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HEADQUARTERS US ARMY EUROPE (U)

1 July 1954 - 30 June 1955



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ANNUAL HISTORICAL REPORT

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY, EUROPE (U)

1 JULY 1954 – 30 JUNE 1955

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Contents

		Page
CHAPTER 1:	MISSION AND ORGANIZATION	1
	1. USAREUR	1
	2. USAREUR Headquarters	10
	3. Organizational Changes within USAREUR Headquarters	14
	4. Seventh Army	15
	5. The USAREUR Communications Zone	17
	6. Subordinate Commands	21
	7. USAREUR Units	26
CHAPTER 2:	COMPTROLLER ACTIVITIES	28
I:	Budget Activities	28
	8. The Deutsche Mark Budget	28
	9. USAREUR Dollar Budget	39
	10. Department of the Army Construction Expenditure Controls	40
	11. Revised Budget Advisory Committee Procedures	41
II:	Funding and Accounting Problems	42
	12. USAREUR Integrated Accounting System	42
	13. Financial Property Accounting	44
	14. Army Technical Services Stock Fund Program	46
	15. Problems Under Joint Utilization of Facilities	48
	16. Audit Accomplishments	49
III:	Program Review and Analysis Activities	50
	17. Establishment of the USAREUR Program System	50
	18. Transfer of Forms Control Responsibility	53
	19. Reports Control Activities	54
IV:	Management Engineering Activities	55
	20. Reviews and Surveys of Manpower Usage	55
	21. Management Improvement Programs	57
	22. Electric Accounting Machine Program	60
	23. Operation PAPER CHASE	61
V:	MDAP Control Functions	64
	24. MDAP Control Group	64

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Contents--(Continued)

	Page
CHAPTER 3: PERSONNEL	68
25. Manpower Trends	68
I: Military Personnel	71
26. Strength	71
27. Characteristics	81
28. Completion of Integration of Negro and White Troops	83
29. Experimental Replacement by Platoons	84
30. Reenlistment and Recruiting Program	84
31. Rotation, Reduction, and Extension of Tours of Duty	87
32. Career Management	90
II: Civilian Personnel	93
33. Strength and Trends	93
34. Finance and Administration	94
35. Personnel Problems and Policies	96
III: Labor Service Personnel	108
36. Strength and Trends	108
37. Composition	108
38. Labor Service Personnel Problems in Germany	109
39. Labor Service Personnel Problems in France	111
IV: Morale, Welfare, and Discipline	115
40. General Status of Morale	115
41. Factors Contributing to Improved Morale	116
42. Factors Adversely Affecting Morale	122
43. Welfare and Recreation Program	122
44. Dependents' Schools	133
45. Youth Activities Programs	136
46. Disciplinary Problems	139
47. Health of the Command	141
48. USAREUR Soldiers' Savings Program	142
49. Character Guidance and Religious Activities	143
50. Safety Programs	146
51. Participation in Relief and Assistance Programs	149

Contents--(Continued)

Page

CHAPTER 4: INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES 153

52. Fields of Intelligence Interest. 153
53. Refugee Screening. 154
54. USAREUR Collection Agencies. 156
55. Non-USAREUR Intelligence Agencies. . . . 164
56. Repositories of Information. 169
57. Production of Military Intelligence. . . 171
58. Counterintelligence. 173
59. Coordination of Intelligence Activities. 177
60. Dissemination of Intelligence Outside of the Command 181
61. Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency Program. 184
62. Intelligence Implications of West German Sovereignty 186

CHAPTER 5: EMERGENCY PLANNING AND SECURITY PREPARATIONS 188

I: Emergency and War Planning 188

63. USAREUR Planning Program 188
64. Coordination of Planning 189
65. USAREUR War Planning 189
66. Joint Emergency Alert Plan 191
67. Central Army Group Planning. 191
68. Berlin Planning. 191
69. Plan for the Emergency Evacuation of USAREUR Headquarters 193
70. U.S. Ambassador's Emergency Planning . . 193
71. Plans for the Emergency Evacuation of Noncombatants. 194
72. Plans for Phasing Out Dependents and Other Persons. 196
73. Retention of Civilian Employees in an Emergency 197
74. Combat Developments Program. 198
75. Concept C Planning 200
76. Transportation Emergency Planning. . . . 200

II: Security Preparations. 203

77. Troop Locations and Troop Movements. . . 203
78. Internal Security Directive for Germany. 205
79. Internal Security Directive for USAREUR COMZ 205

Contents--(Continued)

Page

80. Demolition Plans and Preparations. 205
81. Emergency Map Reserves 208
82. Practice Alerts and Test Assemblies. 210
83. Preparations for Implementing the Noncombatant Evacuation Order 211
84. Noncombatant Evacuation and Military Service Movement Test Exercise 212

CHAPTER 6: TRAINING. 214

85. The USAREUR Training Program 214
86. General Training 215
87. Specialized Training 219
88. Field Training Exercises 228
89. Joint and Combined Training. 230
90. Training Programs for Personnel of other NATO Commands. 232
91. USAREUR and Seventh Army Schools 234
92. Ranges and Training Areas. 237
93. The USAREUR Training Aids Center and Subcenters 241
94. Training Inspections 242
95. Operational Readiness of the Command 245

CHAPTER 7: LOGISTICAL SUPPORT. 246

I: Planning. 246

96. USAREUR Depot Planning 246
97. Planning the Implementation of Concept C . . 248

II: Procurement 251

98. Dollar Procurement 251
99. Deutsche Mark Procurement. 259

III: Supply Functions 264

100. Supply 264
101. Depot Maintenance Operations 274
102. Disposal of Excess Property. 275
103. Stock Control. 276

Contents--(Continued)

Page

IV: Transportation 278

104. Port Operations 278
105. Highway Transportation 281

V: Installation Support 283

106. Construction in Germany 283
107. Construction in France 291
108. Real Estate 298

VI: Logistical Relationships with U.S. Military and Civilian Agencies in Europe 301

109. Logistical Support of US EUCOM 301
110. Logistical Support of U.S. Air Forces, Europe 303
111. Logistical Relationship with U.S. Forces, Austria 307
112. Relations with Miscellaneous Civilian Agencies in Germany 308
113. Support of U.S. Commands and Agencies in France 309
114. Support of International Headquarters . . 311

CHAPTER 8: MILITARY-POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS AND ACTIVITIES . . . 312

I: Developments in the German Area of Responsibility 312

115. Relations with HICOG/U.S. Mission to Germany 312
116. Impact of German Sovereignty 316
117. Planning for German Army Assistance . . . 323

II: Developments in the French Area of Responsibility 327

118. Franco-American Relations 327
119. Renegotiation of the LOFC Agreement . . . 329
120. The Status of Forces Agreement in Operation 330

Contents--(Continued)

Page

III: Contacts with the Soviet Armed Forces in Germany 334

121. Official Visits 334
122. The USAREUR Soviet Relations Advisory Committee 334
123. The Soviet Military Liaison Mission, Frankfurt 335
124. Liaison Channels with Soviet Authorities . 336
125. Border Incidents 336
126. Policy Regarding U.S. Defectors 338
127. Aircraft Violations of the Corridors and Borders 338
128. The Berlin Command 339

Glossary 341
Chronology 345

Tables

Table 1--USAREUR FY 1955 Deutsche Mark Funding Program for Army, Navy, Air Force, and MSTS 35
2--USAREUR FY 1955 Dollar Funding Program 40
3--USAREUR Command Personnel 69
4--USAREUR Officer and Warrant Officer Strength by Grade, FY 1955 74
5--USAREUR Officer and Warrant Officer Strength by Major Elements, 30 June 1955 75
6--USAREUR Military Personnel by Race, FY 1955 76
7--USAREUR School Report, 30 June 1954-1 July 1955 235
8--Offshore Procurement, Cumulative Procurement Obligations, FY 1955 (in thousands of dollars) 253
9--USAREUR Stockage Objective, 31 May 1955 (short tons) . . 265
10--USAREUR Command Stocks on Hand (Less Stockage Objective), 31 May 1955 (short tons) 266
11--Summary of Special Reserve Stocks and Targets, 31 May 1955 268
12--Location of Special Reserve Stocks in Depots, Excluding Prestocks and Basic Loads, 31 May 1955 269
13--MDAP Materiel Stored in USAREUR Depots for FED-REP-GER Program, 30 June 1955 271
14--Port Operations, Tonnages Handled, FY 1955 (thousands of long tons) 279

Page

Charts

Chart 1--U.S. Command Structure in Europe, 30 June 1955. 3
2--Organization of United States Army, Europe, 30 June 1955 8
3--Organization of Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, 30 June 1955. 9
4--Military Express and Passenger Service, Movement of Tonnage and Passengers, Percentage of Capacity Utilized. 282
5--USAREUR COMZ LOFC - MCA Dollar Fund Status. 293

Map

Map 1--Pipeline Construction France, 30 June 1955. 294

CHAPTER 1

Mission and Organization

1. USAREUR

For the United States Army, Europe (USAREUR), the period from 1 July 1954 to 30 June 1955 marked the achievement of several long-term objectives. USAREUR's Communications Zone completed the transition from the build-up stage to that of an operating organization; the vast program for constructing troop and family housing in Germany was nearly completed; and USAREUR's combat force, Seventh Army, was at full strength, combat ready, equipped with the Army's newest weapons, and thoroughly trained in their use. An important change in the status of USAREUR took place when the 10-year-old military occupation of Western Germany came to an end on 5 May 1955, with the United States, Great Britain, and France officially ending the occupation and granting sovereignty to the Federal Republic of Germany. Except in Western Berlin, which continued to be an occupied city, the role of all U.S. forces in Germany changed to that of friendly troops stationed in Germany under the terms of the revised Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany and Related Conventions (hereafter referred to as the Bonn Conventions), which went into force when the Federal Republic became sovereign. Throughout this period of transition USAREUR's general mission in Germany remained unchanged: In coordination with other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations, to assist in providing for the security of Western Germany and preventing armed aggression by Soviet-bloc countries. The important difference in 1955 was that USAREUR no longer planned to withdraw and defend. Early in 1955, the Commander in Chief, USAREUR (CINCUSAREUR), Gen. A. C. McAuliffe, announced his intention to support the NATO concept of

standing firmly in place and defending Western Germany against any attempted Soviet armed aggression.[1]

a. Command Relationships. As one of the three components of the U.S. European Command (US EUCOM)--a joint headquarters established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff--USAREUR was under the authority of the Commander in Chief, US EUCOM (US CINCEUR), for certain matters of joint concern to two or more armed services of the U.S. forces and certain other specified matters (see Chart 1). But for all matters concerning only the Army, CINCUSAREUR was under the direct command of the Department of the Army. In case of uncertainty or differences of opinion, regarding the proper agency to exercise authority over USAREUR, the final decision was to rest with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[2]

This general relationship between Headquarters, US EUCOM, and Headquarters, USAREUR, was further clarified by directives which, together with the Unified Command Plan, established the following broad command relationships between the two headquarters:

Under conditions short of war, US CINCEUR was responsible for strategic guidance but he could exercise neither direct command nor operational control over USAREUR. US CINCEUR was responsible for making plans and preparations to carry out his military missions in the event of an emergency, including the evacuation of U.S. nationals; however, he delegated some of this authority to CINCUSAREUR. With regard to logistics US CINCEUR was authorized directive authority over CINCUSAREUR, and in instances where his policy might conflict with existing laws, departmental regulations, or budgetary limitations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would furnish guidance.[3]

Under wartime conditions, US CINCEUR had authority to exercise operational command over USAREUR and all other U.S. forces allocated to him, excluding such authority as would be exercised by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commanders. Within his area of responsibility, US CINCEUR also had authority to assume temporary operational control of USAREUR forces, whether allocated to him or not, with the exception of forces exempted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In a dire emergency he could assume temporary operational control over such exempted units, providing there was a lack of communications with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Finally, to accomplish his mission under

---

[1]Interv, Maj R. A. Gugeler, USAREUR Hist Div, with Col H. W. McClellan, USAREUR ACOFS G3 Plans Br, 14 Jun 55. SECRET.

[2]U.S. Unified Comd Plan, JCS, 9 Mar 55. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR G3 classified files.

[3]DF, Comment 3, Hq USAREUR ACOFS G3 to DCOFS Opns, 1 Mar 55, sub: JCS Unified Command Plan. SECRET. In USAREUR G3 classified files.

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U.S. COMMAND STRUCTURE IN EUROPE,
30 JUNE 1955



Source: Notes for Briefing of Gen Maxwell B. Taylor, Hq USAREUR, 14 Jun 55, G3 Supplement. SECRET.

Chart 1

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existing war plans, US CINCEUR was authorized during wartime to use USAREUR facilities and supplies.[4]

With regard to specific spheres, USAREUR's responsibility toward the Department of the Army and US EUCOM was divided along the following general lines: Departmental directives governed troop training in techniques and tactical methods, while US EUCOM was responsible for formulating joint and combined training policies. The Department of the Army issued direct instructions on technical matters, military doctrine, and over-all personnel administration. In these spheres US EUCOM handled personnel assignments to its own headquarters and to its directly subordinate units, and was responsible for that part of the administration of military justice which required service coordination. Theater plans and operations, especially with regard to psychological warfare, unconventional warfare, and atomic planning, were handled directly between US EUCOM and USAREUR. In finance and accounting matters, USAREUR dealt with the Department of Army on dollar budgeting and programming, but with US EUCOM on Allied Deutsche Mark funding. With regard to civilian personnel, USAREUR dealt directly with the Department of the Army on questions of policy and operations in the conduct of a complete civilian personnel program, but with US EUCOM on policy directives for the geographical distribution of responsibility among the services, and on local wage rate matters.[5]

b. Mission. As the ground forces commander under US EUCOM, CINCUSAREUR had several broad missions and other missions of a more detailed nature that were assigned by either US CINCEUR or the Department of the Army.

(1) Broad Missions. CINCUSAREUR was to exercise command over all assigned U.S. Army forces in order to provide security and meet armed aggression; to train all assigned forces and be prepared to put into effect the U.S. and NATO emergency war plans; to provide administrative and logistical interservice support as required; and to act as the single point of contact with the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG), later redesignated the U.S. Ambassador to Germany with respect to matters concerning the German Federal Republic.[6]

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[4] Ibid.

[5] Memo, Col G. W. Coolidge, USAREUR Dep ACOFS G3 to DCOFS Opns, 7 Mar 55, sub: USAREUR-EUCOM. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 (1955), Vol. I, Item 6A.

[6] Paper, USAREUR, 16 Aug 54, sub: Functions and Operations of U.S. Army, Europe. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 (1954), Vol. I, Item 11.

(2) Additional Missions. In addition, CINCUSAREUR had specific missions of a command nature such as being prepared to assume operational control of all forces assigned to Central Army Group (CENTAG); commanding (as US CINCEUR's representative) a joint task force for the execution of U.S. joint emergency plans in Germany; acting as Area Commander, Germany, for area-type functions of joint concern; and coordinating and directing security measures of joint concern for U.S. forces in Germany.

Missions concerning the employment of forces included that of providing nondivisional antiaircraft units for the defense of U.S. Air Force installations and air defense of other key U.S. installations in accordance with interservice and inter-Allied agreements, and providing for the defense of bases and the line of communications; taking measures essential for the maintenance of law and order and for the support of U.S. policy in West Germany, if requested by HICOG (later the U.S. Ambassador to West Germany); implementing the directives of HICOG (later the U.S. Ambassador to West Germany), and the provisions of the Bonn Conventions applicable to the U.S. forces in West Germany; support the operations of the West German Border Police, when required, in the control of civilian border crossers; and organizing, training, equipping and administering an indigenous labor service organization.

The planning missions included such responsibilities as to prepare certain portions of U.S. joint plans, and other appropriate service plans in support of U.S. joint, NATO, and Allied plans, to include operational plans for all forces assigned or earmarked for assignment to Central Army Group; to prepare joint plans for West Germany for implementation in event of emergency and before NATO commanders assume full operational control; to plan for conducting strategic and tactical psychological warfare in Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland; to assist U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) in the preparation of joint plans for the Berlin airlift; to maintain sufficient Allied representation in the headquarters to fulfill NATO peacetime planning responsibilities and to provide the nucleus for wartime operations; and to provide U.S. Army staff units to Allied land headquarters in Central Europe for the purpose of making plans for the tactical employment of atomic weapons.

In the sphere of the evacuation of civilians, CINCUSAREUR was to plan for the evacuation from Germany and France of U.S., Allied, and other specified noncombatants for whom US CINCEUR was responsible; examine State Department country plans for Benelux, Spain, and Portugal and advise US CINCEUR of the adequacy of provisions for U.S. noncombatants for whom the Department of Defense was responsible; and plan and make preparations, with USAFE, for the emergency evacuation of Berlin.

The military intelligence missions included that of collecting information and producing intelligence on nonmilitary espionage, sabotage, and subversive organizations in Germany, Czechoslovakia, and

Poland, primarily, and on continental Europe, secondarily, to include certain districts of the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, North Africa, and Turkey; maintaining a capability to provide warning against an impending Soviet attack; protecting the command against espionage, sabotage, and subversion; coordinating counterintelligence operations of joint military concern in the U.S. Zone of Germany and the U.S. Sector of Berlin; and collecting potential resistance information and propaganda intelligence in Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.

In his relations with nonservice agencies, CINCUSAREUR was to represent US CINCEUR in relations with U.S. embassies and agencies of foreign governments as directed; to act as the single point of contact for all U.S. forces in Germany in their relations with HICOG (later the U.S. Ambassador to Germany), with the government of the Federal Republic of Germany, with the Soviet forces stationed in Germany, and for matters of joint concern with Allied forces in Germany (but all matters relating to German sovereignty and rearmament were excepted from this mission); and to advise HICOG (later the U.S. Ambassador to Germany) on matters affecting the U.S. forces in Germany or having a military implication.

The missions of a logistical and administrative nature were to develop and operate the line of communications according to Department of the Army directives; to implement the unit rotation plan as it applied to USAREUR; to provide administrative and logistical support to dependents of U.S. Army personnel in Germany and France; and to stockpile supplies to support plans for the emergency evacuation of personnel and for the conduct of psychological warfare.

Some of the missions concerned with the support of non-USAREUR agencies were to provide training, logistical, and fund administration support to the Mutual Defense Assistance Program; to provide training and logistical support for the organization and development of the German Army; to provide logistical and other support to U.S. forces as directed by US CINCEUR; to support, in their missions, the other component commanders and other U.S. commanders operating within or adjacent to US CINCEUR's area of responsibility; to provide logistical and administrative support to the forces of the other component commands, and to other U.S. and Allied agencies in accordance with interservice support agreements or other directives; to develop the necessary interservice support agreements for Germany; to support NATO commanders within the limits of available resources and in accordance with policies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and US CINCEUR; to coordinate and consolidate those requirements of the U.S. forces in Germany that were furnished by the German economy; to establish policies and procedures applicable to U.S. forces regarding the procurement, administration, and allocation of indigenous labor, services, facilities, and supplies from the German economy; to establish administrative policies and procedures respecting matters peculiar to Germany to insure uniformity of practices and conduct of U.S. forces in Germany; and to furnish necessary support to the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner or the U.S. Embassy in Germany,

and to other accredited nongovernmental agencies and nonappropriated fund agencies.[7]

c. Organization. No significant changes were made in the organization of USAREUR during FY 1955. Throughout this period USAREUR was composed of 2 major commands, 10 subordinate commands, and 12 staff divisions whose chiefs exercised command authority over various assigned and attached units. In addition, there were several USAREUR units, the commanders of which reported directly to USAREUR headquarters.[8] The organization of USAREUR on 30 June 1955 is shown on Chart 2.

(1) The Major Commands. The U.S. Seventh Army and the USAREUR Communications Zone were the two major commands of USAREUR, with the commanding general of each being responsible directly to CINCUSAREUR.

(2) Subordinate Commands. Commanders of the ten following subordinate commands reported directly to USAREUR headquarters: The 32d AAA Brigade; the 66th Counter Intelligence Corps Group; Special Troops, Headquarters, USAREUR; the Berlin Command; the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation; the 513th Military Intelligence Group; and the four area commands in Germany (Headquarters, Northern, Western, and Southern Area Commands). Also included among the subordinate commands were the following staff divisions having command functions: Adjutant General, Provost Marshal, Special Activities, Armed Forces Information and Education, Finance, Chemical, Engineer, Medical, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Signal and Transportation.

(3) USAREUR Units. Four organizations were designated as USAREUR units, the commanders of which were instructed to report to Headquarters, USAREUR. These were: The Dependents' Education Group, 7755 Army Unit; USAREUR Audit Agency, 7756 Army Unit; the U.S. Military Liaison Mission to Commander in Chief of the Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany, 7893 Army Unit; and the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Spain, 7951 Army Unit. A fifth unit, the 7791 Office of the U.S. Commander, Berlin (USCOB), was assigned to and administered by USAREUR except for some specified functions for which it was directly responsible to the U.S. High Commissioner or Ambassador for Germany.[9]

---

[7] Mission Register, Hq USAREUR, 1955. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 (1955), B/P.

[8] USAREUR Cir 124, 1 Jul 54, sub: Designation of Commands and Units of the United States Army, Europe. UNCLASSIFIED.

[9] Ibid.

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ORGANIZATION OF UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
30 JUNE 1955



* Staff divisions of Headquarters, USAREUR, having certain assigned and attached units under the command of the respective heads of divisions: Adjutant General, Provost Marshal, Special Activities, Armed Forces Information and Education, Finance, Chemical, Engineer, Medical, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Signal, Transportation.

** Assigned to and administered by Headquarters, USAREUR, and reporting directly to Headquarters, USAREUR, on military matters, but reporting directly to U.S. High Commissioner for Germany on such functions as are directed.

Source: USAREUR Cir 124, 1 Jul 54, sub: Designation of Commands and Units of the United States Army, Europe. UNCLASSIFIED.

Chart 2

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ORGANIZATION OF HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE

30 JUNE 1955



Source: USAREUR Organizational Chart, 30 Jun 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

2. USAREUR Headquarters

Throughout the period the headquarters organization of USAREUR consisted of the Office of the Commander in Chief, the General Staff, and the Special Staff (see Chart 3).

a. Office of the Commander in Chief. The Commander in Chief, USAREUR, on 1 July 1954 was Gen. W. M. Hoge. The Office of the Commander in Chief also included the Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. Claude B. Ferenbaugh; the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Maj. Gen. R. G. Gard; the Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration, Brig. Gen. J. F. Cassidy; the Secretary of the General Staff, Lt. Col. W. J. Coats (promoted to Colonel 31 January 1955); and the Political Adviser, Mr. H. P. Fales.[10]

During the fiscal year the following changes of personnel were made within the Office of the Commander in Chief:[11]

Commander in Chief	1 Feb 55	Lt. Gen. A. C. McAuliffe (promoted to General on 1 March 1955) succeeded Gen. W. M. Hoge.
Chief of Staff	2 Dec 54	Maj. Gen. John F. Uncles vice Maj. Gen. C. B. Ferenbaugh.
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations	8 Sep 54	Brig. Gen. Douglas V. Johnson vice Maj. Gen. Robert G. Gard.
	15 Feb 55	Maj. Gen. E. D. Post vice Brig. Gen. Douglas V. Johnson.
Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration	12 Aug 54	Maj. Gen. John G. Van Houten vice Brig. Gen. John F. Cassidy.
	23 Oct 54	Maj. Gen. Oliver P. Newman vice Maj. Gen. John G. Van Houten.
Political Adviser	20 Jan 55	Mr. A. B. Moreland vice Mr. H. P. Fales.

b. The General Staff. Although primarily a coordinating staff, the general staff also exercised all functions of command. At the beginning of the fiscal year the following officers served as chiefs of the general staff divisions:

---

[10] USAREUR Organizational Chart and Directory of Key Personnel, 15 Jul 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

[11] USAREUR GO's, 1 Jul 54 to 30 Jun 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

Col. Robert Hackett	Office of the Comptroller
Maj. Gen. J. G. Van Houten	Assistant Chief of Staff, G1
Brig. Gen. J. H. Phillips*	Assistant Chief of Staff, G2
Brig. Gen. D. V. Johnson	Assistant Chief of Staff, G3
Maj. Gen. H. P. Storke	Assistant Chief of Staff, G4

*Promoted 18 Aug 54 to major general.

During the 12 month period covered by this report the following changes in personnel were made:[12]

Assistant Chief of Staff, G1	21 Aug 54	Maj. Gen. A. S. Newman vice Maj. Gen. J. G. Van Houten
Assistant Chief of Staff, G3	25 Aug 54	Maj. Gen. E. D. Post vice Brig. Gen. D. V. Johnson
	15 Feb 55	Brig. Gen. John C. Oakes vice Maj. Gen. E. D. Post

c. The Special Staff. All staff divisions of USAREUR headquarters that were not included in the general staff were grouped in the special staff, which was further separated into several subgroups. Three special staff divisions were designated as "administrative staffs and services;" another group of seven was called "technical staffs and services." Although the chiefs of all staff divisions were responsible directly to the Chief of Staff, because of the interdependence of their functions some of the special staff divisions were placed within the area of responsibility of the general staff division having the primary responsibility for the particular staff function. This relationship between a general and a special staff division was not that of command but that of staff coordination.[13]

In addition to the staff divisions placed under the coordinating authority of one of the general staff divisions, there remained nine divisions of the special staff that were left to operate directly under the supervision of the Chief of Staff. These divisions, and the chief of each on 1 July 1954, were as follows:[14]

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[12] USAREUR GO's, 1 Jul 54-30 Jun 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

[13] Interv, Maj R. A. Gugeler, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col R. M. Beechnor, Jr., USAREUR ACOFS G3, 19 Jul 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

[14] (1) USAREUR Organizational Chart, 15 Jul 54. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR GO's, 1 Jul 54-30 Jun 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

Armed Forces Information and Education Division	Col. E. R. Ott
Civil Affairs Division	Col. H. C. Burgess
Headquarters Commandant	Col. T. L. Walters
Historical Division	Col. Wilbur S. Nye
Inspector General Division	Col. Edward J. Maloney
Judge Advocate Division	Brig. Gen. G. W. Gardes
Labor Services Division	Col. K. P. Brock
Public Information Division	Col. R. V. Shinn
Special Activities Division	Maj. Gen. C. K. Gailey

(1) Administrative Staffs and Services. Staff divisions of the special staff designated as "administrative staffs and services" and the division heads on 1 July 1954 were:[15]

Adjutant General Division	Col. D. R. Van Sickler
Chaplain Division	Col. E. L. Kirtley
Provost Marshal Division	Brig. Gen. J. P. Holland

This subgroup was placed, for coordination, under the Assistant Chief of Staff, G1.

(2) Technical Staffs and Services. Special staff divisions in the subgroup designated "technical staffs and services" fell primarily within the sphere of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, and were placed under him for staff coordination. These divisions and their chiefs on 1 July 1954 were:[16]

Chemical Division	Col. R. B. Strader
Engineer Division	Brig. Gen. F. M. Albrecht
Medical Division	Maj. Gen. J. I. Martin
Ordnance Division	Brig. Gen. C. H. Deitrick
Quartermaster Division	Brig. Gen. W. Anderson
Signal Division	Brig. Gen. E. R. Petzing
Transportation Division	Brig. Gen. C. C. Sibley

(3) The Finance and Accounting Division. The Office of the Comptroller supervised the Finance and Accounting Division much as the Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, coordinated the activities of the technical staffs and services. The chief of the Finance and Accounting Division on 1 July 1954 was Col. Leonard H. Sims.

The following changes in key positions were made during the year:[17]

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[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid.

[17] USAREUR GO's, 1 Jul 54-30 Jun 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

Adjutant General Division	3 Jul 54	Col. Donald R. Van Sickler vice Brig. Gen. Leo V. Warner
	1 Oct 54	Brig. Gen. Bruce Easley, Jr., vice Col. Donald R. Van Sickler
Civil Affairs Division	7 Sep 54	Col. Carl N. Smith vice Col. Henry C. Burgess
Engineer Division	28 Feb 55	Col. Charles H. McNutt vice Brig. Gen. Frank M. Albrecht
Finance and Accounting Division	6 Jul 54	Col. Robert B. McKay vice Col. Leonard H. Sims
	16 May 55	Col. M. B. Hale vice Col. Robert B. McKay
Historical Division	6 Jul 54	Lt. Col. V. E. Pate vice Col. Wilbur S. Nye
	9 Jun 55	Lt. Col. E. J. Barta vice Lt. Col. V. E. Pate
Inspector General Division	6 Jul 54	Col. Jacob S. Samer vice Col. Edward J. Maloney
Judge Advocate Division	3 Jul 54	Brig. Gen. George W. Gardes vice Col. Edgar H. Snodgrass
Quartermaster Division	28 May 55	Brig. Gen. Aaron K. Beeman vice Brig. Gen. Webster Anderson
Signal Division	1 Aug 54	Brig. Gen. Wesley T. Guest vice Brig. Gen. Edwin R. Petzing
Special Activities Division	16 Jun 55	Maj. Gen. Richard C. Partridge vice Maj. Gen. Charles K. Gailey, Jr.
Transportation Division	1 Oct 54	Brig. Gen. Benjamin F. Modisett vice Brig. Gen. Cleland C. Sibley

3. Organizational Changes within USAREUR Headquarters

Except for several minor changes the organization of Headquarters, USAREUR, remained essentially the same as at the beginning of the fiscal year.

On 12 August 1954 the Finance Division was redesignated the Finance and Accounting Division--a designation that more accurately reflected its functions--and placed under the authority of the Office of the Comptroller. Earlier in 1954 the Department of the Army had placed its Finance Office directly under the Army Comptroller, and the change within Headquarters, USAREUR, therefore conformed with the reorganization in Washington. Another change affecting the Office of the Comptroller became effective on 1 April 1955 when the Military Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) Control Group was transferred to US EUCOM. During July 1954 US EUCOM had assigned to CINCUSAREUR the responsibility for administering the budgeting, funding, and fiscal services for the administrative support of MDAP for various military assistance advisory groups (MAAG's). US CINCEUR withdrew this responsibility from USAREUR during March 1955, and transferred it to the newly organized MDAP Control Branch at the Comptroller Division, Headquarters, US EUCOM.[18]

The Transportation Division was reorganized and the number of its branches increased from 4 to 6, the principal affect being the addition of the Traffic Branch and the Aviation Branch. The latter branch was added in order to follow the pattern set by the Office of the Chief of Transportation in the Department of the Army. The mission of the Army Aviation Branch was to exercise staff supervision and coordination over the Army aircraft employment, supply, and maintenance activities of the Transportation Division.[19]

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, added the Plans, Policy, and Liaison Section; the USAREUR Board of Requisition Demand Appeals was added to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G4; several internal changes were made within the Adjutant General Division; and the Provost Marshal Division added the Records and Registration Branch. These were the only changes of significance during the period.[20]

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[18] Interv, Maj R. A. Gugeler, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. John Cousens, USAREUR Off of Compt, 30 May 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

[19] Interv, Maj Gugeler with Maj J. F. Sullivan, USAREUR Transportation Division, 7 Jun 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

[20] USAREUR Organizational Charts and Directories of Key Personnel for FY 1955. UNCLASSIFIED.

4. Seventh Army

a. Mission. Seventh Army's most important mission was to maintain USAREUR's principal combat force in a state of immediate readiness for combat. In the event of hostilities, this tactical force, consisting of 5 divisions, 3 armored cavalry regiments, 14 antiaircraft artillery battalions, corps and army artillery units, and other supporting forces, would have the combat mission of defending a 300-mile border. With this mission, CINCUSAREUR assigned to Seventh Army full responsibility for the military security of the border separating the U.S. Zone of Germany from the Russian Zones of Germany and Austria, and from Czechoslovakia, and the secondary mission of providing a security screen along the border to detect and report evidence of impending movement of hostile forces into the U.S. Zone of Germany.[21]

In addition, the commanding general of Seventh Army had such specific missions as commanding Seventh Army and attached forces, and being prepared to assume command of the area commands, and the technical service depots and maintenance facilities in Germany; being prepared to assume responsibility for movement control of all U.S. highway and rail traffic in the U.S. Zone of Germany, and coordinating movements to and within the French Zone of Germany, and between these areas and COMZ; being prepared to execute plans for the evacuation of civilians and other noncombatants, materiel, and military agencies from the U.S. Zone of Germany; and conducting destruction and demolition according to plan.

Planning missions included the preparation and maintenance of plans for current Seventh Army operations and for emergency and war plans.

Some of the intelligence missions were to maintain and disseminate current intelligence information with specific emphasis on early warning of the imminence of hostilities, and ensure appropriate counterintelligence measures; to plan and direct the activities of Seventh Army intelligence and counterintelligence agencies with specific emphasis on intelligence related to the physical security of the border separating the U.S. Zone of Germany from the Russian Zones of Germany and Austria, and from Czechoslovakia; and to maintain liaison and to coordinate with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, and component elements, designated U.S. nonmilitary intelligence and other agencies, NATO intelligence agencies, and foreign intelligence agencies within his sphere of responsibility.

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[21](1) Stf Memo 11-101, Seventh Army, 28 Mar 55, sub: Seventh Army Program Directive. SECRET. (2) Seventh Army Mission Register. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1955), B/P. (3) USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jan 53-30 Jun 54, pp. 5-6. SECRET.

The logistical and administrative missions of Seventh Army were to provide equipment and logistical support necessary for its current operations and to maintain a continuous state of combat readiness; to support its own tactical operations in the event of hostilities or certain emergencies, provide common-user items to U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy elements in its area of operations, and be responsible for supply and maintenance support of all U.S. Army forces in Germany; to be prepared to assume responsibility for all civil affairs and military government operations in its area of operations; to conduct budget, fiscal, and management activities in support of current operations and in preparation for war or emergency requirements; to provide chemical supply and field maintenance support to the area commands; and to provide engineer maintenance and spare part support to the area commands, and to provide engineer supply support, other than repair and utility support, to units and activities in the area commands.

b. Organization.

(1) Structure on 1 July 1954. At the beginning of FY 1955, Seventh Army consisted of Headquarters, Seventh Army; two corps, V and VII Corps; and the following five subordinate supporting commands: Seventh Army Artillery; Seventh Army Engineer Command; Special Troops, Seventh Army; Seventh Army Troops; and Detached Troops, Seventh Army.[22]

(2) Changes. The most significant change affecting Seventh Army's organization during FY 1955 was the addition of six field artillery rocket batteries, one 280-mm. gun battalion, and a guided missile battalion. These units, each capable of delivering either atomic or conventional warheads, substantially increased Seventh Army's combat capability. Seventh Army assigned three "Honest John" rocket batteries to each corps to strengthen the corps artillery. The "Corporal" guided missile battalion was assigned to Seventh Army Artillery.

The 280-mm. gun battalion that reached Europe during FY 1955 was the sixth unit of that type to be assigned to Seventh Army. During the spring of 1955, Seventh Army assigned one battalion to each corps, the other four 280-mm. battalions remained attached to the 42d Field Artillery Group, which was assigned to Seventh Army artillery.[23]

Another change within Seventh Army's artillery units was the conversion of 4 of its 14 antiaircraft battalions to Skysweeper weapons, a change that made necessary slight reorganizations of these battalions.

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[22](1) USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jan 53-30 Jun 54, p. 18. SECRET. (2) Interv, Maj R. A. Gugeler, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col L. M. Prescott, Seventh Army Hist Sec, 26 Jul 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

[23]Interv cited above.

There were, in addition, many small organizational changes and other changes resulting from a Department of the Army order to return all reserve component units to reserve component control in the United States. This program, initiated during FY 1954 with the release of two National Guard divisions, affected 73 Seventh Army units, mostly of company or battalion size, during FY 1955. These units were approaching the statutory limitations for active federal service, having been inducted into active federal duty during the expansion program after the outbreak of the Korean War. All units released were replaced by Regular Army units of the same kind, with all changes made less personnel and equipment.[24]

(3) Composition of Seventh Army Headquarters. Headquarters, Seventh Army, consisted of the office of the commanding general, the chief of staff, the four general staff offices, the special staff, and a group of seven offices that were in neither the general nor the special staff but were responsible directly to the chief of staff. In the latter group were: Secretary of the General Staff; Special Liaison Office; Headquarters Commandant; Inspector General Section; Comptroller Section; the Public Information Section and the Troop Information and Education Section. Only two changes were made to this structure during the year. The TI&E Section was placed with the special staff, and the Special Services Section of the special staff was eliminated as a staff section and incorporated in G1.[25]

5. The USAREUR Communications Zone

a. Mission. The mission of the Communications Zone was based upon Concept C, a plan approved by the Department of the Army during FY 1954. According to this concept, as soon as COMZ became fully operational, only the nonwar risk supplies--post exchange supplies, household goods for dependents, and items of a similar nature--would be shipped through the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation. Individual units and personnel would continue to move through Bremerhaven, but military supplies would arrive at COMZ ports on the west coast of France and be processed through COMZ depots.[26]

(1) Broad Missions. The principal mission of the Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ, was to develop and operate across central France a line of communications capable of supporting all U.S. forces in Central Europe with all war risk supplies. In addition, the line of communications

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[24] Ibid.

[25] (1) Ibid. (2) Seventh Army Organizational Chart and Directory of Key Personnel, 1 May 55.

[26] Notes of Army-AF Conf, USAREUR COMZ, 20 Oct 54. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 (1954), Vol. I, Item 3.

was to be so organized and constructed that, in the event of hostilities, it could be expanded to provide all logistical support to U.S. forces.[27]

(2) Additional Missions. In addition, the Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ, was given such specific missions as to plan for the evacuation of technical service supplies and equipment; to plan for the general alert order (GAO); to receive, store, and distribute POL in the event of a general alert; to make necessary plans for emergency headquarters; to plan for a COMZ reinforced troop list; to plan for and be prepared to execute the noncombatant evacuation order (NEO); to provide for construction of an emergency pipeline; to provide support to elements of the U.S. Air Force and Navy, to joint U.S. and international headquarters and other specified U.S. governmental agencies as directed; and to represent CINCUSAREUR in negotiations with French governmental agencies.[28]

b. Organization.

(1) Structure on 1 July 1954. At the beginning of FY 1955 USAREUR COMZ was composed of Headquarters, Communications Zone, and five subordinate commands. These were: the Advance Section, COMZ (ADSEC); the Base Section, COMZ (BASEC); the 34th General Hospital; the Seine Area Command, COMZ (SAC); and the Orleans Area Command, COMZ (OAC). Of these, the first two were operating commands of COMZ, and the last two were support organizations. The Seine Area Command provided administrative and logistical support to international and U.S. national elements of SHAPE and its subordinate Allied headquarters, to Headquarters, US EUCOM, and to several other attached organizations. Detachments of SAC were located in Paris and in Fontainebleau. The Orleans Area Command performed a similar mission for Headquarters, COMZ.[29]

The Base Section, with headquarters at La Rochelle, was responsible for receiving water shipments from the United States or elsewhere. For this purpose BASEC operated three ports--St. Nazaire, La Pallice, and Bordeaux. It also operated most of the COMZ depots in which the required 60-day level of wartime stocks were stored, and was responsible for moving the supplies forward to the Advance Section. To fulfill its responsibility for the port operations on the west coast of France, BASEC had the 11th Port Command with headquarters at Rochefort. The

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[27] Ibid.

[28] DF, USAREUR G3 to DCOFS Opns, 19 Apr 55, sub: USAREUR COMZ Mission Register. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 (1955), Vol. I, Item 9, atchd.

[29] (1) Notes of Army-AF Conf, USAREUR COMZ, 20 Oct 54. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322, Vol. I, Item 3. (2) USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jan 53-30 Jun 54, p. 22. SECRET. (3) USAREUR COMZ Organizational Chart and Directory of Key Personnel, 1 Apr 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

mission of this organization was to command all units engaged in the operation of COMZ water terminals, including offshore discharge. Under the 11th Port Command there were three provisional port battalion headquarters with a port company assigned to each. The port companies were organized to supervise vessel discharge and loading operations, although the actual stevedoring operations were performed by indigenous labor under contract. In addition, a provisional terminal service battalion headquarters was assigned to the 11th Port Command. Organized to perform unconventional terminal operations such as offshore discharge and clearance over the beach or through small, shallow draft ports, this battalion consisted of a provisional terminal service company, an amphibious transportation truck company, and a transportation boat company equipped with landing craft to provide lighterage from ship to shore.[30]

The Advance Section, located along the east boundary of France, had the responsibility of operating the forward depots where ammunition and petroleum products were stored, and of supporting combat forces on forward boundaries.[31]

(2) Changes. The only significant change within USAREUR COMZ was the elimination of the Orleans Area Command on 1 September 1954. That command was redesignated as the Orleans Installation, which in turn was incorporated into the Headquarters Command of COMZ headquarters.[32]

(3) The Reorganization of COMZ Depots. Early in 1954 the USAREUR Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, dissatisfied with depot operations in both USAREUR and COMZ, urged that an examination be made of the organization of all depot units. In addition, the Inspector General Division objected to the manpower utilization methods in COMZ depots. An ad hoc committee, chaired by the chief of the G4 Services Branch, met during March 1954 to submit suggestions for a reorganization of the depot units to improve their efficiency.[33]

Most functions of the depots fell under stock control, storage, or maintenance. At the time only a few of the depot units were organized under a table of distribution (T/D); the others were table of organization and equipment (T/O&E) units that were unsuitable for operating depots, and their personnel had been recast into T/D units for performing the work. Since the administration continued to be done according to the

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[30] Notes of Army-AF Conf cited above.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Interv, Maj R. A. Gugeler, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col J. R. Looney, USAREUR ACOFS G3, 19 Jul 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

[33] Interv, Maj Gugeler with Col Looney, 16 May 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

T/O&E unit organization, this resulted in a double layer of organizations--one for administrative purposes, another for the operation of the depots. It also wasted manpower and frequently resulted in having men working for officers who had no command authority over them, and in other awkward administrative situations. The ad hoc committee recommended that no T/O&E unit should be used to cut across the functional lines of the depots and that no personnel of T/O&E units should be wasted.[34]

On the basis of this recommendation, CINCUSAREUR decided to proceed with the reorganization. Working with the technical services concerned, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, issued letters directing that all COMZ depots in France, as well as the remaining depots in West Germany, be reorganized to conform with the internal organization as set forth by Department of Army regulations. More specifically, the depots were to be organized under a T/D reflecting all military and civilian spaces; T/O&E units were to be employed only in activities for which they had been organized and where they could operate efficiently; and military spaces required for the T/D's were to be provided by inactivating the T/O&E units then engaged in depot operations; and the tables of allowances were to include equipment for both peacetime operational and emergency requirements.[35]

At the same time, another ad hoc committee was formed to screen the T/D's when they were submitted. This committee consisted of representatives of the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G3 and G4, the Office of the Comptroller, as well as a representative from the technical service divisions concerned. Under G3 chairmanship, this committee examined all the facts, including both current and emergency requirements for depot operation, and then recommended an appropriate organization for each depot. When the members of the committee could not reach agreement, the divergent proposals were submitted to the Chief of Staff for a decision. The reorganization of the 35 depots affected was completed by the end of the fiscal year. Of this number, 21 depots in France were under COMZ jurisdiction while the rest were under the direct command of the technical services. Although the main changes occurred in the COMZ depots, all were affected by the reorganization and all former T/O&E units were converted to T/D units. Approximately 1,500 personnel spaces were saved as a result of the reorganization.[36]

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[34] Ibid.

[35] USAREUR ltr, 26 Apr 54, sub: Depot Organization. AG 323.3 GOT-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[36] Interv, Maj Gugeler with Col Looney, 16 May 55, cited above. UNCLASSIFIED.

6. Subordinate Commands

a. 32d AAA Brigade. The mission of the 32d AAA Brigade continued to be that of furnishing antiaircraft artillery and chemical smoke defense against low-level airplane attacks for U.S. Air Force installations in the United Kingdom. As an additional mission, the commanding officer of the 32d was designated "Chief of the Military District for Great Britain" in March 1955. Situated in England and separated from other U.S. Army units, this brigade was in an unusual position. Although a subordinate command of USAREUR, it coordinated its administrative policies with the U.S. Third Air Force, was under the operational control of the British Fighter Command, and maintained liaison with the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Navy, and the British War Office.[37]

As of 1 July 1954, the 32d AAA Brigade consisted of a headquarters and headquarters battery; 4 antiaircraft battalions; a chemical smoke battalion with 7 chemical smoke companies and 4 integrated fire control repair detachments for maintaining antiaircraft weapons; an ordnance company; 2 signal detachments for radar maintenance; an augmentation unit to provide post-headquarters-type support, operate the practice gunnery range, and perform similar duties; an Army band, and several smaller support units. The most significant change that occured during the year was the conversion of the gun battalions from the former semi-mobile weapons to the 75-mm. mobile Skysweeper guns. Concurrently with that change, Battery D of each of the 4 battalions was disbanded. This conversion commenced in April 1954 when 1 battalion started to train for the new weapons. The first battalion was redesignated as a Skysweeper unit on 1 July 1954; 2 were converted during November and the fourth battalion during December 1954.[38]

b. 66th Counter Intelligence Corps Group. During FY 1955 the 66th CIC Group was responsible for all counterintelligence operations in the U.S. Zone of Germany, the U.S. controlled Bremen Enclave, the U.S. Sector of Berlin, and USAREUR COMZ, except that the CIC detachments of Seventh Army and their USAFE counterparts were responsible for the internal security of the installations and personnel of their major controlling units. The primary mission of the 66th CIC Group was to protect the U.S. forces in Germany against espionage, sabotage, and subversion; to collect intelligence of a countersubversive nature; to maintain a central registry of personality files of individuals of

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[37](1) 32d AAA Brig Ann Hist Rept, FY 54. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br. (2) Ltr, 32d AAA Brig to C/USAREUR Hist Div, 10 Aug 55, sub: Request for Information. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR Hist Div files.

[38]Ibid.

interest to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2; and to perform other collection or investigative duties assigned by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2.

The group headquarters was in Stuttgart, and seven regional headquarters were located in the U.S. Zone of Germany, and a detachment in France. Each regional headquarters was responsible for basic coverage in its assigned area. The detachment in France was assigned to the group only for planning and personnel purposes, but was responsible to the Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ, and was supervised by the G2 Division of that headquarters.[39]

The single organizational change was the creation of the Group Comptroller Section on 1 July 1954. Organized to handle all budget and fiscal problems, this section was given the mission of developing sound organizational management and accounting practices for the group. This section also assumed responsibility for all management activities.[40]

c. Special Troops, Headquarters, USAREUR. This command continued to perform its mission of furnishing enlisted personnel, and providing security, transportation, supplies, utilities and various services for USAREUR headquarters, and of administering and training all personnel assigned to Special Troops. The following units, aggregating approximately 1,400 men, were assigned to Special Troops during the period: 519th Transportation Car Company; 529th Military Police Company; 33d Army Band; the 9th, 10th, and 11th Military History Detachments; the 11th Finance Disbursement Section; the 7787 Army Unit, Aviation Detachment; 176th Engineer Platoon (Service); and Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Special Troops, Headquarters, USAREUR, 7888 Army Unit. There was no change in these assigned units except for the 176th Engineer Platoon, which was newly assigned during December 1954. In addition to these units, there were about 10 small units that were attached only, and for which Special Troops had no administrative responsibility.[41]

d. Area Commands. The principal mission of the area commands was to furnish supplies and services to the units and individuals, including dependents, within their areas. In addition to this common mission, the

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[39](1) 66th CIC Gp Hist Rept, 1 Jan 53-30 Jun 54. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br. (2) Interv, Maj R. A. Gugeler, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj R. A. Steinhausen, USAREUR ACOFS G2, 15 Jun 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

[40]Ltr, 66th CIC Gp to C/USAREUR Hist Div, 21 Jul 55, sub: Change in 66th CIC Group Organization. CONFIDENTIAL.

[41]Interv, Maj R. A. Gugeler, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col J. N. Blutchart, ExO, USAREUR Sp Trps, 2 Aug 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

Southern Area Command (SACOM) was responsible for operating the recreational areas in Garmisch and Berchtesgaden in order to provide U.S. forces in Europe with leave and rest facilities at the lowest practicable cost.[42]

After undergoing thorough reorganizations during the previous fiscal year, only minor adjustments and consolidations were made to the organizations of the area commands during FY 1955. One change that affected three of the area commands was the USAREUR authorization, effective 1 April 1955, to redesignate their staff positions as "general staff with troops" positions. Subordinate area commands had submitted several requests to have their staffs designated as general staffs, but these requests had been disapproved on the grounds that the number of personnel assigned to area commands, and the logistical mission of those commands, did not justify having a general staff. USAREUR had turned down such requests from the Frankfurt Military Post in 1952, from the Western Area Command (WACOM) in March 1954 and from Northern Area Command (NACOM) during June of the same year. During December 1954, the Southern Area Command made the same request which was again turned down, with the explanation that the activities of SACOM were not within the intent of existing Army regulations regarding the planning and direction of the operations of combined branches of the service. On 4 March 1955, NACOM again asked for approval to designate some of the positions in that headquarters as "general staff with troops" positions. After having consistently opposed such requests, USAREUR reversed its position and approved the designation of general staffs for SACOM, WACOM, and NACOM, effective 1 April 1955. The following positions, and the deputy or assistant for each, were authorized the general staff title: chief of staff, G1, G2, G3, G4, G5, and the comptroller.[43]

(1) Northern Area Command. In addition to the reorganization of the headquarters to change the staff sections to general staff divisions, Northern Area Command, on 1 December 1954, redesignated the Bamberg, Darmstadt, Frankfurt, Giessen, Hanau, Kassel, Schweinfurt, and Wuerzburg Detachments as subareas. On the same date the Commander in Chief, U.S. Air Forces, Europe (CINCUSAFE), assumed responsibility for the administration and logistical support of the Rhine-Main Airbase and the Wiesbaden Airbase. Until that date NACOM had furnished this support.[44]

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[42] USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jan 53-30 Jun 54, pp. 24-26. SECRET.

[43] DF, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to COFS, 14 Mar 55, sub: Designation of General Staff with Troops Positions in Area Commands. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 331 (1955), Vol. I, Item 4.

[44] NACOM GO 89, 3 Nov 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

(2) Southern Area Command. The Southern Area Command underwent a complete reorganization at the end of FY 1954, during the previous reporting period. At that time SACOM assumed responsibility for the Garmisch and Berchtesgaden areas, discontinued its three district headquarters, and reduced the number of its detachments from 27 to 10. During FY 1955 several additional changes were made that resulted in the discontinuance or consolidation of several subareas.[45]

(3) Western Area Command. Effective 1 January 1955, WACOM discontinued its Worms Subarea and reorganized the remaining five subareas with new geographical boundaries and operational functions to accomodate the area for which the Worms Subarea had been responsible.[46]

(4) Headquarters Area Command. Only two small changes occurred within HACOM during FY 1955. On 1 September 1954 the Finance and Accounting Detachment was added to Headquarters Area Station Complement, to which was assigned the Utilities Detachment on 15 April 1955. The former replaced a finance disbursing section that was inactivated; the latter unit was given the mission of providing repair and utilities support for facilities located in Heidelberg and vicinity.[47]

e. Berlin Command. The area known as the U.S. Sector, Berlin, made up the geographical area of the Berlin Command. Except for a relatively small number of personnel with other assignments, it consisted of all U.S. Army troops located in Berlin--approximately 6,000. The command was composed of a headquarters, a headquarters and service battalion, and seven subordinate commands. These included a band unit, two military police companies, an Army hospital, and the 6th Infantry Regiment, the only U.S. tactical unit in Berlin. The mission assigned to the Commanding General, Berlin Command, was to plan and supervise military action in the maintenance of law and order and whatever other action was necessary to support U.S. policy regarding Berlin. The security of the three Western Powers in Berlin required that all U.S. plans and actions be coordinated with the British and French commanders. In the event of an emergency endangering U.S. personnel or property in Berlin, the commanding general was to take action to safeguard the security and immunities of U.S. troops, of U.S., Allied, and neutral employees, of representatives of the U.S. and Allied occupation forces, and their dependents, in the U.S. Sector. He was also responsible for furnishing

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[45] See following SACOM GO's: GO 57, 30 Oct 54; GO 62, 30 Nov 54; and GO 3, 11 Jan 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

[46] WACOM GO 33, 20 Dec 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

[47] (1) USAREUR GO 100, 5 Aug 54. (2) USAREUR GO 50, 4 Feb 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

logistical support for U.S. military units and other agencies and personnel connected with or located within the command.[48]

f. Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation. After a thorough reorganization during the previous reporting period, the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation (BPOE) made only minor changes in its organization during FY 1955. At the beginning of July 1954, BPOE consisted of a headquarters and headquarters company, a staging area detachment, a station complement detachment, a military police detachment, the Farge POL Depot Detachment, the Bremerhaven Station Hospital Detachment, a security company, and a veterinary medical food inspection detachment.[49] The latter was discontinued during the year; the name of the security company was changed to the 77th Armored Infantry Company, and that of the hospital detachment to the 33d Station Hospital. The mission of the Commanding Officer, BPOE, was the operation of the Bremerhaven military water terminal, the only U.S. seaport in Germany; the operation of a troop and dependent staging area, a cold storage warehouse, and a POL depot. The port operation was to serve all continental areas for which USAREUR had support responsibility, besides other port elements and lodger units as directed by USAREUR.[50] Although the mission was unchanged from the previous period, the scope of the BPOE was scheduled to decrease as USAREUR COMZ gradually took over most of the functions of the Bremerhaven port.

g. 513th Military Intelligence Group. The organization and the mission of the 513th Military Intelligence Group remained unchanged during the period under review. Under the supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, it performed specialized intelligence activities through the employment of operational teams that required the use of foreign language or other skills. The 513th MI Group was a cellular organization comprised of teams that were organized, trained, and equipped to perform their mission independently of any other unit. There were three basic types of teams: operational linquistic teams; operational nonlinguistic teams such as editorial, order of battle, or photo interpreter teams; and administrative teams used to support the operational teams when necessary. Although assigned to the group, the intelligence specialist teams were usually allocated to other organizations, and placed directly under the operational control of the intelligence officer of the command to which they were attached.[51]

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[48](1) Berlin Comd Hist Rept, 1 Jan 53-30 Jun 54. SECRET. (2) Ltr, Capt R. R. Jones, Berlin Comd AG Div, to USAREUR Hist Div, 11 Jul 55. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR Hist Div.

[49]USAREUR Ann Hist Narr, 1 Jan 53-30 Jun 54, pp. 27-28. SECRET.

[50](1) Ibid. (2) Ltr, BPOE to USAREUR Hist Div, 18 Jul 55, sub: Request for Information. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Hist Div.

[51](1) T/O&E 30-600, 26 Sep 53. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR G2 Actvs file for 513th MIG, 1954-55. SECRET. In USAREUR G2 Opns Br.

h. USAREUR Staff Divisions with Command Functions. Included among the subordinate commands were certain staff divisions that had assigned or attached units under the command of the division chief. In addition to being staff officers of Headquarters, USAREUR, the chiefs of the following divisions exercised command of all troops, installations, and other activities assigned to their control: Adjutant General, Provost Marshal, Special Activities, Armed Forces Information and Education, Finance, Chemical, Engineer, Medical, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Signal, and Transportation.[52]

7. USAREUR Units

a. Dependents' Education Group, 7755 Army Unit. The mission of the Dependents Education Group (DEG) was to provide educational facilities on a comparable level with the better public schools in the U.S. for eligible minor dependent children of Department of Defense personnel in Germany and France. This unit was composed of the Dependents School Detachment (DSD) and the Dependents Education Organization (DEO), the first a military and the second a civilian organization. The Dependents Education Organization supervised all school academic operations, prepared the curricula, and recruited and assigned the professional personnel connected with the school system. The Dependents School Detachment was the support element, responsible for furnishing all supplies for 96 elementary schools and 12 high schools, and operating 6 dormitories having a resident population of about 560 students. The detachment also provided administrative support to approximately 1,600 teachers and other civilian employees, and performed budgetary, fiscal, and disbursing activities. During the year the Assistant Chief of Staff, G1, was appointed military director of the Dependents Education Group, and by a slight organizational change a direct command line was established from G1 to the Dependents School Detachment.[53]

b. USAREUR Audit Agency, 7756 Army Unit. The USAREUR Audit Agency underwent no change in its organization or mission. It consisted of a headquarters and some 15 field audit offices distributed throughout Germany and France. Its mission was to perform audits of all military property and related accounts, and of all other activities involving appropriated, nonappropriated, and local currency funds for which CINCUSAREUR was responsible. This mission included making surveys of accounting systems, preparing price studies, furnishing advice on accounting matters in the negotiation of contracts, and performing other special assignments as directed or requested.[54]

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[52] USAREUR Cir 124, 1 Jul 54, sub: Designation of Commands and Units of the United States Army, Europe. UNCLASSIFIED.

[53] T/D 77-7755, Hq USAREUR, 2 May 55, Change 1. UNCLASSIFIED.

[54] T/D 77-7756, Hq USAREUR, 24 Mar 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

c. U.S. Military Liaison Mission to Commander in Chief of the Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany, 7893 Army Unit. As the only U.S. agency having direct daily contact with the Soviet forces in Germany, this unit had the mission of assisting any U.S. agency in its dealings with the Soviet headquarters, and to follow up Soviet execution of quadripartite agreements, reporting any Soviet failure to enforce such agreements. Assigned to USAREUR, the mission was located in Potsdam, Germany, with a subordinate office in Berlin, and had a strength of 9 officers, 12 enlisted men, and 3 civilians. Neither the mission nor the organization were changed during the year.[55]

d. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Spain, 7951 Army Unit. All Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG's) in Europe were under the operational control of US EUCOM, except for the one serving in Spain, which was assigned to USAREUR. Only the personnel spaces of the other MAAG's were controlled by USAREUR. By the end of June 1955 all military assistance advisory groups in Europe were discontinued. Personnel and equipment from these units were transferred to the Department of the Army Administrative Area for assignment to similar units.[56]

e. Office of the U.S. Commander, Berlin, 7791 Army Unit. The U.S. Commander, Berlin (USCOB), retained his responsibility for the supervision over all U.S. military and political activities in Berlin, representing the United States in all Four-Power meetings and resolving questions of both a military and nonmilitary nature. Although the primary function of the office was political, USCOB had a secondary function as joint commander of all U.S. forces in Berlin. As such he was assigned to USAREUR, and the Berlin Command was subordinate to him. Originally established to provide unity of command for the preservation of U.S. interests in Berlin and the coordination of all U.S. agencies within the city, the office of USCOB consisted of 13 officers and 15 enlisted men organized into 4 sections: a command, an intelligence, an allied staff, and an administrative liaison section. Maj. Gen. T. S. Timberman held the position as USCOB on 1 July 1954. He was succeeded by Maj. Gen. G. Honnen on 22 July 1954.[57]

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[55] T/D 77-7893, Hq USAREUR, 18 May 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

[56] (1) DA ltr, 31 Jan 55, sub: Correlation of Administrative Funds with Staffing Pattern of MDAP Activities. AGAC-C 320.2 MDAP (7 Jan 55) Gl. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR GO 170, 30 Jun 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

[57] (1) Memo, USCOB to Gen A. C. McAuliffe, 6 Apr 55. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 094 Berlin (1955), Vol. I, Item 9. (2) T/D 77-7791, Hq USAREUR, 2 May 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

CHAPTER 2

Comptroller Activities

Section I: Budget Activities

8. The Deutsche Mark Budget

The USAREUR Deutsche Mark budget was financed by monthly contributions from the German Federal Republic according to the terms of agreement reached shortly after the signing of the Bonn Conventions in 1952. Under the terms of this agreement, which was extended numerous times, the West German Government provided DM 600 million per month for the support of Allied forces in Germany. The U.S. High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG) allocated the U.S. proportionate share of this amount to USAREUR on a quarterly basis.[1] The monthly contribution of DM 600 million was divided among the three occupying powers after DM 20 million was set aside for NATO infrastructure projects in Germany. The average U.S. share of the remainder was DM 266.8 million per month, of which DM 5 million was allocated to HICOG for the expenses of that organization. Under the terms of an agreement reached between the Allied High Commission and the West German Ministry of Finance on 29 December 1953, the provisions of the Occupation Costs Agreement were to extend to the end of FY 1954. The nonratification of the European Defense Community (EDC) Treaty, however, prevented the Bonn Conventions from becoming effective before that date. The London Agreements, which were developed by the three occupational powers and West Germany after the rejection of EDC, determined the contributions of the German Federal Republic during an interim period

[1] USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, 1953-54, pp. 265-66. SECRET.

between the granting of sovereignty to West Germany and her admission to NATO, and provided for extension of the Occupation Costs Agreement until 31 December 1954 or the end of the occupation period, whichever occurred first.[2] Regardless of the course of political events, the provisions for the interim period were not to extend beyond 30 June 1955. During the interim period, the West German Government would continue its contribution of DM 600 million per month, with DM 100 million being set aside each month to finance particular defense measures which were agreed upon jointly by the three powers and the Federal Republic of Germany. After West Germany's admission into NATO, a 12-month defense support period was to be established during which the Bonn Government would make available a total of DM 3.2 billion for the support of the Allied forces. These funds were to be made available at the rate of DM 400 million per month for the first 2 months, DM 300 million per month for the next 4 months, and DM 200 million per month for the last 6 months. Assuming the same proration of funds between the three Allied powers as existed previously, the U.S. share of this total for the 12-month period would average DM 122.6 million per month.[3]

In November 1954 HICOG asked his counterparts on the Allied High Commission to discuss a common policy on an extension of the Occupation Costs Agreement beyond the 31 December 1954 deadline. HICOG proposed to extend all provisions of the agreement, with the contributions for January and February 1955 remaining unchanged at the DM 600 million level. From 1 March until the start of the interim period the occupation costs ceiling would continue at DM 600 million with DM 100 million set aside in accordance with the London Agreements. The remaining DM 500 million per month would be divided according to the same ratio as previous monthly appropriations by allocating DM 230 million to the United States, DM 174 million to the United Kingdom, and DM 96 million to France. In no case was this proposal to be extended beyond 30 June 1955.[4] US EUCOM concurred on 6 December 1954 but pointed out that the acceptance of such funding prior to the beginning of the interim period contravened the occupation concept. The proposal was acceptable as a basis for negotiations to obtain definite amounts for

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[2] C/N 1, USAREUR Compt to USAREUR ACOFS G4, 28 Oct 54, sub: Construction and Procurement Planning for the Remainder of the Occupation Period and Post-Occupation Period. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1954), Vol. II, Item 34A atchd.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Cable 314, HICOG to State Dept (1950), 24 Nov 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above, Item 39.

program planning and funding through June 1955.[5] After much urging from the State Department to conclude discussions with the British and French and to arrange for a simple 3-month extension of the original Occupation Costs Agreement, HICOG announced on 4 February 1955 the acceptance by the Allied High Commission of a modified package proposal that would extend the agreement to 30 June 1955.[6]

a. The DM 100 Million Fund. The London Agreements provided that DM 100 million of the DM 600 million monthly contribution would be set aside to facilitate the buildup of the German Armed Forces, to finance NATO infrastructure projects, and to settle outstanding claims against the Allied forces. The West German Government indicated to the Allied High Commission that these provisions would have to be made applicable to the extension of the Occupation Costs Agreement beyond 31 December 1954 to foster the rapid buildup of the German forces.[7] The agreement finally reached between the Allied High Commission and the West German Ministry of Finance stipulated that the DM 100 million would be set aside effective the first month following ratification of the Paris Accords by West Germany. As of 1 April 1955 the monthly contribution paid to the three occupation powers was reduced to DM 500 million with the remaining DM 100 million to be used for jointly approved projects, infrastructure, and claims. A sum of DM 18 million per month was set aside for the payment of claims and the remaining DM 82 million was to be divided among the four partners to the agreement as follows: 50 percent to the Federal Republic of Germany; the United States was to receive 24.6 percent for the first one and one-third months and 23 percent thereafter; the United Kingdom 18.5 percent and 17.4 percent; and France 6.9 percent and 9.6 percent. All four powers had agreed to use their shares to finance projects that would be of mutual benefit.[8]

b. Deutsche Mark Utilization Program. The USAREUR Deutsche Mark Utilization Program was developed in conjunction with US EUCOM, subject to final review by the Deputy Defense Comptroller, Europe (DDCE), and representatives of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In developing priorities for the use of Deutsche Marks, US CINCEUR determined that the operational programs of both USAREUR and USAFE had a priority

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[5] Cable EC-9-5190, US CINCEUR to DA for COA, 6 Dec 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above, Item 39 atchd.

[6] (1) Cable SMC-IN 1950, State Dept to HICOG (1850), 7 Jan 55. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Cable 461, HICOG to State Dept (2236), 4 Feb 55. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR SGS 112 (1955), Vol. I, Item 1 atchd.

[7] C/N 1, USAREUR Compt to USAREUR DCOFS Admin, 13 Nov 54, sub: German Views Toward Utilization of the "100 Million DM Set-Aside." CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1954), Vol. II, Item 34A atchd.

[8] (1) Cable SX-2609, USAREUR to DA, 4 Apr 55. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1955), Vol. I, Item 5A atchd. (2) Cable 652, HICOG to State Dept (3075), 18 Apr 55. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR Compt Div Incoming cable file (Apr 55).

second only to the recurring costs of the services. Therefore, any German funds available for the two services during the second and third quarters of FY 1955 would, as a matter of priority, be used to effect these operational programs. At the end of the second quarter the accomplishments of the services in carrying out their programs would be reviewed in detail and the Deutsche Mark utilization program would be adjusted accordingly. In addition, the proration of Deutsche Marks among the three services in West Germany would only be changed by mutual agreement based on uniform priority listings. The Deputy Defense Comptroller, Europe, stipulated that any Deutsche Mark funds saved during the remainder of the fiscal year would either be used for the advance procurement of supplies or be transferred to the construction program for the accomplishment of deferred priority items subject to approval by the Department of Defense. He also directed that items budgeted in the FY 1955 program that could be financed under the DM 100 million set aside during the interim period were to be deferred until that period. The USAREUR Construction Program was to be carried out in strict compliance with a priority system, which was to be sufficiently flexible to insure obligation of all funds within each quarter of the fiscal year.[9]

As a result of the above decisions the Office of the Comptroller recommended certain actions for the command. First, the USAREUR Construction Program was to be screened in order to eliminate items not essential to the command's mission. This was necessary because the cost of the program exceeded funds available by approximately DM 420 million. Second, the USAREUR Procurement Program was to be reexamined to eliminate procurement items that were not essential to the mission of the command or would not result in savings to the United States. Third, all budgetary programs were to be reviewed prior to the first week in December to be sure that maximum Deutsche Mark funds would be available for the construction program and for major procurement, which in turn would save dollars. On 18 October 1954 the Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration approved these recommendations for immediate implementation.[10]

c. Effect of Sovereignty. In April 1955, the Department of the Army had informed USAREUR that, during the 12-month defense support period following the granting of sovereignty to West Germany, no appropriated dollars would be made available for any purpose for which Deutsche Marks might be used under existing practices. In addition, the department directed USAREUR to take steps to minimize dollar requirements for FY 1956 subsequent to the defense support period. For this purpose USAREUR was to obligate Deutsche Marks during the defense support period to cover all items required for the period from 6 May to 30 June 1956. Immediately upon commencement of the defense support period,

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[9] Memo, USAREUR Compt to USAREUR DCOFS Admin, 15 Oct 54, sub: DM Utilization Program for FY 1955. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1954), Vol. II, Item 34.

[10] See par. 104.

the average monthly expenditure of Deutsche Marks would have to be reduced to one-twelfth of the total Deutsche Marks available for the period, with first priority given to meeting operating expenses.[11]

On 5 May 1955 US EUCOM announced that there would be no interim period and that the defense support period would commence on 6 May 1955. This action reduced the component commands' share of the monthly Deutsche Mark contribution from DM 261.8 million to DM 122 million per month, including the DM 8.3 million ($1,976,190) per month for the settlement of claims. US EUCOM pointed out that the available amount was substantially less than the Deutsche Mark portion of the aggregate maintenance and operation programs submitted by the three component commands in West Germany, particularly in view of the proposed increase in wage rates and social security benefits for German employees. Immediate steps were to be taken to freeze Deutsche Mark fund employment at the existing levels, to confine recruitment of indigenous employees to a case-by-case basis, and to review peacetime missions and functions for earliest curtailment or elimination. In the latter review, particular attention was to be given to eliminating amenities and services that could not be fully justified under dollar criteria.[12]

(1) Economies Effected by USAREUR. The reduced availability of Deutsche Marks during the defense support period caused USAREUR to curtail some of its operations and to eliminate certain activities in order to effect the necessary economies without delay. To this end USAREUR directed all subordinate commands to take the following actions:[13]

1. To derequisition all hotels not required for BOQ occupancy or for which replacement by BOQ's was not required;

2. To release hotels required for BOQ occupancy as rapidly as completion of the USAREUR BOQ Construction Program permitted;

3. To reduce utilities expenditures by billing non-appropriated fund agencies for above-normal utilities expenses;

4. To freeze quartermaster laundry and dry cleaning service at existing levels;

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[11] Cable DA-979658, DA from Compt-B to CINCUSAREUR, 14 Apr 55. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1955), Vol. I, Item 5A atchd.

[12] Cable EC-9-2243, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 5 May 55. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above, Item 15 atchd.

[13] Cable SX-3300, CINCUSAREUR to All Comds, 16 May 55. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above, Item 13 atchd.

5. To defer activation of "labor service" units contemplated for FY 1956 and immediately reduce the authorized strengths of labor service units by 5 percent for technical units, 15 percent for guard companies, and 25 percent for supervision centers;

6. To reduce engineer repair and utilities (R&U) maintenance standards by 25 percent by extending painting and other maintenance cycles;

7. To reduce modification and alteration of buildings by approximately 25 percent;

8. To reduce fire protection;

9. To reduce the administrative motor pool by approximately 15 percent and increase the U-drive-it program for passenger and light cargo vehicles;

10. To reduce Class A telephones and trunk service and eliminate the use of paid military phones in quarters;

11. To reduce the standards of printing through curtailment of contract printing;

12. To eliminate the German wage-scale civilian augmentations to Seventh Army T/O units that had no additional mission beyond their tactical one;

13. To reduce by 15 percent all German wage-scale employees at all subordinate headquarters and activities funded through Budget Project 3811;

14. To reduce appropriated fund support for operation of the leave and rest centers to an annual level of $1,400,000;

15. To reduce appropriated fund operational costs for Special Services by 50 percent;

16. To reduce the number of German wage-scale employees in the USAREUR headquarters staff agencies by 15 percent below the 30 April 1955 level; and

17. To reduce USAREUR TI&E activities by 15 percent below the existing fund levels.

(2) Allocation of Funds for Defense Support Period. US EUCOM reexamined the operating requirements of the three component commands in West Germany in order to arrive at a just and equitable proration of the Deutsche Marks to be made available by the Federal Republic of Germany during the 12-month support period. After a preliminary review, US EUCOM

established tentative funding limitations subject to later adjustment. The USAREUR share of the funds was set at $232,000,000; USAFE was to receive $85,000,000; USNAVGER, $3,362,912; and $28,208,040 were reserved for the payment of claims.[14] After a final review of the financial plans of all three component commands, US EUCOM decided to allocate $268,000,000 to USAREUR, subject to review by the Departments of Defense and the Army.[15]

d. Deutsche Mark Funding Program. From 1 July 1954 to 5 May 1955 USAREUR had operated on the normal occupation costs Deutsche Mark budget. With the granting of sovereignty to West Germany on 5 May 1955, the occupation status of the U.S. forces had changed to one of defense. From 6 May to 30 June 1955, the Deutsche Mark support received was the prorated amount of funds allocated for the defense support period.[16] For that reason USAREUR requested new schedules of apportionment from the Department of the Army for the last quarter of FY 1955. The sum of $121,162,638 in Deutsche Mark equivalent was requested for that quarter. Of this amount USAREUR was to receive the equivalent of $93,412,399; USAFE, $26,460,915; USNAVGER, $1,117,324; and MSTS, $172,000. Since all budgetary figures were submitted to, and approved by, the Department of the Army, the amounts are expressed in dollars.

The total of $121,162,638 was arrived at in the following manner: The April contribution of $56,738,095 consisted of the U.S. share of the usual 46 percent contribution of DM 600 million ($119,047,620) or $54,761,905, plus $1,976,190 for the settlement of claims. The May contribution was based on receipt of occupation funds for five days (46 percent of $119,047,620 times 5/31) plus claims contributions for five days for a total of $9,151,310. For the remaining 26 days of May the contribution was based on 26/31 of approximately one-twelfth of the total actual contribution ($350,476,190) for the defense support period, or $24,362,519. The June amount, $29,047,619, was based on approximately one-twelfth of the contribution for the defense support period. In addition to the monthly contributions during the last quarter of FY 1955, the U.S. forces also received $1,395,238 of excess HICOG funds and $467,857 contributed for infrastructure.[17]

The revised apportionment schedules were not approved by the Department of the Army until after the end of FY 1955, so that USAREUR had to make tentative obligations against the schedules pending such approval.

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[14] Cable EC-9-2597, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 23 May 55. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above, Item 15 atchd.

[15] Cable EC-9-2711, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 27 May 55. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

[16] Interv, Mr. J. R. Moenk, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col V. E. Bird, USAREUR Compt Div, 8 Sep 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

[17] Cable SC-37052, USAREUR to DA for COA, 7 Jun 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1955), Vol. II, Item 19.

Table 1--USAREUR FY 1955 Deutsche Mark Funding Program for Army, Navy, Air Force, and MSTS

Appropriation	DA Funding	Obligations 30 June 1955
Total	$824,620,553	$823,391,176
Army	597,345,666	597,272,728
Military Personnel, Army	6,786,777	6,201,244
Maintenance and Operations	302,261,692	301,838,605
Military Construction	248,927,911	250,016,787
Procurement and Production	36,724,297	36,619,372
Reserve Personnel Requirements	5,151	2,310
Preparation for Sale or Salvage of Military Property	39,858	30,624
Claims (DM Support)	2,599,980	2,563,786
Air Force	220,733,881	220,032,538
Navy	5,667,422	5,278,460
MSTS	873,584	807,450

Source: USAREUR Compt Div Bud Br. UNCLASSIFIED.

Table I shows in dollars the FY 1955 Deutsche Mark funding program for USAREUR, including the revised fourth quarter apportionment schedules, as approved by the Department, as well as the amounts obligated as of 30 June 1955. The Army portion of the funding program approved for USAREUR use in Western Germany was $597,345,666 (DM 2,508,851,797) of which USAREUR obligated $597,272,728 (DM 2,508,545,457) before the end of FY 1955.[18]

e. The Berlin Command Budget. The West Berlin budget of operations was separate from that of the Federal Republic of Germany since the funds for that budget were contributed by the West Berlin Magistrat (Berlin City Administration). Deutsche Mark expenditures for Berlin were subject to the same Department of Defense control as the West German budget. The Berlin budget, however, was not affected by the granting of sovereignty to West Germany on 5 May 1955, because the occupation status of the city remained unchanged. As approved by the Department of the Army, the Deutsche Mark budget for Berlin amounted to $17,117,163 (DM 71,892,084), of which USAREUR--through the subordinate Berlin Command--obligated $16,639,098 (DM 69,884,211), broken down in the following tabulation:[19]

Appropriation	DA Funding	Obligations 30 June 1955
Total	$17,117,163	$16,639,098
Army	14,600,222	14,305,337
Maintenance and Operations	11,967,492	11,887,379
Military Construction	2,573,215	2,392,793
Claims (DM Support)	59,515	25,165
Navy	28,989	26,851
USAFE (Tempelhof)	2,487,952	2,306,910

In addition to the above amounts, HICOG made available to USAREUR about DM 2 million, which exceeded its needs. Berlin Command obligated this

[18] C/N 1, USAREUR Compt Div Bud Br to USAREUR Hist Div, 9 Sep 55, sub: Funding Programs and Obligations FY 1955 (Dollars and DM). UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

[19] C/N 1, USAREUR Compt Div to USAREUR Hist Div, 9 Sep 55, cited above.

amount before 31 March 1955 for the purchase of dependent furnishings and for engineer repair and utilities projects programmed for FY 1956. This enabled the command to save an equal amount of FY 1956 funds destined for the conversion of privately owned requisitioned property to U.S. ownership.[20]

f. Congressional Limitations on Deutsche Mark Expenditures. Congressional limitations on Deutsche Mark expenditures by the U.S. forces had existed since 1952. At that time, Congress had included the following limitations in Section 1415 of the 1953 Supplemental Appropriation Act (PL 547, 82d Congress): "Foreign credits owed to or owned by the U.S. Treasury will not be available for expenditure by agencies of the U.S. after 30 June 1953 except as may be provided for annually in appropriations acts, and provisions for the utilization of such credits for purposes authorized by law are hereby authorized to be included in general appropriations acts."[21] After much discussion Congress had finally agreed to exempt the military departments from the effect of these provisions for FY 1954. Since the defense agencies continued to object to the application of Section 1415, new provisions were inserted in the FY 1955 Supplemental Appropriations Act by the House of Representatives. Section 727 of that act, as passed by the House and subsequently enacted, read as follows:

> During FY 1955 agencies of the Department of Defense may accept the use of real property from foreign countries for the United States in accordance with mutual defense agreements or occupational agreements and may accept services furnished by foreign countries as reciprocal international courtesies as services customarily made available without charge; and such agencies may use same for support of U.S. Forces in such areas without specific appropriation therefor.
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> In addition to the foregoing, agencies of the Department of Defense may accept real property, services and commodities from foreign countries for the use of the United States in accordance with mutual defense agreements or occupational arrangements and such agencies may use same for the support of U.S. Forces in such areas without specific appropriation therefor, provided: That within thirty days after the end of each quarter, the Secretary of Defense shall render to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the Bureau of the Budget a full report of

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[20] Cable SC-15218, USAREUR to DA for Compt-B, 4 Feb 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Compt Div Outgoing cable file (Feb 55).

[21] US BOB Bul No. 53.6, 12 Sep 52, sub: Special Instructions for the 1954 Budget. UNCLASSIFIED.

such property, supplies and commodities received during such quarter.[22]

g. Department of Defense Controls over Deutsche Mark Expenditures. Department of Defense controls over the expenditure of Deutsche Marks had been instituted in FY 1954. The Secretary of Defense had directed that subsequent to 1 January 1954 no obligations were to be incurred against Deutsche Mark support from the Federal Republic of Germany or the Berlin Magistrat until the fund program of the service concerned had been approved by the Department of Defense. Following such approval, minor adjustments could be made within the total approved program for Deutsche Mark support to the extent permissible in the case of dollar appropriations. Whether classified as "occupation" or "mandatory" costs, any item that could not be funded under U.S. budget criteria was to be identified and full particulars furnished concerning its inclusion in the program. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), or his designated representative, was authorized to approve the funding programs involving the use of foreign credits of the respective military departments.[23]

h. Review of Deutsche Mark Budget by US EUCOM and Deputy Defense Comptroller. In October 1954 the Department of Defense and Department of the Army directed CINCUSAREUR to conduct a mid-year review of his fund requirements for operations during the balance of FY 1955. This mid-year review was to be completed and presented--in summary form with complete justification covering the Deutsche Mark program in Germany--to US CINCEUR by 1 December 1954. US CINCEUR, in turn, was to re-examine and evaluate the USAREUR Deutsche Mark program for the Deputy Defense Comptroller, Europe. The review was also to include the USAREUR dollar programs so that the two programs might be examined concurrently by the Deputy Defense Comptroller, Europe, subsequent to the review by US CINCEUR.[24]

The report that the Deputy Defense Comptroller, Europe, sent to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) was extremely critical of USAREUR's presentation of the funding program for the second half of FY 1955. While most of the report was factually correct, its manner of presentation was conducive to wrong inferences. Because of the effect of such misinterpretations at Department of Defense level, the Office of the Comptroller, together with the Assistant Chief of Staff,

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[22] Cable DA-961053, DA from Compt-B to CINCUSAREUR, 5 May 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1954), Vol. I, Item 19.

[23] (1) Cable DA-951546, COFSA from COA to CINCUSAREUR, 30 Oct 53. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Cable DA-954266, COFSA to CINCUSAREUR, 11 Dec 53. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR SGS 112 (1953), Vol. I, Item 8 atchd (B/P).

[24] C/N 1, USAREUR Compt to USAREUR ACOFS's G1, G2, G3, and G4, 15 Nov 54, sub: BAC Working Committee. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 USAREUR (1954), Vol. I, Item 12.

G4, and the chiefs of the technical services, prepared a memorandum of rebuttal and sent it to the Deputy Defense Comptroller, Europe. This memorandum acknowledged the factual correctness of the report, but attempted to clarify points that could be misinterpreted. In addition, the Office of the Comptroller retraced the many steps taken before the funding program had been reviewed by the Deputy Defense Comptroller, Europe, thus showing the continuous efforts made to refine the command's budgetary processes. As a result of this memorandum, the Deputy Defense Comptroller, Europe, sent a second report to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) in which the inferences of the first one were corrected and some highly complimentary observations were made of the USAREUR budgetary processes. As a result of this action, the mid-year review of the USAREUR funding programs was accepted by the Department of Defense.[25]

9. USAREUR Dollar Budget

In addition to the Deutsche Mark budget for occupation costs in Germany, USAREUR required dollar appropriations to cover expenditures, which according to international law could not be included in the occupation costs budget. Chief among these were the pay of U.S. military and civilian personnel, and certain maintenance and operations expenditures. The USAREUR dollar budget was only a small part of the annual defense appropriations bill, which in turn was a part of the annual budget appropriation estimates presented to Congress by the Executive Branch. On 30 June 1954 Congress passed the FY 1955 Defense Appropriations Bill and sent it to the President for his signature.[26] The dollar budget approved by the Department of the Army and allocated by the Bureau of the Budget for USAREUR use in Europe totaled $137,381,784. Of this amount USAREUR obligated $135,337,063 before 30 June 1955. Table 2 shows the breakdown of the USAREUR dollar budget for FY 1955 by appropriation, juxtaposing the amounts funded with those obligated.[27] The dollar budget provided only $1,497,000 for military construction, because the program in France was carried out with funds allocated for FY's 1951, 1952, 1953, and the supplemental budget for FY 1953. Because of the slow rate of obligation no budgetary appropriation had been made for military construction in France during FY's 1954 and 1955.[28]

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[25] C/N 1, USAREUR Compt to USAREUR DCOFS Admin, 28 Jan 55, sub: Review of USAREUR Funding Program for 2d Half FY 1955. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1955), Vol. I, Item 4 atchd.

[26] Cable SC-24406, USAREUR to all Comds, 30 Jun 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1954), Vol. II, Item 23 atchd.

[27] C/N 1, USAREUR Compt Div to USAREUR Hist Div, 9 Sep 55, sub: Funding Programs and Obligations FY 1955 (Dollars and DM). UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

[28] See par. 105.

Table 2--USAREUR FY 1955 Dollar Funding Program

Appropriation	Funded	Obligated
Total	$137,381,784	$135,337,063
Military Personnel, Army, 2152010	43,669,000	42,460,183
Maintenance and Operations Army, 2152020	91,094,600	90,377,897
Reserve Personnel Requirement, 2152070	113,000	93,977
Procurement and Production, 21X2030	172,714	119,876
Military Construction Army, 21X2050	1,497,000	1,496,180
Preparation for Sale or Salvage of Military Property Army, 2155371	44,000	34,143
Research and Development Army, 21X2040	51,470	1,269
Refugee Relief Act, Executive 21-1150063	740,000	753,538

Source: USAREUR Compt Div Bud Br. UNCLASSIFIED.

10. Department of the Army Construction Expenditure Controls

Construction expenditure controls imposed by the Department of the Army pertained mainly to France. Originally the Department had imposed a 55 million dollar ceiling for construction in France during each of FY's 1954 and 1955. By the end of FY 1954 the amount for the coming fiscal year was raised to 60 million dollars or a total of 115 million dollars for both years. The Department, however, was willing to further raise this ceiling provided that the rate by which the Joint Construction Agency (JCA) obligated funds during the last half of FY 1954 justified such a move. After US EUCOM had reviewed the USAREUR construction program, the Department of the Army established a total obligation ceiling of $140 million for the combined FY's 1954 and 1955. This was an actual increase of 25 million dollars over the previously established ceilings for the two fiscal years, and represented an even more substantial increase for FY 1955 since the department directed that projects programmed but not obligated during FY 1954 could be carried over

into FY 1955, provided that the total combined ceiling was not exceeded.[29]

11. Revised Budget Advisory Committee Procedures

In November 1954 the Office of the Comptroller suggested that the Budget Advisory Committee be reestablished and that a working committee be formed of members appointed by each of the Budget Advisory Committee members. The working committee was to facilitate the Budget Advisory Committee operations by conducting preliminary reviews of budgetary matters and submitting recommendations to the senior committee.[30] The Budget Advisory Committee, including its working committee, was formally established on 15 November 1954. As a standing committee of Headquarters, USAREUR, the Budget Advisory Committee was composed of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration as chairman, and the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G1, G2, G3, and G4, and the Comptroller as members. The mission of the committee was threefold, involving review of the budgets of subordinate agencies, responsibilities for budgetary procedures, and advice, as appropriate, to the Program Advisory Committee. In the process the committee conducted detailed and comprehensive reviews of subordinate agency budget estimates, checking whether these estimates were in conformity with the approved assumptions, policies, and objectives of the command program, whether the resources requested were sufficient but not in excess of amounts required to support the assigned mission, and whether cognizance had been given to improved methods of management consistent with military efficiency and economy. In addition, the committee made certain that the consolidated budget estimates were in conformity with the approved programs and policies of higher authorities, and that fund requests were commensurate with the mission. The committee also supervised the USAREUR budgetary activities in Germany for other than Army responsibilities, and checked budget data requested as supplementary to regular budget submissions for conformity with original procedures or approved changes. Whenever appropriate, the committee furnished advice to the Program Advisory Committee as to areas in which fund availabilities would not permit the attainment of the program objectives, so that the committee might readjust its programs as necessary. In this connection, direct contact between the Budget Branch of the Office of the

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[29](1) Cable DA-939100, COFSA from ACOFS G4 to CINCUSAREUR, 16 May 53. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1953), Vol. II, Item 39 atchd. (2) Cable DA-962511, DA from G4/C2 to US CINCEUR, 3 Jun 54. CONFIDENTIAL. (3) Cable DA-963969, DA from G4/C2 to US CINCEUR and CINCUSAREUR, 2 Jul 54. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1954), Vol. II, Item 56 atchd.

[30](1) C/N 1, USAREUR Compt to USAREUR DCOFS Admin, 9 Nov 54, sub: Charter for BAC. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1954), Vol. II, Item 37. (2) C/N 1, USAREUR Compt to USAREUR ACOFS's G1, G2, G3 and G4, 14 Nov 54, sub: BAC Working Committee. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 USAREUR (1954), Vol. I, Item 12.

Comptroller and the agency concerned was authorized for matters dealing with minor changes in fund availabilities. The working committee prepared such studies, analyses, and reviews as were required for consideration by the Budget Advisory Committee, and functioned within, and as a part of, the staff organization to insure proper coordination.[31]

Section II: Funding and Accounting Problems

12. USAREUR Integrated Accounting System

Early in 1954 the Department of the Army announced a plan for the extension to overseas commands of the phase of the integrated accounting system that dealt with appropriation and fund accounting. USAREUR was directed to completely implement the integration plan throughout the command by 30 June 1955.[32] Integrated accounting was defined as a system of record keeping, disbursing, and reporting to reflect the use and status of appropriations, funds, and other resources administered at installation level by an organizational entity under accepted accounting principles. For the first time in Army history integrated accounting introduced the double entry system of bookkeeping for fiscal-type accounting.[33]

The appropriation and fund-accounting phase of the integrated accounting program consisted of the consolidation of disbursing, fiscal, civilian payroll, and expenditure accounting functions in one office. The mission of this office was to be ultimately extended to include financial property, cost, and revenue accounting. Under the concept developed in the U.S. these offices were to be established on an installation basis and at the headquarters of major overseas commands. The timetable established by the Department of the Army for implementation within USAREUR covered the entire problem from indoctrination to complete application. According to this plan, preliminary training courses were to be conducted during the period 15-31 July 1954, and a pilot installation and a headquarters finance and accounting office established on 1 August 1954. The period 1 August-25 September 1954 was to be

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[31] USAREUR GO 175, 15 Nov 54, sub: Budget Advisory Committee. UNCLASSIFIED.

[32] C/N 1, USAREUR Compt to USAREUR DCOFS Admin, 19 Apr 55, sub: Inauguration of Integrated Accounting in USAREUR. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 100 (1954), Vol. I, Item 15.

[33] Interv, Mr. J. R. Moenk, USAREUR Hist Div, with Capt Leo Thatcher, USAREUR Fin and Acctg Div Acctg Br, 7 Sep 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

utilized for on-the-job training and assistance at the pilot installation. Beginning 1 October the program was to be extended throughout the command so as to complete implementation by 30 June 1955.[34]

The effects of integrated accounting were to be a reduction in the number of fiscal stations, the physical relocation of some fiscal functions, improved accounting methods, and more timely reporting in the fiscal disbursing field. The new system was expected to improve accounting for obligations and expenditures; eliminate duplicate accounting, detailed reconciliations, and the necessity for adjustment actions; and produce more timely and accurate obligation and expenditure data.

a. Objections to the System. Shortly after implementation of the initial portion of the program in USAREUR, certain objections arose from staff divisions and subordinate agencies. Chief among these objections was that the Central Finance and Accounting Office would be required to maintain detailed accounting in certain fields for which other offices or activities were responsible. In addition, some agencies argued that the integrated accounting concept would separate authority from responsibility. The Office of the Comptroller answered the first objection by noting that pertinent regulations permitted the responsibility for performing detailed accounting for costs, financial property, and working capital funds to be assigned to the organizations that generated such data. As a minimum requirement, however, the installation finance and accounting officer would have to maintain ledger accounts into which he would incorporate the financial data pertaining to such organizations. In answer to the second objection the Office of the Comptroller pointed out that the finance and accounting offices were to act as service organizations for the installation commander in order to provide him with expert accounting assistance in his management responsibilities. The accounting records and reports generated in the integrated accounting office were intended both for the use of the immediate commander and of higher echelons. For these reasons the record-keeping function itself could not possibly detract from the authority or responsibility of the installation commander.[35]

b. Implementation of the System. As stipulated by the Department of the Army the USAREUR pilot station was inaugurated on 1 August 1954 at Headquarters Area Command with the 41st Finance Disbursing Section participating. This pilot station was begun on a test basis using a tentative regulation that was later revised and formally published on 20 October 1954. On the USAREUR headquarters level, the integrated accounting was performed by National Cash Register electrical accounting

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[34] C/N 1, USAREUR Compt to USAREUR COFS, 19 May 54, sub: Integrated Accounting. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 100 (1954), Vol. I, Item 15 atchd.

[35] C/N 3, USAREUR Compt to USAREUR QM through USAREUR ACOFS G4, 16 Dec 54, sub: Integrated Accounting. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Compt Div Cen files, G4 file (1954), Item 38.

machines. The use of these machines eliminated 1 out of every 4 personnel in the accounting system, and the savings so generated were estimated to pay for the cost of the machine in 2 years' time. To complete the mechanization essential for integrated accounting, 80 machines had to be purchased at a total cost of $320,000. However, 60 of these machines were purchased with Deutsche Marks from the Occupation Costs budget and were for use in West Germany only. By 30 June 1955 the integrated accounting program was fully implemented. In addition, experiments were conducted at the Mannheim Ordnance Depot and Giessen Quartermaster Depot to comply with the Department of the Army directive that integrated accounting should eventually include Financial Property Accounting as well as stock funding and consumer funding at the installation level.[36]

c. Problems Encountered. In implementing the integrated accounting program USAREUR encountered a number of problems, some of which had not been anticipated by the Department of the Army. First, there were the communications difficulties inherent in bridging the long distances between activities in the command. While every attempt was made to keep the number of finance and accounting agencies at a minimum, the necessity for prompt disbursing service and the short deadlines imposed for fiscal accounting reports had to be considered. USAREUR presented a unique problem in the integrated accounting program because of payments from Deutsche Mark funds. These funds were not disbursed by U.S. disbursing officers, but by occupation cost offices and their successor organizations under the control of the Federal Republic of Germany. The processing of Deutsche Mark payment documents by U.S. authorities, however, was similar to that involving dollar instruments except for the actual disbursement of funds. Provision had to be made within the finance and accounting organization for the handling of documents relating to payments from occupation cost and defense support funds. To comply with the wishes expressed by officials of the Bonn Government, finance and accounting offices were located where they would be readily accessible to both the procurement agencies of the command and the West German payment offices.

