusually prolific source of boundary incidents throughout this report period. Moreover, because the U.S. Commander Berlin was also HICOG's representative there, the procedure of making protests to the Soviet authorities over incidents was sometimes confusing. Incidents occurred frequently and varied greatly as to their nature. Some involved West Berlin Germans who were either kidnapped or arrested for violations in crossing the sector borders. Others were instigated by East Berlin communist elements for political purposes, often on special holidays such as May Day. Although most of the cases were handled by West Berlin German authorities and police, the military commanders of Allied forces in the Western Sectors were also sometimes involved because they were responsible for the security of their sectors.[23] Many incidents involved U.S. nationals, including tourists and soldiers who were arrested by East Berlin police after having inadvertently wandered across the sector border. Likewise, Soviet soldiers occasionally wandered into the U.S. Sector while under the influence of liquor and were arrested by West Berlin police. Most cases of this kind were handled by the chief of the U.S. Military Liaison Mission to Potsdam. If U.S. personnel were missing he called up the Soviet External Relations Branch in Berlin for information about them. The chief of the mission received similar inquiries from Soviet authorities with regard to missing Soviet personnel. In either case the individual in question was detained overnight, and questioned, and on the next day the proper authorities were notified of the place where he would be turned over to them.[24]

b. Detention of Lieutenant Sincore. In more serious incidents, such as the kidnapping by Russian soldiers of Lt. H. J. Sincore, an officer of the 6th Infantry Regiment, while on maneuvers in the U.S. Sector, negotiations between USAREUR and Soviet authorities dragged on for weeks. On 24 November 1952 Lieutenant Sincore disappeared on field exercises near Wannsee Island, U.S. Sector. German witnesses said he had been seized by Soviet troops and East German police. The Soviet External Relations Branch and the Soviet commander in Berlin denied any knowledge of the whereabouts of the lieutenant.[25] After several weeks of fruitless negotiations the USAREUR Soviet Relations Advisory

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[23]Cable D-2071, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR, 1 May 53. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 094 (1953), Vol. I, Item 30.

[24]Ltr, Col A. E. Schanze, C/USMLM/SOZ to Brig Gen J. H. Phillips, USAREUR ACOFS G2, 10 May 54, sub: Soviet Trends in Berlin. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR G2 Div Admin Br file (1954).

[25]Cable 252, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR, 5 Dec 52. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 250.2 (1953), Vol. I, Item 6.

Committee transferred the case from U.S. Commander Berlin to CINCUSAREUR, who then wrote to General Chuikov, Commander in Chief, Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany, demanding the release of Lieutenant Sincore. General Chuikov disclaimed any knowledge of the case. On the night of 25 December Soviet authorities released the lieutenant at an isolated spot in the Soviet Zone, to find his way back to Berlin as best he might. However, in a letter of 27 December, Chuikov still claimed to have no information as to Sincore's whereabouts. CINCUSAREUR's reply accused Soviet authorities of kidnapping the U.S. officer at gun point and of mistreating him, saying it seemed inconceivable that General Chuikov would know nothing about this affair. General Eddy demanded that those responsible for the act be punished.[26]

c. Arrest of U.S. Sergeant By East German Police. A number of incidents occurred in which U.S. military personnel were arrested by East Berlin police or Soviet troops, but as a rule they were released within two or three days. One of these demonstrated how the Soviet and East Berlin police deliberately set traps to catch unwary West Berlin personnel. On 10 May 1954 a U.S. military police sergeant, in the course of checking border signs, found one knocked down and lying several steps inside the Soviet Sector. The sergeant stepped across the line to recover the sign and was about to set it up again when he was apprehended by a group of East Berlin police, who sprang out of nearby bushes with fixed bayonets. There were definite indications that the East Sector police were lying in ambush, expecting to catch a West Berlin policeman to hold as hostage, but the trap was sprung unwittingly by the U.S. sergeant.[27] Taken to a nearby police station, the sergeant was interrogated by representatives of the East German Army. Later Soviet officers took him from German custody to Soviet headquarters at Babelsberg, where the sergeant underwent additional interrogation. Following an inquiry from the chief of the U.S. Military Liaison Mission, the sergeant was promptly released and returned to West Berlin. No protest was made because the sergeant had been indiscrete in crossing the border and he had not been mistreated.[28]

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[26] Ltr, Lt Gen M. S. Eddy, CINCUSAREUR, to Gen V. I. Chuikov, CINC Gp of Soviet Occupation Forces in Ger, 12 Jan 53, sub: Protest Detention of Lt Sincore. UNCLASSIFIED. In 7893 USMLM/SOZ Unit Hist, Supporting Docs, Jan 53, Item 12.

[27] Cable 164, HICOG Berlin to HICOG Bonn, 11 May 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR G2 Div Admin Br file (1954).

[28] Ltr, Col A. E. Schanze, C/USMLM/SOZ to Brig Gen J. H. Phillips, USAREUR ACOFS G2, 10 May 54, sub: Soviet Trends in Berlin. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

234. Air Incidents Along the Borders and Air Corridors to Berlin

a. Their Nature. Incidents in the air space along the U.S. zonal boundaries with East Germany and Czechoslovakia and in the Berlin air corridors were not uncommon. They were of two kinds: those created by inadvertent flights of U.S. or other Allied civilian or military aircraft over the zonal boundaries, and those created by attacks of Soviet or satellite armed planes on U.S. or other Allied aircraft. The Soviet and Czechoslovak authorities frequently complained that U.S. aircraft violated their borders by flying over their territory to drop pamphlets or other kinds of anticommunistic propaganda. As a rule such allegations were unfounded. In all such cases, when the Soviet authorities were requested to produce samples or copies of the alleged propaganda as proof of their contentions they were unable to do so.[29] The protests usually ended with a demand that further incidents of the type be stopped. However, the air incidents created by Soviet and Czechoslovak aircraft were usually of a very serious nature. They consisted of the "buzzing" by Soviet military planes of U.S. or other Allied civilian or military aircraft while the latter were flying in the marked air corridors en route to or from Berlin, together with the even more serious type of incident in which Soviet or satellite armed planes crossed into the U.S. Zone to attack U.S. or other Allied planes in the air. Illustrative of the first type of Soviet-created incidents were two "buzzings" that occurred within three days near the end of this report period. In the first incident two Soviet MIG's made passes at a U.S. Air Force C-47 on a routine flight from Frankfurt to Berlin by the southern corridor, when approximately 48 miles from Berlin. The two planes flew over the C-47 several times at a distance of not more than 100 feet. Two days later a Soviet MIG-type aircraft performed stunts and maneuvers dangerously close to another C-47 on a flight to Berlin in the same corridor.[30] Czechoslovak aircraft were most often involved in the more serious type of incidents. From 16 to 22 July 1953 three different groups of Czechoslovak MIG's penetrated the U.S. Zone to a depth of several miles near Neuiach, Bischofsreut, and another border point respectively, while trying to

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[29](1) Ltr, Maj Gen R. G. Gard, USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, to Maj Gen Trusov, DCOFS, Gp of Soviet Occupation Forces in Ger, 23 Jan 53, sub: Protest over U.S. C-54 Aircraft Dropping Pamphlets in Russian Zone on Way to Berlin. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Ltr, Trusov to Gard, 1 Sep 53, sub: Border and Corridor Violations by U.S. Aircraft. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in 7893 USMLM/SOZ Unit Hist, Supporting Docs, Jan 53, Item 22; Sep 53, Item 2.

[30]Ltr, Maj Gen C. B. Ferenbaugh, USAREUR COFS, to Maj Gen A. Yarazov, COFS, Gp of Soviet Occupation Forces in Ger, 24 Jul 54, sub: Air Incidents in Corridor to Berlin. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G2 Admin Br file (1954).

interfere with U.S. aircraft. CINCUSAREUR submitted protests to the Czechoslovak Government through HICOG and the U.S. Embassy at Prague.[31]

b. Method of Handling. The reporting and investigation of incidents followed a definite procedure. An immediate spot report of the incident was transmitted by the quickest means to USAREUR G2. Personnel observing foreign military aircraft entering the U.S. Zone of Germany reported immediately to the nearest air command, Seventh Army, and USAREUR headquarters by a "flash" call on a military phone or a "clear-the-line" call on a civilian telephone. If the reporter was unable to contact an aircraft and warning unit, he used the fastest alternative means of transmission available.[32] In incidents involving the interception of U.S. Air Force or civil aircraft, the commander of the nearest Air Force landing base was responsible for conducting an immediate on-the-spot investigation of the incident. He reported all available information and the action being taken to the HICOG Civil Aviation Division, Frankfurt, and to US CINCEUR, CINCUSAFE, and CINCUSAREUR. In cases involving U.S. civil aircraft, the investigation was conducted by the nearest HICOG civil airport administrator.[33] Complaints from the Soviet authorities over air incidents were channeled through the U.S. Controller, Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC) to the executive assistant of HICOG Berlin Element, who decided whether the protest was routine or not. If it was considered routine, HICOG Berlin Element and the controller processed the complaint in the normal manner, investigating it and replying to the Soviet controller after the investigation had been completed. If the protest was not considered routine, involving important policy questions, the controller referred the matter to the HICOG Berlin Element, and the Civil Aviation Division, Frankfurt, together with all available information on the case. The information was also passed on to HICOG, CINCUSAFE, and CINCUSAREUR. However, the HICOG Civil Aviation Division, Frankfurt, was responsible for coordinating the investigations. If necessary in the course of investigation, the Civil Aviation Division was authorized to communicate directly with any or all of the following agencies: USAFE, USAREUR, Aircraft Control Warning Service, Flight Service

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[31] Cable 45, HICOG Bonn to AMEMB Prague, 24 Jul 53. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above (1953).

[32] USAREUR ltr, 10 Dec 53, sub: Procedure for Reporting Foreign Aircraft, Unauthorized Landings, Crashes, Unusual Concentrations and Other Flights. AG 360-AS EGB. CONFIDENTIAL.

[33] USAREUR ltr, 9 Sep 53, sub: Procedures for Processing Communications with Soviets on Air Protests. AG 360-AS EGB. UNCLASSIFIED.

501st Tactical Air Control Center, Twelfth Air Force, civil air carriers, and any other U.S. Air Force facilities. As soon as an investigation had been completed, the HICOG Civil Aviation Division drafted a reply to the Soviet authorities. After coordination with interested agencies, and with USAREUR's and HICOG's concurrence, the draft was forwarded to the HICOG Berlin Element, for transmission to the Soviet Controller, Berlin Air Safety Center.[34]

235. The U.S. Military Liaison Mission, Potsdam

As the only accredited USAREUR organization to the Soviet authorities in the East Zone of Germany, the U.S. Military Liaison Mission to the Commander in Chief, Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany, continued to fulfill its mission throughout 1953 and 1954.[35] (See pars. 14c, 51h.) On 4 September 1953 the mission moved its Berlin headquarters from the Berlin Command compound to the former headquarters of the Press Club at 11 Sven Hedin Strasse. By this move it achieved better coordination of its activities, greater economy of time and effort, and stricter security because men, cars, and office were at one location. During 1953 the mission traveled more than a quarter of a million miles, mostly in the Soviet Zone of Germany. Although the rights and privileges enjoyed by the mission in Soviet-controlled territory were guaranteed by the Huebner-Malinin Agreement of 2 April 1947, practically all mission activities in East Germany were carried on at Soviet sufferance.[36]

a. Harassment of Mission by Soviet Authorities. The harassment of mission personnel and their activities by Soviet authorities in 1952 continued into 1953. Mission vehicles and personnel were trailed whenever they left the compound; mission privileges were curtailed; and members on routine travel were frequently detained for no apparent reasons. For example, on 31 December 1952 the acting chief of the mission and another member were stopped on a main road near Gross Lubers in the East Zone by a Soviet sergeant, submachine gun in hand. Taken to a nearby guardhouse, they were held for 11½ hours, without food or conveniences, on charge of having violated a restricted zone, although no signs designating such an area had been seen. The acting mission chief was asked to sign a statement that his colleague and he had entered a clearly marked restricted zone and that they therefore did not protest their detention. After crossing out the "no protest," portion of the statement, he demanded to see the restricted zone signs. He was

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[34] (1) Ibid. (2) For further details on policy, see EUCOM/USAREUR Comd Rept, 1952, pp. 409-24. SECRET.