The principal personnel problem was the shortage of competent officers and enlisted men who possessed a good fiscal background. German indigenous employees were handicapped by the language barrier and the related difficulty in understanding the new system.[37]

13. Financial Property Accounting

Financial property accounting--a Department of the Army program by which monetary accounting procedures for Army stocks transactions were installed on a world-wide basis to provide additional management

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[36] Interv, Mr. J. R. Moenk, USAREUR Hist Div, with Capt Leo Thatcher, USAREUR Fin and Acctg Div Acctg Br, 7 Sep 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

[37] (1) Ibid. (2) C/N 3, 16 Dec 54, cited above. UNCLASSIFIED.

controls--was introduced on 1 July 1954.[38] The objective of the program was to effect improvement in three major areas of the supply system, through analysis of financial statements and reports. These areas included: supply practices, procedures, and policies; supply management and administration with special emphasis on supply control and supply economy; and accounting and budgetary practices and procedures.

Financial property accounting covered all command bulk stocks as well as authorized reserve stocks with the exception of station and Seventh Army depot stocks. Prices were established for items of inventory by the use of a common pricing policy, and records were maintained to register transactions financially and to show supply activity by class of material. Financial accounts were reconciled with physical stocks by means of taking inventory at least once a year.

a. Implementation. Responsibilities for implementing financial property accounting were divided between the Office of the Comptroller, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, and the chiefs of the technical services. The Office of the Comptroller was assigned staff responsibility for the review of technical service financial property accounting systems and procedures to insure their conformance with Comptroller of the Army principles and policies. In addition, the Comptroller was responsible for the review and analysis of the operational effectiveness of the overall financial property accounting program. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, was responsible for implementing departmental policies; for programming and installing financial property accounting; for staff supervision over operation of the program, and analysis, consolidation, and transmittal of reports and statements; and for supply management decisions and actions that were to be based on the analysis of the financial statements. The chiefs of the technical services, acting under the general supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, were made responsible for the installation, administration, and management of the financial accounting program within designated depots and class II installations and in COMZ. In addition, they were responsible for supply management actions and decisions based on the data provided by the system.[39]

b. Reports. In December 1954 USAREUR published information for the guidance of responsible agencies in the preparation of the reports required by the financial property accounting system. This information was derived by comparing the reports prepared on a world-wide basis in August 1954 with those prepared in the U.S. during the month of July. Deficiencies noted in the reports rendered to the Department of the Army included the questionable accuracy of the general arithmetic contained in the reports and the failure to follow the instructions and definitions

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[38] USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, 1953-54, pp. 271-73. SECRET (information used UNCLASSIFIED).

[39] USAREUR ltr, 20 Oct 54, sub: Extension of Financial Property Accounting (FPA) to USAREUR. AG 140 GLD-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

contained in the pertinent regulations governing the program. The Department ordered that these deficiencies be corrected and directed that all future reports should include complete narrative analyses. If information contained in the reports deviated from instructions, the report was to explain the specific reasons for the difference in presentation.[40]

c. Financial Inventory Accounting. Effective 1 April 1955 financial property accounting was redesignated financial inventory accounting (FIA). The responsibilities under the FIA program remained unchanged with one exception. In addition to their previous responsibilities the chiefs of technical services were to initiate corrective actions as directed in the G4 comments of the FIA supply management report. The new program provided that separate reports would be prepared for ordnance class V supplies, which incorporated the changes required by the new FIA supply management reports and the FIA statement of inventory transactions.[41]

14. Army Technical Services Stock Fund Program

In conjunction with introducing financial property accounting, the Secretary of Defense established stock funds for the three services. The Army stock fund consisted of unspent cash balances in the U.S. Treasury, accounts receivable, stocks of supplies, materials, and equipment, and all other current assets pertaining to or acquired in the financing of such stocks. In turn, the Department of the Army was directed to maintain separate divisions of the Army stock fund for each technical service. Each such agency, as a stock fund operating agency, was responsible for the control of its share of the fund, including budgeting and accounting. Thus each stock fund operating agency was a separately chartered fiscal entity under the management of the respective technical service. Procurement funds were allocated from stock funds to the technical services, which in turn suballotted them to the subordinate command technical services. While financial property accounting concerned itself with the extension of modern monetary accounting methods to all stock transactions in the Army, the stock fund program placed stock funded inventory transactions under double entry accounting and required reimbursements from customers for all stock issues.[42]

In October 1954 the Department of the Army issued instructions

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[40] USAREUR ltr, 9 Dec 54, sub: Financial Property Accounting. AG 140 GLD-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[41] USAREUR ltr, 1 Apr 55, sub: Financial Inventory Accounting Reports (RCS CSGLD-688 (R-1)). AG 140 GLD-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[42] (1) AR 37-60, 5 May 54, sub: Financial Administration--Army Stock Fund. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Cable DA-315738, DA from Compt to CINCUSAREUR, 24 May 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Compt Div Incoming cable file (May 55).

governing the overseas extension of the technical services stock fund program. To prepare for this extension, USAREUR headquarters selected 1 project officer from the Office of the Comptroller, 1 from G4, and 2 from each technical service and sent them to Washington where they attended orientation meetings during the period 10-28 January 1955. These meetings included a Department of the Army 1-day over-all indoctrination on the stock fund program, followed by visits to technical service depots and offices. Upon completion of the orientation course the project officers returned to USAREUR and proceeded to install test operations beginning in March 1955. Eventually authorization was received to delay test operations of the Ordnance Division stock funds.[43]

a. Assignment of Responsibilities. To meet the target dates set by the Department of the Army, instructions were issued to implement the program in April 1955. In assigning responsibilities the same delineation of functions was applied as that described in paragraph 13a, above.[44]

b. Development of Policies and Principles. While the stock funds were established in accordance with departmental procedures, certain special provisions applied to USAREUR. Stock fund capitalization of inventory included all pertinent stock items in the command depot system that were under the control of the technical service chiefs with the exception of Deutsche Mark-procured property. Using agencies adhered to existing procedures governing the submission of requisitions to depots but did not have to price requisitions or cite funds on requisitions. Both of these operations would be accomplished, where necessary, by the appropriate chief of technical service. With the establishment of integrated accounting, the governing principles and policies were amended so as to provide for centralized fiscal accounting and bookkeeping (i.e., maintenance of general ledgers) at the technical service supply control level or the finance and accounting office level, or both, based on appropriate depot feeder reports. Subsidiary ledgers, however, could be established where necessary to expedite reconciliation, follow-up, and reporting.[45]

c. Implementation. By April 1955 the operation of the Army stock fund program had been introduced by the Chemical, Engineer, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Signal, and Transportation Divisions. The Ordnance

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[43] USAREUR ltrs, 3 Nov 54, 4 Apr 55, sub: Orientation Conference for Stock Fund Extension Overseas. AG 337 GLD-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[44] USAREUR ltr, 2 Apr 55, sub: Extension of Working Capital Funds-Army Stock Fund to USAREUR. AG 120 GLD-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[45] USAREUR ltrs, 4 Apr 55, 16 Jun 55, sub: Policy and Principles Governing the Establishment and Operation of Stock Funds in USAREUR. AG 140 GLD-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

Division stock fund had been established even though not required by the Department of the Army. The Medical Division of the Army stock fund had been in operation since October 1954. Thus all technical service divisions of the Army stock fund were in operation by the target date of 1 July 1955.[46]

d. Consumer Funding. The Department announced in May 1955 that consumer funding was to be applied on 1 July 1955 for the purchase of supplies from the Army stock fund. Consumer funding differed from Army stock funds in that consumer funds were allocated by the Comptroller of the Army through regular command channels and were to be used to reimburse the technical service stock funds for pertinent supplies issued at the depot level. Consumer funding was based on a departmental policy to provide agency and installation commanders with funds, insofar as practicable, to cover all their costs of operation. Consumption funds were to be made available to USAREUR for FY 1956, and their reimbursement was to be accomplished at the depot level for all stock fund supplies issued. At the same time, stock fund supplies were to be furnished up to the installation level without reimbursement by the installation.[47]

15. Problems Under Joint Utilization of Facilities

The USAREUR-USAFE joint utilization policy was developed by the two commands to provide uniform guidance in arranging support of one service by the other to preclude unnecessary duplication of facilities. At the same time, budgeting, funding, and reimbursement policies were to remain within the scope of departmental and US EUCOM directives and were to be based on dollar-appropriated criteria. Both USAREUR and USAFE were determined to invoke sound budgetary concepts for providing common logistical support requirements with a maximum of economy through the joint use of common facilities and services. Under the terms of the joint utilization policy the representatives of the two services who were authorized to make cross-servicing agreements were also authorized to waive charges for incidental services, work, supplies, materials, and equipment when only insignificant amounts were involved. Since the processing of numerous small dollar-value vouchers for interservice reimbursement resulted in unnecessary expense and the uneconomical use of manpower, such charges were to be waived. If, however, costs were reimbursable by departmental agreements or directives, or arose from functions peculiar to the receiving department, reimbursements were to be made as directed. The two component commands agreed to comply with the Department of Defense policy wherein each department budgeted to equip,

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[46] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to TAG for DCOFSA Log, 7 May 55, sub: Progress in Extension of Army Stock Fund. AG 123 GLD. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Div Cen files 319.1 (1955), Vol. I.

[47] (1) Cable DA-317792, DA from Log H2 to CINCUSAREUR, 2 Jun 55, UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Compt Div Incoming cable file (Jun 55). (2) AR 37-30, 3 Jun 55, sub: Financial Administration-Consumer Funding. UNCLASSIFIED.

maintain, and operate its own forces. Military pay, allowances, subsistence, and permanent change of station (PCS) travel were to be paid by the respective services. This policy was to apply to all tenant units of one service located at the installations of the other. Moreover, these provisions were to be applied to both dollar and Deutsche Mark budgeting and funding in all geographical areas where CINCUSAREUR and CINCUSAFE had support or command responsibility. Installation support of a tenant unit was normally to be furnished on a common service basis without reimbursement. However, a formula prescribed by the Department of the Army stipulated that reimbursement would become necessary whenever the host service had not budgeted for the support or if general logistical areas were involved.[48]

16. Audit Accomplishments

a. The Audit Branch. The Office of the Comptroller's Audit Branch provided liaison with the USAREUR Audit Agency, which was responsible for the performance of all audit operations within the command. The Audit Branch was instrumental in adopting the so-called Ebisch Plan, named after an official of the West German Ministry of Economics. This plan provided for the automatic audit of every requisition demand over DM 50,000 for supplies and services and DM 100,000 for construction projects. Such audits were conducted by the price controls offices of the West German Ministry of Economics prior to effecting final payment. The adoption of this system had two-fold results, in that it reduced or eliminated overpayments and led to a sizable reduction in the number of claims. In addition to adopting the Ebisch Plan, USAREUR strengthened its relations with the Bundesrechnungshof, the German audit court, which was the equivalent of the U.S. General Accounting Office. Because of difficulties encountered in previous years with the Sonderbauverwaltung (German governmental construction agency) in Western Area Command,[49] the Bundesrechnungshof agreed to automatically audit all accounts with that agency. In addition, the German audit agency agreed to check any and all German accounts as requested by USAREUR, provided such requests concerned major projects.[50]

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[48](1) USAREUR ltr, 7 Mar 55, sub: USAREUR/USAFE Joint Utilization Policy, and Incl 1, 10 Jan 55, same sub. AG 158 GLD-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Comment 2, USAREUR Compt to USAREUR Hist Div, 23 Jan 56, sub: Review of Hq USAREUR Annual Historical Report, 1 July 1954-30 June 1955, to DF, 14 Dec 55 same sub. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div 314.7 (1956).

[49](1) USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, 1953-54, pp. 278-84. SECRET. (2) See par. 109 below.

[50]Interv, Mr. J. R. Moenk, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj C. L. Parfitt and Mr. H. Steinitz, USAREUR Compt Div Audit Br, 13 Sep 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

b. USAREUR Audit Agency, 7756 Army Unit. During FY 1955 the USAREUR Audit Agency performed audits, surveys, and other assignments as directed. At the beginning of the fiscal year, the annual workload of the agency was 1,545 audits, which increased to 1,620 by 30 June 1955. By that date a total of 1,214 audits had been completed for the fiscal year or approximately 75 percent of the annual workload. The Internal Audit Branch of the agency was responsible for the performance of internal audits and review of corrective action taken, as well as for the issuance of clearances for certain specified accounts and activities throughout the command. This branch alone prepared and issued approximately 1,000 reports of audit during the fiscal year. The Contract Audit Branch of the agency completed a total of 168 audits during the fiscal year, with approximately 25 percent of these covering procurement accounts. Included among the audits and surveys conducted by this branch were: surveys of practical application of tax exemptions granted to the U.S. Government by European governments with respect to offshore procurement, audit of the 1952 Lisbon Budget Support Program contracts, audit of costs with respect to management fees paid to operate U.S. Army ordnance depots, and surveys of internal controls exercised by the Quartermaster Procurement Center with respect to cooperage for milk products.

c. Audit Results. The audits resulted in substantial savings to the U.S. Government in the form of reduced contract and claims settlements with respect to U.S. dollar contracts and related claims and Deutsche Mark claims submitted by German suppliers. Audit of offshore procurement contracts in Italy were expected to result in substantial tax refunds from both the Italian Government and some contractors. In addition to such tangible results, successful audit activities resulted in better management and increased efficiency by introducing sound business practices and procedures.[51]

Section III: Program Review and Analysis Activities

17. Establishment of the USAREUR Program System

In January 1954 the Department of the Army directed the extension of the Army Program System to USAREUR. The Army Program System was defined as a method of administering the nontactical activities of the Army through the use of programs to provide organized direction and control of those nontactical operations, and to attain the required mobilization base in both forces and facilities. Specifically, the

[51] Interv, Mr. J. R. Moenk, USAREUR Hist Div, with Col J. G. Black, CO, USAREUR Audit Agency, 14 Sep 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

program system was to enable each element of the Army to develop the scope and extent of operations required for the achievement of its assigned mission and was to provide a basis for determining requirements in terms of funding, personnel, materiel and facilities. The full implementation of this system, however, was not required until FY 1957.[52]

To establish the program system by 1 July 1955, USAREUR made some preliminary plans. The first step consisted of determining the over-all responsibility for program development, execution, review and analysis, and, in conjunction with this move, the appointment of a program coordinator and the establishment of a program advisory committee. Next, this Program Advisory Committee had to determine the command programs, including recommended directorship responsibilities. In this respect the Chief of Staff directed that the responsibility for program development, execution as well as review and analysis would rest with the individual program directors, while the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations would be responsible for the coordination of all three activities. The Office of the Comptroller was to be responsible for monitoring the review and analysis of the programs. Moreover, the position of the program coordinator--preferably an officer with the rank of colonel with 18 to 24 months remaining of his tour of duty in the command--was to be set up in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations.[53]

a. Development of USAREUR Programs. In developing their programs, directors were instructed to consult the appropriate departmental primary program documents for guidance on the specific program objectives, and the mission register for indications of required tasks. The programs were to be prepared in accordance with format instructions contained in a procedures manual, with all activities and subactivities as prescribed in the program structure.[54] In January 1955 the system was extended to the major and subordinate commands. To insure uniformity in the application of the system and ready identification of each activity at every echelon of the command, the major and subordinate command program structures were to be identical with that for Headquarters, USAREUR, insofar as the activities and subactivities contained in the detailed

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[52] SR 11-10-6, 21 Jan 54, sub: Application of the Army Program System to Overseas Commands. UNCLASSIFIED.

[53] (1) C/N 1, USAREUR Compt to USAREUR COFS, 24 Jun 54, sub: Implementation of SR 11-10-6 (The Extension of the Army Program System to USAREUR). UNCLASSIFIED. (2) C/N 2, USAREUR DCOFS Opns to USAREUR Compt, 4 Sep 54, to C/N 1, above. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR SGS 322 USAREUR (1954), Vol. I, Item 11 atchd.

[54] (1) C/N 1, USAREUR DCOFS Opns to all USAREUR Stf Divs, 23 Dec 54, sub: Program Directive FY 1956. SECRET. In SGS 322 USAREUR (1955), Vol. I, Item 1 atchd. (2) USAREUR Cir 40, 23 Oct 54, sub: USAREUR Command Program System. UNCLASSIFIED.

program structure were applicable to each command. Applicable activities and subactivities were to be identified by the same titles and included in the same program as that issued by USAREUR headquarters.[55]

On 1 April 1955 each program director was instructed to submit to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations his recommendations for schedules to be included in each program for which he was individually responsible. These recommendations were to be submitted on or before 11 April 1955 in order to permit the early issuance of the program schedules, which would describe in detail the execution of the command programs. The schedule documents were to be similar to the schedules that had previously been prepared in support of the budget execution plan.[56]

b. Transfer of Supervisory Responsibility. By 1 May 1955 a total of 24 command programs had been established. While the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations had over-all supervisory responsibility for programming, it was interested in the substance of only 8 of the 24 established programs. Responsibility for the substance of the other 16 rested with the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration. Another point to be considered in a possible reassignment of supervisory responsibilities was that programming was controlled by the Program Advisory Committee and budgeting by the Budget Advisory Committee. While the voting membership of the two committees was identical, the chairman of the program committee was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and the chairman of the budget committee was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration. In September 1954 the Office of the Comptroller was made responsible for monitoring program review and analysis under the supervision of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. According to the headquarters organization and functions manual, however, supervision of the Office of the Comptroller was the responsibility of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration. Because of these facts, the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations for Programming concluded that the normal staff responsibility for the program system would rest more logically with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration, and that a merger of the Program and Budget Advisory Committees would result in a better integration of both programming and budgeting. Finally, by transferring the assistant for programming to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration, better organizational balance would be achieved within the Office of the Chief of Staff, and the assistant's time would be used more effectively. On 12 May 1955 a formal recommendation was made that the assistant for programming be transferred to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration effective with the rotation of the incumbent. Concurrently the Program and Budget

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[55] USAREUR ltr, 21 Jan 55, sub: Structure of the USAREUR Command Program System (Management Program). AG 120 SGS-AGO. CONFIDENTIAL.

[56] C/N 1, USAREUR DCOFS Opns to all USAREUR Stf Divs, 1 Apr 55, sub: Preparation of Program Schedules. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 USAREUR (1955), Vol. I, Item 1 atchd.

Advisory Committees were to be merged into a single program-budget advisory committee, with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration as chairman. This recommendation, concurred in by both deputy chiefs of staff, was approved by the Chief of Staff on 16 May 1955. The actual transfer, however, did not take place before 30 June 1955.[57]

c. Effect of West German Sovereignty Upon the Program System. The granting of West German sovereignty and the transition from the occupation cost to the defense support budget at the beginning of May 1955 led to the reduction in Deutsche Mark funds during FY 1956, which in turn required drastic curtailments in the planned program activities. Certain actions were taken to effect initial savings, but further curtailments became necessary. The program directors were requested to suggest activities that could be restricted or eliminated by the curtailment of funds. Reductions in the planned programs could be made by complete elimination of a function; consolidation of the means for performing an activity; reduction of the standards for performing a function; curtailment of services; or by an increase in the efficiency of performance, to include reduction of strength to existing authorized levels.[58] The full effect of these program restrictions was expected to be felt after the period under review.

18. Transfer of Forms Control Responsibility

Before FY 1955 the only command directive on forms control was contained in EUCOM Circular 1, 1952, which merely required each staff division and commander to establish controls so that no extra forms duplicating existing ones would be used. In September 1954 the Department of the Army revised AR 310-40, imposing the Forms Management Program Report on all major commands. This revision of existing regulations apparently came about as a result of recommendations made by the Comptroller of the Army in a management survey of the Quartermaster Corps that "an Army-wide program for the review and standardization of forms be formalized and centralized in the Office of the Adjutant General."[59]

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[57] Memo, USAREUR Asst DCOFS Opns to USAREUR COFS, 12 May 55, sub: Responsibility for Supervision of Programming. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 USAREUR (1955), Vol. I, Item 9A atchd.

[58] C/N 1, USAREUR DCOFS Opns to all USAREUR Stf Divs, 20 May 55, sub: Adjustment of Programs to Meet DM Availabilities, FY 1956, 2d Estimate. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 1 atchd.

[59] (1) C/N 1, USAREUR Compt to USAREUR COFS through AG, 12 Nov 54, sub: Forms Control and Standardization. COM 315. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Compt Div COFS file (1954), Item 58. (2) C/N 5, USAREUR Compt to USAREUR COFS through ACOFS G3, 11 Jan 55, to C/N 1, above. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Compt Div COFS file (1955), Item 2.

When the Office of the Comptroller assumed responsibility for forms control, the program activity was limited to administrative approval and coordination of requests for printed matter. The interested staff divisions subsequently agreed to recommend the transfer of responsibility for staff supervision of the forms control and standardization program from the Office of the Comptroller to the Adjutant General Division. This recommendation was approved by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration on 1 February 1955, and the transfer took place concurrently.[60]

19. Reports Control Activities

During FY 1955 this command reviewed 91 Department of the Army and 83 USAREUR recurring reports. In consequence of the departmental reports review, 63 new reports were initiated and 42 rescinded, a net increase of 21; in addition, 19 reports were revised. As a result of the USAREUR reports review 35 new recurring reports were initiated and 30 reports were rescinded, a net increase of 5; in addition, 13 reports were revised.

The total reporting workload of the command increased from 425 to 456 recurring reports as follows:

Originator	30 Jun 54	30 Jun 55	Gain or Loss
Total	425	456	+31
DA	250	271	+21
NATO	22	22	0
US EUCOM	18	25	+ 7
USAFE	3	1	- 2
USAREUR	132	137	+ 5

A study of personnel, performance analysis, and fiscal reporting was conducted during April and May 1955. The purpose of the study was to consolidate and standardize as many reports as possible. As a result of this study, work units and base data were standardized in accordance with the Department of the Army Integrated Structure. Moreover, one report only was to serve for the submission of budget and fiscal subsidiary expense account information, so that the requirement for 2 USAREUR reports and feeder information for 1 departmental report was rescinded. In addition, this report also provided a standardized source

[60] C/N 8, USAREUR Compt to USAREUR COFS, 19 Jan 55; and C/N 9, USAREUR SGS to USAREUR Compt, 1 Feb 55, to C/N 1, cited above. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322.01 (1955), Vol. I, Item 6 atchd.

for this type of information and facilitated the preparation of the report by a single agency within each preparing command.[61]

Section IV: Management Engineering Activities

20. Reviews and Surveys of Manpower Usage

The Office of the Comptroller was responsible for management and manpower surveys in the command. Manpower surveys were based on a departmental requirement that each major command schedule and conduct "surveys of at least 50 percent of the activities and 75 percent of the operating personnel under its jurisdiction annually, provided that each activity is surveyed at least once every 2 years."[62] All activities and installations, other than combat- and combat support-type units whose primary mission was to maintain a state of combat readiness, were included in this requirement. Consequently, some 200 activities, with a total personnel strength of approximately 200,000 were surveyed within a 2-year cycle. In addition to fulfilling these departmental requirements, USAREUR directed in its own management program that an organization, methods, and procedures review be made concurrent with each manpower survey, including special surveys of problem areas.

a. Routine Survey Accomplishments. During FY 1955 a total of 86 routine and 10 special manpower surveys were conducted throughout the command. As a result of these surveys, some 4,971 personnel spaces were obtained to meet other requirements in the command. Only two categories of personnel--warrant officers and Department of the Army civilians--represented an increase over previous strengths and these were insignificant when compared with the personnel savings achieved. The biggest reductions were in enlisted military personnel, 2,039 spaces, and in non-U.S. personnel, 2,211. The reduction in the Deutsche Mark budget for FY 1956 effected in May 1955 required a cut of 12,033 non-U.S. spaces for the year. Non-U.S. spaces saved as a result of manpower surveys during FY 1955 concerned Deutsche Mark-paid personnel exclusively and could be applied against the over-all cut. Many surveys conducted during the last half of FY 1955 were not fully processed before

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[61] Incl 2 to C/N 2, USAREUR Compt to USAREUR Hist Div, 23 Jan 56, to C/N 1, USAREUR Hist Div to USAREUR Compt, 14 Dec 55, sub: Review of Hq USAREUR Annual Historical Report, 1 Jul 54-30 Jun 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Hist Div Master File 314.7 (1956).

[62] SR 600-620-11, 27 Jul 54, sub: Manpower Control and Utilization. UNCLASSIFIED.

the end of the fiscal year, in that the surveying headquarters retained the data for determining where cuts should be made. Surveys not yet implemented included those at the Mainz Ordnance Depot; the Trois Fontaines Ordnance Ammunition Depot; the Toul Engineer Depot; the Nahbollenbach, Metz, Perigueux and Ingrandes Quartermaster Depots; the U.S. Armed Forces Institute Supply Depot; the Landstuhl Army Medical Center; and the Engineer Intelligence Center. Personnel savings were anticipated as the result of the surveys to be made at the installations located in Germany; any such savings were to be applied against the mandatory 12,033 space reduction in non-U.S. employees. In addition to making manpower surveys, comptroller teams from various subordinate commands completed a number of special organization and methods surveys. The results of the latter could be measured in terms of greater efficiency, improved procedures, better use of personnel and equipment, faster processing, etc. Since such results were qualitative in nature and many of the benefits indirect, they could not be readily translated into terms of manpower or dollars saved.[63]

b. Department of the Army Manpower Survey. In August 1954 the Department of the Army announced its intention of sending a team, composed of representatives of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G1, to USAREUR for the purpose of conducting a manpower survey. This was to be a comprehensive analysis patterned after the surveys that had previously been made of the six continental U.S. Army headquarters. The main purpose of such surveys was to check on manpower requirements and personnel utilization; but, in the case of USAREUR, consideration was also to be given to assigned missions, organizational structure, facilities, operational methods, procedures, and workload. The basic reason for the survey was to satisfy both the Secretary of the Army and the Army Chief of Staff that headquarters were operating with a minimum of overhead personnel to provide for maximum combat capabilities.[64]

The survey was conducted during the period 27 September-8 October 1954 and included all the elements of the headquarters located in Heidelberg, as well as the Historical Division in Karlsruhe and the Special Activities Division (with the exception of the European Motion Picture Service and the European Exchange System) in Nuremberg. The team found that Headquarters, USAREUR, made proper use of its personnel

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[63] Interv, Mr. J. R. Moenk, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. R. A. Soderberg, C/USAREUR Compt Div Mgmt Br, 8 Sep 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

[64] (1) Cable DA-539544, DA from G1 to CINCUSAREUR, 11 Aug 54. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Ltr, DCOFSA Opns and Admin to CINCUSAREUR, 17 Sep 54, sub: DA Team Manpower Survey in USAREUR. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR SGS 320.4 (1954), Vol. I, Item 20 atchd.

and that the requirements were at a minimum for the effective performance of the assigned missions.[65] In line with the objective of reducing the burden of operating details imposed upon major headquarters, the team recommended that a total of 1,284 spaces including related functions be transferred to the field. All interested divisions of USAREUR headquarters concurred in this recommendation. In addition however, the team recommended a reduction of 80 spaces throughout the headquarters. The staff divisions, on the other hand, requested reconsideration of 76 of these spaces and an increase of 38 additional spaces for a total of 114 spaces. Five of the spaces were deleted by the Chief of Staff, so that the Department was asked to reconsider 109 spaces.[66] USAREUR's exceptions to the recommendations of the team were based on increased workloads, which were not considered at the time of the survey. Also, certain of the recommended space reductions could not be made without corresponding decreases in the workload, and there were omissions in, or misunderstandings of, the data presented for certain cases. Based on detailed comments and justifications presented to the Department of the Army, a new personnel ceiling for Headquarters, USAREUR, established at 4,002 spaces as of 1 January 1955, was submitted for approval.[67] The Department of the Army had not made any decision on this matter by 30 June 1955.

21. Management Improvement Programs

a. Efficiency Awards Program. The Department of the Army Efficiency Awards Program was established late in 1951 in order to authorize salary increases and cash awards for suggestions from civilian employees. The purpose was to increase production and better operations through improving management procedures and raising employee morale. While military personnel were not authorized to receive any cash incentive awards, they were urged and encouraged to participate in the program. To achieve such participation, commanding officers were directed to make maximum use of the military incentives available to them in existing directives.[68]

During FY 1954 the participation of the Department of the Army civilian employees in USAREUR had been considerably below the Army-wide average. As shown on the departmental summaries, the USAREUR rate of participation had been 5.36 suggestions per 100 employees while the

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[65] Memo for rcd, Mr. J. W. Seffens, C/DA Survey Team, 8 Oct 54, sub: Manpower Management Survey of Hq USAREUR. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[66] Memo, Col C. P. Hannum, C/USAREUR SGS Stf Studies Br, to USAREUR DCOFS Admin and USAREUR COFS, 6 Jan 55, sub: DA Manpower Survey Results. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 320.4 (1955), Vol. I, Item 1 atchd.

[67] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to ACOFSA G1, 11 Jan 55, sub: Personnel Inventory Reports, RCS SCGPA-396. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[68] SR 620-30-1, 17 Oct 51, sub: Efficiency Awards Program. UNCLASSIFIED.

Army-wide average had been 10.0. While the statistics for FY 1954 had included local wage rate employees in France, they had excluded the same type of worker in Germany because such workers had not been paid from dollar-converted funds. The major share of suggestions had originated from local wage rate employees and lower ranking military personnel.

The Army-wide survey of the efficiency awards program for 1954 provided interesting information. The tabulation showed that almost 50 percent of the total number of military suggestions adopted by Army elements during 1954 were adopted in USAREUR (1,582 out of 3,227). At the same time, 14.8 percent of all suggestions submitted, and 25 percent of all suggestions adopted originated in USAREUR. The savings effected from USAREUR suggestions amounted to 24.9 percent of the total Army-wide savings.

During FY 1955 the Efficiency Awards Committee received a total of 8,491 suggestions on work simplification proposals, of which some 3,733 were adopted in the command. The total estimated first year's savings resulting from accepted suggestions--including savings in the Deutsche Mark budget converted to dollars--was $4,039,830. At the same time the committee paid out some $51,213 in awards, including the Deutsche Mark awards converted to dollars. The rate of participation, including Department of the Army civilians, local wage rate employees, labor service personnel, and military personnel increased to 8.2 per 100.[69]

b. Work Simplification Program. The Work Simplification Program was continued in order to train supervisory personnel--military, Department of the Army civilians, and local wage rate employees--in the five basic techniques of management engineering: work distribution charting, flow process charting, work counts, motion economy studies, and layout studies. The trainees received a total of 12 hours of assembled instructions and on-the-site advice and guidance in applying these techniques to the work at hand. Upon completion of instruction each trainee was required to apply the techniques to operations which he supervised and to develop at least one proposal for improvement which was of sufficient merit to justify installation. The savings effected under the work simplification program were included in the totals for the efficiency awards program described above, since departmental regulations included all money saving suggestions for incentive awards.

During FY 1955 active work simplification training programs were in effect in 64 installations. A total of 1,913 supervisory personnel were thus trained during the year, with an estimated 47 percent of supervisory personnel in the command remaining to complete training requirements. Altogether 1,852 improvements were adopted in the command as a result of proposals received from students during the work simplification courses and the immediate follow-up period. The estimated savings or benefits attributable to these improvements totaled $1,695,316.

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[69] Interv, Mr. J. R. Moenk, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. R. A. Soderberg and Mr. K. D. Pithey, USAREUR Compt Div Mgmt Br, 9 Sep 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

The command expended some 22 man-years on work simplification activities, exclusive of the time spent by the trainees in the program.[70]

c. Cost Consciousness Indoctrination. Cost consciousness indoctrination was an element of the management improvement programs for which the Office of the Comptroller had supervisory responsibilities.[71] Previously, the responsibility for over-all supervision and development of cost consciousness indoctrination had not been assigned to any single staff division. Moreover, the specific actions to be taken by staff divisions, subordinate commands, and activities in the furtherance of cost consciousness indoctrination within their respective spheres had not been clearly defined.

To remedy the situation, the Office of the Comptroller had prepared a circular which was approved and published in October 1954.[72] The cost Consciousness Indoctrination Program thus formally established on 28 October 1954 was to develop a sense of cost consciousness on the part of all personnel. Efficient economical operation was to be achieved through the conservation of manpower, material, and fiscal resources. While the program was a command responsibility in all organizations and at all levels, specific responsibilities were assigned to various staff divisions. The Office of the Comptroller was assigned responsibility for the over-all coordination of the program and for its integration, as appropriate, with other elements of the management improvement program. The other general staff divisions were directed to integrate the concept of cost consciousness into their policies and programs. Dissemination of information concerning the program was to be effected through the publications media and releases of the Information and Education and the Public Information Divisions. The Inspector General was directed to review the status of cost consciousness in all units inspected throughout the command. In addition, commanders at all echelons were instructed to use every means available to conduct operations with the maximum economy consistent with attainment of mission objectives. Continued efforts were to be made to induce each individual in every command to look for ways of performing his job or duty more efficiently and at less cost through eliminating waste. Actions taken to implement the program were to include, but not to be limited to,

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[70] Interv, Mr. Moenk with Mr. Pithey, 9 Sep 55, cited above. UNCLASSIFIED.

[71] SR 11-110-1, 5 Jun 55, sub: Management Improvement Programs. UNCLASSIFIED.

[72] C/N 2, USAREUR SGS to USAREUR Compt, 13 Oct 54, to C/N 1, USAREUR Compt to USAREUR DCOFS Admin, 24 Sep 54, sub: Proposed USAREUR Circular "Cost Consciousness Indoctrination." UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 320.4 (1954), Vol. II, Item 25A atchd.

the marking of equipment, publicity, training, inspections, supply discipline, budgeting and control of dollar and Deutsche Mark funds, and recognition of individual efforts.[73]

d. Work Measurement Program. The USAREUR Work Measurement Program was designed to provide commanders and their staffs at all levels of command with a factual basis for estimating and authenticating personnel requirements, evaluating job performances, and improving operating efficiency. To achieve the program objectives, man-hours expended and work units produced had to be uniformly tabulated and reported, and the performance effectiveness had to be analyzed. The Office of the Comptroller selected and established work measurement standards and yardsticks in order to assist the individual commander in the evaluation of performance effectiveness within his respective command.[74] The yardstick served as basis for determining personnel requirements for USAREUR activities with regard to management, operation, and maintenance of installations, including services provided for military and civilian personnel and their dependents at these installations.[75]

As of 30 June 1955 USAREUR had established 375 work measurement and yardstick accounts in classes I and II-type activities throughout the command. However, this represented 70 percent coverage of the total number of yardsticks and standards to be established.[76]

22. Electric Accounting Machine Program

The Office of the Comptroller was responsible for the implementation, management, and staff supervision of the Electrical Accounting Machine Program. The following table illustrates the development of the program during FY 1955:

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[73] USAREUR Cir 230, 28 Oct 54, sub: Cost Consciousness Indoctrination. UNCLASSIFIED.

[74] USAREUR ltr, 1 Aug 51, sub: Work Measurement Program. AG 230 COM-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[75] USAREUR ltr, 8 Feb 54, sub: Personnel Utilization. AG 230 COM-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[76] Interv, Mr. J. R. Moenk, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. H. T. Fladeland, USAREUR Compt Div Mgmt Br, 10 Jan 56. UNCLASSIFIED.

	Jun 54	Jun 55
Number of Installations	23	23
Number of US Personnel	914	902
Number of non-US Personnel	489	615
Number of Machines	527	507
Machine Rental Costs	$79,225	$90,943
Pay of US Personnel	$226,845	$243,481
Pay of non-US Personnel	$48,029	$64,858
Cost of Supplies	$56,535	$65,938
Average Monthly Use FY 1954	98,516	-
Average Monthly Use FY 1955	-	103,067

The period under review represented the first complete year of operation of the USAREUR Stock Control Center at Maison Forte, Orleans, France. The move of the stock and supply control agencies from Germany brought with it the problem of personnel procurement and training lower wage rate employees for electric accounting machine operations. Concurrently, the technical services were converting to the Mark-sense system and FY 1955 saw the document originating machine (type 519) replacing the older reproducers (type 514) and eliminating many keypunches (type 024). The first two alphabetic accounting machines (type 407), were installed in the 65th Machine Records Unit during the latter part of FY 1955. In February 1955, the Signal Detachment of the USAREUR Stock Control Center installed a transceiver machine (type 065), which established wireless contact with Tobyhanna (Pa.) Signal Depot by microwave, thus pioneering in direct requisitioning on stateside depots. On 30 June 1955 dependence on the Department of the Army for all electric accounting machine matters came to an end, with USAREUR becoming solely responsible for budgeting, funding, approval of requests, contracting, and payment of rental charges for the entire electric accounting machine program.[77]

23. Operation PAPER CHASE[78]

The Department of the Army had selected certain posts in the United States as testing grounds for a departmental team that was carrying out Operation PAPER CHASE in April and May 1954. The report submitted by the departmental team indicated that an excessive amount of administrative work was required from small units, causing either the use of

[77] Incl 3 to C/N 2, USAREUR Compt to USAREUR Hist Div, 23 Jan 56, to C/N 1, USAREUR Hist Div to USAREUR Compt, 14 Dec 55, sub: Review of Hq USAREUR Annual Historical Report, 1 Jul 54-30 Jun 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Hist Div Master file 314.7 (1956).

[78] While Operation PAPER CHASE was not a Comptroller function, it is included in this chapter because of its relation to the over-all management improvement programs.

extra personnel or long hours of overtime. As a result of this report the Department of the Army directed its major commands to form teams in each area with missions similar to those given the departmental team. Whenever consistent with the channels of command responsibility, these teams were authorized to eliminate unnecessary administrative procedures and reports.[79]

The Adjutant General Division was designated as the action agency for the preparation of plans to comply with the departmental directives. Guidelines for the program developed by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration decentralized the responsibility to implement appropriate portions of the program to each level of the command to include separate battalions or the equivalent. Depending on the level of the command, the required teams were to be composed of staff representatives of G1, G3, G4, the AG and JA Divisions, and the Office of the Comptroller or their appropriate counterparts, with the addition of the technical services for those commands having a major interest. The teams were to be delegated all reasonable authority to take final action in reducing the administrative burden wherever such action did not transgress the authority of a headquarters higher than the parent headquarters of the team. Each headquarters team was directed to screen the administrative requirements placed on lower echelons by its own headquarters as well as those imposed on its own headquarters by the next higher command. The results of the latter screening were to serve as the basis for recommendations to the next higher headquarters. The USAREUR headquarters team, was directed to screen only major subordinate command headquarters and the requirements placed on USAREUR by the Department of the Army.[80]

Operation PAPER CHASE, conducted throughout the command during the period 1 November 1954-28 February 1955, had the primary mission of substantially reducing the Army's administrative workload. All staff divisions were instructed to conduct a preliminary screening of its own administrative operations prior to 1 November 1954 and report the accomplishments to the Adjutant General before 10 November 1954. The progress reports on screening were to include the number of linear feet of files eliminated as well as the number of filing cabinets rendered surplus and turned in. The plans and operations at each level of the command were to conform, but not necessarily to be limited, to the salient features outlined in the USAREUR plan and the Department of the Army directive.[81]

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[79] Ltr, COFSA to CINCUSAREUR, 17 Aug 54, sub: Operation PAPER CHASE. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 320.4 (1954), Vol. I, Item 22 atchd.

[80] C/N 1, USAREUR DCOFS Admin to USAREUR AG through ACOFS G1, 31 Aug 54, sub: Operation PAPER CHASE. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[81] (1) USAREUR ltr, 25 Oct 54, sub: Operation PAPER CHASE. AG 319.22 AGM. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) C/N 1, USAREUR Compt to all Compt Div Brs, 22 Oct 54, same sub. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Compt Div Misc Memos file (1954), Item 26.

a. Results of the Operation. The USAREUR headquarters team consisted of the staff representatives listed above with additional members from the technical and administrative services assisting temporarily in the various phases of the plan. In addition to conducting staff and field visits, the team met six times to organize, monitor, and direct the command-wide program. Before visiting subordinate headquarters, a careful evaluation was made of administrative actions and paper work within USAREUR headquarters staff divisions. Members of the team visited each of the 25 staff divisions for the purpose of observing organizational procedures, exchanging ideas, and reviewing the scope of the program. The entire committee visited at least once the headquarters of Seventh Army and COMZ, as well as Northern, Southern, and Western Area Commands. Individual members of the team also visited the headquarters of the Berlin Command, the 32d AAA Brigade, and the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation. In addition, committees representing the major and subordinate commands made an average of from 1 to 3 visits to organizations under their jurisdiction. The results of the project were very gratifying as shown in the statistical summary of results accomplished throughout the command:

1. 5,565 local reports eliminated;

2. 468 reports imposed by the Department of the Army and higher headquarters recommended for elimination;

3. 13,569 forms, certificates, etc., abolished;

4. 175 forms, certificates, etc., imposed by the Department of the Army or higher headquarters recommended for elimination;

5. 42,704 separate convenience and/or duplicate files eliminated;

6. 25,218 linear feet of unnecessary records and convenience files disposed of;

7. 2,878 4-drawer filing cabinets turned in to supply channels;

8. 8,100 linear feet of publications saved by revised distribution on a "need-to-know" basis;

9. 988 reports reduced in content or in frequency of submission from monthly to quarterly;

10. 353 book cases or field safes turned in; and

11. 31,593 reams of paper saved annually by revised distribution of local publications.

This summary, however, portrayed only a portion of the tangible results achieved under the program. Thousands of additional economies and improvements were reported to the team by organizations throughout the command. No monetary value could be placed on the listed accomplishments even though the savings were estimated to run into millions of dollars.[82]

b. Findings and Recommendations. On the basis of visits to subordinate units, administrative surveys, and evaluation of paper work in general, the USAREUR headquarters team concluded that nonessential administrative and excessive paper work in the Army was generated primarily by requirements imposed by higher headquarters, including the Department of the Army. The volume of administrative requirements seemed to be in direct proportion to the size of the headquarters. Higher headquarters appeared reluctant to eliminate administrative requirements, and recommendations of this kind were usually brushed off with the comment that they were based on local or departmental regulations. A greater decentralization of administrative responsibilities seemed advisable at all echelons of command, and particularly at the departmental level. An honest continuing effort would have to be made to eliminate unnecessary administrative requirements, reports, procedures, etc. Command initiative was being jeopardized by continuing requirements for detailed reports, correspondence, and actions relating to routine problems. In this regard the execution of certificates by officers in a great number of administrative actions should be curtailed. In concluding its report the team made the two specific recommendations that the objective of Operation PAPER CHASE be continued in a vigorous management improvement program and that an active paper chase program be conducted every year for a 1-month period throughout the command.[83]

Section V: MDAP Control Functions

24. MDAP Control Group

In March 1950, when the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) was initiated, the MDAP Control Group was established and attached to the Office of the Comptroller. This group was responsible for the budgeting, funding, fiscal, and related reporting activities of the Army Mutual Defense Assistance Program. Upon activation of US EUCOM in 1952, that headquarters delegated to USAREUR the responsibility for

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[82] Final Rept, USAREUR Paper Chase Committee, 2 Apr 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 320.4 (1955), Vol. I, Item 3 atchd.

[83] Ibid.

the above control functions over the military agencies engaged in MDAP activities.[84] In July 1954 US EUCOM assigned to USAREUR the responsibility for administering the budgeting, funding, and fiscal services for the administrative support of MDAP as it pertained to the Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG's) assigned to Belgium-Luxembourg, Denmark, France, Italy, Portugal, Norway, and the Netherlands, as well as the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) to Greece and the Joint Allied Military Mission for Assistance to Turkey (JAMMAT), the MDAP elements of Headquarters, US EUCOM, and Headquarters, USAREUR, and such other US EUCOM agencies and activities as might be subsequently designated. US CINCEUR retained the approving authority for all policy matters pertaining to MDAP financing and personnel as applied to joint activities or agencies of US EUCOM.[85]

a. Proposals for Transfer. In January 1955 US EUCOM proposed the transfer of functions and commensurate manpower for budgeting, fiscal accounting and related functions pertaining to the MAAG's and missions, and both the administrative funding and unliquidated obligations of MDAP offshore procurement. These functions and corresponding personnel would be transferred from the MDAP Control Group, USAREUR, to the MDAP Control Branch, Comptroller Division, Headquarters, US EUCOM. The recommended transfer would include all current- and future-year aspects of the administrative funds for the MAAG's and missions, the current- and future-year aspects of Army MDAP offshore procurement administrative funds, and the unliquidated obligations of both past and current years for the Army MDAP offshore procurement program funds.[86]

USAREUR concurred in the first part of the proposal but opposed the transfer of functions of its procurement field offices since such action would seriously affect the ability of the command to accomplish the assigned MDAP offshore procurement missions. Nor was the transfer of unliquidated obligations to US EUCOM considered feasible, mainly because of the considerable fiscal activity that was foreseen by USAREUR but was apparently unknown to US EUCOM. Maintaining fiscal records in Paris with the procurement centers located near Heidelberg would most certainly impair the ability of procurement personnel to accomplish the specific objectives dictated by the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, the U.S. Regional Organization (USRO), and the General Accounting Office. Even the transfer to US EUCOM of the current-year administrative funds pertaining to the MAAG's and missions would entail an additional workload to split fiscal accounts into two groups, one of

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[84] Memo, USAREUR Compt to USAREUR COFS, 11 Feb 55, sub: Transfer of Certain MDAP Functions to US EUCOM. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 400.336 (1955), Vol. I, Item 1A atchd.

[85] US EUCOM Pol Dir 50-4, 8 Jul 54, sub: Comptroller, MDAP. UNCLASSIFIED.

[86] Cable EC-3-243, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 18 Jan 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 400.336 (1955), Vol. I, Item 1A atchd.

which would be transferred while the other would remain. In summarizing, USAREUR concurred in the transfer of administrative funds for the MAAG's and missions but opposed the transfer of past- and current-year funds for MDAP offshore procurement. Since the fiscal station handling MDAP accounts could not be transferred before the end of the fiscal year, USAREUR recommended as an alternate solution that US EUCOM assume the MAAG's and mission funding responsibilities on 1 July 1955.[87]

US EUCOM's final recommendations to the Department of the Army were substantially in accord with USAREUR's alternate suggestions, except that US EUCOM intended to effect the transfer on 1 April 1955. The MDAP Control Group would be transferred to US EUCOM on that date, but the transfer was to be correlated and phased to insure a minimum interruption of operations. The fiscal accounting problem was solved by recommending the establishment of a fiscal station at US EUCOM to receive from USAREUR headquarters all MDAP funds for fourth quarter FY 1955 operation, exclusive of MDAP offshore procurement. After 1 July 1955 an operating agency would be established at US EUCOM to receive the required funds by direct allotment from the Army.[88]

b. Approval of the Transfer. The US EUCOM recommendations were formally approved by the Department of the Army with the understanding that effective 1 July 1955 the MDAP funds allocated directly to US CINCEUR would include the mission expenses fund, headquarters administrative funds, Army training expenses of mission funds where applicable, Army mobile training team funds, and other MDAP training funds previously allocated to CINCUSAREUR. All MDAP funds for the offshore procurement of end-items, offshore procurement office expenses, production equipment and machinery, facilities assistance program, accessorial costs, and repair and rehabilitation of excess material would continue to be allocated to CINCUSAREUR. The transfer of activities was not to result in any increase in personnel ceilings or MDAP funds.[89]

c. Transfer Actions. On 26 March 1955 US EUCOM issued the instructions transferring the MDAP Control Group effective 1 April 1955. USAREUR retained the responsibility for activities pertaining to the funding and administrative aspects of the Army MDAP offshore procurement program. Pending the completion of transfer of personnel and records

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[87](1) Memo, USAREUR Compt to USAREUR COFS, 11 Feb 55, sub: Transfer of Certain MDAP Functions to US EUCOM. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Cable SC-16492, CINCUSAREUR to US CINCEUR, 12 Feb 55. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in file cited above.

[88]Cable EC-3-758, US CINCEUR to DA, 21 Feb 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[89](1) Cable DA-592707, DA from COA to US CINCEUR, 4 Mar 55. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Cable DA-599996, DA from Compt-B to CINCUSAREUR, 30 Mar 55. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in file cited above.

and until further notice, communications relative to matters normally handled by the Control Group were to be addressed to US CINCEUR with information copies to CINCUSAREUR. All queries, comments, and correspondence pertaining to offshore procurement field office expenses (Project 404) would continue to be directed to CINCUSAREUR.[90]

[90] (1) Cable EC-3-1300, US CINCEUR to Component Comds and MAAG's and Missions, 26 Mar 55. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Cable EC-3-1351, US CINCEUR to MAAG's, 31 Mar 55. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in file cited above.

CHAPTER 3

Personnel

25. Manpower Trends

During FY 1955 the number of persons under the military command or jurisdiction of USAREUR increased by a little more than 20,000, as shown in Table 3. Because of legislation limiting the size of the U.S. Armed Forces, redistributing allocations to the three services, and reducing the strength of the Army, USAREUR military strength was cut back by about 4,600 spaces. The granting of sovereignty to the Federal Republic of Germany and the consequent decrease in Deutsche Mark support for American and other Allied forces led the command to relinquish the services of approximately 4,200 German resident and 2,000 "labor service" workers. Dollar-paid continental wage scale (CWS) employees were slightly fewer at the end of the year than at the beginning. However, these decreases, aggregating about 11,000, were over-balanced by increases of more than 31,000 in other personnel categories. The greatly increased availability of family housing in Germany and a liberal policy with respect to granting dependent status to registered tourists were reflected in an increase of 23,000 in the number of sponsored dependents in the command. The number of U.S. civilian employees increased by about 1,200, including some 200 additional teachers for dependents schools. About 7,000 dollar-paid local wage rate (LWR) French employees were added in USAREUR COMZ, incident to the continued build-up of the line of communications there.[1] Paradoxically, the number of dependents of U.S. civilian personnel decreased by 671, notwithstanding an increase of about 1,200 in the number of U.S. civilian employees. This development took place because an increase in the number of unmarried personnel, principally

[1] USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 30 Jun 54, 30 Jun 55. SECRET.

Table 3--USAREUR Command Personnel

Category	30 June 1954				30 June 1955			
	Total	Germany	France	Other	Total	Germany	France	Other
Grand Total	502,909	438,195	59,005	5,709	523,157	452,490	66,050	4,617
U.S. Military Personnel	250,298	216,908	29,142	4,248	245,675	214,430	28,211	3,034
Officer	19,339	16,595	2,462	282	19,667	17,068	2,330	269
Enlisted	230,959	200,313	26,680	3,966	226,008	197,362	25,881	2,765
U.S. Civilian Personnel	4,970	4,097	822	51	6,181	4,954	1,191	36
Appropriated Fund Employees	3,460	2,776	637	47	4,606	3,635	942	29
Nonappropriated Fund Employees	1,510	1,321	185	4	1,575	1,319	249	7
Dependents	88,253	72,911	13,955	1,387	111,227	95,063	14,753	1,411
of Military Personnel	80,979	66,407	13,189	1,383	99,888	84,298	14,193	1,397
of Civilian Personnel	3,335	2,565	766	4	2,664	2,090	560	14
Registered Tourist-Dependents	3,939	3,939	0	0	8,675	8,675	0	0
Continental Wage Scale Personnel (Dollar Paid)	244	211	32	1	180	154	25	1
Appropriated Fund Employees	146	120	26	0	117	96	21	0
Nonappropriated Fund Employees	98	91	6	1	63	58	4	1
Local Wage Rate Personnel (Dollar Paid)	12,598	0	12,576	22	19,593	347	19,111	135
Appropriated Fund Employees	9,998	0	9,979	19	16,648	347	16,177	124
Nonappropriated Fund Employees	2,600	0	2,597	3	2,945	0	2,934	11

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Table 3--USAREUR Command Personnel--continued

Category	30 June 1954				30 June 1955			
	Total	Germany	France	Other	Total	Germany	France	Other
German Resident Employees	120,896	120,896	0	0	116,661	116,661	0	0
*Occupational Cost Employees	89,775	89,775	0	0	81,450	81,450	0	0
*Mandatory Cost Employees	1,123	1,123	0	0	1,264	1,264	0	0
Nonappropriated Fund Employees	29,998	29,998	0	0	33,947	33,947	0	0
Labor Service Personnel	25,650	23,172	2,478	0	23,640	20,881	2,759	0

*Known after 5 May 1955 as Defense Support Cost Employees.

Source: USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 30 Jun 54, p. 8; 30 Jun 55, p. 8. SECRET (information used is CONFIDENTIAL).

school teachers and, in France, clerk-typist and secretarial employees, was accompanied by a marked decrease in the number of married civilian personnel. A large part of this decrease occurred as several large installations, principally depots, in Germany, were phased out. Married personnel in considerable numbers chose to return to the United States rather than to move with their families to the new installations in France.[2]

Section I: Military Personnel

26. Strength

a. Reduction in Troop Basis. On 1 July 1954 the official troop basis, or ceiling strength, established by the Department of the Army as USAREUR's goal for 30 June 1955 was 242,267.[3] In a subsequent cutback and reallocation of manpower, under which the Department of the Army was directed to reduce its over-all fiscal-year-end military strength by 73,000, USAREUR's ceiling was reduced by a little more than 2,000 enlisted spaces to 240,365.[4] Moreover, in May 1955 USAREUR was instructed to plan to transfer accountability for all joint activities personnel (US EUCOM, the MAAG's, and the Joint Construction Agency) to the Department of the Army, as of 1 July, and to contribute later 2,500 personnel spaces to the projected U.S. Army forces in Italy. These projected transfers reduced to 236,500 the ceiling for 30 June 1956, toward which all personnel strength programming was immediately directed. On 30 June 1955 the strength authorized by USAREUR to its components was 238,438, about 2,000 above this ceiling.[5]

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[2] Interv, Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. S. Sutherland, USAREUR G1 CPB Policy & Regs Sec, 27 Sep 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

[3] Ltr, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 26 Mar 54, sub: Presentation of Tables of Distribution, FY's 1954, 1955, and 1956. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 326 (1955), Vol. I, Item 1 atchd.

[4] Ltr, Gen M. W. Ridgway, COFSA, to Lt Gen A. McAuliffe, CINCUSAREUR, 1 Feb 55. (2) Ltr, Maj Gen P. D. Adams, DCOFSA G3, to Maj Gen E. D. Post, USAREUR DCOFS Opns, 10 Feb 55. Both SECRET. Both in file above, Items 1 atchd, 5A.

[5] Memo, USAREUR Compt to CINCUSAREUR, 29 Jul 55, sub: Analysis of Monthly Statistical Report, United States Army, Europe (hereafter cited as Analysis USAREUR Mthly Stat Rept), 30 Jun 55. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div 319.1 (1955), Vol. I.

b. Actual Strength. As shown above in Table 3, the actual military strength of the command on 30 June 1955, as distinct from ceiling strength and authorized strength, was 245,675, which included about 800 persons in the "pipeline out" or carried as patients. With these excluded, the operating actual strength of the command was 244,905. This figure, although about 2,000 less than the operating actual strength at the beginning of the year, was 6,477, or 2½ percent, above authorized strength and 8,539, or 3½ percent, above ceiling strength. The forecast was that gains and losses under Operation GYROSCOPE (see par. 31a), together with the anticipated arrival in USAREUR of personnel from the inactivated United States Forces, Austria (USFA), would increase this divergence through July 1955, but that a diminution would then set in and continue through the remainder of the calendar year.[6]

c. Ratio of Supporting to Operating Forces. During FY 1955 the command succeeded in increasing operating forces to 98 percent of command strength and decreasing supporting forces to 2 percent of command strength, as shown in the following tabulation of troop program categories:[7]

Category	30 Jun 54		31 Dec 54		30 Jun 55	
Total	243,127	100.0	238,637	100.0	245,971[a]	100.0
Supporting Forces	21,158	9.3	24,863	11.0	4,995[b]	2.0
Operating Forces	221,969	90.7	213,764	89.0	240,976	98.0
Combat Forces		59.0		59.0		58.0
Service Forces		31.7		30.0		--
Combat Support Forces		--		--		40.0

[a] Includes US EUCOM elements.

[b] Includes Special Activities and training forces; transients and patients not included.

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[6] (1) USAREUR Mthly Stat Rept, 30 Jun 55, p. 10. SECRET. (2) Analysis USAREUR Mthly Stat Rept, 30 Jun 55. SECRET.

[7] USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 30 Jun 54, 31 Dec 54, 30 Jun 55. SECRET (information used CONFIDENTIAL). In the June 1955 report the troop program is divided into five categories: operating forces, supporting forces, special activities, training forces, and transients and patients; and operating forces are divided further into combat forces and combat support forces. Operating forces are defined as "those forces whose primary missions are to engage in combat, and the integral supporting elements thereof;" supporting forces as "those units and elements whose missions are to perform logistical, intelligence, and administrative functions not as a part of a combat force;" and combat support forces as "those elements which are a part, or prepared to become a part, of a theater, command, or task force formed for combat operations."

d. Officer and Warrant Officer Strength. The distribution of USAREUR officer and warrant officer strength, by quarters, during the year is shown in Table 4. Operating actual strength increased gradually, with some fluctuation, from 16,772 to 17,742--1,200 above authorization--and was slightly in excess of both ceiling and authorized strengths throughout the year. The largest increase was in the number of second lieutenants, which was more than doubled. This increase more than offset decreases in the number of warrant officers, captains, and field grade officers.

(1) Strength by Grade. At the end of the year actual strength in general officers, in which there had been little change, was 2 less than authorized. That of field grade officers, although it had decreased appreciably, was 57 above authorization. That of captains was 400 below authorization and that of lieutenants 1,545 above. Warrant officer actual strength fell below both ceiling and authorized strength in August 1954, for the first time in several months, and continued so to the end of the fiscal year, when it was 213 below authorized strength. A new system of "manning levels" for officers, directed by the Department of the Army in November 1954, reduced the number of field grade officers and captains in almost all branches of the service. This reduction, however, was more than compensated for by increases in the number of lieutenants, who were sent over in such excess of requisitions that a large number of lieutenants were used in captains' and warrant officers' positions.[8]

(2) Strength by Major Elements. Table 5 shows the distribution of USAREUR officer and warrant officer strength by major elements as of 30 June 1955. During the year there were no major changes in the officer strength of any element, and at the end of the year, as before, slightly more than half of all the officers in the command were assigned to Seventh Army. The command as a whole and all major elements were overstrength in officers. Seventh Army, COMZ, and the command as a whole were understrength in warrant officers.

(3) Strength by Race. The numerical increase in officer strength and the decrease in warrant officer strength that characterized the command during the year affected both white and Negro officers, as shown in Table 6. During FY 1954, Negro officers and warrant officers had constituted 3.9 percent of the command's officer and warrant officer strength.[9] During FY 1955, Negro officers and warrant officers averaged 3.7 and 5 percent, respectively, of those categories. In contrast, Negro personnel as a whole constituted, on the average, 11.8 percent of the command.

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[8](1) USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 30 Jun 54, 31 Aug 54, 30 Jun 55. SECRET. (2) Analyses USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 31 Dec 54, 31 Jul 55. SECRET.

[9]USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, 1953-54, pp. 37, 38. SECRET.

Table 4--USAREUR Officer and Warrant Officer Strength By Grade, FY 1955
(Operating Actual Strength)[a]

Grade	30 Jun 54 Actual	30 Sep 54 Actual	31 Dec 54 Actual	31 Mar 55 Actual	30 Jun 55 Actual	30 Jun 55 Ceiling	30 Jun 55 Authorized		Over -Under
Officers									
Total	16,772	17,167	17,238	17,069	17,742	16,619	16,542	+	1,200
General	54	54	58	55	55	56	57	-	2
General	1	1	1	1	1				
Lt. General	1	3	3	3	3				
Maj. General	21	21	20	19	18				
Brig. General	31	29	34	32	33				
Field Grade	4,375	4,551	4,482	4,277	4,150	4,099	4,093	+	57
Colonel	422	415	433	433	391	385	383	+	8
Lt. Colonel	1,498	1,481	1,539	1,465	1,356	1,343	1,339	+	17
Major	2,455	2,655	2,510	2,379	2,403	2,371	2,371	+	32
Company Grade	12,343	12,562	12,698	12,737	13,537	12,464	12,392	+	1,145
Captain	5,946	6,236	6,138	5,778	5,308	5,726	5,708	-	400
1st Lieutenant	4,702	3,909	3,775	4,161	4,150)	6,738	6,684	+	1,545
2nd Lieutenant	1,695	2,417	2,785	2,798	4,079)				
Warrant Officers									
Total	2,323	2,222	2,035	1,934	1,857	2,122	2,070	-	213
CWO	1,526	1,446	1,279	1,760	1,747				
JWO	797	776	756	174	110				

[a]Operating actual strength represents unit actual strength of all T/O&E and T/D units under the jurisdiction of USAREUR, plus actual strength of all incoming replacements (pipeline in) and trainees, both of which are "chargeable" against spaces allotted to USAREUR by the Department of the Army.

Source: USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 30 Jun 54-30 Jun 55. SECRET.

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Table 5--USAREUR Officer and Warrant Officer Strength
By Major Elements, 30 June 1955

Command	Total			Officers			Warrant Officers		
	Authorized	Actual[a]	+Over -Under	Authorized	Actual[a]	+Over -Under	Authorized	Actual[a]	+Over -Under
Totals	18,612	19,592	+ 980	16,542	17,736	+1,194	2,070	1,856	- 214
USAREUR Headquarters and Units	858	904	+ 46	807	839	+ 32	51	65	+ 14
Seventh Army	9,767	10,550	+ 783	8,661	9,653	+ 992	1,106	897	- 209
COMZ	2,225	2,200	- 25	1,933	1,946	+ 13	292	254	- 38
Subordinate Commands	3,354	3,479	+ 125	3,087	3,196	+ 109	267	283	+ 16
Services	2,408	2,459	+ 51	2,054	2,102	+ 48	354	357	+ 3

[a]Actual strength represents unit actual.

Source: USAREUR Mthly Stat Rept, 30 Jun 55, p. 12. SECRET.

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Table 6--USAREUR Military Personnel By Race, FY 1955
(Operating Actual Strength)

	Total	White	Negro	Percent Negro
Total Military Personnel				
1 Jul 54	246,835	214,867	31,968	12.9
30 Sep 54	240,616	211,048	29,568	12.3
31 Dec 54	241,146	212,373	28,773	11.9
31 Mar 55	244,013	216,568	27,445	11.2
30 Jun 55	244,905	218,355	26,550	10.8
Officers				
1 Jul 54	16,772	16,147	625	3.7
30 Sep 54	17,167	16,507	660	3.8
31 Dec 54	17,238	16,588	650	3.7
31 Mar 55	17,069	16,457	612	3.6
30 Jun 55	17,742	17,095	647	3.6
Warrant Officers				
1 Jul 54	2,323	2,200	123	5.3
30 Sep 54	2,222	2,111	111	4.9
31 Dec 54	2,035	1,935	100	4.9
31 Mar 55	1,934	1,841	93	4.8
30 Jun 55	1,857	1,763	94	5.0
Enlisted Personnel				
1 Jul 54	227,740	196,520	31,220	13.7
30 Sep 54	221,227	192,430	28,797	13.0
31 Dec 54	221,873	193,850	28,023	12.6
31 Mar 55	225,010	198,270	26,740	11.8
30 Jun 55	225,306	199,497	25,809	11.4

Source: USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 30 Jun 54-30 Jun 55. SECRET.

e. Enlisted Strength. During FY 1955 enlisted strength was alternately over and under authorized strength, as shown in the following tabulation:[10]

Date	Ceiling	Authorized	Operating Actual	(Wacs Incl)	+ Over - Under
1 Jul 54	221,170	224,133	227,740	(831)	+ 3,607
31 Jul	221,158	223,794	227,276	(845)	+ 3,482
31 Aug	222,169	223,752	224,569		+ 817
30 Sep	222,492	223,107	221,227	(824)	- 1,880
31 Oct	222,192	223,212	220,226	(799)	- 2,986
30 Nov	222,192	222,114	219,458	(825)	- 2,656
31 Dec	223,221	222,242	221,873	(806)	- 369
31 Jan 55	221,579	222,417	216,523	(831)	- 5,884
28 Feb	221,308	221,866	214,553	(842)	- 7,313
31 Mar	220,426	221,897	225,010	(859)	+ 3,113
30 Apr	220,355	221,620	217,068	(882)	- 4,552
31 May	219,497	221,181	218,436	(946)	- 2,745
30 Jun	217,509	219,816	225,306	(1,015)	+ 5,490

At the beginning of FY 1955 the command had reduced to 3,607 an overstrength that had reached a high of more than 8,000 during the previous December. By the end of August actual strength exceeded authorized strength by only 817, or less than 1 percent. September showed an understrength of about 1 percent, which increased to slightly over 1 percent during October and November. But an emergency holdback of personnel due to rotate in December brought operating actual strength to just 369, or less than two-tenths of 1 percent, under authorization. Understrength increased to 3 percent by February 1955. In March, however, a gain of more than 10,000 troops, resulting partly from the arrival of delayed replacements and partly from overshipments to USAREUR in anticipation of a large number of releases in April and May, carried enlisted strength once more to an overstrength of over 3,000, or 1.5 percent. In April a loss of almost 8,000 troops, as anticipated, marked the beginning of another period of understrength, which continued through May; but in June enlisted strength increased by almost 7,000 to 225,306, which was not only 3 percent above authorized strength but almost 4 percent above the reduced Department of the Army ceiling. Meanwhile, Womens Army Corps (WAC) enlisted strength increased by almost 20 percent, from 831 at the beginning of the fiscal year to 1,015 at the end.[11]

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[10] USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 30 Jun 54 to 30 Jun 55. SECRET.

[11] (1) USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 30 Jun 54 to 30 Jun 55. SECRET. (2) Analyses USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 30 Jun 54 to 30 Jun 55. SECRET.

(1) Strength by Grade. The following tabulation shows USAREUR actual operating enlisted strength, by grade, at the beginning and end of FY 1955:[12]

		1 Jul 54	30 Jun 55
Total		227,740	225,306
Grade			
M/Sgt	E-7	8,824	8,100
SFC	E-6	15,843	16,687
Sgt	E-5	27,808	30,073
Cpl	E-4	47,978	42,066
PFC	E-3	80,768	64,412
Pvt		46,519	63,968
	E-2	43,880	61,774
	E-1	2,639	2,194

With considerable fluctuation, approximately 60 percent of enlisted personnel were privates and privates first class (E-1, E-2, and E-3), 20 percent corporals (E-4), and 20 percent sergeants, sergeants first class, and master sergeants (E-5, E-6, and E-7) throughout the year. The increase in the number of sergeants (E-5) and sergeants first class (E-6), which took place notwithstanding decreased enlisted strength, reflected in part the extension of overseas tours by personnel of those grades.

(2) Overstrength in Grade E-7. The aforementioned "pileup" of E-5's and E-6's also reflected the problem of overstrength in E-7's, which had plagued the command during FY 1954, making promotions to that grade virtually impossible. This problem continued to be critical. In an attempt to solve it the Department of the Army in November 1953 had withdrawn temporarily the authority to extend overseas tours of E-7's, placed a virtual embargo on the shipment of E-6's and E-7's to the command, and directed USAREUR to accelerate the rotation of E-7's to the United States in such a way as to reduce the number of E-7's in the command to 100 percent of authorized strength by 31 August 1954 and to 88.3 percent (the Army-wide percentage) by 31 December.[13] The command succeeded in reducing E-7 strength to 101.3 percent of authorized strength by 31 August 1954, to 96.1 percent by 31 December, and to 86.7 percent (as compared to the then Army-wide percentage of 93.8 percent) by 31 March 1955.[14] Meanwhile, although the command had continued to be authorized its proportionate share of promotions

[12] USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 30 Jun 54, 30 Jun 55. SECRET.

[13] (1) Ltr, VCOFSA to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Nov 53. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to VCOFSA, 7 Nov 53. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) Cable DA-956324, TAG to CINCUSAREUR, 29 Jan 54. CONFIDENTIAL. All in USAREUR SGS 320.2 (1954), Vol. I, Item 9A atchd.

[14] DF's, USAREUR ACOFS G1 to DCOFS for Admin, sub: Periodic Strength Reports, Master Sergeants and Sergeants First Class. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

to E-6, no promotions to E-7 had been allotted since a token allocation of 10 in January 1954.

On 29 December 1954 the Department of the Army proposed to lift the embargo on the shipment of E-6's and E-7's to the command. A USAREUR staff study of the proposal indicated that the embargo should be modified in anticipation of a predicted understrength in those grades, but that it should not be lifted for certain MOS's in which an overstrength was expected to continue to the end of the fiscal year.[15] This policy was followed thereafter; but the Army-wide high reenlistment rate of E-7's (who averaged about 13 years of service) and the reduction of the over-all strength of the Army prevented the hoped-for creation of an appreciable number of vacancies in grade E-7.

The Department of the Army recommended as a next step that commanders be more aggressive in weeding out inefficient NCO's, so that no valuable personnel would be lost in a forced attrition of E-7's. While there was considerable E-7 overstrength in administrative and some technical service MOS's, there was a shortage in nearly all combat MOS's of that grade.[16] (See par. 27e.) General McAuliffe brought the matter of aggressive command action to the attention of the USAREUR Commanders' Conference on 28 March 1955. In his reply to the Department of the Army, he stated, "In addition to having a serious effect on morale, the total lack of promotions serves to blunt the initiative of soldiers who have been conscientiously discharging their duties in an E-7 position vacancy for a considerable period of time."[17] He pointed out that most commanders would almost immediately promote eligible and deserving soldiers, who had been waiting long, to fill E-7 vacancies created by aggressive weeding-out and that thus, while the average efficiency of master sergeants would be improved, the number of available vacancies would not be increased noticeably. He suggested that before adopting a stringent attrition or reduction-in-force policy, the Department should exhaust every possibility of readjusting MOS distributions among E-7's through retraining qualified holders of administrative MOS's in other specialties. He also suggested that Army policy be changed to prohibit promotions to E-7 when such promotions would result, in the command concerned, in an MOS overstrength in that grade.[18] The Department replied that General McAuliffe's recommendations

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[15] Cable SX-1148, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 11 Jan 55. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above, Item 2 atchd.

[16] Ltr, Maj Gen Robt. N. Young, ACOFSA G1, to Gen A. C. McAuliffe, CINCUSAREUR, 11 Mar 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 11A atchd.

[17] Ltr, Gen McAuliffe to Gen Young, 2 Apr 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[18] Ibid.

would be considered carefully.[19] However, up to 30 June 1955 the number of possible promotions to E-7 was still small. Sixteen were allotted to the command during June, and these were limited to five specific MOS's.[20]

(3) Strength by Major Elements. The following tabulation shows strength of enlisted personnel by major elements, as of the beginning and end of FY 1955:[21] The distribution pattern between elements was consistent during the year, and the general trend was toward overstrength or increased overstrength.

	1 July 1954			30 June 1955		
Command	Authorized	Actual	+Over -Under	Authorized	Actual	+Over -Under
Total	224,133	224,201	+ 68	219,816	224,072	+4,256
USAREUR Headquarters and Units	1,345	1,406	+ 61	1,497	1,627	+ 130
Seventh Army	153,985	153,966	- 19	154,660	154,629	- 31
COMZ	25,295	24,601	- 694	22,590	23,836	+1,246
Subordinate Commands	21,455	22,140	+ 685	20,442	21,832	+1,390
Services	22,053	22,088	+ 35	20,627	22,148	+1,521

(4) Strength by Race. Continuing a 2-year trend extending from June 1953, when Negro enlisted personnel constituted 16.1 percent of the command's enlisted strength, the percentage of Negro enlisted personnel dropped from 13.7 percent to 11.4 (Table 6). Total Negro personnel (officer, warrant officer, and enlisted strength) dropped from 12.9 to 10.8 percent of total command personnel, approaching the 10 percent proportion of Negroes in the general population of the United States.

(5) Strength by Components. During the third quarter, ending March 1955, Regular Army enlisted personnel strength began to exceed non-RA for the first time in 18 months. This trend continued during the remainder of the fiscal year, and on 30 June 1955 Regular

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[19] Ltr, Gen Young to Gen McAuliffe, 22 Apr 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 11A atchd.

[20] Cable DA-319811, to CINCUSAREUR, 8 Jun 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 19.

[21] USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 30 Jun 54 and 30 Jun 55. SECRET. Discrepancies between this tabulation and those in pars. 26d and 26d(1) arise from the fact that the former shows unit actual strength while the latter show operating actual strength (unit actual plus pipeline-in and trainees).

Army personnel were 55.7 percent of total USAREUR enlisted strength:[22]

Date	Strength		Percent
	RA	Non-RA	Non-RA
1 Jul 54	99,677	128,063	56.2
30 Sep	99,023	122,204	55.2
31 Dec	104,679	117,194	52.8
31 Mar 55	116,862	108,148	48.1
30 Jun	125,529	99,777	44.3

All major elements reflected the change, and at the end of the year the only division with a preponderance of non-RA troops was the 1st Infantry Division, for which no reenlistments had been permitted since its selection for GYROSCOPE rotation, and which had received no RA replacements since 1 January. The Provost Marshal, distinctly a "career" branch, had the highest percentage (78.6 percent) of Regular Army personnel. The trend of incoming replacements indicated that the command might expect Regular Army troops to constitute more than half of total strength for several months.[23]

27. Characteristics

a. Age. From the beginning of FY 1955 to 31 May 1955, when the latest survey for the year was made, the percentage of officers above age 40 remained fairly constant at about 20 percent, and that of officers of age 40 and below at about 80 percent. Among the latter, however, the percentage of officers of ages 21-30 increased from about 31 percent to about 39 percent of total officer strength. The great majority--approximately 85 percent--of enlisted personnel was aged 30 and below. The percentage of enlisted personnel under 21 years of age more than doubled, increasing from about 9 percent to about 22 percent.[24]

b. Educational Level. On 30 September 1954 and 31 May 1955 surveys were made of the number of years of formal schooling completed by USAREUR personnel. These surveys showed that during the intervening eight months educational levels had risen among both officer and enlisted personnel--more markedly among the latter.[25]

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[22](1) USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 31 Jul 54, 31 Oct 54, 31 Jan 55, 30 Apr 55, 31 Jul 55. SECRET. (2) Analyses USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 31 Aug 54, 30 Nov 54, 28 Feb 55, 31 May 55. SECRET.

[23]Ibid.

[24]USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 31 Jul 54, 31 Oct 54, 31 Jan 55, 30 Jun 55. SECRET (information used UNCLASSIFIED).

[25](1) USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 31 Oct 54, 30 Jun 55. SECRET. (2) Analyses USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 30 Nov 54, 31 Aug 55. SECRET.

(1) Officers. The percentage of Regular Army officers who were college graduates or postgraduates rose from 66.2 to 69.7, and of those with 1-3 years of college education, from 23.1 to 24. The percentage with only a high school education or less dropped from 10.7 to 6.3. Among non-RA officers, the percentage of college graduates and postgraduates increased from 37.3 to 41.7; the percentage of those with 1-3 years of college education dropped from 28.6 to 25.6, and of those with only a high school education or less, from 34.1 to 32.7.

(2) Enlisted Personnel. Among Regular Army enlisted personnel the percentage of high school graduates and more advanced students increased from 35 to 36.3, and of those with 1-3 years of high school education from 34.5 to 36, while the percentage of those with no high school education dropped from 30.5 to 27.7. The most striking improvement, however, was in the educational level of non-RA enlisted personnel. Among them the percentage of high school graduates and more advanced students rose from 55.7 to 69.1; the percentage of those with 1-3 years of high school education dropped from 22.4 to 16.7, and of those with no high school education from 21.9 to 14.2. The percentage of those with 1-3 years of college education rose from 10.5 to 16.8, and of college graduates and postgraduates from 4.9 to 13.2.

c. GCT Categories. Surveys of the General Classification Test (GCT) scores of USAREUR enlisted personnel as of the same dates revealed a general improvement in scores, as indicated in the following tabulation:[26]

	Regular Army		Non-RA	
	30 Sep 54	31 May 55	30 Sep 54	31 May 55
	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent
GCT Category	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Group I (score 130 or over)	2.8	3.2	4.2	7.6
Group II (110-129)	26.2	26.6	27.4	35.3
Group III (90-109)	37.0	41.2	31.4	31.4
Group IV (60-89)	32.8	27.9	34.5	24.4
Group V (under 60)	1.2	1.1	2.5	1.3

The percentage of Regular Army personnel scoring Groups I, II, and III rose from 66 to 71, while the percentage of those in Groups IV and V dropped from 34 to 29. Among non-RA personnel the percentage in Groups I,II, and III rose from 63 to 74.3 while that in Groups IV and V dropped from 37 to 25.7. The percentage of non-RA's in Group V was virtually halved. Group V's, moreover, were virtually eliminated from NCO grades except in the case of non-RA sergeants first class (E-6's), 20 percent of whom were Group V's on 30 September 1954, principally because of combat promotions. This percentage dropped to

[26] Ibid.

17 by 31 May 1955. The general trend of enlisted scores reflected not only the rising level of formal education and the improved quality of replacements, but the effectiveness of the USAREUR program of eliminating low-capacity personnel.[27] (See par. 32c.)

d. Marital Status. Except for a slight increase in the percentage of single officers during the last quarter, caused by the assignment of larger numbers of lieutenants to the command, the ratio of married to single personnel during FY 1955 did not change significantly from that of the preceding 18 months. An average of 81 percent of the officers and 31 percent of enlisted personnel were married. About 60 percent of the married personnel had children. The average number of children under 18, for those with children, was 1.11 per family, and 60 percent of the total number of children were under six years of age.[28]

e. MOS Distribution. Surveys of enlisted Military Occupation Specialty (MOS) distribution made at the end of the first, second, and third quarters of FY 1955 showed a continuing understrength in personnel with combat MOS's and a continuing overstrength in personnel with administrative MOS's. For example, the understrength in personnel with infantry light weapons MOS's was 1,734 at the end of the first quarter, 3,446 at the end of the second, and 4,226 at the end of the third. NCO's with infantry light weapons MOS's were 31, 28, and 50 percent understrength as of the corresponding dates. At the end of the third quarter understrengths in NCO's with tank, antiaircraft gun, antiaircraft automatic weapons, and field artillery gun MOS's were 55, 35, 45, and 48 percent respectively. On the other hand, overstrength in enlisted personnel with general administrative MOS's increased from 1,416 (18.3 percent) at the end of the second quarter to 2,469 (32.1 percent) at the end of the third quarter, although there was an understrength in NCO's (except E-6's and E-7's) with administrative MOS's. The new MOS system (see par. 32d) was expected to go far toward correcting these discrepancies, although large overstrengths in general administrative MOS's at the expense of combat requirements would probably persist.[29]

28. Completion of Integration of Negro and White Troops

The assignment, on 11 August 1954, of a number of white enlisted personnel to the formerly all-Negro 68th Transportation (Medical Truck) Company, USAREUR COMZ, left only one all-Negro Army unit in USAREUR. This unit, the 94th Engineer Battalion, was inactivated on 27 November 1954, completing, in Europe, the racial integration of service-type

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[27] Ibid.

[28] USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 31 Jul 54, 31 Oct 54, 31 Jan 55, 30 Jun 55. SECRET.

[29] (1) USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 30 Nov 54, 28 Feb 55, 31 May 55. (2) Analyses USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 30 Nov 54, 28 Feb 55, 31 May 55. Both SECRET (information used CONFIDENTIAL).

and T/D-type units, which was the second and final phase of a program that had been initiated on 1 April 1952, in accordance with instructions from the Department of the Army, for the purpose of ending racial segregation in the composition of Army units. The first phase--integration of combat-type units--had been completed in November 1953.[30] Both phases were effected without publicity, as directed. The change-over proceeded smoothly, notwithstanding its scope and impact, and was accomplished more rapidly than had been anticipated.[31]

29. Experimental Replacement by Platoons

On 6 August 1954 Headquarters, USAREUR, informed the Department of the Army that the experiment of training, processing, and shipping infantry platoons from the United States to USAREUR as unit replacements had proved effective. This opinion was based upon tests that had been conducted by Seventh Army since January 1954. USAREUR suggested, however, that the Department should not require such units to be assigned intact below battalion level, since experience had indicated that assigning platoons, as units, to established companies created reassignment and morale problems among older personnel of these organizations. Although assignment of entire platoons to infantry companies was desirable, battalion commanders should be allowed discretion in reassigning their personnel. This principle, USAREUR suggested, should be applied to armored platoons also.[32]

30. Reenlistment and Recruiting Program

a. Special Recruitment Drive. During the last three months of calendar year 1954 a concentrated recruiting drive was conducted throughout the command, to supplement the continuous recruiting

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[30](1) Ltr, EUCOM to Maj Units, 1 Apr 52, sub: Racial Integration of EUCOM Army Units. In EUCOM P&A Jnl file, Apr 52, p. 1, Item 3. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) EUCOM/USAREUR Comd Rept, 1952, p. 5, 72-75. SECRET. (3) USAREUR Ann Hist Rept 1953-54, p. 60. SECRET. (4) USAREUR Hist Div, Integration of Negro and White Troops in USAREUR, 1952-1954, MS. CONFIDENTIAL. (5) List, Integration of Formerly Negro Units, May 52-Aug 54. UNCLASSIFIED. (6) Cable 1058, Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, 7 Jul 54. UNCLASSIFIED. Last two in USAREUR SGS 291.2 (1954), Vol. I, Item 3. (7) Interv, Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col M.J. Dolan, C/USAREUR G1 MPB Enl Pers Sec, 16 Oct 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

[31]Interv, PFC Robert Gumerove, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col. M. J. Dolan, C/USAREUR G1 MPB Enl Sec, 12 Oct 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

[32]Ltr, USAREUR to TAG, attn G3, 6 Aug 54, sub: Experimental Infantry and Armor Platoon Training and Replacement Plan. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 320.2 (1954), Vol. I, Item 41A.

program required by Army Regulations.[33] The drive was recommended by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G1, in August 1954 because recruitments in the command had gradually declined from 855 in July 1953 to a low of 357 in April 1954, with slight increases in May and June.[34] The drive emphasized quality as well as numbers. No quotas were established, but the desired goal was 1,500 recruitments during each of the three months of the drive. On an average each subordinate command would therefore have to double its recruitments over the corresponding months of 1953. As the drive progressed, October recruitments were slightly under the desired 1,500, but November and December recruitments were in excess of 2,000 each. During the three months 5,991 enlistments, reenlistments, or extensions of periods of service were obtained, as compared with 2,332 during the corresponding months of 1953. The monthly figures were as follows:[35]

1954	Reenlistments
October	1,448
November	2,345
December	2,198

In January 1955 recruitments dropped to slightly under 1,200, where they leveled off through March. Thereafter they increased steadily during April, May, and June. During the last-named month recruitments totaled 1,602, of which 1,352 were Regular Army reenlistments, 224 were Regular Army enlistments from non-RA status, and 26 were Regular Army extensions.[36]

b. Expansion of the Alien Enlistment Program. Public Law 597, 81st Congress, as amended, authorized the Army to enlist 12,500 selected aliens of high caliber. By stipulating that West German nationals, nationals of countries participating in the European Recovery Plan, and nationals of NATO countries were not eligible, Congress indicated its desire that the alien recruits should be nationals of Soviet and satellite countries. In addition, although neither the statute nor Army Regulations restricted the geographical areas in which the enlistments might be secured, the Department of the Army and its representatives in Europe limited recruiting activities at the outset to

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[33] USAREUR ltr, CINCUSAREUR to all sub comdrs, 3 Sep 54, sub: USAREUR-Wide Recruiting Drive, and Incl 2, sub: Instructions for Conducting USAREUR-Wide Recruiting Drive. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 342 (1954), Vol. I, Item 15 atchd.

[34] DF, USAREUR G1 to COFS, 13 Aug 54, sub: USAREUR-Wide Recruiting Drive. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[35] (1) Ltr, Gen W. M. Hoge, CINCUSAREUR, to Gen M. D. Ridgway, COFSA, 27 Dec 54. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Rept, Monthly Recruitment Rates for USAREUR, 1 Jul-31 Dec 54. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in file cited above.

[36] USAREUR Mthly Stat Rept, 30 Jun 55. SECRET.

individuals entering West Germany from Iron Curtain countries. The recruitment proved difficult.[37] In 4½ years of experience, only 1 of every 10 applicants screened was finally accepted for enlistment. At the end of 1952 only 486 aliens had been enlisted. There had been no enlistments from May to October, 1954. An average of six months elapsed usually between application and final decision on acceptance, but USAREUR was of the opinion that both the attrition and the long processing were essential to obtaining personnel of the quality desired.

In November 1954 the Department of the Army, with the concurrence of the Departments of Defense and State and the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA), proposed that the program be extended to individuals from Iron Curtain countries who entered Turkey, Greece, and Italy and who were under the supervision of FOA for resettlement. The individuals would be screened in those countries and sent to West Germany for actual enlistment.[38] USAREUR concurred in the proposal, since securing a sizable number of recruits, without lowering standards, would be possible only if the base of the program was expanded. After the plan was coordinated with the Federal Republic of Germany to assure its cooperation both before and after the establishment of German sovereignty, and with FOA to assure its acceptance of certain responsibilities, the Department of the Army directed on 17 March 1955 that the program be extended to Greece, Turkey, and Italy as proposed.[39] Screening of applicants was thereupon initiated in each of these three countries. By the end of FY 1955, not enough time had elapsed for a valid evaluation of the extended program.[40] However, alien enlistments, of which there had been only 2 during February 1955, numbered 5 in March, 7 in April, 46 in May, and 24 in June.[41]

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[37](1) EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, p. 113-14. (2) EUCOM/USAREUR Comd Rept, 1952, p. 79. SECRET.

[38](1) Ltr, Maj Gen R. N. Young, ACOFSA G1 to Gen W. M. Hoge, CINCUSAREUR, 12 Nov 54. SECRET. (2) DF and Comment 2, USAREUR G1 to COFS, 23 Nov 54, sub: Letter to General Hoge from General R. N. Young. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 342 (1955), Vol. I, Item 1 atchd.

[39]DA ltr, to CINCUSAREUR, 17 Mar 55. SECRET. In file cited above.

[40]Ltr, Maj Gen O. P. Newman, USAREUR DCOFS for Admin to Maj Gen D. P. Booth, ACOFSA G1, 13 Jun 55. SECRET. In file cited above.

[41]USAREUR Mthly Stat Rept, 30 Jun 55. SECRET.

31. Rotation, Reduction, and Extention of Tours of Duty

a. Operation GYROSCOPE. During the year a new system of unit rotation designated Operation GYROSCOPE was inaugurated. It was essentially a division rotation plan based on conditions short of general war.[42] Under this system, planned to be in effect as long as the worldwide deployment of Army units continued, a division would be scheduled for 2 tours of duty in the United States and 2 tours in overseas areas where division-size units were deployed. The entire cycle covered about 11 years, with the length of the European tour accounting for 33 months. The divisions concerned would replace each other, and each division, with its dependents, would move virtually as a unit from its old station to the new, in simultaneous coordination with the elements of the division that it replaced.

In the first GYROSCOPE operation involving USAREUR troops, the 1st Infantry Division, with headquarters at Wuerzburg, was scheduled to exchange station with the 10th Infantry Division at Fort Riley, Kansas; and the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, with headquarters at Nuremberg, was to exchange stations with the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland--the largest peacetime troops-and-dependents movement in the history of the Army. USAREUR planning for the movement began in December 1954. The action agency was the Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, under the general supervision of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations.[43] In March 1954 two officers from the 10th Infantry Division and one officer from the 3d Cavalry Regiment were attached to USAREUR on temporary duty as liaison officers for the movement.[44] By the end of the fiscal year the operation was well under way, in both directions. The first increment, advance party, 1st Infantry Division, left Frankfurt en route to Fort Riley on 2 May. The first increment, advance party, 10th Infantry Division arrived in Europe on 25 May 1955,[45] and the main body of the division was scheduled to arrive beginning in July.

The advanced planning group for a second GYROSCOPE operation, involving the transfer of the 11th Airborne Division from Fort Campbell,

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[42] AR 220-20, 7 Apr 55, sub: Field Organization: Operation GYROSCOPE. UNCLASSIFIED.

[43] USAREUR CINC's Wkly Staff Conf Notes, No. 17, 14 Dec 54, p. 2. SECRET (information used UNCLASSIFIED).

[44] Cable DA-52947, to CINCUSAREUR, 4 Mar 55. In USAREUR SGS 510 (1955), Item 1 (B/P).

[45] The Stars and Stripes, (Eur. ed.), May 26, 1955.

Kentucky, to replace the 5th Infantry Division, USAREUR, arrived on 12 May.[46]

b. Advanced Rotation of Certain Enlisted Personnel. In order to accelerate enlisted separations made necessary by manpower cutbacks, some inductees were returned to the United States before the completion of their normal tours. Those who would complete 23 months of military service in May 1955 were rotated in April, for separation in May; and those who would complete 22 months of service in June were returned in May, for separation in June. However, inductees were permitted to waive early return if they desired to do so.[47]

c. Shortened Foreign Service Tours.

(1) For Enlisted Men. In November 1954 the Department of the Army considered shortening the maximum length of foreign service tours for enlisted men from 6 years--as specified in AR 600-175--to 4, and requested USAREUR to comment upon the proposal. One purpose of the proposed change was to reduce the great disparity between the maximum tour of 6 years and the planned 33-month GYROSCOPE tour. Another was to allow all personnel to serve their fair share of tours in both desirable and undesirable areas--USAREUR being considered a desirable area.[48] After consulting with Seventh Army and COMZ headquarters, USAREUR concurred in the proposal.[49] Enlisted personnel only would be affected, since USAREUR regulations already limited tours for officers to 36 months, with the possibility of extension to not more than 42 months if military urgency demanded.

The Department of the Army promulgated the change, as proposed, in March 1955. Two exceptions were made. First-three-graders with 20 years of service were allowed to extend their tours to a maximum of 6 years--instead of indefinitely, as before--with the approval of the overseas commander. Individuals assigned to GYROSCOPE units were permitted to extend for sufficient time to enable them to accompany their units back to the United States.[50]

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[46] Ibid., May 13, 1955.

[47] Cable SX-18423, USAREUR to sub comds, 2 Feb 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Hist Div 311 (1955), Vol. I, Item 18.

[48] Cable DA-564730, G1 sgd TAG to CINCUSAREUR, 16 Nov 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 210.45 (1954), Vol. I, Item 19.

[49] (1) Cable SC-26163, USAREUR to DA for G1, 8 Dec 54. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) DF, USAREUR G1 to COFS, 1 Dec 54. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in file cited above.

[50] (1) Cable DA-503714, TAG to CINCUSAREUR, 9 Mar 55. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR Release No. 55-147, Mar 55, sub: Maximum Oversea Tour Cut to Four Years. Both in file cited above.

(2) For Women. A change in the length of overseas tours for women, made in the spring of 1955, was the outgrowth of a Department of the Army proposal, in October 1954, to reduce overseas tours of Army Nurse Corps personnel from 3 years--as specified in AR 614-30--to 2, because of that Corps' heavy losses from resignations and category expirations.[51] USAREUR concurred in the proposal and recommended that Women's Medical Specialist Corps personnel be included. USAREUR also recommended, however, that female officers accompanied by dependents be required to serve full 3-year tours, that female officers who desired to complete 3-year tours be permitted to apply for 12-month extensions in 6-month increments, and that those with extensions already approved be permitted to complete them.[52] The revised regulation, published on 14 March 1955, established a normal overseas tour of 24 months for all female military personnel unaccompanied by dependents and permitted one 12-month extension. It did not apply to female personnel whose dependents accompanied or joined them. Rotation of eligible enlisted women to the United States began in June 1955, and that of eligible officer personnel was planned to begin in July.[53]

d. Proposed Adjustment of Certain Foreign Service Tours to School Terms. In October 1954 Seventh Army requested USAREUR to grant, whenever practicable, spring extensions and fall curtailments of overseas tours for military personnel with dependents of school age. Existing regulations prevented requests for extensions or curtailments of that nature from being forwarded to Headquarters, USAREUR. Although such adjustments would no doubt contribute to the continuity of dependents' schooling and might enhance morale, USAREUR felt that their merits would be outweighed by several important disadvantages. For instance, rotation would probably double during the summer months, inequities would develop between stabilized GYROSCOPE and relatively mobile non-GYROSCOPE personnel, and the concurrent travel program would be upset. Thus no action on the proposal was taken.[54] However, in the case of GYROSCOPE units scheduled to rotate from the command at such a time that dependent children would miss instruction during the first few weeks of a school year, USAREUR later authorized arrangements to provide, during the preceding summer, the first six weeks of normal fall term instruction.[55]

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[51] Cable DA-558036, G1 to CINCUSAREUR, 21 Oct 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 17A.

[52] Cable SC-22816, USAREUR to DA, 5 Nov 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[53] USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf Notes, No. 13, 23 May 55, p. 2. SECRET (information used UNCLASSIFIED).

[54] DF, USAREUR ACOFS G1 to COFS, 3 Jan 55, sub: Adjustment of Foreign Service Tours. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 210.45 (1955), Vol. I, Item 1.

[55] Incl 1 to USAREUR ltr, 1 Feb 55, sub: Operation GYROSCOPE, Sec III-2. AG 370.5 GCT-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

32. Career Management

Significant career management measures designed to improve the efficiency of military personnel were taken during the period under review.

a. USAREUR Command and Staff Rotation Policy. In addition to the usual assignment rotation prescribed by the Department of the Army as career guidance policy for officers on all levels,[56] USAREUR began in February 1954 a command and staff rotation policy, which came to full swing during FY 1955. Its principal purpose was to give to the maximum number of combat arms colonels and lieutenant colonels an opportunity to broaden and raise their professional qualifications by assigning them to command and staff positions in rotation. Its correlative purpose was to provide the various headquarters in Europe with staff officers who were better qualified because of their knowledge of problems in the field. In view of critical MOS requirements and the limited number of command positions in the grades of colonel and lieutenant colonel, the plan was made applicable primarily to Regular Army officers. Approximately 50 percent of the 1954 graduates of the command and General Staff College and higher schools assigned to USAREUR, and from 66 to 75 percent of the 1955 graduates, were reassigned to Seventh Army for command positions. An additional 25 percent were assigned directly to staff positions at USAREUR and other headquarters. This 25 percent, consisting of officers whose records showed that they had had recent command tours and a few officers whose field experience was greatly needed, were scheduled to remain in staff assignments during their full overseas tours. Others would be rotated between command and staff positions at some time during the latter half of their tours.[57]

b. Officer Corps Revitalization. During the period covered by this report the Department of the Army inaugurated, in several phases, a long-range program designed to create and maintain an active officer corps that would be young, vigorous, of high quality, and of maximum mobilization potential.[58]

(1) Mandatory Retirement of Certain Regular Army Permanent Colonels. As a forerunner of this program, the Department informed USAREUR in January 1954 that the President had terminated an Executive order permitting the retention of permanent Regular Army colonels on active duty beyond the "30 and 5" limit (30 years of

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[56] TM 20-605, Jun 48, sub: Career Management for Army Officers. UNCLASSIFIED.

[57] Interv, Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col A. D. Von Rohr, C/USAREUR G1 MPB Off Sec, 15 Jul 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

[58] Cable DA-31693 to CINCUSAREUR, 27 May 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 210.456 (1955), Vol. I, Item 13.

active duty, 5 of them in grade). As an exception, the Secretary of the Army was authorized to retain not more than 20 such officers, from a list previously designated, until June 1957, but all others would be subject to mandatory retirement. Those originally scheduled for retirement between 1 January and 31 July 1954 would be retired on 30 September 1954, and those originally scheduled for retirement after 31 July 1954 would be retired normally.[59] The order affected 58 officers in USAREUR and associated MAAG's. CINCUSAREUR was later authorized to consider and act upon requests of these officers for extensions or curtailments of overseas tours to prevent personal or financial hardships.[60]

(2) Release of Certain Non-Regular Officers Eligible for Retirement. An associated step in the officer corps revitalization program was the mandatory release from active duty of non-Regular officers, captain through colonel, who reached age 53 (55 for colonels) or completed 28 years (30 for colonels) of satisfactory active Federal service. Under Title II, Public Law 810, 80th Congress, these officers were eligible for retirement after 20 years of service. The releases, directed by the Department of the Army, began on 30 September 1954 and affected approximately 200 USAREUR officers by 30 June 1955.[61]

(3) Release of Non-Regular Officers on Account of Age. A third step in the process was the mandatory release from active duty, and separation from service, of non-Regular officers who, because of advanced age, would be unable to qualify for retirement under Title II, Public Law 810, 80th Congress, referred to above. In USAREUR the first group of officers was released on 30 April 1955, with additional increments on the last day of each succeeding month. However, officers within two years of completing the 20 years of active service were retained on active duty, pending retirement, irrespective of their ages.[62]

(4) Release of "Twice-Passed-Over" Officers. The fourth step in the officer corps revitalization program was the mandatory release, directed by the Department of the Army, of Regular and non-Regular

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[59] Cable DA-956021 to CINCUSAREUR, 23 Jan 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 4 atchd.

[60] (1) Cable DA-288516, G1 to CINCUSAREUR, 10 Feb 54. (2) Cable DA-495903, G1 to CINCUSAREUR, 10 Mar 54. Both UNCLASSIFIED. Both in file cited above.

[61] TAG ltr, 30 Jun 54, sub: Mandatory Release of Officers, and Incl 1, sub: Commissioned Officers Scheduled to be Released, etc. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Cable DA-552357 to CINCUSAREUR, 29 Sep 54. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR SGS 210.456 (1954), Vol. I, Item 58.

[62] Cable DA-561057 to CINCUSAREUR, 1 Nov 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

officers twice passed over for temporary promotion to the grades of captain, major, or lieutenant colonel.[63] The implementation of this directive began on 1 January 1955.[64] Officers were given 120 days notice prior to release. The cases of Regular Army officers were referred to a screening board, a board of inquiry if requested, and a board of review, as required by law.[65]

c. Release of Enlisted Personnel Below Minimum Aptitude Standards for Reenlistment. The Department of the Army directed in February 1955 that, with certain exceptions, enlisted personnel who had prior service in any of the Armed Forces and 3 years or more of total active service should be separated if they were ineligible for reenlistment because of a percentile score of 30 or less on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (or a score of 90 or less on the Army General Classification Test). To allow the retention of individuals who had otherwise performed satisfactorily, separation would not be mandatory for personnel in grade E-4 or higher; for individuals with continuous active service since 1 September 1945; for individuals with 9 or more years of active Federal service whose commanding officer certified to his willingness to retain them in his unit; for partially disabled combat-wounded veterans of World War II who had been allowed to enlist or reenlist because of critically needed skills; or for personnel holding Army Reserve or National Guard commissions or warrant officer appointments. However, individuals in those categories might request separation under the provisions of the directive. Personnel to be released were to depart the command after 30 April 1955 but in time to allow actual separation in the United States before 26 June.[66] Reports from subordinate commands indicated that 5,367 enlisted men would be returned to the United States under this directive. Of this number, 3,005 were originally scheduled for rotation during the period from June 1955 to April 1956, and slightly more than 25 percent were Negroes.[67]

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[63](1) Cable DA-575361, to CINCUSAREUR, 29 Dec 54, as amended by Cable DA-579098, to CINCUSAREUR, 13 Jan 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 210.456 (1955), Vol. I, Item 13. (2) Cable DA-574083, to CINCUSAREUR, 22 Dec 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 210.456 (1954), Vol. I, Item 58. (3) SR 135-175-4, C5, 10 May 55, sub: Civilian Components: Release of Officers and Warrant Officers from Active Duty. UNCLASSIFIED.

[64]/Author's Note./ On 25 July 1955 the Department of the Army rescinded this directive because of the new Reserve Forces Act, which made a new system of extended active duty necessary, and because of pending legislation concerning readjustment pay for involuntarily separated non-Regular officers.

[65]PL 180, 80th Cong.

[66]Cable DA-500808, 25 Feb 55, quoted in USAREUR Cable SC-19159, to all sub comds, 2 Mar 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 210.456 (1955), Vol. I, Item 8.

[67]Comment 4 to DF, USAREUR G1 to COFS, 18 Mar 55, sub: Involuntary Separation of Enlisted Personnel. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

d. New Enlisted Personnel Management System. A major accomplishment of the last three months of the fiscal year was the execution and completion of personnel measures required for installing the new Army-wide enlisted personnel management system in USAREUR.[68] The purpose of the new system originating from the Office of The Adjutant General was two-fold: to institute and maintain an MOS structure that was more meaningful, flexible, and adaptable to either peace or mobilization, and to enhance the prestige of noncommissioned officers as enlisted leaders by identifying them as leaders and restoring them to positions of responsible leadership. For this purpose new specialist grades from E-4 through E-7 were established with insignia distinct from those of NCO's, and every enlisted man in grades E-4 through E-7 was classified as NCO or specialist. A Department of the Army team came to USAREUR in March, and held a series of conferences and schools in Heidelberg,[69] to acquaint personnel officers with the scope of the new system and assist them in setting it up. Personnel officers, in turn, reviewed the record of every enlisted individual in the command and on the basis of his or her complete military history, Army schooling, and civilian education and experience, assigned a new MOS. An NCO who was redesignated a specialist and wished to remain an NCO made a written request, to that effect, to a classification board. Local commanders were authorized to consider cases of individuals designated NCO's who desired to be specialists instead. The entire process was completed in time for the new system to go into effect on 1 July 1955.[70]

Section II: Civilian Personnel

33. Strength and Trends

During FY 1955 the number of civilian employees of the command, excluding "labor service" personnel, increased by about 3 percent. The figures, extracted from Table 3 were:

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[68] (1) AR 611-201, 9 Mar 55, sub: Manual of Enlisted Military Occupational Specialties. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) AR 615-15, 2 Jul 54, sub: Separation of Noncommissioned Officers from Specialists. UNCLASSIFIED.

[69] USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf Notes, No. 9, 12 Apr 55. SECRET (information used UNCLASSIFIED).

[70] The Stars and Stripes, (Eur. ed.) June 28, 1955, p. 11.

	30 Jun 54	30 Jun 55	+Increase or -Decrease
Total	138,708	142,615	+ 3,907
U.S. Civilian Employees	4,970	6,181	+ 1,211
Continental Wage Scale Employees (Dollar Paid)	244	180	- 64
Local Wage Rate Employees (Dollar Paid)	12,598	19,593	+ 6,995
German Resident Employees	120,896	116,661	- 4,235

The increases in the number of U.S. civilian and indigenous local wage rate (LWR) employees reflected not only the increased needs of the command but the national policy of making maximum use of civilian employees in positions that could be occupied by either military or civilian personnel. They reflected also Department of the Army policy that civilian employees should be used in all positions not requiring military skills or military personnel for reasons of training, security, or discipline.[71] United States civilians constituted only about 4 percent of the civilian working force during the year, and as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the necessity of employing about 200 additional teachers in the dependent schools system of the command accounted for 1 out of every 6 additions in that category. Most of the increase in the number of indigenous LWR personnel took place in France to meet the increasing requirements of the build-up of the line of communications and the needs of the Joint Construction Agency. On the other hand, the cutback of 4,235 in German resident employees, which was made late in the fiscal year, was the direct result of reductions in Deutsche Mark funds incident to West German sovereignty (see par. 35c (2)).

34. Finance and Administration

a. Funds. A breakdown of civilian employee figures, exclusive of "labor service" personnel, as of 30 June 1955, according to funds from which wages or salaries were paid is given in the following tabulation:[72]

[71] Memo, Brig Gen D. V. Johnson, DCOFS for Opns, to Maj Gen J. F. Uncles, USAREUR COFS, 21 Dec 54, sub: Tables of Distribution for COMZ Depot. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 322 COMZ (1954), Vol. II, Item 33 atchd.

[72] USAREUR Mthly Stat Rept, 30 Jun 55. SECRET (information used UNCLASSIFIED).

	Totals	From Appropriated Funds	From Non-appropriated Funds	From Defense Support Costs
Totals	142,615	21,371	38,530	82,714
U.S. Civilian Employees	6,181	4,606	1,575	-
Continental Wage Scale Employees	180	117	63	-
Local Wage Rate Employees	19,593	16,648	2,945	-
German Resident Employees	116,661	-	33,947	82,714

b. Payroll. During FY 1955, the payroll of civilian employees whose wages and salaries came from appropriated dollar funds amounted to $45,927,244, an increase of $10,666,828 over the preceding fiscal year. The amount paid to civilian employees (including labor service personnel) who were paid in appropriated Deutsche Marks was DM 464,606,651 ($110,620,631), an increase of DM 93,866,389 ($22,349,140) over FY 1954.[73]

c. Collective Tariff Agreement, German Personnel. The most important development in the sphere of civilian personnel administration was the adoption of a joint wage agreement for German employees.[74] This agreement covered more than 85 percent of all civilian personnel in the command. Effective 1 February 1955, it established uniform wage schedules and conditions of employment applicable to virtually all German Deutsche Mark-paid employees of the U.S., British, and French forces in Germany (except Berlin), replacing 62 separate pay scales and tariffs previously in effect. Not included were labor service personnel, whose pay was governed by other regulations, or household domestics, musicians, artists, and ecclesiastical persons. For all personnel affiliated with the seven major German trades unions, however, as well as for all other employees who agreed to its terms, the new tariff regulated hours of work (normally 8 hours a day, 6 days a week), overtime, leaves, absences, grades of employment, wage scales and salary groups, transfers, and terminations, and made

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[73](1) Intervs, Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. R. V. Wilson, Jr., USAREUR Compt Program Rev & Anal Br., 18, 27 Sep 55. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jan 53-30 Jun 54, p. 74. SECRET (information used UNCLASSIFIED).

[74]Official title (translated from the German): Tariff Agreement dated 28 January 1955 Concerning the Employees Employed with Offices, Agencies, Enterprises, and Other Institutions of the Allied Authorities and of the Allied Forces Within the Territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 230 Ind (1955), Vol. I, Item 4 atchd (B/P).

provisions for claims and settlement of disputes. Its application reduced competition among the Allied forces, established a common administrative code, and made greater mobility and interchange of labor between the forces possible. It not only met the requirements of the Forces Convention, applicable to the period before West Germany was admitted to NATO, but conformed to conditions thereafter, subject to only a few administrative changes. In the U.S. Zone the agreement effected two principal changes. The first was an over-all wage increase of from 12 to 15 percent, enabling U.S. forces to compete with German industry. The second was full recognition of the general applicability of German labor laws to the employment of local civilian manpower and of the right of individual employees to have recourse to German labor courts in adjudicating claims. The agreement was concurred in formally by the three U.S. component commanders and accepted by the Allied High Commissioners. The signing of this agreement on 28 January 1955 by the Minister of Finance, for the Federal Republic of Germany, and by representatives of the German trades unions for the employees, ended 3½ years of negotiations in which USAREUR had participated as the coordinating agency for U.S. forces in Germany.[75]

35. Personnel Problems and Policies

a. U.S. Civilians.

(1) Reinstatement of Reemployment Leave for U.S. Civilians. An administrative change affecting U.S. Department of the Army civilian employees paid from appropriated funds was made in November 1954 when reemployment leave to the United States was reinstated. The privilege had been withdrawn in August 1951 for employees recruited after that date. Under the reinstated regulation an employee completing a 2-year employment agreement would be eligible, by signing another transportation agreement, to return to the United States at government expense for the purpose of taking annual leave, and thereafter to return at government expense to the overseas duty station. The leave time would be exclusive of actual travel time from station to U.S. residence and return, together with time spent necessarily in awaiting sailing or flight, and per diem would be payable for all travel time. Military personnel who became Department of the Army civilian employees immediately following release from military service, without a break in government employ, would become eligible for reemployment leave after completing a 1-year employment agreement.

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[75](1) DF, USAREUR ACOFS G1 to COFS, 24 Jan 55, sub: Collective Wage Tariff Agreement, Germany (except Berlin). UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above. (2) Interv, Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. L. M. Taylor, Dep C/USAREUR G1 CPB, 15 Jul 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

Personnel not having sufficient accrued leave time would be permitted to go on leave-without-pay status.[76]

(2) Proposed Extension of Competitive Civil Service to USAREUR. In the fall of 1954 the Department of the Army submitted to the U.S. Civil Service Commission, through the Department of Defense, a plan to remove most U.S. civilian jobs overseas from the list of so-called excepted positions (i.e., positions not subject to competitive civil-service requirements) and to place them within the competitive civil-service system, effective 2 January 1955. The basis of the proposal was that excepted employment offered no career security and could therefore not be depended upon to attract the highest type of new employees. Furthermore, since excepted overseas employees lacked competitive status that would be of value to them in obtaining other civil-service employment in the United States, they tended to remain abroad for extended periods of dissociation with the United States that were sometimes detrimental both to the individual and the command.[77] In response to the Department of the Army request, the Civil Service Commission authorized its staff representatives to arrange for most of the Department of Defense positions in foreign areas to be brought into the system.[78] A Department of the Army team thereupon made a preliminary USAREUR survey and examined the job classifications of a representative percentage of positions. Upon that team's recommendation, the Civilian Personnel Branch, Assistant Chief of Staff, G1, made a complete job-by-job survey of U.S. civilian positions, applying standards used in the United States.[79] At the close of the fiscal year a Presidential Executive Order to put the plan into effect was being awaited.[80]

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[76](1) Press release (approved by USAREUR DCOFS for Admin), 30 Nov 54, sub: Reemployment Leave to the United States for Department of the Army Civilians. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 230 (1954), Vol. I, Item 55. (2) HACOM Civilian Personnel News Letter No. 2, Sep 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

[77]DF, USAREUR ACOFS G1 to COFS, 15 Nov 54, sub: Civil Service Status Overseas, and Incl 1 thereto, sub: Survey of Civilian Jobs and Qualifications. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 230 (1955), Vol. I, Item 8.

[78]USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf Notes, No. 1, 4 Jan 55, p. 8. SECRET (information used UNCLASSIFIED).

[79]DF, USAREUR ACOFS G1 to all USAREUR Stf Div Chiefs, 16 Mar 55, sub: Survey of Civilian Personnel Positions. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 230 (1955), Vol. I, Item 8.

[80](1) Interv, Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. L. M. Taylor, Dep C/USAREUR G1 CPB, 3 Aug 55. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) HACOM Civilian Personnel News Letter, No. 1, Aug 55, p. 2. UNCLASSIFIED.

b. Legal Status of Army Air Force Exchange System Employees Under NATO Status of Forces Agreement. In July 1954 the Department of the Army initiated a study of the status of exchange employees in overseas areas.[81] The question, which was of importance to USAREUR since it involved more than 23,000 such employees, arose specifically from a suit for breach of contract and for physical assault brought in a French local court against the French Central Exchange by a French civilian employee of the exchange. The local court awarded a default judgment of about $3,500, and the employee attached the exchange's account with the American Express Company, for the amount. The attachment was later lifted, but a sum sufficient to satisfy the judgment was impounded, pending further inquiry. The issue was whether the exchange service was a part of the Armed Forces and therefore not subject to suit in the French courts (under the doctrine of sovereign immunity) or whether it was merely a commercial enterprise whose employees had the same status as those of other commercial organizations. Involved also was the related question of whether persons paid out of nonappropriated funds were employees of the Armed Forces. The Department of State and the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany were desirous of keeping claims of sovereign immunity at a minimum. On the other hand, from the point of view of practical operation of exchanges, USAREUR and AFEX felt that if those installations were declared to be merely commercial enterprises, host countries might refuse to issue work permits to American employees, so that indigenous personnel would have to be employed in their places; local merchants could bring pressure upon their governments to curtail or eliminate the operation of exchanges; local taxes, as well as customs and license fees, might be imposed and exchanges be subjected to local ordinances in such a way as to bring about higher prices, limitation of services, and other undesirable changes.[82] By the end of the fiscal year it had been clearly decided that Allied, neutral, and U.S. employees of the European Exchange System were employees of the U.S. Armed Forces within the NATO Status of Forces Agreement's definition of a civilian component.[83] Under the pertinent agreements with France and Germany concerning local wage rate employees in those

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[81] Ltr, Brig Gen Robt. W. Berry, Dir/US EUCOM J1 Div, to Maj Gen C. B. Ferenbaugh, USAREUR COFS, 10 Aug 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 230 (1954), Vol. I, Item 23A.

[82] Memo for rcd, sgd by M. Scolnick, AFEX. 19 May 54, sub: Legal Status of AAFEX System and Employees under the NATO Status of Forces Agreement. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[83] State-Def Msg, CAE-6964, 12 Apr 55. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SAD EES Legal Br files.

countries,[84] LWR personnel employed by EES were employees of the U.S. Government. Under the terms of the Conventions, which became effective in the Federal Republic of Germany on 5 May 1955, EES was clearly entitled to the protection of sovereign immunity. With respect to France, the Department of State had not taken a definitive position at the close of the period. However, the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Army had adhered to the position that EES, as a non-appropriated fund activity established under the authority of the Secretary of the Army, was an instrumentality of the United States and therefore entitled to sovereign immunity; and the doctrine of sovereign immunity had been used successfully in several suits in France to prevent judgment against the European Exchange System.[85]

c. Use of Indigenous Personnel. The use of indigenous personnel, a practice that, in the logistical system especially, USAREUR considered to be a calculated risk imposed by national policy, and budgetary restrictions,[86] came under discussion several times and in different connections during the period covered by this report.

(1) Preliminary Request and Study. In October 1954 US CINCEUR asked the three component commanders to submit data on the economies effected by the employment of indigenous personnel. In addition they were to make an estimate of the number of positions filled by indigenous personnel that would be either assigned to U.S. military and civilian personnel or abolished if the present incumbents were no longer available. This estimate was to include figures on the additional cost involved in such a switch. Finally, each commander was asked to state whether he was making maximum use of indigenous personnel, and if not, why not.[87] CINCUSAREUR replied that of the approximately 123,500 such positions in his command, 45,500 (36,000 in Germany and 9,500 in France) would become military jobs and 78,000 (75,000 in Germany and 3,000 in France) would become Department of the Army civilian jobs, none being abolished; and that the additional annual

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[84](1) Statute Applicable to Labor (LWR Personnel) hired for the U.S. Air Force in Metropolitan France. (2) Tariff Agreement, dated 28 January 1955, Concerning the Employees Employed with Offices, Agencies, Enterprises, and Other Institutions of the Allied Authorities and of the Allied Forces Within the Territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. Both UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR POLAD files.

[85]DF, C/USAREUR SAD EES to SAD Tech Info Off, 21 Sep 55, sub: Historical Information, and Comment 2, USAREUR SAD to C/USAREUR Hist Div, 26 Sep 55. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR Hist Div files.

[86]Memo, Maj Gen E. D. Post, USAREUR G3, to COFS, 13 Dec 54, sub: Consideration of Comments by the Quartermaster. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 322 COMZ (1954), Vol. II, Item 33 atchd.

[87]Cable EX-9-4348, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR and others, 16 Oct 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 230 (1954), Vol. I, Item 43.

cost would be about 620 million dollars. CINCUSAREUR also stated that the maximum feasible use of indigenous personnel was being made.[88]

(2) Follow-up Study. The Office of the Secretary of Defense then directed US EUCOM to make a study of economies that could be effected, in personnel and dollars, by replacing appreciable numbers of U.S. military and civilian personnel, who required housing, transportation, etc., with indigenous personnel, whose requirements of that nature would presumably be less. CINCUSAREUR was asked specifically to furnish data supporting the statement that maximum feasible use of indigenous personnel was already being made. The basic question for study was: Could indigenous personnel be used to replace U.S. military and civilian personnel in sufficient numbers to bring about a 25 percent reduction in the number of dependents overseas? If so, what would the number of replacements be, and to what extent could they be made from the indigenous labor potential within the command? CINCUSAREUR replied that a reduction of 25 percent, or 10,000 families, in the number of sponsored dependents would have to be prorated among all command elements and all grades. Because of the command's wide dispersion such a reduction would have no great impact on any one area, and the same number of U.S. military and civilian personnel would be required to take care of the remaining 30,000 families, although the number of local wage rate (LWR) personnel would decrease. CINCUSAREUR pointed out that the feasibility of using indigenous personnel involved several factors: the command's primary mission, which was readiness for combat; its secondary mission, which was the evacuation of noncombatants; security, budgetary considerations, the nationality of the indigenous people, and their availability. Some of the advantages of employing indigenous personnel were the release of U.S. military manpower; lower budget cost per employees; in Germany, greater local availability of persons with mechanical and technical skills; continuity of work experience; and the ability of LWR manpower to supplement U.S. manpower, in some measure, in the initial phases of an emergency. Arrayed against these were such disadvantages as the undesirability of the employment of LWR personnel in positions involving access to classified materials; the language barrier; stationary status, except in the case of labor service personnel; the complexities of German and French labor laws and customs, making employment and administration difficult; the difficulty of recruiting skilled personnel in agricultural France; the necessity, in Germany, of training certain categories of workers, only to have them hired away by German industry; and the general uncertainty, especially in USAREUR COMZ, with regard to the continued availability of indigenous personnel in the event of an emergency. To sum up, local wage rate indigenous personnel constituted a valuable

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[88] Cable S-2895, USAREUR to US CINCEUR, 21 Oct 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

source of manpower for many custodial, industrial, and administrative functions and were economical where they could be employed within the limits of security and scarce skills. However, to increase their use in Germany would impair the command's capability to fulfill its mission. In France the use of additional LWR personnel was prevented by the agricultural nature of much of the region from which they would have to be recruited and by the likelihood that, in the event of French mobilization, USAREUR COMZ installations would lose nearly all French employees under age 40, plus others through defection or because of the imminence of attack. These could not be replaced except by women or by men over 40, assuming that the French Government would agree to mobilize such men "in place." CINCUSAREUR's recommendation, therefore, was that the command be considered as already making maximum use of LWR personnel in Germany and that further increase in the use of such personnel in France should be limited to the number of personnel whose continued employment after the outbreak of hostilities could be guaranteed by the French Government.[89]

(3) The ORO Study. In the same connection the field team of the Operations Research Office (ORO), attached to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, was asked to study the emergency availability of civilian labor in USAREUR COMZ, and to make recommendations to assure an adequate supply of such labor.[90] According to this study, U.S. forces were becoming increasingly dependent upon French indigenous labor as the logistical base shifted from Germany to France. At 5 of the major Advance Section depots, LWR strength was 21 to 70 percent of the total manpower. Indigenous personnel constituted from 18 to 67 percent of the manpower assigned to depot operations, as distinct from administration and housekeeping. U.S. forces experienced difficulties in meeting requirements for civilian labor, especially in skilled categories. Nevertheless, current policy was to increase the number of LWR's and to decrease the number of military personnel, with a view toward changing the over-all LWR/military personnel ratio from 38/62 to 64/36 by 1957. In the early stages of an emergency, the availability of labor from local resources was to be relied upon pending the arrival of reinforcements from the United States. The ORO study concluded that the Armed Forces could not fill their existing needs for indigenous depot workers except by offering inducements in the form of housing or better transportation. Moreover, within 5 days of the start of an emergency, COMZ installations would lose at least 20 percent of all male LWR's through French military mobilization alone, although

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[89] 1st Ind and Incls to Cable S-2895, cited above, CINCUSAREUR to US CINCEUR, 7 Nov 54, sub: Utilization of Indigenous Personnel. SECRET. In file cited above.

[90] The Availability of Civilian Labor for the USAREUR COMZ in an Emergency, Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University, ORO-S-56 (USAREUR), 21 Mar 55. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR G3 ORO files.

the extent of this loss could be reduced by the substitution of women and of men over 40. It seemed doubtful that replacements could be supplied by the transfer to France of personnel employed by U.S. Forces in Germany, although limited numbers of refugees, preferably to be organized as mobile labor units, might help meet immediate and early emergency needs. On the basis of World War II experience U.S. forces would have to expect the defection of about 75 percent of the remaining depot labor personnel. After the beginning of hostilities such losses could not be replaced, or the labor force augmented, except by action of the French Government. The ORO study recommended that the current LWR force in COMZ be militarized by agreement with the French Government. The best method would be to give the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, unquestioned authority to assign French reserve units to U.S. installations as needed. In addition, plans should be prepared for the formation of mobile labor units composed of refugees, preferably German LWR's. The study also recommended that plans for disaster relief, shelter areas, air defense exercises, reserve food and clothing stocks, hazard pay, bonuses, etc., be developed, to increase the security of the labor force and attract civilian manpower after the start of enemy attacks. Since some loss was inevitable, additional preventive measures such as job rotation, on-the-job training, dispersal of depots and stockpiles, and replacement of draft-eligible men with older men or with women should be taken at once to lessen its impact. A final recommendation was that manpower requirements for 30, 60, and 90 days after the start of hostilities be estimated and lists of essential job classifications and key positions be drawn up as guides for the negotiation of agreements with the French Government and for advance planning.[91]

(4) French Governmental Assurances. As early as June 1954 US CINCEUR requested the advice and assistance of the U.S. Ambassador to France in the matter of obtaining from the French Government the desired assurances concerning the wartime retention, replacement, and procurement, by U.S. forces, of French indigenous employees. In February 1955 the Ambassador finally reached an agreement with the French Government that, in the event of war, French "special assignments" regulations would apply to American military installations in France in the same manner as to French national defense establishments. The implementing procedure later agreed upon provided for requests for the retention of LWR key personnel to be forwarded to French authorities, together with an estimate of the total USAREUR requirement for

[91] Ibid.

French LWR labor.[92]

d. Special Problems in Germany.

(1) The German Children's Allowance Law. A German law of 13 November 1954, known as the Children's Supplementary Allowance Law, provided for certain payments to be made, through employer contributions based on payroll, to employees having three or more children. The Allied forces were exempted from the requirements of the law. However, on 7 January 1955 the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany proposed that the U.S. forces voluntarily accept application of the law to their local German employees.[93] USAREUR's view was that acceptance of the application of the law would establish a dangerous precedent. However, without accepting application of the law as such, the command agreed on 25 February to make payments comparable to those set forth in the German law.[94] This action was taken in accordance with the Allied and U.S. policy of basing rates of pay to German employees on those prevailing in German private industry, and also because the British and French forces planned to accept application of the law to their German employees. Moreover, upon obtaining sovereignty the Federal Republic of Germany would probably amend the law so as to make it applicable to the Allied forces. According to USAREUR estimates, the cost of the payments would be approximately three-fourths of 1 percent of the command's total payroll.

(2) Impact of Reduced DM Support on Employment of German Personnel. On 16 May 1955 all subordinate commands were informed that because of the reduced availability of DM support during the defense support period, 5 May 1955 to 5 May 1956, certain operations and activities supported by Deutsche Marks would have to be curtailed or eliminated, to effect maximum economies as soon as possible. Personnel measures directed as initial steps included the following: Elimination of custodial services in dependent housing apartments, school

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[92](1) Ltr, Maj Gen C. D. Palmer, US EUCOM COFS, to CINCUSAREUR, 11 Feb 55, sub: Special Designation for Civilian Personnel in Time of Mobilization. (2) Ltr, M. Leduc, C/Fr Cen Ln Msn for Assistance to Allied Forces, to AMEMB, Paris, 22 Feb 55. (3) Comment 2, USAREUR ACOFS G1 to COFS, 2 Mar 55. (4) 1st Ind, CINCUSAREUR sgd Uncles thru CINCUSAFE to US CINCEUR, 11 Mar 55. All SECRET. All in USAREUR SGS 230 Ind (1955), Vol. I, Item 8A.

[93]DF, USAREUR ACOFS G1 to COFS, 2 Feb 55, sub: Application of German Law on Payment of Children's Allowances to Personnel of the Allied Forces. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 3A.

[94]Ltr, Col L. S. Bork, USAREUR Dep ACOFS G1 to HICOG, 25 Feb 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

dormitories, BOQ's and hotels, and of grounds maintenance for individual houses; maximum curtailment of personnel employed to operate heating plants in those facilities; elimination of a number of fire companies through agreements for the services of civil fire departments and volunteer companies; a 15 percent reduction in the number of busses, passenger cars, and cargo vehicles operating out of administrative motor pools; a reduction of approximately 15 percent in the number of German wage scale employees of USAREUR headquarters staff agencies and at certain subordinate headquarters and installations; immediate reduction of the budgeted support for the Leave and Rest Centers (see par. 43d) to an annual level of $1.4 million; and an immediate reduction in labor service personnel (see par. 38b). All commands were instructed to place release notices in the hands of personnel affected (and especially those entitled by law to 6 weeks' notice) by 19 May. Labor service personnel, however, were to be notified by 31 May.[95] In June 1955 authority to use appropriated DM funds for the employment of dishwashers, kitchen police, and mess attendants in field ration "A" messes, which had been granted in June 1954, was withdrawn. Termination notices were to be effective 25 June, except that personnel with over 5 years of service would have to be continued until 2 July.[96] To maintain favorable public relations, General McAuliffe instructed the commanding generals of all area commands to inform the public about the reasons and necessity for the reduction in force. Moreover, deserving employees who were being separated were to be assisted in finding new employment, in order to lessen the impact of large-scale reductions in the number of German employees. Special attention was to be given to possibilities of reemployment, by the Army, of long-time employees to fill suitable vacancies. Civilian personnel officers were instructed to arrange meetings with Land and local German labor officials and to request their participation, as well as that of any other officials concerned, in the placement of surplus employees. To this end, appropriate local German officials were to be furnished with lists of the released employees, by names and skills.[97]

(3) Use of German Civilians After the Activation of the New German Armed Forces. In December 1954, US CINCEUR asked the component commanders to estimate the impact of West German sovereignty, and particularly of the activation of the new German armed forces, upon

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[95] Cables SX-3300, 3310, and 3335, CINCUSAREUR to sub comds, 16, 17, 18 May 55. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above, Item 13 and atchd.

[96] Cable SC-36223, USAREUR to all Area Comds, 2 Jun 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 320.4 (1955), Vol. I, Item 13.

[97] (1) Ltr, Maj Gen O. P. Newman, USAREUR DCOFS for Admin to CG's Area Comds, 6 Jun 55, sub: Out-Placement of German Personnel Separated by Reductions in Force. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 230 Ind (1955), Vol. I, Item 17B atchd.

the employment of German manpower by the U.S. forces. He also asked them to recommend measures to forestall a manpower shortage.[98] CINCUSAREUR had been considering this question since March 1954, and as the coordinating authority for U.S. forces in Germany, had gathered pertinent data from USAFE, as well as from his own headquarters and subordinate commands. On 15 September 1954 representatives of CINCUSAREUR held preliminary discussions with German officials. These discussions revealed that, as in France, the two principal questions involved were the exemption or deferment of German employees of the U.S. forces from German military draft in peacetime and the retention of those employees, and especially of key personnel, in the event of war.[99] In later talks and correspondence, the prevention of proselyting was added as a third consideration. After the exchange of views between U.S. military and political agencies, which continued after the granting of sovereignty to West Germany on 5 May 1955, the U.S. Ambassador in Bonn expressed his willingness to negotiate with the Federal Republic. However, he would not ask for the exemption of German employees of the U.S. forces, or of key personnel, as a class, but for an agreement that German personnel in the employ of U.S. forces would obtain, both during peace and in an emergency, the same draft status accorded equivalent personnel in the employ of the German armed forces or in essential German industry. At the same time he suggested that representatives of USAREUR and the U.S. Embassy should discuss with the appropriate West German Ministry, the possibility of an agreement prohibiting the proselytization of German employees of the U.S. forces.[100] At the close of FY 1955 plans for negotiating both of these agreements were under way.

(4) Security Separations of German Employees. Effective 3 November 1954, a policy was established whereby a German employee separated for security reasons could be advised of the reasons and given the opportunity of a personal appearance hearing and a review of the case by USAREUR headquarters. Furthermore, an employee previously separated for security reasons, who applied for reemployment, could be advised of the reasons for his nonemployability and afforded an opportunity to submit affidavits or other documents for review and for

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[98](1) Cable EX-9-5410, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR and others, 17 Dec 54. (2) Cable SC-3806, CINCUSAREUR to sub comds, 18 Dec 54. Both SECRET. Both in file above, Item 2.

[99]Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to US CINCEUR, 6 Jan 55, sub: Impact of German Military and Industrial Mobilization Upon U.S. Forces Requirements for Civilian German Labor. SECRET. In file cited above.

[100](1) Ltr, Gen A. C. McAuliffe, CINCUSAREUR, to Dr. J. B. Conant, HICOG, 2 May 55. (2) Ltr, Amb Conant to Gen McAuliffe, 6 Jun 55. (3) DF, USAREUR ACOFS G1 to COFS, 22 Jun 55, sub: Impact of German Military and Industrial Mobilization Upon U.S. Forces Requirements for German Civilian Labor. All SECRET. All in file cited above.

possible reconsideration of the adverse decision.[101] Prior to the establishment of this policy and procedure, German employees could be separated "for the convenience of the Government" without being informed of the reasons or being allowed any formal appeal rights.

e. Special Problems in France.

(1) French-Proposed Housing Plan for LWR Personnel. In April 1954 the French Government had proposed a housing plan for local wage rate employees. Under that plan a French national employed by the U.S. forces would acquire housing near his place of work by making a down payment of 20 percent, half of which would come from his own funds and the other half would be a loan to him from an account funded by contributions of 1 percent of the gross payroll by the French Social Works Commission and the U.S. Government, respectively. The other 80 percent would be borrowed by the employee from a French banking firm. The 10 percent borrowed from the account contributed to by the U.S. Government would be repaid to the account, by the employee, in installments. A similar program was imposed by French law, upon the larger manufacturing firms, but this was the first proposal for government participation.[102] CINCUSAREUR suggested that the three component commands turn down the French proposal because they were already paying a social insurance contribution of 33.1 percent of French LWR salaries, plus 2.5 percent administrative charges, making the voluntary assumption of an additional contribution of 1 percent for housing inadvisable. The proposal was even more unacceptable because repayments, by employees, of amounts contributed by the U.S. Government would revert, not to the U.S. Treasury, but to the French-controlled revolving fund.[103] US CINCEUR agreed with this point of view, adding that U.S. participation in the program might establish a precedent for extension to other areas. USAFE was to secure a coordinated joint position.[104] As a result, on 21 July 1954 US CINCEUR

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[101] (1) USAREUR ltr, 3 Nov 54, sub: Security Separations and Adjudications--German and non-German Resident Civilians. (2) USAREUR ltr, 12 Nov 54, sub: Status of Employees Previously Separated for Security Reasons. (3) Ltr, USAREUR ACOFS G2 to sub comds, 9 Nov 54, sub: Organizations Considered Inimical to Interests of the U.S. Forces. All CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR G1 cen files.

[102] Cable EC-3-1740, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR and CINCNELM, 26 Apr 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 230 (1954), Vol. I, Item 21.

[103] Cable SC-19194, USAREUR to DA for Compt, 1 May 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[104] Cable EC-3-2164, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAFE, 15 May 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

was informed that the three component commanders had decided not to participate.[105]

(2) COMZ Request to Resume CWS Employment and Recruitment. In December 1954 COMZ headquarters requested permission to resume the recruitment in France of so-called continental wage scale (CWS) employees, who were citizens of Allied and neutral countries other than the United States or the host country--in this case, France.[106] Recruitment of CWS employees had been discontinued throughout USAREUR in May 1954,[107] largely because host governments objected to the employment of other than their own nationals or U.S. citizens. The order of discontinuance had provided for the gradual phase-out of CWS employees, for the absorption of their jobs in other existing civilian or military jobs, and for the conversion to U.S. civilian or LWR status of essential vacated positions that could not be absorbed. COMZ advanced the following reasons for requesting a change in policy: COMZ currently had 400 Department of the Army civilian vacancies, most of which required technical or professional qualifications, and satisfactory progress in filling them was not being made; American civilians qualified for technical positions were not generally available overseas; recruiting procedures in the United States were very lengthy, averaging 7 months, and yet not highly selective; the current conversion, throughout COMZ, from T/O&E- to T/D-type units would aggravate the situation, since the number of civilian spaces authorized in the new T/D's was greater than the current number of spaces. After study, USAREUR headquarters requested USAFE, as the coordinating authority for U.S. forces in France, to call a special meeting of the Civilian Personnel Coordinating Committee to consider the request. The Air Force study was completed by about 10 April 1955. On 5 May Army and Air Force representatives coordinated their points of view in a meeting preparatory to approaching French authorities,[108] and on 1 June the COMZ request was granted, effective 11 May 1955. Conditions of the grant were that the personnel employed were critically needed and that stateside recruitment would cause undesirable delays.[109]

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[105] Cable EPCPA-2-51243, CINCUSAFE to US CINCEUR, 21 Jul 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[106] Ltr, Maj Gen Philip Gallagher, CG COMZ, to Maj Gen A. S. Newman, USAREUR ACOFS G1, 6 Dec 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Vol. II, Item 56.

[107] USAREUR ltr, 13 May 54, sub: Revision of Policy Regarding Employment of Allied and Neutral Employees on Continental Wage Schedule in Germany and France. AG 230 GPA-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[108] USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf Notes, No. 12, 10 May 55, p. 2. SECRET (information used UNCLASSIFIED).

[109] USAREUR ltr, 1 Jun 55, sub: Recruitment of CWS Personnel in NATO Countries for Assignment to France. AG 230 GPA-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

Section III: Labor Service Personnel

During FY 1955 labor service (LS) units--quasimilitary organizations of German and displaced non-German civilians recruited and employed by the U.S. forces by agreement between the governments of the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, and France--continued to be utilized. Under the staff supervision of the Labor Services Division (LSD), Headquarters, USAREUR, such units performed liaison, guard, and technical service functions; in Berlin they also served as special industrial police (civilian guards). No significant changes in organization took place during the year.

36. Strength and Trends

a. USAREUR Personnel. Table 3 (see par. 25, above), shows that during FY 1955 the strength of labor service units under the jurisdiction of the Army dropped from 25,650 to 23,640. Of the latter number 20,881 were serving in Germany and 2,759 in France.[110] Total strength was about 900 less than authorized strength and represented a decrease of approximately 8 percent during the year. The decrease in Germany was about 10 percent and was part of a directed reduction in force made necessary by restrictions in Deutsche Mark funds incident to the granting of West German sovereignty. In France, on the other hand, where labor service personnel were dollar-paid, the year showed a slight increase in strength, from 2,478 to 2,759, which was nevertheless short of the authorized 3,325.[111]

b. USAFE and USNAVGER Personnel. Labor service personnel under USAFE and USNAVGER jurisdiction, but paid from Deutsche Mark funds allocated to USAREUR, are outside the scope of this report. They numbered 1,132 and 1,092 respectively at the end of the fiscal year, as compared with 1,027 and 1,004 at the beginning.[112]

37. Composition

a. General. On 30 June 1955 the national composition of labor service personnel under the jurisdiction of the Army was as follows:[113]

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[110] USAREUR Mthly Stat Rept, 30 Jun 55, p. 8. SECRET (information used CONFIDENTIAL).

[111] Ibid.

[112] (1) Ibid. (2) For the use of labor service units by USAFE and USNAVGER, see EUCOM/USAREUR Comd Rept, 1952, p. 87, and USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jan 53-30 Jun 54, p. 92. SECRET.

[113] Interv, Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR Hist Div, with Col K. P. Brock, C/USAREUR LSD, 12 Sep 55. SECRET.

Total	23,640
Germans	13,844
Poles	6,629
Latvians	1,252
Lithuanians	719
Czechoslovaks	335
Estonians	329
Albanians	188
Russians	174
Bulgarians	170

b. Employment of Former Citizens of U.S.S.R. and Satellite Countries. Because of the rapidly diminishing pool of displaced Poles, and partly because of the necessity of maintaining and possibly increasing the strength of labor service units in France, enlistment was opened to former citizens of the U.S.S.R. on 6 January 1955. At the same time renewed publicity was given to the availability of labor service employment to former citizens, not only of Poland, but of other Soviet-orbit countries.[114] Recruiting was slow, and efforts to negotiate an agreement with France for the use there of other than Polish labor service nationals were not successful (see par. 39c). However, as of 15 May, 429 applicants had been processed, 238 claiming former U.S.S.R. citizenship and 191 Soviet-orbit citizenship. Of the latter, 152 were accepted and integrated into existing labor service units. Of the former, 174 were accepted and on 10 January 1955 were organized into the first all-Russian 4,030 Labor Service Guard Company, as authorized by US EUCOM. On 24 May the Adjutant General Division submitted an evaluation of the expansion efforts. According to this report former U.S.S.R. nationals could be most effectively employed as guards. Even under the intensified recruitment program their number would not exceed 200; nevertheless, the projected goal of 1,000 Soviet-orbit nationals would be retained. The organization of all-Romanian and all-Hungarian units was also under consideration.[115]

38. Labor Service Personnel Problems in Germany

a. Size and Utilization of West Berlin Units. A staff visit to Berlin by representatives of the Labor Services Division, 19-21 August 1954, indicated that the existing strength of Berlin labor service units could not be justified from the standpoint of utilization.

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[114] Cable S-3865, USAREUR to HICOG Bonn, 23 Dec 54. (2) USAREUR News Release No. 55-26, 21 Jan 55. Both UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR SGS 231.4 (1955), Case I, Vol. I, Item 15 atchd.

[115] (1) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR sgd W. M. Ryerson, Asst/AG to US CINCEUR, 24 May 55, sub: Evaluation of Labor Service Expansion. SECRET. In file cited above. (2) Interv, Mr. Lane with Col Brock, 12 Sep 55, cited above. SECRET.

Authorized strength was 920, consisting of 4 guard companies of 200 each and a guard center of 120. Only 2 of the guard companies were employed on a guard mission at any one time, the other 2 being in training. According to USAREUR criteria, 4 companies could man from 112 to 120 guard posts; but the Berlin Command had only 41 posts, indicating marked overstrength, which by the transfer of spaces might be used to make up for shortages in some other areas--notably in the Western Area Command. However, because of the special security and political situation in Berlin, together with the fact that the Berlin units were supported by Deutsche Mark funds that would continue to be available after the impending Bonn Conventions were signed, the retention of overstrength units seemed desirable. The West Berlin units were therefore authorized to retain their existing strength until such time as dollar funds would be required for their support.[116] Meanwhile the strength of the Berlin Industrial Police, a special force of 296 men outside the command ceiling, would be allowed to reduce itself by natural attrition.[117]

b. Impact of German Sovereignty. As already pointed out, the granting of West German sovereignty on 5 May 1955 necessitated a reduction in Deutsche Mark-supported labor service forces. Designed to cut the strength of labor service technical units in Germany by 5 percent, guard companies by 15 percent, and supervision centers by 25 percent,[118] the reduction began in May, after 4 successive months of increase, and was accelerated in June, as shown by the following tabulation:[119] A continued but less marked decrease, to complete the

31 Jan 55	23,178
28 Feb	23,214
31 Mar	23,322
30 Apr	24,001
31 May	23,267
30 Jun	20,881

planned reduction in force, was forecast for succeeding months.

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[116] (1) Memo, Col K. P. Brock, C/USAREUR LSD, to COFS, 23 Sep 54, sub: Berlin Labor Service Units. SECRET. (2) DF, USAREUR LSD to COFS, 5 Oct 54, same sub. SECRET. (3) Comment 2, SGS to LSD, 1 Nov 54, same sub. UNCLASSIFIED. All in USAREUR SGS 231.4 (1954), Case I, Vol. I, Item 20 and atchd.

[117] Interv, Mr. Lane with Col Brock, 12 Sep 55, cited above. SECRET.

[118] Cables SX-3300, 3310, and 3335, CINCUSAREUR to sub comds, 16, 16, 18 May, respectively. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 230 Ind (1955), Vol. I, Item 13 and atchd.

[119] USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 31 Jan-30 Jun 55. SECRET (information used CONFIDENTIAL).

c. Replacement of German Labor Service Chaplains. In May 1955, as a part of the planned reduction of labor service strength, USAREUR directed the elimination of 36 German labor service chaplains' spaces, to be effective 30 June. The chaplains were serving under a 1950 agreement between USAREUR (then EUCOM) and the heads of the Roman Catholic and Evangelical churches in Germany. The value of their contribution to the morale and welfare of the labor service force was recognized, but it was felt that German personnel could now attend local churches. (Because of language difficulties, no release of labor service chaplains ministering to displaced persons was contemplated). The German chaplains, moreover, were on leave from their churches. On 27 May the appropriate church officials were informed of the action contemplated and of the reasons for it.[120] Before the end of June 1955, arrangements were completed for providing continued religious care and guidance for German labor service personnel. A limited number of Protestant and Roman Catholic clergymen, to be designated by their respective churches according to geographical areas, were to replace the former labor service chaplains. The command agreed to furnish these clergymen with transportation, office space, and facilities for meetings, with the understanding that their financial compensation, if any, would be borne by the churches.[121]

39. Labor Service Personnel Problems in France

a. Involuntary Transfer of Personnel to COMZ. During FY 1955 most of the command's labor service personnel problems in France were related to securing and maintaining sufficient manpower to service the expanding line of communications. Because of the command's inability to maintain the desired labor service strength through volunteers, a policy of involuntary transfers to COMZ was adopted in August 1954.[122] This policy, which also provided that labor service employees who refused to go to France would be discharged from the service, was

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[120](1) DF, C/USAREUR LSD to COFS, sub: Labor Service Chaplains, 24 May 55. (2) Ltr, Maj Gen J. F. Uncles, USAREUR COFS, to His Eminence Cardinal Dr. Joseph Wendel, 27 May 55. (3) Ltr, Gen Uncles to Herr Oberkircherat Dr. D. Niemeier, 27 May 55. All UNCLASSIFIED. All in USAREUR SGS 231 (1955), Case I, Vol. I, Item 14 and atchd.

[121]Ltrs, Gen Uncles to Dr. Johann Fuchs, Curate General, Office of the Archbishop of Munich & Freising and to Dr. D. Niemeier, German Evangelical Church, 5 Jul 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[122]Comment 4, 2 Aug 54, to DF, USAREUR LSD to COFS, 23 Jul 54, sub: Planned Use of Polish Labor Service in COMZ. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 231.4 (1954), Case I, Vol. I, Item 17A.

reaffirmed in January 1955.[123] Such discharges were justifiable, the command felt, because through the labor service system, the United States had given employment to thousands of displaced persons who would otherwise have been forced to live in DP camps or compete in the German labor market. Moreover, nothing in the employment agreement precluded assignment of personnel anywhere in the command. The view adopted was that the needs of the Army were paramount in determining assignment location, overriding any personal objections to transfers.

b. Social Insurance Coverage and Medical Care. As many as 50 percent of the labor service personnel selected for transfers to COMZ were found to prefer separation from the service. One reason was that, for married personnel, service in France would mean either separation from their families or the necessity of living under the difficult conditions of the French economy. The principal reason given, however, by most of the personnel who preferred separation, was that, if they were transferred to France and did not return to Germany within 6 months, they would lose their membership to the German social insurance system, all entitlement to its benefits, and all contributions made before their transfer. At the same time they would not be admitted to membership in the French social insurance system, because the French Government held that while on French territory they had the same status as U.S. personnel. Efforts to compensate them through increased pay rates, certain PX privileges, and other measures were not effective because the employees still placed higher value on the disability provisions, old age pensions, and unemployment benefits of social insurance coverage.[124] Under the German social insurance and medical laws, for example, such personnel in Germany were eligible for full medical care, with full pay, for a maximum of 42 days and unemployment insurance of DM 120 (approximately $29.00) per month for a maximum of 6 months, plus certain charity payments thereafter. To remedy the situation, and in anticipation of the granting of sovereignty to West Germany, the Labor Services Division proposed in February 1955 that the appropriate German Federal authorities be approached to work out a new agreement. The desirable agreement would be that personnel transferred to France thenceforward would retain German social insurance coverage and that those already transferred and serving in France could resume German coverage, including benefits accrued prior to their transfer.[125] At

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[123] (1) DF, C/USAREUR LSD to DCOFS Admin, 29 Dec 54, sub: Labor Service Replacements for USAREUR COMZ. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG SACCZ, 4 Jan 55, same sub. Both UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR SGS 231.3 (1955), Case 1, Vol. I, Item 2 atchd.

[124] DF, USAREUR LSD to DCOFS Admin, 28 Feb 55, sub: Social Insurance Coverage of Personnel Assigned to France. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 231.4 (1955), Case 1, Vol. I, Item 7.

[125] Ibid.

the end of June 1955 no agreement to this effect had been reached. Meanwhile, to fill the gap, the Department of the Army gave a special authorization to USAREUR to provide up to 26 weeks free medical care to Polish labor service personnel employed in France and to apply to them the civilian personnel regulations concerning sick and annual leave.[126] These provisions eased the situation only slightly. Labor service personnel still preferred German social insurance coverage. The free medical care provided by the U.S. Government was not available to their dependents. Civil service sick and annual leave provisions were meaningful to an individual only after he had accrued leave time. Moreover, married personnel still had to choose between being separated from their families or maintaining them on the French economy.[127]

c. Proposal to Amend the Bruce-Parodi Agreement. A basic deterrent to solving the problem of obtaining labor service personnel for work in France was a provision in the original 1950 agreement between the United States and France, known as the Bruce-Parodi Agreement,[128] which stipulated that only Polish personnel recruited in West Germany would be used in France. In January 1955 US EUCOM suggested that a change in the agreement, to permit the use in France of labor service personnel of any nationality except the German, be negotiated with the French Government. The proposal was concurred in by the Department of State.[129] Early talks led to the hope that such an amendment would be successfully negotiated, but the French Ministry of the Interior suddenly raised strong objections. At the close of FY 1955 the amendment had not been agreed to, even though the American negotiators gave assurances that the existing ceiling of 3,325 foreign labor service personnel in France would not be exceeded. The Ministry's objections were not to the labor service program as such, which

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[126](1) Comment 1, 23 Jul 54, to DF, USAREUR LSD to COFS, 23 Jul 54, sub: Planned Use of Polish Labor Service in COMZ. SECRET. (2) Comment 3, ACOFS G1 to COFS, 28 Jul 54, to DF cited. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR SGS 231.4 (1954), Case I, Vol. I, Item 17A. (3) Interv, Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR Hist Div, with Col K. P. Brock, C/USAREUR LSD, 12 Sep 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

[127]Interv, Mr. Lane with Col Brock, 27 Sep 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

[128]Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of France Regarding the Establishment and Operation of Line of Communications Across France, 6 Nov 50. In USAREUR POLAD files.

[129](1) Cable EC-9-211, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, HICOG Bonn, and AMEMB Paris, 14 Jan 55. (2) Cable 23, Paris sgd Achilles to State Dept, 18 Jan 55. (3) Cable, no number, State Dept sgd Dulles to Paris, 24 Jan 55. All SECRET. All in USAREUR SGS 231.4 (1955), Case I, Vol. I, Item 3 and atchd.

was admittedly working well, but rather upon the incidence of social problems growing out of the presence of foreign labor groups in France--problems that had already reached serious proportions.[130]

d. Delays in Screening. According to another stipulation of the Bruce-Parodi Agreement, French authorities were not to take more than 10 days to screen labor service personnel proposed for duty in France. From 1950 through 1952 the average time taken was 4½ weeks, and by the end of July 1954 the delay increased to nearly 9 weeks, without apparent reasons. At the same time, the percentage of rejections by the French rose from 12 to 48 percent.[131] Discussions with French authorities during the year did not produce any improvement.

e. Documentation and Status. The problem of the documentation and legal status of non-German (Polish) labor service personnel in France--to meet the requirements of the West German Government--continued to be discussed and to be of serious concern during most of the current reporting period. In April 1951 the German Federal Republic had enacted the so-called Homeless Foreigners Law, to the effect that foreigners without nationality who resided in Germany would forfeit their status if they left German Federal territory and did not resume permanent residence within two years. In addition, a related police ordinance required all aliens to have in their possession acceptable documentation of their status, including valid passports. As time passed, the enforcement of these regulations proved embarrassing to the United States with respect to non-German labor service personnel stationed in France for longer than two years. Under the Bruce-Parodi Agreement the United States was obligated to remove such personnel from France when their services were no longer required, but at the same time West Germany could refuse them reentry to its territory. A survey in May 1954 showed that approximately 30 percent of the labor service personnel in France had no legal status in Germany under the German interpretation of the Homeless Foreigners Law.[132] The U.S. point of view was that the temporary absence, from Germany, of labor service employees stationed in France was merely a condition of their employment, which should not affect their status in West Germany. The matter became of more and more concern as the time for granting sovereignty to West Germany approached, since the German authorities would undoubtedly be stricter than ever in the control of

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[130] Cable 33, Paris sgd Achilles to State Dept, 18 Feb 55. SECRET. In file cited above.

[131] Comment 1, 23 Jul 54, to DF, USAREUR LSD to COFS, 23 Jul 54, sub: Planned Use of Polish Labor Service in COMZ. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 231.4 (1954), Case I, Vol. I, Item 17A.

[132] Ltr, HICOG Bonn to State Dept, 15 May 54, sub: Status of Non-German Personnel of the USAREUR Labor Service Organization. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above, Item 9A atchd.

foreign elements in its population.[133] After lengthy negotiations the U.S. Ambassador to Germany and representatives of the German Federal Republic reached the following 4-point agreement in June 1955: (1) A German-manned screening center that existed at Kaiserslautern, Germany, and was financed by the United States would continue to screen and to document all labor service personnel whether stationed in France or in Germany. (2) The U.S. Army would have the initiative in deciding the order in which members of labor service units would be screened; specifically, it would have the right to give priority to the screening of personnel stationed in France. (3) A practice, already in operation, of allowing labor service personnel stationed in France to move into or out of the German Federal Republic on the basis of military orders would continue, unless some other travel document was mutually agreed upon. This provision, particularly, had the effect of rendering the "two-year" clause of the Homeless Foreigners Law not applicable to labor service personnel stationed in France as far as reentry to Germany was concerned. (4) On the other hand, the United States gave assurance that any labor service individual stationed in France who had not been hired by the U.S. Army in West Germany would--upon termination of his service--be removed from the territory of the Federal Republic if brought within its borders.[134]

Section IV: Morale, Welfare, and Discipline

40. General Status of Morale

A news release prepared by the USAREUR Public Information Division in October 1954 stated that the command as a whole was in a better moral, physical, and military condition than ever before. Attention was called to the lowest AWOL record in 2½ years, the continuing decrease in the number of troops held in stockades, the popularity of the Religious Retreat House in Berchtesgaden, and church attendance of more than 300,000 a month--an increase of about 13 percent over that of the preceding year.[135] All of these indexes improved as the year progressed. The steadily declining number of complaints received by

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[133] DF, USAREUR LSD to DCOFS Admin, 8 Nov 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

[134] Ltr, Mr. Walter Dowling, Dep US Amb to FEDREP Ger, to Maj Gen O. P. Newman, USAREUR DCOFS Admin, 28 Jun 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 231.4 (1955), Case I, Vol. I, Item 9 atchd.

[135] Memo, C/USAREUR PID to COFS, Oct 54, sub: Public Relations Aspects of Official Actions. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 330.11 (1954), Vol. I, Item 12A, Tab D.

inspectors general, likewise an index of morale, might well have been cited also. The complaint rate, which had dropped during FY 1954 from 3.76 to 2.90 per thousand troops per quarter, continued to drop, reaching a low of 2.48 during the quarter ending 30 June 1955, although there was a sharp rise during the first quarter in complaints concerning disciplinary matters, food and mess, and transfers. The number of complaints found to be justifiable, which had dropped during FY 1954 from 1.45 to 0.89 per thousand troops per quarter, dropped still further to 0.71 per thousand troops per quarter.[136]

41. Factors Contributing to Improved Morale

A delineation or full evaluation of all factors that contributed to improved morale during the year would be impossible. Among them, however, were pay increases affecting military personnel and U.S. civilian employees; increased availability of overseas transportation; marked success in the establishment of concurrent overseas travel; the granting of commissary privileges to certain unmarried military personnel; and the modification of restrictions concerning marriage to aliens.

a. Pay Increases. Under Public Law 20, 84th Congress, enacted 31 March 1955, all military personnel with two years or more of service received graduated pay raises averaging 8 percent, effective 1 April 1955.[137] In conformity with Congressional legislation all Department of the Army civilians received salary increases of 7½ percent, likewise effective 1 April 1955.[138]

b. Transportation Availability. An operational program that increased the availability and utilization of air transportation facilitated the overseas movement of both individuals and groups. It not only released spaces on surface vessels for the accommodation of personnel traveling to the United States in regular status and on a space-available basis, but also made it easier for the command to schedule air space for military personnel and their dependents returning to the States on emergency and morale leaves[139] or being returned in the best interests of the government.[140]

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[136] (1) USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 30 Jun 54, 30 Sep 54, 31 Dec 54, 31 Mar 55, 30 Jun 55. (2) Analysis USAREUR Mthly Stat Rept, 22 Oct 54, p. 5. Both SECRET (information used CONFIDENTIAL).

[137] DA Bul 4, 15 Apr 55, sub: Career Incentive Act of 1955 (PL 20, 84th Cong). UNCLASSIFIED.

[138] DA CP Cir 11, 27 Jun 55, sub: Federal Employees Salary Increase Act of 1955. UNCLASSIFIED.

[139] Cable DA-555537, DA to USAREUR, 12 Oct 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G1 Pers Svcs Br files.

[140] Cable DA-574433, DA to USAREUR, 23 Dec 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

c. Concurrent Travel. Another development contributing to better morale was the marked success of the command in establishing concurrent overseas travel of dependents with their sponsors, both military and civilians, together with the reduction, to a maximum of 90 days, of the waiting time, in the United States, of dependents not traveling concurrently.[141]

(1) Background. In April 1954 the Department of the Army informed USAREUR that every effort would have to be made to reduce the length of time that married Army personnel ordered overseas were separated from their families.[142] Overseas commanders were not to deny concurrent travel but were to inform applicants of the living conditions to be expected, so that they themselves would decide whether to leave their families at home or not. The Department promised enthusiastic support to any plan that would reduce the period of family separation. The situation was complicated, however, by the urgent desire of the State Department to derequisition and release German properties, which could be achieved only by moving U.S. personnel into government-constructed housing units as rapidly as possible. While in sympathy with this desire, CINCUSAREUR wanted to give priority for the new housing to the dependent families waiting in the United States, or living on the German economy, pending the availability of housing. Another complicating factor was the Department of the Army's recurring proposal to authorize transportation of dependents of Army personnel in Grades E-4 and below, with 7 years of service, to overseas stations at government expense. There were nearly 6,000 such Army personnel in USAREUR, and 2,000 would be entitled to family housing, although the corresponding number of family units had not been included in the construction program.[143] The Air Force and Navy desired the proposed travel authorization for personnel assigned to the Far East, where the period of family separation was even longer than for Europe. USAREUR, however, continued to express firm nonconcurrence in the proposal, as far as Germany was concerned, since the basic difficulty in Germany was not length of the waiting period but nonavailability of housing. To the extent that available family housing was assigned to families of personnel of grade E-4 and below, concurrent travel for dependents of personnel of grade E-5 and above would be delayed. USAREUR pointed

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[141] Interv, Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR Hist Div, with Col L. D. Goodall, C/USAREUR G1 Pers Svcs Br, 27 Sep 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

[142] DF, USAREUR ACOFS G1 to COFS, 22 Apr 54, sub: Transportation of Dependents. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 510 (1954), Vol. I, Item 3A-1 atchd.

[143] (1) Ltr, Gen W. M. Hoge, CINCUSAREUR, to Gen C. L. Bolte, VCOFSA, 6 May 54. (2) Ltr, Gen Bolte to Gen Hoge, 28 May 54. (3) Cable DA-565193, to CINCUSAREUR, 17 Nov 54. (4) Cable SC-24644, USAREUR to DA for TAG, 24 Nov 54. All UNCLASSIFIED. All in file cited above.

out, moreover, that enlisted personnel who were still in grade E-4 and below after 7 years of service were in most cases substandard soldiers, beset with more than the usual family and financial troubles, who should not be given preference over better soldiers with less service.

(2) Establishment of Advanced Application Policy. During the latter part of June 1954 USAREUR began to approve--through US EUCOM channels--every request for concurrent travel from personnel whose assignment was definite and for whom quarters would be available on arrival, and informed the Department of the Army to that effect.[144] At that time the introduction of automatic concurrent travel to Germany by 1 January 1955 seemed feasible.[145] In July 1954, US EUCOM delegated to USAREUR the authority to approve concurrent travel requests to stations under the latter's jurisdiction, whenever quarters were available.[146] In August the Department of the Army established two types of concurrent overseas travel: the automatic type, for personnel authorized to travel with their dependents without individual approval of the overseas command; and the advance application system, for personnel permitted or required by the overseas command to apply for concurrent travel of dependents after having received their new assignments. Automatic concurrent travel was authorized for a few key personnel and advance application concurrent travel for all others.[147] Upon this basis, USAREUR established in September 1954 two types of overseas travel--nonconcurrent and concurrent--and further subdivided concurrent travel into the automatic and advance application categories. The advance application system was to be used in Germany until progress in housing construction would make automatic concurrent travel possible. Because of the very limited availability of housing in France and England, advance application for concurrent travel to those countries seemed the only feasible procedure. For all three countries the command reaffirmed the policy of approving all applications for concurrent travel from authorized personnel, whenever quarters were expected to be available at the sponsor's duty station on the anticipated date of the family's arrival. The policy of not assigning family quarters to military personnel below grade E-5 or to civilian personnel below GS-7 was continued.[148]

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[144] Cable SC-1141, USAREUR to US CINCEUR Paris, 14 Jul 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[145] USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf Notes, No. 12, 21 Sep 54, p. 2. UNCLASSIFIED.

[146] Cable EC-3-3212, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR and CINCUSAFE, 24 Jul 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 510 (1954), Vol. I, Item 3A-1 atchd.

[147] Cable DA-542866, TAG to all Continental Armies, 24 Aug 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[148] USAREUR ltr, 16 Sep 54, sub: Movement of Dependents and Assignment of Living Accommodations. AGO 292 GPA-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

(3) Department of the Army Concern. On 10 November 1954 the Department of the Army expressed concern over the slow progress of the program of concurrent travel to USAREUR. Up to that date USAREUR headquarters had disapproved the vast majority of requests from both officer and enlisted personnel.[149] Of 766 applications made by officers during July, August, and September 1954, only 128 had been approved; and of 96 applications made by enlisted personnel, only 35 had been approved. USAREUR replied that a higher percentage had been approved in October and that lack of housing would continue to restrict approvals for concurrent travel until the end of 1954, and probably until April 1955.[150]

(4) Continued Progress. In December 1954 streamlining of procedures and increased availability of housing had increased the number of approvals, but their ratio to disapprovals fluctuated, increasing each time new housing became available and dropping back during intervals. Automatic concurrent travel did not seem to be possible in the foreseeable future.[151] Nevertheless, as of 30 January 1955 the command was approving 65 percent of the advance applications for concurrent travel to Germany,[152] and the number of individuals traveling concurrently continued to increase weekly. The operation of the program was somewhat marred, however, by cases in which assigned housing stood empty for as long as 90 days because of failure of families to arrive in the command or because of reassignment of personnel upon arrival to units stationed in other areas.[153] During the fourth quarter, additional complications grew out of the concurrent travel requirements of Operation GYROSCOPE whereby military personnel and their dependents were transferred overseas in simultaneous mass movements.

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[149] Cable DA-563642, DA sgd Young to CINCUSAREUR for Newman, 10 Nov 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 510 (1954), Vol. I, Item 3A-1 atchd.

[150] Cable SC-23582, USAREUR sgd Newman to DA for Young, 14 Nov 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[151] Ltr, Maj Gen A. S. Newman, USAREUR ACOFS G1, to Maj Gen R. H. Young, ACOFSA G1, 16 Dec 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[152] DF, USAREUR ACOFS G1 to COFSA, 9 Feb 55, sub: Automatic Concurrent Travel to Germany. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 510 (1955), Item 1 atchd (B/P).

[153] (1) USAREUR ltr, 12 Jan 55, sub: Concurrent Travel Program. AG 292 GPA-AGO. (2) Cable SC-14507, USAREUR to sub comds, 31 Jan 55. (3) Cable SC-12974, USAREUR to DA for G1, 20 Jan 55. All UNCLASSIFIED. All in USAREUR SGS 510 (1955), Vol. I, Item 2.

(5) Automatic Concurrent Travel to Germany. A staff study made in February 1955 showed that the advanced application concurrent travel system was working well. It provided for the full utilization of available housing, assured quarters to each family on arrival, and was rapidly approaching the point where the command could approve 100 percent concurrent travel to West Germany without referring applications to subordinate commands. While the study indicated that automatic concurrent travel to West Germany for Army personnel would be feasible by 15 May 1955 (the estimated date for USAFE personnel was 1 August 1955), announcement to that effect was considered inadvisable, for several reasons. In the first place, automatic concurrent travel would so increase the attractiveness of assignments in West Germany to married personnel that its premature announcement might increase family housing requirements to the point where such travel would become impracticable. Even at best, some families would have to live in off-post housing for a considerable length of time after 15 May 1955. Premature inauguration of automatic concurrent travel would increase the number of such families. Furthermore, the travel of dependents of GYROSCOPE personnel could not be 100 percent concurrent; but public announcement of automatic concurrent travel "except for GYROSCOPE units" would react unfavorably upon personnel scheduled for that type of movement. For these reasons the announcement of automatic concurrent travel was delayed and the advance application system was continued.[154] On 30 June 1955 the advance application system was still in operation in West Germany, as well as in France and England. Meanwhile, effective 1 April 1955, transportation of dependents to the command, at government expense, was authorized for military personnel of Grade E-4 with 7 years or more of service, whose orders assigning them to the command were of a prior date, and for military personnel of that grade with 4 years or more of service, whose orders were dated 1 April 1955 or later.[155] At the same time USAREUR adopted the policy of assigning family quarters to eligible military personnel below grade E-5 when quarters in a specific community were in excess of the requirement for personnel in grade E-5 and above. Such assignments were to be terminated whenever the quarters were required for personnel of higher grades.[156]

d. Commissary Privileges for Certain Bachelor Personnel. A welcome change for many bachelors in the command was a Department of the Army regulation,[157] adopted in December 1954 granting commissary privileges to bachelor personnel occupying quarters with jointly

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[154] DF, USAREUR ACOFS G1 to COFS, 9 Feb 55, cited above. UNCLASSIFIED.

[155] USAREUR Cir 614-20, 3 Aug 55, sub: Movement of Personnel to the U.S. Army, Europe. UNCLASSIFIED.

[156] USAREUR Cir 614-30, 3 Aug 55, sub: Assignment of Living Accommodations and Residence on the Local Economy. UNCLASSIFIED.

[157] USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf Notes, No. 15, 14 Dec 54, p. 9. UNCLASSIFIED.

shared cooking facilities. As the BOQ construction program progressed, more and more unmarried officers, who were about 20 percent of all officers, benefited from this provision.

e. Modification of Regulations Concerning Marriage to Aliens. Another change that undoubtedly contributed to improved morale occurred in November 1954, when military personnel were permitted to apply to marry civilian aliens after 8 months of service in USAREUR. Prior regulations had prohibited such marriages earlier than 4 months before the individual's rotation date, so that the marriage would usually take place immediately before actual rotation. For a long time USAFE had urged modification of this policy, on the ground that it was too restrictive and that it had tended to encourage some airmen to return to the United States instead of remaining in Germany with their alien wives, as they would have done if permitted. US EUCOM supported the USAFE point of view and directed USAREUR either to liberalize its policy or to agree that USAFE adopt a different policy. USAREUR recommended that the restrictive policy be continued, principally because of jurisdictional questions that might arise in matters involving U.S. military personnel with German spouses after West Germany was granted its sovereignty. If, however, the existing policy was changed, 8 months of service in USAREUR should be made the minimum requirement applicable to personnel of all services. On 12 July 1954 US EUCOM informed USAREUR that such a change had been proposed to the Department of the Army.[158] The proposal was approved and the new directive, which became effective 15 November 1954, permitted a member of the U.S. forces to marry an alien as early as a year after arrival in Europe and to continue his overseas tour of duty.[159] The alien marriage rate, which had been 300 a month, increased by approximately 25 percent and continued at the increased average monthly rate during the remainder of the fiscal year.[160]

f. Recommendations of USAREUR Subsidiary Womble Committee. In November 1954 Gen. W. M. Hoge, CINCUSAREUR, forwarded to the Department of the Army a number of suggestions concerning measures for improving military morale. These suggestions were based upon the recommendations of a committee General Hoge had appointed, as directed by the Army,[161] to consider the report of the Department of Defense's ad hoc committee--

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[158] USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf Notes, No. 9, 13 Jul 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

[159] (1) USAREUR Wkly Dir 45, 5 Nov 54, Sec. XVII. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR Cir 608-30, 18 Apr 55, sub: Personal Affairs: Marriage, par. 5f. UNCLASSIFIED.

[160] Interv, Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. L. D. Reeves, USAREUR AG Div Pers Br, 3 Oct 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

[161] Ltr, TAG to CINC's of Fld Comds, 12 May 54, sub: Establishment of Subsidiary "Womble Committee" in Field Commands. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 330.11 (1954), Vol. I, Item 5A.

on the future of military service as a career. Among the measures suggested by General Hoge were the establishment of concurrent or parallel travel of dependents if unit rotation was implemented; the reexamination by the Army, Defense, and State Departments of the ability of NATO countries, especially France, to provide housing facilities for U.S. personnel and dependents; the promotion of enlisted personnel on the basis of T/O&E and T/D vacancies rather than on the current and generally "automatic" basis; assurance that tours in the United States would be reasonably long before assignments overseas; a substantial reduction in the number of enlisted MOS's; provision of severance pay for Reserve officers who were involuntarily relieved from active duty, through no fault of their own, before becoming eligible for retirement pay; and provision of adequate benefits for suvivors of military personnel without favoring one component over another.[162] At the close of the fiscal year considerable progress in the establishment of concurrent travel had been made; legislation concerning severance pay for Reserve officers and equitable survivor benefits was before the Congress; and the new classification system for enlisted personnel was expected to greatly simplify the MOS pattern.

42. Factors Adversely Affecting Morale

Morale was adversely affected by some problems, the solutions to which were essentially beyond the control of the command.

a. Freeze on E-7's. The virtual impossibility of promotion to grade E-7, which definitely lowered the morale of the hundreds of E-6's immediately affected, throughout the command, and of personnel of lower grades as well, has already been pointed out (par. 26e (2)).

b. Living Conditions in France. In France, shortages in permanent quarters (see par. 35e, above) and the high cost of living on the French economy, notwithstanding station allowances, made service there difficult for married personnel.

43. Welfare and Recreation Program

The principal welfare and recreation programs for personnel of the command were the Special Service, motion picture, and exchange activities provided and supervised by the Special Activities Division (SAD); the activities of the Armed Forces Recreation Center controlled by USAREUR headquarters through the Southern Area Command; and the programs of off-duty education supervised by the Armed Forces Information and Education Division. The scope of most of these activities and the extent of participation in them increased during FY 1955.

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[162] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to TAG, 30 Nov 54, sub cited above. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

a. Special Services. During the period under review, USAREUR Special Services provided and supervised programs of athletics, recreation, and entertainment throughout the command at a cost of $10,300,000, almost a million dollars less than that of the preceding year. Three-fourths of this amount was paid from nonappropriated funds, as shown in the following tabulation of command-wide costs:[163]

	FY 1954		FY 1955	
Total	$11,101,195	100.0	$10,327,572	100.0
Source of Funds				
Nonappropriated Dollars	8,648,658	78.0	7,718,661	75.0
Occupation Cost Deutsche Marks Converted into Dollars	1,541,861	14.0	1,778,676	17.0
Appropriated Dollars	910,676	8.0	830,235	8.0

Somewhat more than half of the expenditure was for service clubs and libraries, 15 percent for sports, 9 percent for entertainment and music, 8 percent for craft shops and photo laboratories, and 14 percent for administrative and clerical assistance, as shown in the following tabulation:[164]

		Funds		
Programs FY 1955	Total Cost $10,327,572	Nonappropriated $7,718,661	Appropriated $830,235	Deutsche Mark $1,778,676
Service Clubs	4,040,396	3,662,672	34,627	343,097
Sports	1,622,720	1,240,619	111,566	270,535
Libraries	1,497,838	1,069,181	355,331	73,326
Clerical and Administration	1,460,800	730,515	261,765	468,520
Entertainment and Music	892,216	455,477	47,677	389,062
Craft Shops, etc.	813,602	560,197	19,269	234,136

Approximately 65 percent of the over-all cost was for the services of personnel and 35 percent for equipment and supplies. No activities had to be eliminated because of the decreased availability of Deutsche Marks near the close of the fiscal year; but economies in personnel and procedural modifications were effected, and further changes were planned for FY 1956.[165]

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[163] Chart, USAREUR SAD Sp Svcs. UNCLASSIFIED.

[164] Ibid.

[165] Interv, Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR Hist Div, with Col. C. A. O'Reilly, Jr., C/USAREUR SAD Spec Svcs, 18 Aug 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

(1) Athletics. The nature of the program of supervised competitive sports and the extent of participation in them, is indicated by the following tabulation:[166]

Team Sports FY 1955	Teams	Games	Individual Sports	Number of Participants
Football	61	409	Boxing	3,382
Baseball	75	2,447	Bowling (games bowled)	6,636,649
Softball	1,500	19,452	Swimming	10,393
Basketball	1,972	19,976	Tennis	4,451
Volleyball	1,776	25,470	Badminton	935
Touch Football	1,342	10,083	Track	8,414
			Golf	8,977
			Skiing	66

To assure the proper and effective conduct of the sports program, clinics for coaches, officials, and associated workers were held in football, touch football, boxing, basketball, WAC-WAF basketball, volleyball, baseball, track and field athletics, soccer and softball.

In the field of competitive athletics for men, bowling, tennis, track and field athletics, golf, and boxing were provided throughout the command as individual-type sports; volleyball, football, touch football, and basketball (at least one sport each season) were provided on the company level; soccer teams were organized from battalion-size units, and basketball, football, and baseball were provided on the regimental level. Basketball and football were organized into 7 geographical leagues and other sports into 10 corps and divisional conferences. Teams maintained their identity throughout the respective seasons, except in individual-type sports. In these, all-star teams were formed at some stage in the progression. In each sport, play progressed to USAREUR championships. On the All-Army level, USAREUR competed in bowling, basketball, boxing, and in track and field athletics. On the international level boxing and basketball teams were sent to the CISM (Conseil International du Sport Militaire) competitions, with USAREUR responsible for the coordination of armed forces representation.

A separate WAC-WAF program for women provided table tennis, horseshoes, and badminton as competitive sports for individuals, together with volleyball, basketball, bowling, and softball competition on the team level. Four leagues were organized on a geographical basis, each league progressing to championships.

[166] Chart cited above.

The bowling program--supervised by the Procurement and Supply Section of Special Services and cosponsored by the American Bowling Congress, which issued free memberships to participating servicemen and women--was unique as a completely self-supporting activity operated on a reimbursable basis. At the start of the program in 1945 there were 330 alleys; 10 years later 934 alleys were in operation. At the close of the year there were 306 sanctioned bowling leagues in the command and 25,000 participants.[167]

(2) Recreation. There was an over-all increase in the number of recreational facilities provided for the command and supervised by Special Services:[168]

	1 Jul 54	30 Jun 55	Increase	Decrease
Service Clubs	127	133	6	
Libraries	203	201		2
Craft Shops	97	108	11	
Photo Labs	121	135	14	
Portable Craft Bars	0	3	3	

Approximately 85 percent of the cost of these facilities was borne by nonappropriated funds. The estimated total number of visits to service clubs, indicating utilization, averaged 2 million monthly, with a seasonal high of about 2,300,000 in December. Estimated total monthly library attendance averaged 530,000, at photo labs 140,000, and at craft shops 83,000.[169]

During the year a portable crafts bar (work bench) was designed and developed to meet the needs of installations where the establishment of normal crafts facilities was impossible or impracticable. In the crafts field, also, 2 command-wide contests were held: the 1954 Photography Contest, with 140 entries, and the USAREUR phase of the second All-Army Art Contest, with 107 entries. On the Department of the Army level a USAREUR entry won two first prizes and an honorable mention in the All-Army Art Contest and sixth place in photography.[170]

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[167] Intervs, Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. Geo. M. Wilson and Mr. N. L. Roquemore, USAREUR SAD Spec Svcs, 18, 19 Aug 55, respectively. UNCLASSIFIED.

[168] Memo, Lt Col K. T. Hawkins, USAREUR SAD Spec Svcs, to Mr. B. V. Downey, SAD Tech Info Off, 19 Aug 55, sub: Historical Report of Recreation Section Fiscal Year 1955. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Hist Div files.

[169] USAREUR Mthly Stat Rept, 31 Jul 55, p. 63-65. SECRET (information used UNCLASSIFIED).

[170] Memo, 19 Aug 55, cited above. UNCLASSIFIED.

During the year, 55,148,290 individuals, an average of about 12,500 a month, made local-vicinity tours directed by service clubs; and 36,700, an average of 3,000 a month, went on longer tours conducted by commercial agencies. The services of commercial tourist agencies were made more accessible, at the end of the year, when the agencies were authorized to send their printed materials to service clubs and to area command Special Services officers directly, instead of through the Special Activities Division.[171]

(3) Entertainment. The Special Activities Division provided professional shows, facilities for soldier shows, supervision of bands, and opportunities for competition in singing and talent contests, as during the preceding year. Attendance figures indicated continued high interest in soldier shows, with a decrease in attendance commensurate with the decline in command strength, and a marked preference for soldier shows over professional shows. Most of the costs of the entertainment program were paid from nonappropriated funds.[172]

Following is a tabulation of the number and types of professional shows, with attendance, and a comparison with FY 1954:[173]

	FY 1955		FY 1954	
	Performances	Attendance	Performances	Attendance
Total	16,253	1,782,409	13,895	1,814,689
Formal Shows	2,824	725,611	2,692	755,870
Informal Shows	13,429	1,056,798	11,203	1,058,819

Following is a tabulation of the number of professional shows, with attendance, and a comparison with FY 1954:[174]

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[171] Ibid.

[172] Intervs, Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col J. W. Norviel, Maj H. E. Cox, Mr. R. C. Lueders, and Mr. A. B. Myers, USAREUR SAD Spec Svcs, 18 Aug 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

[173] Statement prepared by USAREUR SAD Spec Svcs. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Hist Div files.

[174] Ibid.

	FY 1955		FY 1954	
	Performances	Attendance	Performances	Attendance
Total	1,764	500,409	1,561	832,910
Purchased Shows	1,004	279,316	1,131	339,486
USO Camp Shows	365	112,852	86	56,394
Celebrity Shows	10	13,990	82	33,935
Others	385	94,251	262	403,095

The presentation of high-grade soldier shows was facilitated by the accessibility of a theatrical costumes and accessories loan service, operated from Nuremberg and available to units upon application, without charge. The use made of this service, as compared with FY 1954, is indicated in the following tabulation:[175]

	FY 1955	FY 1954
Costumes and Accessories Issued	23,212	15,036
Music Issued	28,514	28,692
Scripts Issued	1,806	1,792
Costumes Repaired	1,573	1,900
Costumes Constructed	780	728

Assistance in the conduct of entertainment programs was given to area and subarea service club personnel by 23 field entertainment directors scattered throughout the command. In addition, technical supervision, including inspection, was given to all T/O&E bands, and informal aid to other bands.[176]

USAREUR sponsored two command-wide contests of an entertainment nature during the year: in the fall of 1954 the second All-Army Singing Contest, in which there were 6,160 USAREUR participants who performed at 154 soldier shows; and in the spring of 1955 the second All-Army Talent Contest, in which there were 1,240 USAREUR participants performing at 155 soldier shows. In the singing contest there were 10 categories of competition. In 5 the USAREUR winner went on to compete successfully in the All-Army finals, winning first places in the popular singer, classical singer, and spiritual group categories and second places in the barbershop quartet and singing platoon categories. In the talent contests there were four categories of competition: group act, instrumental soloist, vocal soloist, and individual novelty or specialty performer. In each of the latter two categories the

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[175] Ibid.

[176] Interv, Mr. D. A. Lane with Lt Col J. W. Norviel, 18 Aug 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

USAREUR winner also won first place in the All-Army finals.[177]

b. The European Motion Picture Service. A principal development was the transfer to the newly established U.S. Air Force Motion Picture Service (USAFE MPS), on 31 December 1954, of 120 theaters previously operated by the European Motion Picture Service (EMPS). On 1 July 1954 EMPS was operating 435 paid and free admission 35- and 16-mm. theaters, but by virtue of this transfer and other discontinuances, the number was reduced to 303 by the end of the fiscal year. Five programs weekly were available to all paid admission theaters, each program consisting of a feature film with short subjects and/or newsreels to maintain usually a running time of slightly less than two hours. Installations were authorized to present performances with sufficient frequency to afford all personnel the opportunity to see each feature film. Some installations also presented special childrens' shows, usually as Saturday matinees. In an additional service, EMPS furnished films to 30 so-called outside units, such as embassies, consulates, and attaches' offices, and 16-mm. films, on a no-charge basis, to troops on maneuvers.

A second development was the initiation of the conversion of the command's 35-mm. theaters to wide-screen (Cinemascope) pictures. On 31 December 1954, two theaters had been so converted. Six months later this number had increased to 47, and all 35-mm. theaters were expected to be converted by the end of 1955.[178]

c. The European Exchange System. At the beginning of FY 1955 the European Exchange System (EES) was operating 2,728 retail sales installations of great variety for the convenience of armed forces military and civilian personnel and their dependents. On 31 December 1954, however, 339 installations were transferred to the Air Forces, Europe, Exchange (AFEX). During the year activations and inactivations resulted in a net increase of 124 other installations. Thus on 30 June 1955 EES was operating 2,513 installations, including 459 retail installations (department stores, community stores, auto parts sales rooms, etc.), 614 food installations (snack bars, beer bars, counters, bakeries, etc.), and 1,440 services installations (garages, tailor shops, photo-finishing plants, barber and beauty shops, etc.). Of these, 1,828 were being operated by EES directly and 685 as concessions. Income for the year, after deduction of commissions for concessionaires and amusement machines, was approximately $178 million (as compared with $180 million for FY 1954). Net profit was 6.29 percent; $9,033,694 of the profits (as compared with approximately $7½ million in FY 1954) was turned over as dividends to the Army Welfare

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[177] Interv, Mr. Lane with Mr. A. B. Myers, 19 Aug 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

[178] (1) Interv, Mr. D. A. Lane with Mr. R. W. Beaudry, and Mr. S. S. Nelson, USAREUR SAD EMPS, 19 Aug 55. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Memo, USAREUR SAD EMPS to SAD Tech Info Off, n.d. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Hist Div files.

Fund Germany-Austria-France. During the year more than 100 new valet service points, 52 delicatessen counters, and more than 20 snack bars were opened. There was a slight reduction, however, in the number of retail outlets. Laundry and dry cleaning service on a concessionaire basis was established in France, with pick-up points in nearly every installation. In the early spring of 1955 a made-to-measure custom tailoring service, using concessionaire firms, was introduced in principal locations, and throughout the year a program of renovating and converting many types of stores to self-selection or self-service operation was under way.[179]

d. Armed Forces Recreation Center. The Armed Forces Recreation Center, designated until March 1955 as the USAREUR Leave and Rest Center and from then until June as the USAREUR Leave Area, continued to be operated at Garmisch and Berchtesgaden (including Chiemsee). Activities were under the control of the Commanding General, Southern Area Command.

(1) Utilization. During the year utilization averaged about 63 percent of capacity, with Garmisch enjoying greater popularity than Berchtesgaden. At Garmisch--with 4 hotels for officers, 5 for enlisted personnel, 1 for VIP's, and a number of guest houses--over-all utilization averaged 76 percent of capacity, with a peak utilization of from 100 to 125 percent during December and January weekends and a low of about 60 percent during the midweeks of September and October. At Berchtesgaden--with 5 hotels for officers, 3 for enlisted personnel, a Religious Retreat House, and 2 lodges--over-all utilization averaged 53 percent (at the Religious Retreat House 67 percent), with a peak utilization of about 105 percent of capacity during June weekends and a low of 30 percent during the midweeks of November and December. At the Chiemsee family center utilization averaged 35 percent during the first quarter, 20 percent during the second and third, and 49 percent during the fourth.[180] Individual hotel reservations (one person for one night counted as one reservation) averaged 40,000 monthly at Garmisch, 14,000 at Berchtesgaden, and 2,500 at Chiemsee.[181]

(2) Profits. All the hotels with the exception of one at Berchtesgaden showed an operating profit. Over-all operating profits, by quarters, were as follows:[182]

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[179](1) EES Ann Rept, FY 1954, pp. 9, 10, 28. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Comment 2, to DF, USAREUR SAD Tech Info Off to C/SAD EES, 13 Sep 55, sub: Historical Information. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Hist Div files.

[180]USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 31 Oct 54, 31 Jan 55, 30 Apr 55, 31 Jul 55. SECRET (information used UNCLASSIFIED).

[181]Memo, Lt Col K. T. Hawkins, USAREUR SAD Spec Svcs, to Mr. Downey, SAD Tech Info Off, 19 Aug 55, sub: Historical Report of Recreation Section Fiscal Year 1955. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Hist Div files.

[182]Ibid.

	Garmisch Hotels	Berchtesgaden Hotels (including Chiemsee)
Total	$271,055	$149,351
1st Quarter	76,745	63,289
2nd "	36,196	26,683
3rd "	98,205	20,008
4th "	59,909	39,371[a]

[a]Includes July 1955

(3) Survey and Redesignation. In January 1955, General McAuliffe appointed a board of officers to survey the Leave and Rest Center and to make recommendations concerning its operation after the loss of Deutsche Mark support. The board was also to suggest possible economies, with a view toward reducing the center's over-all requirement for either appropriated or nonappropriated fund support.[183] It made a preliminary report in February and a final report in April 1955.[184]

One of the board's principal findings was that the Garmisch and Berchtesgaden centers were being operated competitively rather than on a complementary basis. To remedy the situation the board recommended that the two subareas be placed under a single commander, with centralized operation of such functions as billeting, contracting and purchasing, logistical support, and public information. Every possible measure would have to be taken to eliminate the existing competition and duplication. In March 1955 General McAuliffe ordered that these recommendations be implemented. At the same time the Leave and Rest Center was redesignated as the USAREUR Leave Area and its two geographical divisions were redesignated as the Garmisch Recreation Center and the Berchtesgaden Recreation Center (including Chiemsee), respectively. The Commanding General, Southern Area Command (SACOM), was made commander of the Leave Area.[185] All financial support of the Leave Area from the SACOM Welfare Fund was to be discontinued, beginning 1 July 1955, and such welfare-fund support as would be needed thereafter was to come from the Armed Forces Germany-Austria (AFGA) Welfare Fund, with a proportional contribution from the USAFE Welfare Fund. In the absence of established criteria, the existing

[183]USAREUR LO 1-690, 31 Jan 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 353.8 AMU (1955), Item 1A atchd (B/P).

[184]Repts of Board of Officers Appointed to Survey the USAREUR Leave and Rest Center, 9 Feb 55, 4 Apr 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[185]Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG SACOM, 29 Mar 55, sub: Reorganization of USAREUR Leave and Rest Center. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 3A atchd.

capacity of 3,017 guests was to be accepted as a ceiling. The SACOM commander was to revise guest price schedules so as to make them commensurate with services rendered and identical in Garmisch and Berchtesgaden, and to reduce the requirement for appropriated and/or welfare-fund support. In addition, all nonappropriated funds derived from guest expenditures were to be paid into a single Leave Area Fund for controlled disbursement without regard to the area from which the funds were derived. The implementation of the recommendations made in the board's preliminary report enabled the command to set a budget estimate of $1,400,000 as additional appropriated fund support for FY 1956, as compared with $2,300,000 for FY 1955.