[35] EUCOM/USAREUR Comd Rept, 1952, pp. 212-13. SECRET.

[36] 7893 USMLM/SOZ Unit Hist, 1953, pp. 2-3. SECRET.

then shown a 7-foot sign at the edge of the road, but the newly dug earth on top of the snow clearly indicated that the sign had been planted there only a few hours before. Consequently, the acting mission chief repudiated the statement he had signed. Soviet harassment of mission personnel increased until March 1953.[37] Thereafter, relations improved considerably and on 26 March 1953 the trailing of mission vehicles ceased abruptly. The mission's request that its vehicles be given access to an increased number of gasoline distribution stations at convenient locations was favorably received and acted upon in less than a month. Soviet officials promptly and favorably answered all requests from the mission for authority to visit places within the East Zone. Although detentions of mission personnel by the Soviet authorities continued, in most instances they were of short duration. After March 1953 the Soviet External Relations Bureau was very cooperative, especially in locating the remains of U.S. soldiers buried in the East Zone during the war, in returning Americans who wandered across the Berlin sector border by mistake, and in assisting U.S. personnel involved in accidents on the Autobahn to Berlin.[38] After Gen. A. A. Grechko replaced General Chuikov as commander of the Soviet forces in Germany, relations between Soviet and American officials in Berlin also improved.[39] However, there were indications that the East German Government would present new difficulties for the mission. The first signs came before and immediately after the June 1953 riots in East Berlin and involved two particularly trying detentions of mission personnel by the East German police. The chief of the mission and CINCUSAREUR, however, repeatedly emphasized to the Soviet authorities that the U.S. Military Liaison Mission was accredited to the commander of Soviet forces in East Germany and not to the satellite East German Government, and that the latter had no jurisdiction over mission activities. There the matter rested during the first half of 1954, although the East German authorities continued their efforts to harass the mission.[40]

236. The Soviet Military Liaison Mission, Frankfurt

The retaliatory measures imposed in 1952 on the Soviet Military Liaison Mission, accredited to CINCUSAREUR under the terms of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement and stationed in Frankfurt, continued in effect in 1953 because of the Soviet restrictions on the U.S. Military Mission. When surveillance of the U.S. Military Liaison Mission vehicles and detention of its personnel were eased by

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[37] Ibid., Supporting Docs, Jan 53, Items 2 and 5.

[38] Ibid., pp. 3-4.

[39] Ibid., pp. 2-3.

[40] Ibid.

Soviet authorities early in 1953, USAREUR eased restrictions on the Soviet mission. However, Soviet authorities invariably protested the imposition of the slightest restrictions by USAREUR on the Soviet mission in Frankfurt or on the transit through the U.S. Zone of the Soviet mission accredited to the French occupation forces.[41] To illustrate the tendency of Soviet authorities to protest and enlarge upon minor incidents, the mission chief alleged that on 6 June 1953 some unknown persons threw anticommunist propaganda leaflets over the wall into the Soviet military mission compound in Frankfurt. Though not a single leaflet was produced in evidence, the mission chief immediately protested to the Chief of Staff, USAREUR, and demanded to know what actions were being taken to punish the perpetrators and to prevent further incidents.[42] Members of the Soviet Military Liaison Mission, Frankfurt, frequently violated restricted areas, spied on U.S. maneuvers, traveled over highways at excessive speeds; members of the Soviet Military Liaison Mission to the French forces often ignored USAREUR travel regulations in the U.S. Zone. In August 1953 CINCUSAREUR therefore issued a directive to guide U.S. military police and military personnel whenever they detected members of the Soviet military missions violating instructions. This directive divided Soviet personnel coming under USAREUR jurisdiction into four categories. In the first category were members of the Soviet Frankfurt mission, who were subject to the provisions of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement. In the second were Soviet personnel accredited to the French and subject to the new directive. In the third was the Soviet mission accredited to the Northern Army Group, and in the fourth category were Soviet military and civilian personnel not accredited to any of the three Western Powers with occupation zones in Germany. To enter the U.S. Zone the latter two groups had to obtain special permission, which was granted or refused according to the purpose of the proposed travel.[43] Because the principal purpose of the Soviet Military Mission in Frankfurt was to spy on American military activities, USAREUR headquarters considered requesting its withdrawal. Such a request, of course, would have resulted in a Soviet request that USAREUR withdraw its mission from the East Zone. Since the command derived sufficient information on Soviet activities in East Germany to justify the presence

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[41] Ibid., Supporting Docs, May 53, Item 6; Jan 53, Item 24.

[42] Ltr, Col V. Stepanenko, C/Soviet Mil Ln Msn, to Maj Gen E. T. Williams, USAREUR COFS, 13 Jun 53, sub: Anti-Communist Leaflets Thrown by Germans into Mission Compound. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322.01 Ln Arrangements (1953), Vol. I, Item 20A.

[43] USAREUR ltr, 5 Aug 53, sub: Travel of Members Soviet Military Liaison Mission, Frankfurt and Other Russian Missions in U.S. Zone of Germany. 014 331 GLD-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

of the Soviet mission in the U.S. Zone, CINCUSAREUR favored the continuation of the exchange of liaison missions.[44]

237. Repatriation of U.S. Military and Civilian Personnel Held by Soviets or Their Satellites

During the period under review a number of USAREUR military personnel were in the custody of Soviet or satellite authorities in the East Zone of Germany or in Czechoslovakia. Some of these persons had been in Soviet hands for extended periods of time. The reasons for their presence behind the Iron Curtain ranged from accidental crossings of the border to desertions, defections and abductions. Some of the defections were induced by communist propaganda promises. Generally, the USAREUR Soviet Relations Advisory Committee made every effort to return these persons to the U.S. Zone. In most cases, those who had fallen accidentally into Soviet hands were returned within a short time, after questioning, unless the Soviet authorities chose to keep them for propaganda purposes. However, those who defected to the Soviet area were detained indefinitely, until they had lost all propaganda or informational value, and then were returned only if the Soviets chose to do so. In some instances, disillusioned by the treatment received from the Soviets, defectors managed to escape to the U.S. Zone.[45] Of the USAREUR military personnel under Soviet or satellite control during this period, only 18 persons were defectors. Six of the 18 belonged to USAREUR units and 12 to Seventh Army. Eleven returned to U.S. control voluntarily during the period and only 7 still remained in Soviet custody at the end of June 1954.[46]

a. Procedure for Repatriation of U.S. Military Personnel in Soviet Custody. Upon verification by Soviet authorities of a defector's presence in Soviet territory, USAREUR, according to routine procedure, requested Soviet military authorities to permit U.S. representatives to interview the individual to confirm his intentions. If this action was unsuccessful, the matter was referred to HICOG, with a request that the case be reopened with the Soviet authorities through political channels. The next step was to determine as accurately as possible whether the individual

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[44] C/N 1, C/USAREUR CAD, to USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 25 May 54, sub: Incidents Involving Soviet Military Mission. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 500 (1954), Vol. I, Item 29.

[45] Interv, Dr. G. Tays, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col F. M. Clark, USAREUR Soviet Relations Advisory Committee, 7 Sep 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

[46] Incl 5 to USAREUR G2 Rept of Army Personnel in Soviet Custody, 28 Jun 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR G2 Div Admin Br file (1954).

was being held against his will. If he was not involuntarily detained, the question had to be decided as to what possible advantage could be gained by USAREUR in pressing the Soviets for the right to interview the defector. Consideration was also given to the propaganda advantage the Soviets might derive from granting an interview with a military defector.[47] If, after careful screening of all information, U.S. authorities concluded that the individual was an actual defector, or that protests would jeopardize future possibilities of obtaining the release of a person held involuntarily, no further action with the Soviet authorities was initiated. If Soviet authorities alleged that a U.S. serviceman had signed a statement requesting political asylum in the East Zone, the USAREUR Soviet Relations Advisory Committee requested a copy of the statement and referred the case to HICOG and the Department of the Army for appropriate action. Upon the committee's recommendation that it was in the best interest of the United States not to act on behalf of a soldier who had deserted to the East Zone, HICOG or other U.S. agencies were still free to pursue any effort in his behalf they deemed appropriate. The initial action and decision rested with CINCUSAREUR but the Department of the Army and HICOG were to be kept fully informed. When a case was turned over to HICOG or some other U.S. agency, all actions taken by the agency were first coordinated with USAREUR. However, in every case USAREUR made a maximum effort to effect the return of the individual, by direct contact with appropriate Soviet military authorities, before referring the matter to another agency.[48]

b. Treatment of U.S. Military Defectors by Soviet Authorities in East Zone. Soviet propaganda heavily exploited defections from the West. When a member of the U.S. forces defected to the East Zone the fact was publicized in the communist press to the fullest extent. Usually, the individual was generously treated until his propaganda value had been exhausted. To keep such persons contented, but under control, a colony for stateless persons was established at Bautzen, near Dresden in early 1952. After lengthy interrogations and indoctrinations at Potsdam, the defector was sent to Dresden, where he was subjected to more questioning and to "reeducation." Some defectors were eventually considered suitable for integration into the Bautzen community. Persons assigned to Bautzen were housed in a hotel and were provided with food and clothing at no expense until regular employment was obtained. The defectors at Bautzen became members of the "Foreigners' Club," which was amply equipped with recreational

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[47] 1st Ind, USAREUR to TAG (Attn: AGPO-DA), 13 Aug 53. AG 383.01 CAD (14 Jul 53). CONFIDENTIAL.

[48] (1) Ibid. (2) DA ltr, 14 Jul 53, sub: Procedure for Recovery of Army Personnel under Soviet Control in Germany. AG PODA 383.01 (9 Jun 53). CONFIDENTIAL.

facilities. Since the income from employment was usually very low, members of the club frequently resorted to illegal activities to derive additional income. Escape from Bautzen was not especially difficult, although figures of the number of unsuccessful escape attempts are not available. Most returnees stated that the other defectors at Bautzen could return if they so desired and that the consideration preventing them was fear of the action that U.S. authorities might take against them. Moreover, most of them had run away from legal, financial, or marital difficulties that they would still have to face, in addition to charges of defection and possibly Smith Act prosecution. In May 1953 there were twenty Americans in Bautzen, according to statements of men who returned from there.[49]

c. Statistics on U.S. Defectors as of 1954. At the close of the period under review USAREUR G2 assembled incomplete data concerning the number and status of U.S. military personnel who had been, or were still, in Soviet custody. The categories of personnel were those believed to be still in the Soviet Zone of Germany, persons believed to be in Soviet territory other than Germany, individuals who were returned to U.S. control after having been detained involuntarily by the Soviet authorities; and persons who returned to U.S. control after voluntarily entering Soviet areas.[50] Since 18 June 1948 at least 19 American soldiers had been detained or were staying voluntarily in East Germany and only 3 of these were reported between 1 January 1953 and 30 June 1954. Eight U.S. servicemen had been detained in Soviet-controlled countries other than East Germany since 1 February 1949; 3 of these were recorded between 1 January 1953 and 30 June 1954. Of the 17 U.S. personnel returned to U.S. control after 6 February 1952, 13 were returned after 15 March 1953; and of 26 defectors returned to U.S. control after 1 August 1949, 18 were returned after 22 March 1953.[51]

238. Defection of Soviet and Satellite Citizens to U.S. Zone and Berlin Sector

a. General Policy. The defection of large numbers of military personnel and of civilians from the USSR and its satellite areas to the U.S. Zone of Germany and to the Western Sectors of Berlin loomed large in U.S.-Soviet relations during the period under review. These defectors included Soviet military and

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[49](1) USAREUR G2 Rept of U.S. Army Personnel in Soviet Custody, 28 Jun 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR G2 Div Intel Br file (1954). (2) Memo, Lt Col A. D. Albro, USCOB Intel Off, to Lt Col W. F. Woodward, USAREUR G3 Tng Br, 7 May 53, sub: American Personnel Observed in Bautzen, Soviet Zone. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 250.2 (1953), Vol. I, Item 3.

[50]USAREUR G2 Rept, 28 Jun 54, cited above.

[51]Ibid.

civilian personnel, East German police personnel, East German Government officials, other satellite military personnel, and civilian refugees from satellite countries. Since the Soviet authorities realized that these defectors could provide a great deal of valuable information to the United States and the other Western Powers they tried to stop the stream of defectors by every means at their disposal.[52] USAREUR treatment of the defectors followed uniform procedure whenever possible. Each defector was promptly questioned and screened to determine whether or not he was a Soviet or satellite agent. If he had defected deliberately or had inadvertently entered the U.S. Zone, he was treated kindly and given the opportunity to return to Soviet control or ask for political asylum. If he chose to return, Soviet authorities were notified and he was repatriated with a minimum of delay. If he requested and was granted political asylum, he was placed under the protective custody of USAREUR until he could be settled in Germany or in another western country. If he had entered West Berlin, he was flown to West Germany as soon as possible.[53] Upon request and with the consent of the defector, Soviet representatives were allowed to interview him to ascertain for themselves whether the individual wished to be repatriated. Generally, refugees and civilian defectors to the West were given assurance of good treatment, food, and shelter and were questioned for whatever information they could furnish. However, they were not guaranteed political asylum, employment, resettlement, or monetary rewards.[54]

b. Soviet Military and Civilian Defectors. Escapees in this category were relatively few, but valuable because of the information about Soviet activities that they made available to USAREUR. Although a considerable number of Soviet military personnel entered the U.S. Sector of Berlin annually, most of them did so inadvertently, and after being questioned and held a

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[52] Ltr, Gen V. Chuikov, CINC Gp of Soviet Occupation Forces in Ger to Lt Gen M. S. Eddy, CINCUSAREUR, 3 Jan 53, sub: Protest over Granting Asylum to Russian Soldier Kulikov. UNCLASSIFIED. In 7893 USMLM/SOZ Unit Hist, Supporting Docs, Jan 53, Item 3.

[53] Ltr, Maj Gen G. P. Hays, HICOG, to Mr. I. Semichastnov, Dep Chm Soviet Ctl Com for Ger, 13 Feb 52, sub: Repatriation of Soviet Citizens to USSR. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322.01 Ln Arrangements (1953), Vol. I, Item 7.

[54] (1) Memo, Mr. S. Reber, Act HICOG, 12 Jan 53, sub: Meeting of Soviets with Russian Soldier. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 250.2 (1953), Vol. I, Item 7. (2) C/N 1, USAREUR COFS, to USAREUR ACOFS G2, 14 Jun 54, sub: US EUCOM Policy Directive, 55-9. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 250.2 (1954), Vol. I, Item 7.

few hours were returned to Soviet custody. However, from time to time Soviet military personnel defected to the U.S. Sector of Berlin and requested political asylum. As a rule such requests were granted. After their arrival in West Germany, the defectors invariably refused to return to Berlin for interviews with Soviet representatives.[55]

c. Defectors from East German Police and Other Government Agencies. The number of escapees from the East German people's police and the German Democratic Republic was immeasurably greater than the number of Soviet defectors and reflected widespread dissatisfaction with the Communist regime established in East Germany by the USSR. Members of the people's police frequently defected because of revulsion against the stern measures they were forced to take against their own people. During 1952 more than 2,500 people's police and scores of minor officials sought asylum in West Germany. Although in 1953 and 1954 the East German Government used stringent preventive measures, defectors continued to arrive in West Berlin in large numbers.[56] During and after the East German riots in June 1953, many people's police and minor officials requested and received asylum in West Berlin.[57]

d. Flight of Personnel from Other Satellite Countries. A number of defectors from Poland, Romania, and Hungary, also managed to find their way into West Berlin and West Germany to request political asylum.[58] Many Czechoslovak nationals crossed the border into the U.S. Zone of Germany even though the border was closely guarded by Czechoslovak and Soviet patrols. Since USAREUR had no direct representation with the Czechoslovak Government, all such incidents were handled through HICOG and the State Department. In a widely publicized incident in November 1953, five young Czechoslovaks fled their country, fighting running battles with East

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[55](1) Ltr, Gen Chuikov, to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Jan 53, sub: Protests Granting Asylum to Kulikov. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Ltr, Gen Eddy to Gen Chuikov, 26 Jan 53, sub: Meeting of Soviets with Kulikov in West Berlin. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in 7893 USMLM/SOZ Unit Hist, Supporting Docs, Jan 53, Items 3 and 25. (3) C/N 1, USAREUR CAD to USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 25 Feb 53, sub: Kulikov Exploitation Plan. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 250.2 (1953), Vol. I, Item 7.

[56]Cable SMC-IN 76, HICOG Bonn sgd Reber to HICOG Berlin, 29 Jan 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 094 Berlin (1953), Vol. I, Item 14.

[57]Cable SMC-IN 5900, HICOG Berlin sgd Lyon to HICOG Bonn, et al., 27 Jul 53. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above, Vol. II, Item 38.

[58]Cable ST-2783, USAREUR to HICOG Bonn, 20 May 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 250.2 (1954), Vol. I, Item 27.

German police. Two were captured, but three arrived in West Germany and were granted asylum.[59]

e. Care and Disposition of Refugees. The flood of refugees that streamed into the Western Sectors of Berlin and into the Federal Republic from Soviet-controlled areas created a number of problems for USAREUR. The vast majority of refugees came from East Germany and entered the Western Sectors of Berlin. During 1952 more than 100,000 inhabitants of the Soviet Zone fled to West Berlin or West Germany.[60] In the following year this stream of refugees increased tremendously. In an effort to cope with this great mass, West Berlin authorities, with Allied assistance, established a number of centers to process and screen the refugees, and to weed out Soviet agents and other undesirable persons. Legitimate refugees were housed, fed, and clothed. A few found employment in West Berlin; the remainder were flown by commercial air lines to West Germany for resettlement in the Federal Republic or other countries.[61] During February approximately 40,000 refugees entered West Berlin, while only 14,700 were flown out to West Germany. During January and February 65,302 refugees entered Berlin and only 25,138 were evacuated. By the end of February daily arrivals averaged 2,500 persons, with only about 4,700 being flown out each week. This situation developed because the screening process was necessarily slow and the city's facilities for handling the refugees were severely taxed. City officials appealed to the three Western Powers to establish a military airlift in order to eliminate the backlog of refugees and ease housing and feeding problems in Berlin.[62] The general problem became more and more urgent, reaching its climax during the period of the East Germany riots of 17 June 1953 and subsequent disturbances. In June and July tens of thousands of East Germans fled to West Berlin and West Germany. When President Eisenhower's offer of 15,000 tons of food to avert starvation in East Germany was refused, the West Berlin city authorities requested that the food be sent to Berlin and offered to distribute food packages free to all East Germans who wished to receive them. A number of food distribution centers were placed in operation and East Germans flocked to West

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[59] Cable 123, HICOG Berlin to HICOG Bonn, 6 Nov 53. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 250.2 (1953), Vol. II, Item 61.

[60] Cable SMC-IN 76, HICOG Bonn sgd Reber to HICOG Berlin, 29 Jan 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 094 (1953), Vol. I, Item 14.

[61] Cable SMC-IN 6031, HICOG Berlin to HICOG Bonn, 23 Mar 53, sub: East Zone Refugee Problem in West Berlin. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above, Item 20 atchd.

[62] (1) Cable 120, HICOG Berlin sgd Lyon to HICOG Bonn, 2 Mar 53. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Cable 122, USCOB to HICOG Bonn, 5 Mar 53. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in file above, Items 20 and atchd.

Berlin for the packages by the hundreds of thousands.[63] More than a million food packages were received by East Zone residents during two weeks in July 1953, despite all Soviet countermeasures. The demand was so great that the U.S. Government supplied more food and USAREUR flew it to West Berlin, where distribution continued into August 1953.[64] Improvements effected in the East Zone by Soviet and East German authorities, following the June riots, eased the economic situation and brought about a marked decrease in the influx of refugees to West Berlin and West Germany for the remainder of 1953. During 1953 approximately 336,000 East Germans crossed into West Germany. Although the tide of refugees declined in 1954, approximately 60,000 arrived in the Federal Republic from Soviet-controlled territories during the first six months of that year.[65]

239. Support of the Berlin Conference

Plans and decisions for the provision of logistical support and for the security requirements of the Berlin Conference held in January 1954 were developed jointly by the USAREUR G4 Division and the U.S. Commander Berlin (USCOB). At USCOB's request, USAREUR G4 furnished 10 officers and 220 military policemen, 170 of whom were from Seventh Army and 50 from Headquarters Area Command units. Nine enlisted personnel operated the telecon and message center and communications. Other personnel were assigned to act as couriers from Berlin to Frankfurt and to assist in public information activities of the conference. USCOB and West Berlin police shared security responsibilities involving the safety of the delegations to the conference.[66]

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[63] Cable SMC-IN 5900 HICOG Berlin sgd Lyon to State Dept, 27 Jul 53. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above, Vol. II, Item 38.

[64] Cable SMC-IN 1746, HICOG Berlin to HICOG Bonn, 6 Aug 53. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above, Item 40 atchd.

[65] The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), September 23, 1954. UNCLASSIFIED.

[66] (1) USAREUR ltr, CINCUSAREUR to all Stf Divs, 16 Dec 53, sub: USAREUR Support of Berlin Conference. AG 337 SGS-AGO. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 28 Dec 53, sub: USAREUR Support of Berlin Conference Report No. 1. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 337 (1954), Item 1 (B/P).

CHAPTER 12

Participation in Disaster Relief Operations

Section I: U.S. Military Flood Relief Operations in the Netherlands

240. Establishment of American Military Relief Organization

a. The Netherlands Disaster. On Sunday, 1 February 1953, a major disaster struck the Netherlands. High tides, coupled with strong winds, breached protective dikes in numerous places, and caused heavy flooding, particularly in the North Sea islands of southwest Netherlands. By late afternoon it was estimated that a thousand victims had been claimed. Approximately 700 square miles of land were affected.[1] The Netherlands Minister of Defense, Mr. C. Staf, on the same day requested aid in combatting the disaster from the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Netherlands. The MAAG passed the request on to CINCUSAREUR, who promptly referred it to US CINCEUR since USAREUR was not authorized to take independent action. At 2100 on 1 February, US CINCEUR charged CINCUSAREUR with responsibility for providing disaster assistance to the Netherlands and General Eddy, CINCUSAREUR, was designated to direct relief operations of all U.S. forces, with authority to call on the Air Force and Navy for aid.[2] A USAREUR-USAFE reconnaissance team, headed by General Eddy, took off from the Wiesbaden airfield at 0700, 2 February, to survey the disaster area before making concrete suggestions for assistance. Certain USAREUR units were alerted for

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[1] USAREUR Hist Div, Rept of U.S. Military Flood Relief Operations in the Netherlands, p. 7. UNCLASSIFIED. Since the balance of Section I is based on this report, remaining footnotes cite only page references to the report.