In its final report the board reviewed and resubmitted its preliminary recommendations and made additional suggestions. Retrenchments were recommended to be made, when necessary, first through operational economies and only thereafter by the elimination of individual facilities, such as ski slopes, guest houses, etc. Facilities would be eliminated in such a way that those retained could be operated according to high standards of safety, health, and welfare. The board submitted a list of possible economies and a recommended order in which facilities would have to be eliminated if the need for elimination were to arise. In approving the board's recommendations, General McAuliffe directed that a concentrated effort be made to achieve at least a 75 percent average of over-all utilization of facilities and that positive action be taken to increase the utilization of Berchtesgaden and Chiemsee by making them more attractive for year-round utilization. In addition, he directed that the Leave Area be redesignated once more as the Armed Forces Recreation Center, to emphasize its availability to personnel of all services. At the same time he redesignated the Garmisch and Berchtesgaden Recreation Centers as the Garmisch and Berchtesgaden Recreation Areas, respectively.[186]

e. Off-Duty Education. During FY 1955 participation in the Army Education Program[187] in USAREUR became almost entirely voluntary, with primary emphasis on intermediate education for enlisted men and college education for officers. During the preceding fiscal year transitional training centers for functional illiterates--personnel with less than a fourth-grade education--had been inaugurated in the United States. The elimination of functional illiterates from the replacement stream relieved USAREUR of much of its former responsibility for mandatory on-duty education. Thus, whereas 18,103 fourth-grade certificates were issued during FY 1954, only 2,540 were issued during

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[186] (1) Ltr, sgd by Gen McAuliffe, 7 Jun 55, sub: Action of Convening Authority. (2) Memo for rcd, sgd Maj Gen A. S. Newman, USAREUR ACOFS G1, n.d. Both UNCLASSIFIED. Both in file above, Item 1A.

[187] AR 355-5, 12 Mar 53, sub: Troop Information and Education, and changes thereto. UNCLASSIFIED.

the period under review. The basic education courses that had been given at the Frankfurt and Dachau Army Education Centers for several years were discontinued on 1 October 1954. Priority in mandatory functional education was given thenceforward to English language training for Puerto Rican and other non-English-speaking troops, of whom slightly over 500 attended classes in that category during the fourth quarter.[188]

(1) Intermediate Education. Altogether, 19,108 soldiers in USAREUR completed intermediate education courses and 3,409 earned eighth-grade certificates during FY 1955. Corresponding figures for the preceding year had been 9,105 and 2,953, respectively. In pursuit of the Department of the Army's minimum objective of an eighth-grade education for every noncommissioned officer, the percentage of Seventh Army NCO's with less than an eighth-grade education dropped from 34 to 27, through the completion of courses or the passing of tests.[189]

(2) High School Education. Participation in voluntary education on the high school level continued to increase. A total of 6,892 soldiers, as compared with 4,299 during FY 1954, earned high school certificates of equivalency by successfully passing the appropriate General Education Development (GED) test. Continued interest was also shown in attaining first-year-of-college equivalency by passing the college GED test. A total of 1,354 soldiers achieved this equivalency, as against 765 in FY 1954.[190]

(3) College-Level Courses. The University of Maryland continued to serve USAREUR military personnel on the college level. Army personnel completed 7,218 University of Maryland courses--2½ times the number of completions during the preceding year.[191]

(4) USAFI Courses. The United States Armed Forces Institute (USAFI) continued to provide self-teaching and correspondence courses in nearly 300 subjects. Army enrollments continued to increase and the rate of completions was approximately 10 percent, which was considered high.[192]

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[188] Statement prepared by USAREUR AFIED Educ Br, 27 Jul 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Hist Div files.

[189] Ibid.

[190] Ibid.

[191] Ibid.

[192] Ibid.

(5) MOS-Related Courses. Many courses were conducted throughout the command, to meet specific needs related to training and administrative duties. Students were often unable to complete courses or pass end-of-course tests because they did not have sufficient time. During the last quarter 230 classes were conducted in the German language with 4,600 persons enrolled; 219 classes in French with 2,400 enrolled; 190 classes in typing with 2,300 enrolled; and 402 classes in vocational and related subjects with an enrollment of more than 5,000.[193]

f. Red Cross Volunteer Program for Dependents. In addition to rendering emergency and personal services to military personnel and dependents (see par. 51b), the American Red Cross developed a program of voluntary participation of dependents in Red Cross activities, similar to programs in typical communities in the United States. The program, which was initiated in 1945, to train volunteers to be Gray Ladies and staff aides in military hospitals and to instruct other volunteers in first aid, water safety, home nursing, and baby care, reached peak activity during the second half of the year under review. American Red Cross personnel conducted 188 classes--30 for Gray Ladies, 20 for staff aides, 72 in first aid and water safety, and 66 in home nursing and baby care. During that period 11,245 volunteer workers rendered service to military personnel and to fellow dependents. Of this number 8,616 were certified volunteers trained in the classes; the remainder were uncertified. Volunteers working in Army installations numbered 4,876.[194]

44. Dependents' Schools

a. Facilities. At the end of the school year 1954-55 the command was operating 93 elementary schools, 12 high schools, and 54 kindergartens. Despite the transfer of 11 schools to the control of USAFE in October 1954, the June 1955 total of 105 USAREUR-operated elementary and high schools was only 1 less than at the beginning of the school year. The high schools at Heidelberg, Frankfurt, Munich, Nuremberg, Kaiserslautern and Rochefort continued to operate dormitories to accommodate pupils from communities not large enough to justify the establishment of high schools.[195]

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[193] Ibid.

[194] Ltr and memo, Mr. W. E. Henry, ARC Ln Rep to USAREUR, to USAREUR Hist Div, 21 Jul 55, sub: Volunteer Statistics. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Hist Div files.

[195] (1) Enrollment Rept, USAREUR-Operated Schools, 10 Jun 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR DSD files. (2) USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, 1953-54, pp. 118-19. SECRET (information used UNCLASSIFIED). (3) Interv, PFC R. H. McDonald, 10th Mil Hist Det, with Mr. M. E. Armitage, USAREUR DEO, 15 Jul 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

b. Enrollment. Enrollment increased in grades 1-12 and decreased in the kindergartens.

(1) Grades 1-12. At the beginning of the school year in September 1954 the enrollment in USAREUR-operated elementary and high schools was 30,603, highest during the year and a USAREUR record, reflecting the increased number of dependent families in the command. Though considerably less than the anticipated peak enrollment of 42,500, it was 45 percent over the September 1953 figure of 21,251 and 20 percent above the June 1954 total of 25,521. However, the aforementioned transfer of 11 schools, with an enrollment of over 4,000 pupils, to Air Force control in October 1954 reduced the USAREUR total to 26,089 as of the end of that month. At the beginning of the second semester, February 1955, enrollment stood at 26,218 and at the close of the school year, 25,002--only 500 less than the previous school year's closing total. The average monthly enrollment for the year was 26,326--2 percent higher than the 1953-54 average of 25,836. It ranged from 5,423 in the 1st grade to 1,080 in the 9th and 365 in the 12th.[196]

(2) Kindergartens. Enrollment in the 54 kindergartens rose steadily from a low of 2,734 in September to a high of 3,821 in February 1954, then decreased to 3,566 in June. The peak enrollment, like that of grades 1-12, was much lower than predicted. The average monthly enrollment was smaller by 16.5 percent than that of the school year 1953-54, having dropped from 4,351 to 3,630.[197]

c. Teachers and Librarians. At the beginning of the school year the command employed 1,301 American teachers, including teaching principals, kindergarten through grade 12, on the basis of predicted enrollment forecasts. Of this number approximately 100 were transferred to Air Force jurisdiction in October 1954. Other losses during the year brought the total number to 1,168 at the close of the year. At that time, also, 150 German and French nationals were in the employ of the command as language instructors and 36 as librarians. At the end of the previous school year American teachers had numbered 977 and indigenous teachers and librarians 156.[198]

d. Administrative and Personnel Problems. Procedural changes formulated during the year transferred the administration of teachers from the military Dependents Schools Detachment (DSD) to the civilian Dependents Education Organization (DEO). By delegating the administrative control of teachers to several area supervisors, DEO eased

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[196] Ibid.

[197] Ibid.

[198] (1) Ibid. (2) Interv, Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. M. E. Armitage, USAREUR DEO, 3 Oct 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

considerably the problems of day-to-day teacher administration in the field. Other problems, however, persisted. Since all teachers, including principals, started at the beginning step of their salary levels irrespective of experience, the command was often unable to attract experienced school principals from the United States. Above all, turnover among American teaching personnel, which had always been excessive by stateside standards, became an even more serious administrative problem during the year. Resignations surged from 349 in December 1954 to 532, more than 45 percent of the teaching force, by the end of the school year.[199] Basic reasons for the high turnover were the same as those of previous years: Nonacceptance of overseas teaching experience toward the longevity requirements of the school systems of the various states; the necessity of returning to teaching jobs in the United States in order to keep certificates "alive"; difficulty of adjusting to the known but often ignored fact that the full annual salary was received only by those teachers who worked for 12 full months, as few did or were allowed to; and the 6 percent salary deduction for Civil Service retirement, which most teachers did not seek. To these grievances others were added during the year. Two days before the start of the Christmas holiday season the practice of granting teachers a 2-week vacation on an administrative-leave-with-pay basis, so as to enable them to travel, was discontinued by Department of the Army direction. This meant that a Christmas vacation entailed leave without pay and, for teachers in France, the discontinuance of quarters and station allowances during the period. In addition, and for all teachers, the privilege of resignation and reappointment (R&R), which in previous years had enabled them to go home at government expense and be reemployed for the following school year, was discontinued early in January 1955. The morale of USAREUR teachers was seriously affected, particularly when they learned that their colleagues in the employ of the Air Force had retained these privileges. In March 1955 a number of suggestions for ameliorating conditions were made to the Civilian Personnel Division, Department of the Army. According to these suggestions teachers--excluding principals--would be employed on a 10-month basis. Their pay would be distributed over the 10-month period; they would receive additional pay for summer sessions and would be given the choice of contributing either to the Civil Service Retirement Fund or to the Social Security System. Salary schedules would be adjusted to those of comparable school systems in the United States; no annual leave would be granted as such, but teachers would not be required to work during school holidays. Termination and rehire travel benefits would be restored.[200] However, at the close of the fiscal

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[199] (1) Statement of Dr. E. R. Sifert, Dir/USAREUR DEO, to the USAREUR Bd of Educ, 10 May 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR DEO files. (2) Interv, PFC R. H. McDonald, 10th Mil Hist Det, with Mr. S. J. Hergenroeder, Dep Dir/USAREUR DEO, 11 Jul 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

[200] Ibid.

year no action had been taken to improve the situation.

45. Youth Activities Programs

This was the first full year of operation for the American Youth Activities (AYA) program, which had been in the formulation stage during the preceding report period. It was also the last year in which U.S. forces gave official financial support to the German Youth Activities (GYA) program.

a. The AYA Program. Official policy governing AYA was set forth in USAREUR Circular 148, dated 8 July 1954, which established the program as a command function and provided for its general operation. The purpose of AYA was to promote wholesome social and athletic activities, travel, and other worth-while out-of-school projects for youthful dependents of U.S. personnel, particularly those between the ages of 7 and 18. The program was also to promote sound concepts of citizenship and democracy and to encourage friendly relations between American youth groups and comparable groups in France and Germany. The Army intended to supervise and direct the program through designated AYA officers, but the youths themselves would be encouraged to participate in the management of AYA installations. Youth advisory councils elected for this purpose would include representatives of youth organizations and youth at large. Parents would be encouraged to support AYA through parents' advisory councils or boards of governors.[201] At first the program was funded by voluntary contributions, money-raising events, and the like;[202] but in March 1955 the use of official welfare funds was authorized.[203] This authorization meant, in general practice, that 2 percent of each area command's welfare fund was made available for AYA programs. But in most localities supplementary membership drives and other voluntary fund-raising activities were carried on also.[204] By the end of the fiscal year $94,439.97 was on hand in 44 AYA funds.[205] The first year's efforts were directed primarily toward setting up an organization, securing facilities, and getting local programs under way. The Youth Activities Board, composed of the Chief, Personnel Services Branch,

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[201] USAREUR Cir 148, 8 Jul 54, sub: American Youth Activities Program. UNCLASSIFIED.

[202] Interv, Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj B. L. Burke, USAREUR G1 Pers Svcs Br, 13 Jul 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

[203] Memo, CINCUSAREUR to ACOFS G1, 4 Mar 55, sub: American Youth Activities. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G1 Pers Svcs Br files.

[204] Interv, Mr. Lane with Maj Burke, 11 Oct 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

[205] Sum of AYA, Jun 55, compiled by USAREUR G1 Pers Svcs Br. UNCLASSIFIED.

Assistant Chief of Staff G1, as chairman, the Chief of the AYA-GYA Section of that branch as executive secretary, and representatives of the Logistics, Special Activities, Provost Marshal, Civil Affairs, Chaplain, and Adjutant General Divisions (and subsequently the Army representative of the European Scouting Advisory Council), met for the first time on 2 August 1954. The first command-wide conference to present plans and programs of assistance to AYA officers and to discuss problems, was held at Heidelberg on 21 October.

(1) Establishment of Community Centers and Local Programs. In the spring of 1955 several areas presented requests for the construction of AYA centers to the AYA board. In determining priority, the board considered principally the degree of isolation, the numbers of persons to be served, and the availability of recreational facilities. At the close of the year the construction of AYA centers at 13 locations--Frankfurt, Munich, Schwetzingen, Vogelweh, Ludwigsburg, Baumholder, Butzbach, Vaihingen, Hanau, Augsburg, and Bad Toelz, Nuremberg, and Schweinfurt--seemed reasonably certain.[206] Meanwhile, 40 U.S. Army communities in Germany were operating youth centers without special buildings, 44 communities had initiated so-called varied programs of AYA activities, and 4 communities had established limited programs. The latter programs consisted only of scouting and teen-age club activities. Varied programs included, in addition, activities for all age groups--handicraft classes, dancing classes, tours, baseball, and touch football.[207]

(2) Major Projects. The three major AYA projects initiated command-wide during FY 1955 were the 1955 Arts and Crafts Contest, Junior League Baseball, and summer camps. The first project was an arts and crafts contests conducted at local, subarea, and area levels and culminating in command-wide finals in June 1955. Sponsoring agencies bore the expenses of the contest, since no official funds were available.[208] In France the sponsoring agencies were the dependents schools, with approximately 15,000 children participating. In Germany the contests were sponsored by AYA centers, and approximately 12,000 children participated.[209]

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[206](1) Min Sp Mtg, USAREUR Youth Acts Bd, 12 May 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G1 Pers Svcs Br files. (2) Interv, PFC R. H. McDonald, 10th Mil Hist Det, with Maj B. L. Burke, USAREUR G1 Pers Svcs Br, 27 Jul 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

[207](1) Sum of AYA, Jun 55, cited above. (2) Interv, Mr. Lane with Maj Burke, 13 Jul 55. Both UNCLASSIFIED.

[208]USAREUR ltr, 14 Dec 54, sub: AYA Arts and Crafts Contest for 1955. AG 353.8 GPA-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[209]Intervs, Mr. Lane and PFC McDonald with Maj Burke, 13 Jul 55, and 27 Jul 55, respectively. UNCLASSIFIED.

The second major project was Junior League Baseball, for boys under 13 years of age, which was organized at local, subarea, and area levels according to the rules of Little League Baseball, Inc., of Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The season opened on 4 June 1955. There were 100 Junior League Teams of 15 members each. In addition, 300 smaller boys played on "club" teams, making a total of 1,800 participants. USAREUR championship finals were to be held in Garmisch in August.[210]

The third major project of the year was the establishment of 7 summer camps, all but 1 of which opened in June 1955. Five were in Germany--at Giebelstadt, Bad Toelz, Dahn, Luebberstedt, and near Heidelberg--and 2 were in France--in the forest of La Palmyre and at Bar-le-Duc. It was anticipated that by the end of the camp season 4,720 youths would have used the facilities.[211]

b. The GYA Program. When the German Youth Activities program was started in 1946 to combat juvenile delinquency among German youths and to promote the spirit of democracy, it was intended that the activities would eventually be taken over by German communities. American support was through counterpart funds and fund-raising activities, not through dollar expenditures. At the height of the movement in 1948-49 about 380 centers were being operated. Through gradual transfer or closing, only 22 centers were still being supported at the beginning of FY 1955, and by the end, 14 of these had been transferred to German operation and the remainder closed.[212] United States forces official financial support of GYA centers and camps was terminated effective 30 June. Nonappropriated funds remaining on hand for GYA at that date were to be distributed proportionately to cooperating German "open door" centers that served all children without regard to nationality, race, religious belief, or social status. The new directive permitted the operation of facilities for German youth activities by U.S. troop units or other organizations on a voluntary basis, provided that personnel were not assigned to work with the activities on a duty basis and that no budgeted dollar or Deutsche Mark funds were used to support them.[213]

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[210] (1) USAREUR ltr, 5 Mar 55, sub: AYA Junior League Baseball for 1955. AG 353.8 GPA-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Interv, Mr. Lane with Maj Burke, 13 Jul 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

[211] Interv, Lane with Burke, 13 Jul 55, cited above. UNCLASSIFIED.

[212] Ibid.

[213] USAREUR Cir 28-75, 29 Apr 55, sub: Assistance to German Youth Activities (GYA). UNCLASSIFIED.

46. Disciplinary Problems

a. Absence Without Leave. The monthly AWOL rate, computed in man-days lost per thousand man-days strength, dropped rather steadily from 0.41 in July 1954 to 0.26 in June 1955. The June rate, which represented a decrease of 36.6 percent during the year, was the lowest in three years. As in past years, moreover, the USAREUR AWOL rate was well under that in the United States, where the rate dropped from 4.4 in July 1954 to 2.3 in March 1955, and under the total Army rate, which dropped from 2.6 in July 1954 to 1.6 in March 1955. The actual number of USAREUR cases in June 1955 was 522, lowest in over two years.[214]

b. Crimes and Offenses. USAREUR's over-all monthly crime rate among military personnel, offenders known and unknown, which averaged 0.86 incidents per thousand troops per month in 1952, 1.00 in 1953, and 1.20 in 1954, averaged 1.51 for FY 1955, increasing, with fluctuations, from 1.03 in July 1954 to a high of 3.25 in December and falling to 1.53 in June 1955. The increase was marked among both white and Negro troops, although Negro personnel continued to be responsible for a disproportionately high rate, averaging 2.12 incidents per thousand troops per month as compared with 0.86 among white troops.[215]

(1) Crimes Against Persons and Property. Crimes of military personnel against persons and property, measured by the number of offenders per thousand troops per month, averaged 2.96 for FY 1955 as compared with 2.91 during CY 1954 and 2.96 during CY 1953. Crimes of military and civilian personnel of all the U.S. forces against Germans remained fairly constant, and comparable with previous years, at about 0.35 incidents per thousand personnel per month, while crimes of Germans against Americans, which were usually about 3 times as numerous, declined from 0.80 to 0.61 incidents per thousand personnel per month. As in previous years, crimes of Americans against Germans were principally hit-and-run incidents and assaults; those of Germans against Americans were principally thefts and burglaries, with occasional assaults. Thefts of government property, excluding November 1954, averaged $59,470 monthly, as compared with $87,355 in 1954 and $70,476 in 1953, and recoveries averaged about $38,250. In November 1954 ordnance supplies valued at about $167 million were stolen in the Southern Area Command and $127.5 million worth were recovered.[216]

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[214] USAREUR Mthly Stat Rept, 30 Jun 55, p. 41. (2) Analysis USAREUR Mthly Stat Rept, 30 Jun 55, p. 5. Both SECRET (information used CONFIDENTIAL).

[215] USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, Jul 54-Jun 55. SECRET (information used CONFIDENTIAL).

[216] Ibid.

(2) Traffic Offenses. In spite of command emphasis on safety and safe driving (see par. 50), the rate of traffic offenses, measured in the number of military offenders per thousand troops per month, almost doubled during the year, from 7.6 per thousand per month in July 1954 to 14.7 in June 1955, with most of the increase taking place during the 6 months beginning January 1955. About 80 percent of the offenses were "moving" violations, including speeding, drunken driving, failure to heed signs and signals, etc. The 20 percent of "stationary" violations involved illegal parking, nonregistration, and use of unsafe equipment.[217]

(3) Military Offenses. The rate of purely military offenses did not vary much from an average of about 11 offenses per thousand troops per month: 5 AWOL's, 1 pass violation, 1 uniform violation, and 4 miscellaneous offenses such as disrespect, unbecoming or disorderly conduct, violation of liquor regulations, etc. The AWOL rate, while averaging 5 per thousand troops per month, dropped steadily, but with slight fluctuations, from 6.0 in July 1954 to 4.7 in June 1955.[218]

c. Courts-Martial. Through concerted effort to handle matters of discipline at as low an administrative level as possible, there was a significant decline in the over-all number and rate of courts-martial and in the number and rate of general and special courts-martial, and a slight increase in the number and rate of summary courts-martial. The over-all court-martial rate decreased by about 8.5 percent from 7.8 cases per thousand troops in July 1954 to 7.15 in June 1955; the general and special court-martial rates dropped from 0.6 to 0.44 and from 2.8 to 2.24 respectively, and the summary court-martial rate increased from 4.3 to 4.47. At the same time, through the continuing special efforts initiated two years before by the Judge Advocate Division, the average general court-martial processing time, from restraint to sentence, was reduced from the 1953 and 1954 averages of 20.4 and 18.4 days, respectively, to 17.25 days. On the other hand the average number of days required for the review of a general court-martial sentence, which had dropped in 1954 from 14.5 to 10.7, was 11.26 during FY 1955.[219]

d. Imprisonment. The number of sentenced and unsentenced prisoners decreased, with seasonal fluctuations, by 21.5 percent from 956 at the end of July 1954 to 751 at the end of June 1955. Concurrently, the prison commitment rate declined by 36 percent from 2.52 per thousand troops during July 1954 to 1.61 during June 1955. The total number and the rate per thousand troops of prisoners at the end of each month are shown in the following tabulation:[220]

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[217] Ibid.

[218] Ibid.

[219] Ibid.

[220] Ibid.

	Number			Rate Per Thousand Troops	
	Total	Sentenced	Un-sentenced	In Prison Sentenced and Unsentenced	Committed During Month
July 1954	956	692	264	3.87	2.52
August	971	626	345	3.98	2.56
September	849	595	254	3.52	2.63
October	845	578	267	3.52	2.63
November	845	534	311	3.53	2.66
December	756	485	271	3.13	2.34
January 1955	842	601	241	3.55	2.05
February	786	564	222	3.33	1.70
March	734	562	172	3.00	1.93
April	765	546	219	3.20	2.00
May	693	522	171	2.91	1.90
June	751	496	255	3.06	1.51

Of the 751 prisoners confined as of 30 June, 373 were in the Rehabilitation Center, and of these 65.6 percent had had from 1 to 3 previous convictions by courts-martial during their current terms of enlistment.[221]

47. Health of the Command

a. Military Personnel. The health of the command as measured by the daily average military noneffective rate per thousand troops continued to improve during the year. This rate, which stood at 23.4 in 1947 and fell to 20.0 in 1950 and 11.84 in 1953, stood at 9.9 for June 1955. The sick-in-hospital-and/or-quarters rate, which averaged 397.8 cases per thousand troops per year during CY 1954, was approximately 357 for July 1954, rose sharply during the four months from December 1954 through March 1955, and fell again to approximately 357 for the month of June 1955, during which 8,306 military patients and 3,506 others were sick in hospital and/or quarters at one time or another.[222] The abnormal increase in the number of frostbite cases that had taken place during the winter 1953-54 from 20 cases in December 1953 to 477 in February 1954, did not recur.[223] In July 1954 the venereal disease (VD) incidence rate was 70 per thousand troops per year. In November 1954, the last month for which VD incidence figures

[221] Ibid.

[222] USAREUR Mthly Stat Rept, 30 Jun 55, pp. 28-29. SECRET (information used CONFIDENTIAL).

[223] USAREUR Mthly Stat Rept, 31 Mar 55. SECRET (information used CONFIDENTIAL).

were published in the monthly statistical report, it was 65. Though higher than the worldwide Army rate, which was 61 in July 1954, the USAREUR rate, July through November, was consistently lower than the overseas Army rate, which was 97 in July 1954. The average amount of time lost from duty, per case, was four-tenths of a day and the incidence rate presented no medical problem.[224] In December 1954 the incidence rate for scabies and infectious hepatitis reached new lows after a steady 5-year decline, and these maladies were no longer charted as diseases of special interest.[225]

b. Services to Dependents. The load of hospital services to dependents of military and civilian personnel continued to become significantly heavier. The number of dependent outpatient treatments during June 1955 was 33 percent larger than during June 1954 although the number of military and civilian dependents had increased by only a little more than 20 percent. Averaging 63,535 monthly during 1954 and 99,000 monthly during 1955, treatments in this category averaged 128,382 monthly during the six months ending 30 June 1955 and totaled 770,293, more than for the entire year 1953.[226]

48. USAREUR Soldiers' Savings Program

In May 1955 a new Department of the Army Savings Bond program[227] was launched to encourage troops to make continuous rather than spasmodic savings. The program laid special stress on the purchase of U.S. Savings Bonds through the payroll participation plan, with 65 percent participation as the goal for 1955. Consolidated reports for June 1955 showed that 10 percent of the USAREUR personnel bought bonds during the month and that 21 percent made soldiers' deposits.[228]

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[224](1) USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, Jul-Nov 54. SECRET. (2) Analysis USAREUR Mthly Stat Rept, 30 Nov 54, p. 3. SECRET (information used CONFIDENTIAL).

[225]Analysis USAREUR Mthly Stat Rept, 31 Jan 55, p. 4. SECRET (information used CONFIDENTIAL).

[226](1) USAREUR Mthly Stat Rept, 30 Jun 55, pp. 28-29. SECRET (information used CONFIDENTIAL). (2) Analysis USAREUR Mthly Stat Rept, 30 Jun 55, p. 4-5. SECRET (information used CONFIDENTIAL). For more complete data concerning the health of the command, see the Annual Report of the Surgeon, USAREUR to the Surgeon General, Department of the Army. SECRET.

[227]DA Cir 600-1, 11 Apr 55, sub: Savings Bond Program. UNCLASSIFIED.

[228]USAREUR Fin & Acctg Opns Rept (RCS-FIN-113), Jun 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Fin & Acctg Div.

49. Character Guidance and Religious Activities

The Character Guidance Program and the religious activities of USAREUR personnel received new emphasis.

a. Character Guidance Program. In November 1954, upon recommendation of the Character Guidance Council established in 1951, the statement of principles and policies governing the Army Character Guidance Program in USAREUR under the provisions of AR 15-120, originally issued in May 1952, was republished in the command. The mission of the program "to encourage the individual to develop moral responsibility, spiritual values, and strong self-discipline" was reaffirmed.[229]

(1) General Bolte's Letter. In March 1955, moreover, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, Gen. C. L. Bolte, addressed a personal letter to General McAuliffe in which he stressed the importance of the Character Guidance Program in the moral training of military personnel as an element in combating atheistic materialism and strengthening adherence to the spiritual principles to which the free world was dedicated. General McAuliffe was asked to exert his personal influence in making officers of the command cognizant of the program and of their part in it.[230]

(2) Command Action. In reply General McAuliffe pledged continued support of the program, stating that U.S. troops in Europe had unusual opportunities to see, at first hand and on an international scale, the basic moral issues involved.[231] On 22 March 1955 he discussed General Bolte's letter at the HICOG-Commanders' Conference, stressing the Character Guidance Program as a command function. On the same date a new letter of instructions was issued suggesting a number of practical means of integrating character guidance with daily operations and activities. For instance, leaders not ordinarily associated with character development were encouraged to include character development in their lectures and discussions; the value of participation in religious activities was emphasized; chaplains were encouraged to cooperate in directing a part of their religious instruction and character development talks to practical measures; spiritual values and international responsibility were stressed in the

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[229] USAREUR ltr, CINCUSAREUR to sub comds, 18 Nov 54, sub: Character Guidance Policy Statement, and Incl 1. AG 334 GPA-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[230] Ltr, Bolte to McAuliffe, 2 Mar 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 330.11 (1955), Vol. I, Item 6, Tab A.

[231] Ltr, McAuliffe to Bolte, 12 Mar 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

light of the situation in Europe; and character development activities were included on command inspection check lists.[232] Not enough time had elapsed before the end of June 1955 for an evaluation of results.

(3) The Problem of Questionable Literature. As an item of specific action, in July 1954 the sale of objectionable literature on The Stars and Stripes newsstands was discussed by the Character Guidance Council. The guiding principle of the discussion was that military personnel and dependents should be provided with appropriate literature on the stands without the imposition of a "book burning" type of control. The problem was considered to be a matter for the coordinated action of the Chaplains Division, the Armed Forces Information and Education Division, and The Stars and Stripes. In January 1955 these agencies agreed to establish, under the councils' auspices, a "literature standards committee" to assist the editor-in-chief of The Stars and Stripes in screening literature. As a final action, in April 1955, the council decided, with the concurrence of the editor-in-chief of The Stars and Stripes that the statement of 12 voluntary restrictions imposed by comic book editors in the United States would be adopted for all comic books sold on The Stars and Stripes stands.[233]

b. Religious Activities. There was a marked trend toward greater participation in religious activities, undoubtedly contributed to by the increase in chaplains and chapels and the stress on mandatory character lectures, normally given by chaplains. In another trend, caused by the growth of dependents communities, chaplains fulfilled more and more functions of community pastors in addition to those of specialized military chaplains.[234] The number of chaplains increased to 286, largest number ever serving the command, as compared with a high of 275 in the preceding year.[235] At the same time the number of completed and equipped chapels increased from 241 to 261, seating from 144 to 500 persons per chapel.[236] The 286 chaplains were of 27 denominations, corresponding in ratio of numbers very closely to the distribution of denominational

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[232] USAREUR ltr, to sub comds, 22 Mar 55, sub: Letter of Instructions, Character Guidance. AG 353 GPA-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[233] Min, Mtgs of USAREUR Character Guidance Council, for 21 Jul 54, 19 Jan 55, 22 Apr 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G1 Pers Svcs Br files.

[234] Interv, Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col (Ch) C. J. Murphy, Dep C/USAREUR Ch Div, 26 Jul 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

[235] Interv, Mr. Lane with Lt Col (Ch) C. F. Gunther, C/USAREUR Ch Div Pers Br, 26 Jul 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

[236] Interv, Mr. Lane with Maj (Ch) P. D. Roche, USAREUR Ch Div, 26 Jul 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

members in the United States and in the command. The following tabulation lists the chaplains by denomination as of 30 June 1955:[237]

Total			286
Catholic	91	Nazarene	2
Baptist	52	Christian Scientist	2
Methodist	39	African Methodist Episcopal	2
Lutheran	29	Evangelical Reformed	2
Presbyterian	15	Advent Christian	1
Jewish	11	Universalist	1
Disciplies of Christ	7	Pilgrim Holiness	1
Episcopal	5	Evangelical Mission Covenant	1
Congregationalist-Christian	4	Pentecostal Holiness	1
Latter Day Saints	4	Church of God	1
Assembly of God	4	Christian Missionary Alliance	1
Reformed Church American	3	Christian Reformed	1
Brethren Progressive	3	Adventist	1
Evangelical United Brethren	2		

(1) Community Programs. Typical "full parish" programs established by Protestant chaplains for Protestant members of the several communities included youth organizations, highlighted by two Young Peoples' Conferences in Berchtesgaden; an interdenominational men's organization, with frequent speakers from the United States and elsewhere; and women's organizations, in addition to the usual Sunday and weekday services and Sunday Schools. Roman Catholic parochial programs were conducted in general like those of civilian churches and included catechitical classes, confirmation classes, an annual "mission" of one or two weeks' duration, and two parochial societies--the Hold Name Society for men and the Ladies' Sodalities for women. Jewish programs, to the extent that numbers justified, included Jewish educational programs under the chaplain's office, and daily and after-school classes for children, together with the activities of the Jewish Welfare Board.[238]

(2) Religious Retreat House. This was the first operational year of the USAREUR Religious Retreat House, established on 1 June 1954 at the Alpine Inn, Berchtesgaden, to provide a suitable place and additional opportunities for military and civilian personnel of the

[237] Info from USAREUR Ch Div Pers Br. UNCLASSIFIED.

[238] Intervs, Mr. Lane with Lt Col (Ch) J. I. Rhea and Lt Col (Ch) C. J. Murphy, USAREUR Ch Div, and Lt Col (Ch) M. Engel, HACOM Ch Div, 3 Aug 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

Armed Forces to spend periods of withdrawal for individual prayer, meditation, and consideration of their religious state.[239] Its undoubted success was considered by the command to be an indication of religious interest; at the same time it was an activator of increased religious participation by personnel.[240] Organized retreats held during the year, for periods averaging 3 days, numbered 67, of which 42 were Protestant, 21 Roman Catholic, and 4 Jewish. The house was used for religious purposes by 6,391 individuals, of whom 4,649 were enlisted personnel, 854 were officers, and 888 dependents or civilian personnel. Usage by months was as follows:[241]

Total	6,391
July 1954	394
August	640
September	538
October	620
November	485
December	117
January 1955	420
February	558
March	496
April	1,304
May	401
June	448

50. Safety Programs

The problem of safety, and particularly safe driving, continued to occupy the attention of USAREUR and Allied commands in Europe, but improvement was spasmodic at best, in spite of intensive efforts. Traffic accidents and fatalities continued to be the most frequent item of unfavorable comment about U.S. forces in the German press.[242]

a. Command Concern. In June 1954 US EUCOM called USAREUR's attention to French concern about the way in which U.S. official and civilian vehicles were being operated in France and about the number of accidents in which they were involved. This problem involved the

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[239](1) USAREUR GO 66, 17 May 54, sub: Establishment of USAREUR Religious Retreat House. (2) USAREUR Cir 105-50, 9 Feb 55, sub: USAREUR Religious Retreat House. Both UNCLASSIFIED.

[240]Interv, Mr. Lane with Maj (Ch) J. M. Rhea, USAREUR Ch Div, 29 Jul 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

[241]Info from USAREUR Ch Div Plans and Opns. UNCLASSIFIED.

[242]USAREUR Mthly Stat Rept, 31 Mar 55, p. 65. SECRET (information used UNCLASSIFIED).

loss of lives and property and could therefore become a source of increasing friction.[243] In September 1954 US EUCOM again asked for USAREUR emphasis on safety, in view of the number of accidents.

b. Increase in Fatality Rate. Meanwhile, in July 1954 the Assistant Chief of Staff, G1, had noted that accidental deaths in the command had risen steadily, from 16 in January to 35 in June.[244] A complete study of fatal traffic accidents for 1954, which included the first 6 months of the period covered by this report, showed that 443 persons were killed during the year in accidents involving U.S. civilian and military vehicles. Of the persons killed, 257 were German, 128 American, 40 French, and 20 of other nationalities. The figure represented a rate of 2.88 fatalities per month for every 1,000 registered military vehicles in the command, and 3.46 per month, or 21.4 percent higher, for every 1,000 registered civilian vehicles. The highest fatality rates were in the Berlin and Southern Area Commands; the lowest rate was in the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation. During the second 6 months of the fiscal year, 229 persons were killed: 134 Germans, 64 Americans, 27 French nationals, and 4 persons of other nationalities. The civilian vehicle rate of fatal traffic accidents during that period--1.88 per 1,000 registered vehicles--was far in excess of the military rate of 1.14. Both rates, however, were lower than those of the preceding 6 months. The 1954 injury rate--as distinct from the fatality rate--for military personnel, measured in the number of injuries per 100,000 man-days of military service, showed a 12.5 percent increase over that for 1952-53. On the other hand, the 1954 injury rate for civilian personnel, measured in the number of disabling injuries per million man-hours of employment, improved 14.9 percent over 1952-53, although the Seventh Army and COMZ rates showed increases. Although both the military and civilian injury rates reflected improvement (22.5 and 0.4 percent) over the comparable 6 months for FY 1954, the motor vehicle accident rate showed a 7.4 percent increase and property damage costs, a 22.8 percent increase.[245]

c. Traffic Safety Weeks. Two traffic safety weeks were held during the year. The first such week, known as the U.S. Forces Traffic Safety Week, was held from 29 October to 4 November 1954. USAREUR,

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[243] Ltr, Gen O. R. Cook, USAF, Dep US CINCEUR, to Gen W. M. Hoge, CINCUSAREUR, 29 Jun 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 729.3 (1954), Item 27A.

[244] DF, USAREUR G1 to COFS, 10 Jul 54, sub: Reduction of Fatalities. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 30A.

[245] (1) USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 31 Jan 55, p. 48; and 31 Jul 55, pp. 23, 26. (2) Analysis USAREUR Mthly Stat Rept, 31 Jan 55. Both SECRET (information used UNCLASSIFIED).

USAFE, COMNAVGER, FFA (French Forces in Germany), BAOR (British Army of the Rhine), and the French and West German Governments participated.[246] Winter driving hazards were specially emphasized. The second traffic safety week, held within the framework of the German National Safety Campaign conducted by the German Federal Republic, was participated in by USAREUR and FFA.[247]

d. Command Safety Awards. Although, as pointed out, the traffic accident rate was not bettered during the year, some over-all quarterly accident rates were better than those of the corresponding quarters of the previous year. Thus the accident record for the third quarter showed the following improvement over that for the corresponding quarter of FY 1954:

	Percent of Decrease
Military personnel injuries	26.3
U.S. civilian personnel fatalities	11.5
Other Army personnel injuries	36.2
Other personnel fatalities	3.6
Army motor vehicle fatalities	21.0

The USAREUR Quarterly Safety Command Award, established in May 1954 and awarded each quarter to the major subordinate command attaining the greatest achievement in the prevention of accidents[248] was won by the Transportation Division in the first and second quarters and by the Special Activities Division in the third and fourth quarters. The Transportation Division accident record for 1954 showed a 40 percent decrease below that of the preceding year.[249]

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[246](1) USAREUR ltr, to sub comds, 3 Aug 54, sub: Traffic Safety Week. AG 729.3 GPA-AGO. (2) Ltr, Gen W. M. Hoge, CINCUSAREUR, to Gen O. R. Cook, Dep US CINCEUR, 24 Aug 54. (3) Min, Mtg at Fr Ln Msn on Mutual Participation in U.S. Forces Traffic Safety Week, 22 Oct 54. All UNCLASSIFIED. All in USAREUR SGS 729.3 (1954), Vol. I, Items 27A, 33A atchd, and 44A.

[247](1) USAREUR ltr, to all sub comds, 18 Feb 55, sub: Traffic Safety Week. AG 729.3 GPA-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) DF, USAREUR ACOFS G1 to COFS, n.d., sub: German-American Safety Committee Meeting. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 2A.

[248]USAREUR ltr, sub: Quarterly Command Safety Citation. AG 729.3 GPA-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[249]Memo, to C/USAREUR G1 Pers Svcs Br, sgd J. M. Hoefer, C/Safety Sec, 8 Jul 55, sub: Report of Command Management Improvement, 4th Quarter FY 1955. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G1 Pers Svcs Br files.

e. Department of the Army and National Safety Council Awards. USAREUR received the Department of the Army Award of Merit for Safety for the third successive year; it was 1 of 8 commands receiving the award. The command also received 4 Department of the Army Awards of Merit for Safety for presentation to the Northern Area Command, the Headquarters Area Command, the Berlin Command, and the 66th Counter Intelligence Corps respectively. On the basis of over-all improvement in safety programs during 1954, and upon USAREUR's recommendation, Department of the Army Letters of Achievement were presented to USAREUR COMZ and to the 32d AAA Brigade; and for outstanding achievement in various categories of accident prevention, certificates of merit for safety were presented to 52 smaller units. For outstanding improvement in safety programs during 1954 as compared with the preceding two years, the Transportation Division received the National Safety Council Award of Honor, the highest-ranking award given by the council.[250]

f. Plans for the Immediate Future. At the close of the fiscal year the following safety projects were planned for the first quarter of FY 1956, with a view toward increasing driving proficiency and decreasing accidents: a series of presentations in the field of safety for dissemination through TI&E channels; a new USAREUR circular for the guidance of unit commanders and part-time safety officers; a new table of allowance for protective clothing and equipment; and a so-called Truck Roadeo to determine the best military vehicle drivers in the command.[251]

51. Participation in Relief and Assistance Programs

As provided in Army Regulations,[252] military and civilian personnel were given the opportunity to make voluntary financial contributions to recognized charitable, health, welfare, and similar organizations in fund-raising campaigns sponsored by the command. Six campaigns, so spaced that dates would not conflict, were conducted:

28 Aug 54- 2 Oct 54	Joint Army Emergency Relief Army Relief Society Campaign
21 Dec 54- 2 Feb 55	March of Dimes
13 Feb 55-19 Feb 55	American Heart Fund Campaign
28 Feb 55- 4 Apr 55	American Red Cross Drive
1 Apr 55-30 Apr 55	Cancer Fund Crusade
1 May 55-31 May 55	Crusade for Freedom

[250] Ibid.

[251] Ibid.

[252] AR 600-29, 23 Dec 54, sub: Fund Raising and Solicitation of Military and Civilian Personnel. UNCLASSIFIED.

A total of $941,333 was contributed--an increase of about 18 percent over the approximately $771,000 contributed during FY 1954. Principal emphasis on the part of the command was given to the American Red Cross, Army Emergency Relief, and the Army Relief Society campaigns because of the direct benefits derived by military personnel.[253]

a. Joint AER-ARS Campaign. The USAREUR Branch of Army Emergency Relief (AER), of which there were 29 sections and subsidiary offices in the command on 30 June 1955, continued to render emergency financial assistance to military personnel in cases not within the province of the Red Cross or in which Red Cross aid was not adequate. During 1954 the AER agency made loans and grants totaling slightly more than a million dollars to about 6,800 individuals in USAREUR. The Army Relief Society (ARS), with a smaller program, gave financial assistance to widows and orphans of Regular Army personnel, and reimbursable financial assistance to widows and orphans of non-RA personnel. The fund-raising campaigns for the two organizations were conducted jointly. Contributions totaled $240,917.55--three times the approximately $80,000 contributed the previous year.[254]

b. American Red Cross Drive. During the command-wide American Red Cross drive in the spring of 1955, a total of $330,230 was contributed, as compared with $322,897 during the previous year's campaign, and 251,856 individuals took out or renewed memberships in the society by contributing one dollar or more. The extent of the services rendered by the Red Cross was indicated partially by the fact that 10,000 service personnel used its emergency and personal services monthly. About 80 percent of these were given financial assistance, averaging $75 each; in about 90 percent of the cases this assistance was given in form of a loan and in the remaining instances as an outright grant. An official report for 1954 showed that there were 109 major Red Cross offices, staffed by 379 American and local employees, serving both hospitalized and able-bodied U.S. forces personnel. Red Cross hospital recreation workers were reported to have held 24,822 group recreation events and to have given individual service to 9,533 patients.[255]

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[253](1) DOD Dir 5035.1, 13 Aug 53. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Interv, Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj John G. Goodeve, C/USAREUR AG Compt Br AER, 19 Jul 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

[254](1) AER Ann Rept, 1954. (2) Info ltr 2, Hq AER, Wash., D.C., sub: AER Ann Rept, 1954. Both UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR SGS 005 (1955), Vol. I, Item 7 atchd. (3) Interv, Mr. Lane with Maj Goodeve, 19 Jul 55, 27 Sep 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

[255](1) USAREUR Wkly Dir, 28 Jan 55. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Ltr, Mr. R. C. Lewis, Dir ARC, Eur Area, to CINCUSAREUR, 17 Feb 55. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) Interv, Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. W. E. Henry, USAREUR ARC Ln Off, 19 Jul 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

c. The March of Dimes. The USAREUR March of Dimes Campaign, held at the turn of 1954-55 on behalf of the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis, raised $320,379.73, when all returns were in. Probably because of command deemphasis, this amount was somewhat less than the $338,349.28 contributed in the previous year.[256]

d. The Heart Fund Campaign. Though the American Heart Association was not one of the organizations receiving major USAREUR support, $8,825.43 was contributed during the February 1955 campaign in its behalf,[257] as compared with $8,466.10 contributed in the preceding year.

e. The Cancer Crusade. In April 1955 the USAREUR campaign on behalf of the American Cancer Society raised $25,911.05, as compared with $16,377.14 contributed in 1954.[258]

f. The Crusade for Freedom. In 1954 the American Express Company and the Chase National Bank in Europe assumed responsibility for collecting funds for the Crusade for Freedom, a nonpartisan civilian organization devoted principally to the solicitation of funds for Radio Free Europe. Because neither of these companies was instructed by its home office to assume similar responsibility for 1955, USAREUR conducted a fund-raising campaign for this organization during May 1955. Contributions totaled $15,469.24, approximately three times the amount contributed in the previous year.[259]

g. Operation Friendly Hand. In addition to contributing to the foregoing fund-raising campaigns, USAREUR personnel assisted in Operation Friendly Hand 1955, a project sponsored by American Women's groups in Europe with the cooperation of a Berlin women's organization and the West Berlin administration. For the third successive year this project enabled a number of Berlin children between the ages of 6 and 15 to spend the summer vacation in American homes and with American

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[256](1) Ltr, Gen A. C. McAuliffe, CINCUSAREUR, to Mr. Basil O'Connor, National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis, N.Y., 7 Apr 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 005 (1955), Vol. I, Item 3. (2) Interv cited above.

[257](1) Ltr, Gen W. M. Hoge, CINCUSAREUR, to Gen Mark W. Clark, USA Ret, Amer Heart Assn, N.Y., 15 Oct 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 005 (1954), Vol. I, Item 19A. (2) Ltr, Mr. R. A. Betts, Exec Dir, Amer Heart Assn, N.Y., to Gen A. C. McAuliffe, CINCUSAREUR, 3 May 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 005 (1955), Vol. I, Item 8. (3) Interv cited above.

[258]Interv cited above.

[259](1) Ltr, Brig Gen B. Easley, USAREUR AG, to Mr. E. F. Bartelt, Nat Chm for Fed Employees, Crusade for Freedom, Wash., D.C., 15 Feb 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 005 (1955), Vol. I, Item 4 atchd. (2) Interv cited above.

families in West Germany. Official support furnished by USAREUR included transportation of the children from reception centers in Germany to local reception points, communications facilities for the movement, and appropriate press publicity.[260] Unofficial support consisted of housing, subsistence, care and entertainment of the children, furnished on a voluntary basis by military and civilian personnel of the command. During the summer, beginning 15 June, 589 children were accommodated in the homes of 555 American sponsors. Of that number 56 were name-requested by sponsors who wanted the same children whom they had entertained in 1954, when approximately 900 children visited American homes. The decrease in 1955 was attributed to the large-scale transfer of U.S. personnel from derequisitioned houses into apartments in dependents housing areas, where space for guests was more limited.[261]

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[260] USAREUR ltr, 4 May 55, sub: Friendly Hand 1955. AG 353.8 GPA-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[261] Interv, Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj Beatrice L. Burke, C/USAREUR G1 Pers Svcs Br, 13 Jul 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

CHAPTER 4

Intelligence Activities

Because of a continuing threat of armed attack from Eastern Europe, CINCUSAREUR maintained an intelligence organization to obtain information concerning the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions of the U.S.S.R. and its satellites, and to prevent those countries from obtaining similar information concerning the United States and its NATO Allies.[1]

52. Fields of Intelligence Interest

With respect to Eastern Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the U.S.S.R., USAREUR's primary intelligence efforts were directed toward discovering indications of the imminence of hostilities. The command was specifically interested in order of battle information concerning the identification, strength, composition, command structure, organization and equipment, disposition, tactics, training, and morale of all ground military and uniformed security forces. This interest extended to significant movements of Soviet and satellite troop units into, out of, and within USAREUR's area of intelligence responsibility.

Also sought was logistical information concerning rail operations, supply depots, equipment maintenance installations, and highway and waterway operations. In the field of economics, the command was interested in information concerning armament, vehicle, petroleum, and iron and steel production, manpower, civil stockpiles, and trade between the East and the West. Scientific and technical information was sought, especially that concerning atomic energy, missiles, electronics, biological and chemical warfare, research and development of weapons and equipment, and cryptological activities.

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[1]The intelligence mission of the command is explained in greater detail in Ch. 1, pars. 6b, 6g.

Efforts were made to secure basic intelligence concerning communications systems, railways and allied equipment, highways, waterways and ports, urban districts, and geodetic mapping operations. Also of interest was intelligence concerning political and governmental activities related to military planning and military security, the psychological vulnerability of the governments, as well as resistance movements and other antiregime activities. Especially desirable was biographical information concerning prominent political and military personalities.

Other items of intelligence interest were border incidents, Soviet-inspired moves to impede traffic between Berlin and Western Germany, and intelligence operations of the Soviet Union and its satellites.[2]

53. Refugee Screening

a. German Refugees. In FY 1955 a continuous stream of people fled from Soviet-bloc countries and sought refuge in the Western Sectors of Berlin and in Western Germany. Of course, German residents of the Soviet Zone were free to enter the German Federal Republic and visit for any length of time. However, if they desired to establish permanent legal residence in Western Germany, and wished to obtain employment, housing, and social security benefits, or exercise the right to vote, they had to be processed through a Federal Republic refugee center in West Berlin, Giessen, or Uelzen and be granted official refugee status. In 1954 about 175,000 Germans were processed at the three centers and an additional 95,000 were processed in the first 6 months of 1955. Nearly three out of four applicants were given refugee status.[3]

b. Non-German Refugees. Regardless of nationality, border crossers formerly residing in Soviet-bloc countries other than Eastern Germany were classified as non-German refugees. Persons of this classification were sent to non-German refugee centers in Berlin and Nuremberg for processing by the Bundestelle fuer die Anerkennung von Auslaendlischen Fluechtlinge (Federal Office for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees).[4] The Berlin center was established in July 1954 in the American Sector in

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[2](1) USAREUR ACOFS G2 Intel Sums 192-218, 2 Jul 54-1 Jul 55. SECRET. (2) USAREUR Intel Plan 1955, 3 Nov 54. SECRET.

[3](1) USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs File for Marienfelde Refugee Center, 1954-55. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Memo for rcd, 25 May 55, sub: German Government Processing of Refugees to the German Federal Republic. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br. (3) Ltr, Der Bundesminister fuer Vertriebene, Fluechtlinge und Kriegsgeschaedigte an alle Bundesministerien, et al., 7 Jul 55, sub: Statistik ueber das Notaufnahmeverfahren in Berlin, Giessen, und Uelzen, and Incls 1 & 2, thereto. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 CI Br.

[4]Memo for rcd, 25 May 55, cited above.

order to have a centralized and U.S.-controlled facility for the reception and screening of non-German refugees. The center was governed by an advisory panel composed of representatives of the Army, Navy, Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency, and administered by a USAREUR representative.[5] During FY 1955, 433 non-German refugees were processed at the Berlin center. They were Poles, Czechoslovaks, Yugoslavs, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Russians, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Romanians, Latvians, and French Foreign Legionnaires of German origin who had been captured, or had defected, in Indochina and had subsequently been returned to Eastern Germany.[6] The Nuremberg non-German refugee center, formerly Camp Valka, received persons who had crossed the border into Western Germany from Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Zone of Austria. The number processed during the period was about one-half of those processed through the Berlin Center.[7]

c. Screening Operations. Because they had resided behind the Iron Curtain, the refugees were, in varying degrees, acquainted with military, political, economic, and social activities in the U.S.S.R. and its satellite countries. Consequently, these potential sources of information, especially the non-Germans, were of great interest to U.S., British, and French intelligence agencies. To determine what information these individuals possessed, and to make preliminary arrangements for the exploitation of the more knowledgeable ones, the three Allies maintained screening teams at Berlin-Marienfelde and at the refugee processing centers within their respective zones.[8]

After each refugee completed his registration with the German authorities, the screening teams questioned him about his employment, political and social activity, military service in the Soviet sphere of influence, and affiliations with security agencies in Soviet-bloc countries. This information was noted on a screening card. Then all identification papers in the possession of the individual were examined to determine if he was a bona fide refugee. This step was particularly important because Soviet and satellite intelligence agents entered the refugee stream, tried to plant misleading information, and sought

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[5]USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file for Non-German Refugee Center, 1954-55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br.

[6]Ltr, American Refugee Center to USAREUR ACOFS G2, 6 Jul 55, sub: Operations Report of the Non-German Refugee Center. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br.

[7]Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj A. A. Terris, USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br, 17 Jun 55. CONFIDENTIAL.

[8](1) USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs files for Marienfelde Refugee Center and 66th CIC Gp, 1954-55. SECRET. (2) Memo for rcd, 25 May 55, cited above. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br.

refugee status and resettlement in Western Germany as cover for Soviet intelligence operations.[9]

Insofar as USAREUR intelligence agencies were concerned, the preliminary screening operations during the year indicated that less than 10 percent of the refugees possessed information of intelligence value, and even most of this information was peripheral in nature. However, at times extremely valuable sources were found among the refugees, such as persons who had spent years in the service of the East German Communist Party or Government or who had worked for years within Soviet installations such as the Soviet High Commission for Germany. To uncover such individuals required constant alertness because they normally did not admit these former associations, believing that such an admission would be detrimental to their efforts to obtain refugee recognition and resettlement in Western Germany.[10]

Because of budgetary limitations and the shortage of qualified intelligence personnel, USAREUR was unable to exploit the large number of knowledgeable refugees culled from the preliminary screening. Therefore careful rescreening operations were carried out to eliminate persons having only peripheral knowledge in the command's specific fields of intelligence interest. Individuals possessing limited pertinent information were sometimes "spot" interrogated at or near the refugee centers whenever this was possible without incurring great expense. However, individuals possessing a great deal of valuable information, including most non-German refugees, were offered to the USAREUR intelligence collection agencies for extensive exploitation. The collection agencies made their own arrangements for handling and exploiting the better sources, which during the year numbered only a few thousand.[11]

54. USAREUR Collection Agencies

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, instructed the USAREUR collection agencies as to the specific kinds of information that were to be collected through the exploitation of sources; that is, persons, things, or actions. Information was acquired from persons through interrogation of refugees, defectors, escapees, evaders, returnees, and other categories of border crossers. A great deal of information concerning the U.S.S.R. and its satellites was obtained through observation, experience, and contacts in those areas. Intelligence specialists examined Soviet and

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[9](1) USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file for Marienfelde Refugee Center, 1954-55. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Ltr, American Refugee Center to USAREUR ACOFS G2, 6 Jul 55, cited above. Both in USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br.

[10]USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file for Marienfelde Refugee Center, 1954-55. CONFIDENTIAL.

[11]Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col G. L. Wilson, USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br, 16 Jun 55. CONFIDENTIAL.

satellite documents, equipment, and material obtained by overt and covert means. Moreover, highly specialized communications intelligence personnel monitored telecommunications for information concerning potential enemy plans and operations. All information gathered was submitted in formal reports, which, in turn, were processed into intelligence, and disseminated to the using agencies.

a. Seventh Army. Within the U.S. Zone of Germany the Seventh Army overtly collected information concerning the physical security of the common border with Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia. In this respect the primary objective was to detect and report evidence of the movement, or impending movement, of hostile forces from the Soviet satellites so as to be in a position to obtain an early warning of the imminence of hostilities. This responsibility included the prompt investigation and reporting of border incidents involving non-American military personnel.[12] Seventh Army also collected information relating to activities, conditions, individuals, or agencies within Germany that threatened the security of its troops and installations.

The Seventh Army intelligence collection arm was the 532d Military Intelligence Battalion. Within its field of interest, this organization collected information on the U.S.S.R. and satellite countries through the exploitation of refugees, defectors, and deserters who entered the U.S. Zone of Germany. To promote maximum efficiency in giving advance warning of the imminence of hostilities, simulated enemy contact messages were often transmitted to test communications facilities from border areas to Seventh Army and USAREUR headquarters. Liaison was maintained with German border and customs police detachments. Regular border runs were conducted by subordinate military intelligence units to contact each German border police station at least once each day. Through these daily contacts intelligence personnel gathered valuable information and were able to direct border crossers to refugee centers and interrogation points with a minimum of delay. There were 416 such border police stations in the Seventh Army area, and the 532d Military Intelligence Battalion operated 23 installations to accomplish its mission.[13]

b. USAREUR Communications Zone. The intelligence activities of the Communications Zone were limited because France, a sovereign nation, was extremely jealous of its intelligence prerogatives. Headquarters, COMZ, did collect and report information concerning the general attitude

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[12] Hq Seventh Army Mission Register, 15 Jun 55. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1955), Vol. I, Item 4 atchd (B/P).

[13] USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file for 532d MI Bn, 1954-55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br.

of the French people and the French Government toward the U.S. logistical program in France. This activity also included determining the extent of Communist Party influence on French official agencies with which negotiations were conducted regularly as a normal part of COMZ affairs. The commanding general of COMZ was responsible for coordinating collection activities within his command to provide an adequate and timely warning of existing or approaching danger to installations. However, intelligence and security operations outside of the U.S. military installations were conducted by the French.[14]

c. Area Commands. The area commands in the U.S. Zone of Germany, Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation, and Berlin engaged in the overt collection of information concerning the internal German situation and possible points of civil disturbance. They also collected weather data, some types of engineering intelligence information, and assisted in mapping and aerial photographic planning and operations. The area commands could not participate in covert collection activities without the express permission of the USAREUR Assistant Chief of Staff, G2.[15]

d. 66th Counter Intelligence Corps Group. Toward the middle of 1954 the 66th Counter Intelligence Corps Group was relieved of most of its responsibility for the covert collection of positive intelligence information. Throughout FY 1955 the organization continued to collect political information from behind the Iron Curtain. In this respect its efforts were directed toward securing top-level imminence of hostilities data chiefly through penetrations of the East German Government and through other clandestine means.[16]

e. 513th Military Intelligence Group. For administrative purposes, all USAREUR positive intelligence agencies were attached or assigned to the 513th Military Intelligence Group.[17] The personnel of the group operated the USAREUR Intelligence Center at Camp King. The center was

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[14](1) USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file for USAREUR COMZ, 1954-55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br. (2) Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G2 to USAREUR COFS, 20 Apr 54, sub: Letter of Instructions to CG, COMZ. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Hist Jnl file.

[15]USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file for Area Comds, 1954-55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br.

[16](1) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col H. V. Maixner, USAREUR ACOFS G2 Div CI Br, 14 Jul 55. SECRET. (2) USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file for 66th CIC Gp, 1954-55. (3) See par. 58 for an account of the 66th CIC Group's counterintelligence activities.

[17]See par. 6g above, for an account of the organizational purposes and administrative functions of the 513th MI Gp.

essentially an interrogation point for collecting information through the exploitation of overt sources within the U.S. Zone of Germany. All information resulting from the exploitation was prepared and transmitted in the form of reports, drawings, and sketches. Available for interrogation were repatriated German prisoners of war, civilian internees; and ethnic Germans; legal and illegal border crossers; expellees; political refugees; defectors from the Kasernierte Volkspolizei (East German Garrison Police); other deserters and defectors not exploited by intelligence agencies; specific sources referred to the center by the USAREUR Assistant Chief of Staff, G2; and targets of opportunity encountered in Western Germany.

The USAREUR Intelligence Center gathered information concerning the Kasernierte Volkspolizei and other East German paramilitary forces and all available information pertaining to Poland. A secondary activity of the center was to collect information regarding the U.S.S.R. and its satellites with specific emphasis on transportation and communications, electric power stations and electric power grids; manpower and labor, scientific and technical research and development, and industrial operations. Subjects reported on during the year included the atomic energy research center at Agudseri in the U.S.S.R., the sighting of atomic guns at Muellrose in Eastern Germany, smuggling activities and trade between Eastern and Western Europe, and the centralization of channels of command in the Soviet Army. In the first half of 1955 personnel of the USAREUR Intelligence Center interrogated about 800 sources, including persons "spot" interrogated in Berlin, and prepared about 1,000 informational reports.[18]

f. 522d Military Intelligence Battalion. On 27 July 1954 the 7880 Military Intelligence Detachment was reorganized and redesignated as the 522d Military Intelligence Battalion.[19] The covert collection of military intelligence pertaining to Eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland was carried out by this battalion. It obtained information concerning order of battle, military supply, transportation, telecommunications, scientific and technical developments, and economic affairs. The required information was obtained by means of penetrations, resident agents, and roving observers. To facilitate this collection effort, the technical services furnished the battalion with qualified technical intelligence specialists.[20]

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[18](1) USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file for USAREUR Intel Cen, 1954-55. SECRET. (2) USAREUR Intel Cen Mthly Repts, Jan 55-Jun 55. SECRET. Both in USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br.

[19]USAREUR GO 90, 21 Jul 54, sub: Activation and Reorganization of Certain Units. CONFIDENTIAL.

[20](1) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Capt J. J. Hagerty, USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br, 22 Jul 55. SECRET. (2) USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file for 522d MI Bn, 1954-55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br.

The method of operation and the techniques employed by the 522d Military Intelligence Battalion did not change appreciably from those employed by its predecessor. There was, of course, a natural refinement of operational techniques that developed through experience. A big change, however, was the battalion's assumption of sole responsibility for the undercover collection of order of battle information in USAREUR's primary intelligence target area. This responsibility was shared previously with the 66th CIC Group. The principal result of this was a 50 percent increase in informational output by the 522d Military Intelligence Battalion.[21]

Innumerable obstacles to the covert operations were encountered throughout the indicated target area because of the tight security measures taken by Soviet and satellite security agencies. In spite of these obstacles, the collection activity was reflected in the production of a reliable military intelligence estimate for East Germany.[22]

g. Communications Intelligence Service Detachment, 7746 Army Unit. The Communications Intelligence Service Detachment engaged in the surveillance of civil communications in the U.S. areas of interest in Germany, including Berlin. The detachment was a collecting agency assigned to the 513th Military Intelligence Group but under the operational control of the USAREUR G2. Operating under authority contained in the Statute of Occupation, it intercepted communications in order to protect the security and dignity of the U.S. occupation forces, and to obtain information within the fields of interest of U.S. intelligence agencies. The information was obtained through monitoring telephone, telegraph, and teletype traffic, and through the covert examination of mail. This activity was distinct from censorship because messages were not cut or obliterated and every effort was made to conceal the surveillance.[23]

To carry on its work, the detachment was organized into a detachment headquarters with 10 stations and 11 substations physically situated within German telephone exchanges or post offices. Without the unstinting cooperation of the Deutsche Post officials, the surveillance operations would not have been feasible.

The civil communications in West Germany were not monitored haphazardly. Only the messages of specific individuals or organizations under surveillance at the request of U.S. intelligence agencies were monitored,

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[21] Interv cited above.

[22] (1) Ibid. (2) USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file for 522d MI Bn, 1954-55. SECRET.

[23] USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file for 7746 CISD, 1954-55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br.

but in a few instances all communications to and from a particular locality were intercepted. However, monitoring of messages of U.S. citizens was forbidden without express permission of the USAREUR G2, and monitoring of messages of high German officials or political party leaders was forbidden without coordinating with HICOG.[24]

During FY 1955 the detachment used 150 tape recorders to assist in the tapping of more than 500 telephone lines. It also used 250 teletype machines for tapping cable and teletype lines. In this field the volume of intercepts was extremely large; for example, in the month of October 1954 almost 700,000 cable and teletype messages were intercepted for the Army Security Agency in Europe alone. Also during the year the mail of more than 1,800 individuals and organizations was examined surreptitiously on a continuous basis. In terms of man-hours, postal surveillance represented the greater effort since the mail was procured, examined, and sometimes copied at small and remote villages as well as in the larger cities.[25]

The communications surveillance activities uncovered information concerning East-West trade in strategic materials, internal conditions in the Soviet Union and satellite countries, the Russian order of battle, industrial and scientific advancements, German scientists taken to Russia, and activities of opposing intelligence agencies.

Throughout its almost eight years of operation the detachment had taken extreme care to maintain the secrecy of its activities. These efforts were successful. Not only was the general public unaware of its operations but in some instances the German press, which was vociferous against similar French activities, was informing its readers that businessmen in the French Zone dispatched their mail in the U.S. Zone to avoid French communications interception activity.[26]

h. USAREUR Technical Services. The intelligence activities of the USAREUR technical services were directed and supervised by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2. In France and Western Germany each technical service overtly collected information within its respective specialized field and within its capabilities. Requirements for collecting technical information in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Eastern Germany were submitted to G2 for processing by other collection agencies. Each technical service also gathered material for and maintained a specialized library of general technical reference material including strategic

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[24] Ibid.

[25] Mthly repts of 7746 CISD, Jul 54-Jun 55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br.

[26] USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file for 7746 CISD, 1954-55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br.

technical service studies and dossiers prepared by the technical services of the Department of the Army and other major headquarters.[27]

i. USAREUR Technical Intelligence Teams. In order to carry out its intelligence functions properly, each USAREUR technical service--except the Medical Division--required the assistance of one or more technical intelligence teams. A team usually was made up of 1 or 2 officers and from 2 to 7 enlisted men, all of whom were technical experts trained in a specific field. Although in all instances these teams were assigned to a specific technical service, they were directed and supervised by the USAREUR Assistant Chief of Staff, G2. No clerical, linguistic, or overhead personnel were authorized for the operations of the teams. Consequently, each team had to be attached to other intelligence units for logistical and administrative support. In this manner, the teams obtained the services of qualified analysts, interpreters, interrogators, report writers, and editors. At the end of 1954 there were 13 technical intelligence teams in USAREUR. One team was operationally controlled directly by the USAREUR G2, 1 by Seventh Army, 1 by the Engineer Division, 7 by the 522d Military Intelligence Battalion, 2 by the 513th Military Intelligence Group, and 1 jointly by the 513th and 522d.[28]

Through overt and covert operations the technical intelligence teams collected and studied information and material associated with those parts of foreign military organizations paralleling their own technical services. They acted as technical advisers to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, and to the field agencies, prepared briefs, and assisted the briefers and interrogators of other intelligence agencies. No official intelligence reports were prepared by the teams, but the information they gathered was included in the reports of the intelligence agencies to which they were attached. Foreign military equipment obtained by the teams was made available to tactical units for identification and instructional purposes.[29]

j. United States Military Liaison Mission to the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany, 7893 Army Unit. The only U.S. military agency in constant and direct contact with Soviet and East German military forces was the U.S. Military Liaison Mission to the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany. The liaison mission was primarily concerned with collecting information concerning East Germany. While the main element of the mission was situated in Potsdam in the Soviet Zone of Germany, a supporting element

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[27] USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file for Tech Svcs, 1954-55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br.

[28] (1) Ibid. (2) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj A. A. Terris, USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br, 22 Jun 55. SECRET.

[29] Ibid.

was stationed in the U.S. Sector of Berlin. Besides its liaison and collection activities, the mission confirmed or denied source reports, rumors, radio reports, and newspaper articles; reported economic conditions in East Germany; and assisted in investigating Autobahn incidents, border violations, and accidental or willful border crossings by U.S. military or civilian personnel.[30]

The element at Potsdam consisted of fourteen officers and enlisted men, including Air Force and Navy members, who were accredited to the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Forces of Occupation. These U.S. representatives carried credentials that permitted them to travel in East Germany with relative freedom. For intelligence collection purposes, East Germany was divided into six areas. Each area was assigned to an Army officer who was responsible for its coverage. The area responsibility system made each officer a specialist in a relatively small section of East Germany and put him in closer contact with all intelligence objectives in his district. In the course of a week each officer usually toured his own area twice and a neighboring area once. To improve the quality of observation, the officers usually traveled in pairs. While one observed and photographed intelligence targets, the other took notes. In addition, the Air Force and Navy officers observed their specific objectives regardless of location.

During the observation trips the officers especially looked for indications of the imminence of hostilities, and examined specific targets for requested information. Whenever possible, they searched maneuver areas for lost or discarded photographs, maps, overlays, sketches, and other items that might have intelligence value. If there was a dearth of definite requirements, the observers went on general coverage trips, or visited public exhibitions or other affairs. For example, in September 1954 members of the mission, in company with special representatives of the technical services, visited the Leipzig Industrial Fair. A close examination of the many displays gave them first hand knowledge of the latest industrial developments in the Soviet Union and in the Soviet satellite world.[31]

In carrying out their activities, the liaison mission personnel were often subjected to harassment and restrictions. Observation of military and civilian intelligence objectives was usually very brief because the officers were not allowed to leave their vehicles to

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[30](1) USAREUR Intel Plan 1955, 3 Nov 54. SECRET. (2) USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file for USMLM, 1954-55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br.

[31]IRS, USAREUR ACOFS G2 to USAREUR COFS, 24 Aug 54, sub: Leipzig Fair Trip. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 350.09 (1954), Vol. II, Item 76.

investigate afoot. Consequently, observation usually was limited to the few seconds it took to pass an objective in a car moving at 15 to 25 miles an hour. The Soviets also established permanent restricted areas, and local commanders posted restriction signs barring mission vehicles. Traveling was hampered also by accidental or intentional restrictions. Soviet or East German personnel stopped mission vehicles for perfunctory document checking, and sometimes detained members as long as 20 hours. In many instances these delays forced the abandoning of intelligence targets. Casernes and other installations were concealed with high camouflaged fences to prevent observations of interiors. In spite of these curtailments, the amount of freedom granted for firsthand observation by qualified personnel represented a distinct advantage.[32] This opportunity was not neglected. During the year members of the mission traveled more than 300,000 miles in Eastern Germany; collected invaluable information, documents, and material; and compiled and filed numerous intelligence reports.[33]

55. Non-USAREUR Intelligence Agencies

a. Office of Coordinator and Special Adviser, HICOG. Strictly speaking, the U.S. High Commission for Germany did not maintain an intelligence organization. Nevertheless, the HICOG Office of Coordinator and Special Adviser collected information from U.S. sources, Allied officials, and officials of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Laender. From these sources, the office obtained political, economic, and security intelligence information concerning Western Germany, including information on West German capabilities, intentions, and policies. It also collected information on other European areas from which German affairs could be influenced, and biographical data on leading German personalities. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, obtained this information through his liaison officer at Bonn.[34]

b. Department of the Army Detachment. The cover name for Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations in Germany was Department of the Army Detachment. There was no direct operational relationship between USAREUR and CIA, except through liaison officers. Certain USAREUR intelligence activities were coordinated with those of CIA, and there was

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[32] USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file for USMLM, 1954-55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br.

[33] Mthly Repts of USMLM, Jul 54-Jun 55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br.

[34] (1) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col G. L. Wilson, USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br, 19 Jul 55. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file for Liaison and Coordination, 1954-55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br.

some cooperation at a few field intelligence installations. Otherwise, CIA activities were carried on independently. USAREUR received copies of printed intelligence information produced by CIA.[35]

c. Special Detachment USAREUR. Operating under the direction and control of the Department of the Army Detachment, the 6966 Special Detachment USAREUR was an intelligence agency that supervised the collection activities of an affiliated covert intelligence service--the Reinhard Gehlen organization, which was staffed by German nationals. Reinhard Gehlen controlled the field operations of his organization, but all other aspects of its functioning were controlled by the Special Detachment USAREUR. With more than 4,000 agents in the field, the Gehlen organization undoubtedly was one of the most effective intelligence services collecting information and material on the Soviet Union and its East European satellites. Some of these agents penetrated as far as Eastern Siberia. Among other things the organization gathered information and material pertaining to the strength, disposition, and armament of the Soviet and satellite military forces, and political and economic information having a bearing on the military situation. The information and material thus obtained was processed by the Special Detachment USAREUR, and the intelligence reports were disseminated to CIA and other accredited agencies.

A USAREUR liaison officer stationed at Special Detachment USAREUR headquarters near Munich effected a limited exchange of military information and material with American elements at Special Detachment USAREUR that enabled USAREUR to check its own estimates against those of the detachment. Although operating entirely independently of the command, the Special Detachment thus greatly assisted USAREUR G2 in evaluating sources, establishing leads, and providing a basis of comparison.[36]

d. Defector Reception Center. Known overtly as the 7925 Personnel Survey Detachment, the Defector Reception Center was a CIA-supervised interagency intelligence installation situated near Frankfurt. The center was operated in accordance with policy established by the Interagency Defector Committee in Washington and the Defector Committee in West Germany. Representatives of USAREUR, HICOG, USAFE, USNAVGER, and CIA constituted the committee in West Germany.

Persons classified as defectors during refugee screening operations were sent to the center for processing, debriefing, and interrogation. A defector was a voluntary escapee or a person overtly or

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[35] Interv cited above.

[36] (1) USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file for Sp Det USAREUR, 1954-55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br. (2) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj A. A. Terris, USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br, 17 Jul 55. SECRET.

covertly induced to flee from the U.S.S.R. or one of its satellite countries. To be sent to the center, such an individual had to be unwilling to remain behind the Iron Curtain. United States governmental agencies were especially interested in persons who had valuable new or confirmatory information to existing knowledge of the Soviet world, or who were of operational value to a U.S. agency, or whose defection could be exploited in the psychological field. During the year most of the defectors were knowledgeable voluntary escapees.

Thirty-three new sources were received during 1954 and there were 20 holdovers from the previous year. In the first half of 1955 an additional 20 arrived. Most of the defectors were scientists and technicians from the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania. No East Germans were included because they usually were not classified as defectors. While the number of sources from the Soviet Union increased, there was a noticeable decrease in sources from the satellite countries, especially Poland. This decrease was probably due to the tightening of border control and more effective propaganda in the puppet nations. In spite of this difficulty, the volume of information obtained in FY 1955 increased by more than 15 percent in comparison with the previous year.[37]

e. Returnee Exploitation Group. In the years immediately following World War II more than 3,500 East German scientists and technicians willingly or unwillingly went to the U.S.S.R. to work in Soviet installations. Many of them later made their way to West Germany through defection, escape, or voluntary release. These particular returnees were very lucrative sources of information concerning Soviet installations, laboratories, and scientific research and development. Acting under the over-all supervision of the Interagency Defector Committee and the Defector Committee in Germany, CIA operated the Returnee Exploitation Group, which selected, acquired, exploited, documented, and resettled all German returnee scientists and technicians interrogated by U.S. intelligence agencies. Returnees in this category were referred to by the code name of DRAGON. Each DRAGON was interrogated by a 2-man team consisting of a case and reports officer of the Returnee Exploitation Group and a service technician who was a specialist in the same technical field as the DRAGON. For over-all guidance and to promote interagency participation, the Returnee Exploitation Group had a DRAGON Committee consisting of the chief of the group as chairman and representatives of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Scientific Detachment of the CIA.

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[37](1) Interv, Walker with Terris, 14 Jul 55. SECRET. (2) USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file for Defector Reception Center, 1954-55. SECRET. (3) Min, 17th Mtg, Defector Comm in Ger, 28 Jan 55. SECRET. (4) Min, Mtg 102, Interagency Defector Comm, 7 Apr 55. SECRET. Last two in USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br, DC/G folder (1955).

USAREUR G2 was represented by a liaison officer whose primary responsibility was to obtain specifically requested information pertaining to scientific and technical progress in the U.S.S.R.[38]

During FY 1955, 48 new DRAGONS were exploited who provided vital information concerning 20 Soviet installations; no previous information had been available on 6 of these installations. Although the primary emphasis was on atomic energy and guided missiles, much information was collected on such subjects as radio, radar, television, optics, chemical engineering and warfare, submarine and ship construction, and mine and torpedo design and development. Over 300 reports were prepared on topics pertaining to the U.S.S.R. and 13 on topics pertaining to Eastern Germany.[39]

Despite these achievements only about 10 percent of the potential sources were being exploited. Since September 1951, when the group was organized, U.S. intelligence agencies had accepted slightly over 200 DRAGONS and Great Britain had exploited an additional 110. A survey disclosed that over 2,500 scientists and technicians had returned to East Germany by mid-1955, and only 250 remained in the Soviet Union. There were good reasons for the low percentage of exploitation. Stringent border controls made it difficult to defect to the West. Moreover, most of these men were reluctant to leave because they did not want to abandon real and personal property, or because they were building up sizable bank accounts in East Germany. Yet gaining the information possessed by the scientists and technicians was vital to the success of U.S. intelligence operations. Therefore, the Returnee Exploitation Group, in cooperation with the 522d Military Intelligence Battalion, intensified its overt and covert efforts to get more scientists and technicians to defect.[40]

f. United States Air Forces in Europe. USAFE collected important information required by CINCUSAREUR. This information included Soviet capability for carrying atomic weapons and for interfering with the safety and movement of USAREUR's airborne troops. USAFE also engaged in aerial reconnaissance and photographic activities for USAREUR targeting and mapping purposes. While flying the air corridor between

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[38](1) USAREUR G2 Actvs file for Returnee Exploitation Group, 1954-55. SECRET. In USAREUR G2 Div Opns Br. (2) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj A. A. Terris, USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br, 14 Jul 55. SECRET.

[39](1) Min, 17th Mtg, Defector Comm in Ger, 28 Jan 55. SECRET. (2) Min, Mtg 104, Interagency Defector Comm, 13 Apr 55. SECRET. Both in USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br, DC/G folder (1955).

[40](1) Ibid. (2) Interv, Walker with Terris, 14 Jul 55, cited above.

Berlin and Rhine-Main Airbase, USAFE personnel photographed order of battle targets such as supply dumps and areas and ground force installations. Since the air corridor was quite wide, a considerable portion of East Germany could be covered by photographing obliquely with telescopic lens cameras. USAREUR sent its own teams of photointerpreters to Wiesbaden for the exploitation of aerial photographs. Newly developed negatives were examined by the USAREUR teams as soon as they became available to supplement existing information without delay. Other photointerpreters at USAREUR headquarters carefully examined enlarged prints for detailed items of interest.[41]

g. United States Naval Forces in Germany. The Office of Naval Intelligence of the Commander Naval Forces Germany was situated in Berlin. Subordinate intelligence offices were situated in Heidelberg, Frankfurt, Bremerhaven, and Munich. The staffs of these naval intelligence offices were usually quite small, generally consisting of one officer and a few enlisted assistants. About 95 percent of the Navy's intelligence efforts in Germany were devoted to collecting information, with a minor part of this activity being covert. Knowledgeable defectors and refugees of naval interest were made available to the Office of Naval Intelligence by the USAREUR field agencies. Although its intelligence activities in Germany were quite limited, the Navy did assist USAREUR in the fields of aerial reconnaissance and photography.[42]

h. Army Security Agency in Europe. Functioning under the operational control of the Department of the Army, the Army Security Agency in Europe (ASAE) furnished communications intelligence and communications security support to USAREUR G2 and its subordinate commands. With headquarters in Frankfurt, ASAE had about 4,500 personnel in Germany on 1 January 1955. The operations of ASAE that were of particular interest to USAREUR G2 were those referring to the early recognition and rapid reporting of indications of hostile preparations. To insure that such information was received without delay, rapid means of communication were available and ASAE attached liaison officers to the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G2, at USAREUR and Seventh Army headquarters. The security agency also furnished USAREUR with a continuous stream of selected intelligence information on Soviet and satellite order of battle; military, paramilitary, police, and air activity; economic matters pertaining to transportation, logistics, and communications; and political and economic developments affecting the war potential of East Germany and other satellite nations.[43]

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[41](1) USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file for G2 Air, 1954-55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br. (2) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col P. V. Converse, USAREUR ACOFS G2 MI Br, 21 Jun 55. SECRET.

[42]USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file for ONI, 1954-55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br.

[43]USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file for ASAE, 1954-55. SECRET. In USAREUR G2 Div Opns Br.

USAREUR intelligence agencies, in turn, provided ASAE with raw intelligence information, such as the teletype, cable, and telephone intercepts of the Communications Intelligence Service Detachment. This USAREUR material was processed by ASAE and some of it was used for that agency's intelligence releases and bulletins. USAREUR also furnished ASAE with finished intelligence concerning electronics as applied to communications, cryptographic equipment, signal order of battle, and research activities and materials pertaining to communications. In addition, USAREUR G2 supplied and administered confidential funds, incentive items, and equipment for a small field technical intelligence information collection staff of ASAE.[44]

i. German Federal Republic Security Service. The principal efforts of the Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution), the German Federal Republic's security agency, were directed toward countersubversion with emphasis on penetrating West German political organizations. In both positive and counterintelligence fields it collected valuable information bearing on the security of U.S. military forces in Germany. USAREUR maintained close relations with this agency through liaison officers who improved its professional standards of operation, rendered technical intelligence advice, protected U.S. intelligence interests, and made arrangements for the mutual exchange of intelligence information.[45]

56. Repositories of Information

a. Central Registry. The Central Registry at Stuttgart, maintained and operated by the 66th CIC Group, was the heart of USAREUR's personnel screening and investigative activities. As of 1 January 1955 it contained over 500,000 dossiers of information available on all individuals, organizations, and specific subjects of counterintelligence interest to the command. For example, there were more than 200 volumes pertaining to the Communist Party of Germany. In addition to the dossiers, the Central Registry had almost 2,500,000 personality and topical index cards containing valuable information concerning individuals and organizations.[46]

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[44](1) Ibid. (2) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj A. A. Terris, USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br, 7 Jul 55. SECRET.

[45](1) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col T. L. Bryan, USAREUR ACOFS G2 Plans Policy & Ln Sec, 23 Jun 55. SECRET. (2) USAREUR G2 Actvs file for USAREUR G2 Ln Offs, 1954-55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br files. (3) Ltr, CO 66th CIC Gp to USAREUR ACOFS G2, 8 Sep 54, sub: Proposed Organization of the Intelligence Services of the German Federal Government. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 CI Br.

[46]USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file for Central Registry, 1954-55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br.

Besides making more than 75,000 CIC investigations during the year, the Central Registry processed almost 1,500,000 file checks for 44 U.S. and Allied agencies. Some of the more routine file checks were concerned with German and U.S. citizens seeking employment with U.S. agencies; displaced persons applying for immigration to the United States, Canada, and Australia; applicants for the alien enlistment program; prospective brides of U.S. personnel; persons undergoing counterintelligence investigations; and individuals being sought as informants for U.S. covert intelligence operations.[47]

b. International Tracing Service. The Allied High Commission for Germany controlled and operated the International Tracing Service at Arolsen in the British Zone of Germany. At the end of June 1955 the Allies, with the cooperation of the German Federal Republic, were making arrangements for transferring control of the records of the service to the International Red Cross. During the preliminary discussions the Allies and other nations reserved their rights of continued access to the archives. Furthermore, West Germany was to bear the costs of maintaining the records and would be responsible for administering them under the observation of an international policy board.[48]

The master file of the International Tracing Service contained 17,000,000 locator cards pertaining to persons whose names had appeared in concentration camps and deportation records. In addition there were lists of Jewish immigrants to Israel, records of Nazi concentration camps, records of the emigration of one million persons to the United States and other countries, and 2,385,000 informational cards, taken from the registration records of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Association, concerning persons displaced in Germany at the end of World War II.

USAREUR intelligence agencies used the International Tracing Service archives for obtaining background information on persons involved in espionage cases, classifying individuals as displaced persons or escapees, checking residence or imprisonment data, verifying information submitted by visa applicants--particularly those applying for

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[47] Ibid.

[48] (1) Ltr, Col A. F. Kleitz, USAREUR Dep ACOFS G2 to Mr. A. Cagiati, HICOG Off of Coordinator & Sp Advisor, 12 Jan 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br I.T.S. folder. (2) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj A. A. Terris, USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br, 14 Jul 55. CONFIDENTIAL. (3) Ltr, Col A. F. Kleitz, USAREUR Dep ACOFS G2 to Mr. L. Campbell, AMEMB, Bonn, 27 Jul 55, sub: Disposition of the Records of the I.T.S. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 CI Br.

emigration to the United States under the Refugee Relief Act of 1953--and for reviewing information on cases being investigated for the U.S. escapee program.[49]

c. Berlin Document Center. Most of the papers and membership rolls of the Nazi Party were stored in the U.S. Sector of Berlin. This central depository, the Berlin Document Center, was controlled and operated by HICOG. The records were used chiefly for checking the party affiliations of German employees of USAREUR, HICOG, and other agencies. The Department of State used them for determining whether persons were eligible for emigration to the United States because of existing restrictions on the entry of former Nazi Party members. USAREUR intelligence agencies used the document center for some 650 file checks a month. Authorized British, French, and West German agencies could also obtain information from the center, whereas private individuals were not given access to the archives. During the year the Berlin Document Center processed a monthly average of 13,500 requests for information.

Several times during the year the Federal Republic of Germany expressed an interest in gaining control of the Nazi Party archives. USAREUR became concerned over the eventual disposition of the records because of their security and intelligence importance. The command therefore requested the U.S. Embassy in Germany not to make any arrangements relating to the control of the Berlin Document Center which would not give the right of free access to USAREUR agencies.[50]

57. Production of Military Intelligence

After its collection by the field agencies, information was collated, evaluated, and interpreted; the processed information was usually synthesized into intelligence studies, reports, and basic documents. Particular emphasis was placed on processing information, both positive and negative in nature, which had some bearing on the imminence of hostilities.

a. USAREUR G2. During FY 1955 the USAREUR G2 staff produced special strategic, scientific, and technical intelligence studies;

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[49](1) Ibid. (2) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj R. W. Hodgson, USAREUR ACOFS G2 CI Br, 28 Jul 55. CONFIDENTIAL.

[50](1) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. W. J. Mueller, Dir, Berlin Doc Cen, 16 May 55. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Ltr, Col A. F. Kleitz, USAREUR Dep ACOFS G2, to Mr. L. Campbell, AMEMB Bonn, 27 Jul 55, sub: Disposition of Records of the Berlin Document Center. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 CI Br.

order of battle handbooks and summaries concerning the Soviet Army in occupied Europe and the Polish, Czechoslovak, and East German armies; surveys of Soviet field training areas; lists of known military installations occupied by Soviet and satellite forces in Central Europe; a Reichsbahn (East German Railways) handbook; and a Soviet arms and equipment identification booklet. In addition, the staff wrote periodic intelligence studies and reports such as the biweekly USAREUR Intelligence Summary, Items of Intelligence Interest, the USAREUR WEEKA Cable, and the weekly INTEX Cable. These periodic productions were summaries of carefully considered observations, comments, and opinions pertaining to the military significance of current events; discussions of significant incidents, developments, and trends in all intelligence fields of interest to commanders and intelligence agencies in the European area; and urgent factual reports relating to subjects of vital intelligence interest. One of the most important USAREUR G2 intelligence products was the Quarterly Military Estimate. This top secret item was an estimate of enemy capabilities, of courses of action open to potential enemies, and of the military situation in Europe as related to the mission of CINCUSAREUR.[51] Once each month a representative of USAREUR G2 attended a monthly conference held by US EUCOM J2. Representatives of State, Army, and Air, in France, attended this conference, at which all available intelligence bearing on imminence of hostilities was reviewed, and a final monthly report prepared and disseminated.

b. Seventh Army. Seventh Army produced appropriate current and staff intelligence to satisfy its own requirements. This production was mostly Soviet and satellite order of battle intelligence and information related to obtaining an early warning of the imminence of hostilities.[52]

c. USAREUR Technical Services. Each USAREUR technical service produced intelligence within its field of interest. The production included, within the capabilities of the service, intelligence concerning design, manufacture, operational characteristics and storage of foreign weapons and military equipment; foreign communications and

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[51](1) USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file for MI, 1954-55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br. (2) Ltr, C/USAREUR ACOFS G2 MI Br to USAREUR Dep G2, et al., 1 Jun 55, sub: Military Intelligence Branch SOP, and Incl 1. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 MI Br. (3) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col H. L. Cornutt, USAREUR ACOFS G2 MI Br, 27 Jul 55. CONFIDENTIAL.

[52]USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file for Seventh Army, 1954-55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br.

transport systems; and military organizations, installations, and techniques pertaining to them.[53]

d. USAREUR Technical Intelligence Teams. Based on the physical examination of items and on information obtained from available sources, technical intelligence teams produced intelligence reports concerning the components, use, and effectiveness of foreign military equipment, weapons, and other material. Whenever advisable the reports were enhanced with drawings and sketches. Personnel of the 566th Transportation Corps Intelligence Detachment assisted the USAREUR G2 staff in the production of logistical intelligence related to inland waterway, highway, and railway transport systems of interest to the command.[54]

e. Strategic Intelligence Detachments. The personnel of the 4th, 55th, and 168th Strategic Intelligence Detachments were attached to the USAREUR G2 staff. They were usually employed as analysts and assisted in the production of strategic intelligence having a bearing on the military situation in Europe including Soviet and satellite order of battle intelligence and military supply intelligence. They also assisted in the preparation of basic terrain studies and compiled targeting lists and target information folders.[55]

58. Counterintelligence

USAREUR took active and passive measures to deny military information to unfriendly countries; to secure U.S. military forces and U.S. national interests from sabotage and subversion; and to neutralize unfriendly agents actively engaged in espionage, subversion, and sabotage. Under the direction of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, the 66th CIC Group carried out the counterintelligence field of operations in Germany. The USAREUR G2 staff processed counterintelligence information obtained by the 66th CIC Group and other agencies, and produced intelligence concerning espionage, sabotage, and subversion.[56]

a. Safeguarding Security Information. USAREUR maintained the security of its classified information by a variety of practices, precautions, and safeguards. Appropriate measures were taken against the

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[53] USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file for Tech Svcs, 1954-55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Div Opns Br.

[54] (1) Ibid. (2) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col H. L. Cornutt, USAREUR ACOFS G2 MI Br, 27 Jul 55. SECRET.

[55] (1) USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file for Strat Intel Dets, 1954-55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br. (2) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Cols H. L. Cornutt and T. B. Strother, USAREUR ACOFS G2 MI Br, 8 Aug 55. SECRET.

[56] Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col H. V. Maixner, USAREUR ACOFS G2 CI Br, 15 Aug 55. SECRET.

capture or salvage of classified papers and material; against theft, espionage, observation, and photography; against interception and analysis of USAREUR communication traffic; against spurious messages and other deceits; and against the carelessness and laxity of U.S. personnel. To make certain that classified information was being guarded properly the command monitored its communication systems, screened its civilian and military personnel, conducted security surveys of its installations,. and investigated possible security violations.[57]

b. Countersabotage. USAREUR surveyed its installations for vulnerability to sabotage, recommended preventive measures, and, whenever feasible, took corrective action. The command evolved methods for reporting and investigating incidents of suspected sabotage. Investigations during the year disclosed that cases of tampering with demolition chambers, cutting telephone cables, pilfering U.S. military stores, and other incidents were usually isolated actions of disgruntled Germans or Frenchmen employed at or dismissed from American installations. The incidents were simply acts of vandalism, or were associated with attempted larceny. There was practically no sabotage against U.S. property in Western Germany and France. The most sensitive countersabotage problem was concerned with the tremendous buildup of logistical supplies in the Western Area Command. Depots and stockpiles in this area were the most lucrative targets for potential saboteurs, and USAREUR therefore took intensive countersabotage measures to protect them.[58]

c. Countersubversion. In Germany there were many individuals and groups that threatened the security of the U.S. military forces and the Federal Republic of Germany because they might foster civil disturbance, sedition, disaffection, sabotage, and espionage. To forestall these potential threats, USAREUR sought information concerning the plans, policies, capabilities, and possible courses of action of these subversive or otherwise inimical groups and individuals. The principal countersubversive activities of the command were directed against left-wing organizations like the Communist Party of West Germany, the Socialist Unity Party of East Germany, and the Free German Youth; and against right-wing organizations like the League of German Soldiers, the Association of Waffen SS Veterans, the Steel Helmet, the German veterans' Kyffhaeusserbund, the Association of Former German Parachutists, and several radical nationalistic groups. The command also directed its countersubversive efforts toward determining the reliability, capabilities, and objectives of West German governmental agencies. In general, the required information was obtained by means of aggressive long-range penetrations of

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[57] USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file for CI, 1954-55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Div Opns Br.

[58] (1) Ibid. (2) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj C. H. Becker, USAREUR ACOFS G2 CI Br, 20 Jul 55. SECRET.

the organizations. The countersubversive operations, which were remarkably successful, were carried to the highest levels of the Communist Party, the Socialist Unity Party, and the East German Government. Every important Communist in both West and East Germany was identified, the policies guiding the parties were learned, and the degree of Soviet domination was accurately portrayed. Although coverage was not as extensive, equal success was attained in regard to right-wing and radical veterans' organizations in West Germany.[59]

d. Counterespionage. USAREUR's counterespionage efforts were directed toward detecting and neutralizing hostile intelligence agencies operating in the U.S. Zone of Germany and the U.S. Sector of Berlin, toward covering the activities of Soviet and satellite missions stationed in the same area, and toward collecting information concerning hostile intelligence agencies.

Espionage penetrations of hostile intelligence agencies were made in several satellite countries with varying degress of success. Through these penetrations the command determined to some extent what information the opposition was seeking, their operational methods, their capabilities, and their relative success. However, it did not obtain nearly as much counterespionage information as it wanted.