[2] pp. 8-9.

departure to the Netherlands upon call. Since the most immediately available units for evacuation and rescue work were amphibious truck companies manned by German labor service personnel, CINCUSAREUR informed HICOG of the situation and inquired whether he objected to the movement of labor service personnel outside the confines of Germany. HICOG assumed responsibility for informing the West German Government of the contemplated action and agreed to inform CINCUSAREUR immediately if any serious objections were raised.[3]

b. Initial Planning.

(1) Joint Conference at The Hague. The reconnaissance party was met at Skipol Airport, near Amsterdam, by Maj. Gen. A. H. Noble, chief of MAAG Netherlands, and Netherland officials headed by Lt. Gen. Buurman Van Vreeden, commanding general of the Netherlands Territorial Command. After a reconnaissance trip over the disaster area by the USAREUR-USAFE team, the situation was reviewed in detail at a joint conference of the U.S. military representatives and Netherland military and civilian officials responsible for disaster relief activities. General Van Vreeden emphasized that the over-all direction and control of the relief operations were in the hands of Netherland civilian authorities and that assistance would be rendered by Netherland and Allied military forces only upon request.[4] As the most urgent requirements were evacuation of people from the danger areas and repair of communications, Netherland officials requested the use of amphibious trucks, rubber boats, light self-propelled watercraft, aircraft, and helicopters, and indicated an immediate need for drinking water and lighting equipment. General Eddy agreed at the conference to send all possible aid from U.S. forces in Europe and informed Netherland officials that at least 3 amphibious truck companies were nearby in Germany and that 2 of them could arrive in the Netherlands within 24 hours. The requested helicopters and light liaison planes would be dispatched by USAREUR and cargo planes for parachute-drop operations would be furnished by USAFE. Engineering aid, sandbags, and shovels would be sent to the disaster area.[5] General Eddy emphasized that American forces in the Netherlands would augment the efforts of Netherland forces, who in turn were subordinate to the authority of the civilian Rijkswaterstaat (National Waterways Authority), and that only necessary elements and supplies would be furnished.[6]

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[3] pp. 9-11.

[4] pp. 12-13.

[5] p. 13.

[6] p. 15.

(2) Dispatch of Troops and Equipment. In response to General Eddy's requests for troops and equipment, USAREUR immediately dispatched certain of the units which had been placed on an alert basis on 1 February. The largest category consisted of engineer troops, including an advance party from the 39th Engineer Construction Group; the 8540 and 8542 Engineer Amphibious Truck Companies (Labor Service) and the 7972 Labor Supervision Center; the 795th Engineer Dump Truck Company; and the 1279 Engineer Combat Battalion. A detachment of the 35th Transportation Army Aircraft Maintenance Company and the 42d Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company were designated to perform maintenance functions. The 17th Signal Operations Battalion was sent at the specific request of General Eddy, and a provisional air division consisting of 8 helicopters, 15 L-19's and 2 L-20's was formed from USAREUR and Seventh Army units and directed to Gilze-Rijen Airfield for rescue and evacuation operations. Three sedans of the 519th Transportation Car Company, for use at The Hague, and a detachment of the 7738 European Exchange System Group, to provide mobile post exchange and snack bar service for American personnel, were also dispatched. The following equipment was sent to the disaster area: 300,000 sandbags, 10,000 short-handled shovels, six 3,000-gallon canvas tanks, 200 parachutes with lashings and containers, 30,000 bottles of halazone tablets, 50,000 calcium hypochlorite ampules, and rubber life rafts from USAFE stocks.[7]

c. Establishment of the American Military Relief Organization.

(1) Mission and Functions. In accordance with General Eddy's decision of 2 February to set up a temporary command post at The Hague, the American Military Relief Organization (AMRO), was established in the Princess Juliana Caserne. The chief concern of AMRO would be rescue and evacuation operations rather than rehabilitation. General Eddy therefore directed all requests for general rehabilitation work by American forces to be denied, except under unusual circumstances. Brig. Gen. R. G. Gard, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, USAREUR, assumed the position of Chief of Staff, AMRO, and the members of General Eddy's original reconnaissance party formed the nuclei of the AMRO staff. For coordinating ground units in the rescue and evacuation operations, a field headquarters staffed by the 39th Engineer Construction Group was established in the town of Breda, near the disaster area.[8]

(2) Designation of Key Personnel. Since General Eddy's duties necessitated his return to Heidelberg, Brig. Gen. Raleigh R. Hendrix, Seventh Army Artillery, was selected to take over actual command of AMRO at The Hague, although General Eddy still

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[7] pp. 16-17.

[8] pp. 17-20.

retained over-all command of the relief operations. As General Eddy also desired a replacement for General Gard as AMRO chief of staff, Col. D. C. Tredennick, G3 of General Eddy's original AMRO staff, was designated chief of staff. On the morning of 3 February, the same day on which AMRO headquarters was officially established, the USAREUR chief of staff directed the USAREUR staff divisions to set up a comprehensive staff for the headquarters at The Hague.[9]

241. Field Operations

a. U.S. Forces Participating in Relief Operations.

(1) Army Units. The following Army units, or in some instances, elements of these units, participated in the disaster relief operations.[10]

39th Engineer Construction Group
7972 Labor Supervision Center
8540 Engineer Amphibious Truck Company (LSU)
8542 Engineer Amphibious Truck Company
5th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital
Seventh Army Provisional Air Detachment
8th Transportation Traffic Regulating Group
540th Quartermaster Subsistence Supply Company
436th Quartermaster Bath Company
531st Quartermaster Petroleum Supply Company
557th Quartermaster Aerial Supply Company
42d Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance (MAM) Company
35th Transportation Army Aircraft Maintenance Company
17th Signal Battalion (Operations)
317th Signal Construction Battalion
39th Signal Support Battalion
497th Signal Photo Company
53d Army Postal Unit
41st Finance Disbursing Section

Additional supporting elements and detachments included personnel from the following:

334th Engineer Dump Truck Company
1402 Engineer Combat Battalion
5th Engineer Combat Battalion
406th Engineer Construction Battalion
109th Engineer Combat Battalion
17th Armored Engineer Battalion
552d Engineer Ponton Bridge Company

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[9] pp. 20-26.
[10] p. 27.

547th Engineer Combat Battalion
332d Engineer Topographic Company
317th Engineer Combat Battalion
293d Engineer Construction Battalion
77th Engineer Construction Battalion
4th Engineer Combat Battalion
1st Engineer Combat Battalion
311th Engineer Construction Group
519th Transportation Car Company
7738th European Exchange System (EES) Group

(2) Navy Units. A detachment from the Rhine River Patrol consisting of 1 LCU, 1 LCR, and 2 patrol boats participated.

(3) Air Force Units. The U.S. Air Force was represented by the 39th, 40th, and 41st Troop Carrier Squadrons; the 9th and 12th Air Rescue Groups; the 68th and 69th Air Rescue Squadrons; and the 517th Troop Carrier Wing. A signal detachment from Allied Air Forces Central Europe manned a telephone switchboard in Sevenbergen.[11]

(4) Total Strength. The peak in personnel strength of AMRO was reached on 12 February, when 2,211 men were engaged in relief operations.[12]

b. Rescue and Evacuation, 2-7 February.

(1) Air Rescue and Supply. Air rescue and emergency drop missions were the first relief activities undertaken by U.S. units. The Air Section, Headquarters, AMRO was responsible for coordinating U.S. air matters and for securing aircraft to aid in rescue operations. At 1515 on 3 February the first contingent of helicopters arrived at Gilze-Rijen airport and by nightfall had rescued 125 persons in emergency evacuations. Through a steady buildup of air rescue operations, 52 U.S. aircraft, including 18 L-19's, 13 H-13's, 3 H-19's, 10 C-119's, 2 C-47's, 3 SA-16's, and 3 L-20's, participated in relief activities on 5 February. By 6 February an estimated 853 persons had been rescued by aircraft, principally by helicopter. The C-119's and C-47's dropped thousands of pounds of sandbags, food, and drinking water during this period.[13]

(2) Ground Units. Cooperating closely with air rescue teams were ground units, which moved by convoys and individual

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[11] p. 30.
[12] p. 30.
[13] pp. 34-39.

units from stations in Germany to the disaster area. The 8540 and 8542 Amphibious Truck Companies moved into the area on 3 February and during the emergency rescue period evacuated 666 people and 497 head of cattle. Elements of the 39th Engineer Construction Group also performed essential, if somewhat less spectacular, roles, chiefly in the strengthening and repair of dikes, maintenance of road communications, transportation of sandbags, workers, and equipment, and establishment of water purification points. Another task of the engineers was the destruction of bunkers and gun emplacements that had been erected by the Germans at Monster, near The Hague, and were causing currents that cut away the softer banks of the dikes and sea walls.[14] Elements of four Signal Corps units furnished communications support for AMRO, and the 8th Transportation Traffic Regulation Group detachment processed all requests for rail and highway movements. The 5th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital provided medical support for U.S. units in the operation, the 42d Ordnance MAM Company furnished ordnance support, and the Quartermaster Section, AMRO headquarters, supervised and directed quartermaster support.[15]

(3) Navy Participation. The naval detachment performed transportation and reconnaissance missions during the rescue and evacuation period.

c. The Leveling-off Period, 8-12 February. By 7 February the first phase of relief activities by U.S. forces was completed. On 8 February General Hendrix reported that the general situation was greatly improved, as favorable weather had intervened and the fear that weakened dikes would be breached and a new evacuation problem created had begun to lessen. Evacuation in the flooded islands was nearly completed. Air operations were drastically reduced during the period 8-12 February although, in the face of adverse weather conditions, U.S. aircraft continued to carry sandbags, water, shovels, tarpaulins, drills, and air hammers. Extensive aerial reconnaissance and courier missions were carried out and plans were made to meet a possible emergency on 16 February, which could result if the peak tides expected that day were accompanied by high winds. Ground units also repaired roads and dikes, evacuated livestock, improved communications, and cleaned up debris.[16]

d. Standby Operations, 13-17 February. Military units continued clean-up and repair operations until 15 February when plans for a possible emergency on the 16th were completed. Because of

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[14] pp. 44-45.

[15] pp. 50-51.

[16] pp. 52-57.

the weakened condition of the dikes, further inundation was expected, and on the 15th all U.S. units were alerted. On the same day, however, weather forecasts indicated only weak to moderate winds and a somewhat lower tide than had been anticipated. When it became apparent that the anticipated emergency would not occur, U.S. units prepared for departure to their home stations and AMRO began carrying out its phase-out plans.[17]

e. Close-out Operations, Phase-out of AMRO. On 17 February Netherland military authorities, through General Van Vreeden, requested that 1 amphibious truck company (consisting of 31 trucks), 10 water purification units, and 4 helicopters be left behind until 15 March to evacuate dead livestock and for standby purposes. Since these functions were outside the stated mission of AMRO, which was to help with rescue and evacuation rather than with rehabilitation, and since they could not be considered emergency measures, they would necessitate a new policy statement from US CINCEUR. General Eddy recommended that the request be granted, but US CINCEUR made a compromise arrangement providing for the retention by the Netherlands of 15 amphibious trucks and 10 water purification units to be operated by Netherland personnel. US CINCEUR also shortened the retention period to 1 March, at which time the situation would be re-evaluated. On the basis of General Eddy's belief that U.S. personnel were necessary to operate the equipment, General Handy, Deputy US CINCEUR, agreed to leave a skeleton force of no more than 25 U.S. personnel behind to supervise maintenance and operation. No German labor service personnel were to remain, and the equipment was to be operated by Netherland personnel under U.S. supervision.[18] As of 0600, 17 February, AMRO officially ceased to function. Naval craft began moving to their home stations on that day. Air operations ceased as of 0500 and USAFE aircraft were released at 0600. The departure of Army vehicles began on 18 February. On 19 February at 0830 the last vehicle left Breda and the command post was closed. At 1000 on 20 February AMRO headquarters itself was closed and the remaining staff officers departed for their home stations.[19]

f. Accomplishments. During the rescue operations the coordinated efforts of ground, air, and naval units resulted in the saving of hundreds of lives and the repair of many damaged dikes. The two amphibious truck companies evacuated 758 persons and 529 head of cattle and transported 28,000 empty and 20,970 filled sandbags. The 1279 Engineer Combat Battalion used 150,000 sandbags in dike construction. The 795th Engineer Dump Truck Company hauled 95,250 sandbags and one platoon of the 334th Engineer

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[17] pp. 60-61.

[18] p. 70.

[19] p. 72.

Dump Truck Company hauled 37,000. Aircraft evacuated 914 persons, 893 of them by helicopter, and dropped over 200 tons of such items as sandbags, life rafts, food, and water. The naval detachment moved 1,800 tons of sandbags, evacuated furniture and farm equipment, freed one grounded Netherland vessel, and transported Netherland Army engineer units.[20]

242. Funding and Accounting Support

a. Funding of the Relief Work. One of the first topics discussed between USAREUR and US EUCOM representatives on 1 February was the financing of expenditures during relief operations in the Netherlands. US CINCEUR notified the Department of the Army that funds available in US EUCOM could not be utilized for paying the costs of such a relief effort, but added that circumstances warranted prompt action without the necessity of waiting for special authorization. CINCUSAREUR requested from the Department an appropriate fund citation, together with the limitation, if any, to be set upon expenditures incurred by USAREUR as the agent of US EUCOM for the relief activities.[21] Initial instructions from the Department concerning funding procedure granted authority to both commands to obligate Army maintenance and operations funds in an amount not to exceed $2,000,000, pending receipt of USAREUR's cost estimate of the activities. More detailed instructions on 5 February authorized the component commanders of US EUCOM to furnish the required support from available funds or supplies, within limits established by US EUCOM for each command and within a maximum overall ceiling of $2,000,000.[22]

b. Use of Funds for Direct Relief Purposes. Department of the Army instructions forbade the use of appropriated military funds for direct relief purposes. However, the Mutual Security Agency had released counterpart funds in guilders for use by the Netherlands Government in relief and construction activity and the Department of the Army considered that these funds would be sufficient to cover any necessary direct relief. In order to insure strict compliance with the Department of the Army prohibition on the use of funds, supplies, and equipment for direct relief purposes, US EUCOM defined "indirect" relief as the provision of services, supplies, and utilization of equipment directly to private individuals or organizations. This definition was not intended to deny emergency aid to any individual in dire need, but to insure that direct and indirect relief aid were administered through proper channels.[23]

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[20] pp. 61-64.

[21] p. 73.

[22] p. 74.

[23] pp. 74-75.

c. Accounting Procedures. The accounting for Army support by USAREUR was handled in accordance with AR 500-60, the costs being charged to Project 910 under allocation ACCW established by USAREUR. Full instructions for accounting procedures were issued by both USAREUR and AMRO. Supplies, equipment, etc., needed for disaster relief operations in the Netherlands were shipped to AMRO and charged by USAREUR fiscal officers to Project 910. AMRO maintained informal jacket files for all property turned over to Netherland officials and at the close of operations all unused property was returned to AMRO and appropriately credited. The items were then shipped to the proper depots, where the rehabilitation costs were figured for each item separately. The depots in turn forwarded the shipping documents to the fiscal officers, who removed the end-item cost from the account, but entered the rehabilitation cost, for final settlement. All U.S. Army units assigned to AMRO were directed by USAREUR to clear all property issued to them through AMRO for relief purposes prior to their return to home stations. USAREUR also directed that all property issued to AMRO accounts on memorandum receipt be recovered prior to the departure of units for their home stations.[24]

d. USAREUR Cost Estimates. After the close-out of operations on 17 February the AMRO comptroller section, drew up a final cost estimate of operations. The estimate for equipment and services is shown in Table 20.

e. Final Cost Accounting. The figure presented by the AMRO comptroller does not represent the final cost of the operations. All nonexpendable supplies were returned to U.S. Army control and credit charges were made for all equipment returned. Costs for rehabilitating material were entered as charges, but the end-item itself was removed through a credit charge. In some cases figures presented by the AMRO comptroller did not coincide with final figures on support cost furnished by participating services. Provision was made for an audit by the 7756 USAREUR Audit Agency, but at the close of this reporting period a final cost figure for the operation was not available.[25]

243. Administrative and Logistical Support

a. U.S. Army, Europe.

(1) G3 Activities. From the first day of the Netherlands disaster, USAREUR G3 played an important role in relief operations. Colonel Tredennick, deputy assistant chief of staff, was charged with responsibility for selecting and preparing troop

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[24] p. 76.

[25] pp. 80-81.

Table 20--Cost Estimate of Flood Relief Operations

Total Cost	$956,736
Army	$484,036
Quartermaster Corps	92,034
Engineer Corps	207,000
Helicopter Detachment, Seventh Army	54,275
Signal Corps	1,000
Ordnance Corps	2,000
Destroyed equipment	100,000
Transportation Corps	7,727
Per Diem to TDY personnel	20,000
Air Force	$117,700
Freight lift and evacuation	112,700
Per Diem to TDY personnel	5,000
Navy	$25,000
Freight lift and evacuation	25,000
Property Left in the Netherlands[a]	$330,000
Engineer equipment	330,000

[a]This equipment was left on memorandum receipt in the Netherlands for a specified period of time, to be returned as a credit when the need for it no longer existed. A charge for its rehabilitation was to be made against the account.

Source: Table reproduced from USAREUR Hist Div, Rept of U.S. Military Flood Relief Operations in the Netherlands, p. 80. UNCLASSIFIED.

units for movement to the Netherlands and was directed to obtain information concerning the availability of light planes and helicopters and to alert as many as necessary for movement to the disaster area. At the staff meeting on 3 February, USAREUR G3 was charged with responsibility for screening all personnel requests from AMRO. This function included screening of requests for units from AMRO, selecting specific USAREUR units to meet desired needs, alerting units for movement, and finally effecting the movement of each selected unit, upon call from AMRO. Another task of G3 was the preparation of summaries of USAREUR activities in the relief operations. The summary was prepared twice daily from 3 February through 6 February and once daily from 7 February through 11 February, when the reports were discontinued.[26]

(2) G4 Activities. During the relief operations USAREUR G4 screened all requests for rail movements of supplies and equipment, both from AMRO and from the USAREUR technical services. In connection with this role, G4 set up a daily train to transport rations and supplies for U.S. units.[27]

(3) The Technical Services. During the disaster relief operations, urgently needed support was provided by four USAREUR technical services--Engineer, Quartermaster, Signal, and Transportation Divisions. The Quartermaster Division shipped $92,034 worth of supplies to the Netherlands. These included parachutes, lashings, containers for aerial drop activities, and rations for U.S. military units. The 557th Quartermaster Aerial Supply Company packed supplies for the aerial drops and detachments of the 520th and 531st Quartermaster Petroleum Supply Companies serviced vehicles of U.S. units. A detachment of the 540th Quartermaster Subsistence Company established a ration breakdown point at Breda. The 39th Engineer Construction Group provided the field operating headquarters and the 795th Engineer Dump Truck Company transported supplies and materials in the disaster area. The USAREUR Engineer Division furnished $207,000 worth of engineer supplies and equipment to the Netherlands Government and left an additional $330,000 worth of equipment in the Netherlands for use until 15 March 1953. The 17th Signal Operations Battalion, augmented by a detachment of the 317th Signal Construction Battalion and the 20th Low Power Radio Team of the 39th Signal Support Battalion, provided communications facilities for units operating in the disaster area between the headquarters at Breda and The Hague and between The Hague and Heidelberg. The Transportation Division provided truck companies for hauling POL supplies in the Netherlands and between Mannheim and the Class III Supply Point at Duesseldorf. It also established a railhead at Vught in the Netherlands for administrative purposes.

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[26] pp. 82-83.

[27] pp. 83-84.

An officer of the 8th Transportation Traffic Regulating Group was stationed at the international border crossing at Roermond to facilitate crossing. By 12 February the division had shipped 105 tons of quartermaster Class I and 265 tons of quartermaster Class III supplies by rail. Highway shipments during the period were 12 tons of ordnance supplies, 3 tons of mixed engineer and signal supplies, 16 tons of engineer supplies, approximately 170 tons of quartermaster Class III supplies, a 2,816-pound less-than-carload lot of engineer supplies, 4,532 pounds of quartermaster supplies, and 1,540 pounds of miscellaneous ordnance supplies.[28]

(4) Legal Problems and Arrangements. Maj. R. F. Ottavi, president of the USAREUR claims commission, was sent to The Hague as staff judge advocate for AMRO, but general court-martial jurisdiction remained with USAREUR headquarters in Heidelberg. His major role at The Hague was checking claims and making arrangements with the Koninklijke Marechaussee (Royal Netherlands State Police) for turning over U.S. personnel to U.S. authorities in any cases of arrest by Netherland authorities.[29]

b. U.S. Air Forces in Europe. US CINCEUR authorized General Eddy, as commander of US EUCOM relief activities in the Netherlands, to call upon Army and Navy commanders for necessary assistance. All requests for aid from USAFE were directed through USAREUR or directly from AMRO to USAFE. During the period of the Netherlands emergency, USAFE aircraft flew 426 hours in performing 353 sorties, evacuated 141 persons, and transported 1,134,100 pounds of supplies. In addition USAFE supplied thirty-six 6-man life rafts, 300 1-man life rafts, and 30 exposure or immersion suits.[30]

c. U.S. Naval Forces, Germany. On the basis of preliminary reconnaissance of the disaster area on 2 February, the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Germany, Rear Adm. H. E. Orem, ordered 2 landing craft of the U.S. Navy Rhine River Patrol to proceed at once to the Netherlands. These were later augmented by 2 patrol craft of the Rhine River Patrol, and the 4 were formed into Naval Task Unit 104.1.7. Principal activities of the unit included transporting sandbags, farm equipment, and Netherland engineer units, and performing reconnaissance and liaison tasks. On 18 February, the day after the departure of the unit from the Netherlands, Admiral Orem received an inquiry from the Chief of Staff of the Royal Netherlands Navy as to the possibility of the permanent transfer of LCT's and LCM's for use in dike repair. US CINCEUR replied that no U.S. Navy craft of the types requested was available for permanent transfer because of previous NATO commitments.[31]

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[28] pp. 84-86.
[29] pp. 87-88.
[30] pp. 88-90.
[31] pp. 91-92.