As a result of information obtained from the penetrations, defectors, refugees, and friendly intelligence services, many East German and Czechoslovak espionage agents operating in West Germany were identified. Some of them were captured and turned over to West German courts for prosecution. Other identified low-level espionage agents and informants were neutralized by making their activities known to U.S., Allied, and West German intelligence services. However, the efficiency of USAREUR's counterespionage operations could not be judged accurately from a tabulation of apprehended or convicted agents because those persons were not necessarily the most effective. In fact the saturation of West Germany with low-level East German and Czechoslovak agents and informants undoubtedly overtaxed the command's counterespionage operations to the extent of drawing attention away from higher level espionage agents who were far more useful to enemy intelligence agencies. Since every effort had to be made to ferret out these higher level espionage agents, USAREUR began in 1955 to turn over to the German Federal Republic the task of dealing with low-level cases.

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[59](1) USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file for CI, 1954-55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br. (2) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col H. V. Maixner, USAREUR ACOFS G2 CI Br, 15 Aug 55. SECRET.

In addition to espionage agents operating out of East Germany and Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Military Mission in Frankfurt was undoubtedly collecting U.S. order of battle and other information. Personnel of the mission traveled widely in the U.S. Zone, and observed, photographed, and sketched anything of military interest. They also questioned local residents about troop installations. Although bulk information could be obtained by low-level informants, Soviet mission personnel could be used to confirm significant information, to give coverage by radio on military movements of immediate interest, and to channel routine intelligence information out of West Germany with diplomatic immunity. Close surveillance of mission activities disclosed Soviet fields of intelligence interest and identified persons associating themselves with the mission.

There were also Czechoslovak, Hungarian, and Polish trade missions in Frankfurt, and there were Czechoslovak and Polish military missions and a Polish press agency in West Berlin. Realizing that Soviet and satellite agencies in foreign countries were obvious centers for espionage, USAREUR's counterespionage personnel kept those organizations under continuous surveillance during FY 1955, but discovered no covert intelligence operations.[60]

e. Personnel Security Program. In the interests of national security, President Dwight D. Eisenhower established in 1953 a program to insure that no person was employed in the U.S. civil service unless he was reliable, trustworthy, of good conduct and character and unswervingly loyal to the United States.[61] In accordance with its responsibilities under this program, USAREUR investigated prospective civil service employees, and in some instances persons already holding positions, to determine their loyalty and the effect of their employment on the national security of the United States. Prospective employees were subjected to a national agency check and a check of the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Written inquiries concerning them were made to appropriate local law-enforcement agencies, former employers and supervisors, references, and schools. Upon the development at any stage of investigation of information indicating that the employment of a person might not be clearly consistent with the interests of national security, the individual in question was subjected to a full field background investigation, as were all persons being considered for positions requiring access to information classified top secret. Prospective local wage rate

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[60](1) USAREUR Intel Sums 201, 5 Nov 54, pp. 22-24; 207, 27 Jan 55, pp. 20-23; 210, 10 Mar 55, pp. 18-21. SECRET. (2) USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file for CI, 1954-55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br. (3) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Dr. D. M. Krasomil, USAREUR ACOFS G2 CI Br, 12 Jul 55. SECRET.

[61]EO 10450, 27 Apr 53. UNCLASSIFIED.

employees were also subjected to investigation, which, however, was of a more perfunctory nature. During FY 1955 the command made about 8,000 national agency checks and about 3,000 field investigations.[62]

f. Investigative Program for the Refugee Relief Act of 1953. In West Germany USAREUR was responsible for investigating persons applying for admission to the United States under the provisions of the Refugee Relief Act of 1953. The field work was done by the investigative section of the 66th CIC Group. At the end of June 1955, 363 Department of the Army civilians, 367 Germans, and 36 U.S. military personnel were employed at the task. The Department of State, which was ultimately responsible for deciding who was to be admitted, required a minimum of six interviews of each applicant, the questioning of credible witnesses, and a check of specified archival and official records in West Germany and Berlin. Since USAREUR had little or no control over most of these agencies, processing of the requested record checks depended upon their workload and willingness to cooperate. Most of them cooperated readily, but the German agencies, especially the labor and health offices, were very slow in providing the requested information. In spite of the many difficulties encountered, USAREUR completed most of the investigations within a prearranged 90-day period.

About 60,000 persons in West Germany were eligible for emigration to the United States under the Refugee Relief Act of 1953. By the end of June 1955, the Department of State had referred 11,620 cases to USAREUR for investigation. The number of new applications was declining, and many already on file were being withdrawn, because improved economic conditions in West Germany made emigration to the United States less desirable. The 66th CIC Group had completed and transmitted the reports of 5,542 investigations to the Department of State for determination. An additional 1,100 reports were being readied for transmittal, with the remaining investigations under way and practically all of them expected to be completed within the allotted 90 days.[63]

59. Coordination of Intelligence Activities

Extensive intelligence operations were conducted in Europe by the U.S. forces and the Central Intelligence Agency. To achieve maximum effectiveness and to avoid duplication, their efforts were synchronized by several intelligence coordinating bodies.

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[62] USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file for CI 1954-55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br.

[63] (1) Ibid. (2) Col D. M. Garvey's Briefing for Gen McAuliffe on Refugee Program in USAREUR, 28 Jul 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Div CI Br. (3) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj R. W. Hodgson, USAREUR ACOFS G2 CI Br, 8 Aug 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

a. Office of Coordinator and Special Adviser. To coordinate all overt U.S. intelligence operations in Germany was the responsibility of HICOG. This authority was delegated to his Coordinator and Special Adviser who was the Senior U.S. Intelligence Representative in Germany. Besides coordinating U.S. intelligence activities, he supervised CIA operations in Germany and maintained liaison with the intelligence services of other countries. USAREUR G2 maintained a liaison officer at the Office of Coordinator and Special Adviser in Bonn.[64]

b. Intelligence Coordinating Committee for Germany. Composed of representatives of USAREUR, USAFE, USNAVGER, and CIA, the Intelligence Coordinating Committee for Germany met regularly under the permanent chairmanship of the Coordinator and Special Adviser. The primary function of the committee was to obtain the maximum benefit from the intelligence facilities available in Germany. This objective was attained by systematically examining all aspects of intelligence collection and reporting and initiating any action required for improvement. Whenever it needed guidance that could not be obtained locally, the committee consulted the Intelligence Advisory Committee or whichever governmental agency was concerned in the problem.[65]

c. Intelligence Coordinating Committee for Berlin. The Intelligence Coordinating Committee for Berlin was composed of representatives of the 7893 Army Unit, Company A of the 522d Military Intelligence Battalion, the Office of Naval Intelligence of USNAVGER, Region VIII of the 66th CIC Group, the Office of Special Investigations of USAFE, the 7050 Air Intelligence Wing of USAFE, and the Intelligence Office of the U.S. Commander of Berlin. The mission of the committee was to coordinate the work of U.S. intelligence agencies operating in West Berlin so as to eliminate operational overlapping, dual source usage, and controversy and confusion resulting from conflicting interest. Matters of policy were not considered by the committee, but were referred to the Intelligence Coordinating Committee for Germany or to one of the headquarters of the U.S. forces in Europe.[66]

d. Joint Coordinating Panel. The Joint Coordinating Panel, operating as a subcommittee of the Intelligence Coordinating Committee for Germany, was composed of one representative each from USAREUR, USAFE, USNAVGER, and the Department of the Army Detachment. The panel

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[64](1) USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file for HICOG, 1954-55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br. (2) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col T. L. Bryan, USAREUR ACOFS G2 Plans, Policy, & Ln Sec, 15 Aug 55. SECRET.

[65]Ibid.

[66]USAREUR G2 Actvs files for CI and ICCB, 1954-55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br.

coordinated the exploitation of German prisoners of war returning from the U.S.S.R. or other Soviet-bloc countries so as to insure efficient screening and interrogation of these sources by eliminating needless duplication of effort and by determining which U.S. intelligence organizations would do the interrogating. From 1946 through 1954 more than 2,000,000 ex-prisoners of war were screened and carded. USAREUR intelligence organizations interrogated over 40,000 who were selected for their knowledgeableness. Despite Soviet claims that all German prisoners of war had long been returned, some of them still were returning from time to time. For example, in November 1954 the Soviets released 60 German prisoners of war, many of whom had been engaged in some phase of the Soviet atomic energy program.[67]

e. Counterintelligence Coordinating Committee. Coordination of counterintelligence activities in West Germany was achieved through the US EUCOM Counterintelligence Coordinating Committee which consisted of representatives of US EUCOM, USAREUR, NELM, USAFE, USFA, and--until its inactivation--TRUST. The chairman was US CINCEUR or his representative. The function of the committee was to facilitate the broad direction and coordinating of US EUCOM counterintelligence plans, policies, and operations that were of joint concern.[68]

f. Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority for Germany. US CINCEUR designated CINCUSAREUR as the Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority for Germany. He was empowered to coordinate counterintelligence operations of joint military concern in West Germany and the U.S. Sector of Berlin. Although he had the right to require consultation among U.S. military organizations involved in a counterintelligence disagreement, he had no authority to compel agreement. If essential agreement could not be obtained through discussion and consultation, he or the component commanders involved were required to refer the matter to US CINCEUR for final decision.[69]

g. U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation. A liaison officer of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation was stationed at the offices of USAREUR G2 to coordinate the handling of counterintelligence cases

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[67](1) USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file for Jt Coordinating Panel, 1954-55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br. (2) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj A. A. Terris, USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br, 20 Jul 55. SECRET.

[68]USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file for CI, 1954-55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br.

[69](1) US EUCOM Policy Dir 40-4, 27 Apr 54, sub: Counterintelligence Responsibilities and Relationships in Germany. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR Hist Div 300 (1954). (2) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj R. W. Hodgson, USAREUR ACOFS G2 CI Br, 8 Aug 55. CONFIDENTIAL.

involving U.S. citizens in Germany who were not attached to the U.S. military forces. In this category were U.S. citizens who were tourists or residents in Germany, U.S. civilian returnees from East Germany, and U.S. military returnees from the Soviet bloc whose enlistments in the U.S. military forces had expired. Also coordinated were investigations concerning the espionage and subversive activities of persons and rings in the United States that were associated with similar activities in Germany.[70]

h. German Federal Republic Agencies. Within the framework of authorization granted by the Allied High Commissioners, many aspects of USAREUR's intelligence operations were coordinated with those of the German Federal Republic agencies. The normal channel of communication was through the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, but coordination was often achieved at the working level. Because subversive activities of right- and left-wing organizations, especially the Communist Party, constituted the main threat to the status of the German Federal Republic, the government's security service concentrated its efforts on counter-subversion. Since the USAREUR intelligence agencies were engaged in countersubversive activities against practically the same organizations in West Germany, there was considerable cooperation and exchange of information. Coordination of activities also was involved in the screening of refugees, intelligence mapping operations, and the organization of the West German Army.[71]

i. Allied Directors of Intelligence. The senior British, French and American intelligence representatives in Western Germany met every few months as the Allied Directors of Intelligence. They were interested in the organization, staffing, and operation of the West German Office for the Protection of the Federal Constitution. After previously reaching agreement on courses of action, the directors discussed tripartite problems with the West German security service officials and presented unified ideas and requests concerning such things as the intelligence provisions of the Bonn Conventions, screening of officer candidates for the West German Army, and German Federal Republic collaboration with the Allies in security and intelligence activities.[72]

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[70] Interv cited above.

[71] (1) Ibid. (2) USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file for BfV, 1954-55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br.

[72] (1) USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file for Allied Directors of Intel, 1954-55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br. (2) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col T. L. Bryan, USAREUR ACOFS G2 Plans, Policy, & Ln Sec, 15 Aug 55. SECRET.

j. North Atlantic Treaty Organization Commands. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, was simultaneously the CENTAG Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, and members of his staff were assigned to the CENTAG Plans Section. In his NATO role he was responsible for fulfilling intelligence requirements levied on COMCENTAG by COMLANDCENT. However, since it was operational only for planning and coordination purposes, CENTAG had no intelligence organization of its own. The requirements therefore actually were fulfilled by the USAREUR intelligence agencies through coordination with the CENTAG Plans Section. Other NATO commands, of course, were engaged in intelligence operations in Europe, so the USAREUR-CENTAG activities had to be coordinated with them. This harmonization of activities was achieved through the U.S. representatives in the NATO commands and through a series of periodic intelligence conferences, and was concerned principally with Soviet and satellite order of battle, geographic information, air photo intelligence, and intelligence mapping operations.[73]

60. Dissemination of Intelligence Outside of the Command

The dissemination of the intelligence and information in CINCUSAREUR's possession was strictly controlled to prevent them from falling into unauthorized hands. The most rigid control was exercised over the revelation of sources of information, methods of collection, or the degree of success of the exploitation of sensitive sources.[74]

a. Release of Intelligence to Other U.S. Agencies. Because the Department of State and the three armed services were jointly responsible for implementing U.S. policy in Western Europe, they required all available information and intelligence that would enable them to fulfill their respective missions. Consequently, CINCUSAREUR almost automatically released to the other services and the Department of State all information that they needed to know. Moreover, considerable information was furnished to CIA to assist that organization in fulfilling its functions. Counterintelligence information concerning espionage and subversive activities in the United States and in Western Europe was released to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The command released classified security information to other U.S. nonmilitary agencies whenever such a release was of benefit to the U.S. Government. However, no information was given to these agencies if its disclosure

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[73](1) Ltr, C/USAREUR ACOFS G2 MI Br to USAREUR Dep ACOFS G2, et al., 1 Jun 55, sub: Military Intelligence Branch SOP, and Incl 1. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 MI Br. (2) Ltr, USAREUR ACOFS G2 to COMLANDCENT, 14 Apr 55, sub: Agenda Items for LANDCENT Intelligence Conference, 30 Jun-1 July 55. NATO SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 337 (1955), Vol. I, Item 27.

[74]Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col G. L. Wilson, USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br, 19 Jul 55. SECRET.

was liable to jeopardize any U.S. military activity or could be detrimental to the national security.[75]

b. North Alantic Treaty Organization. Within the limitations established by the Secretariat of the State-Defense Military Information Control Committee, the Department of the Army, and the U.S. European Command, intelligence produced for CINCUSAREUR and essential for achieving North Atlantic Treaty objectives was furnished to the NATO commands.[76] United States intelligence released to the NATO commands was expunged of all information that was not releasable to foreign nationals, and particular care was taken not to divulge sources of information, methods of acquisition, and the degree of success attained in exploiting sources.[77]

Intelligence items distributed to SHAPE and subordinate commands by USAREUR included the NATO SECRET weekly INTEX Cable consisting of excerpts from Items of Intelligence Interest and from the USAREUR WEEKA cable, and an expurgated version of the Quarterly Military Estimate. Certain basic intelligence documents, such as order of battle handbooks, were released only to specified foreign nationals in the various NATO headquarters.[78]

Intelligence personnel of the command participated in a series of NATO intelligence conferences held in Heidelberg, Muenchen-Gladbach, Baden-Baden, Fontainebleau, Vienna, Salzburg, London, and Wiesbaden. These conferences were sponsored usually by Allied Land Forces, Central Europe; the United Kingdom; or the United States.[79]

c. Federal Republic of Germany. Intelligence information classified no higher than secret was released on a "need-to-know" basis to the West German federal and state security agencies. This information was concerned with the German Communist Party, German communist fronts and affiliated organizations, counterespionage, and other matters relating to the security of the German Federal Republic and its constituent states.[80]

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[75](1) Ibid. (2) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj R. W. Hodgson, USAREUR ACOFS G2 CI Br, 8 Aug 55. SECRET.

[76]USAREUR Cir 380-50, 14 Jul 55, sub: Guide for the Release of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments. SECRET.

[77]Interv, Walker with Hodgson, 8 Aug 55, cited above.

[78]Interv, Walker with Lt Col H. L. Cornutt, USAREUR ACOFS G2 MI Br, 27 Jul 55. SECRET.

[79]USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file for Intel Production Confs, 1954-55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br.

[80]USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file for USAREUR Intel Ln with Ger Fed Rep, 1954-55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br.

Throughout FY 1955 CINCUSAREUR was authorized to furnish West Germany with information classified as high as top secret if it was related to the imminence of war in Europe.[81] If classified no higher than secret, information concerning the Soviet Union and its satellites was released whenever it was of direct interest and essential to the German Federal Republic.

During the days of negotiating the European Defense Community Treaty, a limited amount of U.S. military information was given to Dienststelle Blank. In March 1955 the Department of the Army authorized CINCUSAREUR to furnish information through top secret that might be required for the active participation of West Germany in combined military combat operations against a common enemy. Also authorized was the release of U.S. operational and logistical planning information classified no higher than secret and needed by the German Federal Republic to make plans for the use of its forces with those of the United States in defense of Western Europe. Information required for organizing, equipping, and training the new Army could also be released.[82]

However, since there were justifiable doubts about the adequacy of the West German security system, the Department of the Army and US EUCOM established special conditions for the release of information to the German Federal Republic. All information pertaining to the rearmament training plan had to be released through the Advance Planning Group at Bonn.[83] Furthermore, the West German Government had to establish security requirements parallel to those of the United States; USAREUR intelligence agencies began to verify the security clearances of German nationals receiving U.S. information; a "US-GFR EYES ONLY" security system was inaugurated; and USAREUR personnel began keeping an accurate record of all information released to the German Federal Republic.[84] Dienststelle Blank, which in May 1955 became the Defense Ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany, was given information concerning U.S. Army procedures for conducting background investigations and national agency checks. The Germans then initiated preliminary measures to conform with the U.S. security requirements.[85]

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[81] EUCOM ltr, 20 May 52, sub: Guide for the Release of Classified Military Information to European Governments by the European Command. AG 380.01 GID-AGO. SECRET.

[82] Cable DA-977876, DA from G2 to US CINCEUR and CINCUSAREUR, 17 Mar 55. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 380.01 (1955), Vol. I, Item 6 atchd.

[83] Study on the Security Deficiencies of the Federal Republic of Germany, 15 May 55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 CI Br.

[84] Cable SX-2873, USAREUR to Seventh Army, et al., 19 Apr 55. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 380.01 (1955), Vol. I, Item 6 atchd.

[85] Study, 15 May 55, cited above.

Although these security measures were accomplished only partially during the spring of 1955, military information within the authorized categories was released to the West German Government because of the urgency of rearmament planning and implementation. However, on a case-by-case basis the need for the information was carefully weighed against the security risk involved in its release.[86]

61. Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency Program

For several years the American colleges and universities were not producing enough scientists to meet the defense requirements of the U.S. Government and U.S. industry. On the other hand, as an aftermath of World War II there was a surplus of scientists in Central Europe. To obtain these men for defense employment in the United States, and at the same time deny their services to the U.S.S.R., the Joint Chiefs of Staff established Project Paper Clip in 1945 and Project 63 in 1951. The Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency, a JCS instrument, supervised the over-all program, and CINCUSAREUR and his intelligence staff carried out the task in Germany and Austria.[87]

a. Bad Homburg Center. The hub of recruiting activities for the projects was the Bad Homburg Center, which was operated by the USAREUR Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, as a regular U.S. employment office. Scientists were recruited, investigated, and processed by the USAREUR intelligence organization whose connection with the center was carefully safeguarded. The center also was used as the staging area for the reception, housing, and movement of scientists, including their dependents, hired under the Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency personnel procurement program.[88]

b. Project Paper Clip. The Paper Clip program was designed to fill specific positions in the technical services of the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force. During the year, ten scientists and technicians were recruited under this program in the fields of guided missiles and biological chemistry, and were assigned to technical service jobs in the United States.[89] They were young, relatively inexperienced and mostly recent doctoral graduates of German and Austrian universities. Because of the improved economic conditions in Central Europe, which

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[86] Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj R. W. Hodgson, USAREUR ACOFS G2 CI Br, 8 Aug 55. SECRET.

[87] USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file for JIOA, 1954-55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br.

[88] Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Miss P. M. Betts, USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br, 21 Jul 55. SECRET.

[89] Project Paper Clip Qtly Repts, Jul 54-Jun 55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br.

made emigration less desirable, recruiting men for the Paper Clip program was becoming more difficult.[90]

c. Project 63. A program, designated Project 63, was created to bring men of high caliber and considerable scientific experience to the United States under temporary open contract.[91] During FY 1955, 16 specialists were recruited for this program, and at the expense of the U.S. Government, they and their dependents were sent to accommodations in New York.[92] There the scientists were interviewed and offered jobs within their capabilities, either with the U.S. Government or with private industry working on defense contracts. On the basis of geographical area, employer, or salary, each scientist was free to accept or reject any job offered to him. Most of them accepted positions concerned with the research and development of guided missiles.

A few of the scientists hired under Project 63 had been employed in European industry, but most of them were former professors at German and Austrian universities. After 1953 the recruitment of professors of science had become far more difficult. Although the improved economic conditions in Europe contributed to their reluctance, the professors' main objection to emigrating was that their social prestige in Europe was much greater than it would be in the United States. Furthermore, German and Austrian retirement systems for professors were superior to those applicable in the United States. Briefly, there no longer was much incentive for a professor of natural science to leave his homeland.[93]

d. National Interest Cases. Through the mechanism established for operating the Paper Clip and Project 63 programs, USAREUR Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, assisted in the processing of National Interest Cases. These cases were European scientists and technicians whom U.S. corporations, such as the General Electric Company and Radio Corporation of America, intended to hire for positions in the United States and whose employment was deemed to be in the national interest. USAREUR intelligence agencies made the security investigations on these individuals and certified whether or not their employment in the United States would be in the national interest. In these cases, the U.S. industrial firms did their own recruiting and processing, obtained all necessary documentation, and arranged for and paid the transportation costs to the United States.[94]

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[90] Interv, Walker with Betts, 21 Jul 55, cited above.

[91] USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file for JIOA, 1954-55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br.

[92] Project 63 Qtly Repts, Jul 54-Jun 55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br.

[93] Interv, Walker with Betts, 21 Jul 55, cited above.

[94] (1) Ibid. (2) USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file for JIOA, 1954-55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br.

62. Intelligence Implications of West German Sovereignty

Agreements for continuing U.S. intelligence operations in the Federal Republic of Germany after that country achieved its sovereignty were contained originally in open provisions of the Bonn Conventions of 1952 and in two secret memorandums of understanding. Although tacitly recognized, the memorandums were never actually signed by the West German Government.[95]

The status of these agreements was obscured in the summer of 1954 when the French National Assembly refused to ratify the European Defense Community treaty. Consequently, U.S. intelligence requirements for the contractual period had to be reoriented to the new conditions. In July 1954 the Anglo-American Study Group met in London to discuss the problems of West German sovereignty; the group also reviewed the secret memorandums of understanding. The report of the group included recommendations for taking appropriate measures to ensure that the West German commitments undertaken in the memorandums were carried out. As a result of these recommendations, a clause having intelligence implications was inserted in the ensuing London Conference agreements. This clause was one of the bases for negotiating the Paris Accords and the protocol to the Bonn Conventions, both of which were signed on 23 October 1954. Many articles of the revised Bonn Conventions contained implications for U.S. intelligence operations in Western Germany.[96]

Although not actually a part of the Paris Accords or the revised Bonn Conventions, the secret memorandums of understanding concerning intelligence operations were accepted simultaneously by the West German Government, but with reservations. The Federal Republic would carry out the individual provisions of these intelligence agreements providing it could do so without violating its constitution or its laws. On the other hand, the United States and its Allies reserved the right to continue any activity permitted under the Occupation Statute that the West German Government could not assume legally under its own laws. For example, since the Federal Republic was forbidden under its own laws to engage in covert communications monitoring operations, the U.S. intelligence agencies could continue that activity. With those reservations, the German negotiators promised that the secret memorandums would be signed and implemented after the West German legislature had ratified

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[95] USAREUR ACOFS G2 Actvs file for German Sovereignty, 1954-55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br.

[96] Stf study, ICCG Position Regarding NATO Status of Forces Agreement Negotiations, 12 Feb 55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Plans, Policy, & Ln Sec.

the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany and its subsidiary documents.[97]

On 5 May 1955 the Allied High Commission for Germany terminated the Occupation Statute; the revised Bonn Conventions and other agreements became effective; and the Federal Republic of Germany achieved sovereignty.[98] However, the secret memorandums and the intelligence clauses of the open conventions were written in general terms, leaving the detailed procedures for implementing them to be defined. The first steps toward accomplishing this objective were taken by a quadripartite committee that met secretly in mid-June 1955.[99]

The revised Bonn Conventions and other agreements, which defined only the status of the forces of the three occupying powers, were to be effective from the beginning of sovereignty until the negotiation of a new treaty similar to the status of forces agreements for other NATO countries. This treaty was substantially in draft form by the beginning of 1955 and negotiations for its completion were well under way by the middle of that year. The general clause protecting U.S. intelligence interests was to be Article 4 of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, which provided for cooperation on security matters on the basis of understandings to be reached. Throughout the negotiations the secret memorandums were regarded as the relevant "understanding." Upon ratification of the treaty, and the signing of the renegotiated secret memorandums, the U.S. military forces would be able to continue their intelligence and security activities in the Federal Republic of Germany, thus protecting that country from external aggression and protecting themselves against tactical surprise, espionage, subversion, and sabotage. The United States contemplated that those activities would continue until Western Germany had fully rearmed itself and had perfected its own machinery for intelligence collection and internal security.[100]

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[97](1) Memo, Mr. L. A. Campbell, HICOG, to Lt Gen L. K. Truscott, Jr., HICOG, 28 Oct 54, sub: Agreements Affecting the Intelligence Situation in Germany after the Termination of the Occupation. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Plans, Policy, & Ln Sec. (2) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col U. G. Carlan, USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br, 8 Aug 55. SECRET.

[98]Official Gazette of the Allied High Commission for Germany, No. 126, 5 May 1955. UNCLASSIFIED.

[99]Interv, Walker with Carlan, 8 Aug 55, cited above. SECRET.

[100](1) Stf study, ICCG Position Regarding NATO Status of Forces Agreement Negotiations, 12 Feb 55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G2 Plans, Policy, & Ln Sec. (2) Intervs, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Cols U. G. Carlan and G. L. Wilson, USAREUR ACOFS G2 Opns Br, 17 Aug 55. SECRET.

CHAPTER 5

Emergency Planning and Security Preparations

Section I: Emergency and War Planning

63. USAREUR Planning Program

In his capacity as Commander of Central Army Group, CINCUSAREUR developed plans for meeting aggression with the NATO forces under his jurisdiction; as Area Commander of Germany he prepared plans for the emergency evacuation of noncombatants from Germany and under delegated authority made similar arrangements for U.S. noncombatants in France; and as Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe, he was responsible for the preparation of USAREUR alert and war plans and certain other plans relating to this field of responsibility.[1] In addition CINCUSAREUR was responsible for special and limited distribution planning and politico-military planning. By analyzing and refining the major plans, USAREUR headquarters developed the command's requirements for combat and service troops, facilities, services, training, and funds.[2]

As an integral part of his planning, CINCUSAREUR revised the troop basis and emergency reinforcement troop list, prepared and submitted his budgetary requirements, and adjusted current programs to fund limitations and manpower cuts. Changed capabilities resulting from these actions, and from similar ones taken by the French forces

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[1]Memo for rcd, 16 Aug 54, sub: Operational Planning of U.S. Army Europe. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 (1954), Vol. I, Item 11 atchd.

[2]Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col G. W. Mason, USAREUR ACOFS G3 Plans Br, 15 Aug 55. CONFIDENTIAL.

of the Central Army Group, were taken into account in revising emergency and war plans. When changes in capability were sufficiently important, they were reported through U.S. and NATO channels for evaluation of their effect on the plans of US CINCEUR and SACEUR.[3]

64. Coordination of Planning

Because the over-all planning program for Western European defense was complex, and the various plans were interdependent, CINCUSAREUR had to make certain that his U.S. and NATO plans were cohesive and directed toward the common goal. This objective was achieved by carefully coordinating USAREUR planning with that of the Department of the Army, US EUCOM, and the other component commands in Europe; the NATO commands; the other occupational powers in West Germany; and appropriate political agencies.[4]

USAREUR headquarters also provided planning policy and guidance for the subordinate commands. The Seventh Army, COMZ, Berlin Command, Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation, and the four area commands prepared supporting operational plans, which were developed primarily by two-way coordination with Headquarters, USAREUR.[5]

65. USAREUR War Planning

a. Emergency War Plan. Completed on 15 March 1954, the USAREUR Emergency War Plan 1-54 remained effective throughout FY 1955.[6]

b. Emergency Troop Reinforcement. Troop requirements for the phased buildup of ground forces during the initial period of a general war were defined in the USAREUR Emergency Troop Reinforcement List. This program for the augmentation of combat, combat support, and service troops in the European theater was developed so that the military operations envisioned in the war plans could be carried out. Plans for the first 90 days of the troop buildup, based on forces actually existing in the United States, were finished at the end of May 1954; and plans for the second 90-day period, based on units to be activated upon mobilization, were finished in October 1954. When submitted to the Department of the

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[3]Memo, USAREUR COFS to all USAREUR Stf Divs, 1 Feb 54, sub: USAREUR Planning Program. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 322 (1954), Vol. I, Item 5.

[4]Interv, Mr. Walker with Col W. P. Brooks, Jr., CENTAG Plans Sec, 13 Oct 55. CONFIDENTIAL.

[5]Interv, Mr. Walker with Col W. L. Osborne, C/USAREUR ACOFS G3 Plans Br, 22 Jun 55. CONFIDENTIAL.

[6]For more information on this plan, see Appendix A of the top secret supplement to the USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jan 53-30 Jun 54, p. 87.

Army, the list was not approved, and in May 1955 USAREUR was instructed to prepare a 180-day integrated troop augmentation plan based on minimum essential requirements without regard to whether or not the forces existed. The draft of a new integrated Emergency Troop Reinforcement List was completed toward the end of June 1955 and copies were distributed for intraheadquarters coordination.[7]

c. Capabilities Plan. The USAREUR Capabilities Plan 1-55 was drafted in accordance with the Department of the Army Capabilities Plan 1-54 and in support of the US EUCOM Joint Capabilities Plan 1-54; at the end of June 1955 the USAREUR plan was being coordinated with CINCUSAFE and CINCNELM. The plan made provisions for executing specified missions and tasks during the "cold-war" period, and during general hostilities before and after NATO commanders assumed operational control of designated U.S. military forces. It envisioned and provided for three phases of military action: operations short of a general war; operations during the emergency period of a general war from D-day through D plus 6 months; and subsequent operations from D plus 6 months through D plus 30 months.[8]

d. Alternate Capabilities Plan. By mid-1955 the USAREUR Capabilities Plan 1-55 (Alternate), supporting US EUCOM Joint Capabilities Plan 1-54 (Alternate), was being coordinated with CINCUSAFE and CINCNELM. The alternate plan made provisions for securing CINCUSAREUR's forces and attaining U.S. objectives in case of a war in which NATO did not immediately authorize SACEUR to assume his command functions. This plan covered the period from D-day through D plus 30.[9]

e. Supplementary Capabilities Plan. If military operations in SACEUR's central region were to take an unfavorable turn--especially if the Rhine-Ijssel line collapsed--U.S. ground forces most probably would have to withdraw. To provide for that possibility the USAREUR Capabilities Plan 1-55 (Supplement) was prepared in support of a similar US EUCOM joint plan. This supplementary plan was being coordinated with CINCUSAFE and CINCNELM in June 1955.[10]

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[7] Interv, Mr. Walker with Lt Col R. T. Bowie, USAREUR ACOFS G3 Plans Br, 16 Aug 55. SECRET.

[8] Interv, Mr. Walker with Lt Col G. W. Mason, USAREUR ACOFS G3 Plans Br, 17 Aug 55. SECRET.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

66. Joint Emergency Alert Plan

In Joint Emergency Alert Plan 1-54, which was prepared at USAREUR headquarters and approved by US CINCEUR on 14 September 1954, the former three EUCOM alert orders were combined into one integrated program. In addition to delineating responsibilities, the plan outlined countermeasures to be taken in the event of a possible deterioration of relations with the Soviet bloc. The preparatory measures and planned deployment of U.S. forces provided for progressive transition from peace to war in three phases: order for simple alert, order for reinforced alert, and order for general alert.[11]

67. Central Army Group Planning

a. Central Zone Joint Emergency Defense Plan. In his NATO role as COMCENTAG, CINCUSAREUR participated in the formulation of the Central Zone Joint Emergency Defense Plan 1-55, which was issued on 18 March 1955 with a top secret cosmic classification. The plan provided operational guidance and concepts for the three component commands of AFCENT. CENTAG, with the adjacent command NORTHAG, comprises the land component of AFCENT.[12]

b. Central Army Group Emergency Plans. On 28 December 1954 CENTAG Emergency Plan 1-54 was issued, which in turn was superseded on 20 June 1955 by CENTAG Emergency Plan 1-55. Both plans were based on Central Zone and Central Europe joint emergency defense plans. They provided guidance and instructions for the detailed planning of the major components of Central Army Group, that is the U.S. Seventh Army and the French First Army.[13]

68. Berlin Planning

a. Defense Plan. Allied Staff Berlin Operations Instructions No. 5 was a tripartite plan for defending Berlin in the event of an armed attack from Soviet and satellite military forces. The first part of the plan furnished instructions for concentrating Allied forces by withdrawal to the Olympic Stadium area in the British Sector to engage in a combined defense. The second part of the plan provided for

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[11](1) Interv, Walker with Bowie, 16 Aug 55, cited above. SECRET. (2) Interv, Mr. Walker with Lt Col L. R. Adams, Asst to USAREUR DCOFS Opns, 23 Aug 55. SECRET.

[12]Interv, Walker with Brooks, 13 Oct 55, cited above. SECRET.

[13]For details of CENTAG planning, see the top secret cosmic FY 1955 USAREUR annual historical report to Headquarters, Allied Land Forces, Central Europe.

alternate operations in case the military situation or the presence of Allied noncombatants prevented the linkup of the Allied forces. In that event each national force was to make an individual stand: the Americans at Tempelhof Airbase, the British at Olympic Stadium, and the French at Tegel Airbase.[14]

b. Airlift. In FY 1955 the USAREUR alternate operations plan for a reduced Berlin airlift remained in effect, although USAFE continued to be responsible for Berlin airlift planning, and was preparing on behalf of US EUCOM a joint plan in which the newly sovereign Federal Republic of Germany would participate on a basis of equality. By the end of June 1955 arrangements of the Allied Ambassadors for negotiating with Western Germany were underway, and a draft US EUCOM Berlin airlift operation plan was taking form. Upon completion of the joint plan each component command would produce a supporting plan for its part of the operation. USAREUR's primary interest was in clarifying the mission of the U.S. Army Airlift Support Command, which was to be responsible for delivering supplies to the Rhine-Main Airbase near Frankfurt, from which USAFE was to airlift the cargoes to West Berlin.[15]

According to existing plans HICOG and US CINCEUR were responsible for organizing and operating an airlift to Berlin in the event of a blockade. Diplomatic steps were also taken to obtain British and French participation, to the extent of each furnishing up to one-third of the airlift effort. Under the sponsorship of HICOG, tripartite politico-military discussions developed the basic requirements for an Allied airlift of 120,000 metric tons per month. An agreement incorporating the principles of tripartite airlift operations was completed on 30 August 1954 and approved by the council of the Allied High Commission on 23 December, subject to concurrence of the French and British Governments. Even though this top-level approval was not immediately forthcoming, the commissioners authorized preliminary military planning. A draft plan was completed on 12 May 1955 and was in the hands of the three Allied Ambassadors in June 1955 awaiting final approval.[16]

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[14] Allied Stf Berlin Opns Instrs No. 5. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G3 Cen files.

[15] (1) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CINCUSAFE, 28 Jun 55, sub: US EUCOM Operation Plan (DRAFT). SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 094 Berlin (1955), Vol. I, Item 2 atchd. (2) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col E. C. Carlson, USMC, USAREUR ACOFS G3 Plans Br, 13 Sep 55. SECRET.

[16] (1) Cable SX-1233, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 16 Jul 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS AG 1820 (1954). (2) Tab C to DF, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to USAREUR DCOFS Opns, 14 Jan 55, sub: Tripartite Planning for a Berlin Airlift. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 094 Berlin (1955), Vol. I, Item 2 atchd. (3) Interv, 13 Sep 55, cited above.

c. Air Evacuation. The operation plan for the USAREUR air evacuation of Berlin, dated 15 December 1953, was still effective during FY 1955, but was undergoing revision to make it conform with the latest U.S. policies and capabilities. Like its predecessor, the draft revised plan provided for the unilateral emergency air evacuation of U.S. noncombatants and the U.S. garrison from Berlin.

In the summer of 1954 a tripartite draft plan entitled Operation Triple Play was completed, which at the end of June 1955 was still awaiting approval. The plan provided for the emergency air evacuation of noncombatants for whom the Tripartite Powers were responsible from Berlin to destinations in Great Britain and France. If inclement weather or the military situation so required, American and French evacuees were to be unloaded at Rhine-Main Airbase and the British evacuees at Duesseldorf. The Allied commanders were to arrange for surface transportation to destinations in France.[17]

69. Plan for the Emergency Evacuation of USAREUR Headquarters

Headquarters, USAREUR, Emergency Evacuation Order 1-54, issued on 10 September 1954, superseded the headquarters evacuation plan of 25 April 1952. The new plan provided for the division of headquarters personnel into ten groups which were designated by the letters A through J. Personnel were assigned to these groups in accordance with manning tables contained in the top secret war plans. Upon the declaration of a state of emergency, personnel were to assemble at Campbell Barracks and other locations in Heidelberg. Each group would follow a predetermined route and adhere to a fixed time schedule of movement until arrival at the destination indicated in the war plans. The evacuation plan also provided for protecting the men from aerial attack, sabotage, and espionage, both at the headquarters in Heidelberg and en route.[18]

70. U.S. Ambassador's Emergency Planning

a. Quadripartite Discussions. The High Commission Emergency Plan of 28 September 1953 was effective until the Federal Republic of Germany became sovereign on 5 May 1955. Since the Allies could no longer order the West German Government to take specific measures for controlling the civilian population in the event of civil disturbance, threat of hostilities, or armed attack by unfriendly military forces, new agreements and a quadripartite plan would have to be negotiated. At the end of

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[17] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG Seventh Army, 12 Aug 55, sub: Tripartite Air Evacuation of Allied Noncombatants from Berlin. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1955), Vol. I, Item 16 atchd.

[18] (1) Hq USAREUR Emergency Evacuation Order 1-54, 10 Sep 54. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G3 Plans Br. (2) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col G. W. Mason, USAREUR ACOFS G3 Plans Br, 22 Aug 55. SECRET.

FY 1955 discussions were underway to accomplish those objectives on the basis of the revised Bonn Conventions, but final agreement could not be achieved until certain problems relating to German sovereignty were resolved.[19]

b. U.S. Ambassador's Plan. On 5 May 1955, Executive Order 10608 defined the functions, rights and obligations of the Chief of the U.S. Mission for West Germany and the U.S. military commander having area responsibility for West Germany, as well as the relationship of both to the sovereign German Federal Republic. On the basis of the order and the quadripartite discussions, preparations were initiated for a U.S. Ambassador's emergency plan that would delineate procedures to be followed and actions to be taken by the military commander and the chief of mission in order to control German civilians during emergency conditions. This plan, too, could not be completed until certain problems of West German sovereignty were resolved.[20]

71. Plans for the Emergency Evacuation of Noncombatants

a. Liaison Groups. The Washington Liaison Group coordinated planning and preparations for the emergency evacuation of U.S. noncombatants on a world-wide basis and initiated arrangements for processing evacuees upon their arrival in U.S. ports. It supervised the Paris Liaison Group, composed of a Department of State official as chairman and representatives of US EUCOM, USAREUR, USAFE, and NELM as members and a SHAPE representative as observer. The Paris Liaison Group prepared the master noncombatant evacuation plans for Europe, North Africa, and the Near East; coordinated the plans of U.S. military commanders and chiefs of diplomatic missions in those regions; assured that arrangements were made with foreign governments to obtain facilities for assembling, housing, and feeding American evacuees; and supervised the activities of the Rome and London Liaison Groups. While the Paris group retained direct responsibility for preparing the noncombatant evacuation plans for the central subarea, it delegated similar responsibilities for the northern subarea to the London Liaison Group and for the southern subarea to the Rome Liaison Group.[21]

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[19](1) Incl 1 to DF, USAREUR CAD to USAREUR ACOFS G2, 21 Feb 55, sub: Civil Control Emergency Planning. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1955), Vol. I, Item 9. (2) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col J. A. Hudson, USAREUR ACOFS G3 Plans Br, 13 Sep 55. SECRET.

[20](1) Ibid. (2) Interv, Mr. Walker with Lt Col R. T. Bowie, USAREUR ACOFS G3 Plans Br, 13 Sep 55. SECRET.

[21]Terms of Reference for the Paris Liaison Group, n.d. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G3 Opns Br.

b. Noncombatant Evacuation Order. In the event of an emergency CINCUSAREUR would be responsible for evacuating specified categories of U.S. noncombatants from West Germany and France--a responsibility delegated to him by US CINCEUR. For this eventuality, his staff prepared the Noncombatant Evacuation Order of 7 May 1953, which, with a few amendments, was in force throughout FY 1955. The general scope of the plan included the evacuation of U.S. noncombatants from Germany and France to a staging area in the Bordeaux-La Pallice port district of France and their transshipment to safe havens in Spain and Portugal.[22] In the first half of 1955 a new noncombatant evacuation order was being drafted to correct deficiencies discovered during two Exercises ROAD BOUND conducted in November 1953 and 1954, respectively. Moreover, the new plan was to take into account the latest command capabilities as well as the large increase in dependent population. By June 1955 the final draft of the order was sent to US CINCEUR, CINCUSAFE, and CINCNELM for concurrence.[23]

c. Safe Haven Planning. As previously mentioned, in the event of an emergency U.S. noncombatants were to be evacuated from Western Europe and the Mediterranean region to safe havens in Spain and Portugal, from where NELM would transship them to the United States. CINCUSAREUR was responsible for removing most of the evacuees from the staging area in France to the Iberian Peninsula, and for rendering limited proportionate assistance to the Department of State in the support, movement, and embarkation of all U.S. sponsored noncombatants arriving in Spain and Portugal. In 1953 USAREUR headquarters prepared a safe haven plan that was essentially complementary to the noncombatant evacuation order.[24] This plan was subsequently revised to conform with the command's latest capabilities and with new planning factors. The revision was accomplished in June 1955, and--because of their close relationship--the new safe haven plan was integrated into the new noncombatant evacuation order.[25]

Negotiations for using Portugal as a safe haven had been under way since 1952, but since Portugal insisted that its nationals residing in Western Europe be included in the U.S. evacuation columns no formal agreement could be reached until 8 February 1955.[26] The new agreement

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[22]For a detailed analysis of the plan, see USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jan 53-30 Jun 54, pp. 167-74. SECRET.

[23](1) Draft NEO 1-55, n.d. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G3 Opns Br. (2) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col M. O. Engen, USAREUR ACOFS G3 Opns Br, 12 Sep 55. SECRET.

[24]For a detailed account of the safe haven plan of 1 July 1953, see USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jan 53-30 Jun 54, pp. 174-77. SECRET.

[25](1) Draft NEO 1-55, n.d. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G3 Opns Br. (2) Interv, 12 Sep 55, cited above.

[26]Cable, no number, AMEMB in Lisbon to Dept of State, 9 Feb 55. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1955), Vol. I, Item 5 atchd.

stipulated that in an emergency the United States would be permitted to evacuate 70,000 U.S.-sponsored noncombatants to Portugal, where they would be accommodated and furnished subsistance for not more than 120 days. The United States would furnish the necessary funds, supplies, equipment, and processing personnel. Along with the American noncombatants, USAREUR would evacuate up to 2,400 Portuguese nationals from the Bordeaux-La Pallice staging area to Portugal and furnish them with subsistence against reimbursement. However, the Portuguese authorities would be responsible for assembling their own nationals and evacuating them to the staging area at their own expense.[27] In June 1955 a special planning team was sent to Portugal to negotiate details for implementing the agreement.[28]

d. Evacuation of Selected Aliens. During FY 1955 the comprehensive top secret plan for the emergency evacuation of selected noncombatant aliens from Germany was still under preparation.[29] Its completion was delayed because the interested U.S. agencies failed to agree on such matters as the selection of potential evacuees, and the responsibility for carrying out the evacuation of these individuals.[30]

72. Plans for Phasing Out Dependents and Other Persons

In 1953 USAREUR planners had envisioned a period of international tension, which, while not serious enough to implement NEO, might induce the U.S. Government to order the evacuation of American civilians from Europe. For this purpose they had prepared a plan for the rapid phase-out of dependents and certain other personnel.[31] While this plan provided for the removal of about 83,500 individuals from Germany, by mid-1955 this number had grown to almost 140,000 persons in the specified evacuation categories.[32] In September 1954 USAREUR had been assured of sealift capacity for evacuating 65 to 70 thousand noncombatants within an 80-day period.[33] Since the available airlift capacity would be

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[27] Agreement on Safe Haven--Evacuation of Americans from Portugal, 8 Feb 55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G3 Opns Br.

[28] Terms of Reference for Portuguese Safe Haven Planning Team, n.d. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G3 Opns Br.

[29] For details concerning the scope of this draft plan, see USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jan 53-30 Jun 54, pp. 176-77. SECRET.

[30] Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col J. A. Hudson, USAREUR ACOFS G3 Plans Br, 16 Aug 55. SECRET.

[31] For an explanation of the rapid phase-out plan, see USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jan 53-30 Jun 54, pp. 181-86. SECRET.

[32] USAREUR Mthly Stat Rept, 30 Jun 55. SECRET.

[33] DF, USAREUR Trans Div to ACOFS G1, 3 Sep 54, sub: Planning for Sea Lift Phase of Rapid Phase-out. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G1 Plans Br files.

insufficient to evacuate the remaining 70 to 75 thousand noncombatants within the specified period, the planning was no longer realistic. USAREUR therefore contacted USAFE, NEIM, and the Department of the Army, which in turn referred the matter to the Joint Military Transportation Committee. Finally, USAREUR was informed that by diverting passenger aircraft from all scheduled European routes and by using cargo aircraft for carrying passengers, the Military Air Transport Service could furnish airlift capacity for evacuating 65,000 persons from West Germany within an 80-day period.[34] With these assurances of transport capabilities, the USAREUR planners in June 1955 began preparing a new rapid phase-out plan providing for the evacuation of about 140,000 noncombatants from Germany. At the same time COMZ headquarters was preparing special plans for evacuating about 40,000 additional noncombatants from France and Benelux.[35]

73. Retention of Civilian Employees in an Emergency

During the first half of 1955 there was a gradual change in the policy for retaining U.S. civilian employees in the command under emergency conditions. Instead of keeping the number of key positions earmarked for compulsory retention at a minimum, more and more jobs were being designated as such. The command was planning to retain as many male employees as possible if their services were likely to materially benefit operations. In preparation for this new policy, retention clauses were being inserted in many job descriptions, especially at lower grades, and male personnel not willing to accept the added responsibility were being asked to resign. New employees, of course, understood that their acceptance of a position in that category obligated them to stay on the job in an emergency.[36] Existing noncombatant evacuation and alert orders had already previously authorized commanders to retain all USAREUR Department of Army male civilian employees for duty in the communications zone, even on an involuntary basis, until suitable replacements could be obtained.

A survey of emergency labor requirements for USAREUR COMZ indicated that there would be an acute shortage of local wage rate personnel.[37]

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[34](1) Cable SX-3546, USAREUR to DA, 1 Jun 55. SECRET. (2) Cable DA-320225, DA from COFT to CINCUSAREUR, 9 Jun 55. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR ACOFS G1 Plans Br files.

[35]Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col W. W. Quimby, USAREUR ACOFS G1 Plans Br, 4 Oct 55. SECRET.

[36]Interv, Walker with Quimby, 5 Oct 55. SECRET.

[37]R. G. Ruppenthal and P. D. Tilton, ORO Study, The Availability of Civilian Labor for the USAREUR Communications Zone in an Emergency, 21 Mar 55. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR ACOFS G3 ORO.

One of the expedients under consideration was to make maximum use of female U.S. civilian personnel who were scheduled for evacuation under NEO plans and who would volunteer to remain with the command, ostensibly in France, as employees in noncombatant status. Plans for that purpose were drafted in June 1955, and a directive and questionnaire were being prepared for the advance screening of eligible women who were willing to volunteer to work under emergency conditions.[38]

74. Combat Developments Program

The command engaged in an extensive combat developments program concerned with atomic warfare, radiological defense, unconventional warfare, psychological warfare, and new scientific developments pertaining to materiel, tactics, and techniques.

a. Atomic Warfare. Atomic warfare annexes were prepared for NATO and U.S. unilateral plans for conducting operations in Western Europe. Requirements for the number of atomic weapons needed during the different phases of a war in Central Europe were analyzed in two studies. SACEUR's atomic policy and procedures for requesting atomic strikes during actual combat were studied, and the command presented its views in the form of comments.

An atomic warfare annex was prepared for CPX LION ROUGE held in December 1954, and target folders were prepared for use in CPX CARTE BLANCHE held in June 1955. At mid-year staff personnel were working on atomic warfare annexes and developing background data required for Exercises FOX PAW and CORDON BLEU scheduled for the autumn of 1955.[39]

b. Unconventional Warfare. The employment of special forces for conducting operations within or behind enemy lines played an important part in the command's planning for future combat action. Responsibilities for carrying on such unconventional warfare in Europe were delineated and listed. Targets, areas of operation, task force requirements, and operational techniques were determined. A bill of materials was developed in support of wartime unconventional warfare operations. Provisions for the emergency deployment of special forces were also incorporated into the USAREUR Joint Emergency Alert Plan.[40]

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[38](1) Interv, 5 Oct 55, cited above. SECRET. (2) Draft Directive and Questionnaire, n.d., sub: Utilization of Civilian Women in an Emergency. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G1 Plans Br.

[39]History of Special Weapons Section for FY 1955, 29 Jul 55. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G3 Combat Devs Br.

[40]History of Support Plans Section for FY 1955, 29 Jul 55. SECRET. In file cited above.

Combat development activities also included the planning and preparations for employing the 10th Special Forces Group in support of Exercises WEST WIND and 54-2. Moreover, in cooperation with USAFE, the operational readiness of the 580th and 582d Air Resupply Groups was tested and perfected. During June 1955 plans were being prepared for simulating guerrilla warfare in the forthcoming Exercise CORDON BLEU. Throughout the year new procedures, techniques, and items of equipment, were tested with special emphasis on the AN/TRC-37 frequency modulation radio communications set, an airfield lighting system, ground-to-air recognition procedures, and newly developed fingerprint data for establishing "bona fides."[41]

c. Psychological Warfare. Command personnel participated in a series of US EUCOM-sponsored conferences, which led to a complete revision of existing concepts of conducting psychological warfare in Western Europe. This new concept was written into the psychological warfare annex to the US EUCOM Joint Capabilities Plan 1-54, which established the basis for developing the psychological warfare annex to the USAREUR Capabilities Plan 1-55. Over-all policy planning was initiated for the emergency evacuation of personnel and equipment of the Munich Radio Center, Radio Free Europe, and Radio Liberation, but the task of formulating detailed plans was delegated to the U.S. Seventh Army and Southern Area Command. The country guides to psychological warfare potentialities in various sections of Europe, and the plans for waging psychological warfare in them, were being revised in accordance with the latest data on capabilities and current requirements. In addition, assistance was given in implementing a Department of the Army directive to include former U.S.S.R. nationals in the labor service organization. Also, some practical measures were taken to coordinate special operations in support of Radio Free Europe. Psychological warfare operations in Exercise LION ROUGE were planned by the combat developments staff, and during May and June 1955 similar plans were being prepared for the forthcoming exercises CORDON BLEU and POLO BALL.[42]

d. Operations Research Office Field Team. The USAREUR Operations Research Office Field Team, an extension of the Department of the Army Operations Research Office, continued work for the command under general supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, and the Combat Developments Branch. The research program was established by mutual agreement between the ORO Field Director and the USAREUR Research Advisory Committee. In general, the team was engaged in the scientific, qualitative, and quantitative study of warfare with the objective of improving the weapons, tactics, and strategy for future military operations. This end was accomplished by analyzing and evaluating past operations, current maneuvers, and operational tests.[43]

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[41] Ibid.

[42] (1) Ibid. (2) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col M. F. Sullivan, USAREUR ACOFS G3 Combat Devs Br, 28 Jun 55. SECRET.

[43] Interv, Mr. Walker with Dr. R. G. Ruppenthal, USAREUR ORO, 27 Jun 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

Studies completed by the field team during the period covered by this report included "A Critical Analysis of the Seventh Army Tactical Retardation Plan," "An Application of Atomic Demolitions in Direct Support of Ground Tactics," "The Radiological Effects of Thermonuclear Weapons," "Refugees and the Conduct of U.S. Military Operations East of the Rhine," "The Availability of Civilian Labor for the USAREUR Communications Zone in an Emergency," "Flooding the Upper Rhine Valley by Demolition Damming," "NATO Atomic Request Capability," "Atomic Play in Exercise COUNTERTHRUST II" and "Tactical Use of Atomic Weapons in the Defense of Western Europe." Other subjects under study by the field team were the vulnerability of the USAREUR line of communications to air attack and subversive action, dynamic map model of refugee movements in West Germany, the British PHANTOM high speed reporting system, the partial use of airlift on the USAREUR line of communications, the air defense of NATO Europe, and the USAREUR training program.[44]

75. Concept C Planning

Planning for Concept C, which provided for the simultaneous buildup of the U.S. line of communications in France and the phasing down of the Bremerhaven line of communications, continued unchanged.[45] However, on 17 June 1955 CINCUSAREUR approved a study recommending that the Concept C plan should be made compatible with the SHAPE 1957 Capabilities Plan.[46] On 31 March 1955, because of construction, personnel, and budgetary problems, new goals were set for implementing the Concept C plans.[47]

76. Transportation Emergency Planning

a. Evacuation of Technical Service Supplies and Equipment. Because of the lagging construction of storage facilities in France, unusually large stockpiles of technical service supplies and equipment had to remain in West Germany. These supplies would be extremely vulnerable to an armed attack from Eastern Europe. In the event of such an emergency, they would either have to be removed to France and the Benelux area, or else be destroyed.

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[44] ORO USAREUR Hist Rept, FY 55, 4 Aug 55. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

[45] For a detailed description of the Concept C Plan, see USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jan 53-30 Jun 54, pp. 201-05. SECRET.

[46] Memo for rcd, USAREUR ACOFS G4, 17 Jun 55, sub: Concept C vs. SHAPE Capabilities Plan. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 COMZ (1955), Vol. II, Item 14.

[47] (1) For steps taken toward implementing the Concept C plan, see par. 97 of this report. (2) Concept C: Goals for Implementation, Off of USAREUR ACOFS G4, 31 Mar 55. GLD 65-1. SECRET.

The USAREUR Plan for the Emergency Evacuation of Technical Service Supplies and Equipment, dated 16 November 1952, was still effective during FY 1955. It was amended in February 1955 to provide for the use of more railway and less truck transportation. However, such factors as the advent of West German sovereignty, certain changes in USAREUR capabilities, and growing U.S. dependence on the French and West German railway systems, required the development of a new plan. The draft was completed in June 1955 and at the end of that month was in the hands of US CINCEUR for review and approval.[48]

b. Evacuation of German Rail Equipment. The Transportation Division staff prepared a plan for the evacuation of West German rail equipment which was needed for USAREUR's own use in the event of war, or which had to be denied to the enemy for strategical and tactical reasons. This plan was to serve as the basis for preparing a tripartite plan through the Military Transportation Office.[49]

c. Military Transportation Office. Composed of the chiefs of transportation of the U.S., British, and French forces in Western Germany, and their representatives, the Military Transportation Office became operational on 1 July 1954. It was established to coordinate the military rail transport requirements of the Allies with the West German Federal Railways and to prepare plans for controlling the rail system in the event of war with the Soviet Union and its satellites. Since there was no need for coordinating rail requirements on a tripartite basis during FY 1955, the Military Transportation Office devoted most of its effort to planning for the tripartite evacuation of technical service supplies and West German rail equipment.

(1) Draft Plan. In the spring of 1955 a draft plan for the evacuation of the rail equipment was completed and distributed to the three Allied transportation chiefs. Since this draft had not been coordinated with the Federal Republic of Germany, which had meanwhile achieved its sovereignty, the status of the plan was somewhat dubious. In fact, the British quite pointedly ignored the new plan, and the other two Allies had not approved it by the end of June 1955.

(2) Draft Terms of Reference. On 16 June 1955 new terms of reference were drafted to make the Military Transportation Office a more effective organization. According to this draft, the designation of the agency was to be changed to that of Military Transportation

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[48](1) Draft USAREUR Plan for the Evacuation of Technical Service Supplies and Equipment, n.d. SECRET. In USAREUR Trans Div Plans and Intel Br. (2) Annex A to Min, CINCUSAREUR's Wkly Stf Conf 7, 22 Mar 55. SECRET. (3) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col W. E. Ligon, C/USAREUR Trans Div Plans and Intel Br, 15 Sep 55. SECRET.

[49]Interv, 15 Sep 55, cited above. SECRET.

Committee of the Forces in Germany. The three Allies were to be made permanent members with the understanding that the Federal Republic of Germany would be invited to join the committee as soon as the first German contribution of troops and equipment to NATO had been effected. The new committee would be responsible for planning and coordinating the use of all means of surface transportation, instead of merely railways as formerly. At the end of June 1955 these proposals for the reorganization of the transportation agency were submitted to the interested parties.[50]

(3) NATO Transportation Conference. On 22 and 23 June 1955 a conference was held at Heidelberg to discuss NATO transportation problems. Among other questions discussed by the conferees was the effectiveness of the Military Transportation Office. The British representative pointed out that during its year of operation the office had produced only one draft rail evacuation plan, and had done so without consulting the Federal Republic of Germany. Moreover, since West Germany was a sovereign nation by the time the conference took place, disposition of its rail equipment was its own responsibility. Finally, the British representative believed that continued operation of the Military Transportation Office would be a waste of manpower, especially in view of its unproductiveness. Although no immediate decision was made, the inference was that the tripartite transportation agency would soon be abolished. However, since U.S. transportation problems could be handled through the USAREUR Transportation Center at Frankfurt and tripartite matters through Central Army Group channels, there was no reason for alarm. In fact, with the admission of Western Germany, NATO seemed the appropriate agency to assume responsibility for future multilateral transportation planning.[51]

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[50] Terms of Reference for the Military Transportation Committee of the Forces in Germany, 16 Jun 55. SECRET. In USAREUR Trans Div Plans and Intel Br.

[51] (1) Min, Fifth LANDCENT Mvmts Plng Mtgs, 22 and 23 Jun 55. SECRET. In USAREUR Trans Div Plans and Intel Br. (2) Interv, Mr. Walker with Lt Col D. G. Carson, USAREUR Trans Div Plans and Intel Br, 4 Oct 55. SECRET.

Section II: Security Preparations

77. Troop Locations and Troop Movements

Troop units were stationed throughout the command in accordance with the provisions of the USAREUR and NATO emergency plans. Occasional deviations were made to take into account the availability of dependent housing. Command policy in locating troops was to consolidate units as far as practicable in order to obtain optimum use of facilities without detrimental effect on unit integrity or the execution of tactical missions. Another factor to be taken into consideration was that troop housing and other facilities would soon have to be allocated to the new Army of West Germany.[52]

a. Divisions and Separate Regiments. During the report period 4 infantry divisions, 1 armored division, 3 armored cavalry regiments, and 1 separate infantry regiment were assigned to the command. The three armored regiments were substantially equivalent to a sixth division. As of 30 June 1955 the 1st Infantry Division was stationed in the general area of Wuerzburg, the 4th Infantry Division around Frankfurt and Hanau, the 5th Infantry Division around Augsburg, the 9th Infantry Division in the region of Goeppingen and Stuttgart, and the 2d Armored Division around Bad Kreuznach. Defense Planning provided that the armored cavalry regiments, organized as highly mobile screening forces in front of the main U.S. troop concentrations, would bear the initial brunt of an attack from Eastern Europe. Consequently, they were concentrated along the borders of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Zone of Germany. The 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment was deployed in a defensive line extending through Nuremberg, Bayreuth, Bamberg, and Amberg; the 6th Armored Cavalry Regiment was located in the Straubing-Regensburg-Landshut area; and the 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment was stationed along the Fulda-Bad Kissingen-Hersfeld axis. The 6th Infantry Regiment constituted the U.S. garrison of Berlin and, in conjunction with British and French forces in the city, was to make a stand in the face of a Russian or Soviet satellite attack.[53]

b. Major Nondivisional Combat Units. Although there was some variation in the types of nondivisional combat units assigned to the command during the year, their aggregate number remained about the same. For greater tactical mobility, most of the battalion-size and a few of the smaller-type units were assigned to army or corps headquarters

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[52] Interv, Mr. Walker with Col J. W. Barlow, C/USAREUR ACOFS G3 Opns Br, 11 Aug 55. SECRET.

[53] (1) Station List of Organizations in USAREUR, 30 Jun 55. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Interv, Mr. Walker with Lt Col B. S. Hopper, USAREUR ACOFS G3 Combat Devs Br, 14 Oct 55. SECRET.

rather than to divisions.[54] On 30 June 1955 there were 65 major non-divisional combat units deployed throughout the command. Eighteen of these battalions were antiaircraft artillery, including 4 attached to the 32d AAA Brigade in England; 10 were combat engineer; 3 were tank battalions; 24 were conventional field artillery battalions; 6 were 280-mm. gun battalions; 1 was a Corporal guided missile battalion; and 3 were infantry battalions. In addition to these major units, 6 Honest John rocket batteries arrived in the command during the year and were located at Kitzingen, Ansbach, Schwaebisch Gmuend, Darmstadt, Hanau, and Leipheim.[55]

c. Permanent Changes in Location of Major Troop Units. In moving troop units from one location to another, no permanent changes were made without taking into account the impending sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Germany and the consequent loss of Deutsche Mark support. Other factors were West Germany's future need for troop housing and other facilities, probable dollar savings resulting from decreased maintenance costs and better use of facilities, and the opportunity to locate units in the best interest of the command. Additional considerations were the anticipated arrival of other programmed units for which accommodations had to be provided, the stage of completion of the dependent housing program, and the implications of Operation GYROSCOPE.[56] Based on these factors, the following permanent changes of station for major units were made during the year:[57]

Unit	Old Station	New Station	Date
4th Inf Div Arty	Hanau	Frankfurt	1 Sep 54
30th Fld Arty Gp	Neckarsulm	Hanau	1 Sep 54
12th AAA Gp	Karlsruhe	Kaiserslautern	15 Nov 54
30th Med Gp	Landstuhl	Ludwigsburg	1 Apr 55
10th Trans Gp	Kornwestheim	Ludwigsburg	15 Apr 55
2d QM Gp	Kornwestheim	Ludwigsburg	20 Jun 55

[54] Interv, Mr. Walker with Lt Col H. D. Evans, USAREUR ACOFS G3 Opns Br, 12 Oct 55. CONFIDENTIAL.

[55] Compiled from information furnished by USAREUR ACOFS G3 Opns Br, 7 Sep 55. SECRET.

[56] Interv, 12 Oct 55, cited above. SECRET.

[57] Compiled from information furnished by USAREUR ACOFS G3 Opns Br, 7 Sep 55. CONFIDENTIAL.

78. Internal Security Directive for Germany

During FY 1955 the internal security directive for Germany issued on 19 December 1953 was still in force.[58] Although the command policy for controlling the German civilian population and protecting U.S. personnel and property in the event of internal strife or war remained unchanged, many of the supporting plans of the subordinate commands had to be revised to conform to the latest local capabilities and conditions. After 5 May 1955 the problem of maintaining internal security changed, with the Federal Republic of Germany assuming the responsibilities of a sovereign nation. However, the drafting of a new directive had to be held in abeyance until the U.S. Ambassador had concluded the previously mentioned over-all negotiations with the German authorities regarding a new emergency plan.[59]

79. Internal Security Directive for USAREUR COMZ

Under an internal security directive of 25 January 1954 the Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ, was responsible for the security of all USAREUR units, installations, and personnel in France.[60] The directive was not changed during the ensuing 18 months, but the internal security supporting plans of the subordinate units were revised to reflect current conditions and the latest capabilities of local commands. No revision of the basic directive was contemplated in mid-1955.[61]

80. Demolition Plans and Preparations

a. Policies. Included in the Joint Emergency Alert Plan 1-54 were instructions to Seventh Army and USAREUR administrative and technical services for the emergency demolition of installations, supplies, and equipment.[62] Because of inadequate coordination, the operational supporting plans prepared by the services and Seventh Army were in some instances incompatible and contradictory. Consequently, in May and

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[58] For details of the internal security directive of 19 December 1953, see USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jan 53-30 Jun 54, pp. 196-98. SECRET.

[59] Interv, Mr. Walker with Col M. F. Schneider, ACOFS G3 Opns Br, 9 Sep 55. SECRET.

[60] For details of the USAREUR COMZ internal security directive of 25 January 1954, see USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jan 53-30 Jun 54, pp. 198-99. SECRET.

[61] Interv, 9 Sep 55, cited above. CONFIDENTIAL.

[62] For details regarding demolition policies, see USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jan 53-30 Jun 54, pp. 210-14. SECRET.

June 1955 the operational demolition plans were being reviewed and revised to eliminate inconsistencies.[63]

Operational demolition planning required that certain critical structures, such as runways not utilized by USAFE or bridges over major rivers, be prepared in advance for destruction. In preparation for an attack from the East directed at the U.S. Zone of Germany and the Western Area Command, key structures were selected for the preparation of strategic demolitions, and contracts were made with West German firms to construct the necessary demolition chambers.[64]

b. Difficulties in Executing the Demolition Program. At the end of August 1954 the USAREUR demolition chambering program was about three-quarters finished; 96 bridge projects were awaiting completion. However, by that time the demolition chambering program had practically come to a standstill. Local politicians and agitators, assisted by newspapers looking for a nationalistic issue, had aroused the West German people into opposing specific projects. Their efforts were so successful, that, because of political implications, most of the remaining projects had to be deferred.[65]

Sporadic opposition, accompanied by protests from West German governmental and local agencies, continued throughout the second half of 1954 but grew especially vociferous as sovereignty negotiations at the Paris Conference progressed successfully. Moreover, West German elections, to be held in November 1954, were approaching. This situation was considered so serious, that on 15 and 16 September 1954 representatives of USAREUR staff divisions and Seventh Army headquarters, as well as civil affairs officers of the area commands, met to examine the current demolition chambering program. In addition, they wanted to determine what amendments to existing policies could be introduced to counteract the increasing German opposition. The conferees decided that work on a project ought not to be initiated if a difference of opinion with German officials remained unresolved at the end of the 6-week consultation period. Nor was any chambering to be undertaken in the face of objections from German officials, regardless of the nature of the objections. Each case would have to be judged on its individual merits and possible repercussions would

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[63] DF, USAREUR DCOFS for Opns to USAREUR ACOFS G3, et al., 25 Apr 55, sub: Demolition Plans. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 600.6 (1955), Vol. I, Item 8 atchd.

[64] Interv, 9 Sep 55, cited above. SECRET.

[65] (1) Ibid. (2) IRS, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 24 Sep 54, sub: Chambering of Bridges. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 600.6 (1954), Vol. I, Item 4A atchd.

have to be considered. For this reason the decision whether to proceed with a project was to be made at USAREUR headquarters. At the same time, area commanders were to make every effort to obtain concurrence and support for projects at the local level without giving any indication of compulsion.[66]

These recommendations were just chaff in the wind. Even while the conference was in session, CINCUSAREUR met with Minister President Dr. Gebhardt Mueller of Land Baden-Wuerttemberg and agreed to defer work temporarily on 12 projects in Stuttgart, Mannheim, Heidelberg, and Heilbronn. Soon afterward popular opposition erupted into violence. During the night of 23 and 24 October 1954 a mob of 80 persons destroyed partially completed chambers on two Wetzlar bridges, threw the scaffolding into the river, and demolished equipment belonging to the German contractor. Mindful of political implications, CINCUSAREUR immediately deferred work on these bridges, but took the opportunity of pointing out to Wetzlar's mayor that bridge chambering still was essential for the defense of the Federal Republic of Germany.[67]

Minister President Dr. Hans Ehard of Bavaria was not long in taking advantage of the agreement for deferring projects in Baden-Wuerttemberg. On 2 November 1954 he informed U.S. officials that to support the demolition chambering program in Bavaria would mean political suicide for himself and any local mayor. He therefore requested that work on three bridge chambering operations in the vicinity of Bamberg be halted until after the Bavarian elections on 28 November. Because of Ehard's friendly attitude in the past, the command called a temporary halt to the chambering work on the three Main River bridges.[68] After the election was over, the mayor of Bamberg raised such strong objections that the work could not be resumed. However, because of the extreme tactical importance of these Main River bridges, their rapid and certain destruction immediately after the state of hostilities was considered essential by USAREUR. The command also felt that the prestige of U.S. military forces was seriously impaired by invariably giving way to the pressure of local officials and therefore decided to take a strong position in this instance. Nevertheless, even though negotiations for completing these three particular projects were

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[66](1) IRS, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 24 Sep 54, sub: Chambering of Bridges. SECRET. (2) Sum, Conf Discussion Re USAREUR Demolition Chambering Program, n.d. SECRET. Both in file cited above.

[67](1) IRS, C/USAREUR CAD to USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 12 Nov 54, sub: Chambering of Wetzlar Bridges. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Ltr, USAREUR AG to Dr. Schmidt, Mayor of Wetzlar, 20 Nov 54. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in file cited above.

[68]Ltr, USAREUR AG to Mr. Zinn Garrett, Civ-Mil Relations Off, HICOG, 18 Nov 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

continued through the spring of 1955, the chambers were still not built by the end of June 1955.[69]

Dozens of other demolition chambering projects encountered similar opposition during the year, and the same pattern of protest, negotiation, and deferment was repeated again and again. After the Federal Republic of Germany was granted sovereignty, advance preparations for emergency tactical demolitions stopped for all practical purposes. Although the command continued to negotiate for the completion of a few vital projects, indications were that practically no more advance chambering would be accomplished unless there was a complete reversal in the attitude of the West German people. No such reversal was expected in the foreseeable future. Of course, the demolition plans of the new West German Army--if any such plans were to be prepared--were not yet known at USAREUR headquarters.[70]

81. Emergency Map Reserves

On 13 July 1954 the USAREUR Map Stockage Plan superseded the EUCOM Map Supply Plan of 19 July 1951. Conforming to the NATO policy that the maintenance of map reserves was a national responsibility, the new plan provided for the distribution of maps exclusively to U.S. land forces in the US EUCOM jurisdictional area. It was estimated that approximately 47,600,000 maps would be needed during the first 90 days of military operations.[71]

a. Suggested Change in Policy. USAREUR-CENTAG did not agree with the NATO policy according to which maps were logistical supply items and therefore a national responsibility. Since maps were intelligence documents rather than items of supply, CINCUSAREUR recommended on 3 August 1954 that the planning policy for maps be removed from the SHAPE Logistical War Plan and become part of the intelligence annex of the SHAPE European Defense Plan. He added that SHAPE policy ought to be changed to make map supply in wartime a command responsibility for headquarters receiving reinforcements. In other words, any command receiving reinforcements of foreign land forces would be responsible for issuing tactical maps to the newly assigned units.[72]

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[69] Comment 2 to DF, USAREUR Dep ACOFS G3 to USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 25 Feb 55, sub: Letter to US HICOG Concerning Bamberg Demolition Chamber Projects. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 600.6 (1955), Vol. I, Item 4.

[70] Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Col M. F. Schneider, USAREUR ACOFS G3 Opns Br, 7 Sep 55. SECRET.

[71] USAREUR Map Stockage Plan, 13 Jul 54. SECRET. In USAREUR Engr Div Intel and Mapping Br files.

[72] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to US CINCEUR, 3 Aug 54, sub: Mobilization Map Stocks and Map Supply in War to Land Forces. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 060 Maps (1954), Vol. I, Item 10 atchd.

On 29 December 1954 the Department of the Army and US EUCOM accepted USAREUR's recommendation as the U.S. position and authorized the command to discuss the matter with SHAPE headquarters. At the same time, US EUCOM informed USAREUR that the subject had already been broached to SHAPE which, in turn, had agreed to prepare a study on the new policy for presentation at the next NATO mapping conference.[73] Since by the end of June 1955 this conference had not been held USAREUR was uncertain whether all NATO countries would agree to the change in policy. In the meantime, USAREUR was making preparations to revise its map stockage plan on the basis of its recommendation and to stock sufficient maps for issuance to the French II Corps, which would be assigned to the U.S. Seventh Army in the event of war.[74]

b. Production and Storage of Maps. By the end of FY 1955 practically all the maps provided for in the USAREUR Map Stockage Plan were printed and stored in the U.S. map depots in France and Western Germany. Since these map reserves were in support of war plans that were primarily defensive, the stocks consisted mostly of sectional maps of the U.S. and northern French Zones of Germany and, to a lesser extent, of other regions.[75] The tactical maps of Germany were based on German war maps produced in the 1930's and 1940's, but since that time so much new housing and so many new roads had been built that the small-scale maps had to be brought up to date. Consequently, USAREUR's mapping service began redrafting 1,000 sectional maps in the 1:25,000-scale series. To facilitate the job, the Army Map Service assumed partial responsibility for producing 300 of the maps. By the end of June 1955, 103 of the new maps were redrawn, printed, and stored. Another 28 were redrafted, but were not yet printed.[76]

A 1:50,000-scale map program for producing 257 new sectional maps of the American and northern French Zones of Western Germany was still in the planning stage and would not be started until the 1:25,000-scale maps were completed. Maps of 182 selected towns in Germany were also being prepared as part of the map stockage plan; 82 of them were completed by the end of June 1955. The production of maps of 76 towns along the U.S. line of communications in France was scheduled to begin upon completion of the project covering Germany.[77]

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[73] DF, USAREUR Engr to USAREUR ACOFS G3, et al., 26 Jan 55, sub: Mobilization Map Stocks and Map Supply in War to Land Forces. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 060 Maps (1955), Vol. I, Item A.

[74] Interv, Sp3 R. H. McDonald, 10th Mil Hist Det, with Maj W. J. Albright, USAREUR Engr Div, 25 Nov 55. SECRET.

[75] Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Col F. O. Diercks, C/USAREUR Engr Div Intel and Mapping Br, 13 Sep 55. SECRET.

[76] USAREUR Engr Div Intel and Mapping Br Hist Rept, 1 Jul 54-30 Jun 55. SECRET (information used UNCLASSIFIED). In USAREUR Engr Div Intel and Mapping Br.

[77] Ibid.

82. Practice Alerts and Test Assemblies

To test the feasibility of emergency planning, USAREUR headquarters and its subordinate commands called periodic practice alerts and test assemblies. Practice alerts disclosed the state of operational readiness and familiarized personnel with alert procedures. Emergency communication networks were operated, personnel assembled, supply points were opened, vehicles were loaded with prescribed equipment, and units moved to field assembly areas. Procedures for evacuating noncombatants were simulated insofar as practicable. Block and area wardens practiced their functions, but dependents never participated in the testing. Test assemblies, usually limited to USAREUR headquarters, determined the effectiveness with which personnel could assemble during off-duty hours in accordance with Emergency Evacuation Order 1-54.[78]

In practice alerts and test assemblies personnel were supposed to get to mustering points by means of military transportation expressly furnished for that purpose. Private automobiles were to be left at home since they were reserved for the transportation of dependents in the event of an emergency. This planned procedure was often ignored. Even after repeated briefing, alerted personnel continued to arrive at assembly points in their own automobiles or in taxicabs. This disregarding of instructions did not give emergency planning a fair trial, and so defeated one of the purposes of holding practice alerts and test assemblies. USAREUR headquarters, and local commanders therefore intensified their orientation programs to stress that the military transportation pickup system would have to be used during the tests.[79]

Several other deficiencies were noted during the various test assemblies held at USAREUR headquarters. For instance, the pickup-truck drivers were not properly instructed in their duties, there was too much delay in alerting the pickup platoon, and responsible officers frequently neglected to check whether the platoon had been alerted. In one test assembly, several staff duty officers had to be called three times before the alert notification officer could get them on the telephone. On numerous occasions men arrived at the assembly point without required steel helmets and entrenching tools.[80]

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[78](1) USAREUR ltr, 5 Aug 54, sub: Practice Alerts. AG 371.2 GOTAGO. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Intervs, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Col M. F. Schneider and Lt Col M. O. Engen, USAREUR ACOFS G3 Opns Br, 7 Sep 55. SECRET.

[79](1) Ibid. (2) USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf Notes, No. 5, 8 Mar 55. SECRET.

[80](1) IRS, USAREUR DCOFS for Opns to USAREUR Hq Comdt, 28 Aug 54, sub: Test Assembly. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 371.2 (1954), Vol. II, Item 38A. (2) USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf Notes, No. 14, 2 Nov 54. SECRET. (3) USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf Notes, No. 5, 8 Mar 55. SECRET.

Steps were taken to correct these deficiencies. The operational readiness of the alert pickup platoon was improved through additional training and further testing. The pickup platoon furnished a messenger who remained on duty with the USAREUR Headquarters Commandant's officer of the day during off-duty hours. In subsequent test assemblies this messenger, under instructions of the officer of the day, delivered a written alert message to the platoon. The officer of the day then followed through by making a physical check of the platoon area and the motor pool. In addition, chiefs of staff divisions briefed their personnel on why instructions had to be followed faithfully and explained the scope of the alert procedures.[81]

83. Preparations for Implementing the Noncombatant Evacuation Order

Thorough advance preparation was necessary to assure the successful implementation of the noncombatant evacuation order in an emergency. Men with NEO assignments, such as military police escort and traffic control personnel, were trained and equipped. Supplies and equipment were stored at assembly points, at supply and holding areas along the French evacuation routes, and in the COMZ BASEC staging area. A block warden warning and alert system had been established and was operating. Ten prepunched passport control cards and instructional notes were distributed to each noncombatant.

Since the number of military personnel available for NEO assignments was insufficient, Department of the Army male civilian employees were assigned to block warden duties and were designated as truck drivers for NEO evacuation columns. When the block warden system broke down because of the voluntary nature of the assignments, permanent assignments were made by military orders. With only one noncombatant driver being available for each passenger automobile, assistant drivers were needed because driving under hazardous conditions would be tiresome. Nondrivers were therefore encouraged to qualify for driver permits even if they had no cars of their own. Steps were also taken to train high school students as drivers.

USAREUR and Seventh Army survey teams frequently visited the area commands to establish the state of NEO readiness, and COMZ teams did likewise in France. Whenever deficiencies were discovered, means for

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[81](1) Ibid. (2) IRS, Hq USAREUR Comdt to USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 2 Sep 54, sub: Test Assembly. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 371.2 (1954), Vol. II, Item 38A atchd.

eliminating them were suggested. Subsequent checks were made to determine if the shortcomings had been eradicated.[82]

84. Noncombatant Evacuation and Military Service Movement Test Exercise

Under simulated conditions of a general alert, noncombatant evacuation plans and military service emergency movement plans were tested simultaneously in Exercise ROAD BOUND II. The test, conducted by Seventh Army and COMZ in coordination with French national authorities, began early in the morning of 12 October 1954 with the calling of a USAREUR-wide practice alert, and ended on 22 October. It consisted of simulated and actual movements of USAREUR and USAFE units, march serials, equipment, and personnel from West Germany to destinations in France. Some French Army units participated in the military service movements phase. Emphasis was on traffic control, communications, supply, documentation, and warden procedures.[83]

Observers of the exercise noted that excessive time was required for alerting units. It was 45 minutes after the alert was called before the area commands received notification, and 90 minutes elapsed before military service units were notified. Signal communications between Seventh Army and COMZ Advance Section were inadequate, and the two headquarters were not properly coordinated. During the movement phase the march tables of the U.S. Seventh Army and French First Army were found to be in conflict with one another. In addition, there were insufficient strip and road maps, and some of the maps were inaccurate. Because of unfamiliarity with time movement requirements, military service units arrived at army initial points at the wrong time and caused traffic congestion and became mixed up with NEO traffic. Some of the heavy wreckers scheduled to accompany NEO columns and several heavy vehicles assigned to service units could not maintain the prescribed rate of march. On the other hand, the efficient erection of the tent camp in COMZ Base Section was a particularly noteworthy achievement.[84]

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[82](1) Memo for rcd, 6 Jul 54, sub: Survey of NEO Readiness. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR ACOFS G3 Opns Br NEO file (1954-55). (2) USAREUR ltr, 30 Jul 54, sub: NEO Block Wardens. AG 371.2 GOT-AGO. CONFIDENTIAL. (3) USAREUR ltr, 3 May 55, sub: Noncombatant Drivers. AG 371.2 GOT-AGO. CONFIDENTIAL. (4) USAREUR ltr, 6 May 55, sub: NEO Traffic Control. AG 354.2 GOT-AGO. SECRET. (5) Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col M. O. Engen, USAREUR ACOFS G3 Opns Br, 11 Aug 55. SECRET.

[83](1) Seventh Army Opns Order, Exercise ROAD BOUND II, 9 Sep 54. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) USAREUR COMZ ltr, 28 Sep 54, sub: French Participation During Exercise ROAD BOUND II. AG 345 OT-P. CONFIDENTIAL. (3) Cable SC-19977, USAREUR to Seventh Army, et al., 12 Oct 54. UNCLASSIFIED. All in USAREUR SGS 354.2 (1954), Item 47 atchd.

[84]IRS, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 19 Nov 54, sub: Results of Exercise ROAD BOUND II. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

After the exercise was completed, the results were subjected to critical analysis. The planners agreed that most of the difficulties arose because the movement of the military service units had been inadequately planned. In comparison with the previous year's exercise, there was a noticeable improvement in the NEO test operations. However, because of the long distances from assembly points to the staging area, Southern Area Command march tables imposed driving efforts that would be beyond the capabilities of the average female noncombatant drivers. The results of the exercise were used for revising the NEO plans.[85]

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[85] Ibid.

CHAPTER 6

Training

85. The USAREUR Training Program

a. The General Program. The training of all USAREUR units was governed by USAREUR Training Circular 4, dated 20 August 1954, which was based on the training doctrines established by the Department of the Army.[1] Except for minor changes and an increased emphasis on training in special weapons warfare, Circular 4 followed the general outline of its predecessors and defined the purpose, length of training week, and types of training required for the subordinate commands.

b. Seventh Army and Berlin Command Program. The training program for Seventh Army and the combat units of the Berlin Command, as outlined in the USAREUR directive, prescribed combined arms and joint training with particular emphasis on offensive and defensive operations involving the use of atomic and chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) warfare.[2]

c. Special Programs. Circular 4 provided for a diversified training program for COMZ and the noncombatant subordinate commands and units. Within the prescribed 44-hour work week, each unit was to

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[1](1) FM 21-5, sub: Principles and Methods of Instruction. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR Tng Cir 4, 20 Aug 54, sub: 1954-55 Training Directive for USAREUR. UNCLASSIFIED.

[2]USAREUR Tng Cir 4, Annex A, 20 Aug 54, sub: Prescribed Training for Seventh Army Units and Combat Units of Berlin Command. UNCLASSIFIED.

conduct 4 hours of combat training. Field training was to be conducted monthly, with an overnight problem to be held each quarter.[3]

d. Specialized Training. Other programs, which supplemented the basic USAREUR training directive, provided for specialized training in CBR and atomic warfare, marksmanship, air defense, civil affairs and military government, educational and specialist training, and an intensive Army Reserve training program--all designed to keep the command in a state of readiness to fulfill its combat mission.[4]

86. General Training

a. Major Command Training. The two major components of USAREUR, Seventh Army and COMZ, incorporated into their training programs various subjects pertinent to the accomplishment of their assigned missions.

(1) Training of Seventh Army. Since Seventh Army was the major U.S. combat command in Europe and was the NATO pivot in the defense of Western Europe, its training was designed to achieve maximum operational readiness. Continued emphasis was placed on such training as division, corps, and army maneuvers, and other simulated combat exercises involving the use of atomic weapons; physical conditioning; cold weather training; combined arms training; practice alerts; evacuation of dependents and civilians; riot and insurrection control; and other subjects required to bring the command to a state of maximum efficiency. Much of this training extended beyond normal duty hours.[5]

(2) COMZ Unit Training. Because COMZ units had a specialized supply mission and were farther removed from immediate danger, the question arose whether they ought to devote 4 hours of their 44-hour work week to combat training as prescribed by existing directives. COMZ headquarters suggested that the entire program would be better served by

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[3] USAREUR Tng Cir 4, Annex B, 20 Aug 54, sub: Prescribed Training for USAREUR Communications Zone, USAREUR Subordinate Commands, and USAREUR Units. UNCLASSIFIED.

[4] (1) USAREUR Cir 1, 12 Jul 54, sub: CBR Warfare Training. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR Cir 2, 9 Aug 54, sub: U.S. Army Reserve Training. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) The USAREUR School Catalog, 28 Aug 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

[5] (1) USAREUR Tng Cir 4, Annex A, 20 Aug 54, sub: Prescribed Training for Seventh Army Units. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR memo, 18 Aug 53, sub: Officers Physical Fitness Program. AG 201.5 SGS-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) USAREUR ltr, 21 Oct 54, sub: Cold Weather Indoctrination. AG 353 GOT-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED. (4) Seventh Army Tng Cir 1, 8 Jul 54, sub: Training Program, 1 November 1954-31 October 1955. UNCLASSIFIED.

condensing all field training into one annual 2-week training period, as a substitute for the weekly prescribed training. Once their intensive 2-week combat training was over, COMZ units could devote the remainder of the year to training for their assigned missions.[6] USAREUR, however, opposed such a plan because of COMZ's vulnerability to air attacks with conventional and nuclear weapons as well as to airborne raids, CBR warfare, espionage, sabotage, and guerrilla activities. To defend themselves successfully, COMZ units would therefore need sufficient combat training to meet emergency conditions. While a 2-week training camp would be an excellent substitute for the mandatory overnight and daylight field problems, concentrating the training for a whole year into such a short interval would probably defeat its own purpose. Moreover, COMZ lacked suitable facilities where such 2-week training periods could be held. In any event, the mandatory 4-hour periods would have to remain unimpaired so that the troops could be trained at their home stations.[7] Nevertheless, because of the variety of units in the command and the shortage of suitable training areas, the detailed scheduling of training programs was left to COMZ.[8] In March 1955, he was therefore given over-all guidelines that conformed to the general training program; he was also made responsible for training his troops so that they would be capable of accomplishing their mission and meeting emergency conditions.[9] Since COMZ had no specialized schools, trainees were sent to USAREUR schools in West Germany for specialist training. On-the-spot specialist training in supply and maintenance functions was given at the various depots in COMZ.[10] In addition, a training course for Army aviators in COMZ was organized at Chateauroux Air Force Base.[11]

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[6] Ltr, USAREUR COFS to CG COMZ, 15 Oct 54, sub: Two-weeks Training Camp for COMZ Personnel. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1954), Vol. II, Item 51A.

[7] IRS, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to DCOFS Opns, 20 Sep 54, sub: Mandatory Training Requirements for USAREUR COMZ. SECRET. In file cited above.

[8] (1) DF, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to DCOFS Opns, 21 Feb 55, sub: Training Responsibilities for Class II Units. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) DF, same to same, 14 Mar 55, sub: Change of Training Requirements COMZ. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR SGS 353 (1955), Vol. I, Items 8A, 15.

[9] Ltr, USAREUR DCOFS Opns to CG USAREUR COMZ, 16 Mar 55, sub: Change of Training Requirements. AG 353 GOT. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 15.

[10] COMZ Cir 350-17, change 1, 24 Jun 55, sub: Training Programs. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR ACOFS G3 Tng Br file.

[11] COMZ Tng Memo 3, change 1, 19 Mar 54, sub: Pilot and Aircraft Crew Training. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

b. Subordinate Command Training. Subordinate commands were also allowed some flexibility in providing the type of training best suited for the accomplishment of their mission.

(1) Area Commands. The training programs for the four administrative commands were spelled out in area command training circulars and memorandums. Assigned and attached units were to achieve maximum operational readiness for supporting the combat troops. In addition to the routine training, the area commands held one field training exercise per month to prepare individuals and units for their emergency missions. The area command units also participated once each quarter in an overnight training exercise that was substituted for one of the monthly problems. Because of the special mission of Headquarters Area Command (HACOM), unit training emphasized military justice, psychological warfare, internal security, and supply economy.[12] Northern Area Command (NACOM), with a large number of Seventh Army and other lodger units stationed in its area, stressed daytime field and overnight problems. Moreover, because of its common border with East Germany, training emphasized mine warfare doctrines and demolition techniques.[13] Southern Area Command (SACOM), where all USAREUR schools were located, focused its attention on specialist training. Western Area Command (WACOM), with its many lodger units engaged in supply and service functions, stressed supply economy training and field problems.

(2) Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation. Because of its physical location, the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation placed considerable emphasis on supply economy, CBR warfare, and cold weather indoctrination and encouraged on- and off-duty educational programs.[14]

(3) Berlin Command. The Berlin Command, because of its isolated position and limited area, trained extensively in offensive and defensive operations, air movements, atomic and CBR warfare, guided missiles, mine warfare, intelligence and counterintelligence, sabotage, demolition, and police work.[15] The troop information and education program was stressed, and the off-duty Army Education Center program and the University of Maryland program were also encouraged. Field

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[12] HACOM Tng Memo 10, 7 Oct 54, sub: Training Program for Headquarters Area Command, 1 November 1954-31 October 1955. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[13] NACOM Tng Memo 3, change 3, 7 Mar 55, sub: Mine Warfare and Demolition. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[14] BPOE Tng Memo 4, 13 Oct 54, sub: 1954-55 Training Program. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[15] USAREUR Tng Cir 4, Annex A, 20 Aug 54, sub: Prescribed Training for Combat Units of Berlin Command. UNCLASSIFIED.

training and maneuvers were accomplished by transporting one battalion at a time to West Germany where training areas were available.[16]

(4) 32d AAA Brigade. The 32d Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade, with a primary mission of defending U.S. Air Force bases in Great Britain from enemy air attack, conducted its training in accordance with Circular 4.[17] To accomplish the objective of operating effectively from assigned battle positions as well as providing semimobile units for a field army, each battery had to fire twice each year and had to be tested once a year. Two air defense exercises, one of which was command-wide, were also to be conducted from battle positions. Training for the chemical smoke generator companies included the production and laying of smoke screens for the airbases and antiaircraft artillery battery positions. Monthly exercises in radar tracking of aircraft and instruction in conducting surface missions were supplemented by weekly tracking tests in which all AAA batteries and surveillance radar, fire, and antiaircraft operations center units participated. Brigade headquarters controlled the number of aircraft participating in the exercises and the time and courses flown.[18] To provide for the detection of low-flying aircraft missed by the radar trackers, a 2½-week basic course in aircraft recognition and an advance course of one week were instituted. The courses entailed a study of the basic outlines of all aircraft and the methods of locating them in flight.[19] Selected brigade personnel also attended USAREUR specialist schools in West Germany.

During the fiscal year, the 32d AAA Brigade had difficulty in securing range facilities for its firing requirements since the limited number available were in almost constant use by British Army units that had returned from overseas. In addition, operational commitments at Southern Area Command bases, which required the continual rotation of units from one airfield to another, and the difficulty of getting flights for towing targets frequently interfered with scheduled firing

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[16] Berlin Comd Tng Memos 15, 27 Oct 54, sub: Troop Information and Education; 18, 6 Nov 54, sub: Intelligence Training; 2, 21 Jan 55, sub: Demolition Training. UNCLASSIFIED.

[17] USAREUR Tng Cir 4, Annex D, 20 Aug 54, sub: Prescribed Training for Units of the 32d AAA Brigade. UNCLASSIFIED.

[18] 32d AAA Brig Tng Memo 1, 3 Mar 55, sub: Brigade Tracking Missions. UNCLASSIFIED.