Section II: U.S. Military Relief During the Disaster in Greece

244. Participation in Disaster Relief Operations

a. Request for Aid. The second major relief operation in which USAREUR participated followed the earthquake in Greece in August 1953. Beginning on Tuesday, 11 August, and continuing for three days, a series of violent quakes rocked the Ionian Islands of Cephalonia, Ithaca, and Zante, and, according to International Red Cross estimates, killed 1,000 persons, injured 4,000, and destroyed 20,000 houses. Communications were entirely disrupted. Unable alone to cope with the situation above, the Greek Government requested aid from US CINCEUR. On 13 August US CINCEUR initiated relief activities and requested that CINCNELM designate the commander of the Sixth Fleet to coordinate all assistance rendered by U.S. armed forces in the operation. The Sixth Fleet commander was authorized to call upon other U.S. commands for necessary assistance.[32]

b. USAREUR Participation. The major role in the operations was played by the U.S. Sixth Fleet, which dispatched ten ships and a Marine battalion to provide relief. Certain requirements, however, had to be met by USAREUR. All staff divisions were alerted to function on a 24-hour basis, so as to take immediate action as requirements developed.[33] The first requirement filled by USAREUR was to supply, on 13 August, 804 pints of blood plasma.[34] Next, a requirement for helicopters was met in response to CINCNELM's request on 14 August for delivery of as many as possible to Araxos Field, Greece. A Seventh Army provisional flight detachment of 6 helicopters was airlifted that day by Twelfth Air Force to the field. The detachment was manned by 12 pilots, 6 mechanics, and civilian technical representatives of Bell Aircraft.[35] Upon

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[32](1) Cable C-1564, USASG sgd Hart to US CINCEUR, 12 Aug 53. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Cable 131427Z, CINCNELM to COMSIXTHFLT, 13 Aug 53. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR SGS 729.3 (1953), Vol. I (B/P 2). Unless otherwise noted, remaining footnote material is in the same file location.

[33]USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf Notes, No. 8, 27 Aug 53, p. 3. UNCLASSIFIED.

[34](1) Ibid. (2) Memo for rcd, 14 Aug 53, sub: TELECON General Bolte-General Gard, 1545 hours, 14 Aug 53. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) Cable SX-2617, USAREUR to US CINCEUR, 3 Sep 53. UNCLASSIFIED.

[35](1) Cable SC-12938, USAREUR to CINCNELM, 14 Aug 53. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Cable EOOTD-37783, CINCUSAFE to COMSIXTHFLT, 14 Aug 53. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) TELECON, Gen Gard with Capt Dillavue (USN) Actg COFS NELM, 1700 hours, 14 Aug 53.

arrival in Athens, the detachment began operations from the Sixth Fleet aircraft carrier USS ROOSEVELT and on 15 August made 800 drops of food and water, in addition to evacuating injured from remote areas. In response to a further request, CINCUSAREUR on 16 August dispatched to Greece a detachment of 1 officer and 11 enlisted men, from the 557th Aerial Supply Company, equipped with 130 cargo G-1 type parachutes, with water cans, for use in case of an extreme emergency.[36] On 19 August the Department of the Army advised US CINCEUR that the International Red Cross in Geneva had indicated an urgent need for folding cots for disaster relief in Greece. Authority was granted, therefore, by the Army to supply, if necessary, a maximum of 2,000 cots (to be withdrawn from project Army EUCOM General 102-50 OP). On 21 August US CINCEUR requested CINCUSAREUR to take steps to make the cots available.[37] On the next day USAREUR delivered the cots to Landstuhl Air Force Base for air shipment to Athens, where they were to be turned over to the Red Cross on a 30-day loan.[38]

c. Phase-out of Relief Operations. After 16 August the over-all situation in Greece improved rapidly and the U.S. took steps to phase out relief activities. When units of the Sixth Fleet moved out, the chief of Joint U.S. Military Assistance to Greece was designated as coordinator of U.S. relief operations. On 19 August he released the Seventh Army detachment of helicopters and on the next day they returned to their home station. By 22 August all active U.S. military assistance in the area had been terminated.[39]

d. Funding and Accounting. No funds in US EUCOM were specifically earmarked for expenses contracted in disaster relief, but because of the urgency of the situation US CINCEUR requested authority from the Department of the Army to meet those incurred

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[36](1) Cable 1520302, COMSIXTHFLT to CINCNELM, 15 Aug 53. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Memo, Col Hillberg to Gen Gard, 17 Aug 53, no sub. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) Cable 161154Z, CINCNELM to COMSIXTHFLT, 16 Aug 53. UNCLASSIFIED.

[37](1) Cable DA-946350, COFSA to US CINCEUR, 19 Aug 53. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Cable EC-9-352, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 21 Aug 53. CONFIDENTIAL.

[38](1) Cable SC-13346, USAREUR to CINCUSAFE WIESBADEN, 22 Aug 53. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Cable SX-2617, USAREUR to US CINCEUR, 3 Sep 53. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) Interv, Cpl Ralph Wooster, USAREUR 9th Mil Hist Det, with Maj A. G. Todoroff, USAREUR G4 Div Sup Br, 20 Oct 53. CONFIDENTIAL.

[39](1) Cable 181215Z, COMSIXTHFLT to CINCNELM, 18 Aug 53. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Memo, Col Vann, to Gen Gard, 19 Aug 53, no sub. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) Cable L-0636, JUSMAG to US CINCEUR, 20 Aug 53. UNCLASSIFIED.

in the Greek relief operation.[40] The Department established an over-all ceiling of $1,000,000 for indirect relief to Greece and set up accounting procedures, to follow Section III of AR 500-60. Costs were to be charged to Project 910 under an allotment account established by USAREUR. Cost estimates for the operations were: Army, $10,000 (not including the loan of 2,000 cots); Navy, $580,000; Air Force, $500,000; local costs to JUSMAG, $10,000.[41]

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[40] Cable EC-3-96, US CINCEUR to COFSA, 15 Aug 53. UNCLASSIFIED.

[41] (1) Cable DA-445464, COFSA to US CINCEUR, 20 Aug 53. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Cable EC-9-349, US CINCEUR to COFSA, 21 Aug 53. UNCLASSIFIED.

APPENDIX A

USAREUR Exercises and Maneuvers,
1 January 1953 to 30 June 1954

Command Post Exercises

Name	Date	Participants
GRAND ALLIANCE	19-23 Jan 53	Combined NORTHAG, CENTAG, LANDCENT, AIRCENT, FLAGCENT
SEVEN UP	20-27 Feb	Hq VII Corps
TWO	9-13 Mar	SHAPE
IRON CURTAIN	18-19 Mar	Hq VII Corps
No name	2- 3 Apr	Hq V Corps
HOME RUN	12-18 Apr	1st Inf Div
53	18-22 May	Hq USAREUR COMZ
SPRING TIDE	28-29 May	CENTAG
ON GUARD	4- 7 May	VII Corps
GRAND SLAM	8-12 Jun	Hq 43d Inf Div
SPRINGER II	22-27 Jun	Hq ADSEC
FORWARD PASS	20-24 Jul	Hq 43d Inf Div
No name	3- 6 Aug	Hq 2d Armd Div
DRAW BRIDGE	7-10 Aug	CENTAG
DOWN BEAT	18-21 Aug	Hq VII Corps
No name	18-20 Aug	Hq 2d Armd Div
SLEDGE HAMMER	3- 7 Sep	2d Armd Div
TEAR DROP	6-11 Dec	Hq 2d Armd Div
COUNTER THRUST I	28-31 Jan 54	CENTAG
LINCH PIN	16-19 Feb	VII Corps
MEDFLEX ABLE	24-31 Mar	CINCAFMED (naval exercise)
SHIELD I	29-31 Mar	CINCSOUTH (air defense exercise)
SHIELD I	1- 2 Apr	CINCSOUTH
MEDFLEX ABLE	1- 2 Apr	CINCAFMED
COUNTER THRUST II	9-12 Apr	CENTAG
SHAPE IV	26-30 Apr	SHAPE

Name	Date	Participants
EARLY BIRD	17-23 May 54	2d Armd Div
PANTA GRUEL	24-30 May	FFA (logistical exercise)
SATURNE	2- 4 Jun	FFA I Corps, French 15th Inf Div; US 5th Armd Div, VII Corps
EARLY BIRD	7-12 Jun	2d Armd Div
JUMP TEAM	22-24 Jun	4th Inf Div

Field Training Exercises

OVER THE BEACH	20 Jan 53	COMZ BASEC
BOAT RIDE	2- 6 Feb	Hq 4th Inf Div
GROUP F BIVOUAC	26-27 Feb	Hq USAREUR
OVER THE BEACH	10-14 Mar	BASEC
RAIN DROP	7- 9 Apr	4th Inf Div
ODEX PERS SHIP	13 Apr	Hq BASEC
ODEX GAMB SHIP #11	20 Apr	Hq BASEC
CONCERTO	21-25 Apr	NORTHAG
BASEC, USAREUR	20-27 Apr	Hq BASEC
CONCERTO	15-19 May	NORTHAG
LONG HAUL	2-18 Jun	37th Trans Hwy Trans Div
ODEX GAMB #12	17 Jun	Hq BASEC
AIR DANGER	19 Jun	1st Gp (U.S., British, French, Belgian)
OPEN AIR	20-24 Jul	Hq BASEC
ACK-ACK II	20-31 Jul	Seventh Army, 34th AAA Brig
CORNET	23-31 Jul	LANDCENT
SUMMER I	21-26 Jul	Hq 28th Inf Div
ODEX #13	20-22 Aug	Hq BASEC
MONTE CARLO	10-13 Sep	Seventh Army
GRAPE LEAF	21-29 Sep	43d Inf Div
GRAND REPULSE	18-24 Sep	NORTHAG
HARVEST MOON	12-17 Oct	VII Corps
ODEX #14	25-29 Oct	BASEC

Name	Date	Participants
POWER PLAY	24-30 Oct 53	V Corps
ODEX #15	6-11 Nov	BASEC
ROAD BOUND	12-20 Nov	Seventh Army, USAREUR COMZ
COCKED HAT	19 Feb 54	Berlin Comd
COOL BREEZE	22-27 Mar	4th Inf Div
RENARD II	29 Mar-1 Apr	US 4th Inf and FFA 3d Inf Div
AGAC VICTOR	7- 9 Apr	Berlin Comd
BLUE DANUBE	6-12 May	43d Inf Div

Signal Exercises, 1 January-31 December 1953

SMOKE SIGNAL ONE	4- 5 Mar 53	Hq LANDCENT
No name	16-21 Mar	Hq NORTHAG
OLD SMOKY	1- 3 Apr	NORTHAG
KELLER	14-17 Apr	Hq LANDCENT
SMOKE SIGNAL TWO	2- 3 Jul	Hq LANDCENT

Staff Exercises, 1 January 1953-June 1954

PHASE I	9-13 Mar 53	V Corps
No name	16-21 Mar	Hq NORTHAG
PHASE II	23-27 Mar	V Corps
STEEL CHAIN	6-10 Apr	Hq VII Corps
HOSTAGE TWO	9-12 Jun	Hq LANDCENT
No name	8-11 Mar 54	V Corps
BATTLE MACE	15-19 Mar	VII Corps

Glossary

This glossary contains all abbreviations used in this volume, except those listed in SR 320-50-1, 28 October 1949, and changes thereto.