[19] 32d AAA Brig Tng Memo 2, Annex 3, 13 Dec 54, sub: Aircraft Recognition Instruction. UNCLASSIFIED.

exercises. A shortage of prime movers prevented firing batteries from moving simultaneously, so that a shuttle system had to be employed.[20]

c. USAREUR Unit Training. In general, the training of all USAREUR units[21] continued along the same general lines as in the preceding fiscal year, with particular emphasis on such subjects as security, intelligence, supply economy, staff work, military planning, communications, military construction, education, labor services, and physical fitness. Active off-duty athletic programs were encouraged.[22]

87. Specialized Training

During the reporting period, many special training programs were conducted that applied equally to Seventh Army and other subordinate commands. These were designed to train specialists and to acquaint other personnel with new developments in combat weapons and their employment and with other fields related only indirectly to combat operations.

a. Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Defense Training. In July 1954, USAREUR outlined its chemical, biological, and radiological warfare program. Local schools were to be established by subordinate commands to teach personnel how to protect themselves, render first aid, and prevent panic. The purpose was to ensure continued operational effectiveness if attacked with CBR agents. At these schools, selected officers and NCO's, to be assigned as instructors to various units when proficient, were to be trained to detect and employ countermeasures against such an attack. They were to be taught to recognize toxic and nerve gases and other chemical agents; the general characteristics of biological warfare (BW) and the methods of collecting and destroying BW agents; and various phases of radiological warfare (RW), including the structure of matter, radioactivity, effects of explosions, shielding effects of ordinary materials, the theory and operation of radiac instruments, and decontamination procedures.[23]

This program was carried out, and after the officer and NCO personnel had returned to their assigned units, they held regularly scheduled

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[20](1) Ltr, CO 32d AAA Brig to CINCUSAREUR, n.d., sub: Prescribed Training for 32d AAA Brigade Units. CG 353 (19 Oct 54). UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1954), Vol. II, Item 63B. (2) Interv, Capt John Mewha, 10th Hist Det, with Lt Col W. W. Saunders, USAREUR ACOFS G3 Tng Br, 2 Nov 55. SECRET.

[21]For a listing of USAREUR units, see Ch. 1, par. 7, above.

[22](1) Memo, CINCUSAREUR to all Stf Div, 18 Aug 53, sub: Officer Physical Fitness Program. AG 201.5 SGS-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR Stf and Tech Svcs Divs Tng Memos, 1954-55. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR ACOFS G3 Tng Br file.

[23]USAREUR Tng Cir 1, 12 Jul 54, sub: Chemical, Bacteriological, and Radiological Warfare (CBR) Training. UNCLASSIFIED.

classes in all phases of CBR warfare. Practical exercises were held in gas chambers and in the field to teach the detection of CBR agents and to demonstrate the value and uses of protective clothing and other materials against a CBR attack. After the unit was judged to be proficient, it was issued its equipment for CBR defense.[24]

b. Atomic Weapons Training. Tests at Desert Rock had indicated the importance of all types of atomic weapons, whether in the form of atomic artillery, bombs, or as warheads on guided missiles. Army training in Europe embodied the use of all these weapons. The 280-mm. atomic artillery units were in constant use at all field training exercises, from division-size to NATO maneuvers. However, actual firing with conventional shells was restricted by the limited range areas available. To simulate atomic warfare during field maneuvers, Seventh Army technicians constructed a pyrotechnic device which when detonated gave the appearance of an atomic explosion, giving off clouds and producing a concussion sufficiently loud enough to be heard at least two miles from the launching site. One hundred and fifty pyrotechnic projectiles and 15 launching mortars were available for loan to the umpires of field exercises, and were used in several field training exercises (FTX's) late in the training period. The USAREUR Intelligence School continued the orientation and training of selected commanders and staff officers in the planning and coordination required for the tactical employment of special weapons.[25]

c. Guided Missile Training. In late 1954 the first Honest John battery arrived in Europe. Since these guided missiles were all-weather weapons to be used in general support of a corps, the unit was attached to VII Corps, Seventh Army. The Honest John missile, a surface-to-surface 762-mm. solid propellant rocket, could be fitted with either of three warheads, fragmentation, chemical or atomic and had a range of 15 miles. Although the Honest John batteries participated in various FTX's, its practice firings were limited due to a lack of suitable ranges. On 17 March 1955, the two VII Corps Honest John batteries fired one round each in a demonstration at the Grafenwoehr training area.[26] Another guided missile available for training was the radio-controlled Corporal, a liquid propellant rocket, which arrived in the theater on 2 February 1955.[27] This weapon, launched from mobile ground installations,

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[24](1) Ibid. (2) USAREUR ltr, 10 May 55, sub: Equipment for CBR Defense. AGO 400 CML-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[25]Seventh Army ltr, to Sub Comds and Units, USAREUR and NATO Forces, 15 Jun 55, sub: Atomic Marking Devices. AG-354.2 ASEGC-MV. UNCLASSIFIED.

[26]Memo, Lt Col R. E. Phelps to Maj Gen J. F. Uncles, USAREUR COFS, 15 Mar 55, sub: Firing of HONEST JOHN Batteries. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1955), Vol. I, Item 15.

[27]The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), February 3, 1955. UNCLASSIFIED.

could be used against targets 30 to 75 miles distant and could reach a speed of 2,200 miles per hour. Normally it was to be employed as an Army weapon in support of corps troops.[28]

The lack of suitable training areas seriously hampered the addition of guided missile units. Only one Corporal battalion was in the theater and no NIKE units were received. At the close of the reporting period, after USAREUR had tried unsuccessfully to obtain a suitable guided missile range, US EUCOM was conducting negotiations to obtain a range in Africa where the various units could train.[29]

d. Training of Special Forces. By special arrangement, the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne)--a unit assigned to Seventh Army with the mission of conducting unconventional warfare behind enemy lines--conducted its training jointly with the Air Force. During three successive periods, each lasting approximately six weeks, simulated parachute drops were made behind mythical enemy lines (the first in the Southern Area Command) with the group resupplied at night by airdrops. The exercises stressed training in survival and security, training local guerrillas, gathering intelligence, inflicting maximum damage on the enemy, and withdrawing safely by an airlift. Twenty officers and 190 enlisted men of the group also attended the USAREUR Intelligence School during the report period.[30]

During March and April 1955, the 10th Special Forces Group attended the Air Force Survival School where it received instructions in such subjects as the will to survive; primitive first aid; protection from the elements; parachute training; air recovery; winter survival, including skiing, snowshoe training, and avalanche training; field treks, by day and night; navigation reconnaissance; trail discipline; camouflage; emergency evacuation; river crossings; preparation of rations;

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[28] Ltr 353, Hq 42d FA Gp to CG Seventh Army Arty, 14 Jun 55, sub: Early Firing of Guided Missile Units. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G3 Tng Br file.

[29] Memo, Lt Col W. W. Saunders, USAREUR ACOFS G3 Tng Br, 10 Jun 55, sub: Joint Service Requirement for Guided Missiles Range. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G3 Tng Br file.

[30] (1) USAREUR Sp Trps Tng Memo 5, 29 Jun 54, sub: Special Forces Training Memo No. 1. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAFE Opns Order 54-1, 8 Apr 54, sub: Joint Training Exercise with 10th Special Forces Group. CONFIDENTIAL. (3) Ltr, CO 10th Sp Forces Gp to CG Seventh Army, 7 Jul 54, sub: Requirements for Exercise 54-2, 10th Special Forces Group. CONFIDENTIAL. (4) IRS, ACOFS G3 Opns to G2 Opns, 7 Jul 54, sub: Additional School Training for 10th Special Forces Group. UNCLASSIFIED. All in USAREUR ACOFS G3 Tng Br file.

construction of various traps and snares; and the care of weapons and equipment in all types of weather.[31] In May 1955, training inspectors reported the 10th Special Forces Group to be in a superior state of training, both physically and in subject matter.[32]

e. Marksmanship Training. One of the principal mandatory subjects on all programs continued to be marksmanship training. With the improved performance of the USAREUR teams at the All-Army tournament at Fort Benning and their marked success in the National Matches at Camp Perry in August 1954, the 1954-55 marksmanship training program was off to a fine start. To fire both the familiarization and qualification courses was a general requirement for all troops. Units also formed marksmanship teams that competed against one another to select regimental, division, and major command teams, which in turn competed in championship matches held at Grafenwoehr on 9 June 1955. Although the marksmanship training program had the unqualified support of the Department of the Army and CINCUSAREUR, many unit commanders objected, stating that they could not spare their men from other duties to practice and compete in the matches. Nevertheless, the Office of Chief of Army Field Forces and USAREUR ordered unit commanders to allow qualified men the time to train and compete.[33] At the request of the major commands, the USAREUR Welfare Board made available $16,959.40 for equipment, awards, and other incidental expenses for this competition.

The rules and conditions prevailing at the National Matches were applied at the Grafenwoehr championship, where 17 rifle and 17 pistol teams competed. At the end of the firing, V Corps placed first in the rifle matches, and SACOM took the pistol competition.[34] Thirty-one of the marksmen were selected to represent USAREUR at the All-Army rifle and pistol shoot at Fort Benning on 14-17 June 1955, and later at the U.S. national championship at Camp Perry and the European matches near Cologne, Germany. At Fort Benning the USAREUR "Blue" and "Gray" rifle teams took 2d and 22d places respectively, while the "Blue" and "White" pistol teams took 8th and 20th places.[35] The national and European

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[31] Curriculum, USAFE Survival School, 1954-55, sub: Instruction for 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Instruction in Survival Techniques. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[32] Memo, Lt Col W. A. Luszki to Col J. G. Felber, USAREUR ACOFS G3 Tng Br, May 55, sub: Staff Visit to Special Forces Group. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[33] (1) OCAFF ltr, 15 Nov 54, sub: Competition in Small Arms Marksmanship. ATTNC-24 353.1/189. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) IRS, USAREUR DCOFS Opns to ACOFS G3, 12 Aug 54, sub: Participation in Small Arms Competition. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[34] USAREUR Bul No. 12, 13 May 55, sub: Competitive Small Arms Marksmanship Program 1955. UNCLASSIFIED.

[35] DA Bul No. 7, 18 Jun 55, sub: All-Army Championship Rifle Matches, 16-17 June 1955. UNCLASSIFIED.

championships took place after the close of the reporting period.[36]

f. Intelligence Training. All Army elements continued their participation in the USAREUR special intelligence training program which continued to stress proficiency in intelligence operations at all levels.[37] Unit commanders were still held responsible for training their men to the required standards of proficiency. Specialized survival training was given to individuals subject to capture or isolation behind enemy lines. To conduct the training, each unit appointed an intelligence officer or formed a team that could give on-the-spot instruction. Special instruction was given to combat unit intelligence section personnel in field operations, and intelligence agents and specialists were trained at the USAREUR Intelligence School.[38]

g. Training in Civil Affairs and Military Government. Typical of the civil affairs and military government training programs initiated by subordinate commands was that of Seventh Army. Each division and regimental commander was held responsible for civil affairs and military government activities and instruction within his area of command. He in turn selected groups or teams to be trained in the importance of these functions as aids to military operations, and the control, screening, and governing of civil populations to prevent interference with military activities. Among the specific subjects studied were: history of military government; rules of warfare; command responsibilities; maintenance of law and order; the establishment of courts of law; refugee control; organization of labor services; transportation, communications, and public utilities; the custody and administration of public properties and the control of commodities; the issuance of proclamations and ordinances; and the amount and type of public information to be released to the civil population.[39]

h. Air Defense Training. As in the previous year, air defense training was divided into two main parts, air support and ground defense. Air support training, conducted by Twelfth Air Force, consisted of maintaining radar posts to provide the ground forces with accurate and speedy information; training personnel for the joint operations centers (JOC) and tactical air control parties (TACP); training liaison personnel; close

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[36] DF, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to USAREUR COFS, 28 May 55, sub: Le Clerc Trophy Competition. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR ACOFS G3 Tng Br file.

[37] USAREUR Tng Cir 5, 9 Sep 54, sub: Intelligence Training. UNCLASSIFIED.

[38] (1) Ibid. (2) The USAREUR School Catalog, 28 Aug 54, pp. 19-23. UNCLASSIFIED.

[39] Seventh Army SOP, Annex 12 (CA/MG) Part I, 18 Jun 55, sub: Civil Affairs and Military Government. AG 354.2 ASEGO-OP. UNCLASSIFIED.

support of the ground troops; and operation of air-to-ground communications equipment. Ground defense training called for close cooperation between the combat arms and the air support elements. Communications were furnished by the signal operations battalions; the engineers were responsible for camouflage training; while the main ground defense against air attack was provided by the antiaircraft artillery units.

During the reporting period, Twelfth Air Force increased its radar posts, thereby abetting the flow of information to the ground forces and removing a deficiency of former years. However, ground communications continued to be hampered by a lack of special equipment and spare parts. The antiaircraft units, although equipped with the latest range finders and guns, lacked certain ground-to-air guided missiles. In addition, training exercises revealed such weaknesses as insufficient realism in the employment of air support, unsatisfactory cooperation among ground forces, and deficiencies in air-ground liaison. Despite these apparent deficiencies, the status of air defense training continued to improve during the fiscal year.[40]

i. NODEX Field Operations. In April 1954, the Department of the Army decided that a permanent organization capable of expansion in wartime ought to control all supply-over-the-beaches exercises (redesignated NODEX). This organization was to eliminate the need for training new units during each exercise. At the same time a location was to be selected that would permit training under simulated combat conditions, with an emphasis on dispersion and rapid beach clearance to meet the threat of both conventional and atomic weapons. The permanent organization would have to be trained to operate over beaches, derelict piers, and through damaged ports. The NODEX exercises, would then be conducted as an integral part of the port operations in western France, thereby requiring coordination with the other activities of that port complex.[41]

In July 1954, a permanent NODEX organization was formed, and personnel were assigned to commence training.[42] On 1 November 1954 the first NODEX training exercise was held at Le Verdon on the Gironde Estuary in France. However, since the establishment of the permanent

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[40] Rept, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to COFS, Sep 54, sub: Ground-Air Operations in USAREUR. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G3 Tng Br file.

[41] DA ltr, to CINCUSAREUR, 14 Apr 54, sub: Over-the-Beaches Discharge Exercise. AG AC-C 353.2. SECRET. In file cited above.

[42] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG COMZ, 16 Jul 54, sub: Over-the-Beaches Exercises Resumed. AG 354 RYT. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

NODEX organization, these exercises were no longer considered to be part of training but became COMZ logistical support activities.[43]

j. U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) Training Program. In August 1954, USAREUR took definite steps to integrate its Reserve training program into the general training program. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, established priorities for augmentation assignments in accordance with the need of the Army, giving top priority to combat units; selected reservists for mobilization assignments; budgeted and controlled all expenditures of USAR funds; prepared and published training directives; organized or discontinued USAR control groups as necessary; and conducted semiannual inspections of Reserve activities in the military districts.[44] The program objectives were to develop and qualify personnel in all grades to perform assigned duties both in peacetime and upon mobilization; to develop capable instructors; to maintain the reservists in the standards of mental and physical fitness necessary for active service; and above all to attain mobilization proficiency.[45]

(1) Reserve Military Districts. During 1954, the following military districts were formed:[46]

Designation	Area
Berlin Military District	Berlin Command
Bremerhaven Military District	Bremen Enclave
Headquarters Military District	Headquarters Area Command
Northern Military District	Northern Area Command, Wiesbaden Area Command, and the British Zone of Germany
Southern Military District	Southern Area Command, and the French Zone of Germany, South of 49° North Latitude
Western Military District	Western Area Command, and the French Zone of Germany, North of 49° North Latitude
USAREUR Communications Zone Military District	France

[43](1) Cable LC-72472, COMLANDCENT to SACEUR, 1 Jul 54. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Cable CO 2-C-881, USAREUR COMZ to CINCUSAREUR, 7 Nov 54. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in file cited above. (3) USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf 17, 14 Dec 54, p. 7. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

[44](1) Briefing, Lt Col S. L. Weinerth, USAREUR ACOFS G3 Tng Br, 1955, sub: USAREUR U.S. Army Reserve Program. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR ACOFS G3 Tng Br file. (2) USAREUR Cir 139, 7 Aug 54, sub: United States Army Reserve (USAR), Pt. II. UNCLASSIFIED.

[45]USAREUR Tng Cir 2, 9 Aug 54, sub: United States Army Reserve (USAR) Training. UNCLASSIFIED.

[46]USAREUR Cir 139, 7 Aug 54, cited above.

The area commanders and the commanders of the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation and the Berlin Command were appointed chiefs of the military districts and were made responsible for providing adequate training facilities and training aids, and for preparing the training schedules for the Reserve units within their areas. In March 1955, however, the Bremen Enclave was incorporated into the Northern Military District and the Bremerhaven Military District was disbanded. An additional military district for Great Britain was also established under the Commanding Officer, 32d AAA Brigade.[47]

(2) The General Program. The program was designed to encourage active participation on the part of all Reservists, consisting of 15 days of annual field training and a 2-hour weekly instruction period necessary for point credit for retention. Training unit commanders were to prepare the training schedules following Department of the Army directives and orders of the military district commander. Most instruction was to be done by Reserve personnel; however, instructors from nearby Regular Army installations could be used to present technical subjects. USAREUR also arranged for reservists assigned or attached to USAR control groups--these were units authorized by area commanders to administer Army Reserve personnel not otherwise assigned--to receive credit for participating in inactive-duty training. However, only those having mobilization designations could receive inactive-duty training pay. Although reservists in Europe could not attend service schools in the United States, one additional 15-day tour of active duty was permitted to attend USAREUR schools, provided funds were available. Officer and NCO schools were encouraged as was participation in the Army Extension Course, a program which enabled the reservists to gain additional retirement point credits.[48]

(3) Training Progress. The new Reserve training policy brought about an increase in the number of assigned reservists. From June 1954 to 30 June 1955, the Reserve strength increased from approximately 850 to 1,145 or by 34.7 percent. Assignments, as of 30 June 1955, were made as follows:[49]

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[47] (1) Change 1 to USAREUR Cir 139, 23 Mar 55, sub: United States Army Reserve (USAR). UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR Tng Cir 2, 9 Aug 54, cited above.

[48] USAREUR Tng Cir 2, 9 Aug 54, cited above.

[49] Table, USAREUR Pers, 30 Jun 55, sub: Reservists Assigned to USAREUR. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR ACOFS G3 Tng Br file.

District	Total	Officers	Enlisted Men
Total	1,125	724	401
COMZ Military District	169	101	68
Berlin Military District	25	19	6
Northern Military District	193	140	53
Southern Military District	142	91	51
Western Military District	40	29	11
Headquarters Military District	91	68	23
Military District for Great Britain	28	28	0
USAREUR (Control Groups)	437	248	189

k. Troop Information and Education Program. The TI&E program continued to function, with each command responsible for insuring its proper operation. The Information and Education Division prepared and issued a list of required subjects and furnished the necessary instructional material. Supplementing the mandatory program were the programs designed to raise the intelligence level of USAREUR troops, such as participation in group study courses, the USAFI program, and the University of Maryland program.

In March 1955 USAREUR took steps to consolidate training centers where practicable in the interests of economy. COMZ, the area commands, and the 32d AAA Brigade were directed to provide adequate facilities where needed; to maintain the text material stock levels authorized their commands; and to render quarterly TI&E reports. In the main, the new program continued the required educational curriculum in grades 1 through 4 and the English language. Classes in Intermediate Education, MOS-related subjects, and spoken German and French could also be conducted using USAFI texts. All of these courses could be taught in on-duty classes, if there was sufficient training time.[50] During FY 1955, the troop education program expanded with each quarter showing a marked increase. For instance, participation in the program during the last quarter increased 7.2 percent (3,250) over the previous quarter and by 33 percent (11,930) over the first one:[51]

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[50] USAREUR Cir 355-5, 8 Mar 55, sub: Troop Information and Education. UNCLASSIFIED.

[51] USAREUR Mthly Stat Rept, 31 Jul 55, pp. 67-68. SECRET (information used UNCLASSIFIED).

	1954 Jul-Sep	1954 Oct-Dec	1955 Jan-Mar	1955 Apr-Jun
Total Persons Participating	36,199	45,479	44,879	48,129
Total Tests Administered	17,773	17,004	22,642	20,452
Total Course Completions	7,341	7,643	14,844	12,245

88. Field Training Exercises

To prepare USAREUR components for actual combat conditions and to coordinate the operations of a larger command, the following types of field training exercises were held during the reporting period: war games (WG), field training exercises (FTX), command post exercises (CPX), signal exercises (SIGEX), and traffic exercises (TRAFEX). Since USAREUR commands participated in numerous exercises during the fiscal year, only selected exercises will be described.

a. Representative Corps- and Division-Type Exercises.

(1) NATO Maneuver INDIAN SUMMER. A typical NATO FTX, in which the U.S. V Corps participated, was known as INDIAN SUMMER--a two-phased free maneuver held from 23-26 September 1954. Phase I consisted of a meeting engagement between opposing forces, while Phase II consisted of offensive operations by the aggressor and delaying and defensive operations by the defender. This NATO exercise was sponsored by CENTAG. USAREUR initiated preliminary planning for the exercise on 9 December 1953; and Seventh Army began detailed planning in February 1954, assisted by V Corps headquarters, which functioned as director headquarters for both sides. Representatives of the Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force (FOURATAF), U.S. Twelfth Air Force, Canadian 1st Air Division, and the French First Air Force (1er CATAC) assisted in the planning. While the planning was progressing, a scenario of the FTX was distributed to participating units to acquaint them with the exercises. An umpire school was set up in August, and liaison was established with the USAREUR Guest Observation Bureau established by the Northern Area Command to handle visitors. From 7-20 September, CINCUSAREUR and the participating commanders were briefed on the exercise, and umpire assignments and units locations were designated.[52] By 1200 hours, 21 September, 42 battalions and regiments of V Corps were in place and were operational. The French First Air Force with its JOC at Nancy, France, supported the U.S. 1st Infantry Division (BLACKLAND), the aggressor force; while the U.S. Twelfth Air Force, with its JOC at Kindsbach, Germany, supported the U.S. 4th Infantry Division and the U.S. 2d Armored Division (GREENLAND), the defending force. The purpose of exercise INDIAN SUMMER

[52] Final Rept, V Corps, 22 Oct 54, sub: Final Report on FTX INDIAN SUMMER. CVACT 354. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR ACOFS G3 Tng Br file.

was to emphasize the use of atomic weapons, guided missiles, CBR warfare, and other special weapons in an offensive operation and to practice a defense against the use of such weapons. Its specific objectives were to gain further experience at all echelons in conducting a meeting engagement with an enemy and to plan for and conduct offensive operations against that enemy.[53] In the exercise, BLACKLAND and GREENLAND were mythical nations of Central Europe that had been at war for five years in 1935-40, ending in the defeat of BLACKLAND. Making an unprecedented economic recovery, BLACKLAND attacked GREENLAND again in late August 1954, crossing the Rhine at several places from Speyer to Mannheim. After the initial attack in the south, which forced a 2-day delaying action pending the buildup of its corps strength, GREENLAND counterattacked and forced BLACKLAND to assume a defensive role.[54]

In general, INDIAN SUMMER was considered a very successful exercise. The early formation of its planning group and the establishment of a director headquarters in the field command post contributed to its success. At the field command post, the FTX director was able to control the participating units more realistically. The maneuver not only demonstrated the training progress achieved during the year, but also revealed certain tactical and logistical weaknesses that needed corrective action. Chiefly, faulty communications between participating ground and air force units indicated that more advance planning was needed before playing the exercise and that available means of communications would have to be used more efficiently. Other weaknesses were the poor use of concealment and camouflage; deficient dispersal of vehicles; violations of communication security; shortage of effective air support; and a lack of realism in providing personnel replacements.[55]

(2) Division CPX AUTUMN MOON. A typical division-type CPX held by USAREUR during the reporting period was AUTUMN MOON, conducted from 7-14 September 1954 by the 9th Infantry Division in the Southern Area Command, Stuttgart subarea. AUTUMN MOON, stressing offensive and defensive operations, incorporated plans for river crossings, a delayed withdrawal, a defense of a river line, a counterattack, and a reorganization by the defending forces. The objective of the exercise was to improve unit tactical and administrative communications under simulated combat conditions, especially in night operations. The exercise as a whole was rated very satisfactorily.[56]

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[53] Ltrs of Instrs, to CG's V Corps, Seventh Army, 23-26 Sep 54, in Final Rept cited above. CONFIDENTIAL.

[54] Final Rept, V Corps, 22 Oct 54, cited above.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Final Rept, 9th Inf Div, 25 Oct 54, sub: Report on FTX AUTUMN MOON. CONFIDENTIAL. In Seventh Army G3 files.

b. Exercises to Train Headquarters, CENTAG. Because it is necessary to conduct national and NATO training concurrently in the European Theater, field training exercises had to be designed to meet the needs and standards of both types of training. In his role as COMCENTAG, CINC-USAREUR was able to meet both requirements with NATO exercises involving the U.S. Seventh Army and the French First Army. Certain of these exercises also provided the means for training the personnel of Headquarters, USAREUR, who were to assume duties in Headquarters, CENTAG, in the event of hostilities, in the various procedures and techniques associated with the operation of an interallied army group headquarters. The remaining personnel of Headquarters, USAREUR, who would be responsible for U.S. logistical functions, also had the opportunity to participate in certain exercises during which logistical functions were played.[57]

89. Joint and Combined Training

Throughout the training year, subordinate units participated in field exercises and maneuvers with Air Force and Navy elements and with troops of other Allied nations. The principal objectives of this joint and combined training were to practice and perfect coordination, cooperation, and effective liaison--all aimed at increasing combat effectiveness as a team.

a. Training with U.S. Air Force and Naval Units. During many training exercises, USAREUR units worked closely with elements of the U.S. Twelfth Air Force and the U.S. Naval Forces in Germany. Training with naval units continued in the form of Rhine River crossings, bridge building exercises, and amphibious landings, while USAFE participated in practically all ground forces exercises, from battalion-size maneuvers to army field exercises, furnishing close-in support, air drops of supplies, training in radar enemy detection, air transportability training, towing targets, air interception, and other forms of support--all of which required much coordination and planning.[58]

During the training year, some disagreement arose between USAREUR and USAFE over the amount and type of tactical air support provided. For battalion- or regimental-size field exercises, the respective commanders estimated and requested the required air support some weeks in advance. Hence USAFE, through the JOC that had been established between Seventh Army and Twelfth Air Force, was able to plan the types of planes and munitions needed for the problems. However, on larger-type exercises, such as division-, corps-, and army-size maneuvers, advance planning of air strikes and close-in tactical support was not always advisable. From the Army viewpoint, it was the line commanders who

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[57] Intervs, Capt John Mewha, 10th Hist Det, with Col K. Hunter and Maj C. S. Johnson, Jr., USAREUR ACOFS G3 Tng Br, 22 Nov 55. CONFIDENTIAL.

[58] Interv, Mr. G. Tays, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj C. S. Johnson, Jr., USAREUR ACOFS G3 Tng Br, 18 Aug 55. CONFIDENTIAL.

would have to decide on the time and type of planes needed since the situation was usually fluid and subject to sudden change. The Air Force, however, wanted to know the air support planned, to include the type, number, and the places where air strikes would be delivered, and requested notification 24 hours in advance. This would permit the notification of the proper air force base housing the type of planes needed, and would allow sufficient time to remove the necessary munitions from storage and to load the planes. During the reporting period no firm plan was evolved to eliminate this difference; consequently, air-ground coordination during FTX's was spotty and, in some cases, ill-timed.[59]

Another apparent hindrance to effective air-ground operations was a lack of knowledge on how to use air support effectively. In some cases, the communications nets were flooded with mission requests, whereas in other cases, air support was almost completely disregarded. For instance, in one exercise the division with the lowest air priority for a certain day requested 57 close support sorties, approximately the entire number of sorties available to the army commander. On the other hand, the unit with top air priority for the day requested only four air strikes. To correct this situation, the Twelfth Air Force and Seventh Army opened an air-ground school to train Army G2 and G3 air officers and as many unit commanders as possible in proper air-ground operations.

b. Training with Allied Land Forces. USAREUR units continued their combined training as part of the NATO forces during the training year, participating in field exercises with NATO units from France, Belgium, Canada, and Great Britain. For the most part these exercises were controlled field maneuvers in which NATO forces were allowed operational freedom of movement within the maneuver areas. Sufficient opposition was provided to afford realism in simulated combat conditions and to allow realistic play in such phases as mine laying, guerrilla operations, bridge constructions, chemical and atomic warfare, etc. The objectives of the problems were to further experience at all echelons in planning and conducting offensive operations, including a subsequent link-up with airborne forces, and to improve techniques and staff procedures in the employment of special weapons. Other objectives were to improve air-ground communications and to provide for air-delivered atomic support; to test the capabilities of and to perfect methods and procedures for the collection and dissemination of special weapons intelligence; to devise and test an interallied ground umpire system; and to further national training. Although the logistical support of the NATO units was a national responsibility, CENTAG's Joint Exercise Planning Staff prepared and published plans for the necessary coordination among participating forces.

To acquaint the Allied members of the NATO forces with the use of atomic weapons, USAREUR conducted demonstrations at the various NATO FTX's with the Honest John guided missile batteries, the 280-mm. atomic

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[59] Ibid.

artillery gun, and the simulated atomic bomb device. Certain members of the Allied forces also attended the USAREUR specialist schools where atomic courses were taught, and specific classified atomic information was released to the various Allied commands.

During the training exercises requests made through channels to SHAPE for authorization to carry out an air or guided missile atomic strike took as long as eight hours to process. By the time permission was received, the target of opportunity was gone. As each FTX was conducted, this problem assumed greater importance. Therefore, CINCUSAREUR requested SHAPE to grant army commanders the authority to use the special weapons when needed. By the end of the reporting period, no reply had been received to this request.[60]

USAREUR participated in full support of CENTAG in exercises with other NATO commands by exchanging liaison officers, plans, and combat units of various sizes. Lacking definite instructions from higher NATO headquarters, training matters involving CENTAG and NORTHAG in Germany were directly coordinated between the two commands. During the period, little training in coordination between the two commands was accomplished because of the difficulty of changing established schedules and because of other conflicting NATO and national commitments. Consequently, when CENTAG conducted field exercises, NORTHAG usually participated by providing a control group or by sending liaison officers to observe the play. CENTAG also sent observers to NORTHAG exercises and in some instances furnished heavy artillery units.[61]

90. Training Programs for Personnel of other NATO Commands

During FY 1955, USAREUR continued the following special programs for training personnel of other NATO nations: The Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) training designed to acquaint Allied personnel with U.S. methods and equipment; observer training, whose purpose was to acquaint foreign officers with the duties and functions of their counterparts in the U.S. Army; the companion unit program for the development of mutual understanding and friendship among units of Allied armies; and the au pair exchange program, designed to promote the interchange of information on training matters.

a. MDAP Training. Acting as the agent of the Department of the Army, USAREUR had begun in May 1950 to train foreign military personnel

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[60] (1) Msg 5027, USAREUR to SACEUR, US CINCEUR, etc., 4 Feb 55. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1955), Vol. I, Item 4. (2) Msg SX-2845, CENTAG to Seventh Army, 16 Apr 55. SECRET. (3) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to US CINCEUR, 5 May 55, sub: Atomic Weapons Specialist Personnel on NATO staffs. SECRET. (4) Cable S-2807, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 15 Oct 54. SECRET. Last three in USAREUR SGS 471.6 (1955), Vol. I, Items 18, 20, 20 atchd, 7A, respectively.

[61] Interv, Capt John Mewha, 10th Hist Det, with Col K. L. Hunter, USAREUR ACOFS G3 Tng Br, 22 Nov 55. CONFIDENTIAL.

under MDAP auspices. The objective of this training was to provide MDAP countries with a nucleus of instructor-type personnel sufficiently oriented in the operation, care, maintenance, and supply of military equipment furnished to them by the United States. Requests for school spaces were channeled through the MAAG units and USAREUR headquarters to the Department of the Army. After a request had been approved, the training was scheduled at the appropriate school or training installation. However, not more than 10 percent of the space capacity could be allotted in any one year to MDAP students.[62] During the 1955 program, 400 spaces in the intelligence, quartermaster, and signal schools were allotted to MDAP trainees. Some students were accepted also at the Seventh Army Tank Training Center and at the Electronics School. The countries with the largest enrollments were Belgium, France, Greece, Spain, and Yugoslavia. Three hundred and twenty-nine MDAP personnel actually attended schools during FY 1955.[63]

b. Observer Training. Observer training for foreign nationals was carried on by USAREUR under instructions from the Department of the Army. It was a program by which foreign officers, mainly from NATO countries, were temporarily assigned to U.S. Army positions comparable to those they held in their own armies. Assignments were made for various periods of time during which these officers performed the routine functions of their jobs. Observers from Title I countries--Belgium, Denmark, Great Britain, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and Portugal--were trained at the expense of the mother country. Title II countries--Ethiopia, Greece, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey--received MDAP funds for their observer trainees, as did Spain and Yugoslavia although these were classified as Title I countries. Approximately 700 foreign nationals participated in observer training during the reporting period.[64]

c. Companion Unit Program. During FY 1955, the companion unit program lost much of its appeal. The program, designed to develop mutual understanding and friendship among Allied armies, had been initiated in 1953 with the support of CINCUSAREUR. Personnel from units of the

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[62](1) USAREUR ltr, n.d. 1953, sub: Policy on Provision of Training Assistance Under the Mutual Security Program. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR ACOFS G3 Tng Br file. (2) Interv, Mr. G. Tays, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col S. L. Weinerth, USAREUR ACOFS G3 Tng Br, 4 Aug 55. CONFIDENTIAL.

[63]USAREUR ACOFS G3 Tng Br FY 54 Rept on MDAP Training in USAREUR, Sep 54. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Stat Info on MDAP School Rqmts, Oct 54-Jun 55. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR ACOFS G3 Tng Br file. (3) Interv, Capt John Mewha, 10th Hist Det, with Lt Col S. L. Weinerth, USAREUR ACOFS G3 Tng Br, 22 Nov 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

[64]Briefing, Lt Col S. L. Weinerth, Jun 55, sub: USAREUR Mutual Defense Assistance Program. CONFIDENTIAL. In ACOFS G3 Tng Br file.

Belgian, French, British, and other Allied forces in West Germany were selected by comparable Seventh Army units for personal visits or for attendance at activities of a combined military and social nature. In turn Seventh Army personnel were to be entertained by their counterparts. The G3 Training Branch of the School Section monitored the program for USAREUR and stimulated interest in it. Although initially successful, the program became a one-sided affair, with USAREUR units doing most of the entertaining. The Allied counterparts did not give equal treatment to the American representatives so that the program became ineffective.[65]

d. The Au Pair Program. Under the au pair program, American officers of USAREUR units were paired off with officers of equal rank in British, French, or Belgium units and exchanged positions with them for varying lengths. Although initially well received, this program achieved only limited success during FY 1955 because the participating Allied countries did not afford equal facilities and treatment.[66]

91. USAREUR and Seventh Army Schools

During the period under consideration, the eight formal service schools operated by USAREUR and Seventh Army were highly praised by foreign observers, the Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces, and by USAREUR inspectors. Both the subject matter taught and the equipment used were considered to be excellent. The total obligation incurred in operating the schools amounted to $597,558.85 plus DM 4,286,550.[67] Statistical data concerning the utilization of the schools is presented in Table 7.

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[65] Interv, Mr. G. Tays, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col S. L. Weinerth, USAREUR ACOFS G3 Tng Br, 4 Aug 55. CONFIDENTIAL.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Ltr, Gen W. M. Hoge, CINCUSAREUR, to CG Seventh Army, 23 Jul 54, sub: Review of USAREUR School Courses. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR ACOFS G3 Tng Br file.

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Table 7--USAREUR School Report,
30 June 1954-1 July 1955

	Utilization	School					
	Total	Engr	Fin	Int & MP	Ord	QM	Sig
Quotas Authorized	22,493	4,714	820	4,055	4,854	5,616	2,434
Quotas Used	20,980	4,376	364	3,824	4,061	5,902	2,453
Percentage Used	93.27	92.82	44.39	94.30	83.66	105.09	100.78
Graduates	20,160	4,272	351	3,747	3,901	5,612	2,277
Percentage Graduated	96.09	97.62	96.42	97.98	96.06	95.08	92.82
USAREUR Graduates							
Total	17,144	3,589	341	2,626	3,385	5,134	2,069
Seventh Army	11,134	2,332	190	1,164	2,689	3,156	1,603
COMZ	1,561	506	48	119	332	513	43
Subordinate Commands	4,449	751	103	1,343	364	1,465	423
Non USAREUR Graduates							
Total	3,016	683	10	1,121	516	478	208
USFA	627	106	0	84	169	202	66
TRUST	100	12	0	7	28	40	13
USNAVGER	63	16	0	31	0	3	13
USAFE	1,554	501	10	566	193	233	51
MDAP	222	40	0	0	122	0	60
Others	450	8	0	433	4	0	5

Source: Compiled from USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 31 Jul 54-30 Jun 55. SECRET (information used UNCLASSIFIED).

UNCLASSIFIED

a. USAREUR Schools. As in previous years, USAREUR continued its policy of providing formal schooling only when proper training at unit level was unavailable. The mission of these service schools was to supplement schools in the United States in providing the minimum number of formally trained specialists; to provide specialized instruction necessary to meet command requirements; and to qualify unit instructors. Since command requirements were being met and since budgetary allocations were gradually being reduced, USAREUR curtailed the number of its schools to five when it discontinued the Finance School on 31 January 1955. The schools continuing in operation were the Engineer School in Murnau, the Intelligence and Military Police School at Oberammergau, the Ordnance School at Fuessen, the Quartermaster-Adjutant General School at Lenggries, and the Signal School at Ansbach. The chiefs of the respective technical services controlled the operation of the schools, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, established the training policies and exercised over-all supervision.[68]

b. Seventh Army Schools. Early in the reporting period, Seventh Army closed its CBR School at Kirchheimbolanden and the Electronic Maintenance School at Karlsruhe. The courses taught were incorporated into the curriculums of the USAREUR specialist schools.[69] However, the NCO Academy at Munich and the Tank Training Center at Vilseck were continued, and at the close of the fiscal year, a new Aviation Training Center was opened at the Echterdingen Airfield near Stuttgart, Germany. The new school was set up to develop and standardize all Army flight instruction.[70] The NCO Academy, which had been originally established as the U.S. Constabulary NCO Academy, had matriculated some 24,995 students and had graduated 20,649 since its inception in 1948. During FY 1955 the academy offered some 25 subjects to 6,264 students, 5,336 of whom graduated. The school operated with a staff of 170 instructors, involving the expenditure of $3,771 plus DM 423,231.[71]

The Seventh Army Tank Training Center, which was initially organized in December 1952, conducted eight 4-week classes for selected company-grade officers and enlisted men in the operation, maintenance, communications, and weapons of the 90-mm. gun tank. During the training period,

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[68] Briefing, Lt Col S. L. Weinerth, USAREUR ACOFS G3 Tng Br, Sep 55, sub: USAREUR Schools and Individual Training. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR ACOFS G3 Tng Br file.

[69] Ltr, USAREUR to US EUCOM, 4 Oct 54, sub: USAREUR Non-Unit Service School Information. AG 352 GOT. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1954), Vol. II, Item 52.

[70] (1) Briefing, Col Weinerth, cited above. (2) Seventh Army GO 28, 5 May 55, sub: Establishment of Seventh Army Aviation Center. UNCLASSIFIED.

[71] Program, Seventh Army NCO Academy, 7777 AU, 22 Nov 54, sub: Background of NCO School. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR ACOFS G3 Tng Br file.

some 4,208 students matriculated--including 65 foreign nationals--and 3,541 graduated. With a staff of 26 U.S. officers, 5 U.S. warrant officers, 179 U.S. enlisted men, and 171 Germans, the school operated on a budget of $147,000 plus DM 700,750. From its inception in December 1952 to 30 June 1955, the school graduated over 15,000 students.[72]

92. Ranges and Training Areas

Throughout FY 1955 field exercises were conducted with the use of both small and large training areas and ranges. Units up to regimental size carried out local field training exercises in areas used with the permission of the local German authorities. But for the training and firing of major infantry, artillery, antiaircraft artillery, and armored units, the large training areas available to USAREUR had to be utilized. Three of these areas--Grafenwoehr, Hohenfels, and Wildflecken--were U.S. ranges and were located in the U.S. Zone; another at Baumholder in the French Zone was shared equally with French troops; and two NATO ranges were situated at Belsen-Hohne and Todendorf in the British Zone. However, the Todendorf "A" range was an exclusive U.S. antiaircraft range. A number of problems concerning these areas arose during the training year.

a. Local Problems. During this reporting period most requirements for local unit training areas were satisfied. Usually requisitions were placed with the local German authorities, although some requests were referred through diplomatic channels to the Federal Republic of Germany. Requisitioning processes were more complicated in the Western Area Command because of the necessity of coordinating the requests with both French military and German civilian authorities. In the main, most of the requests during this period were for easements and rights of trespass on private property. Local problems concerned the settlement of claims for damages done to crops and trees by the participating troops.[73]

b. Major Training Area and Range Problems. Responsibility for allocating and coordinating the training periods of all U.S. training areas and ranges in Germany was vested in the Commanding General, Seventh Army. He in turn, delegated this authority to the Commanding General, VII Corps, for the Hohenfels training area; to the Commanding General, V Corps, for the Wildflecken ranges; and to the Commanding

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[72](1) Ltr, CG Seventh Army to Comdt 7767 Tank Tng Cen, 20 Nov 53, sub: Mission of 7767 Tank Training Center. AG-532, ASEGC-TR. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Program, 7767 Tank Tng Cen, Seventh Army, 20 Nov 54, sub: Tank Training Center, Vilseck 1954. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in file cited above.

[73](1) Memo, Lt Col W. F. Woodward to Lt Col W. W. Saunders, USAREUR ACOFS G3 Tng Br, 25 Jun 54, sub: Requests for Land for Training Areas in WACOM. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Ltr, CG WACOM to CO's all WACOM Dets, 24 Jun 54, sub: Acquisition of Training Alert Maneuver and Training Areas. AG 601 SE. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in file cited above.

General, 34th AAA Brigade, for the Todendorf "A" range. Seventh Army headquarters scheduled the training periods for the Grafenwoehr area.[74] Training time allocated to other NATO units on the U.S. ranges was usually on a space-available basis. French and Belgian units were assigned two tentative periods for training at Wildflecken during 1955. The first, March to April 1955, occurred during this reporting period; the second was scheduled for August and September 1955.[75]

(1) Control of the Todendorf "A" Range. In 1952, after the British forces in Germany had decided to abandon their antiaircraft artillery range at Putlos, the United States acquired "A" range at Todendorf by legal transfer from the British. Under the agreement, USAREUR had agreed to construct and maintain the camp and firing facilities, while the British had retained operational control of the range. However, the range had been subdivided, with the "A" range becoming an exclusive USAREUR facility and the "B," "C," and "D" ranges NATO training areas. Initially the "A" range had been a satellite of the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation and the range officer had been appointed by Seventh Army. This divided responsibility led to controversies.[76] After several months of deliberation, on 28 March 1955 CINCUSAREUR delegated to Seventh Army the responsibility for administering and operating the range. Only logistical support was to be provided by the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation.[77]

Due to weather conditions, firing at Todendorf could be conducted only during the period from April to early October, and the antiaircraft artillery units of different nations training at Todendorf often had to fire simultaneously into a common scoring zone. Therefore, close coordination was necessary between the USAREUR range and the NATO ranges. Close liaison was maintained between the ranges, and target towing operations were conducted jointly by the RAF and USAFE.[78]

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[74] Seventh Army Cir 61-2, 3 Nov 54, sub: Training Areas. UNCLASSIFIED.

[75] Ltr, Gen R. J. Noiret, CCFFA, to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Jun 54, sub: Allotment of Training Period in Wildflecken. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR ACOFS G3 Tng Br file.

[76] Ltr, USAREUR to BPE AG, 27 Nov 54, sub: Organization and Administration of Todendorf Firing Range. ADJ 353 SD. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1954), Vol. II, Item 63.

[77] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG Seventh Army, 28 Mar 55, sub: Change in Responsibility for Todendorf Firing Range. AG 353 GOT. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1955), Vol. I, Item 18A.

[78] Ltr, USAFE AG to CINCUSAREUR, 7 Jun 55, sub: Operating Procedures and Conditions for Joint RAF-USAFE AAA Target Towing Operations. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR ACOFS G3 Tng Br file.

(2) Antiaircraft Artillery Firing at Grafenwoehr. Throughout its antiaircraft firing periods at Grafenwoehr, the 34th AAA Brigade experienced much difficulty with flight targets. The radio-controlled airplane target (RCAT) was better suited for the Grafenwoehr range than the aircraft tow target because of the limited firing area. However, when a temporary shortage of RCAT's occurred during the reporting period, tow flights had to be substituted so that the training would not be disrupted.[79]

(3) The Construction Problem at Baumholder. In 1951 when USAREUR forces had moved into the Rhine Military Post, the French had agreed to share the Baumholder training area on an equal basis. USAREUR had agreed to build a permanent 10,500-man camp with the necessary logistical facilities and a semipermanent camp, while the U.S. and French forces were to jointly maintain these facilities. Early in 1955, the Commanding General, 2d Armored Division, complained of a lack of cooperation in the maintenance of roads in the area, primarily a French responsibility.[80] The French answered with a complaint over the delay in the construction of the semipermanent camp in 1954 as had been planned. USAREUR replied that the delay had been caused by the time required to get French and German approval for the construction and for the detailed plans. As a result, actual construction did not begin until 15 March 1955.[81]

(4) Problems at Belsen-Hohne. The NATO Belsen-Hohne Tank Training Area, located in the northern part of the British Zone of Germany, was some distance from the U.S. Zone. USAREUR nevertheless continued to use this area since it was the only full-size tank range available in Germany. Range allocations were made by the British forces.

In February 1955, NORTHAG proposed to fire its British 120-mm. gun tanks and heavy artillery at times originally scheduled for USAREUR (CENTAG) units. Since the larger caliber artillery and tank guns needed greater firing areas, thus infringing on areas assigned to USAREUR units for tank firing and forcing them to use already overcrowded ranges at

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[79] Interv, Capt John Mewha, 10th Hist Det, with Lt Col W. W. Saunders, USAREUR ACOFS G3 Tng Br, 2 Nov 55. SECRET.

[80] Memo, Brig Gen D. V. Johnson, USAREUR DCOFS Opns, to USAREUR Engr, 15 Jan 55, sub: Lack of French Cooperation at Baumholder. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1955), Vol. I, Item 5.

[81] (1) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CCFFA, 22 May 54, sub: Completion of Semipermanent Camp, Baumholder. AG 600 CLD. (2) Ltr, Gen R. J. Noiret, CCFFA, to Gen W. M. Hoge, CINCUSAREUR, 25 Jan 55, same sub. (3) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CCFFA, 10 Feb 55, same sub. UNCLASSIFIED. All in file above, Item 6B.

Baumholder, LANDCENT was requested to clarify the situation. This problem was being resolved at the close of the reporting period.[82]

During April and May 1955, the U.S. Seventh Army completed its qualification firing at Belsen-Hohne. But until the last moment, an acute ammunition shortage threatened to curtail the firing of 500 tank gunners--approximately 25 percent of the 90-mm. tank gunners within the command. In October 1954, the Department of the Army had deleted TP (Target Practice) and HVTP-T (High Velocity Target Practice-Tracer) ammunition from training and introduced a new training round, TP-T (Target Practice-Tracer). Since this new ammunition was not available in November, Seventh Army agreed to accept AP-T (Armor Piercing-Tracer) in its place, but failed to notify the USAREUR Ordnance Ammunition Supply Officer of its needs for approximately 100,000 rounds for Belsen-Hohne until February 1955. At that time, only 44,709 rounds of AP-T were available in USAREUR. The Ordnance Division immediately requested an urgent shipment from U.S. reserve stocks, and Seventh Army began to screen its prestock points for additional rounds. In April, however, the Department of the Army stated the requested ammunition shipment would be delayed until 4 June 1955, which meant an arrival date long after the firing was to take place. In addition, approximately 10,000 of the available AP-T rounds with steel cartridge cases were suspended by USAREUR and Seventh Army as defective due to ruptures. In early spring 1955 it appeared that, unless the shipment from the United States was expedited or authority to use substitute ammunition was forthcoming, the Seventh Army gunnery program at Belsen-Hohne would have to be seriously curtailed. However, approximately 20,000 AP-T rounds were eventually found at Seventh Army prestock points, and the Department of the Army promised to divert approximately the same amount from other sources, with a tentative date of arrival around 15 May. Meanwhile, Seventh Army had temporarily suspended its 90-mm. gun tank qualification firing in favor of 76-mm. gun tank firing pending receipt of ammunition. The 90-mm. firing was finally accomplished, after the arrival of the ammunition, by firing HE-T on the Battle Run and by reducing the practice firing from 10 to 4 rounds per individual. Steps were taken to prevent such an incident from recurring.[83]

c. NATO Attempts to Absorb the National Ranges. During the fiscal year, both LANDCENT and SHAPE exerted pressure to convert the U.S. national training areas at Grafenwoehr, Hohenfels, and Wildflecken

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[82](1) Msg 96-T&G, COMNORTHAG to COMLANDCENT, 24 Feb 55. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) DF, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to USAREUR DCOFS Opns, 26 Jan 55, sub: LANDCENT Proposals Concerning NATO Tank Ranges. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in file above, Item 7.

[83]Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to DCOFS Opns, 19 May 55, sub: Report of Investigation of 90-mm. AP-T Ammunition Shortage for Tank Training at Belsen-Hohne, 15 April-28 May 1955 (C). SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G3 Tng Br file.

and the joint U.S.-French area at Baumholder, into NATO training facilities. USAREUR, the Department of the Army, and the French opposed all such proposals.[84] USAREUR also rejected suggestions that German border police units be allowed to train at the Wildflecken area. The reasons for opposing these suggestions were that the granting of sovereignty to the Federal Republic of Germany was imminent and that the requirements of the new German Army were unknown. Furthermore, USAREUR was attempting to obtain additional training areas from the Germans since present facilities were considered inadequate. To grant German units permission to use the Wildflecken area at that time might have given the West German Government an excuse to refuse USAREUR additional land.[85]

d. Cost of Maintaining the Infrastructure Installations. For the three previous years, the question of sharing the costs of the infrastructure training facilities had frequently arisen, and by the end of the reporting period, no precise formula had been found. USAREUR's position, which had remained unchanged, was that the facilities would have to be maintained with funds contributed to the international budgetary funds of NATO and that willful damage costs would have to be assessed against the guilty nation. In addition, any nation requiring services or facilities in excess of those available under the infrastructure program would have to procure them from its own national funds.[86]

93. The USAREUR Training Aids Center and Subcenters

In 1950, USAREUR established the Training Aids Center at Griesheim, Germany, under the control of the Publications Depot and Record Center, 7879 Army Unit, to produce training aids for USAREUR units by assembly-line methods. In May 1954, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, was assigned responsibility for establishing training aid policies and exercising general staff supervision over the program and the operations of the center. Moreover he was to review, approve, and establish priorities for items for production or procurement and submit budget estimates for training aid funds. Administrative and operational control of the center remained with the Adjutant General Division. Locally produced aids were not to duplicate those issued by the Department of the Army.[87]

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[84] DF, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to DCOFS Opns, 15 Feb 55, sub: SHAPE Training Area Conference. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1955), Vol. I, Item 6.

[85] IRS, USAREUR DCOFS Opns to ACOFS G3, 16 Oct 54, sub: Utilization of U.S. Range Facilities by Germans. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1954), Vol. II, Item 58.

[86] USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jan 53-30 Jun 54, pp. 356-57. SECRET.

[87] USAREUR ltr, 18 May 54, sub: USAREUR Training Aids Center and USAREUR Training Aids. AG 353 GOT-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

At the beginning of the reporting period, USAREUR formed the Training Aids Center Committee, composed of representatives of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, of the Chief of the Training Aids Center, and of each major command. The committee was to submit recommendations regarding specific items to be produced, the priority of production or procurement, and the basis of issue to using units. An officer from Seventh Army was the permanent chairman of the committee.[88]

The work of the Training Aids Center at Griesheim was so outstanding during 1954 that General Roger Noiret, Commander in Chief, French Forces in Germany, proposed that the French and American forces pool resources to enlarge the center for combined use. Although budgetary considerations prevented such a change, the French were offered technical advice for establishing a similar center, plus the loan of training aids for reproduction.[89]

At the close of FY 1955 a training aids subcenter was being established in the Southern Area Command to provide an accessible supply for Seventh Army and other USAREUR units in the area. This subcenter was to issue training aids received from Griesheim and keep them in a state of repair; no local production of aids was anticipated. One U.S. enlisted man and five German civilian employees were to staff the subcenter that was scheduled to open on 15 July 1955.[90]

94. Training Inspections

Training inspections were carried out to determine the effectiveness of the training programs and to keep units alert and at a state of maximum operational readiness. A training circular published in September 1954 indicated that the purpose of inspections and staff visits was to discover errors and deficiencies in training and to achieve the most efficient utilization of personnel, supplies, facilities, and funds. The USAREUR inspections were of five types: command inspections, training inspections, spot-check maintenance inspections, technical inspections, and staff visits.[91] Only the latter and the command and training

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[88] Ibid.

[89] (1) Ltr, Gen R. J. Noiret to Gen W. M. Hoge, 31 Mar 54, sub: Establishment of Joint Training Aids Center for French and U.S. Forces. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Ltr, Hoge to Noiret, 11 Aug 54, sub: Establishing of Joint French-U.S. Training Aids Center. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR SGS 353 (1954), Vol. I, Item 17.

[90] USAREUR ltr, 28 Jun 55, sub: USAREUR Training Aids Subcenter. AG 353 GOT-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[91] USAREUR Tng Cir 58, 16 Sep 54, sub: Inspections and Staff Visits. UNCLASSIFIED.

inspections had a direct bearing on training in the command. In addition to the USAREUR inspections, a team from the Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces (OCAFF) conducted an annual inspection of major commands.

a. USAREUR Inspections.

(1) Command Inspections. USAREUR continued its policy of annual formal inspections of each major command and subordinate unit, except Seventh Army and COMZ units. These inspections were made by CINCUSAREUR representatives. Such inspections included the status of a unit, installation, or activity and an appraisal of its operational readiness to include its capacity for secondary missions; the discipline, physical condition, appearance, and training of the troops; the adequacy and appearance of quarters and other facilities; and such administrative matters as security, the utilization of supplies, the condition of stocks, etc.[92] During the reporting period, USAREUR headquarters representatives made a total of 14 command inspections, 9 of them in 1954 and 5 in 1955.[93]

(2) Training Inspections. Training inspections of troop units commanded by chiefs of divisions, both of USAREUR and area commands, were conducted semiannually by the responsible commander or his representatives. These inspections were not scheduled but were held at any appropriate time to satisfy the minimum inspection requirements of the Department of the Army. They consisted of examinations of the training programs and observations of the training methods used. If its training status was found unsatisfactory, the unit was allowed to take corrective action within a specified time and then was reinspected.[94]

(3) Staff Visits. Periodic visits to various subordinate commands were made by members of the headquarters staff to observe the methods applied and the difficulties encountered in troop training. All problems were discussed on the spot with the unit commanders and appropriate corrective measures were suggested. A copy of the report was transmitted through channels for the information of CINCUSAREUR.[95]

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[92] Ibid.

[93] Schedule of USAREUR Command Inspections, 1954-55. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR ACOFS G3 Tng Br.

[94] (1) USAREUR Tng Cir 58, 16 Sep 54, sub: Inspections and Staff Visits. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR Stf Memo 17, 11 May 54, sub: Training Inspections of USAREUR Units. UNCLASSIFIED.

[95] (1) Rept, Lt Col S. L. Weinerth, USAREUR ACOFS G3 Tng Br, to Col J. G. Felber, ACOFS G3 Tng Br, 7 Sep 54, sub: Staff Visit to USAREUR Schools. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Rept, Lt Col W. A. Luszki to Col Felber, 9 Nov 54, sub: Report of Staff Visit to COMZ Depot Maison Forte. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR ACOFS G3 Tng Br file.

(4) Inspection Results. The inspections and staff visits provided valuable information on the military efficiency of subordinate units. Moreover, direct contacts established through inspections resulted in improved liaison between the staff divisions and field units, and led to a better understanding of the mutual problems and difficulties. The composition of the inspection and staff visit team permitted a broad coverage of activities. Deficiencies revealed in the inspections required initiation of corrective actions. Responsible commanders were given a specific time to correct these deficiencies and submit a report of corrective action taken. In some instances, reinspections were held to determine whether the corrective actions taken had been effective.[96] Some of the difficulties encountered were caused by frequent changes in training programs. Others stemmed from budgetary and personnel reductions or from political and economic considerations in the United States and in West Germany. The continual rotation of locally trained personnel to the United States and the arrival of only partially trained replacements tended to disrupt the training schedules of field units and to reduce their combat efficiency. It was hoped that the implementation of Operation GYROSCOPE would help to improve this situation.

b. The Army Field Forces Inspection. In July 1954, an inspection team of 17 field grade officers from OCAFF, headed by Maj. Gen. E. W. Ridings, spent more than two weeks in Europe inspecting the major commands. The mission of the team was to determine whether stateside training standards and doctrines were meeting USAREUR requirements. In general, the team found that most of the previous year's deficiencies had been, or were in the process of being corrected, and that the personnel situation had improved since 1953, although a shortage of trained tank drivers still existed. Some of the deficiencies noted by the team were the shortage of M47 tanks; the lack of adequate tank gunnery ranges; and a training deficiency in the techniques and procedures of employing aerial delivered atomic weapons in support of ground combat operations. The latter had resulted from the absence of a jointly accepted doctrine as to what type of atomic weapons should be allocated to Army commanders and the failure to agree on potential targets and proper timing. Other deficiencies observed were the shortage of dependable portable radio equipment to provide air-ground communications for forward air control posts; a shortage of spare parts to

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[96] (1) Memo, Maj Gen E. D. Post, USAREUR ACOFS G3, to USAREUR COFS, 6 Dec 54, sub: Summary of Results of Inspections of USAREUR Lodger Units. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Memo, same to same, 6 Dec 54, sub: Summary of Results of Inspections of USAREUR Units. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) Memo, same to same, 8 Dec 54, sub: Revision of Staff Memo 17. UNCLASSIFIED. All in USAREUR SGS 353 (1954), Vol. I, Item 14A.

properly maintain certain types of equipment; and a lack of proper photo-interpreting equipment.[97]

95. Operational Readiness of the Command

The primary mission of USAREUR, which remained unchanged, was to provide for the security of West Germany and to prevent armed aggression by Soviet-bloc countries. All training programs reflected this mission, and the command was in a good state of preparedness. The training objectives were achieved, and Seventh Army, USAREUR's combat force, was reported to be in a satisfactory state of combat readiness.[98]

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[97] (1) Rept, CAFF Insp Team to USAREUR to COFSA, 5 Oct 54, sub: Report of Visit to USAREUR Commands. SECRET. (2) Rept, OCAFF Insp Team to USAREUR, 20 Aug 54, sub: OCAFF Inspection of USAREUR. SECRET. Both in USAREUR ACOFS G3 Tng Br file.

[98] Interv, Capt J. Mewha, 10th Hist Det, with Lt Col W. W. Saunders, USAREUR ACOFS G3 Tng Br, 2 Nov 55. SECRET.

CHAPTER 7

Logistical Support

Section I: Planning

96. USAREUR Depot Planning

a. Basic Directives. On 5 September 1953, USAREUR had issued a revised Supply Distribution Policy Directive to provide policy guidance for the receipt, distribution, and storage of all supplies within its jurisdictional area. Incorporating the proposed provisions of Concept C, the directive formed the basis for logistical planning for FY 1955, requiring the technical services to prepare supporting plans, phase out supply installations and facilities in Germany, and develop line of communications (LOFC) installations in France.[1] COMZ was to assume the active distribution missions in support of U.S. forces in Germany and France as the necessary programmed facilities along the LOFC were completed. Depot planning envisaged the development of facilities to provide storage space for accommodating the authorized levels of command stocks in implementation of the directive.[2]

In July 1954, COMZ requested USAREUR to develop uniform guidelines for LOFC depot facilities. As a result, previous planning factors were slightly modified, but the original concept of developing an LOFC through France was not changed. For instance, USAREUR queried the Department of the Army whether "stateside standards" of construction could be applied in lieu of the previously authorized temporary construction with 10- to 15-year life expectancy. USAREUR was thereupon instructed that all depot

[1]For a definition of Concept C, see par. 5a.

[2]USAREUR ltr, 5 Sep 53, sub: USAREUR Supply Distribution Policy Directive. AG 400 GLD-AGO. SECRET.

planning be based on the supply and services plans of the respective technical service, which contained the phased peacetime missions and ultimate objectives of each installation. Peacetime requirements, however, would have to be capable of expansion to fulfill wartime missions. The crucial factors in depot planning were the ease with which immediate expansion and maximum dispersal of installations could be effected. Both of these factors, however, were greatly influenced by peacetime requirements, scarcity of sites, and austerity standards. To facilitate a compromise between peacetime and wartime missions, USAREUR issued a circular defining the scope of its passive air defense plans for present and future fixed installations.[3] A little later a new approach to reducing the vulnerability of the LOFC was sought by introducing multistorage depots.

b. Multistorage Depots for COMZ. By early 1955 planning for the continuous logistical support of forces engaged in atomic warfare presented many new problems. While dispersal had been selected as the answer to atomic attack, the achievement of a satisfactory standard of dispersal before the outbreak of hostilities seemed doubtful. The relative congestion at most COMZ depots, the difficulties in obtaining more real estate, and the extra funds required by an adequate dispersal program, were all problems yet to be solved. In a study written by the Operations Research Office, the authors concluded that each depot along the LOFC, with the exception of those storing class V supplies or having underground storage facilities, could be completely destroyed with a single atom bomb and recommended the distribution of supplies in the form of balanced stocks. USAREUR logistical planners, therefore, recommended the introduction of a multistorage depot system, with the majority of depots storing balanced stocks. In March 1955, COMZ was asked to study the feasibility of implementing the multistorage depot system, keeping in mind that such a policy change should not delay the contruction of logistical facilities in COMZ. Existing installations would be used with only minor modifications authorized, and future construction programming would conform to changes in the logistical structure. At the same time, the disposition of logistical supplies required by such a policy change would be provided for in the current plans for implementing Concept C.[4]

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[3](1) Ltr, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to CG USAREUR COMZ, 3 Aug 54, sub: Development of the LOFC. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 COMZ (1954), Vol. I, Item 22. (2) USAREUR Cir 45, 20 Aug 54, sub: Passive Air Defense Plans for Fixed Installations. UNCLASSIFIED.

[4](1) C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to all USAREUR Tech Svcs, 4 Mar 55, sub: Multistorage Depots in COMZ. SECRET. In USAREUR G4 Div Cen files, 323 (1955), Vol. I. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG USAREUR COMZ, 4 Mar 55, same sub. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381.3 (1955), Vol. I, Item 9.

c. Changes in the Quartermaster Depot Supply Missions. During September 1954, the Quartermaster Division recommended a new distribution plan for class I stocks, according to which nonperishable specification subsistence items were to be stored and issued from the Giessen, Metz, and Ingrandes quartermaster depots. The Munich and Nahbollenbach quartermaster depots in Germany no longer would have these functions. Such a plan would reduce by approximately 17,000 gross short tons the over-all inventory for command and special reserve stocks; would assure a constant minimum stockage of 60-days supply for all troops and 30-days supply for noncombatants; and would save approximately 225,000 square feet of warehouse space as well as $61,000 monthly in handling and shipping costs. In addition, it would position the bulk of nonperishable subsistence stocks in the LOFC, thus conforming to the precepts of Concept C. The one disadvantage of this plan--that of the long rail haul from the depot in Base Section, COMZ, to the Munich area--would be offset by the fact that no additional construction would be required and the bulk of specification subsistence stocks would be positioned in the BASEC depot. The subsistence supply mission of the Munich and Nahbollenbach depots for the items of supply in question would be transferred intact to the Ingrandes and Metz quartermaster depots, respectively. To carry out the intention of positioning the stocks in the LOFC depots, the Ingrandes depot would be required to service the area formerly serviced by the Munich depot.[5] On 29 October 1954 the Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, concurred in the implementation of the proposed plan and announced that the Supply Distribution Policy Directive would be revised accordingly.[6]

97. Planning the Implementation of Concept C

While the Department of the Army's approval of Concept C did not increase the theater personnel ceilings as requested, it did permit USAREUR to switch Deutsche Mark spaces in Germany for dollar spaces in France. The buildup of COMZ was thus continued by transferring approximately 10,000 civilian and 4,000 military spaces to France as facilities in Germany were closed down or phased out.[7] On 9 September 1954 the Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, published the first logistical directive

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[5](1) C/N 1, USAREUR QM to USAREUR ACOFS G4, 23 Sep 54, sub: Supply Missions for QM Depots. SECRET. (2) Memo for rcd, Lt Col A. C. Stafford, USAREUR G4 Div Sup Br, 26 Oct 54, sub: Class I Supply Mission for QM Depots. SECRET. Both in USAREUR G4 Div Cen files, 400 GEN (1954), Vol.I, Item CQM 94-194.

[6]C/N 2, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR QM, 29 Oct 54, to C/N 1, cited above. SECRET. In file cited above.

[7]C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 21 Jun 54, sub: Development and Operation of the LOFC's Under Concept C. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 COMZ (1954), Vol. I, Item 9 atchd.

implementing Concept C. Its purpose was to establish an over-all phased plan with projected tonnages and personnel requirements for each of the technical services for 6-month periods, beginning 31 December 1954 and ending 31 December 1957.

Planning objectives provided for the continued support of U.S. non-Army units and activities as well as NATO headquarters, including the U.S. elements thereof; the assignment of new missions to COMZ within its capability to support such missions; a limitation on shipments of additional supplies to COMZ installations until they were fully operational; utmost personnel economy in carrying out the new missions; and Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation to handle no more than 30 percent of over-all cargo receipts for USAREUR, primarily nonwar risk items. The following priorities were to govern the development of the LOFC: (1) preparation of operating procedures and war plans; (2) completion of the 12-inch POL pipeline; (3) placing LOFC depots on an operational basis; (4) development of such COMZ-type support facilities as ports, communications networks, etc.; (5) command support facilities; (6) construction of hospitals; and (7) the development and construction of training facilities.

To initiate this planning, each technical service was to prepare the assigned supply missions for its installations by 6-month phases; to list the number of military, Department of the Army civilian, local wage rate, labor service and contract personnel authorized on 30 June 1954 for operational purposes, as well as the planned increases or decreases for each phase; and to indicate the phase-down or close-out dates of installations in West Germany, indicating each by phase. The technical services were cautioned that maximum economy of military spaces was essential for all future installation planning, and were instructed to make substantial personnel reductions in installations being phased down so that sufficient spaces would be provided for those with increased missions.[8] On 14 September 1954 USAREUR also directed COMZ to list housekeeping personnel requirements by phase for each technical service installation within COMZ, and both operational and housekeeping personnel requirements by phase for those installations that did not have technical service missions or supervision. To achieve maximum use of spaces within existing USAREUR theater ceilings, COMZ was to indicate increases as well as decreases of military personnel.[9]

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[8] C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to all USAREUR Tech Svcs, 9 Sep 54, sub: Logistical Plan for Implementation of Concept C. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR G4 Div Cen files, 381 (1954), Vol. I, Item 39.

[9] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG COMZ, 14 Sep 54, sub: Logistical Plan for Implementation of Concept C. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above, Item 39 atchd.

a. Logistical Goals. On 31 March 1955, USAREUR published an implementing directive, based on the data received, outlining an overall phased plan to be used as a general guide in programming the buildup of COMZ. The planning assumptions and objectives as indicate on 9 September 1954 remained unchanged; however, a set of logistical goals was developed for implementing Concept C by 31 December 1957. First, by that date improved port facilities, particularly at St. Nazaire, were to be developed to attain the 70 to 30 percent ratio of tonnages to be handled through French ports and Bremerhaven, respectively. Second, a nucleus of "over-the-beach" units (Transportation Terminal Battalions) was to be developed and organized in COMZ in addition to regular port facilities. Third, all LOFC depots were to achieve operational status so that ADSEC depots might assume issue missions in place of their counterparts in Germany. At such a time, wartime requisitioning procedures would be established between Seventh Army and ADSEC. The transfer of issue missions would be governed by the selection and establishment of new ADSEC quartermaster, chemical, and ammunition depots as well as a new signal depot to replace the one at Saumur.[10] Decision to abandon the latter depot was made on 8 November 1954 as the result of studies made by USAREUR and Department of the Army technical teams with regard to the effects of excessive humidity at that installation.[11] The final implementation of Concept C was dependent upon the completion of all construction along the LOFC and the buildup of COMZ personnel as the workload in that command increased. When COMZ attained full operational status, USAREUR would be able to transfer war risk supply control functions from Giessen to France, phase the necessary elements of the technical services divisions to COMZ, transfer USAREUR depots in Western Area Command to Seventh Army control, and release certain facilities in Germany to the new German Army. In conjunction with USAFE, intratheater air shipments would have to be perfected and an Army-Air LOFC established for the receipt, issue, storage, and maintenance of fixed-wing and rotary-type Army aircraft. While the projected completion date for these goals was 31 December 1957, uncertainties in current and future construction made the formulation of a firm program so far in advance rather hazardous. This point was further emphasized by the Department of the Army's deferment of the FY 1956 Construction Program for France to FY 1957.[12]

b. Revised Concept C Planning. On 17 June 1955 CINCUSAREUR verbally approved a study to make Concept C plans reasonably compatible with the SHAPE 1957 Capabilities Plan. The study included recommendations for

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[10] Concept C, Goals for Implementation, Off of USAREUR ACOFS G4, 31 Mar 55, GLD 65-1, pp. 6-8. SECRET.

[11] Cable SX-3144, USAREUR to DA for DEP LOG/M2, 8 Nov 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 381.3 (1954), Vol. I, Item 24-A atchd.

[12] Concept C, Goals for Implementation, cited above. SECRET.

h ch immediate implementation and general policy guidance. According to this study, Concept C planning was to be revised so that only selected items of Special Theater Reserve No. 1 (see par 100b) and long stocks would be shipped from the Rhine Engineer Depot and from Pirmasens to the Toul Engineer Depot and Verdun, respectively. The Rhine Engineer Depot and Pirmasens would be given peacetime issue missions for West Germany, and Toul and Verdun the issue missions for France. This concept was to be reviewed during July 1956 for possible changes. To fulfill the provisions of the SHAPE 1957 Capabilities Plan, Seventh Army depots or supply points were to be established east of the Rhine River to provide up to 20 days of combat essential items of supply, whereas COMZ's responsibility was to be extended into the Western Area Command. The essential factors to be considered in effecting the readjustment of Seventh Army and COMZ installations were the maximum use of existing installations, adequate dispersal, limited construction, and minimum land acquisition. Seventh Army depots east of the Rhine were to apply multistorage depot techniques and follow the functional supply point approach.[13]

Section II: Procurement

98. Dollar Procurement

Offshore procurement (OSP), conducted by USAREUR as European agent of the Department of the Army, consisted of procurement under the Mutual Security Act (MSA), including the Facilities Assistance Program (FAP), procurement of items for the Department of Defense, and dollar procurement for the support of U.S. forces in Europe. During the first six months of the period under review obligations for the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) under the Mutual Security Act were negligible, since MSA-OSP fund approval had been delayed and USAREUR lacked proper authorizations. As of 31 December 1954 a total of $32,202,000 had been obligated by USAREUR in offshore procurement with the major share--$23,597,000--having been obligated by the Quartermaster Division for subsistence items bought for the U.S. forces in Europe.[14] At the end of the third quarter the obligations for offshore procurement had increased by less than $11,000,000 to a total of $43,141,000. As in the previous

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[13] Memo for rcd, USAREUR ACOFS G4, 17 Jun 55, sub: Concept C vs SHAPE '57 Capabilities Plan. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 COMZ (1955), Vol. II, Item 14.

[14] (1) USAREUR Mthly Review of Log Actvs, 31 Dec 54, pp. 72-74. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) USAREUR Quarterly Review of Log Actvs, 30 Jun 55, pp. 81-83. CONFIDENTIAL.

quarters, the major share of this procurement was for subsistence items. The Quartermaster Division had obligated $29,253,000 for 67.7 percent of the procurement total. During that same quarter only $62,000 was obligated for MSA-OSP since it was not until 14 March 1955 that USAREUR was finally authorized to solicit bids on the proprietary-type items in the MSA-OSP Program.[15] During the last quarter of the fiscal year, procurement activities required obligations of approximately $178,000,000, which was more than four times the amount obligated during the previous three quarters. During this quarter the Ordnance Division obligated over $149,000,000 of the total, including funds for the Mutual Defense Assistance and Facilities Assistance Programs. Of the balance for the last quarter, a total of $14,400,000 was obligated by the Quartermaster Division for subsistence items financed with defense funds or for other requirements in support of USAREUR troops and activities. As of 30 June 1955 the cumulative obligations for offshore procurement by USAREUR totaled $221,370,000. Table 8 lists these obligations by month and by obligating agency. The distribution of most of the funds obligated for MDAP, FAP, and Defense procurement was as follows:

Country	Obligation (Approx)	Percent of Total
France	$71,100,000	32
Italy	41,500,000	19
United Kingdom	28,300,000	13
Germany	20,500,000	9
Netherlands	11,700,000	5
Greece	11,500,000	5
Denmark	11,300,000	5

Thirteen other countries shared the orders for the remaining 12 percent or approximately $25,500,000.[16]

a. Mutual Security Act Provisions. The MSA-OSP Program included mainly ammunition, miscellaneous proprietary items--including a few Centurion tanks--and some signal equipment. Because of the delay in the authorization and solicitation of proposals for contracts, USAREUR was not able to commence contract awards until the middle of May with the peak of the contract awards reached during the latter half of June so as to complete obligation by the end of the fiscal year. Accordingly the total obligations for MSA-OSP rose from $62,000 at the end of the

[15] USAREUR Quarterly Review of Log Actvs, 31 Mar 55, pp. 78-80. CONFIDENTIAL.

[16] USAREUR Quarterly Review of Log Actvs, 30 Jun 55, pp. 81-83. CONFIDENTIAL.

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OFFSHORE PROCUREMENT

Table 8--CUMULATIVE PROCUREMENT OBLIGATIONS, FY 1955
(in thousands of dollars)

Month	Cumulative Totals	Total Tech Svcs b/	Tech Svcs					Area Comds	COMZ	Other a/
			Engr	Med	Ord	QM	Sig			
July. . .1954	3,373	3,021	41	1	0	2,573	406	46	299	7
August. . . .	5,897	5,173	41	3	0	4,604	525	85	612	27
September . .	11,128	9,636	51	23	2	8,795	765	152	1,297	43
October . . .	13,983	11,657	161	25	30	10,422	1,019	200	2,054	72
November. . .	19,929	15,373	210	27	33	13,923	1,180	237	4,220	99
December. . .	32,202	25,718	398	42	33	23,597	1,648	307	6,055	122
January .1955	35,637	27,556	415	48	34	25,158	1,901	343	7,592	146
February. . .	37,964	28,786	461	91	38	26,022	2,174	398	8,599	181
March	43,141	32,386	495	107	44	29,253	2,487	507	9,946	302
April	47,243	35,354	836	109	211	31,436	2,762	574	10,988	327
May	58,802	45,359	2,157	196	247	39,612	3,147	650	12,434	359
June.	221,370	205,595	2,434	262	149,267	43,727	9,905	756	14,463	556

a/ Includes Det R, G2, AFIED, SAD, 7755 DSD, and AG Publications.

b/ No procurement obligations for Chemical and Transportation Divisions.

Source: USAREUR ACOFS G4 Mgmt & Admin Br. UNCLASSIFIED.

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third quarter to $114,816,662.37 by the end of the year, excluding FAP.[17] The Defense Department's delay in authorizing the solicitation of bids until March 1955 caused this sudden spurt of obligations at the very end of the fiscal year, which was contrary to a clause in Section 108, Mutual Security Act of FY 1955, stating that "not more than 25 percentum of any funds made available by this act shall be obligated during the last two months of the fiscal year."[18]

(1) Changes in Army Policy. Because of the transfer of MDAP control functions to US EUCOM on 1 April 1955 (see par. 24) the Department of the Army suggested a revision of standing procedures. All MDAP-OSP programs and changes thereto would be sent directly to CINCUSAREUR for implementation. The latter would then recommend to the Department of the Army the allocation of OSP deliveries based on available undelivered program balances and minimum shipping costs. In addition, CINCUSAREUR would be authorized to query the department and the appropriate technical services on routine administrative and technical matters requiring action by departmental agencies. On the other hand, US CINCEUR would provide guidance to CINCUSAREUR on directed procurement; procurement of spare parts; exceptions to pricing policy; procurement in countries that failed to ratify OSP and bilateral tax agreements; procurement in non-NATO countries; and country team political clearances. The responsibility for screening OSP programs and recommending changes to Washington would remain with US CINCEUR. The latter would also be an information addressee of all communications between the Department of the Army and CINCUSAREUR. US EUCOM concurred in these revisions and recommended that they be immediately implemented.[19] However, the revised policy was not implemented before the end of the fiscal year.

(2) Congressional Limitations. Congressional limitations on procurement, applying only to contracts awarded under MSA, were stated in Section 107, Public Law 778, 83d Congress, Mutual Security Appropriation Act, FY 1955:

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[17](1) Ibid. (2) Cable SX-1033, USAREUR to DA for Dep Log, 15 Jul 55. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR G4 Div Cen files, Outgoing Cables (Jul 55).

[18]Cable DA-968058, DA from LOG to CINCUSAREUR, 21 Sep 54. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 400.12 (1954), Vol. II, Item 64.

[19](1) Cable DA-311301, DA from DEP LOG/D5, to US CINCEUR and CINCUSAREUR, 10 May 55. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Cable EC-3-2135, US CINCEUR to DA for DEP LOG/D5, 13 May 55. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR SGS 400.12 (1955), Vol. I, Item 6 atchd.

Funds made available pursuant to this act may not be used for the procurement of equipment or materials outside of the United States unless the President or an official of cabinet rank designated by him determines that such procurement will not result in one or more of the following conditions:

1. Adverse effects upon the economy of the United States, with special reference to any area of labor surplus, or upon the industrial mobilization base, which outweigh the strategic and logistical advantages to the United States of procurement abroad;

2. Production of such equipment or materials outside the United States under inadequate safeguards against sabotage or the release to potential enemies of information detrimental to the security of the United States;

3. Unjustifiable cost in comparison with procurement in the United States; and

4. Delays in delivery incompatible with the United States' defense objectives.

In addition, the Senate Appropriations Committee required an evaluation of all factors in letting OSP contracts as well as the preparation of a quarterly report on an item-by-item basis, including unit costs of all items procured through OSP. The President delegated to the Secretary of Defense the responsibility for OSP contracting.[20]

In Europe this responsibility was in turn delegated to the Defense Representative, Northern Atlantic and Mediterranean Area, who redelegated it on 7 March 1955 to CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE and CINCNELM for contracts not exceeding one million dollars. Determinations on contracts exceeding this sum would be made by the Defense Representative, while contracts exceeding five million dollars were to be referred to the Secretary of Defense. Because of the frequent absence of the major commanders from their headquarters and the inadvisability of delaying the OSP program, the delegation of authority to such commanders included a designated personnel representative as well.[21]

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[20] Cable DEF-550918, OSD to US CINCEUR, CINCUSAREUR, et al, 24 Sep 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 400.12 (1954), Vol. II, Item 72.

[21] (1) Memo, Col C. Hannum, C/USAREUR SGS Stf Studies Br, to USAREUR COFS, 8 Mar 55, sub: Definition of Determination. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Cable DEFTO-85, USMIS NATO EURRGN ORGNS, Paris DEFREP NAMA to CINCUSAREUR, 7 Mar 55. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR SGS 400.12 (1955), Vol. I, Item 5 atchd.

b. Facilities Assistance Program. The Facilities Assistance Program in Europe was begun during FY 1954 as a part of MSA-OSP for the purpose of increasing the European production capacity of explosives and propellants. The countries participating in this program were required to furnish the funds for buildings and utilities while the U.S. furnished the heavy machinery and other production equipment. During FY 1954 some 20 contracts for approximately $25,800,000 were consummated with the United Kingdom, Italy, France, Norway, and Spain.[22] The tentative FY 1955 program submitted to the Department of the Army in July 1954 provided for the continuation of this activity. On 8 September 1954 USAREUR was authorized to proceed with negotiations on FY 1955 projects short of actually signing the contracts or committing the United States to signing. The necessary funds would be allocated to USAREUR when made available by the Department of Defense, with the allocation including authority to execute contracts.[23] During the year USAREUR approved and contracted for 38 new projects amounting to approximately $38,500,000. In addition the contribution of the host nations amounted to $53,500,000. Moreover, new projects were developed in accordance with instructions from the U.S. Regional Organization (USRO, the successor to SRE) to assist in alleviating the basic raw material shortages in the European explosive and propellant industries. The projects contracted for in FY's 1954 and 1955 were to raise the NATO countries industrial capacity for producing propellants and explosives to 21 and 22 percent, respectively, of wartime requirements. Furthermore, these contracts were designed to provide NATO countries with an annual output of approximately 23,000 metric tons of the essential raw materials and components used in manufacturing propellants and explosives.[24]

c. Department of Defense Restrictions. In August 1954 the Department of Defense announced that contracts were to be denied to firms and individuals who consistently and materially supported the Communist Party or communist-sponsored organizations wherever located. Yugoslavia, however, constituted a special case in which application of this restriction would have to be tempered in accordance with over-all policy. Firms and individuals who knowingly and consistently aided and abetted Communist China or North Korea were to be excluded from contracts. In addition, all firms and individuals substantially engaged in printing, publishing,

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[22] Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 2 Jul 54, sub: Status of Procurement at the End of Fiscal Year. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 400.12 (1954), Vol. II, Item 56.

[23] Cable DA-968058, DA from LOG to CINCUSAREUR, 21 Sep 54. SECRET. In file above, Item 64.

[24] (1) USAREUR Quarterly Review of Log Actvs, 30 Jun 55, p. 84. SECRET (information used CONFIDENTIAL). (2) Cable SMC-IN 549, Paris to U.S. Embassies in Europe, 1 Oct 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above, Item 64 atchd.

or distributing communist propaganda were to be banned from participating in the offshore procurement program in Europe. The same was true of firms and individuals controlled or who knowingly permitted their use by intelligence agents adverse to U.S. security interests. The Department of Defense directive stipulated that, when information was received showing that any of these conditions applied to a firm or individual, the country team or the head of the U.S. mission concerned was to be queried on the eligibility of that firm or individual to receive contracts. The positive or negative opinion given by the responsible country team was to be considered as authority to deny or award a contract. No contracts were to be placed, however, before the U.S. military purchasing agency concerned received the necessary clearance. If, in addition, the country team or the Department of Defense furnished information showing that a firm or an individual fell within one of these categories, this too would constitute authority to deny contracts. While this restriction was first believed to apply only to procurement under the Mutual Security Act, the Department of Defense made it applicable to all offshore procurement contracts regardless of the source of the funds being used.[25]

d. Procurement in France. In September 1954 the Department of Defense suspended new procurement in France that involved the expenditure of appropriated funds, regardless of the source. On 1 October 1954 USAREUR instructed its subordinate commands not only to suspend new procurement in France but to exclude French firms from solicitation lists for bids on contracts. Low French bids, received as the result of previous solicitation, were to be eliminated, and contracts awarded to the lowest non-French bidder.[26] The term "new procurement" was defined as including supplemental agreements to existing contracts that would necessitate the obligation of additional funds, even for such contract provisions as escalator clauses, price redetermination articles, and change clauses. Certain forms of procurement, however, were necessarily exempted from this ban. For requirements in France only, the Quartermaster Division was authorized to solicit local sources for milk and milk products as well as for fresh fruits and vegetables. Both the Medical and Signal Divisions were authorized to procure certain articles in France within prescribed limitations. Also exempted was the Transportation Division insofar as the negotiation of transportation agreements with the French was concerned.[27] This procurement ban remained in

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[25](1) Cable DA-966989, DA from G4/E1 to US CINCEUR, CINCUSAREUR and AFFE, 31 Aug 54. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Cable EC-3-3893, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR for G4, 10 Sep 54. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in file above, Item 69 atchd.

[26](1) Cable EC-9-4107, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 20 Sep 54. SECRET. (2) Cable SX-2536, USAREUR to all sub comds, 1 Oct 54. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 092 France (1954), Vol. II, Item 42 atchd.

[27]C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to all USAREUR Tech Svcs, 8 Oct 54, sub: Procurement from Sources in France. SECRET. In USAREUR G4 Div Cen files, 400.12 (1954), Vol. I, Item GLD 104-24.

effect until 6 January 1955, at which time the Department of Defense lifted the restriction on construction and general procurement of supplies and services. However, the lifting of the restriction did not affect the ban on procurement for OSP contracts, MDAP shipments, Special Weapons Projects, or the Facilities Assistance Program.[28] On 9 May 1955 the Department of Defense lifted this latter restriction and announced that contracts for OSP, MDAP, and FAP would be submitted to the Defense Adviser, USRO, for clearance before being signed. This restriction did not apply to weapons rebuild contracts.[29]

e. COMZ Procurement Outside France. On 20 August 1954 USAREUR published a revised procedure for procurement solicitation by COMZ in areas outside France. The new procedure was designed both to assure sufficient competition among potential sources and to prevent unnecessary competition among procurement agencies. The directive defined the principles and procedures governing the solicitation of proposals outside France whenever COMZ contracting officers felt that competition within France was insufficient to insure the advantageous purchase of required items. Such requests or proposals were to be disseminated to sources outside France by the respective technical services procurement agencies, which were also made responsible for conducting negotiations with non-French sources. Under normal conditions the appropriate technical service would award and administer contracts for items procured outside France; but whenever this procedure proved uneconomical, COMZ could assume that responsibility, subject to mutual agreement.[30] In December 1954 this directive was amended so as not to restrict the authority of the Commanding General, COMZ, to effect procurement in accordance with the small purchases procedure as set forth in Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR) and Army Procurement Procedures (APP). COMZ procurement officers were authorized to make such purchases outside France, subject to the usual considerations of price, quality, distance, and the export-import regulations of the countries concerned.[31]

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[28](1) Cable DEF-973723, DA from OSD to CINCUSAREUR, 6 Jan 55. SECRET. (2) Cable SX-1097, USAREUR to all sub comds, 7 Jan 55. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1955), Vol. I, Item 2 atchd.

[29](1) Cable DA-980983, DA from OSD to US CINCEUR, 9 May 55. SECRET. (2) Cable EC-9-2379, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 12 May 55. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 092 France (1955), Vol. I, Item 1 atchd.

[30]USAREUR ltr, 20 Aug 54, sub: USAREUR COMZ Procurement Outside France. AG 400.12 GLD-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[31]USAREUR ltr, 17 Dec 54, sub cited above. AG 400.12 GLD-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

99. Deutsche Mark Procurement

a. Policies and Expenditures. The purpose of Deutsche Mark procurement was to substitute equipment financed with funds provided by the Federal Republic of Germany for items bought with dollar funds. The initial funding program submitted to the Department of the Army on 4 June 1954 consisted of items involving an expenditure of $11,336,700--in Deutsche Marks equivalent--listed under the two Army appropriations for Procurement and Production and for Maintenance and Operation. A supplemental program submitted on 12 June added $25,035,295 to the original one. After preliminary screening by the Department of the Army, these amounts were approved by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which recommended the allocation of $22,182,000 for the first quarter of FY 1955. In August 1954 USAREUR directed the technical services and other interested staff agencies to take action on those items for which procurement allocations had been approved and made. The procurement of items for which no allocation had been made, but for which acceptable requirements data had already been submitted to the procurement agencies, was to be acted upon short of executing and issuing the requisition demand, even though no funds were available at that time.[32] By 30 June 1955 the USAREUR procurement agencies had obligated a total of DM 2,322 million or (in dollar equivalent) approximately $552,857,000.

On 1 April 1955 USAREUR changed from a 3-month allocation basis to a monthly one. Heavy obligations were made in March before the application of this change. After the Federal Republic of Germany was granted its sovereignty, Deutsche Mark spending decreased considerably. In the last quarter a total of DM 338 million was spent; and June, with DM 55 million, was the lightest month of the entire fiscal year.[33]

b. Limitations. During FY 1954 both the West German Federal Ministry of Economics and HICOG protested against USAREUR's practice of procuring non-German end-items by requisition order-demand, importing them into West Germany, and paying them out of Deutsche Mark funds. This practice drained West Germany of foreign exchange and led to the use of German occupation funds to bolster the economy of other countries. In July 1954 USAREUR, therefore, issued a new policy directive on

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[32](1) Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 3 Jul 54, sub: DM Procurement Program FY 1955 for Equipment Items. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 400.12 (1954), Vol. II, Item 57. (2) C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to Tech Svcs, PM and Compt, 11 Aug 54, sub: FY 1955 DM Procurement Program. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Div Cen files, 400.12 (1954), Vol. III, Item 13.

[33](1) USAREUR Mthly Reviews of Log Actvs, 31 Jul 54, p. 70; 30 Aug 54, p. 74; 30 Sep 54, p. 74; 31 Oct 54, p. 73; and 31 Dec 54, p. 77. (2) USAREUR Quarterly Review of Log Actvs, 31 Mar 55, p. 83; and 30 Jun 55, p. 85. Both SECRET (information used UNCLASSIFIED).

Deutsche Mark procurement according to which no requisition order-demands in excess of $100,000 or DM 420,000 for items other than of West German or West Berlin origin, would be placed without the approval of Headquarters, USAREUR, and the concurrence of HICOG. This procedure applied only to the procurement of end-items and not to obtaining services from private construction firms or from the West German Governmental Construction Agency.[34]

c. West Berlin. The FY 1955 procurement program for West Berlin called for spending $20 million in that city, but due to a number of factors USAREUR was unable to reach this goal. Some of the factors affecting Berlin procurement were a lack of demand for items that could be procured in that city, increased price quotations, and nonresponsive bids from Berlin suppliers.[35] A new Department of Defense policy in July 1954 authorized special procedures in awarding contracts and requisition demands whenever Berlin suppliers were involved. The total amount obligated for FY 1955 in West Berlin was $18,275,517 or approximately 91 percent of the planned expenditure.[36] At a HICOG-sponsored conference held early in 1955 in the former German capital, a review of the economic effects resulting from previous military procurement in Berlin was presented. Sharply increased spending in Berlin during 1954 had helped reduce unemployment there by approximately 30 percent over previous years. Also, military procurement contributed so greatly to the rise of industrial production that the U.S. was able to reduce direct aid to the city from $200 million in 1949 to approximately $25 million in 1955.[37]

d. Claims. Claims arising from Deutsche Mark procurement preoccupied the responsible USAREUR agencies even more than in previous years because these claims were receiving unfavorable publicity. With the German authorities exerting pressure on the subject, the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany urged, shortly after the beginning of FY 1955, that claims be settled as promptly as possible. Moreover, USAREUR preferred to settle outstanding claims as long as Deutsche Marks were available for payment, rather than to pay in dollars. In line with this policy the participants at a USAREUR conference, held on 30 July 1954, decided that all construction claims over one month old would be

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[34] USAREUR ltr, 31 Jul 54, sub: Procurement by Requisition Demand of End-Items or Products Imported into Germany. AG 400.12 GLD-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[35] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to HICOG, 31 Mar 55, sub: US Military Procurement in Berlin. AG 400.12 GLD. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Div Cen files, 400.137 (1955), Vol. I.

[36] (1) USAREUR Mthly Review of Log Actvs, 31 Jul 54, p. 71. (2) USAREUR Quarterly Review of Log Actvs, 30 Jun 55, p. 86. Both SECRET (information used CONFIDENTIAL).

[37] USAREUR Quarterly Review of Log Actvs, 31 Mar 55, p. 83. SECRET (information used CONFIDENTIAL).

settled within the subsequent three months, thereby eliminating the backlog of outstanding claims by 1 November 1954. At the beginning of the fiscal year approximately 355 outstanding procurement claims, totaling DM 17,200,000, had been pending.[38] As of 30 September this number had been reduced to 273 with a value of approximately DM 14,700,000. In the second quarter of the fiscal year, however, 233 new claims were received, approximating DM 5 million. Some gain in the over-all reduction of claims was realized during the same quarter since a total of 246 claims, with a value of approximately DM 7,800,000 were settled. At the end of 1954 some 260 claims remained outstanding, more than half of which originated from construction contracts for the Western Area Command. This reflected an over-all reduction of 95 claims during the first half of the fiscal year.[39] During the third quarter of the fiscal year the number of claims was reduced by a total of 56 cases but the total value increased by approximately DM 1 million. Western Area Command, which had previously experienced the most difficulty with procurement claims, reduced its number of outstanding cases by 61, and the total value of claims by DM 2,400,000.[40] The last quarter saw an almost even balance in the over-all claims picture because 157 new claims, valued at DM 3,700,000, were received and 159 claims, totaling DM 4,200,000, were disposed of or settled. As of 30 June 1955, the total number of Deutsche Mark procurement claims was 202, which meant a reduction of 153 since the beginning of the fiscal year. At the same time, the total monetary value of outstanding claims was reduced by approximately DM 5,500,000. More than half of the remaining claims stemmed from construction projects in the Western Area Command, and a major portion of these was being held in abeyance pending completion of audit or allocation of funds. To expedite the settlement of all claims, USAREUR established a new procedure for the filing and settlement of claims. Henceforth the suppliers would have to file a claim within 30 days after submitting the final invoice, and procurement officers would be allowed 45 days in which to render a decision.[41]

e. Appeals. On 20 September 1954 the USAREUR Board of Requisition Demand Appeals was established to hear, consider, and render decision on all appeals from German suppliers--except those pertaining to real estate--arising out of procurement involving Deutsche Mark funds.[42]

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[38] Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 10 Aug 54, sub: Processing of DM Procurement Claims. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Div Cen files, 158 (1954), Vol. III, Item 2.

[39] USAREUR Mthly Review of Log Actvs, 31 Dec 54, p. 77. SECRET (information used UNCLASSIFIED).

[40] USAREUR Quarterly Review of Log Actvs, 31 Mar 55, p. 84. SECRET (information used UNCLASSIFIED).

[41] USAREUR Quarterly Review of Log Actvs, 30 Jun 55, p. 87. SECRET (information used UNCLASSIFIED).

[42] USAREUR GO 124, 20 Sep 54, sub: Establishment of the USAREUR Board of Requisition Demand Appeals. UNCLASSIFIED.

As of 31 December 1954, the board had received 86 appeals with a total value of DM 6,400,000. The board heard the first case on 17 January 1955, and after that appeals were handled as rapidly as feasible. By 30 June 1955, the board had heard 39 appeals and had rendered written decisions on 27, the remaining 12 cases being in the process of preparation with decisions to be rendered shortly after the close of the fiscal year.[43]

f. Irregularities in Western Area Command. Investigations into irregularities in procurement activities and procedures in the Western Area Command, begun early in 1953 by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) and the USAREUR Office of the Comptroller as well as the Provost Marshal and Judge Advocate Divisions, continued through FY 1955.[44] Since the General Accounting Office was expected to make a full report of its investigation to Congress, the Department of the Army directed The Judge Advocate General to study and screen all files relating to this matter, including those made available by the General Accounting Office and Headquarters, USAREUR. Upon completion, The Judge Advocate General was to make recommendations for proposed action including, but not limited to, disciplinary action.[45] To carry out the directed investigation and screening, The Judge Advocate General formed a task force and specified to USAREUR which documents and information were to be scrutinized by the task force personnel in order to arrive at final recommendations.[46] To provide the required information a USAREUR conference attended by representatives of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, and the Judge Advocate, Provost Marshal, and Engineer Divisions reached an agreement that pertinent staff division files would be screened to determine what documents were available in the theater. Moreover, an itemized list of relevant retired documents was to be prepared so that investigators could obtain them from the Adjutant General Records Center, Kansas City, Missouri. Since most pertinent documents had been retired, USAREUR staff divisions decided to explain to the investigators the background of

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[43](1) USAREUR Mthly Review of Log Actvs, 31 Dec 54, p. 77. (2) USAREUR Quarterly Review of Log Actvs, 30 Jun 55, p. 87. Both SECRET (information used UNCLASSIFIED).

[44]For the background of investigations in WACOM, see USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, 1953-54, pp. 278-83. SECRET (information used CONFIDENTIAL).

[45]Ltr, VCOFSA to CINCUSAREUR, 25 Aug 54, sub: Procurement Irregularities in WACOM. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 333.5 (1954), Vol. I, Item 1 atchd (B/P).

[46]Ltr, Asst TJAG to USAREUR JA, 22 Oct 54, sub: TJAG Investigation of Procurement Irregularities in WACOM. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

the program, so that they could understand why short-cuts had to be used if necessary. For this purpose the investigators would be reminded of the Joint Chiefs of Staff appraisal of Russia's intentions in 1949; the requirement for a tactical army in Europe after the outbreak of the Korean War; the decision to replace the LOFC leading from Bremerhaven through Germany by one through France; the decision to locate all depot and supply facilities west of the Rhine; the lack of space in the French Zone to accommodate such facilities and the necessity for the USAREUR construction program; and the change from free obligation of funds to an expenditure-type budget.[47]

The investigation took place during the following months and in its final report The Judge Advocate General stated that USAREUR had taken appropriate action to correct the deficiencies and to provide final records of the program. In addition to recommending certain personnel actions against former officers of Western Area Command, the report stated that USAREUR should continue the procedure initiated before the investigation. As soon as final corrective action had been taken, USAREUR should report to the Chief of Staff, Department of the Army. Additional efforts should also be made to dismiss Mr. Leonard Armbruster, of the Western Area Command post engineer section, from government service. These recommendations were approved by the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army, who thus endorsed the position USAREUR had originally assumed in January 1954.[48] As a result, CINCUSAREUR made the Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, responsible for compiling the required report and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G1, for renewing efforts to terminate the services of Mr. Armbruster. The Office of the Comptroller was to determine the expected completion date for the audits being conducted by German audit agencies and the Provost Marshal was to continue the investigation of procurement irregularities. Since the German audits were to take until December 1955, the required report would probably not be submitted to the Department of the Army before 1 January 1956.[49]

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[47]Memo, USAREUR JA to USAREUR COFS, 28 Oct 54, sub: Investigation of Procurement Irregularities in WACOM. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

[48](1) Ltr, SA to CINCUSAREUR, 31 Mar 55, sub: Procurement Irregularities in WACOM. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) C/N 1, USAREUR JA to USAREUR DCOFS Admin, 12 Apr 55, sub: Alleged Procurement Irregularities in WACOM. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR SGS 333.5 (1955), Vol. I, Item 1 atchd.

[49](1) Ibid. (2) C/N 3, USAREUR JA to USAREUR DCOFS Admin, 26 Apr 55, same sub. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

Section III: Supply Functions

100. Supply

a. Command Stocks on Hand. Command stocks consisted of the various categories of supplies, other than special reserve stocks, which USAREUR was authorized to store. These included the USAREUR Stockage Objective, and long, excess, surplus, scrap, salvage, unserviceable, and MDAP stocks. On 31 May 1955, the USAREUR reporting quarter date closest to the end of FY 1955, 757,679 short tons were on hand in USAREUR depots. This total represented a considerable decrease in the amount on hand at the beginning of the fiscal year and continued a downward trend that began in October 1953. As of 31 July 1954 the stocks on hand had amounted to a little more than one million short tons. By 31 October 1954 the total had dropped to 892,000 short tons, and by 28 February it had further decreased to 790,910 short tons. Of the total stockage on hand on 31 May 1955, 41 percent was located east of the Rhine, 31 percent in Western Area Command, and the remaining 28 percent in COMZ. Classes III and IIIA stocks on hand totaled some 83,258,000 gallons, an increase of approximately 5,000,000 gallons over the stockage at the beginning of the fiscal year. Of the classes III and IIIA supplies on hand, approximately 58 percent was located east of the Rhine in Germany, 20 percent was in Base Section, COMZ, 2 percent in Western Area Command, less than 1 percent in Advance Section, COMZ, and the rest in the United Kingdom. At the end of May 1955 the stockage objective comprised 29 percent of the command stocks; long stocks, 28 percent; excess stocks, 19 percent; and surplus, salvage, unserviceable, and MDAP stocks the remaining 24 percent. Table 9 represents a quantitative breakdown of the stockage objective by technical service, class of supply, and location within USAREUR on 31 May 1955. Table 10 shows the composition of the remaining categories of command stocks by technical service and classes of supply as of 31 May 1955.[50]

b. Special Theater Reserve No. 1. Special Theater Reserve No. 1 was an operational project (Army-EUCOM-GEN-102-5-OP) established under the provisions of SR 730-5-1 to store the supplies required for implementing USAREUR emergency plans. Stocks in this project could not be used, except in an emergency, without prior approval of Department of the Army. For its implementation the project was broken down into numbered sections, each of which represented specific quantities of the supplies required. Previous to FY 1955 the Department of the Army had canceled sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 11, 12, and 23, and had substituted a balanced 60-day combat

[50] (1) USAREUR Mthly Review of Log Actvs, 30 Sep 54, pp. 34-36; and 31 Dec 54, pp. 52-54. (2) USAREUR Quarterly Review of Log Actvs, 31 Mar 55, pp. 42-47; and 30 Jun 55, pp. 48-51. Both SECRET (information used CONFIDENTIAL).

Table 9--USAREUR Stockage Objective,
31 May 1955 (short tons)

Technical Service	Class of Supply	Authorized	On Hand Within Requisitioning Objective: Total	BASEC	ADSEC	WACOM	U.S. Zone
Total a/	-	220,424	222,864	16,579	30,825	54,590	120,870
Total b/	III & IIIA	(58,368)	(53,039)	(4,373)	(262)	(175)	(48,229)
Chemical	II & IV	3,200	3,197	2,076	1,121	0	0
	V	1,000c/	816	724	92	0	0
Engineer	II & IV	13,506	10,097	0	7,628	2,469	0
Medical	II & IV	1,500	1,861	0	614	1,247	0
Ordnance	II & IV	72,753	73,949	2,764	11,507	1,124	58,554
	V	53,830c/	30,985	1,334	4,492	25,159	0
Quartermaster	I	40,787	53,986	5,362	3,818	6,583	38,223
	II & IV	28,215	42,750	2,868	478	15,311	24,093
	III d/	(33,228)	(27,016)	(2,917)	(92)	(96)	(23,911)
	III e/	(2,693)	(1,169)	(194)	(95)	(79)	(801)
	IIIA d/	(22,295)	(24,795)	(1,248)	(60)	(0)	(23,487)
	IIIA e/	(152)	(59)	(14)	(15)	(0)	(30)
Signal	II & IV	3,933	3,772	0	1,075	2,697	0
Transportation	II & IV	1,700	1,451	1,451	0	0	0

a/ Excludes classes III and IIIA. Figures in short tons.
b/ Figures for classes III and IIIA stocks in parentheses in thousands of gallons.
c/ 1-year supply of training ammunition.
d/ Bulk.
e/ POL.

Source: USAREUR ACOFS G4 Mgmt and Admin Br. CONFIDENTIAL.

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Table 10--USAREUR Command Stocks on Hand (Less Stockage Objective), 31 May 1955 (short tons)

Technical Service and Class of Supply	Class of Stock								
	Long	Excess	Surplus	Scrap	d/	e/	MDAP	f/	g/
Total a/	213,724	141,230	19,321	226	103,598	1,712	20,796	19,052	15,156
Class IIIA b/									30,219
Chemical									
II & IV	255	0	90	0	142	0	0	0	372
V	199	0	0	0	11	0	0	0	0
Engineer									
II & IV	59,669	47,595	0	0	14,875	894	2,977	0	2,759
Medical									
II & IV	261	16	15	179	1	0	0	7,435	0
Ordnance									
II & IV	95,825	62,660	18,639	0	44,651	760	17,303	1,146	11,325
V	0	17,801	0	0	34,101	0	347	0	700
Quartermaster									
I	12,982								
II & IV	38,528	7,759	0	0	4,949	0	0	1,985	0
IIIA Pkg									213
IIIA Bulk									30,006c/
Signal									
II & IV	5,273	4,037	577	47	4,504	58	169	8,486	0
Transportation									
II & IV	732	1,362	0	0	364	0	0	0	0

a/ Excludes Class IIIA. Figures in short tons.
b/ Class IIIA figures in thousands of gallons.
c/ Includes 6,486,000 and 10,080,000 gallons on base and in United Kingdom, respectively.
d/ Unserviceable stock.
e/ Unclaimed and unidentified stock.
f/ Development and Operational Projects.
g/ Miscellaneous stock.

Source: USAREUR ACOFS G4 Mgmt and Admin Br. CONFIDENTIAL.

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reserve for the former section 14.[51] As of 31 May 1955, the stocks on hand in USAREUR for Special Reserve No. 1, including classes III and IIIA, had increased to 916,746 short tons--a figure 257,292 short tons over the amount reported on hand on 31 July 1954. During the same time, however, the corresponding target requirements for depot stocks, prestocks, and basic loads had increased from 802,163 to 1,146,898 short tons. Due to the increase in target requirements, the percentage of completion of the project decreased from 82 percent on 31 July 1954 to 80 percent on 31 May 1955. On 31 May 1955 the stockage for the basic load section of the special reserve was 100 percent complete as was that for the prestock section with one exception--ordnance class V supplies for the prestock section stood at only 64.2 percent of completion. Table 11 shows a summary of the Special Reserve No. 1 comparing targets and stock status for the various categories of the reserve by technical service and supply class. Table 12 shows the location of special reserve stocks in depots as of 31 May 1955.[52]

c. Special Theater Reserve No. 3. In addition to Special Theater Reserve No. 1, which was stocked in USAREUR proper, a second command reserve, known as Special Theater Reserve No. 3, was held in the United States for immediate automatic shipment to USAREUR in an emergency.[53] In previous years USAREUR had been responsible for requisitioning the supplies needed for stockage in Special Reserve No. 3. In March 1955 The Quartermaster General advised USAREUR that all emergency requisitions for Special Reserve No. 3 were on file in the United States. No future requisitions for this reserve stockpile would be needed inasmuch as requirements for the project would be reviewed and screened in the United States at specified intervals.[54]

d. Shortages in Special Reserve Ammunition. By 30 June 1955 the shortages in the USAREUR special theater ammunition reserve,[55] with the exception of 105-mm. rifle cartridges (HEP-T), were negligible and the USAREUR Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, estimated that the last shortages

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[51] USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jan 53-30 Jun 54, pp. 287-88. SECRET.

[52] (1) USAREUR Mthly Review of Log Actvs, 30 Sep 54, pp. 28-31. SECRET. (2) USAREUR Quarterly Review of Log Actvs, 31 Mar 55, pp. 48-54; and 30 Jun 55, pp. 52-58. SECRET.

[53] USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jan 53-30 Jun 54, p. 293. SECRET.

[54] C/N 1, USAREUR QM to USAREUR ACOFS G4, 10 Mar 55, sub: Special Reserves No. 1 and No. 3. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G4 Cen files, 400.24 (1955), Vol. I.

[55] For a listing of the shortages in the ammunition reserve that existed as of 30 June 1954, see USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, 1953-54, Table 16, p. 289. SECRET.

Table 11--Summary of Special Reserve Stocks and Targets,
31 May 1955

Technical Service	Class of Supply	Total		In Depots		Prestocks		Basic Loads	
		Target	On Hand	Target	On Hand	Target	On Hand	Target	On Hand
Total a/	-	799,809	737,444	644,214	620,349	135,184	96,684	20,411	20,411
Total b/	III & IIIA	(100,884)	(49,224)	(100,380)	(48,720)	(504)	(504)	0	0
Chemical	II & IV	2,443	2,178	2,443	2,178	0	0	0	0
	V	3,902	3,902	513	513	2,582	2,582	807	807
Engineer	II & IV	205,653	192,037	191,627	178,011	14,026	14,026	0	0
Medical	II & IV	7,032	7,032	7,032	7,032	0	0	0	0
Ordnance	II & IV	48,539	34,996	48,539	34,996	0	0	0	0
	V	373,479	343,704	246,688	255,413	107,509	69,009	19,282	19,282
Quartermaster	I	74,372	74,372	63,305	63,305	11,067	11,067	0	0
	II & IV	17,355	14,905	17,355	14,905	0	0	0	0
	III c/	(58,212)	(17,808)	(58,212)	(17,808)	0	0	0	0
	III d/	(39,942)	(30,492)	(39,438)	(29,988)	(504)	(504)	0	0
	IIIA e/	0	(336)	0	(336)	0	0	0	0
	IIIA f/	(2,730)	(588)	(2,730)	(588)	0	0	0	0
	III g/	(8,337)	(6,209)	(8,337)	(6,209)	0	0	0	0
	IIIA h/	(314)	(161)	(314)	(161)	0	0	0	0
Signal	II & IV	12,450	12,074	12,450	12,074	0	0	0	0
Transportation	II & IV	45,933	45,874	45,611	45,552	0	0	322	322

a/ Excludes class III fuels. Figures in short tons.
b/ Figures for classes III and IIIA stocks in paretheses in thousands of gallons.
c/ Mogas in bulk storage.
d/ Mogas and Diesel in barrels and 5-gallon containers.
e/ Army aviation fuels in bulk storage.
f/ Army aviation fuels in barrels and 5-gallon containers.
g/ POL (greases and motor oils).
h/ POL (aviation oils).

Source: USAREUR ACOFS G4 Mgmt & Admin Br. SECRET.

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Table 12--Location of Special Reserve Stocks in Depots, Excluding Prestocks and Basic Loads, 31 May 1955

Technical Service	Class of Supply	BASEC Target	BASEC On Hand	ADSEC Target	ADSEC On Hand	WACOM Target	WACOM On Hand	U.S. Zone Target	U.S. Zone On Hand
Total a/	-	351,702	296,621	148,415	149,230	99,422	129,814	44,675	44,684
Total b/	III & IIIA	(56,784)	(26,082)	(28,476)	(10,458)	(15,120)	(12,180)	0	0
Chemical	II & IV	1,828	1,803	615	375	0	0	0	0
	V	383	383	130	130	0	0	0	0
Engineer	II & IV	110,995	98,031	64,199	65,006	16,433	14,974	0	0
Medical	II & IV	4,891	2,208	2,141	4,824	0	0	0	0
Ordnance	II & IV	35,703	22,998	12,171	11,335	660	658	5	5
	V	120,954	99,922	45,623	47,537	80,111	107,954	0	0
Quartermaster	I	46,442	45,840	15,981	12,775	220	4,028	662	662
	II & IV	15,207	12,077	2,137	2,691	3	129	8	8
	III c/	(38,766)	(17,304)	(19,446)	(504)	0	0	0	0
	III d/	(16,338)	(8,568)	(8,190)	(9,534)	(14,910)	(11,886)	0	0
	IIIA e/	0	0	0	(252)	0	(84)	0	0
	IIIA f/	(1,680)	(210)	(840)	(168)	(210)	(210)	0	0
	III g/	4,257	2,126	2,130	2,060	1,950	2,023	0	0
	IIIA h/	180	47	89	66	45	48	0	0
Signal	II & IV	9,266	9,643	3,184	2,431	0	0	0	0
Transportation	II & IV	1,596	1,543	15	0	0	0	44,000	44,009

a/ Excludes class III fuels.
b/ Figures for classes III and IIIA stocks in parentheses in thousands of gallons.
c/ Mogas in bulk storage.
d/ Mogas and Diesel in barrels and 5-gallon containers.
e/ Army aviation fuels in bulk storage.
f/ Army aviation fuels in barrels and 5-gallon containers.
g/ POL (greases and motor oils).
h/ POL (aviation oils).

Source: USAREUR ACOFS G4 Mgmt & Admin Br. SECRET.

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would be eliminated within the first quarter of FY 1956. The shortage of HEP-T, 105-mm. ammunition, was considered unimportant, since the replacement of the 105-mm. with a 106-mm. rifle was pending.[56]

e. Combat Equipment in Short Supply. A number of items considered vital for the accomplishment of the Seventh Army mission had been in short supply since the reactivation of that army in 1950. By 1 July 1954 the Seventh Army was fully equipped except for bulldozer tanks (M3E1) and some signal items, such as sound ranging sets, radio sets AN/ARC-27, facsimile equipment, and mobile photo labs, which were still in short supply. No shortages were reported at this time by the Chemical, Engineer, Medical, Quartermaster or Transportation Divisions. By 30 June 1955 all shortages of critical items of combat equipment had been eliminated.[57]

f. FED-REP-GER Program. The FED-REP-GER Program, formerly known as Stockpile B, was a Department of the Army project for the storage of MDAP materiel to be ultimately delivered to the Federal Republic of Germany. After consultation in 1952, the Department informed USAREUR that the bulk of this materiel would be stockpiled in the United States for future direct shipment to the German Federal Republic. The Department also directed that supplies and equipment allocated to this project from USAREUR excess stocks and from offshore procurement would have to be carried in separate property accounts by USAREUR. On 1 July 1954, USAREUR depots stored 16,787 tons of supplies and equipment for future delivery to the Germans, including 16,666 tons of ordnance and 121 tons of signal materiel.[58] Table 13 shows a detailed list of the materiel stored in USAREUR for the German Federal Republic on 30 June 1955 and the additional requirements to reach the known objectives. USAREUR indicated that the theater storage of additional materiel could be precluded, if conditions permitted direct delivery to the recipient. In addition to the materiel listed in Table 13, approximately 15,929 tons of class V items were programmed for delivery to the German Federal Republic through September 1955. A possibility existed, however, that all or part of this quantity might be diverted to other MDAP recipients.[59]

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[56] USAREUR Quarterly Review of Log Actvs, 30 Jun 55, p. 6. SECRET.

[57] (1) Ibid. (Information used UNCLASSIFIED). (2) USAREUR Mthly Review of Log Actvs, 30 Jun 54, p. 44. SECRET (information used CONFIDENTIAL).

[58] C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 16 Jul 54, sub: Storage of MDAP Materiel for FED-REP-GER. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G4 Cen Files, 400 GEN (1954), Vol. I, Item GLD-74-46.

[59] USAREUR Quarterly Review of Log Actvs, 30 Jun 55, p. 44. SECRET. (information used CONFIDENTIAL).

Table 13--MDAP Materiel Stored in USAREUR Depots for FED-REP-GER Program, 30 June 1955

Technical Service and Items	Units		Tonnage	
	Stored a/	Added Rqmts	Stored a/	Added Rqmts
Total	7,296,269	1,228	20,719	47,958
Ordnance - Total	7,294,453	1,184	20,511	47,700
Total (excluding ammunition)	6,287	1,184	17,789	47,700
Truck, 3/4 ton C&R	61	38	172	106
Truck, 2½ ton, Dump	290	95	1,455	475
Truck, 12 ton, Prime Mover, M20	3		42	
Transporter, 45 ton, M9	6		60	
Tank, M47 b/	289	940	14,450	46,060
Tractors, HS, 13 ton, M5 Series	71	80	852	960
Bulldozer tank, mtd, M3E1	83		249	
Carbine cal. .30M1	336		1.5	
Gun Submach. cal. .45, M1, M1A1 or M1928A1	4,947		38	
Launcher, grenade, cal. .30, M7	110		.5	
Howitzer, 105-mm. towed	91	31	292	99
Misc. Spare Parts			177	
Total (ammunition)	7,288,166		2,722	
Rocket Practice 3.5	129,700		1,147	
Rocket Heat 3.5, M28H2	150,786		1,331	
Cartridge ball and tracer cal. .30 carbine	6,890,380		126	
Cartridge cal. .50, AP1	100,800		18	
Shell, HEM52H3, M43A/w/Fuze	16,500		100	

Table 13--MDAP Materiel Stored in USAREUR Depots for FED-REP-GER Program, 30 June 1955--Continued

Technical Service and Items	Units		Tonnage	
	Stored a/	Added Rqmts	Stored a/	Added Rqmts
Signal - Total	1,816	44	208	258
SCR-628 Radio Set	16		3	
SCR-193 Radio Set	32		11	
SCR-510-50 Radio Set	40		5	
SCR-300 Radio Set	541		23	
SCR-528 Radio Set	424		79	
Switchboard Assy, CR-PP-1A	5		1	
Switchboard Assy, CF-PP-2A	7		2	
Switchboard Assy, CF-PP-3A	60		2	
Switchboard Assy, CF-PP-4A	24		1	
Telephone, Central, Offset, CF-MP-1	24		7	
Power Unit, PE-210	265		27	
Remote Control Equip, RC-289	75		2	
Reel Unit, RL-31	251		9	
Maintenance Parts			.5	
TC-21	37		13	
Directors, MK VII Radar		44		258
AN/TPS 1 D Radar Set	15		23	

a/ By authority of Department of the Army.
b/ Quantity presently in storage and serving a dual purpose: (1) USAREUR reserve stock; (2) Earmarked for FED-REP-GER. Ultimate storage objectives cannot be reached until such time as the M47 tanks are replaced by the M48 tanks and rehabilitated.

Source: USAREUR ACOFS G4 Mgmt & Admin Br. CONFIDENTIAL.

g. Shop Vans Requested. In November 1954 the Department of the Army needed 210 M109 shop vans to equip high priority claimants in the United States. None of these trucks were available in the United States, and none were scheduled for procurement through FY 1956. USAREUR possessed the only vehicles that could be called in except for three available in U.S. Army, Pacific. According to USAREUR stock reports, a total of 193 M109 vans were on hand in depot and station utility stocks. Since the requisitioning objective for this item was only 64, USAREUR reported 129 vans to the Department, leaving a deficit of 81 to be met from other sources. To satisfy both theater and departmental demands USAREUR proposed the purchase of 90 vans of a similar type, using occupation cost funds. On 29 November 1954 the Department requested the dispatch of the 129 vans to the United States, adding that the purchase request was being staffed and that USAREUR would be informed as soon as it was approved. On 4 March 1955, however, the Department requested 90 additional vans, bringing the total to 219. Still no word had been received on the request for the purchase of the first 90 indigenous replacement vans. To meet the second request from the Department, Seventh Army was to furnish 80 vans from assets on hand, which involved no particular hardship because 199 of the Seventh Army vans were being used for other than intended purposes. The remaining 10 vehicles were to be furnished from utility stocks, leaving an asset of 54 vehicles of this type for the command.[60] At the end of FY 1955 USAREUR still waited for departmental authorization to purchase 90 indigenous vans.

h. Solid Fuel Supply. In May 1955 USAREUR established a new solid fuel supply policy setting up a stockpiling program for FY 1956. The stockpiling program was to be carried out during the first quarter of FY 1956 to establish a 60-day reserve of solid fuels, exclusive of briquettes, by 1 October 1955. This stockpile was to be calculated at the estimated January 1956 rate of consumption. The reserve was to be maintained until the end of 1955 unless an emergency occurred. After 1 January 1956, shipments would be adjusted to allow the reduction to a 30-day stock level by 31 March 1956. This 30-day level would be carried over from 1 April to 30 June 1956. Area Commanders, however, were authorized a reserve level of coke above the 30-day level during April, May, and June 1956 to permit them to take advantage of the summer reduction of coke prices in the interest of the U.S. Government. A similar stockpiling program was to be implemented in West Berlin in order to establish a 70,000 metric ton reserve by 1 October 1955. After that date solid fuel consumption would gradually reduce the reserve to 50,000 metric tons by 31 March 1956. During the period 1 April through 1 October 1956, the reserve would again increase to the 70,000 metric ton level. Reserve stocks for West Berlin were not to drop below a 50,000 metric ton minimum at any time.[61]

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[60] C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 15 Mar 55, sub: Shop Vans, M109. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 451 (1955), Vol. I, Item 8 atchd.

[61] USAREUR ltr, 12 May 55, sub: Solid Fuel Policy, FY 1956. AG 463.3 ENG-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

101. Depot Maintenance Operations

Due to the increasing complexity of instorage maintenance at the depot level, USAREUR developed some new procedures during FY 1955. In February 1955 USAREUR delineated and clarified the instorage maintenance responsibilities for items of one technical service when stored in the depots of another service. In coordination with the Commanding General, COMZ, the USAREUR chiefs of technical services were to make technical inspections of assigned supplies and equipment stored in depots of another service upon request from the storing service. Upon completion of the inspections, the storing service was to be advised about any deficiencies that had been discovered and any improvements that could be suggested. The technical service was also required to instruct storing depot personnel, including on-the-job training for instorage maintenance techniques. If pertinent data and publications were not available through Adjutant General channels, the appropriate technical service was to provide such information on the care and preservation of the supplies and equipment, and the frequency and types of inspections required. These requirements were to be limited to instances where the complexity or nature of the items presented unusual problems to the storing service, i.e., to such items as ordnance vehicular equipment, including mounted tires, signal communications equipment, quartermaster tentage and paulins, engineer generators, and chemical supplies. The directive, however, was not intended to relieve the storing technical service of the final responsibility for the instorage maintenance mission assigned to the depot.[62]

a. Priorities for Instorage Maintenance. Because of a decrease in both military and civilian manpower in storing depots, USAREUR directed that certain priorities be observed to most effectively use the available manpower and equipment. In the order of importance of the stocks concerned, priorities were established as follows:

1. Army and Air Force project stocks, including stocks set aside pending departmental approval of a project;

2. Army and Air Force issue stocks;

3. MDAP stocks;

4. R&U stocks at engineer depots only;

5. Surplus stocks awaiting disposal action to be reported to the appropriate chief of technical service, Department of the Army; and

6. Other surplus stocks.

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[62] USAREUR ltr, 14 Feb 55, sub: Instorage Maintenance Responsibilities. AG 630 GLD-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

Project, issue, MDAP, and R&U stocks were to be fully maintained and preserved in the order of their priority and in accordance with applicable directives and specifications. Those surplus stocks, that were to be reported to the departmental technical service concerned and were awaiting disposal action, were to be given normal maintenance within the assigned priority category pending receipt of disposition instructions. Other surplus stocks were to be given only limited maintenance in accordance with their assigned priority. The above priorities were not inflexible, but were given for guidance purposes. The observance of priorities 1 through 4 would be subject to local conditions, projected requirements for items, physical commingling of project and issue stocks in storage, and coordination of instorage maintenance with established surveillance cycles. Supplementary instructions establishing priorities for the preservation of specific items in project stocks were authorized.[63]

b. Status of Depot Maintenance Operations. The USAREUR technical services scheduled equipment valued at $213,430,200 for rebuild at the various depot maintenance facilities during FY 1955. As of 30 June 1955, the total value of equipment rebuilt in this manner was $187,862,587 or approximately 88 percent of the scheduled program for the year. Accomplishments of the maintenance objective, percentage-wise, for each of the technical services were as follows: Engineer, 91.9 percent; Chemical, 122.2 percent; Medical, 102.7 percent; Ordnance, 86.3 percent; Quartermaster, 103.6 percent; Signal, 108 percent; and Transportation, 76.6 percent. At the same time, the total rebuild cost for FY 1955 was $24,029,982 or a ratio of $7.82 value return in serviceable materiel for each dollar expended. This figure compared favorably with the Army-wide average of $7.45 at the end of FY 1955.[64]

102. Disposal of Excess Property

The program for the disposal of excess property was established on a calendar year basis. The total quantity of excess property to be disposed of in 1954 was 242,912 tons. During the second half of 1954, 176,293 tons of excess property were earmarked for disposal subject to review by USAREUR, and by 31 December 1954 all but 780 tons had been screened by the appropriate technical service. On the basis of sales and other disposal actions, the 1954 Excess Property Disposal Program was approximately 67.8 percent complete by 31 December 1954.[65]

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[63] USAREUR ltr, to Chiefs of Tech Svcs, 21 Apr 55, sub: Priorities for Instorage Maintenance of Technical Services Depot Stocks. AG 630 GLD. UNCLASSIFIED.

[64] USAREUR Quarterly Review of Log Actvs, 30 Jun 55, pp. 59-62. SECRET (information used CONFIDENTIAL).

[65] USAREUR Mthly Reviews of Log Actvs, 30 Jul 54, p. 43; 31 Dec 54, p. 55. SECRET (information used UNCLASSIFIED).

The 1955 prgram was developed during January and February 1955 when the technical services estimated that they would have approximately 211,464 tons of excess property for disposal during the year. Of this amount Ordnance Division estimated excesses totaling 144,000 tons; the Engineer Division, 57,554 tons. The total acquisition value of the estimated excesses was approximately $427,000,000.[66] Of this amount a target of $220,447,192 was established for disposal during the period 1 January-30 June 1955. By 30 June 1955 USAREUR had disposed of excess property totaling approximately $125 million or approximately 59 percent of the disposal target. Slightly more than 50 percent of the target figure for the first six months, however, was the result of a carry-over from calendar year 1954. Sales accounted for 72 percent of the total disposals for the period; redistribution within the Department of the Army, 27 percent; and the remaining 1 percent included transfers to the Air Force or Navy, donations, abandonment, or destruction. As of 30 June 1955 the USAREUR Property Disposal Officer was awaiting Department of State approval on $38,000,000 in disposals, representing individual sales in excess of $250,000 each.[67]

103. Stock Control

a. Establishment of USAREUR Supply Control Agencies in France. General Order 114 issued on 28 December 1953, established the USAREUR Supply Control Center at Maison Forte, France, and reorganized and redesignated the technical services stock control agencies as subunits. The transfer to Maison Forte was completed shortly before the end of the preceding fiscal year.[68]

b. Supply Deficiencies. At the end of FY 1955 the USAREUR Inspector General furnished a list of supply irregularities and deficiencies noted in the annual IG inspections. Five common deficiencies occurred in 13 out of the 30 inspections conducted: excesses, improper maintenance of supply records, failure to conduct required quarterly inspections of records, and improper safeguarding and maintenance of property stockage. The Inspector General concluded that commanders were not exercising complete and proper supervision of the persons

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[66] Memo, C/USAREUR ACOFS G4 Sup Br to USAREUR ACOFS G4, 28 Feb 55, sub: USAREUR Excess Disposal Program for Calendar Year 1955. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR ACOFS G4 Cen files, 400.703 (1955), Vol. I.

[67] (1) Memo, C/USAREUR ACOFS G4 Sup Br to USAREUR ACOFS G4, 29 Jun 55, sub: Status of Excess Property Disposal. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above. (2) USAREUR Quarterly Review of Log Actvs, 30 Jun 55, p. 45. SECRET (information used UNCLASSIFIED).

[68] Memo for rcd, Lt Col E. W. Reynolds, USAREUR ACOFS G4 Opns Br, 29 Jul 54, sub: Mobility of USAREUR Supply Control Agencies at Maison Forte. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Div Cen files, 322 GEN (1954), Vol. I, Item 15.

responsible for administrative and supply functions and that both commanders and supervisory personnel were failing to take cognizance of pertinent directives and implementing provisions. A command letter summarizing the noted deficiencies was prepared, directing subordinate units to immediately review procedures and take measures to insure compliance with current directives. In addition, the USAREUR Weekly Directive was to periodically disseminate information on eliminating supply deficiencies.[69]

c. Increased Levels of Supply. In an effort to produce greater supply efficiency, USAREUR planned to increase to a 1-year level the stockage of certain items with a low dollar value. In February 1955 USAREUR requested authority to increase the command stockage objective of approximately 34,000 signal items to a 1-year level. The proposed 34,000 items comprised 60 percent of the total line items stocked in the USAREUR signal depots. The annual demand for these items was less than $100 per line item, or an estimated annual demand of less than $700,000 for all. The USAREUR proposal was designed to permit a more detailed analysis and better management of the high dollar value items, resulting in dollar savings for the Army and materially improving the efficiency of the USAREUR signal logistical support mission. In the past, low dollar value items were manually analyzed on a monthly basis for stock position along with all other items, and replenished as required. The man hours expended on these items were incompatible with the end results. Increasing the stockage of these items in USAREUR would effectively reduce the number of dues-out which, in turn, would increase the combat readiness of the units supported. In the past, due to fluctuating demands, the items involved created an estimated 70 percent of the dues-out in the USAREUR signal supply system. Both the U.S. and the USAREUR supply systems, particularly the Overseas Supply Agency, Brooklyn, New York, would benefit by a reduction in the number of requisitions processed and the number of line items handled. On 10 March 1955, the Department of the Army approved this request.[70] To implement the new system, USAREUR proposed an annual analysis of all items for stock position to determine those with a cumulative annual demand of $100 or less. A 1-year level with a 180-day reorder point would be established for such items. Those placed in this category would be exempt from disposal action unless obsolete. Whenever the stock position reached the reorder point, a 1-year level would be restored by requisitioning from the U.S. or--for locally procured items--by reordering from open-end and on-call contracts. The initial replacement requisitions would be for items

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[69] Memo for rcd, Maj H. W. Coulter, USAREUR ACOFS G4 Sup Br, 22 Jun 55, sub: Common Deficiencies in Supply Procedures. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR ACOFS G4 Cen files, 400.3 (1955), Vol. I.

[70] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to TAG for DCOFSA LOG, 11 Feb 55, sub: Levels of Supply. AG 400 GLD. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Memo for rcd, Mr. C. Hoybach, USAREUR ACOFS G4 Sup Br, 4 Apr 55, same sub. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR ACOFS G4 Cen files, 400 (1955), Vol. I.

necessary to bring existing quantities up to a 1-year level, and all levels would be reviewed semiannually so as to adjust the level structure to reflect current demand experience. In approving the request regarding signal items, the Department of the Army directed that the USAREUR Ordnance Division study the feasibility of making similar increases in levels for applicable items.[71] This study was not completed by the end of June 1955.

Section IV: Transportation

104. Port Operations

a. USAREUR Operations. Port operations were conducted by two commands, the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation (BPOE) in Germany and the 11th Transportation Port Command B, subordinate to USAREUR COMZ. The latter operated all ports within France, including Bordeaux, Blaye, La Pallice, La Rochelle, Rochefort, St. Nazaire, and the COMZ offshore discharge exercise sites.

(1) Tonnages Handled. During FY 1955, BPOE and the 11th Transportation Port Command B handled 1,073,000 long tons of stock, or 289,000 long tons less than the previous fiscal year. BPOE alone handled some 231,000 tons less than during FY 1954, mainly shipments of general cargo and bulk POL. The tonnage of the 11th Transportation Port Command B also dropped by some 58,000 tons. The total decrease in tonnage receipts, however, was actually 77,000 tons for the French ports since shipments outloaded increased by 19,000 tons over FY 1954. Although plans under Concept C called for a shift to the LOFC in France, BPOE continued to handle a major share of tonnages. During FY 1955 the monthly average for BPOE was approximately 70,000 tons, whereas that for the entire COMZ port complex under the 11th Transportation Port Command B was only 17,000 tons. Much remained to be accomplished before USAREUR could achieve the 70-30 ratio envisaged under Concept C.[72] Table 14 shows the monthly

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[71] C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR Ord Div, 5 Apr 55, sub: Levels of Supply. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[72] (1) USAREUR Quarterly Review of Log Actvs, 30 Jun 55, p. 80. SECRET (information used UNCLASSIFIED). (2) USAREUR Plan and Dir, 31 Mar 55, sub: Concept C, Goals for Implementation, pp. 6-9. Prepared by the USAREUR ACOFS G4. GLD 65-1. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

Table 14--Port Operations, Tonnages Handled, FY 1955
(thousands of long tons)

Month		Total BPE and 11th Trans Port Comd	Bremerhaven					11th Trans Port Comd		
				Discharged						
			Total	General Cargo	Bulk POL	Cold Stores	Out-loaded	Total	Dis-charged	Out-loaded
FY 1954	Total	1,362	1,072	541	372	51	108	290	275	15
FY 1955	Total	1,073	841	385	300	68	88	232	198	34
July	1954	85	70	36	20	5	9	15	12	3
August		118	104	38	54	5	7	14	13	1
September		95	79	35	30	7	7	16	13	3
October		69	53	28	14	6	5	16	13	3
November		97	74	27	30	7	10	23	18	5
December		77	61	35	10	8	8	16	14	2
January	1955	70	52	29	14	4	5	18	16	2
February		87	58	32	15	5	6	29	27	2
March		103	78	30	38	4	6	25	22	3
April		95	69	27	30	5	7	26	24	2
May		90	75	33	30	4	8	15	10	5
June		87	68	35	15	8	10	19	16	3

Source: USAREUR ACOFS G4 Mgmt & Admin Br. UNCLASSIFIED.

UNCLASSIFIED

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cargo tonnages handled by both BPOE and the 11th Transportation Port Command B for FY 1955.

(2) Personnel Movements. During FY 1955 396,692 personnel of all categories were shipped through both port commands, an increase of 16,701 persons over the previous fiscal year. Although BPOE handled some 10,843 more persons, the significant increase was at the 11th Transportation Port Command B, which saw an increase of 5,858 persons over the FY 1954 total of only 301 persons. Shipments of personnel through French ports occurred during only four months--July and December, 1954, and January and February, 1955. At BPOE the major portion of the increase was in personnel embarking for the United States.[73]

b. NODEX Operations, 1954-1955. New offshore discharge exercises (NODEX) were begun in November 1954 after the original offshore discharge exercises (ODEX) had been stopped in February 1954. USAREUR planned to use certain new items of equipment in these exercises, such as landing craft utility (LCU), the 10,000-pound rough terrain forklift, the cargo resupply amphibious barge (BARC), and an aerial tramway.[74] In all, a total of 4 exercises were begun, with 3 of them being completed during the fiscal year. NODEX No. 1 began with the arrival of the Greece Victory on 1 November 1954 and terminated with the completion of discharge of cargo from the Lt. Robinson on 27 November. During the exercise, held at Le Verdon on the Gironde Estuary, a total of 7,832.8 long tons of cargo was unloaded from the participating ships. NODEX No. 2, began on 1 February 1955 at Le Verdon; No. 3 on 11 April at Le Verdon; and No. 4 on 27 June 1955 at La Repente, near La Pallice.[75]

In December 1954 the French Government had nominated five sites at which soil tests could be made for the selection of a permanent NODEX beach site. These included Le Verdon, Benedat Bay, La Foret de Fouesnant, Rade de Quiberon, and Rade de La Pallice. During March 1955 Base Section, COMZ, recommended Le Verdon as a permanent NODEX beach site, with negotiations to be continued for an alternate site. The only obstacle to using Le Verdon on a permanent basis was that the private property at the beach site would have to be purchased.[76]

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[73] USAREUR Quarterly Review of Log Actvs, 30 Jun 55, p. 79. SECRET (information used UNCLASSIFIED).

[74] USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf 14, 2 Nov 54, p. 5. SECRET (information used UNCLASSIFIED). In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

[75] (1) USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf 17, 14 Dec 54, p. 7. SECRET (information used UNCLASSIFIED). (2) Memos, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 1 Feb, 1 Apr, 1 Jun 55, sub: Monthly Report of Important Planning Projects Pending within G4 Division. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR ACOFS G4 Cen files, 319.1 (1955), Vol. I.

[76] Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 1 Feb, 1 Apr 55, cited above.

105. Highway Transportation

USAREUR highway transportation services were concerned with the movement of express cargo and personnel between Heidelberg and points in COMZ. Moreover, a new service was established for transporting less-than-truckload lots of cargo within West Germany and between West Germany and the Advance Section, COMZ.

a. Military Express and Passenger Service. The USAREUR Military Express and Passenger Service (MEPS) was established in 1952 between Heidelberg, Germany, and La Rochelle, France, to transport critically needed small items of supply to and from installations in the command and to provide an auxiliary passenger service, augmenting existing rail facilities. As a military highway transportation facility, using military busses, MEPS had a monthly capacity of 624 measurement tons of cargo and 1,248 passengers.[77] During FY 1955 MEPS transported 3,712 measurement tons for a monthly average of 309.3 tons or a utilization rate of 49.5 percent. The service also transported 5,131 passengers for a monthly average of 428 persons, or 34.3 percent of total capacity. Chart 4 shows the FY 1955 monthly utilization rate for both cargo and passengers.[78]

b. Less-than-Truck-Load Express Service. On 4 April 1955 the USAREUR Transportation Officer established a less-than-truck-load (LTL) line haul scheduled express service to provide military motor transport service to and from USAREUR area commands in Germany and along the LOFC to a terminus located in COMZ. USAREUR directed this service be used to the maximum for all less-than-truck-load freight requiring expeditious delivery to the using agency. No items and supplies that did not fall within the "expedite" category were to be carried by the service. Primary terminals for this service were established at Verdun, Kaiserslautern, Heidelberg, Frankfurt, and Stuttgart. The establishment of additional terminals was to be based on the density of freight, access to the main routes, etc.[79]

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[77] USAREUR Hist Div, The Line of Communications Through France, 1952-53, pp. 210-13. SECRET (information used UNCLASSIFIED).

[78] USAREUR COMZ Performance Rept, 31 Dec 54, p. 30; 30 Jun 55, p. 76. SECRET (information used UNCLASSIFIED). In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

[79] USAREUR ltr, 31 Mar 55, sub: LTL Line Haul Scheduled Express Service. AG 451 RYT-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

Chart 4

MILITARY EXPRESS AND PASSENGER SERVICE,

MOVEMENT OF TONNAGE AND PASSENGERS

PERCENTAGE OF CAPACITY UTILIZED



Source: USAREUR COMZ Trans Div. UNCLASSIFIED.

106. Construction in Germany

a. Deutsche Mark Construction Programs, FY's 1955-56. The FY 1955 portion of the German construction program was planned on the assumption that it would be supported by occupation cost Deutsche Mark funds, but the availability of such funds for the following fiscal year was questionable. The construction program provided for the release of requisitioned housing by providing suitable replacements; the release of requisitioned commercial- and industrial-type properties; passive defense measures for key depots, storage areas, and operational sites; dispersed storage facilities; increased recreational facilities for the troops; and the relocation of tactical units. The program was to continue into FY 1956 for those projects that could not be accomplished due to lack of funds.[80]

The construction program for West Germany developed by the USAREUR Construction Programming Board was found to exceed the value of Deutsche Marks available for FY 1955. The Office of the Comptroller estimated that a total of DM 577,818,082, or approximately $137,575,735, would be available for construction during the year, while the total program contained projects in the amount of $234,743,000. The program, therefore, was divided into two separate parts, with Part I amounting to $196,403,000 and consisting of projects considered essential to the command, and Part II containing the remainder of the program. Part I of the program was to be constructed during FY 1955, subject to the availability of additional Deutsche Mark funds. Part II and the uncompleted portion of Part I were to form the nucleus of the FY 1956 program. If, however, sufficient Deutsche Mark funds could be made available for the construction of the deferred projects, the latter would be included in the FY 1955 program.[81]

The entire program was submitted to the Department of the Army in two increments. The first increment was approved by the Department on 3 November 1954 in the amount of $104,317,000. The second increment was submitted to the Department on 5 December 1954 for a total of $131,426,000. While approving most of the program listed in the second increment, the Department of the Army canceled a few projects, made reservations

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[80] Memo, Maj W. D. Nold, USAREUR ACOFS G4 Instl Br, to USAREUR ACOFS G4 Fiscal Rqmts Off, 15 Jul 54, sub: FY 1955 and FY 1956 DM Construction Programs, Germany. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR ACOFS G4 Cen files, 600.1 (1954), Vol. III, Item 70.

[81] (1) USAREUR ltr, 14 Dec 54, sub: FY 1955 USAREUR DM Military Construction Program, Army. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 8 Jul 54, sub: Construction in Germany During FY 1955. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1954), Vol. II, Item 38A atchd.

concerning others, and emphasized particularly that dollar funds might not be available in future fiscal years to construct any of the projects scheduled for FY 1955.[82]

At the beginning of FY 1955 the equivalent of some $170 million of work remained to be accomplished from previous fiscal years. An additional $150 million was obligated to either private firms or the German Federal Construction Agency, creating a total workload of $320 million for the fiscal year. Of this amount the equivalent of $168 million of construction was built by 30 June 1955.[83]

(1) Construction Priority List. Even before the basic decisions had been made, a priority list was established for construction within West Germany, which was approved by the Chief of Staff on 30 August 1954. While due consideration was given to releasing the maximum number of requisitioned properties, first priority was given to more essential operational and training projects. These projects required the expenditure of an estimated $40 million before funds could be diverted for releasing requisitioned property. Priority sequence for construction projects was established as follows:

1. Facilities for combat operations;
2. Dispersion and protection of depots and storage points with a continuing mission in an emergency;
3. Dispersion and protection of hospitals with a continuing mission in an emergency;
4. Facilities in training areas;
5. Projects to enable the release of requisitioned property;
6. Troop housing facilities;
7. Class II depot requirements;
8. Class I-type requirements such as area command and installation warehousing maintenance shops, motor pools, and heating plants;

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[82] Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 4 Jan 55, sub: FY 1955 USAREUR DM Construction Program. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR ACOFS G4 Cen files, 600.12 (1955), Vol. I.

[83] USAREUR Eng Div Hist Rept, 1 Jul 54-30 Jun 55, Sec. IV. SECRET (information used UNCLASSIFIED).

9. Community support activities, where existing facilities were inadequate to meet the needs;

10. Community facilities for troops;

11. Community facilities for dependent support operations above the minimum required for troops;

12. Tone-down painting of installations without a continuing war-time mission; and

13. Such recreational facilities as swimming pools and golf courses.

To insure the flexibility required to meet deadline dates imposed by fund obligations, projects could be taken out of priority sequence wherever such action guaranteed the maximum use of funds and prevented the loss of funds through failure to obligate.[84]

Under this priority system ammunition storage projects valued at approximately $34,400,000 were begun during the fiscal year, and work valued at $7 million was completed prior to 30 June 1955. In addition, a passive defense program costing $7 million was initiated, with approximately 10 percent being completed before the end of the fiscal year.[85]

(2) Dependents Housing. The housing construction program provided for the erection of 23,212 family units during FY's 1954-55. At the beginning of FY 1955 some 11,922 units were under construction and the remaining number was funded for construction during the fiscal year. Work was completed on 11,326 family units during FY 1955 while construction was begun on an additional 10,242 units. Site plans for the remaining 1,644 units had been completed or were under preparation as of 30 June 1955.[86]

(3) Senior Officers' Quarters. The housing program for West Germany provided for the construction of residences up to 100 percent of the anticipated number of families. An additional 5 percent of selected requisitioned properties was to be retained for use as housing for senior officers and large families. By the beginning of FY 1955, however, the

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[84](1) Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 6 Aug 54, sub: Construction Priority List for Germany. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) C/N 1, USAREUR SGS to USAREUR ACOFS G4, 30 Aug 54, same sub. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1954), Vol. II, Item 75 A atchd.

[85]USAREUR Engr Div Hist Rept, 1 Jul 54-30 Jun 55, Sec. IV. SECRET (information used UNCLASSIFIED).

[86]Ibid.

retention of such property did not seem to be politically or financially feasible. The FY 1955 housing construction program was therefore amended to replace the 5 percent requisitioned housing by constructing 1,950 units for commanders, senior officers, and large families. This amendment was designated as Phase X of the housing program. In addition a small number of housing units for various ranks was planned for small stations where the 105 percent inventory could not be reached in multiples of 18 and for remote or very small stations having a total requirement of less than 18 units.[87]

The senior officer housing units were to be constructed according to criteria established in Public Law 626, 80th Congress. General officers would be allowed a maximum of 2,310 square feet of floor space, colonels, 1,837 square feet, and lieutenant colonels and majors, 1,540 square feet. The cost of these projects, amounting to $33,444,000 was added to the second supplemental FY 1955 construction program.[88] Standard plans were developed for these quarters during the fiscal year and site planning was under way for the majority of these units by the end of the fiscal year.[89]

(4) Bachelor Officers' Quarters (BOQ's). The FY 1954 housing construction program had provided for 4,770 BOQ units as substitutes for requisitioned hotels and residential properties that were to be released. In August 1954 all area commands reviewed the requirements for BOQ construction for the purpose of immediately curtailing nonessential construction. As a result of the completion of the dependent housing program and the advent of concurrent travel, the need for temporary BOQ facilities for unaccompanied sponsors would be greatly reduced.[90] However, instead of the anticipated reduction, the review created new requirements in certain areas and failed to reduce existing needs in others because construction of the allocated number of units had already begun. The increase in requirements was caused by a review of existing BOQ accommodations which, in areas such as Nuremberg, were found to be substandard.

At the beginning of FY 1955 construction was in progress on 548 of the 4,770 BOQ units. During the year work was begun on 2,406 additional

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[87] Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 22 Jul 54, sub: Replacement of Requisitioned Family Housing. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 602 (1954), Vol. I, Item 23.

[88] (1) Cable SC-13197, USAREUR to all area comds, 4 Aug 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1954), Vol. I, Item 9A atchd. (2) C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR Engr, 10 Sep 54, sub: Construction of Senior Officers' Quarters. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR ACOFS G4 Cen files, 600.1 (1954), Vol. IV, Item 8.

[89] Interv, Mr. J. R. Moenk, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. R. A. Freeman, USAREUR Engr Div Constr Br, 18 Oct 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

[90] Cable SC-14978, USAREUR to all area comds, 25 Aug 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1954), Vol. I, Item 9A atchd.

units, and 1,366 units were completed before 30 June 1955. Planning for the remaining 1,216 units was in various stages of preparation at the end of the fiscal year.[91]

b. New Construction Projects.

(1) Phase IX. During the early months of the year troop transfers within the command gave rise to new housing requirements that had not been considered in planning the FY 1955 construction program. While USAREUR had planned sufficient housing to justify concurrent travel for all areas of the command, tactical troop transfers created surpluses in certain areas. Once the construction of a project had begun in a given area, a transfer of any of the units under construction to another higher priority area was impossible, regardless of the fluctuations in requirements. Although sufficient housing units had been planned for the over-all command requirements many of these were in locations where they could not be used by the dependents of tactical troops. In October 1954 the Engineer Division was instructed to add 702 housing units to the August increment of the FY 1955 construction program, which was then in the final stages of preparation for approval by the Chief of Staff and submission to the Department of the Army. These units would be used to cover minor changes in local requirements; they formed Phase IX of the USAREUR housing program.[92]

(2) The February 1955 Requirement. Certain changes in operational planning, together with the scheduled relocation of several troop units, increased the requirements for new construction in February 1955. Four projects, neither foreseen nor included in any construction program, were suddenly needed so urgently that they could not be included in the FY 1957 dollar construction program. These new projects, costing $717,000, were troop support facilities for the Army Security Agency at Herzogenaurach; basic load facilities for three "Honest John" units; security facilities for the 280-mm. gun battalions; and a building for the CIC Central Registry.[93] These projects were to be carried out with available Deutsche Mark funds, which meant that construction plans had to be completed in time to permit funding obligation before the granting of West

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[91](1) USAREUR Engr Div Hist Rept, 1 Jul 54-30 Jun 55, Sec. IV. SECRET (information used UNCLASSIFIED). (2) Interv, Mr. J. R. Moenk, USAREUR Hist Div, with J. B. Bortnyck, USAREUR Engr Div Real Estate Br, 18 Oct 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

[92]C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR Engr, 14 Oct 54, sub: FY 1955 Dependent Housing Construction. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR ACOFS G4 Cen files 624 (1954), Vol. I, Item 56.

[93]Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to TAG for DEP LOG, 10 Feb 55, sub: Request for Approval of New Construction Projects. AG 600.1 GLD. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1955), Vol. I, Item 13A atchd.

German sovereignty. The Department of the Army approved the new projects and included them in the FY 1955 construction program for Germany.[94]

c. Limitations on Obligations. With the granting of West German sovereignty on 5 May 1955, a German-American agreement became effective according to which all occupation cost funds received by the U.S. forces would have to be expended within 18 months. After that, all outstanding obligations would have to be paid from dollar funds. The Engineer Division was therefore instructed to insure the cooperation of the West German Federal Ministry of Finance in liquidating before the deadline all construction projects executed by the German Federal Construction Agency. The necessary negotiations with the Ministry of Finance were scheduled to be completed by 6 July 1955.[95]

d. Use of Welfare Funds for Construction. A review of the FY 1955 construction program in January 1955 resulted in the indefinite deferment or virtual elimination of many nonessential recreational facilities. An ad hoc committee was therefore formed to determine whether Central Welfare fund money could be used for such construction. The committee arrived at the conclusion that the use of the Central Fund was legal. No welfare funds had so far been budgeted for construction purposes, and the cost of the proposed projects would be approximately $2,000,000.[96] The Army Welfare Board, Germany-Austria-France, was thereupon instructed to examine the Central Welfare Fund budget for money that could be made available to construct recreational facilities within USAREUR and USFA.[97]

A review of the current and projected financial status of the Central Welfare Fund made in February 1955 revealed that $2,500,000 could be provided for construction during FY 1955, with $1,500,000 immediately available and the balance on or before 30 June 1955. The board reported that the above sum would be made available for the construction of recreation, morale, and welfare facilities within USAREUR and USFA, including European Exchange Service projects eliminated from the appropriated Deutsche Mark fund through necessity. A review of the Central Welfare Fund would have to be made in August or September 1955 to determine the

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[94] Interv, Mr. J. R. Moenk, USAREUR Hist Div, with Capt E. J. Fuller, USAREUR ACOFS G4 Instl Br, 19 Aug 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

[95] C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR Engr, 8 Jun 55, sub: Projects Obligated to the German Governmental Construction Agency. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR ACOFS G4 Cen files, 400.318 (1955), Vol. I.

[96] C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 29 Jan 55, sub: Possible Use of Central Welfare Funds for Construction of Recreational Facilities. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1955), Vol. I, Item 12A-1.

[97] Memo, USAREUR COFS to C/Army Welfare Bd, 4 Feb 55, sub: Possible Use of Central Welfare Funds for Construction of Recreational Facilities. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 12A-1 atchd.

availability of funds during FY 1956 for this same purpose.[98] By 30 June 1955 USAREUR compiled a list of projects in France and Germany--USFA was eliminated after the Austrian Independence Treaty--costing $2,466,000. Certain of these projects had already been approved for construction by the Welfare Board but were awaiting authority from the Department of the Army for delegation under Title II of the First War Powers Act. A reply was expected by 12 July 1955.[99]

e. German Alternate Housing Construction. After approximately one year of negotiation, the West German Ministry of Finance proposed a supplement to the second program of alternate housing construction in March 1955. The supplement provided for the construction of 906 additional alternate dwelling units--606 at Army stations and 300 for USAFE--according to designs previously reviewed and approved by the Engineer Division. The 606 units scheduled for construction at Army stations were allocated as follows: Southern Area Command, 282; Headquarters Area Command, 84; Northern Area Command, 204; and Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation, 36. The program was accepted by USAREUR on 7 April 1955.[100]

As of 30 June 1955 a total of 2,454 alternate family units had been received from the West German Government. This number was approximately two-thirds of the entire alternate housing program proposed by the Germans and accepted by USAREUR.[101]

f. Faulty Construction, Western Area Command. USAREUR received two reports from the Department of the Army that faulty construction in the Western Area Command was causing concern in the United States. In August 1954 the Judge Advocate General transmitted the copy of a report prepared by his office for the Hon. Walter Reihlman, Chairman of the Subcommittee of the House Committee for Government Operations, on construction deficiencies in the Vogelweh Dependent Housing area near Kaiserslautern. This report, which resulted from an injury to a dependent child caused by falling plaster, noted many building deficiencies in the Vogelweh apartments and community center facilities due to poor design, poor workmanship on the part of the contractor, and a lack of, or

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[98] Memo, C/Army Welfare Bd to USAREUR COFS, 19 Feb 55, sub cited above. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[99] C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR ACOFS G1, 8 Jul 55, sub: Construction Using Welfare Funds. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR ACOFS G4 Cen files, 600 (1955), Vol. I.

[100] (1) C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 6 Apr 55, sub: Supplement to 2d Program of German Alternate Housing Construction. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1955), Vol. I, Item 21A atchd. (2) USAREUR ltr, 22 Apr 55, same sub. AG 600.1 GLD-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[101] Interv, Mr. J. R. Moenk, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. J. R. Bortnyck, USAREUR Engr Div Real Estate Br, 18 Oct 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

inadequate, supervision.[102] Again in December 1954 construction in WACOM was criticized in a General Accounting Office (GAO) report. Although the GAO investigation had been under way for approximately two years, this was the first report with specific findings that had been made available to Headquarters, USAREUR. The report stated that faulty construction resulted from poor planning and design by German architect-engineer firms, which adapted USAREUR standard plans and specifications for use in Germany; substitution of inferior materials; poor workmanship by the contractors; lack of supervision by architect-engineer firms and inadequate inspections by Army authorities; and performance of work during the frost period to meet completion deadlines. These charges were supported by numerous photographs, many of which showed cracks in the dependent housing buildings at Vogelweh. USAREUR officials disputed the interpretation given these photographs and described some of them as being normal construction expansion joints erroneously labeled as large cracks.[103]

In justifying the execution of its construction program, USAREUR stressed that in the augmentation and build-up of the command, speed was essential and the amount of construction was enormous. From 1951 to 1953 the value of construction executed in Germany totaled $504 million, approximately one-third of which was concentrated in WACOM. The military situation was such in 1951 that normal procurement and construction procedures had to be bypassed in the interest of quickly improving the tactical situation. The alleged deficiencies, moreover, were based on a comparison with stateside concepts of permanent construction, whereas construction in Germany was considered to be of a temporary nature. Only few U.S. supervisory personnel were available so that German supervisors and contractors had to be employed who were unfamiliar with American requirements and methods. If a sufficient number of qualified officers and civilians had been available during the buildup in WACOM, many of the imperfections in construction would not have occurred.[104]

g. Debarment of Construction Firms. Early in 1954 the West German Government had begun to investigate construction firms operating in the Northern Area Command, an effort that resulted in court actions against 34 firms for price fixing. As a result, the Judge Advocate Division recommended that 26 of these firms be precluded from USAREUR contracting for a period of 3 months and that the other 8 be suspended for a longer

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[102] Memo for rcd, USAREUR ACOFS G4 Instl Br, 25 Aug 54, sub: Information on WACOM Construction. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR ACOFS G4 Cen files, 600.1 (1954), Vol. III, Item 84.

[103] Memo, USAREUR JA to USAREUR COFS, 4 Jan 55, sub: Investigation of Faulty Construction in WACOM, USAREUR. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 333.5 (1955), Vol. I, Item 1 atchd.

[104] 1st Ind, USAREUR to COFSA, 10 Jan 55, sub: Reply to GAO Report, sub: Investigation in Faulty Construction in WACOM, USAREUR. AG 600 AEENG (20 Dec 54). UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

period since they had been fined for additional illegal actions. The Engineer Division amended these recommendations to provide for debarment of the 8 firms until 31 January 1955. The debarment period began on 15 September and extended to 15 December 1954 for 26 of the firms and until 31 January 1955 for the remaining 8.[105]

107. Construction in France

a. Funding. The Department of the Army's limitation on obligations for the USAREUR military construction program in France for FY's 1954-55 was placed at $55,000,000 each.[106] This precluded construction of any facilities programmed for FY 1954 since projects previously approved by the Department of Defense for construction in that period amounted to $55,272,000.[107] Because of the low rate of obligation during the previous fiscal year, the Department of the Army canceled the FY 1955 USAREUR construction program for France that had been submitted for approval in September 1953.[108] In June 1954 the previous limitation on obligations for FY 1955 was being reconsidered by the Department of the Army, which requested an estimate of the cumulative obligations as of 30 June 1954 and an estimate of the obligations for FY 1955.[109] Based on figures submitted by the Joint Construction Agency (JCA), US EUCOM estimated the cumulative obligations as of 30 June 1954 at approximately $116 million. Since the Military Construction, Army (MCA), budget authorized approximately $227 million for construction in France, a balance of $111 million remained. The rate of progress on the MCA program in France was dependent upon such factors as JCA's capability, the ability of the French agencies to place contracts, and the construction load for the U.S. Air Force. Based on firm contracts awarded and the June forecast, JCA estimated the average monthly rate of obligation at approximately $7,500,000 for the first six months of 1954. Since no major rate increase was anticipated during

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[105] Memo for rcd, USAREUR ACOFS G4 Proc Br, 1 Sep 54, sub: Policy Considerations Relative to Debarment of Construction Firms. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR ACOFS G4 Cen files, 381 (1954), Vol. I, Item 37.

[106] Cable DA-939100, COFSA from ACOFS G4 to CINCUSAREUR, 16 May 53. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1953), Vol. II, Item 39 atchd.

[107] 2d Ind, COFSA to CINCUSAREUR, 6 Jun 53, sub: Restriction on Development of USAREUR Installations in France. SECRET. In file above, Item 48A atchd.

[108] C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 24 Apr 54, sub: Submission of USAREUR Future Construction Program--France. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1954), Vol. IA, Item 46.

[109] Cable DA-962511, DA from G4/C2 to US CINCEUR, 3 Jun 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above, Vol. II, Item 56.

FY 1955, US EUCOM recommended a ceiling of $90 million for MCA obligations during FY 1955. On 2 July 1954 the Department of the Army established the obligation ceiling for construction in France at $140 million for the combined FY's 1954-55. Projects programmed but not obligated during the first fiscal year could be carried over into FY 1955, if the total ceiling for the two years was not exceeded.[110] During FY 1954 total obligations had risen from approximately $73 to $121 million so that nearly 48 out of the $55 million authorized for this purpose had been obligated. Therefore, the obligation ceiling for FY 1955 was actually $92,000,000 or slightly more than the amount recommended by US EUCOM.[111]

In answer to an inquiry from the State Department, JCA estimated in March 1955 its obligations for the entire fiscal year at $40 million with expenditures at an equal amount for the same period.[112] Cumulative obligations at the end of FY 1955, however, totaled $138,741,206, or only $17,602,817 more than at the end of the preceding fiscal year.[113] As of 30 June 1955, $254,898,338 had been made available to USAREUR for construction in France. This included $248,740,000 in MCA funds appropriated by Congress, plus repair and utility funds and contributions from the French Government. (Chart 5.) While $229,918,000 had been apportioned by the Army for expenditure in France, actual obligations totaled only $138,741,206. The value of work in place amounted to $104,794,000, of which only $89,265,657 had been paid through reimbursement to the French Government.[114]

b. Inspections. The inspection of projects under construction in France posed a serious problem for the U.S. forces, because the French Government insisted that French personnel assume the major portion of this responsibility. In October 1954 the Secretary of Defense announced that effective immediately, all inspections of military construction in France would be conducted in the following priority: by personnel under direct employment of the JCA; by U.S. personnel employed under direct

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[110](1) Cable EC-9-2586, US CINCEUR to DA for G4/C2, 15 Jun 54. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Cable DA-963969, DA from G4/C2 to US CINCEUR and CINCUSAREUR, 2 Jul 54. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in file above, Item 56 atchd.

[111]USAREUR COMZ Mthly Progress Repts, 30 Jun 53, p. 58; and 30 Jun 54, p. 51. SECRET (information used UNCLASSIFIED).

[112]Cable JCA-650, Dir JCA to DA, 22 Mar 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1955), Vol. I, Item 2 atchd.

[113](1) USAREUR COMZ Mthly Progress Rept, 30 Jun 54, p. 51. (2) USAREUR Quarterly Review of Log Actvs, 30 Jun 55, p. 71. Both SECRET (information used UNCLASSIFIED).

[114](1) Ibid. (2) Interv, Mr. J. R. Moenk, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj W. E. Ross, USAREUR ACOFS G4 Instl Br, 19 Aug 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

Chart 5

USAREUR COMZ LOFC - MCA DOLLAR FUND STATUS



Source: USAREUR ACOFS G4 Mgmt & Admin Br. UNCLASSIFIED.

SECRET



SOURCE: USAREUR ACOFS G4 MGMT & ADMIN .BR. SECRET.

MAP I

SECRET

Title II contracts[115] to JCA; and by French personnel under Title II contract. Any obligations to the French to use Title II contractors would be honored, but the above priorities would apply to all future construction projects. Any previous instructions that conflicted with this directive were rescinded.[116]

c. POL Pipeline. At the beginning of FY 1955 a number of changes were made in the design and construction of the facilities for the POL pipeline through France. The Quartermaster Division reduced the number of fuels to be transmitted through the pipeline from 5 to 3, deferred the construction of the storage installations at Brou, and modified the storage requirements at Donges accordingly. Tank farm A at Donges was abandoned, and tank farms B and C were redesignated to use floating roof-type tanks, which increased the total capacity to 1,010,000 barrels. The Donges unloading facilities were changed to discharge only two T-2-type tankers, while an offshore anchorage facility for both T-2- and T-4-type tankers was planned in the Rade du Croisic off St. Nazaire. This anchorage was to be served by 20,000 barrels-per-hour unloading facilities connected with the tank farm at Donges by a 2-mile marine pipeline and a 20-mile overland pipeline.[117] By 30 June 1955 the pipeline was completed from Donges to Melun, with the section from Melun to Chalons to be completed on or about 1 October 1955 (Map 1). The "inplace" value of the pipeline facilities on 30 June 1955 was $17,253,000, while the JCA working estimate for the remaining construction requirements was $44,277,000. The JCA estimated date for operational readiness of the POL pipeline system was September 1956.[118]

Construction accomplishments for the year included the laying of 283 miles out of 307 miles of 12-inch pipeline; the initiation of building fuel storage and related facilities for a total of 3,479,000 barrels of POL products; and the completion of plans for 82 miles of 12-inch and 10-inch pipelines, 8 pipeline pump stations, and fuel storage facilities for 1,874,000 barrels of POL products. In addition, construction of the unloading dock at Donges was nearing completion at the end of the fiscal year.[119]

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[115] See Glossary for definition of Titles I-III contracts.

[116] Cable DA-555250, DA from G4/C2 to US CINCEUR, 12 Oct 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1954), Vol. III, Item 92.

[117] Memos, USAREUR Engr to USAREUR COFS, 7 Jul, 13 Aug 54, sub: Monthly Pipeline Construction Progress Report. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 381.3 (1954), Vol. I, Items 28, 33.

[118] USAREUR Quarterly Review of Log Actvs, 30 Jun 55, pp. 6-7. SECRET.

[119] USAREUR Engr Div Hist Rept, 1 Jul 54-30 Jun 55, Sec. IV. SECRET (information used UNCLASSIFIED).

d. Dependents Housing. The dependents housing program in France made progress in August 1954 when US EUCOM received a package proposal from Lambert and Company to construct 1,012 family units at various locations--564 for the Air Force and 448 for the Army. The general provisions of the proposal included a 23-month construction period, a 5-year guarantee of 95 percent occupancy, and $110 average monthly rental excluding heat and hot water. All units were to be ranch-type duplex houses with four buildings to the acre. The Army housing sites selected and the number of units at each location were as follows: Nancy, 100 units; Poitiers, 152; Chatellerault (Ingrandes), 28; La Rochelle, 100; and Bordeaux, 68.[120]

On 18 November 1954 the Department of Defense approved a revised rental-guarantee contract with Lambert and Company which provided for 1,184 family units, increasing the Army portion to 568 units and that of the Air Force to 616. USAREUR planned to add 20 units at Nancy for a total of 120 at that location, and build the remaining 100 at Metz.[121] The Commanding General, COMZ, was to represent USAREUR in the management and operation of the Army's portion of the contract.[122]

Original instructions from the Department of Defense for rental guarantee housing contracts stipulated that the guarantee would cover 95 percent occupancy for a period of 5 years.[123] But, due to the impossibility of obtaining sufficient offers for a 5-year guarantee period, the Department of Defense authorized a limited extension to 7 years for contracts that could not be concluded with the shorter guarantee. Such projects, however, were to contain more floor space because of the increased financial protection.[124] In December 1954, the Department of the Army, acting as executive agent for the Department of Defense, authorized US CINCEUR to negotiate existing rental contracts in France on a 7-year basis. The 7-year guarantee plan was to be used in package deals to satisfy all of the remaining housing requirements in France with as few contractors as possible. This procedure would prevent contractors from selecting only the most desirable areas and rejecting the less desirable

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[120] Cable EC-9-3407, US CINCEUR to DA for G4, 13 Aug 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 620 (1954), Vol. I, Item 37.

[121] Cable EC-3-4989, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE and USAREUR COMZ, 22 Nov 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 37 atchd.

[122] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to US CINCEUR, 9 Dec 54, sub: Rental Guarantee Housing "Pkg Proposal." UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[123] Cable 141550Z, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 14 May 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 620 (1953), Vol. I, Item 21.

[124] Cable EC-9-2060, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 10 Nov 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Vol. II, Item 55.

ones. Drafts of tentative contracts would have to be submitted to the Department of Defense for review and approval.[125]

In January 1955 US EUCOM circulated the prospectus for a second package housing program for some 4,500 family units, including 784 for the Army.[126] Three months later US EUCOM approved the award of a contract to Aaron-Bertrand and Associates who were to construct a total of 2,500 units, including the Army portion. The contract provided for a 7-year rental guarantee on units that would rent for an average of $105 per month, excluding heat and hot water.[127] During June 1955, one of the associates of Aaron-Bertrand, the Compagnie Generale d'Assurances, requested permission to build the 100 units scheduled for Orleans on a separate contract. This company had sponsored the original 300-unit project at Orleans and was anxious to construct all its units in one location.[128] On 30 June 1955, the Commanding General, COMZ, signed two contracts for rental guarantee housing in France, one with Aaron-Bertrand and Associates for a total of 684 units and another with the Compagnie Generale d'Assurances for 100 units at Orleans. The number of units to be constructed at each location under the Aaron-Bertrand contract was as follows: Verdun, 200; La Rochelle, 100; Bar-le-Duc, 72; Blaye, 72; Poitiers, 48; Bazas, 40; Chinon, 40; Angouleme, 36; St. Andre de Cubzac, 28; St. Jean d'Angely, 28; and Perigueux, 20.[129] With the signing of these two contracts, USAREUR COMZ was assured of the construction of 1,352 family units at 16 separate locations in France.

e. Suspension of Construction. On 20 September 1954 the Department of Defense stopped all procurement activities in France, including solicitation, negotiations, and expenditures for new real estate within the country.[130] Eight days later, all construction in France was

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[125] Cable DA-972986, DA from Dep Log/M2 to US CINCEUR, 21 Dec 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 620 (1954), Vol. I, Item 37 atchd.

[126] Cable EC-9-391, US CINCEUR to DA for Dep Log/M3, 26 Jan 55. CONFIDENTIAL. In US EUCOM SJS 600.1 RGH (1955), Vol. I.

[127] Ltr, US CINCEUR to M. Maurice Aaron and M. Jean Bertrand, 12 Apr 55, sub: Selection of Contractor for 2d Package Deal. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[128] Interv, Mr. J. R. Moenk, USAREUR Hist Div, with Col P. A. Shaw, US EUCOM Housing Gp, Paris, France, 27 Jan 56. UNCLASSIFIED.

[129] Ltr, CG USAREUR COMZ to US CINCEUR through CINCUSAREUR, 12 Jul 55, sub: Dependent Housing - RG Program. UNCLASSIFIED. In US EUCOM SJS 600.1 RGH (1955), Vol. II.

[130] (1) Cable EC-9-4107, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE, CINCNELM and JCA, 20 Sep 54. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 092 France (1954), Vol. II, Item 42. (2) Cable EC-9-4128, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 1 Oct 54. SECRET. In USAREUR ACOFS G4 Cen files, Incoming cables (Oct 54).

indefinitely suspended pending an on-the-spot review of the situation by top-level departmental officials.[131]

USAREUR COMZ immediately objected to these decisions and stressed that they would jeopardize that headquarters' relations with the French. Since numerous negotiations for real estate were close to final commitment, COMZ requested guidance as to what explanations should be given to the French without jeopardizing future COMZ negotiations.[132]

On 26 October 1954 the suspension on new obligations of funds for construction was relaxed. Such obligations could be resumed at the rate of $5 million for October, $8 million for November, and $12 million for December 1954. These totals included the costs of essential architect-engineer contracts, procurement contracts, and Army and Air Force construction contracts and change orders. Construction obligations would be resumed from crucial line items, designated as Group I, from a list prepared by JCA in coordination with USAFE and USAREUR and approved by the Department of Defense. No substitution of Group I items could be made without approval of the Secretary of Defense. The two component commands were authorized to consummate such real estate actions as necessary so that JCA could contract for construction of the approved items. At the same time US EUCOM instructed JCA to make all obligations for October from approved items on which the necessary contractual forms could be expeditiously completed. For the November and December obligations, projects would be about equally divided between the Army and Air Force, exclusive of the POL pipeline but including construction contracts, procurement, and architect-engineer services.[133] On 5 January 1955 Department of Defense limitations on construction were removed and all construction projects and procurement procedures in effect before the freeze were restored.[134]

108. Real Estate

a. Purchase of Commercial Facilities in Germany. The construction programs for FY's 1955-56 provided for the release of certain commercial and industrial facilities held on a rent-payable basis. This decision

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[131] Cable EC-9-4070, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 28 Sep 54. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1954), Vol. II, Item 89B.

[132] Cable COZLG-296, USAREUR COMZ to CINCUSAREUR, 7 Oct 54. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 092 France (1954), Vol. II, Item 42 atchd.

[133] Cable EC-9-4485, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE and JCA, 26 Oct 54. SECRET. In file cited above.

[134] Cable DEF-973613, OSD to US CINCEUR, 5 Jan 55. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1955), Vol. I, Item 2.

had both political and economic motivations since the West German Government desired to have such properties returned to their owners, and the United States would profit by no longer having to make rental payments.[135] Shortly before the end of FY 1954, however, a plan was developed to purchase certain of these commercial facilities with occupation cost funds. The U.S. High Commissioner for Germany promised his support in concluding the necessary governmental agreements with the West German Government.[136]

With German authorities agreeing in principle, the Department of the Army on 13 August 1954 approved the USAREUR project with the following stipulations: the Bonn Government would have to agree to divert Deutsche Mark construction funds from the occupation cost budget for the purchase of such properties; the property selected would have to conform with U.S. requirements for long-term use; release of the property in question would have to require new construction costing the same or more than the purchase price; and no commitments would be made that would require future dollar purchase payments.[137]

On 15 September 1954 USAREUR executed and delivered to HICOG the first requisition order 6 GA for the program, and in January 1955 the Ministry of Finance transmitted a progress report on the purchase negotiations. The majority of the owners approached were willing to sell provided their properties were properly evaluated by a German official agency. By 10 January USAREUR obligated a total of DM 65 million to the Ministry of Finance for the program and announced that additional funds be made available if required.[138] By 30 June 1955 USAREUR had set aside DM 126 million, but actual obligations to the German authorities had not increased over the 10 January 1955 figure. Progress was slow because of

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[135] Memo, Maj W. D. Nold, USAREUR ACOFS G4 Instl Br, to USAREUR ACOFS G4 Fiscal Rqmts Off, 15 Jul 54, sub: FY 1955 and FY 1956 DM Construction Programs, Germany. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR ACOFS G4 Cen files, 600.1 (1954), Vol. III, Item 70.

[136] (1) Ltr, HICOG to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Jun 54, sub: Purchase of Commercial Facilities for USAREUR. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to HICOG, 17 Jun 54, same sub. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR SGS 601 (1954), Vol. I, Item 7A atchd.

[137] (1) Cable DA-540239, DA from G4 to CINCUSAREUR, 13 Aug 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above. (2) Memo for rcd, Mr. W. M. Pool, USAREUR ACOFS G4 Instl Br, 4 Aug 54, sub: Purchase of Required Requisitioned Facilities. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR ACOFS G4 Cen files, 601 (1954), Vol. I, Item 51.

[138] (1) Memo, C/USAREUR ACOFS G4 Instl Br to USAREUR ACOFS G4, 17 Sep 54, sub: Conversion of Requisitioned Properties to Public Property. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 56. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to HICOG, 10 Jan 55, sub: Purchase of German Commerical Facilities. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 601 (1955), Vol. I, Item 2 atchd.

the high prices asked by the owners and the reluctance of some to sell. Only DM 5,671,895 were actually expended during the fiscal year by the Ministry of Finance.[139]

b. Purchase of Property in Berlin. In early November 1954 HICOG made available to USAREUR some DM 30 million that was surplus to State Department needs. HICOG specified that DM 10 million be used for the purchase of 169 requisitioned dwellings in West Berlin to avoid procuring scarce land sites for construction of replacement apartments. The remainder was to be used to finance a portion of the USAREUR construction program. In December 1954, the Department of the Army, with State Department concurrence, approved a USAREUR recommendation to obligate DM 10 million to the German Federal Republic to purchase 169 dwellings in Berlin for senior officers and large families. Although approving the request the Department cautioned that it was not setting a precedent and that similar projects would be considered independently on their merits.[140] By 30 June 1955, only 30 of the 169 houses authorized had been purchased by the West German Government.

The Berlin Senate appropriated DM 4,200,000 from the West Berlin budget to purchase commercial and industrial facilities for the U.S. forces. Since this amount was inadequate, USAREUR was undecided as to what facilities should be purchased.[141]

c. The Derequisition Program. Article 48 of the Bonn Conventions provided for the continued use of requisitioned real estate by U.S. forces for one year from the date of West German sovereignty, and for the German Federal Republic to enact legislation enabling the property to remain available after that date. While the use of real estate would not constitute a problem for the first year, the continued retention of numerous facilities after that period could not be justified. For this reason, a plan had to be developed for the disposition and/or retention of all requisitioned property held by USAREUR on the effective date of West German sovereignty.[142] Conferences were held at USAREUR headquarters during the period 20-27 June 1955 to coordinate property disposition plans with area commands and interested staff divisions. Discussions

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[139] Interv, Mr. J. R. Moenk, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. W. M. Pool and Maj B. Biggs, USAREUR ACOFS G4 Instl Br, 19 Aug 55. UNCLASSIFIED.

[140] (1) Cable SC-22901, USAREUR to DA, 8 Nov 54. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Cable DA-972102, DA from Compt-B to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Dec 54. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR SGS 112 (1954), Vol. II, Item 36A atchd.

[141] Interv, Moenk with Pool and Biggs, 19 Aug 55, cited above.

[142] C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR Engr, 7 May 55, sub: Disposition of all Requisitioned Real Estate, Germany. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR ACOFS G4 Cen files, 602 (1955), Vol. I.

centered about such properties as residential housing for which previous disposition arrangements had not been made, and commercial and industrial facilities not programmed for purchase, replacement by new construction, or operation through service contracts. After the conferees screened the facilities in each area command, they decided that certain properties could be derequisitioned before 6 May 1956 and that others could be consolidated into rent-free properties. They also established for each area command a firm consolidation of overt and covert requirements necessary to fulfill intelligence requirements. As a final action the conferees agreed that certain recreational facilities, regardless of desirability, could not be justifiably retained.[143] Because of the time element involved, these decisions could not be implemented before the end of the fiscal year.

Section VI: Logistical Relationships with U.S. Military and Civilian Agencies in Europe

109. Logistical Support of US EUCOM

Responsibilities for logistical support among the US EUCOM component commands were fixed by policy directives. According to these directives USAREUR provided logistical and administrative support also for Headquarters, US EUCOM, and its organic headquarters elements.

a. R&U Support Problems. On 1 September 1954 US EUCOM complained that the engineer support was inadequate, especially repairs, utility maintenance, and the accomplishment of approved work projects. US EUCOM attributed this failure to the recent activation of its new headquarters at Camp des Loges and to the lack of funds and personnel.[144] Since USAREUR was responsible for providing this support, immediate action had to be initiated despite the shortage of funds available for this purpose. Since departmental policy limited the use of Army maintenance and operation funds to urgent requirements arising from changes in mission or other circumstances, programming under normal budget procedures was precluded. All budgetary funds having been committed to high priority projects, USAREUR requested US EUCOM to furnish a priority list of

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[143] C/N 2, USAREUR Engr to USAREUR ACOFS G4, 13 Jul 55, to C/N 1, cited above.

[144] Ltr, Dep US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 1 Sep 54, sub: Logistical Support for US EUCOM. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 EUCOM (1954), Vol. I, Item 14A.

required projects for immediate action, if and when additional funds were forthcoming. The execution of the project was to be directly coordinated between US EUCOM and the Seine Area Command, COMZ.[145] These problems were included in this report to illustrate the need for revising existing directives.

b. Policy Directives and Support Functions. In February 1955 US EUCOM formed a committee consisting of staff officers from its headquarters and from component commands to review all policy directives for adequateness and comprehensiveness. Existing orders were to be brought up to date and reissued, if necessary. All foreseeable logistical functions and needs of the component commanders were to be defined. Appropriate policy directives were to be issued, and existing ones were to be checked for their compatibility with wartime missions. Every effort was to be made to insure economy and efficiency of interservice support.[146] No revisions of changes were to be made during the initial conference. At first the review committee would consider each directive separately, and each conferee would be prepared to answer the following questions:[147]

1. Does this policy directive prevent unnecessary duplication or overlapping?

2. Does it make an optimum geographic area support assignment?

3. Is adequate support rendered under its provisions?

4. Is it compatible with wartime support requirements?

5. Does it insure maximum peacetime economy consistent with wartime effectiveness? and

6. Is it satisfactory in all other respects?

At the first meeting, the component command representatives contended that US EUCOM's interpretation of Policy Directive 5-1 as the only means of disseminating instructions exclusive of letters was too restrictive, resulting in a mass of instructions and very little policy guidance. The committee therefore formed a subcommittee to clarify policy guidance

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[145] 1st Ind, USAREUR to US CINCEUR, 15 Sep 54, sub: Logistical Support for US EUCOM. AG 400 ENG (1 Sep 54). UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 14A atchd.

[146] Cable EC-3-506, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Feb 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 EUCOM (1955), Vol. I, Item 1.

[147] Cable EC-3-625, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 12 Feb 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 1 atchd.

and to discuss the limitation of such guidance to policy announcements. This subcommittee compiled a list of questions for study by the US EUCOM Assistant Chief of Staff, J4, who would develop new criteria to enable the component commands to reevaluate each logistical support policy directive.[148] However, this action was not completed before 30 June 1955.

The review of US EUCOM policy directives seemed to present a good opportunity for USAREUR to be relieved from the support functions for the Paris area. Relief from this responsibility would save 1,582 badly needed military and civilian spaces.[149] To justify the proposal a study was initiated to determine whether or not USAREUR ought to be responsible for the functions performed by the Seine Area Command, COMZ. Certain support responsibilities in the Paris area had been originally assigned to USAREUR at departmental level. Since relief from such responsibilities was doubtful, an effort had to be made to obtain assistance from other agencies. Apparently, the least costly method was to share the support functions in the Paris area with USAFE, which would lead to a more equitable distribution.[150] Because of the review of policy directives, however, USAREUR was unable to present its position on support functions before 30 June 1955.

110. Logistical Support of U.S. Air Forces, Europe

According to existing policy directives USAREUR was required to furnish personnel, both directly and indirectly, to support U.S. Air Forces in Germany and France. Since between 5,000 and 7,000 military and civilian personnel were estimated to be engaged in this activity, USAREUR felt that its portion of the load was too heavy.[151] The development of the Air Force dispersal program in FY 1955 threatened to aggravate this problem. USAREUR therefore decided to stay within applicable US EUCOM policy directives under the dispersal program, and to give USAFE supply and maintenance support of common-user items at depot or wing-base level only. Class IIIA support would be provided to the railhead or pipehead nearest the designated airbases.[152]

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[148] Memo, C/USAREUR ACOFS G4 Opns Br to USAREUR ACOFS G4, 7 Mar 55, sub: Review of US EUCOM Policy Directives. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR ACOFS G4 Cen files, 461 (1955), Vol. I.

[149] Memo, USAREUR DCOFS Opns to USAREUR COFS, 10 Feb 55, sub cited above. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 EUCOM (1955), Vol. I, Item I atchd.

[150] (1) C/N 1, USAREUR DCOFS Admin to USAREUR ACOFS G4, 14 Feb 55, sub: SACCZ. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to CINCUSAREUR, 21 Feb 55, sub: Support in the Paris area. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in file cited above.

[151] USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf 9, 13 Jul 54, p. 5. SECRET (information used UNCLASSIFIED). In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

[152] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CINCUSAFE, 8 Mar 55, sub: Logistical Support to USAFE. AG 400 GLD. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 USAFE (1955), Vol. I, Item 10.

a. Reimbursement for Subsistence. Effective 1 July 1954 direct consumer procedures were extended to Air Force overseas subsistence items. Under this policy all subsistence issued to the Air Force in Army overseas commands were to be reimbursed, and all Air Force requisitions submitted to Army overseas supply points were to contain certification of funds covering the cost of items desired. Sufficient funds, including amounts covering transportation charges, had to be available before the Army supply unit could ship the items requisitioned. All local purchases of subsistence for overseas Air Force installations were to be funded by the Air Force after 1 July 1954.[153]

b. Reimbursement to the Air Force. Reimbursement for logistical support was to be made on a mutual basis, for subsistence as well as for other items of supply. Army units serviced by Air Force commissaries were to effect reimbursement in the usual manner. If no Army fiscal station was available, the local Air Force office would provide the needed service. Upon application, Headquarters, USAREUR, provided Army subsistence funds to either Army or Air Force fiscal officers to effect reimbursement.[154]

In November 1954, the Department of the Army established the policy of reimbursing the Air Force for items issued to the Army. The Army was to replace in kind or reimburse the Air Force locally for all items supplied. Budgeting and funding for these items remained the responsibility of USAREUR; however, if funds for this purpose were not available within the command, they would have to be requested through channels from the Comptroller of the Army.[155]

c. Joint Occupancy of Airfields. As a part of the USAFE dispersal program, USAREUR and USAFE representatives reached an agreement concerning the mutual use of main and dispersal airfields. The agreement was to provide guidance at the battalion-squadron level where USAREUR-USAFE units would jointly occupy installations having a dispersal airfield. It served to define the responsibilities of each service for logistical support, airfield operation, security, construction, provost marshal and civil

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[153](1) Cable DA-525052, DA from Compt to CINCUSAREUR, 18 Jun 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 400.3 (1954), Vol. I, Item 16. (2) USAREUR ltr, 28 Jul 54, sub: Reimbursement Procedures for Supply of Subsistence to Air Force Units in Europe. AG 158 CQM-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[154]USAREUR ltr, 28 Jul 54, cited above.

[155]C/N 2, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR Ord Div, 7 Dec 54, sub: Requisitioning of Cross Service Supply Support from the Air Force. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR ACOFS G4 Cen files, 400 LS (1954), Vol. II, Item 66.

affairs, and for such miscellaneous services as civilian personnel, dependent support, morale and welfare, and communications.[156]

d. Depot Level Medical Support. In August 1954, USAFE recommended to US EUCOM the establishment of separate medical supply systems for Army and Air Force units in Europe. US EUCOM thereupon asked USAREUR to state its position. More specifically, did USAREUR favor continued joint operation of the Rhine Medical Depot? A point to be considered in this connection was the need for separate accountability in view of Army stock fund operation. Finally, if the USAFE suggestion was adopted, two medical supply channels would be needed between the European theater and the United States.

Although USAREUR did not object to USAFE's desire to establish a separate Air Force medical supply operation, it refused to concur since justification for such a change would have to be predicated on military operations.[157] The Rhine Medical Depot was not a joint installation, since the 7373 Air Materiel Squadron was merely attached for on-the-job training. Since the depot was capable of accomplishing its supply functions, USAREUR saw no need for a separate air medical depot. Moreover, the Medical-Dental Division of the Army Stock Fund could provide medical support to USAFE without the prescribed ownership accounts, thereby eliminating the need for duplicate supply channels.[158]

e. Ordnance Support. During FY 1954 the Department of the Army had directed USAREUR to provide depot maintenance and spare parts for Air Force mechanical heavy equipment (MHE). On 12 August 1954 the Department of the Air Force terminated the Army's responsibility by announcing that no further requirement existed for depot maintenance support of such equipment. Logistical support and supply of common parts for such equipment would be guided by Army SR 700-40-10.[159]

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[156](1) Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to CINCUSAREUR through COFS, 28 Mar 55, sub: USAREUR/USAFE Agreement for the Mutual Use of Airfields. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 8 Mar 55, same sub. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) C/N 1, USAREUR SGS to USAREUR ACOFS G4, 2 Apr 55, same sub. UNCLASSIFIED. All in USAREUR SGS 322 USAFE (1955), Vol. I, Item 2A atchd.

[157](1) Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, n.d., sub: Depot Level Support for Medical Materiel. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 381.3 (1954), Vol. II, Item 36A. (2) DD Dir 4000.8, 17 Nov 52. CONFIDENTIAL.

[158]1st Ind, USAREUR to US EUCOM, 19 Oct 54, sub: Depot Level Support for Medical Materiel. AG 400 GLD (30 Aug 54). CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 381.3 (1954), Vol. II, Item 36A atchd.