Term	Definition
AAFCE (see AIRCENT)	
ACOFSA	Assistant Chief of Staff, Department of the Army
Actvs	activities
ADSEC	Advance Section (COMZ)
AER	Army Emergency Relief
AFCE (see AFCENT)	
AFCENT	Allied Forces Central Europe
AFQT	Armed Forces Qualification Test
AGARD	Advisory Group for Aeronautical Research and Development
AIRCENT	Allied Air Forces Central Europe
ALFCE (see LANDCENT)	
AMA	Air Materiel Area
AMEMB	American Embassy
AMFE	Air Materiel Forces, Europe
AMRO	American Military Relief Organization
A/N	Allied/Neutral
ARC	American Red Cross
ARS	Army Relief Society
ASAE	Army Security Agency, Europe
AYA	American Youth Activities
BAOR	British Army of the Rhine
BASC	Berlin Air Safety Center
BASEC	Base Section (COMZ)
BENELUX	Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg
BfV	Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz (German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution)
BGS	Bundesgrenzschutz (German Federal Border Guard)
BMW	Bavarian Motor Works
B/P	bulky package
BPE	Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation
BPOE (see BPE)	
CAD	Civil Affairs Division
CAFF	Chief, Army Field Forces
CAG (see CENTAG)	

Term	Definition
CCFFA	Commandant en Chef, Forces Francaises en Allemagne (Commander in Chief, French Forces in Germany)
CENTAG	Central Army Group
CINCAFMED	Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Mediterranean
CINCEUR (see US CINCEUR)	
CINCALFCE (see COMLANDCENT)	
CINCLANDCENT (see COMLANDCENT)	
CINCNELM	Commander in Chief, Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
CINCNORTH	Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Northern Europe
CINCSOUTH	Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe
CINCUSAFE	Commander in Chief, U.S. Air Forces in Europe
CINCUSAREUR	Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe
C/N	carrier note
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
COFSA	Chief of Staff, Department of the Army
COMAIRCENT	Commander, Allied Air Forces Central Europe
COMCENTAG	Commander, Central Army Group
COMJTFMED	Commander, Joint Task Force Mediterranean
COMLANDCENT	Commander, Allied Land Forces Central Europe
COMLANDSOUTH	Commander, Allied Land Forces Southern Europe
COMNAVGER	Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Germany
COMSIXTHFLT	Commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet
ctl	control
CWS	continental wage scale
DCOFSA	Deputy Chief of Staff, Department of the Army
DEG	Dependents Education Group
DEO	Dependents Education Organization
DF	disposition form
DM	Deutsche Mark
DSD	Dependents School Detachment
EDC	European Defense Community
EDF	European Defense Force
EDCIC	European Defense Community Interim Committee

Term	Definition
EES	European Exchange System
ELLA	European Long Lines Agency
EMCCC	European Military Communications Coordinating Committee
EO	Executive Order
et. al.	et alii (and others)
EUCOM	European Command
EWP	Emergency War Plan
FAFLO	French-American Fiscal Liaison Office
FAG	Forces Auxiliaires Genie (Auxiliary Engineer Forces)
FEDREP	Federal Republic of Germany
FFA	Forces Francaises en Allemagne (French Forces in Germany), or French First Army
FOURATAF	Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force Central Europe
FTX	field training exercise
GAO	general alert order
Ger	German
GYA	German Youth Activities
HACOM	Headquarters Area Command
HICOG	U.S. High Commission(er) for Germany
HICOM	Council of the Allied High Commission for Germany
Ibid.	Ibidem (in the same place)
ICCB	Intelligence Coordinating Committee, Berlin
ICCG	Intelligence Coordinating Committee, Germany
INTEX	intelligence extracts
IRO	International Refugee Organization (UN)
IRS	internal route slip
JAMAG	Joint American Military Advisory Group
JAMMAT	Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey
JCA	Joint Construction Agency
JCSRE	Joint Chiefs of Staff Representative, Europe
JEAP	Joint Emergency Alert Plan
JEDP	Joint Emergency Defense Plan
JUSMAG	Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group

Term	Definition
LANDCENT	Allied Land Forces Central Europe
LSD	Labor Services Division
LWR	local wage rate
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MCA	Military Construction-Army
MDAP	Mutual Defense Assistance Program
MILREP	U.S. Military Representative for Military Assistance to Europe
MIP	Management Improvement Program
MIS	Military Intelligence Service
MMO	Military Movements Office
MPB	Military Personnel Branch
MPC	military payment certificate
MTO	Military Transportation Office
NACOM	Northern Area Command
NAG (see NORTHAG)	
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVCENT	Allied Naval Forces Central Europe
NAVSECGRUDET	Naval Security Group Detachment (Bremerhaven)
NELM	Headquarters, Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
NEO	noncombatant evacuation order
OAC	Orleans Area Command
ODEX	offshore discharge exercise
ORA	order for reinforced alert
ORO	Operations Research Office
OSA	order for simple alert
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSP	offshore procurement
PBEIST	Planning Board for European Inland Surface Transport
PL	Public Law
PLG	Paris Liaison Group
POLAD	Political Adviser
RAF	Royal Air Force
RCAF	Royal Canadian Air Force
REG	Returnee Exploitation Group
RIF	reduction in force
R&U	repair and utilities
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACOM	Southern Area Command

Term	Definition
SAD	Special Activities Division
SBV	Sonderbauverwaltung (West German Construction Agency)
SEACOM	Southeastern Area Command
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe
SJS	Secretary of the Joint Staff
SMC-IN	staff message center- incoming
SOF	Status of Forces
SRE	Special Representative Europe (Paris)
TACC	tactical air control center
TACP	tactical air control party
TRAPIL	Societe des Transports Petroliers par Pipeline
TRUST	Trieste United States Troops
UHF	ultra high frequency
UNRRA	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
USAASC	U.S. Army Airlift Support Command
USAFE	U.S. Air Forces in Europe
USAREUR	U.S. Army, Europe
US BOB	U.S. Bureau of the Budget
US CINCEUR	Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command
USCOB	U.S. Commander, Berlin
USDOCO	U.S. Documents Office
US EUCOM	U.S. European Command
USFA	U.S. Forces Austria
USMLM/SOZ	U.S. Military Liaison Mission to the Soviet Zone
USNAVGER	U.S. Naval Forces, Germany
USNMR	U.S. National Military Representative, SHAPE
USRO	U.S. Regional Organization
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VCOFSA	Vice Chief of Staff, Department of the Army
VHF	very high frequency
WACOM	Western Area Command

Chronology

Date	Event	Paragraph Reference
1 Jan 53	The four general staff divisions are redesignated as Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G1, G2, G3, and G4.	8b
2 Jan	19th Armored Group is activated and assigned to Seventh Army, attached to V Corps.	11c
8 Jan	Responsibility for the logistical and administrative support of the Joint Construction Agency is assigned to USAREUR by US EUCOM.	178
10 Jan	Brig. Gen. Earl S. Gruver is named as Chief, Ordnance Division, vice Col. G. W. White.	10
14 Jan	Control of Twelfth Air Force and USNAVGER is transferred by US CINCEUR from USAREUR to their respective service commands, and delineates the missions, responsibilities, and duties of each.	1 2 172
15 Jan	Joint Construction Agency is established as a subordinate agency of USAREUR COMZ.	7 135b 150b
	The 513th Military Intelligence Service Group is established.	14e 48
16 Jan	Negotiations for the construction of a POL pipeline through France are reopened by U.S. Embassy, Paris.	150c(4)
21 Jan	Col. S. F. Jarrell is named as Provost Marshal vice Brig. Gen. W. H. Maglin.	10
22 Jan	USAFE terminates assignment of Twelfth Air Force to USAREUR.	181
25 Jan	USAREUR NEO (SAFEHAVEN-SPAIN) plan is completed.	70c(1)

Date	Event	Paragraph Reference
29 Jan 53	Col. Frank McA. Albrecht, is named as Chief, Engineer Division, vice Col. David H. Tulley.	10
1 Feb	Brig. Gen. Frank A. Henning is named as Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, vice Maj. Gen. Aaron Bradshaw, Jr.	10
	Naval Security Group Detachment Bremerhaven is established by Department of the Navy.	199
	Lt. Col. Frederic W. Boye, Jr., is named as Secretary of the General Staff vice Col. Bruce Palmer, Jr.	10
	CINCUSAREUR is charged by US CINCEUR with responsibility to assist victims of Netherlands flood disaster.	242
2 Feb	CINCEUR-CINCUSAFE Agreement of 2 February 1951 is terminated by CINCUSAFE.	180
	American Military Relief Organization is formed at The Hague.	242
	CINCUSAFE designates Deputy CINCUSAFE as the commander to report to CINCUSAREUR for the discharge of Air Force functions assigned the latter as Area Commander, Germany.	180
4 Feb	Department of Defense freezes all military dollar funded construction.	152a
11 Feb	USAREUR freezes local and continental recruitment of Department of the Army civilian personnel.	25b
13 Feb	USAREUR establishes Logistics Planning Board.	104
17 Feb	American Military Relief Organization ceases operations, terminating USAREUR's assistance in the Netherlands flood disaster.	243

Date	Event	Paragraph Reference
17-18 Feb 53	Committee of US EUCOM, USAREUR, USAREUR COMZ and JCA representatives review entire USAREUR dollar construction program.	152a
26 Feb	Maj. Gen. E. T. Williams, Chief of Staff, USAREUR, and representatives of the three Laender of U.S. Zone sign Fishing Agreement.	229
27 Feb	USAREUR implements the previously signed Hunting and Fishing Agreement between USAREUR and representatives of the three Laender of the U.S. Zone.	229
28 Feb	Col. James E. McHugh named as Chief, Chemical Division, vice Col. T. H. James.	10
15 Mar	Col. J. P. Holland is named as Provost Marshal vice Col. S. F. Jarrell.	10
16 Mar	US EUCOM assigns its logistical and administrative support to USAREUR.	174
26 Mar	German Federal Border Guard conducts exercise at Wildflecken with U.S. infantry furnishing fire support.	220
	Col. Ragnar E. Johnson is named as Chief, Chemical Division, vice Col. James E. McHugh.	10
	Russians cease trailing of vehicles of U.S. Military Liaison Mission in Soviet Zone.	235a
1 Apr	Lt. Gen. Charles L. Bolte assumes command of USAREUR.	10
10 Apr	First U.S. ship since World War II unloads at St. Nazaire.	140b
	HICOG and the Federal Republic agree on extension of occupation costs support to 31 December 1953.	108
	Master Noncombatant Evacuation Plan for the Paris Liaison Group is completed.	70a

Date	Event	Paragraph Reference
13 Apr 53	Allied Planning Group is redesignated as Central Army Group Plans Section.	65
15 Apr	Department of the Army reassigns Joint Construction Agency to US EUCOM.	150b
21 Apr	USAREUR accepts German Federal Republic Alternate Housing Program.	225
23 Apr	Agreement concerning carryover of occupation cost funds is approved by the Allied High Commission and the German Chancellor.	223
24 Apr	Department of Defense lifts construction freeze for all LOFC projects certified as essential.	152a
1 May	USAREUR COMZ extends port complex to include St. Nazaire.	140b
	USAREUR issues alternate operations plan for a Berlin Airlift (Reduced).	76
2 May	USAREUR Liaison Detachment, Camp Kilmer, New Jersey, is established to facilitate movement of military personnel from that camp to USAREUR.	17b
4 May	USAREUR and the Federal Republic agree to plan for the construction of 1506 housing units under the Alternate Housing Program.	149d
7 May	USAREUR Noncombatant Evacuation Order 1-53 is completed.	70b
16 May	Department of the Army imposes $55,000,000 expenditure ceiling for FY 1954 military construction in USAREUR.	150c(2)
17 May	The 301st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group is redesignated the 7721 Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group.	78c(2)
19 May	Col. William P. Maxwell is named as Chaplain vice Col. John S. Kelly.	10