[159]Cable DA-539708Z, DA from G4/D3 to CINCUSAREUR, 12 Aug 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 400.3 (1954), Vol. I, Item 17A.

f. Support for Pilotless Bomber Squadron. In November 1954 Twelfth Air Force requested that the Giessen Army Detachment immediately furnish logistical support for about 50 men of Detachment 4, 69th Pilotless Bomber Squadron. The specific requirements included rations, gasoline and diesel fuel, emergency roadside vehicle repair, medical services, commissary and PX privileges, finance service, R&U support, and access to laundry and dry cleaning services. Similar support had previously been approved for a detachment of the 1st Pilotless Bomber Squadron at Driesdorf on 4 May 1954. However, since this squadron was later not used and the support requirements canceled, Twelfth Air Force requested a reinstatement of the previous support agreement. On 23 November 1954 USAREUR authorized Northern Area Command to provide the requested support within available resources and authorized direct contact with Twelfth Air Force to make the necessary arrangements.[160]

g. Transfer of Personnel to Wiesbaden Area Command. Early in FY 1955 Headquarters, USAFE, directed that all intracommand assignments in the Wiesbaden area be personally approved by its Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel before publication of reassignment orders. While USAFE did not consider Army units subject to this restriction, it did solicit USAREUR's cooperation in curtailing the number of intracommand transfers of married personnel with dependents into the Wiesbaden Area Command.[161] In reply USAREUR agreed to hold such transfers to the minimum necessary to maintain its operational mission and the combat effectiveness of Army units assigned to the Wiesbaden area.[162]

h. Support of Air Force Exchange Service. As a result of the separation of the Air Force (AFEX) from the Army post exchange (EES) service, effective 1 July 1954, USAFE requested 71,000 square feet of warehouse space and 42,400 square feet of administrative space by 1 September 1954, either in the Frankfurt area, or at Mainz or Kaiserslautern. At a later date 81,000 square feet of additional warehouse space would be needed. During the negotiations leading to the separation of the two exchange services, USAREUR had warned USAFE that such a division would presumably create additional space requirements that the Army would be unable to satisfy. To provide the space would necessitate new

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[160] (1) Cable 12-MLOPP-MS-5941, 12th AF to CINCUSAREUR, 16 Nov 54. SECRET. (2) Cable SC-24468, USAREUR to NACOM, 23 Nov 54. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR SGS 322 USAFE (1954), Vol. I, Item 25 atchd.

[161] (1) Cable EPACA-55165, CINCUSAFE to all USAFE units, 23 Aug 54. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAFE to CINCUSAREUR, 23 Sep 54, sub: Transfer of Army Personnel into WARCOM. EPACA. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR SGS 322 USAFE (1954), Vol. I, Item 37A atchd.

[162] 1st Ind, USAREUR to CINCUSAFE, 30 Sep 54, sub cited above. AG 220.3 GPA (23 Sep 54). UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

construction.[163] In refusing the USAFE request, USAREUR stated that its policy was to consolidate and retrench agencies to reduce space requirements to the minimum. Essential activities had been relocated to confiscated or other rent-free property whenever possible, and requisitioned commercial-type property housed only activities for which no rent-free accommodations were available. However, any addition to the USAFE FY 1955 construction program for Germany would be given expeditious treatment in the USAREUR program.[164]

111. Logistical Relationship with U.S. Forces Austria

On 22 December 1954, a new logistical support agreement was concluded between USAREUR and USFA. This agreement specified the respective responsibilities of the two commands for supporting USAREUR personnel in the Berchtesgaden area and consolidated a number of informal previous agreements. Class I retail support from the Southern Area Command was to be provided for USFA personnel in the Innsbruck area, and USFA was to support SACOM personnel in the Berchtesgaden area. This agreement replaced the USFA Support Plan, which had been in existence since 8 August 1951.[165]

As a result of the signing of the Austrian Peace Treaty on 15 May 1955, plans--Roll-up in Austria (RIA)--were drawn up for the evacuation of stocks located in USFA. The program consisted of two phases, namely the preliminary screening of Austrian stocks by the USAREUR technical services and the actual evacuation of selected stocks to USAREUR depots. By 30 June 1955 the technical services had screened all the USFA medical and transportation stocks and more than 50 percent of the other service stocks. Evacuation of the selected medical, chemical, and transportation supplies had already begun. The Department of the Army target date for complete evacuation was 90 days after final ratification of the treaty (R plus 90).[166]

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[163](1) Memo for rcd, USAREUR ACOFS G4 Instl Br, 20 Jul 54, sub: USAFE Request for Warehouse and Office Space. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 2 Aug 54, same sub. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 35A atchd.

[164]1st Ind, USAREUR to CINCUSAFE, 6 Aug 54, sub: Logistical Support for Income-Producing Nonappropriated Fund Activities. AG 601 GLD (30 Jun 54). UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[165](1) Cable SC-27849, CINCUSAREUR to CG USFA, 22 Dec 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR ACOFS G4 Cen files, outgoing cables (Dec 54). (2) USFA Regs (Log) No. 40-506, 18 Jan 55, sub: Support Agreement Between USFA and USAREUR. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR ACOFS G4 Cen files.

[166]USAREUR Quarterly Review of Log Actvs, 30 Jun 55, pp. 12-13. SECRET.

112. Relations with Miscellaneous Civilian Agencies in Germany

During the occupation period in Germany, CINCUSAREUR had been given rather broad authority[167] to furnish logistical support to civilian agencies and individuals not integral to the military establishment. When the Federal Republic of Germany achieved sovereignty on 5 May 1955, this authority was terminated. As a result, no logistical support could be furnished to civilian agencies or individuals who were not assimilated as a part of the U.S. Forces. Certain criteria had to be met to become assimilated and the German authorities had to be notified of the categories involved and the extent of assimilation.[168] USAREUR outlined the procedure for curtailing logistical support to the various categories of agencies after German sovereignty in a program that the Defense and State Departments approved prior to its implementation.[169] Under this program, U.S. and foreign civilian governmental agencies were to receive diplomatic and consular privileges and immunities rather than the military benefits that were provided for the U.S. Forces in the Bonn Conventions. By special dispensation, American, British, and French diplomatic and consular personnel retained the privilege to use USAREUR nonappropriated fund services, such as post exchanges, class VI stores, clubs, and messes, and theaters.[170] So far as the diplomatic and consular personnel were concerned, the most significant curtailment of logistical support was the loss of entitlement to U.S. Forces real estate, both for office space and for personal quarters.[171]

The American Red Cross, the University of Maryland, technical representatives and consultants, banks, the National Jewish Welfare Board, the United Seamen's Service, and six auto insurance companies were assimilated to the U.S. Forces, which authorized them to receive logistical support

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[167] SR 730-5-10, 20 Apr 49, sub: Oversea Supply, Acquisition and Transfer of Supplies and Services on a Cost Basis in Oversea Commands, par. 5. UNCLASSIFIED.

[168] Article 36, Bonn Conventions. UNCLASSIFIED.

[169] USAREUR ltr, to COFSA, 14 Apr 55, sub: Curtailment Program for Logistic Support of Civilian Agencies and Individuals in Germany. AG 400 GLD. UNCLASSIFIED.

[170] Ltr, Adenauer to HICOG, 23 Oct 54, sub: Paris Accords, par. 7, cited in Incl 2 to Comment 2, G4 to Hist Div, 18 Jan 56, to DF, 14 Dec 55, sub: Review of Hq USAREUR Annual Historical Report, 1 Jul 54-30 Jun 55. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Master file 314.7 (1956).

[171] Cable SC-42068, 27 Jun 55, cited in Incl 2 cited above.

from USAREUR.[172] However, the support furnished to the banks[173] and the auto insurance companies [174] was specifically limited by the Bonn Conventions. The press agencies and Embassy-sponsored private information, refugee, relief, restitution, and welfare agencies were no longer authorized to receive logistical support, except for some minor privileges that had been stipulated in the Bonn Conventions.[175] Civilian attorneys, the soft drink companies, a freight forwarding company, and a mail order company lost support entirely.

Technically, these changes were due to become effective on 5 May 1955, with the granting of German sovereignty; however, in order to allow a period for transition, most of the curtailment program was not enforced until 30 June 1955.[176] The program was not publicized, primarily because of its relationship to further negotiations with the German authorities. It did not apply to West Berlin since that area retained its occupation status. However, no increase in the logistical support furnished to civilian agencies in Berlin was authorized. This measure was taken to prevent new civilian agencies from moving to Berlin or existing ones from expanding their staffs.

113. Support of U.S. Commands and Agencies in France

a. Paris Air Traffic Center. In December 1954, USAFE proposed that a Paris air traffic center be established under its control, with an Army detachment assigned to process Army personnel using the facility.[177] An interservice conference was held at Wiesbaden on 16 April 1955 to discuss the operation of the air traffic center, which had already been established by USAFE at the Hotel Littre in Paris. The conferees agreed in principle to a draft policy directive prepared by USAFE, according to

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[172] Cable SX-3209, USAREUR to AMEMB, Bonn, 7 May 55. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 400 (1955), Vol. I, Item 1 atchd (B/P).

[173] (1) Ltr, AHC to Fed Min of Fin, 26 May 52, sub: Employees of Banks..., quoted in Cable SX-3209 cited. (2) Cable SC-36623, USAREUR to all Area Comds, 2 Jun 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[174] Article 36, of Bonn Conventions, par. 5. UNCLASSIFIED.

[175] (1) Cable SC-33686, USAREUR to all Area Comds, 19 May 55. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Cable SC-36155, same to same, 1 Jun 55. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) SC-37553 same to same, 9 Jun 55. UNCLASSIFIED. All in file cited above.

[176] Cable SC-35914, USAREUR to all Area Comds, 31 May 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[177] Memo, C/USAREUR ACOFS G4 Svcs Br to USAREUR ACOFS G4, 23 Dec 54, sub: Air Traffic Center, Paris. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR ACOFS G4 Cen files, 322 GEN (1954), Vol. II, Item 69.

which single component service responsibility was assigned to USAFE for the establishment and operation of a jointly used Paris air passenger center. The responsibilities of the other component commands were also delineated in this draft directive.[178]

USAREUR concurred on 24 May 1955, but stipulated that an agreement would have to be reached as to the proportion of Army and Air Force personnel to be furnished for the joint facility before the draft directive was submitted to US EUCOM for approval. While this concurrence committed USAREUR to participate in the operation of the facility, the stipulated supplemental agreement was not reached by 30 June 1955.[179]

b. Paris Administrative Motor Pool. In November 1953 the Department of the Army had asked USAREUR to submit plans for operating an administrative motor pool that would provide transportation service in the Paris area. Not until 3 June 1955, however, did USAREUR forward the draft policy directive to US EUCOM for approval. In December 1954, after considerable staffing, the Transportation Division had prepared a draft directive proposing the establishment of a Paris motor transport service that would operate 393 motor vehicles located in 2 motor pools and 4 subpools throughout the Paris area.[180] This draft was revised in April 1955 to provide for ordnance rebuild. According to the revised draft all military motor transportation in the Paris area, except for SHAPE and the 7415 Air Base Squadron was to be managed by the Paris Motor Transport Service. Maximum use was to be made of commercial facilities for contract maintenance--as provided in AR 750-5--to supplement the limited maintenance potential of the motor-pool shops.[181] Meanwhile, US EUCOM formed a committee to study the transportation problem in Paris and USAREUR's draft directive. The committee approved the contents and initiated the issuance of the policy directive by 30 June.[182]

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[178] Ltr, CINCUSAFE to CINCUSAREUR, 22 Apr 55, sub: Proposed US EUCOM Policy Directive "Paris Air Passenger Center." UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 EUCOM (1955), Vol. I, Item 7A.

[179] (1) C/N 1, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 5 May 55, sub cited above. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) 1st Ind, USAREUR to CINCUSAFE, 24 May 55, same sub. AG 360 GLD (22 Apr 55). UNCLASSIFIED. Both in file cited above, Item 7A atchd.

[180] C/N 1, USAREUR Trans Div to Ord Div and USAREUR ACOFS G4, 21 Dec 54, sub: Administrative Motor Pool Operations in Paris, France, Area. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 COMZ (1955), Vol. I, Item 2A.

[181] C/N 1, USAREUR Trans Div to USAREUR COFS, 23 Apr 55, sub cited above. RYT 537 MTR. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 2A atchd.

[182] (1) C/N 3, USAREUR Trans Div to USAREUR SGS, 2 Jun 55, to C/N 1 above. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to US CINCEUR, 3 Jun 55, same sub. AG 537 RYT-MTR. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in file cited above.

114. Support of International Headquarters

In July 1954, the Department of Defense announced that unified policies outlining detailed pricing and billing procedures for military equipment deliveries to NATO would be forthcoming. US EUCOM was to negotiate with SHAPE headquarters concerning a lease rental policy for equipment loaned to international headquarters since 1 January 1953.[183] The first reaction to this new policy was negative. In the absence of compelling reasons, US EUCOM preferred not to make any recommendations to the Department of Defense for changes of existing policies. It would suffice to prepare a set of clarifying instructions according to which the extent and type of support rendered would be the prerogative of the service component assigned support responsibility in a specific area. Maximum support would be given by existing service facilities and installations. The support given to U.S. elements of international headquarters would be on an austerity basis and not in excess of the service component's own standards. Finally, maximum cross servicing would be effected in the interest of fulfilling particular requirements or achieving greater economy.[184]

As of 30 June 1955, US EUCOM and SHAPE were still negotiating lease rental agreements for various items of technical service equipment used by NATO international headquarters.

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[183] Cable EC-9-2908, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 13 Jul 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 400.336 (1954), Vol. I, Item 2A atchd.

[184] Cable 100838Z, US CINCEUR to all NATO comds, 10 Aug 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 EUCOM (1954), Vol. I, Item 11B.

CHAPTER 8

Military-Political Relationships and Activities

Section I: Developments in the German Area of Responsibility

115. Relations with HICOG/U.S. Mission to Germany

a. Executive Order. On 5 May 1955 President Eisenhower signed Executive Order 10608 defining the relationship of USAREUR to the U.S. Mission in Germany. The result of approximately one year of negotiations between USAREUR and US HICOG, this order represented a compromise between the views of the two organizations. USAREUR, as the single point of contact between the U.S. forces in Germany on the one hand and US HICOG on the other, conducted these negotiations on behalf of US CINCEUR. Two previous orders, dated 6 June 1949 and 21 July 1950, were rescinded by the new order; moreover, US HICOG was abolished and replaced by the U.S. Mission in Germany upon termination of the Allied occupation.[1]

Except as otherwise provided in the new Executive order, the Ambassador--as chief of U.S. Mission--was assigned the supreme authority with respect to all responsibilities, duties, and governmental functions of the United States in the Federal Republic of Germany, including Berlin. US CINCEUR, as the U.S. military commander having area responsibility in Germany, was assigned authority with respect to all military responsibilities, duties, and functions of the United States in the Federal Republic of Germany, including Berlin. Any action affecting the foreign policy of the United States or involving relations or negotiations with nonmilitary German authorities could be taken only after consultation with or agreement by the Ambassador. Major

[1]Cable EC-9-1520, US CINCEUR sgd Cook to DA for OSD, 19 Apr 54. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1954), Vol. I, Item A atchd.

differences arising over matters affecting U.S. forces in Germany were to be referred to the Departments of State and Defense for resolution.[2]

b. Status of U.S. Forces in West Berlin. Following the signature of the Paris Accords in October 1954, the question of the modification of the status of West Berlin arose. With the grant of sovereignty to the German Federal Republic the West Berliners were likely to press for some relaxation of occupation controls. Therefore, in the fall of 1954, the Berlin Element, HICOG, undertook a review of U.S. and Allied policy in Berlin to determine what concessions could be made toward a liberalization of the occupation regime. One of the most difficult problems in conducting such a review was to assess accurately to what extent the status quo ought to be modified to satisfy West Berlin's anticipated demands for a greater measure of self-government. The predominant factor in considering any change in the status of West Berlin was security. Both West German and Allied officials agreed that nothing be done to jeopardize the Allied position in Berlin vis-a-vis the Soviet authorities. Furthermore, the possibility of adverse Soviet reaction to any modification in the Three-Power position in West Berlin had always to be considered.[3]

The Berlin Element, HICOG, proposed that the three Allied Powers issue a new, broad declaration of intent. This declaration would restate the Berlin paragraph of the September 1954 London Agreement in which the Allied Powers expressed their determination to maintain the freedom of the Western Sectors of Berlin. In addition, it would stress that the Allies wished to bring about the greatest possible degree of self-government in Berlin. The authority of the Allied military commanders in Berlin would be restricted to the command of Allied troops and the emergency control of the West Berlin police. At the same time Allied military representatives would be instructed to consult with the West Berlin authorities on the preparation of such emergency plans. The publication of this declaration would be followed by negotiations between Allied and West Berlin representatives concerning the powers that would be retained by the Allies in West Berlin.[4] The U.S. Commander, Berlin (USCOB), opposed the contents of the draft declaration on the grounds that political, economic, and psychological interests had been emphasized at the expense of the security position of the military forces in Berlin.[5] CINCUSAREUR supported USCOB by pointing out that the curtailment of authority, suggested by the Berlin Element, HICOG, would jeopardize

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[2] Ibid.

[3] Cable 37, Berlin sgd Knight to HICOG, Bonn, 27 Sep 54. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 094 Berlin (1954), Vol. I, Item 4 atchd.

[4] Cable SX-2775, USAREUR to DA for G3, 14 Oct 54. SECRET. In file cited above.

[5] Ltr, Maj Gen G. Honnen, USCOB, to Dr. J. B. Conant, HICOG, 12 Oct 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above, Item 4.

Allied ability to carry out the pledge to maintain the freedom of West Berlin in the face of aggression.[6]

The Department of the Army, in turn, promised its continued support in opposing the State Department's plans for the modification of the occupation regime in West Berlin.[7] However, unless USAREUR could advance more specific military reasons for opposing the HICOG plans, there appeared to be little hope of preventing a considerable relaxation of Allied control in Berlin in the near future.[8] USAREUR continued to oppose HICOG's plans on the grounds that the loosening of military control envisioned in the draft declaration would jeopardize the security of West Berlin and would, at the same time, adversely affect certain intelligence activities. The military would have to retain control over all local policies whose implementation might lead to military intervention. Any unilateral change in the Berlin situation might be misinterpreted as a lessening of U.S. interest in the former German capital.[9] This controversy was not settled during the following months. In April 1955 Maj. Gen. G. Honnen, who held the position of USCOB at that time, recalled that Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, who had been U.S. commander in Berlin during the airlift period, had recommended in 1949 the establishment of USCOB as a military-political agency for the purpose of providing unity of command over all U.S. elements in the Berlin sector. Since Berlin would remain an occupied city despite the granting of sovereignty to the Federal Republic of Germany, unity of command was as important in April 1955 as it had been in 1949. Under the proposed HICOG plan the authority of USCOB would be split between the military and political representatives of the United States in Berlin, which would create a difficult situation. Either the senior U.S. civilian in Berlin would have to be subordinate to USCOB, or he would have to be appointed USCOB. The unique situation in Berlin required the U.S. commander to be the supreme authority, since military and police matters were indivisible.[10] No change was made in USCOB's authority before June 1955.

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[6] Cable SX-2775, 14 Oct 54, cited above.

[7] Cable DA-969805, DA from G3 to CINCUSAREUR, 22 Oct 54. SECRET. In file above, Item 4 atchd.

[8] Cable, DA-970069, DA from G3 to CINCUSAREUR, 27 Oct 54. SECRET. In file cited above.

[9] Cable SX-3025, USAREUR to DA for G3, 31 Oct 54. SECRET. In file cited above.

[10] Memo, Maj Gen G. Honnen, USCOB, to Gen A. C. McAuliffe, CINCUSAREUR, 6 Apr 55, sub: Proposed Revision of HICOG's Letter of Instructions to USCOB. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 094 Berlin (1955), Vol. I, Item 9.

c. Parole and Clemency Procedures for War Criminals. Since its creation in August 1953 the Interim Mixed Parole and Clemency Board, which was composed of 2 American and 2 German members, had been under the chairmanship of Henry Lee Shattuck, a State Department appointee. When Mr. Shattuck resigned, effective 2 November 1954, Maj. Gen. Walter J. Muller, the Army member of the board, became temporary chairman until Mr. Edwin A. Plitt, a Foreign Service officer, was appointed chairman effective 1 December 1954.[11] Even though the board was chaired by a State Department official, CINCUSAREUR had final review authority over its recommendations. Since its creation the board had developed a highly successful parole and clemency procedure for the 281 war criminals confined in the Landsberg Prison. The record of its operations indicated close and effective cooperation among the U.S. political and military representatives and the two German members. By 24 November 1954 the board had paroled 177 prisoners. The parolees were released to sponsors who assisted them in their initial adjustment to civilian life. About 95 percent of the former prisoners honored the conditions of their parole, whereas the other 5 percent transgressed the geographical limits of their residence requirement or violated some other stipulation.[12]

The growing workload imposed upon Maj. Gen. Walter J. Muller, both as U.S. Parole Officer and as Deputy Chief for Field Operations, Prison Division, HICOG, led to the appointment of an assistant. On 13 January 1955 an order signed by both HICOG and CINCUSAREUR appointed Capt. DeForest Barton, Provost Marshal Division, as Assistant U.S. Parole Officer with duty station at HICOG.[13] Shortly thereafter General Muller, who was soon to retire from active duty, was replaced by Maj. Gen. Richard W. Stephens, who became the new Army member of the board.[14]

As of 24 November 1954, 6 of the 104 war criminals who had not been paroled were undergoing treatment in various hospitals, and 7 had been released after having completed their sentence. This left a total of 91 prisoners still in confinement after a little more than one year of the board's operations. Of the 197 parole applications considered by the board, 180 were approved and 17 disapproved. As the reviewing authority, CINCUSAREUR disapproved 17 of the 180 applications that

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[11] HICOG & USAREUR Order, 27 Oct 54, sub: Interim Mixed Parole and Clemency Board. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 000.5 (1954), Vol. I, Item 234.

[12] Memo, USAREUR COFS from USAREUR JA, 10 Jun 54, sub: Conference on Parole and Clemency Program. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 96.

[13] C/N 1, USAREUR PM Div to JA, G1, COFS, 5 Jan 55, sub: Supervision of War Criminal Parolees. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Vol. II, Item 10.

[14] HICOG & USAREUR Order, 17 Jan 55, sub: Interim Mixed Parole and Clemency Board. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 000.5 (1955), Vol. I, Item 33A atchd.

had been approved by the board. Of the 117 clemency applications received by the board, 93 were approved, and 24 were disapproved. CINCUSAREUR approved 88 and disapproved 29 of the clemency applications submitted to him, thus overriding the board's recommendations in 5 cases.[15]

In December 1954 General Adolf Heusinger, the then unofficial military representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, approached CINCUSAREUR in an effort to effect the release of the remaining war criminals before the West German legislature debated the Paris Accords and German rearmament.[16] At the same time the Federal Chancellor requested HICOG to decree a general Christmas amnesty for the Landsberg prisoners. After coordination of their positions CINCUSAREUR and HICOG rejected both requests. CINCUSAREUR pointed out in the first case that a general amnesty would not solve the problem of German rearmament and that an effective U.S.-German clemency program was being conducted. In his reply, Dr. Conant pointed out to the Chancellor that to superimpose an amnesty program upon the clemency and parole system for the Christmas season would interfere with the orderly disposition of the cases under study.[17] The Federal Republic of Germany had always refused to recognize the inmates of Landsberg as war criminals, but had considered them as prisoners of war.[18] Consequently, when granted sovereignty, the West German Government refused to accept custody of the remaining war criminals, and USAREUR remained responsible for guarding the prisoners at Landsberg following the end of the occupation.

116. Impact of German Sovereignty

The granting of sovereignty to the Federal Republic of Germany in May 1955 brought to a close a long waiting period during which the three occupation powers had gradually relaxed their control in anticipation of implementing the Bonn Conventions. During this transition period the occupation powers had been forced to modify the Bonn Conventions to conform to the ever-changing political realities in Central Europe.

a. Changes in the Bonn Conventions. At the Paris conference of October 1954 the Allied Powers prepared a "Protocol on the Termination

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[15] Memo, Brig Gen G. W. Gardes, USAREUR JA, to Gen W. M. Hoge, CINCUSAREUR, 26 Nov 54, sub: War Crimes Prisoners' Status Report. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 000.5 (1954), Vol. I, Item 244 atchd.

[16] Ltr, Gen Heusinger to Gen W. M. Hoge, 10 Dec 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 245A.

[17] (1) Ltr, Gen Hoge to Gen Heusinger, 27 Dec 54. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Cable 373, HICOG sgd Conant to State Dept, 20 Dec 54. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in file above, Item 245A atchd.

[18] Min, Mtg of War Criminal Prison Board, 15 Nov 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 000.5 (1954), Vol. I, Item 248.

of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany." This protocol provided, in substance, that the Bonn Conventions--as modified by five schedules--would become effective upon termination of the occupation.[19]

The first schedule stipulated that the three powers would terminate the occupation, but would retain rights and responsibilities with respect to Berlin and to West Germany as a whole regarding the problems of reunification and the final peace treaty. The three powers also retained the right to station as many troops in West Germany as they had at the termination of the occupation. The three powers agreed to consult with the West German Government on all questions concerning the stationing of troops. In addition, no forces of nations other than those occupying Germany at the termination of the occupation were to enter West German territory without the Bonn Government's consent. Action to protect the security of the Forces could be taken only after consultation with the West German authorities.

The second schedule amended the Forces Convention by eliminating nonapplicable items; its purpose was to bridge the gap until completion of a Status of Forces Agreement along NATO lines.[20] The third schedule amended the financial clauses of the Bonn Conventions by defining the West German Government's defense support contributions (see par. 8c). The Federal Republic of Germany agreed to negotiate with the three Allied Powers concerning the amount of goods and services to be furnished after the 12-month defense support period. This amount would depend upon the extent of the German defense contribution to NATO at that time. If the German defense buildup after accession to NATO progressed at the anticipated rate, USAREUR foresaw that the U.S. forces would receive no financial support from the German Federal Republic after the initial 12-month period.[21] The fourth schedule did not affect USAREUR, whereas the fifth, which amended the tax agreements, produced relatively minor changes.[22]

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[19] Memo, ACOFS G3 to USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 6 Nov 54, sub: German Sovereignty. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1954), B/P.

[20] Ibid.

[21] (1) Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany and Related Documents, sgd at Paris on 23 Oct 54 by the United States, United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1954), B/P. (2) Min, CINCUSAREUR Mthly HICOG-Comdrs Conf, 28 Mar 55. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (1955), Vol. III, Item 4.

[22] Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to DCOFS for Opns, 6 Nov 54, sub: German Sovereignty. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1954), B/P.

b. Negotiations for a Status of Forces Agreement. With the German Federal Republic's admission to NATO, steps were taken to negotiate a Status of Forces Agreement similar to those concluded with other NATO countries. The negotiations were expected to require from 6 to 12 months, because the armed forces of 8 nations that maintained troops on West German territory were involved.[23]

USAREUR was to participate only indirectly through US CINCEUR's military representative, who assisted the U.S. Ambassador in Bonn--the official responsible for conducting the negotiations. The positions of the component commands were coordinated by the Department of Defense before being forwarded to Bonn.[24]

c. Reorientation Program. As previously mentioned, USAREUR had gradually reduced its occupation effort during the past five years. This policy offered dual benefits to the United States. The number of U.S. personnel involved in German administrative affairs was reduced, and at the same time the Atlantic alliance was strengthened by increasing West German participation in world affairs. In general, USAREUR wanted to retain only those military rights and privileges that could be justified as essential to the accomplishment of its mission. In line with this new policy, many reminders of the occupation period, such as military road signs, had to be removed since they had become obsolete during recent years.[25] A USAREUR directive, issued on 19 January 1955, ordered a survey--to be completed by 1 April 1955--of all U.S. military directional and informational signs. The purpose of this survey was to eliminate vestiges of the occupation that might be objectionable to the Germans. Signs found to be nonessential were removed; the remaining ones were checked for their wording.[26]

USAREUR's plans for reorienting military and civilian personnel in terms of the new relationship was implemented in a 5-point program. The first step in the program was the publication, within 24 hours of the announcement of West German sovereignty, of an informational article in The Stars and Stripes explaining the status of U.S. personnel on duty in Germany during the immediate postoccupation period. Following the publication of this article, all Army personnel received additional

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[23] Notes, CINCUSAREUR Mthly HICOG-Comdrs Conf, 28 Mar 55, cited above. CONFIDENTIAL.

[24] Cable DA-976193, DA G3 to US CINCEUR, 17 Feb 55. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1955), Vol. I, Item 4 atchd.

[25] (1) Ltr, Gen O. R. Cook, Dep US CINCEUR to Gen W. M. Hoge, CINCUSAREUR, 13 Aug 54. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to Dep US CINCEUR, 24 Aug 54. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1954), Vol. I, Item 28.

[26] Cable SX-2637, USAREUR to US CINCEUR, 30 Mar 55. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1955), Vol. I, Item 4 atchd.

orientation on German-American relations by means of guided discussions during the troop information hour based upon an informational bulletin explaining the Bonn Conventions. As supplement to the above bulletin an article entitled "West Germany, 10-Year Miracle" was published in The Stars and Stripes for use during the discussions. Stateside orientation of personnel along similar lines was accomplished at Campt Kilmer by a representative of the USAREUR Assistant Chief of Staff, G1, prior to movement overseas. All Department of Army civilian employees and dependents were given orientation briefings at the port of embarkation, stressing the point that U.S. personnel were now in Germany as guests rather than as conquerors.[27]

d. Border and Customs Control. With the granting of sovereignty to the Federal Republic of Germany and the implementation of the Bonn Conventions as modified by the Paris Protocol, the status of U.S. personnel with regard to West German border and customs control had to be clarified. Despite the grant of sovereignty, West German control over the borders with East Germany and Czechoslovakia had to be coordinated with Allied security requirements in West Germany. USAREUR had relinquished all control of frontier crossing points, except along the Helmstedt-Berlin Autobahn where direct contact with the Soviet authorities had to be maintained to regulate the movement of U.S. personnel, equipment, and supplies between West Germany and West Berlin.[28] The Bonn Government raised no objection to the maintenance of U.S. checkpoints at the Helmstedt-Berlin Autobahn and in general was aware of U.S. security requirements.[29]

Before the grant of sovereignty, implementation of the articles of the Bonn Conventions pertaining to customs and border control of the Forces was accomplished by means of an agreement reached between the Tripartite Customs Working Party under the auspices of the Allied High Commission and representatives of the West German Government.[30] According to the terms of this agreement, members of the Forces became subject to normal German customs inspection, which hitherto had not been the case.

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[27] Cable SX-2537, USAREUR to US CINCEUR, 30 Mar 55. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

[28] (1) Ltr, Mr. W. Dowling, Dep HICOG, to Maj Gen R. G. Gard, USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 2 Aug 54. SECRET. (2) Ltr, Gard to Dowling, 26 Aug 54. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 091.311 (1954), Vol. I, Item 19 atchd.

[29] Ltr, HICOG to Maj Gen E. D. Post, USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 27 Apr 55. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 091.311 (1955), Vol. I, Item 4.

[30] Memo, Maj Gen A. S. Newman, ACOFS G1, to USAREUR COFS, 8 Apr 55, sub: Circular 550-50 (draft for 550-175) Border Crossings and Customs Control, Germany. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 3A.

At the Autobahn border crossing points, where U.S. guards were stationed for the purpose of clearing U.S. personnel and supplies for transit through the Soviet-controlled area, customs control was exercised together with German officials. Any criminal action resulting from customs violations by members of the Forces remained, however, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Forces. The Forces retained the right of free import and export of such items as furniture, clothing, automobiles, and many other commodities, provided they were for personal use. German customs officials were authorized to be present in Army post offices for routine customs examinations.[31]

Under the tripartite customs agreement, rationed items, formerly not subject to German restrictions, could be imported or exported by members of the Forces only in accompanied baggage. The agreement also required the Forces to reduce the importation of coffee and cigarettes, which were heavily taxed in West Germany. USAREUR therefore put further limitations on the cigarette rations issued to U.S. personnel and restricted the categories of those permitted to purchase rationed coffee and tea.[32]

The customs agreements provided by the Conventions were temporary. The new NATO Status of Forces Agreement, was expected to impose further customs restrictions upon U.S. personnel in Germany. USAREUR anticipated this development by initiating through the U.S. State Department a series of bilateral negotiations with France, the Benelux countries, and the Federal Republic of Germany. The purpose of these negotiations was to create a uniform and simplified customs procedure that would facilitate the rapid movement across international frontiers of goods required by the U.S. forces.[33] The negotiations with the Germans were carried out within the framework of the applicable provisions of the Bonn Conventions. Reconciling the points of view held by the three occupation armies proved difficult, and final agreement with the Germans required persuasive efforts by U.S. negotiators coupled with firm insistence on strict compliance with the terms of the Convention. Eventually, the agreements reached with the Germans differed very little from the standard NATO agreements, with the exception of the German requirement of documentation for rail shipments. At first USAREUR was unwilling to change its standing documentation procedure, but at the insistence of the Allied High Commission a compromise solution was worked out. In this particular instance, the German point of view was supported by the British and the French.

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[31] USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf 10, 24 Aug 54, pp. 8-15. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ltr, Maj Gen O. P. Newman, USAREUR DCOFS for Admin, to Maj Gen P. E. Gallagher, CG COMZ, 15 Jun 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 091.311 (1955), Vol. I, Item 5 atchd.

German press allegations of extensive blackmarketeering led USAREUR to develop measures that would allow German authorities greater latitude in controlling commercial truck shipments for the Forces. Formerly, shipments by commercial vendors to the military or military-sponsored agencies, such as the European Exchange Service, had not been subject to German customs inspection. This procedure did provide an opportunity for illegal importation and, most importantly, a means by which the press linked military personnel to smuggling operations. However, by making such shipments subject to normal customs control, the Germans would be responsible for proper surveillance and could take action against persons violating the law. Upon delivery of the shipments at their destination, the receiving agency would certify receipt by issuing AE Form 302 to the German customs authorities.[34]

e. Excise Taxes and Customs Duties. Shortly after the formal end of the Allied Occupation the West German Finance Ministry issued instructions to its various subordinate offices, directing them to apply excise taxes and customs duties to all occupation cost procurement items, even those ordered before 5 May 1955. (Occupation cost procurement was the purchase of goods made by the U.S. forces with German private contractors and financed from the Occupation Costs Fund). USAREUR immediately requested the U.S. Embassy in Bonn to open negotiations with the Finance Ministry in an effort to exempt undelivered orders placed before the cut-off date.[35] The particular orders affected by the Finance Ministry's instructions consisted of the following imported items purchased through German importers and contractors: 715 German-assembled Chevrolet light sedans, 74 prefab buildings, 152 truck chassis ($3\frac{1}{2}$ ton), subsistence items for labor service units, 10 van chassis ($2\frac{1}{2}$ ton), light bulbs, and diesel oil and lubricants for Navy use in seagoing vessels. The negotiations that followed indicated to U.S. officials that the German representatives were not well-informed concerning the terms of the Occupation Cost Agreement. The Germans assumed that the Occupation Cost Carryover Contingency Funds were similar to a bank account to be drawn against rather than an arrangement whereby funds obligated during the occupation could be expended in the postoccupation period. The German position was therefore clearly inconsistent with the spirit and intent of the Occupation Costs Agreement.[36]

The West German Government offered to waive temporarily the payment of the disputed taxes and customs duties by the German importers and contractors and let the shipment be delivered to the U.S. forces. This offer was made with the understanding that the U.S. forces would

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[34] Ibid.

[35] Cable, no number, AMEMD Bonn sgd Parks to CINCUSAREUR for Col R. Hackett, USAREUR Compt, 18 May 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1955), Vol. I, Item 18 atchd.

[36] Cable 727, HICOG sgd Conant to State Dept, 13 May 55. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above, Item 18.

pay the taxes and duties directly to the West German Finance Ministry, if and when an agreement on this matter was reached. The U.S. diplomatic officials in Bonn strongly recommended that USAREUR accept the German interim proposal, and thereby permit movement of the shipments, pending final settlement.[37]

CINCUSAREUR replied that the German proposal was unacceptable. Any deviation from the position that the pertinent article of the Bonn Conventions preserved the rights involved in this dispute would jeopardize other rights of the U.S. forces in Germany. There was no alternative but to insist that the suppliers deliver the requisitioned items at the stipulated prices, exclusive of taxes and import duties.[38]

In a further effort to work out an agreement, U.S. diplomatic and military representatives met on 11 June in Bonn with officials from the Finance Ministry. No agreement was reached because both sides held firmly to their previously stated legal positions.[39] Ministry officials then presented a compromise solution, embodying the following points: both sides would fully reserve their respective legal positions; the U.S. forces would set aside DM 5 million from their Occupation Cost Carryover Contingency Funds for the payment of any taxes involved in the settlement. Thereupon the Germans would waive any taxes exceeding that amount, unless an unspent balance would ultimately be left in the contingency funds. Finally, any balance from the DM 5 million which would not be required for the payment of taxes would revert to the U.S. forces. Maintaining that a prompt and final solution of the issue was politically desirable, the State Department officials in Bonn urged that this German compromise offer be accepted. If CINCUSAREUR did not accept the compromise, the matter would have to be submitted to an arbitration tribunal.[40]

Subject to Department of Army concurrence, USAREUR offered the Germans a counterproposal according to which both sides would preserve their respective legal positions. The Federal Republic of Germany would temporarily waive the payment of import duties or any taxes from the suppliers, and the United States would refrain from requiring waivers from the suppliers. The question of the payment of the duties and excise taxes would then be submitted to an arbitration tribunal with a request for a decision before expiration of the 18-month period for the expenditure of the Occupation Cost Carryover Contingency Funds. In the event of a verdict that was adverse to the Forces, funds not to

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[37] Cable 745 AMEMB Bonn sgd Conant to State Dept, 21 May 55. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above, Item 18 atchd.

[38] Cable SX-3498, CINCUSAREUR sgd McAuliffe to AMEMB Bonn for Conant, 27 May 55. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

[39] Cable 882, AMEMB Bonn sgd O'Shaughnessy to CINCUSAREUR, 13 Jun 55. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

[40] Ibid.

exceed DM 5 million would be made available from the unexpended portion of the Occupation Cost Carryover Contingency Funds. This amount would then become the maximum liability of the United States for all taxes and duties applicable to occupation cost orders. In USAREUR's view this proposal represented the only basis for a solution.[41]

The U.S. Embassy doubted the practicality of the proposal, since the DM 5 million offer had been presented by the Germans only as a compromise in lieu of arbitration. If USAREUR wished to submit the matter to arbitration, the Germans would undoubtedly take the position that the United States would have to pay whatever the tribunal determined. In this case the availability of funds to meet this obligation would be an internal matter for U.S. authorities.

The French and British also faced similar tax problems, but expressed doubt as to the applicability of the Bonn Conventions in this matter. They even expressed concern that raising the question before an arbitration tribunal might result in a decision harmful to the application of articles of the Conventions to other matters of even greater importance to the three powers.[42]

Contrary to the French and British views, USAREUR considered its position to be sound and its course of action essential to the successful protection of the rights of the U.S. forces. Any attempt to resolve the issue according to the German proposals would create a precedent for German demands to reverse actions taken during the occupation.[43]

117. Planning for German Army Assistance

The decision to include the Federal Republic of Germany in the Western defense system had been made official in 1952 with the signing of the European Defense Community (EDC) Pact by seven of the NATO powers and West Germany. For over two years the legislatures of the respective nations debated, and eventually ratified, the revolutionary integrated defense concept. Only the French legislators continued to delay their decision concerning EDC. Finally in August 1954, after long and bitter debate, the French National Assembly rejected the EDC Pact. During the intervening time, USAREUR had not been given any mission concerning assistance to the projected German defense contribution to EDC. The military-political alternative adopted after the rejection of EDC was the Western European Union (WEU), a more loosely formed coalition of NATO forces to which the Federal Republic of Germany was to be admitted.

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[41] Cable SX-3816, CINCUSAREUR to DA from Compt, 16 Jun 55. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Cable SX-3937, USAREUR to DA for Compt, 23 Jun 55. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

The Paris Accords of October 1954, of which the United States was a signatory power, created the WEU and provided the political framework for the creation of German armed forces with U.S. military assistance.

a. Initial Planning. In September 1954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff designated the Advance Planning Group (APG), Bonn, as the single point of contact between U.S. military planners and the German planning officials for all military assistance and training activities. The Advance Planning Group was directly subordinate to Headquarters, US EUCOM, and was to be eventually reorganized as the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Germany. All contacts between component command personnel and German military planners were to be coordinated through APG.[44]

USAREUR had meanwhile initiated planning activities for training and logistical assistance to the future German Army. To facilitate and coordinate the preparatory planning, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, was assigned over-all monitorship, and the planning activities proper were transferred from the CENTAG Plans Section to the Advance Planning and Training Section, Training Branch, G3.[45] A directive entitled "Planning in USAREUR for Assistance in the Formation of the German Army," defined the planning responsibilities within Headquarters, USAREUR. On the basis of this directive the staff divisions, including the technical services, submitted preliminary planning outlines to the Advance Planning and Training Section early in October 1954. These outlines were used for the preparation of a staff study that stressed the need for a planning staff specifically assigned the task of preparing a comprehensive plan for the training and logistical assistance to be given the German Army. Other factors to be considered were the potential impact of the planning activity upon USAREUR, the major problems to be solved, and the need for detailed information from higher headquarters so that more definite planning could take place. This study, including a time-phased planning program, was coordinated with APG in Bonn, and--after its approval by the Chief of Staff on 15 November 1954--was disseminated to the various staff divisions.[46]

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[44] US CINCEUR's Conf, 15 Dec 54, sub: Col G. C. Teal's Remarks Regarding Responsibilities of CINCEUR for Military Assistance Planning for the West German FEDREP, MAD. TS Ctl, AG 1478. SECRET.

[45] DF, USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 2 Dec 54, sub: Preparation of Hq USAREUR's Plan for Rearmament of Germany's Army. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381 EDF (1954), Vol. II, Item 35A atchd.

[46] Memo, Col A. S. Collins, Jr., USAREUR SGS, to Brig Gen D. V. Johnson, USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 3 Nov 54, sub: Status of Planning for the Training of the German Army. SECRET. In file above, Item 30 atchd.

b. USAREUR's Role. In participating in the military assistance program USAREUR could not assume any tasks that would affect its combat efficiency. If at any time the new program became a major activity of the command, additional means would have to be provided to enable USAREUR to carry out its primary mission as well as assist in the formation of the future German Army.[47]

In a letter of instructions, issued on 1 December 1954, US CINCEUR defined USAREUR's role in the assistance program. This role was to consist of providing for German cadre and specialist training, furnishing logistical support, and administering budget funding.[48] During the initial buildup period, training and logistical assistance was to be provided within the framework of existing resources and capabilities, augmented by assistance from Department of the Army or other sources; training personnel were to be made available to insure the accomplishment of the training mission. Until such time as the German Army's logistical organization was capable of assuming responsibility, USAREUR was also to provide assistance in the reception, storage, maintenance, and distribution of MDAP material. To facilitate German planning, USAREUR was to give information and technical advice in accordance with current security regulations and policy directives of US EUCOM and higher headquarters. Depots and billeting facilities were to be made available to German Army authorities to the maximum extent compatible with U.S. requirements. The need for training facilities in Germany was to be reexamined so that other NATO nations and the Federal Republic of Germany would have maximum access to these facilities consistent with USAREUR's essential training needs. German instructor cadres were to be trained by U.S. personnel to be made available for this purpose by the Department of the Army and USAREUR. The control and support of the training teams supplied by Department of the Army to assist in the accomplishment of this training mission would also be delegated to USAREUR. Spaces for German Army students were to be made available in USAREUR-operated schools as programmed in the training assistance plan. In the event that available resources were found insufficient for properly implementing the training program, estimates of additional needs were to be prepared and submitted to higher headquarters.[49]

c. The New German Army Plan. A new German plan, replacing the former one prepared under EDC assumptions, was presented to APG, Bonn, in November 1954. The new plan for the creation of a national contribution to the NATO defense system was based upon an army consisting of 6 infantry and 6 armored divisions, in addition to 3 armored, 2 mountain,

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[47] Cable S-2296, USAREUR to US CINCEUR for MAD, 17 Sep 54. SECRET. In file above, Item 32 atchd (B/P).

[48] Ltr, Dep US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 10 Nov 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above, Item 35A atchd.

[49] Ltr, US EUCOM to CINCUSAREUR, 1 Dec 54, sub: Letter of Instructions for Planning Assistance. SECRET. In file cited above.

and 2 airborne brigades. These units were to form a field army, including 1 army and 4 corps headquarters.[50] With the revision of the plans for a phased buildup, the training period of the new German Army would be extended from 24 to 36 months. The first 8 months would be devoted to the training of an instructor cadre. During this phase USAREUR would play its most active role, for actual training assistance was to cover only a 12-month period during which the U.S. training teams were to instruct German officer and NCO cadre personnel. From the 9th to the 18th month the various units would become partially manned by the phasing-in of volunteers. In the 19th month the drafting of manpower would begin, with the field army being built up progressively by 6 draft calls to a ceiling of 375,000 men, not including the territorial forces.[51]

In December 1954 copies of the revised German plan were translated by APG and distributed to the USAREUR staff divisions, which were thus able to prepare their specific parts of the plan for assisting the German Army in its initial training stage.

d. The USAREUR Draft Plan. After numerous conferences attended by APG, German, and USAREUR planning personnel, a draft plan was prepared and submitted to the Chief of Staff in March 1955. This plan was forwarded to Headquarters, US EUCOM, for approval. There it was analyzed in detail before it was forwarded to the Department of the Army on 9 April 1955. US EUCOM made no comments or recommendations that were at variance with USAREUR's thinking. Major changes were considered inappropriate at this time, because--when ultimately implemented--the plan would undoubtedly be affected by coordination with the Germans as well as by Department of Army action.[52]

e. Release of the Plan to the Germans. A meeting was held in Bonn on 29 April 1955 between USAREUR and APG representatives for the purpose of deciding which portions of the plan could properly be released to the Germans. Ten days later modified copies of the plan were released to representatives of Dienststelle Blank. For this purpose, the index of the plan was changed to indicate that the items

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[50] Cable 265, HICOG sgd Conant to US CINCEUR for MAD, 10 Nov 54. SECRET. In file above, Item 37 (B/P).

[51] (1) Cable, no number, HICOG to Secy of State, 30 Nov 54. SECRET. In file cited above, Item 37 atchd. (2) USAREUR CINC's Wkly Std Conf 17, 14 Dec 54, p. 5. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

[52] (1) Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 24 Mar 55, sub: Activities of the Advance Planning and Training Section, Week 17-24 March 1955. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 Ger (1955), Vol. I, Item 7 atchd. (2) Ltr, US EUCOM to ACOFSA G3, 10 May 55, sub: USAREUR German Army Assistance Plan. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

withheld were still "under development." The German representatives were informed by APG that the USAREUR draft plan was a planning document only and did not in any way constitute a commitment on the part of the United States. Further discussions would probably be required in order to produce a U.S.-West German plan acceptable to both parties.[53]

Section II: Developments in the French Area of Responsibility

118. Franco-American Relations

a. Troop-Community Relations. Good relations with the French were vital to the achievement of U.S. objectives in Europe, and any deterioration in these relations was therefore a matter of special concern to USAREUR. There were several causes for misunderstandings between U.S. personnel stationed in France and the French civil population. One of them was the great disparity in living standards and social attitudes. Moreover, on the French side there was a notable indifference toward American personnel and their families. As was to be expected, many mistakes could be traced to the language barrier.[54] The COMZ troop orientation program, which had been initiated in 1953 in an effort to improve troop-community relations, had been of some informational value to the military personnel, but had failed to remove the obstacles blocking a solution to the problem. Off-duty classes in French as well as the discussion topics selected for the command conferences, an important part of the Troop Information and Education Program, were further efforts toward remedial action. These measures, in themselves, proved insufficient.

b. Repair and Maintenance of Roads. The failure of COMZ to satisfy French demands concerning the repair and maintenance of roads damaged by military traffic continued to trouble the guest-host relationship. These demands involved not only the repair of actual damage caused by U.S. military traffic, but the improvement of existing local roads to permit their full use by heavy military vehicles. The solution to this problem depended upon the availability of U.S. engineer troops and equipment as well as upon road repair materials being furnished by

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[53] Cable 736, HICOG Bonn from APG sgd Conant to US CINCEUR, 17 May 55. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 Ger (1955), Vol. I, Item 8 atchd.

[54] Ltr, Brig Gen D. V. Johnson, USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, to US CINCEUR, 29 Sep 54, sub: Checklist for Courses of Action. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 EUCOM (1954), Vol. I, Item 14 atchd.

the French at the construction site, since COMZ did not envisage quarrying operations or long hauls of road-building materials.[55] The point at issue between the French authorities and COMZ was that while the U.S. forces were willing to maintain and repair the roads damaged through military use, the French would have to furnish the road repair materials at the work site.[56] The French, however, insisted that the U.S. Army provide equipment such as rock crushers at the quarries, machinery to produce asphalt, and long-haul transportation to carry road-building materials from the French source to the work site. COMZ reiterated that no such agreement existed and that road-building materials would have to be made available at the repair site by the French without cost to the U.S. forces.[57] Illustrative of the problem were the negotiations that started in November 1953 between the local authorities in the vicinity of Angervilliers and the U.S. military concerning the repair of an access road to the alternate radio relay station in that area. The local French officials maintained that they were not obligated to furnish the materials for the repair and maintenance of this road. They based their position on a ruling of the French Ministry of Interior that, since such roads were used mainly by NATO forces, these forces rather than the French would have to provide the necessary maintenance.[58] When all efforts to solve the problem at the command level proved unsuccessful, French Defense Minister Pleven sent a letter to U.S. Secretary of Defense Wilson. The matter was then turned over to the U.S. Embassy in Paris to be settled during the course of the bilateral negotiations concerning the over-all French contribution to the support of the NATO defense forces stationed in France.[59] Late in October 1954 a temporary solution was found when the French Defense Ministry agreed to maintain and repair roads subjected to heavy military traffic, and to prepare for the balance of 1954 and for 1955 its own comprehensive road repair and maintenance program.[60]

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[55] Cable EC-9-2149, US CINCEUR to DA for G4, 14 May 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 322 COMZ (1954), Vol. I, Item 16 atchd.

[56] Ltr, CG COMZ to CINCUSAREUR, 13 Jan 53, sub: Damage to Communal Roads and Departmental Roads in France. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 COMZ (1953), Vol. I, Item 2 atchd.

[57] Cable COZIG-C-119, USAREUR COMZ sgd Gallagher to CINCUSAREUR, 3 May 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 322 COMZ (1954), Vol. I, Item 16.

[58] Cable COZEN-C-320, USAREUR COMZ to CINCUSAREUR, 21 Oct 54. SECRET. In file above, Item 16 atchd.

[59] Cable DA-961764, DA from G4/C2 to US CINCEUR, 19 May 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

[60] Cable LC-73247, COMLANDCENT to USAREUR COMZ, Orleans, 28 Oct 54. SECRET. In file cited above.

119. Renegotiation of the LOFC Agreement

On 2 May 1955 the U.S. Embassy in Paris was informed of the French Government's desire to revise the Line of Communications Agreement of 6 November 1950. The original agreement was to remain effective for 5 years, and to be renewed automatically unless terminated by either party on 6 months' notice. The French action therefore constituted official notification that the LOFC Agreement would terminate as of 6 November 1955, unless a revised agreement was signed.

The French authorities emphasized that they had no intention of altering the basic concept of the LOFC, but inasmuch as so many of the provisions of the original agreement had become obsolete or were no longer applicable, the agreement would have to be renegotiated. They also pointed out that the original agreement had been based upon the U.S. occupation of Germany and Austria, specifying that a line of communications be established from Bordeaux to the German frontier. A new agreement, however, would have to be based upon a line of communications, extending from the Atlantic to the German frontier in support of U.S. troops stationed in West Germany. Moreover, Annex 1 of the LOFC agreement, covering the juridical status of U.S. personnel stationed in France, had meanwhile been superseded by the NATO Status of Forces Agreement. Finally, the French wished to make a more satisfactory arrangement regarding the construction and maintenance of access roads.[61]

USAREUR regarded the proposed revision of the LOFC agreement as an excellent opportunity to redefine more clearly the provisions that had caused dissatisfaction to either party during their application and to cover any points that had been omitted. COMZ was therefore directed to submit its recommendations for drafting a new LOFC agreement.[62]

In a preliminary meeting at Headquarters, US EUCOM, on 10 May 1955, a committee was formed of the representatives of US EUCOM, the component commands, and the Joint Construction Agency. This committee was to develop the unified U.S. position for presentation by the US EUCOM representatives who were to conduct the negotiations with the French.[63]

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[61] (1) Cable 48, Paris sgd Dillon to State Dept, 3 May 55. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 COMZ (1955), Vol. II, Item 13 atchd.
(2) CINCUSAREUR's Mthly Amb-Comdrs Conf, 31 May 55. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (1955), (B/P #5).

[62] Cable SX-3231, USAREUR to USAREUR COMZ, 11 May 55. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 COMZ (1955), Vol. II, Item 13 atchd.

[63] Cable EC-9-2463, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 17 May 55. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

Another conference was scheduled for 6 July 1955 for the purpose of preparing the final draft U.S. position before the start of the bilateral negotiations. USAREUR intended to send representatives of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, and the Engineer, Judge Advocate, and Transportation Divisions as well as of COMZ headquarters. The final draft was to be submitted to the Department of Defense on 1 August 1955.[64]

120. The Status of Forces Agreement in Operation

a. Taxation of U.S. Personnel Stationed in France. As part of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement--in effect for its second year during the period under review--a tax agreement had been developed on principles so broad and general that the creation of loopholes was inevitable. The French, in particular, had succeeded in taking advantage of the situation.[65]

Despite the apparent safeguards against taxing U.S. personnel on duty in France written into the Status of Forces Agreement, several rather substantial personal taxes were being levied by the French authorities. Article 10 of the agreement was designed to relieve all visiting forces from the burden of taxation in the receiving states. These exemptions were to include taxes on incomes derived from the forces, taxes on personal property present in the receiving state solely because of the member's duty assignment in that state, and those taxes based upon the legal incidence of residence or domicile in the receiving state. The language of Article 10 was similar to that of the United States domestic tax law and had, upon implementation in the United States, the effect of exempting members of NATO forces on duty in the United States from virtually all taxes except the sales tax.[66]

At the time the agreement was written, the U.S. negotiators had concurred that the so-called contribution mobilière--a real estate tax based upon the occupancy of a house, frequently amounting to a substantial sum--would not be specifically listed in the general exemption from taxation. In practice, the loophole thus provided, resulted in largely nullifying the protection which was intended for American personnel in France.

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[64] DF, ACOFS G4 to USAREUR COFS, 1 Jul 55, sub: Renegotiation of LOFC Agreement. SECRET. In file cited above.

[65] Ltr, Gen O. R. Cook, Dep CINCEUR to SD thru COFSA, 12 May 55, sub: Direct Taxation of U.S. Personnel and their Property in France. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 012.2 (1955), Vol. I, Item A atchd.

[66] Memo, Brig Gen G. W. Gardes, USAREUR JA, to USAREUR COFS, 5 Jan 55, sub: Taxation of U.S. Personnel Stationed in France. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

The question at issue in this particular tax was whether the legal incidence depended upon residence or domicile. Several other taxes were levied on the basis of the contribution mobilière. Since French law provided for considerable local discretion in the administration of tax legislation, some counties and communes assessed a taxe d'habitation (quarters tax) in lieu of the contribution mobilière. Liability for an additional tax, the taxe vicinale (area tax), which was often levied by municipal councils as a substitute for the taxe des prèstations (service tax), also stemmed from the contribution mobilière. This service tax was levied upon personally owned automobiles and consisted of a small normal tax plus a large surtax, which increased according to the horsepower of the automobile. Since U.S. personnel generally drove large, high-powered American automobiles, this tax placed a greater burden on the U.S. military than upon the French. Moreover, the tax was disproportionate to any service received by U.S. personnel. Personally owned radios of U.S. members of the forces were also taxed, based upon the French claim that the tax was levied not on personal property but rather on the use of such property. This tax for use was based upon the same principle as that for occupancy of a house.[67]

On the basis of recommendations made by the Inter-Service Legal Committee the three component commands had discussed the problem with US EUCOM as early as 14 June 1954. The latter eventually recommended to the Department of the Army that intergovernmental negotiations be initiated for the purpose of obtaining tax relief for U.S. personnel in France. At that time the Department of the Army rejected the recommendation because the available evidence did not substantiate the need for intergovernmental action regarding the taxation problem.[68]

The Inter-Service Legal Committee expressed complete disagreement with this departmental position. The committee's conclusions forwarded by US EUCOM to the Secretary of Defense through the Army Chief of Staff were that Article 10 of the Status of Forces Agreement, as currently implemented by the French, had become valueless as a means of securing the desired tax exemptions for members of the U.S. Armed Forces stationed in France.

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[67](1) Ibid. (2) Memo, USAREUR JA to CINCUSAREUR, 9 Apr 55, sub: Direct Taxation of U.S. Personnel and their Property in France. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

[68](1) Memo, Gen W. M. Hoge, CINCUSAREUR, to Gen C. L. Bolte, VCOFSA, 5 Jan 55, sub: French Taxes. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Ltr, same to same, 25 Jan 55. SECRET. Both in file cited above.

US EUCOM recommended that U.S. personnel pay only those taxes that were designed to defray the costs of public services rendered by community administrations. Such a position would be in line with the over-all U.S. policy with respect to tax problems not specifically covered in existing international agreements with France and other NATO countries.[69] No further developments in this matter took place before the end of the fiscal year.

b. Criminal Jurisdiction. During the almost two years in which the Status of Forces Agreement had been in effect in France, there had been 4,061 incidents involving U.S. Army personnel in which the French authorities could claim primary criminal jurisdiction under Article 7 of that agreement. About 85 percent of the incidents involved relatively minor traffic offenses. French courts tried only 426 cases, or approximately 10.5 percent of the total. Of these 426 cases, 178 concerned serious offenses; confinement was imposed in only 37 of these cases, and there were 44 acquittals. In the other cases the defendants were fined.[70]

At the end of the reporting period 3 Army enlisted men were serving prison sentences in France, with 3 others in pretrial confinement in French prisons. The original 5-year sentences of 2 of the 3 confinees had been reduced to 4½ years. The French authorities had proposed that these men be paroled to the U.S. Army on condition that they leave French territory immediately after their release. USAREUR had agreed to these conditions. While in confinement in French prisons, U.S. personnel received frequent visits from the responsible military authorities to assure that the men were being given treatment reasonably approximating American prison standards.[71]

c. Status of Dependents. The status of male dependents of members of the U.S. forces stationed in France became an issue as the result of French legislation enacted 4 November 1953. According to this law all male aliens between the ages of 18½ and 25 years were subject to French conscription if they resided in France for more than one year, even on an intermittent basis. This law was aimed especially at the United States because of the highly publicized cases of several French nationals, who--during their temporary residence in the United States--had been drafted although they had previously completed their term of military service in the French armed forces. The intent of the law apparently was to force the United States to cease the induction of French nationals into the American armed forces by threatening to draft U.S. citizens of military age residing in France.

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[69] Ltr, 12 May 55, cited above.

[70] Memo, Col A. N. Hickey, Actg JA, to Gen A. C. McAuliffe, 4 Aug 55, sub: Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction in France under NATO SOF. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 250.4 (1955), Vol. I, Item 27.

[71] Ibid.

According to the opinion of the Office of the Judge Advocate General, Department of the Army, male dependents of U.S. military and civilian personnel on duty in France, who had been officially registered with the French Foreign Ministry, ought to be exempt from French military service. The Judge Advocate General, however, suggested that inasmuch as an authoritative interpretation could be made only by the French authorities, the provisions of the U.S. Universal Military Training and Service Act and Executive Order No. 10292 would have to be brought to the attention of the French. Under these provisions no member of the family of an official or employee of a foreign government, residing in the United States in an official capacity and who had given such notice to the State Department, was required to register for military service. The Department of the Army hoped that the French authorities would apply the same privileges on a reciprocal basis to dependents of American personnel on official duty in France.[72] On the basis of this opinion the U.S. Embassy in Paris was asked to secure an extension of this exemption to dependents of members of the U.S. forces.[73] As a first step the U.S. Ambassador to France was to obtain from the French Foreign Ministry a formal determination as to the degree of reciprocity that would be afforded dependents of members of the U.S. forces under French law.[74]

Before the end of the legislative session for 1955, Congress passed an amendment to the Selective Service Act providing for draft exemptions of those representatives from Allied nations residing in the United States who had already completed their military service in their own countries. This action provided a partial solution to the problem, since the French were satisfied with the contents of this amendment. Any male dependent who had completed his U.S. military service would be exempt from the French draft law because of the reciprocal provisions of the legislation. Male dependents who had not completed their U.S. military service still remained legally subject to French conscription, but French officials indicated that they would probably abstain from drafting these individuals.[75]

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[72] Ltr, TAG to CINCUSAREUR, 13 May 55, sub: French Army Draft of Foreigners on a Reciprocal Basis. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 342 (1955), Vol. I, Item 3A, Tab C.

[73] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to US CINCEUR, 24 May 55, sub cited above. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above, Tab F.

[74] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to the U.S. Amb, France, 9 Jun 55. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above, Item 3A atchd, Red Tab.

[75] Ltr, Mr. Douglas Dillon, U.S. Amb, France, to Gen A. C. McAuliffe, CINCUSAREUR, 29 Jul 55. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above, Item 3A atchd.

Section III: Contacts with the Soviet Armed Forces in Germany

121. Official Visits

Official visits and contacts between U.S. and Soviet commanders and staff officers were considered desirable for the purpose of maintaining normal relations. Thus, when General McAuliffe assumed command of USAREUR in March 1955, one of the first items on his agenda was the customary courtesy call on his Soviet counterpart in the Russian-occupied area of Germany. Before any action was taken in this matter, Dr. Conant was asked for his opinion. The U.S. High Commissioner informed CINCUSAREUR that such a visit should preferably be delayed until after the French and West German legislatures had voted on the Paris Accords and the Soviet reaction to these agreements had become manifest.[76] On 4 May 1955, following the ratification of the Paris Accords by France and West Germany, and on the eve of the granting of sovereignty to the Federal Republic of Germany, CINCUSAREUR offered to call on the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Forces in Germany, Marshal Andrei Antonovich Gretchko, and proposed 10 May as the day for the visit. The Soviet Marshal replied that the suggested date was not suitable but that any time after 13 May would be satisfactory.[77] General McAuliffe finally made the visit to Marshal Gretchko at the Soviet headquarters in Karlshorst on 21 June 1955.[78]

122. The USAREUR Soviet Relations Advisory Committee

The chief of the Civil Affairs Division chaired the Soviet Relations Advisory Committee, an interstaff committee of Headquarters, USAREUR, formed in September 1952 for the purpose of coordinating policy on problems involving the U.S. military liaison mission in Potsdam and the Soviet mission in Frankfurt. Such policy served as a guide to the overt activities of the U.S. mission in Eastern Germany as well as a basis for recommendations regarding retaliatory actions against the Soviet mission in Frankfurt.[79]

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[76] Comment 1, POLAD to CAD, 15 Feb 55, sub: Courtesy Call. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 322.01 (1955), Vol. I, Item 7A.

[77] DF, Col C. N. Smith, USAREUR CAD to COFS USAREUR, 23 May 55, sub: Visit by General McAuliffe to Marshal Gretchko. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above, Item 14 atchd.

[78] (1) Ibid. (2) Cable DA-983424, DA from G3 to CINCUSAREUR, 17 Jun 55. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

[79] EUCOM/USAREUR Comd Rept, 1952, p. 417. SECRET.

During the period under review the workload of that committee decreased steadily. There was marked Soviet effort to avoid friction. For instance, the number of protest letters received from the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany, dropped considerably, members of the U.S. mission in Potsdam were permitted greater freedom of movement, the Soviet mission in Frankfurt seemed more willing to cooperate with USAREUR, and the Soviet authorities adhered more closely to existing agreements. The number of Soviet protest letters fell from a high of 275 in 1952, to 140 in 1953, and from 40 in 1954 to 6 as of February 1955. During their travels in Eastern Germany U.S. mission personnel were no longer constantly trailed, and the number of incidents involving detention of personnel was greatly reduced.[80] However, the Soviet authorities kept the American mission under covert surveillance. Although they were authorized greater freedom of movement, U.S. mission personnel found that many areas were still restricted.

123. The Soviet Military Liaison Mission, Frankfurt

As the end of the Allied occupation of Western Germany drew near, the status of the Soviet liaison missions in the Federal Republic had to be redefined. The three Allied Powers wanted to maintain their own liaison missions in the Soviet Zone and, therefore, were anxious that the Federal Republic of Germany should not restrict the Soviet missions on its territory. The Soviet authorities would otherwise be given an opportunity to restrict the movements of the Allied missions in their zone of Germany or to request the withdrawal of these missions. According to the Bonn Conventions the three Allied Powers were to retain the rights heretofore exercised and held by them with regard to stationing armed forces in West Germany; this was considered to be the legal basis for requiring the German Federal Republic not to interfere with the Soviet military missions. The Allied military commanders therefore sought the assistance of their diplomatic counterparts in representing these views to the West German Government during the negotiations for the new agreements that would replace the Conventions.[81] HICOG accordingly prepared a draft aide memoire to be submitted to the Federal Republic of Germany setting forth the Allied position concerning the status of the Soviet military missions after the grant of sovereignty. The draft was coordinated with USAREUR prior to presentation. The Chief of Staff concurred, adding that no restriction ought to be placed on the right of the Soviet mission to use the Wartha-Herleshausen crossing point. This was the principal border crossing point used by the Soviet mission; it was under German control since no U.S. personnel

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[80] Memo, to Maj Gen J. F. Uncles from Maj Gen E. D. Post, 23 Feb 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322.01 (1955), Vol. I, Item 7A atchd.

[81] Ltr, Mr. W. C. Dowling, Dep HICOG, to USAREUR COFS, Maj Gen C. B. Ferenbaugh, 12 Oct 54. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322.01 (1954), Vol. I, Item 4 atchd.

were stationed there.[82] Logistical support provided by USAREUR to the Soviet Military Liaison Mission was continued on a reciprocal basis in accordance with the Huebner-Malinin Agreement of 1949. A new letter on civil support policy, dated 18 September 1954, merely reaffirmed the practices in effect under the existing agreement.[83]

124. Liaison Channels with Soviet Authorities

In July 1954 the Russian authorities informed the chief of the U.S. Military Liaison Mission in Potsdam of a procedural change. From then on matters concerning zones of occupation, zonal borders, the use of the Helmstedt-Berlin Autobahn, and similar inter-Army questions were to be transmitted via the U.S. Mission to the Soviet External Relations Branch. Problems concerning Berlin sector boundaries and East and West Berlin affairs in general were to be discussed between the U.S. Commander, Berlin, and General Dibrova, Soviet Commandant of East Berlin. As in the past, the respective High Commissions would handle all political questions.[84]

125. Border Incidents

a. Policy. Except for occasional detentions of U.S. personnel traveling the Helmstedt-Berlin Autobahn-- usually by East German police-- and some minor incidents in the Berlin area, the border dividing East from West Germany was relatively inactive. On the other hand, several troublesome incidents occurred along the Czechoslovak-German frontier during the period. These incidents, however, did not lead to any direct discussions between USAREUR and the Czechoslovak authorities. Instructions issued to military personnel specified that they were to refrain from becoming involved in discussions concerning the return of persons seized by the Czechoslovaks. Since the United States maintained a diplomatic mission in Prague, the State Department was the sole and proper channel for making protests and conducting negotiations.[85] These instructions were in contrast with the procedure regarding personnel seized by Soviet authorities. Since the United States did not give diplomatic recognition to the East German regime, all relations concerning the Soviet Zone of Germany were properly handled between the missions of the respective military commanders or between the representatives of the High Commissioners.

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[82] Ltr, Maj Gen J. F. Uncles, USAREUR COFS, to Mr. W. C. Dowling, Dep HICOG, 29 Mar 55. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322.01 (1955), Vol. I, Item 11 atchd.

[83] USAREUR ltr, 18 Sep 54, sub: Civil Support Policy Letter. AG 400 GLD-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[84] Cable 2643, USMLM Berlin sgd Schanze to CINCUSAREUR, 10 Jul 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 322.01 (1954), Vol. I, Item 30.

[85] Cable SX-1141, USAREUR to AMEMB Prague, 9 Jul 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 250.2 (1954), Vol. I, Item 32 atchd.

b. Typical Incidents. An incident along the German-Czechoslovak border that preoccupied first American military and then diplomatic agencies happened on 5 June 1954, when Sgt. Walter S. Winter, who was on leave from COMZ, was seized by Czechoslovak border guards while taking photographs approximately 30 yards inside Czechoslovakia. What appeared to be an inadvertent border crossing case developed into a complicated affair. Initially, Czechoslovak local authorities indicated that the sergeant would be released within a few hours following the arrest, but then the Foreign Ministry stepped into the picture in an effort to use the detention[86] as a means of obtaining both the extradition of a former Czech border policeman who had sought asylum in West Germany and the inactivation of two labor service units composed of Czechoslovak refugee personnel. After these efforts failed, Sgt. Winters was released on 15 July 1955--more than 13 months after his seizure--at the Rozvasov-Waidhaus crossing point.[87]

In another incident on 17 September 1954 an officer and an enlisted man on routine patrol duty were seized by Czechoslovak border guards in the vicinity of Eslarn. In this case the confusing nature of the immediate boundary area was undoubtedly the immediate cause of the incident. After having kept the officer and enlisted man over a month in custody, the Czech authorities returned them to U.S. control on 20 October 1954.[88] In an effort to prevent a repetition of such incidents on the eastern frontier, USAREUR directed that signs of sufficient size to be legible at a distance of 100 yards, indicating the proximity of the border, were to be erected on each all-weather road along the Czechoslovak-German frontier and the Soviet Zone border. Personnel on authorized visits to the border were ordered to check in at the nearest command post for orientation as to the location of the border.[89] Any individuals who ignored these warnings did so at their own risk and could be held responsible for their actions.[90]

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[86] CINCUSAREUR's Mthly Amb-Comdrs Conf, 30 Jun 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (1954), Item 7 (B/P #6).

[87] (1) Cable 02, Prague sgd Johnson to State Dept, 12 Jul 54. (2) Cable SX 1222, USAREUR POLAD sgd Fales to Prague NIACT, 15 Jul 54. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR SGS 250.2 (1954), Vol. I, Items 20, 32 atchd.

[88] Cable SC-19043, USAREUR to DA for CSPGO and AGPS, 20 Oct 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Vol. II, Item 48 atchd.

[89] USAREUR ltr, 20 Sep 54, sub: Border Markings for Eastern Border of U.S. Zone. AG 360.9 GOT-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[90] Notes, CINCUSAREUR Mthly HICOG-Comdrs Conf, 29 Sep 54. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (1954), Vol. I, (B/P #9).

126. Policy Regarding U.S. Defectors

In January 1955 the Soviets returned 2 enlisted men and 1 civilian who had spent several years in Soviet prison camps. The efforts involved in locating the men and in obtaining their release were typical for the administrative problems involved in obtaining the return of U.S. defectors from Soviet custody. The policy followed in such cases was to request the cooperation of the Soviet authorities in returning the men to U.S. control. Channels of communications used varied from the exchange of official letters between USAREUR and Soviet Army headquarters to personal visits of U.S. liaison officers at the Soviet External Relations Branch in East Berlin. In cases where the American soldier had actually defected to the Russians, the Soviet authorities usually stated that the soldier had sought political asylum. USAREUR then requested photostatic copies of the man's request for asylum. These were generally furnished by the Soviet authorities, who usually sent defectors to the East German repatriation center in Bautzen. Although, in general, defecting personnel hardly merited the efforts made in their behalf, the procedure followed was necessary to satisfy possible queries or investigations by official and private agencies.[91]

127. Aircraft Violations of the Corridors and Borders

A review of U.S.-Soviet incidents concerning violations of sovereign airspace revealed that these incidents involved almost exclusively Soviet protests against American actions. Soviet violations of U.S. airspace rarely occurred, and American aircraft were only occasionally harassed in the Berlin corridor. Although there was no record of an incident of Soviet aircraft firing at U.S. aircraft, even during the tense days of the Berlin airlift, this fact appeared to be merely coincidence in view of the French and British experience in this respect.[92]

Procedures for processing communications with the Soviets regarding air protests had been developed by agreement among USAREUR, USAFE, and HICOG on 27 October 1954.[93] Since CINCUSAREUR had been designated as the single point of contact with the Soviet Forces in Germany as per US EUCOM Functions Paper, 14 January 1953, USAREUR received and transmitted to USAFE all messages regarding U.S. aircraft violations in the

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[91] DF, USAREUR CAD to DCOFS Opns, 9 Aug 55, sub: U.S. Defector SFC Peter M. Diaz. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 250.2 (1955), Vol. II, Item 32.

[92] Cable EOTAC-10352, CINCUSAFE to USAFE COFS, 21 Dec 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 360.33 (1954), Vol. I, Item 37.

[93] USAREUR Stf Memo, 7, 19 Jan 55, sub: Section II, Soviet and Satellite Incidents (Air). CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 360.33 (1955), Vol. I, Item 3.

corridor and along the Soviet border. After investigation, all replies to Soviet protest letters were drafted by the Civil Aviation Division of HICOG/U.S. Embassy, Bonn, and forwarded to USAREUR for signature and dispatch to Soviet authorities. Although it had no control over the investigations or over the corrective action taken, USAREUR was concerned with avoiding incidents whenever possible. Any incident involving U.S. aircraft or vehicles maintaining the lifeline between West Berlin and the Western World served to increase tension at a period when relations with the Soviets were showing definite signs of improvement.[94]

The picture had been somewhat different along the Czechoslovak-German frontier. Czechoslovak violation of the U.S. airspace in that region occurred quite frequently, although USAFE was seldom able to obtain enough factual data to lodge protests on specific incidents. Czechoslovak aircraft fired on U.S. aircraft in unauthorized airspace, and in several instances entered U.S. airspace to attack American aircraft. USAFE sought to halt such incidents by the establishment of a 30-mile sterile zone adjacent to the frontier. Moreover, Czechoslovak authorities were warned that U.S. aircraft would return fire in the event of further incidents.[95]

128. The Berlin Command

a. Autobahn Tolls. In May 1955 the East German regime increased the tolls payable by West German vehicles using the Autobahn from Helmstedt to Berlin. While not directly affecting U.S. access to Berlin, this increase in toll charges was bound to affect the economy of West Berlin for which the Allies had assumed responsibility. The three Allied High Commissioners, acting on behalf of the Federal Republic of Germany, met with Soviet High Commissioner Pushkin on 20 May 1955 in an effort to get him to intercede with the East German regime to restore the former tolls. Pushkin declared at this meeting that the toll dispute did not constitute an abrogation of the 1949 agreement regarding Allied access to Berlin and therefore did not affect USAREUR. It appeared evident, however that the Soviet authorities were using the dispute as a means of forcing the Federal Republic of Germany to recognize the competency of the East German regime. While the United States refused to recognize the East German Government, the West German officials were encouraged to meet with experts from the East German transport ministry in an effort to reach a solution at a lower level.[96]

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[94](1) Sum sheet, HICOG CAD to USAREUR COFS, 24 May 55, sub: Increased Number of Berlin Corridor and Soviet Border Air Violations. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Ltr, Gen A. C. McAuliffe, CINCUSAREUR, to Maj Gen R. E. Beebe, USAFE DCOFS for Opns, 13 Jun 55. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in file above, Item 21A atchd, 25A atchd.

[95]Cable EOTAC-10352, CINCUSAFE to USAFE COFS, 21 Dec 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 360.33 (1954), Vol. I, Item 37.

[96]CINCUSAREUR's Mthly Amb-Comdrs Conf, 31 May 55. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (1955), (B/P #5).

The Federal Republic of Germany agreed to meet with representatives of the East German Ministry of Transport. The West German Government insisted that negotiations between transport experts of both sides would not constitute recognition of the East German regime. The subsequent negotiations produced some reductions in the tolls imposed, but the tax remained prohibitive. Until the tax was lowered, free access to Berlin as guaranteed in past agreements remained impaired, and the Western Powers were faced with a difficult unsolved diplomatic problem.[97]

b. Removal of the Soviet Tank Memorial. A minor problem, but one that involved USAREUR more directly, was the tortuous procedure leading to the removal of the Soviet Tank Memorial on the Potsdamer Chaussee in West Berlin. This petty affair illustrated the tensions between East and West in divided Berlin. Since the 17 June 1953 uprising against the East German Communist regime, the Soviet Tank Memorial on the Potsdamer Chaussee in the U.S. Sector of the city took on a reverse symbolism that contributed significantly to the sharp decline in Soviet prestige in West Berlin. For many years the memorial had been a serious irritant to West Berliners, and USAREUR had begun negotiations with the Soviets for the removal of the memorial as early as 1951. In the fall of 1954, on the basis of a U.S.-Soviet agreement, U.S. personnel removed the tank with U.S. equipment. After loading the tank on a flatcar, Soviet personnel transported it by rail to an unknown destination in the Soviet Zone. The work of dismantling the pedestal had been begun by Soviet personnel, but had been halted by Soviet authorities on the pretext that the U.S. refusal to remove press correspondents from the work site constituted a breach of the origianl agreement. Demolition of the pedestal was later completed by an East German firm under contract to the Soviets, and the last traces of the memorial disappeared by October 1954.[98]

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[97] CINCUSAREUR's Mthly Amb-Comdrs Conf, 30 Jun 55. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (1955), (B/P #6).

[98] U.S. Msn Berlin Dispatches 179, 3 Sep 54; 277, 8 Oct 54, sub: Removal of Soviet Tank Memorial. In USAREUR SGS 094 Berlin (1955), Vol. I, Item 24.

Glossary

This glossary contains all abbreviations used in this volume, except those listed in SR 320-50-1, 28 October 1949, and changes thereto.

Term	Definition
ACOFSA	Assistant Chief of Staff, Department of the Army
Actvs	activities
ADSEC	Advance Section (COMZ)
AER	Army Emergency Relief
AFEX	Air Forces, Europe, Exchange
AFGA	Armed Forces Germany-Austria (Welfare Fund)
ALFCE (see LANDCENT)	
AMEMB	American Embassy
A/N	Allied/neutral
APG	Advance Planning Group (Bonn)
APP	Army Procurement Procedures
ARS	Army Relief Society
ASAE	Army Security Agency, Europe
ASPR	Armed Services Procurement Regulation
AYA	American Youth Activities
BAC	Budget Advisory Committee
BASEC	Base Section (COMZ)
Benelux	Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg
BfV	Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz (German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution)
B/P	bulky package
BPE	Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation
BPOE (see BPE)	
CAD	Civil Affairs Division
CCFFA	Commandant en Chef, Forces Francaises en Allemagne (Commander in Chief, French Forces in Germany)
CENTAG	Central Army Group
CINCNELM	Commander in Chief, Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
CINCUSAFE	Commander in Chief, U.S. Air Forces in Europe
CINCUSAREUR	Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe
CISD	Communications Intelligence Service Detachment
C/N	carrier note
COFSA	Chief of Staff, Department of the Army
COMCENTAG	Commander, Central Army Group
COMLANDCENT	Commander, Allied Land Forces Central Europe
COMNAVGER	Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Germany
COMNORTHAG	Commander, Northern Army Group

Term	Definition
Contracts	
Title I	Architect-Engineer contract for design.
Title II	Architect-Engineer contract for direct supervision of construction
(Both Title I and Title II are fixed-fee contracts)	
Title III	Construction contracts
ctl	control
CWS	continental wage scale
DCOFSA	Deputy Chief of Staff, Department of the Army
DDCE	Deputy Defense Comptroller, Europe
DEG	Dependents Education Group
DEO	Dependents Education Organization
DF	disposition form
DM	Deutsche Mark
DSD	Dependents School Detachment
EDC	European Defense Community
EES	European Exchange System
EMPS	European Motion Picture Service
EO	Executive Order
et. al.	et alii (and others)
FAP	Facilities Assistance Program
FEDREP	Federal Republic of Germany
FED-REP-GER	Federal Republic of Germany
FFA	Forces Francaises en Allemagne (French Forces in Germany), or French First Army
FIA	Financial Inventory Accounting
FOA	Foreign Operations Administration
FTX	field training exercise
GAO	general alert order
GED	General Education Development
Ger	German
GYA	German Youth Activities
HACOM	Headquarters Area Command
HICOG	U.S. High Commission(er) for Germany
Ibid.	Ibidem (in the same place)
ICCB	Intelligence Coordinating Committee, Berlin
ICCG	Intelligence Coordinating Committee, Germany
INTEX	intelligence extracts
IRS	internal route slip

Term	Definition
JAMAG	Joint American Military Advisory Group
JAMMAT	Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey
JCA	Joint Construction Agency
JCSRE	Joint Chiefs of Staff Representative, Europe
JIOA	Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency
JUSMAG	Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group
LANDCENT	Allied Land Forces Central Europe
LCU	landing craft utility
LSD	Labor Services Division
LTL	less-than-truck-load
LWR	local wage rate
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAD	Military Assistance Division
MCA	Military Construction-Army
MDAP	Mutual Defense Assistance Program
MEPS	Military Express and Passenger Service
MIS	Military Intelligence Service
MPB	Military Personnel Branch
MPC	military payment certificate
MPS	Motion Picture Service (USAFE)
MSA	Mutual Security Agency
NACOM	Northern Area Command
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NELM	Headquarters, Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
NEO	noncombatant evacuation order
NODEX	new offshore discharge exercise
NORTHAG	Northern Army Group
OAC	Orleans Area Command
ODEX	offshore discharge exercise
ONI	Office of Naval Intelligence
ORA	order for reinforced alert
ORO	Operations Research Office
OSA	order for simple alert
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSP	offshore procurement
PL	Public Law
POLAD	Political Adviser
RAF	Royal Air Force
R&U	repair and utilities
RIA	Roll-up in Austria

Term	Definition
SAC	Seine Area Command
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACOM	Southern Area Command
SAD	Special Activities Division
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe
SIGEX	signal exercise
SJS	Secretary of the Joint Staff
SMC-IN	staff message center- incoming
SOF	Status of Forces
SRE	Special Representative Europe (Paris)
TACP	tactical air control party
Title I, II, III (see Contracts)	
TRAFEX	traffic exercise
TRUST	Trieste United States Troops
USAFE	U.S. Air Forces in Europe
USAREUR	U.S. Army, Europe
US BOB	U.S. Bureau of the Budget
US CINCEUR	Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command
USCOB	U.S. Commander, Berlin
US EUCOM	U.S. European Command
USFA	U.S. Forces Austria
USMLM	U.S. Military Liaison Mission
USNAVGER	U.S. Naval Forces, Germany
USRO	U.S. Regional Organization
VCOFSA	Vice Chief of Staff, Department of the Army
WACOM	Western Area Command
WARCOM	Wiesbaden Area Command
WEU	Western European Union
WG	war games

Chronology

Date	Event	Paragraph Reference
	1954	
Jul		
1	First of four gun battalions in 32d AAA Brigade converts from semimobile weapons to 75-mm. mobile Skysweeper guns.	6a
1	Financial Property Accounting is introduced in USAREUR.	13
1	Military Transportation Office becomes operational.	76c
8	American Youth Activities (AYA) program is established.	45a
13	USAREUR Map Stockage Plan supersedes 1951 EUCOM Map Supply Plan.	81
22	Maj. Gen. G. Honnen succeeds Maj. Gen. T. S. Timberman as USCOB.	7e
27	7780 Military Intelligence Detachment is reorganized and redesignated as the 522d Military Intelligence Battalion.	54f
	Berlin non-German refugee center is established in U.S. Sector to receive and screen non-German refugees.	53b
	Army Field Forces team inspects major commands in Europe.	94b
Aug		
1	USAREUR pilot station for the Integrated Accounting System is inaugurated.	12b
12	Finance Division is redesignated the Finance and Accounting Division and is placed under the authority of the Office of the Comptroller.	3

Date	Event	Paragraph Reference
Sep		
1	Orleans Area Command is redesignated as Orleans Installation, which is incorporated into the Headquarters Command of COMZ headquarters.	5b(2)
1	4th Infantry Division Artillery is transferred from Hanau to Frankfurt.	77c
1	30th Field Artillery Group is transferred from Neckarsulm to Hanau.	77c
7-14	Division-type CPX AUTUMN MOON is conducted by 9th Division in SACOM.	88a(2)
10	USAREUR Emergency Evacuation Order 1-54 is issued.	69
15	34 German construction firms are barred from participation in the USAREUR construction program because of price fixing.	106g
16	USAREUR establishes advance application concurrent travel of dependents of military and civilian personnel entitled to family quarters.	41b(2)
20	All procurement is suspended in France by the Department of Defense.	98d
23-26	NATO FTX INDIAN SUMMER is held.	88a(1)
27	Department of the Army begins manpower survey of USAREUR.	20b
28	All construction in France is suspended by the Department of Defense.	107e
Oct		
1	USAREUR transfers 11 dependents schools to USAFE.	44a
8	Department of the Army concludes manpower survey of USAREUR.	20b
12-22	Exercise ROAD BOUND II tests emergency evacuation plans.	84

Date	Event	Paragraph Reference
Oct 23	Paris Accords and the protocol to the Bonn Conventions are signed.	62
28	USAREUR Cost Consciousness Indoctrination Program is established.	21c
Nov		
1	New Offshore Discharge Exercises begin in COMZ.	87i,104b
1	Operation Paper Chase is begun in USAREUR.	23
15	Budget Advisory Committee is established.	11
15	Regulation permitting military personnel to apply for marriage to civilian aliens after 8 months of service in USAREUR becomes effective.	41e
15	12th AAA Group is transferred from Karlsruhe to Kaiserslautern.	77c
27	Integration of Negro and white troops is completed.	28
30	Reemployment leave for U.S. civil service employees is reinstated.	35a(1)
Dec 1	CINCUSAFE assumes administrative and logistical support responsibility for the Rhine-Main and Wiesbaden Airbases.	6d(1)
1	NACOM redesignates the Bamberg, Darmstadt, Frankfurt, Giessen, Hanau, Kassel, Schweinfurt, and Wuerzburg Detachments as subareas.	6d(1)
1	Edwin A. Plitt is appointed chairman of the Interim Mixed Parole and Clemency Board.	115c
1	US EUCOM letter of instructions defines USAREUR's role in assisting the new German Army.	117b

Date	Event	Paragraph Reference
Dec 21	Rental guarantee period for dependents housing in France is extended to 7 years.	107d
28	CENTAG Emergency Plan 1-54 is issued.	67b
31	USAREUR transfers 120 theaters to the new USAFE Motion Picture Service and 339 exchanges to the Air Forces, Europe, Exchange (AFEX) Service.	43b,c
	1955	
Jan 1	WACOM discontinues Worms Subarea and reorganizes remaining five subareas.	6d(3)
5	Freeze on construction in France is lifted by Department of Defense.	107e
6	Ban on procurement in France is lifted for construction and general procurement of supplies and services.	98d
13	Capt. DeForest Barton, Provost Marshal Division, is appointed Assistant U.S. Parole Officer, with duty station at HICOG.	115c
19	USAREUR orders survey of all U.S. military directional and informational signs.	116c
21	USAREUR Program System is extended to major and subordinate commands.	17a
31	USAREUR discontinues the Finance School.	91a
Feb 1	Lt. Gen. A. C. McAuliffe assumes command of USAREUR. (For other changes of personnel in USAREUR, see pars. 2a, b, c(3).)	2a
1	Forms Control Responsibility is transferred from the Office of the Comptroller to the Adjutant General Division.	18

Date	Event	Paragraph Reference
Feb		
1	New Allied joint tariff (wage) agreement for German civilian employees becomes effective.	34c
4	Occupation Costs Agreement is extended to 30 June 1955.	8
8	United States and Portugal reach agreement on evacuation and safe haven plans.	71c
25	USAREUR agrees to make payments to German employees comparable to those under the German Childrens' Allowance Law.	35d(1)
28	Operation Paper Chase is concluded in USAREUR.	23
Mar		
1	Lt. Gen. A. C. McAuliffe is promoted to full general.	2a
4	Use of welfare funds for AYA activities is authorized.	45a
9	Maximum length of overseas tours for male enlisted personnel is reduced to 4 years.	31c(1)
14	Length of overseas tours for female military personnel is reduced to 2 years, with 1-year extension permitted.	31c(2)
17	Alien Enlistment Program is extended to include Iron Curtain refugees entering Germany from Turkey, Greece, and Italy.	30b
18	Central Zone Joint Emergency Defense Plan issued.	67a
23	Commander of the 32d AAA Brigade is designated Chief of the Military District for Great Britain.	6a
28	CINCUSAREUR delegated responsibility for administering and operating the Todendorf "A" range to Seventh Army.	92b(1)

Date	Event	Paragraph Reference
Mar 29	USAREUR Leave and Rest Center, Garmisch-Berchtesgaden, is redesignated the USAREUR Leave Area.	43d(3)
31	Implementing directive for Concept C is published.	97a
Apr 1	MDAP Control Group is transferred from USAREUR to US EUCOM.	3,24
1	Staff positions of SACOM, WACOM, and NACOM are designated "general staff with troops" positions.	6d
1	Contributions to the Allied Forces are reduced by DM 100 million per month to finance jointly approved projects, infrastructure, and claims.	8a
1	Financial Property Accounting is redesignated as Financial Inventory Accounting.	13c
1	Pay increases to civil service personnel and to military personnel with two years or more of service become effective.	41a
1	Transportation to Europe at government expense and limited assignment of family quarters are authorized for dependents of certain military personnel of grade E-4.	41b(5)
1	30th Medical Group is transferred from Landstuhl to Ludwigsburg.	77c
4	Scheduled express service for less-than-truck-load line haul is established in USAREUR.	105b
7	USAREUR accepts the second program of German alternate housing construction for replacement of requisition dependent housing.	106e
9	USAREUR forwards draft plan for German Army assistance to the Department of the Army for approval.	117d

Date	Event	Paragraph Reference
Apr 15	10th Transportation Group is transferred from Kornwestheim to Ludwigsburg.	77c
21	Priorities are established for instorage maintenance in USAREUR Technical Service depots.	101a
May 5	Allied military occupation of Western Germany ends; sovereignty is granted to Federal Republic of Germany.	1,8d,62 70,116
5	President Eisenhower signs Executive Order defining relationship of USAREUR to the US Mission, Germany.	115a
6	Defense Support Period begins for Allied forces in Western Germany.	8c
9	Ban on procurement in France is lifted for all types of procurement.	98d
10	Committee of representatives of US EUCOM, the component commands, and JCA is formed to develop unified U.S. position in the renegotiation of the 1950 LOFC agreement with France.	119
11	COMZ is permitted to resume recruitment of CWS employees.	35e(2)
12	New USAREUR solid fuel supply policy is established.	100h
20	Allied High Commissioners confer with Soviet High Commissioner Pushkin in Berlin on increase in East German road tolls.	128a
25	Advance party, 10th Infantry Division, arrives in Europe as first increment of Operation GYROSCOPE.	31a
Jun 7	USAREUR Leave Area, Garmisch-Berchtesgaden, is redesignated the Armed Forces Recreation Center.	43d(3)

Date	Event	Paragraph Reference
Jun		
20	CENTAG Emergency Plan 1-55 is issued, superseding 1-54 plan.	67b
20	2d Quartermaster Group is transferred from Kornwestheim to Ludwigsburg.	77c
21	CINCUSAREUR makes formal courtesy call on Marshal Gretchko, Commander in Chief, Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany.	121
28	United States and the German Federal Republic reach agreement concerning status and documentation of German-resident Polish labor service personnel stationed in France.	39e
30	Official U.S. financial support of German Youth Activities (GYA) Program is terminated.	45b

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3	Armed Forces Information and Education Division	18 - 20
1	Chemical Division	21
1	Civil Affairs Division	22
2	Engineer Division	23 - 24
1	Finance and Accounting Division	25
1	Inspector General Division	26
1	Judge Advocate Division	27
1	Labor Services Division	28
1	Medical Division	29
1	Ordnance Division	30
1	Provost Marshal Division	31
1	Public Information Division	32
2	Quartermaster Division	33 - 34
2	Signal Division	35 - 36
1	Special Activities Division	37
1	Transportation Division	38
5	USAREUR Communications Zone	39 - 43
2	66th Counter Intelligence Corps Group	44 - 45
1	32d Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade	46
1	Southern Area Command	47
1	Northern Area Command	48
1	Headquarters Area Command	49
1	513th Military Intelligence Service Group	50
19	Historical Division	1, 51 - 68
1	Political Adviser	69

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