Date	Event	Paragraph Reference
26 May 53	Col. John F. Cassidy is named as Assistant Chief of Staff, G1, vice Brig. Gen. John B. Murphy.	10
27 May	USAREUR Recreation Area is redesignated as the Southeastern Area Command.	13d(2) 38
	CINCUSAREUR orders lifting of the command-wide curfew, effective 1 June.	41a 37b
1 Jun	USAREUR transfers Heilbronn Detachments from SACOM to Seventh Army; latter assigns functions of Heilbronn Detachment commander to CO, 112th Infantry Regiment.	147
3 Jun	United States and German Federal Republic sign agreement to restore the 1923 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Consular Rights.	218
4 Jun	Lt. Col. Harris C. Eichen is named as Chief, Budget Division, vice Col. Theodore G. Bilbo, Jr.	10
6 Jun	Col. Russell B. Smith is named as Chief, Labor Services Division, vice Col. Charles M. Busbee.	10
8 Jun	Deutsche Mark programming is discontinued.	214
15 Jun	Col. James B. Murphy is named as Chaplain vice Col. William P. Maxwell.	10
17 Jun	East German workers riot in Soviet Zone of Germany and in Soviet Sector of Berlin.	238e
19 Jun	Seventh Army Noncombatant Evacuation Order 1-53 is completed.	70b
23 Jun	Brig. Gen. Edwin. R. Petzing is named as Chief, Signal Division, vice Brig. Gen. R. V. D. Corput.	10
24 Jun	Col. Henry C. Burgess is named as Chief, Civil Affairs Division, vice Col. Karl E. Henion.	10

Date	Event	Paragraph Reference
30 Jun 53	United States and France sign agreement for construction of a USAREUR POL pipeline through France; USAREUR COMZ and French Liaison Mission sign technical agreement for construction, maintenance and operation of USAREUR POL pipeline through France.	150c(4)
Jul	Transfer of Stockpile A to the USFA Italian LOFC is ordered by the Department of the Army.	206
1 Jul	7961 USAREUR Detachment (both Paris and Fontainebleau) is transferred to USAREUR COMZ.	203b
	USAREUR NEO (SAFEHAVEN) plan is completed.	70c(2)
6 Jul	Separate housing policy for U.S. Navy personnel stationed in Germany is abolished.	198
	Col. Edwin L. Kirtley is named as Chaplain vice Col. James B. Murphy.	10
13 Jul	USAREUR transfers all chemical support activity to Seventh Army control.	146
15 Jul	USAREUR COMZ Operation Order 953 (NEO) is issued.	70b
17 Jul	Special NEO Planning Group is discontinued.	72
	Maj. Gen. Claude B. Ferenbaugh is named as Chief of Staff vice Maj. Gen. Edward T. Williams.	10
	Brig. Gen. Cleland C. Sibley is named as Chief, Transportation Division, vice Brig. Gen. B. F. Hayford.	10
	Brig. Gen. Douglas V. Johnson is named as Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, vice Maj. Gen. Claude B. Ferenbaugh.	10

Date	Event	Paragraph Reference
22 Jul 53	CINCUSAREUR accepts application of West German labor law to German civilians employed by USAREUR and, likewise, extension of jurisdiction of German labor courts to them.	28
23 Jul	Col. Edward C. Gorsuch is named as Chief, Budget Division, vice Lt. Col. Harris C. Eichen.	10
29 Jul	USAREUR terminates program to provide volunteers for infantry units in Korea.	24c
1 Aug	CINCUSAREUR signs first contract for the construction of dependent housing in France under the Rental Guarantee Program.	150d
	Col. Robert V. Shinn is named as Chief, Public Information Division, vice Col. B. Furuholmen.	10
12 Aug	Brig. Gen. James H. Phillips is named as Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, vice Brig. Gen. Mark McClure.	10
13 Aug	USAREUR begins relief activities for victims of Greek earthquake disaster.	246
20 Aug	French Gen. Marcel M. Carpentier is named COMLANDCENT.	154
	U.S. civilian employees subject to military law under the Uniform Code of Justice are declared to be under USAREUR courts-martial jurisdiction for any offense committed in Western Germany or in the U.S. Sector of Berlin.	27a
	Seine Area Command is created in USAREUR COMZ.	12b
	AFCENT is established under command of Marshal Alphose Pierce Juin, with LANDCENT and NAVCENT assigned as subordinate commands.	154
22 Aug	U.S. relief operations in Greece are terminated.	246

Date	Event	Paragraph Reference
23 Aug 53	US CINCEUR establishes the Paris Visitors' Bureau under USAFE Control.	189
24 Aug	Maj. Gen. Joseph I. Martin is named as Surgeon vice Maj. Gen. Guy B. Denit.	10
29 Aug	A mixed clemency board is established to review German war criminal parole applications.	213c(2)
31 Aug	US CINCEUR delegates to CINCUSAREUR certain responsibilities in the implementation of the NATO Status of Forces agreement.	41c
1 Sep	USAREUR agrees to an across-the-board wage increase of 15 percent for German employees.	221c
	USAFE suspends all support activities in the Fontainebleau area; USAREUR assumes responsibility for all support activities in Fontainebleau area.	192b
9 Sep	HICOG-USAREUR agreement concerning handling military-political communications with Soviet Forces in Germany is made.	209
10-13 Sep	NATO FTX MONTE CARLO Interallied Maneuvers are held.	95b
15 Sep	7721 Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group is inactivated.	77c(2)
24 Sep	Plan for the rapid phase-out of dependents and certain other personnel is completed.	74
28 Sep	The High Commission Emergency Plan, SECUR/P(50)4(FINAL), is completed.	64
29 Sep	Lt. Gen. W. M. Hoge assumes command of USAREUR.	10
	Col. Webster Anderson is named as Quartermaster vice Maj. Gen. William H. Middleswart.	10

Date	Event	Paragraph Reference
30 Sep 53	7961 USAREUR Detachment is redesignated 7961 Army Unit Station Complement.	155a
1 Oct	Headquarters, 32d AAA Brigade, moves from Mildenhall, England to Bushey Hall Military Reservation near London.	13c
	Joint USAREUR-HICOG operation of Berlin Document Center is made HICOG responsibility.	51j
5 Oct	USAREUR publishes the directive covering the point system and appeal procedure for German employees of the US Forces.	221
12 Oct	The 868th Field Artillery Battalion, the first 280-mm. atomic artillery unit assigned to USAREUR, arrives in the command.	81
15 Oct	USAREUR COMZ is redesignated COMZ, USAREUR, 7966 Army Unit.	12b
	7950 JAMAG is reorganized and is redesignated MAAG, 7950 AU.	14f
20 Oct	The 513th Military Intelligence Service Group is reorganized and redesignated as the 513th Military Intelligence Group.	48
1 Nov	Brig. Gen. John F. Cassidy is named as Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration vice Brig. Gen. Edward J. O'Neill.	10
10 Nov	USAREUR and Federal Republic of Germany agree on second program of alternate housing for 1740 housing units in the U.S. Zone of Germany and 132 units in WACOM.	149d
12-20 Nov	Exercise ROAD BOUND is held to test the feasibility of NEO plans.	73a 73b
20 Nov	Department of the Army approves FY 1954 Deutsche Mark construction program for Germany.	149c
21 Nov	10th Special Forces Group assigned to Seventh Army.	11c

Date	Event	Paragraph Reference
8 Dec 53	Maj. Gen. John G. Van Houten is named as Assistant Chief of Staff, G1, vice Brig. Gen. John F. Cassidy.	10
15 Dec	Responsibility for the FY 1955 military construction program in Germany is delegated to CINCUSAREUR by US CINCEUR.	149b
	Operation plan for the USAREUR air evacuation of Berlin is completed.	77b
19 Dec	New internal security directive is issued for the U.S. area of responsibility in Germany.	79
23 Dec	Increase in the size of the USAREUR POL pipeline between Melun and Chalons is approved by the Department of the Army.	150c(4)
29 Dec	HICOG and Federal Republic agree to extend the 10 April 1953 agreement on occupation costs support until 30 June 1954.	108
31 Dec	CENTAG Emergency Plan 1-53 is issued.	65c
Jan 54	French statute gives French authorities control over employment of USAREUR-employed LWR personnel in COMZ.	29b
1 Jan	Amendment to HICOG Law No. 20 is published, initiating the liquidation of the HICOG court system.	215b
6 Jan	Maj. Gen. Charles K. Gailey, Jr., is named as Chief, Special Activities Division, vice Brig. Gen. Charles H. Swartz.	10
8 Jan	Construction of 5,270 BOQ rooms in Germany is approved by CINCUSAREUR.	149c(2)
23 Jan	Berlin Conference of Big Four convenes.	239
25 Jan	New internal security directive is issued for USAREUR Communications Zone.	80

Date	Event	Paragraph Reference
1 Feb 54	Brig. Gen. Carroll H. Deitrick is named as Chief, Ordnance Division, vice Brig. Gen. Earl S. Gruver.	10
	USAREUR transfers engineer troop supply support responsibilities to Seventh Army.	145
15 Feb	Department of the Army designates CINC-USAREUR as the operating agent for the Director of Offshore Procurement to implement Facilities Assistance Program.	167b(1)
1 Mar	Air Material Forces, Europe, established within USAFE.	183
8 Mar	USAREUR completes Concept C study.	82b
11 Mar	Seventh Army establishes Army aviation section as a section of the special staff.	11c
15 Mar	USAREUR Emergency War Plan 1-54 is issued.	66a
17 Mar	Logistics Planning Board is replaced by Construction Programming Board.	104
20 Mar	Defense and State Departments instruct USAREUR to make former Wehrmacht personnel files available to Dienststelle Blank.	219
22 Mar	Operation plan for evacuation of Berlin is completed by Twelfth Air Force.	77b
29 Mar	Brig. Gen. Harry P. Storke is named as Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, vice Brig. Gen. Frank A. Henning.	10
1 Apr	Col. Ralph B. Strader is named as Chief, Chemical Division, vice Col. Ragnar E. Johnson.	10
15 Apr	The Dependents School Detachment is reorganized and redesignated the Dependents Education Group, 7755 Army Unit, and placed under the direction of the USAREUR Assistant Chief of Staff, G1.	14a

Date	Event	Paragraph Reference
16 Apr 54	HICOG and CINCUSAREUR agree on final draft Executive Order delineating their respective areas of authority.	208d
21 Apr	Seventh Army replaces position of deputy chief of staff for plans with office of deputy chief of staff for operations.	11c
29 Apr	Heilbronn Detachment is transferred from control of 112th Infantry Regiment to SACOM.	147c
4 May	Col. Robert Hackett is named as Comptroller vice Col. Charles R. Hutchison.	10
	Todendorf detachment is organized under the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation.	13g
15 May	USAREUR Budget Division is replaced by Budget Branch, Office of the Comptroller.	9
	USAREUR ceases all recruitment of Allied/ neutral continental wage scale personnel.	25b
24 May	Lt. Col. Wendell J. Coats is named as Secretary of the General Staff vice Col. Frederic W. Boye, Jr.	10
1 Jun	The Alpine Inn, Berchtesgaden is redesignated as the USAREUR Religious Retreat House.	38c
	USAREUR Press Liaison Office in Mehlem is opened.	210
	USAREUR COMZ Operation Order 154 (NEO) is issued.	70b
3 Jun	Col. Kirk P. Brock is named as Chief, Labor Services Division, vice Col. Russell B. Smith.	10
16 Jun	Department of the Army cancels Section 14, Special Reserve No. 10.	125
17 Jun	Col. Edward R. Ott is named as Chief, Armed Forces Information and Education Division, vice Col. Maurice G. Stubbs.	10

Date	Event	Paragraph Reference
23 Jun 54	USAREUR Youth Activities Board is established.	45
30 Jun	Southeastern Area Command is discontinued, functions are assumed by the Southern Area Command.	13d(2)

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