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HISTORICAL DIVISION
EUROPEAN COMMAND
KARLSRUHE, GERMANY

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CHAPTER I

Mission and Organization of USAREUR

I. Mission

1. The Basic Mission

Lt. Gen. C. R. Huebner, presiding at a commander in chief's staff conference in the summer of 1950, remarked that "the only reason for this headquarters or any other headquarters is the training, supply, and fighting of combat units and the prime mission of this headquarters and all other headquarters is to service the troops."[1] This, in brief, was the mission of Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe. Earlier in the year, a USAREUR letter of instruction had been approved by General Handy clarifying for all commanders subordinate to USAREUR headquarters the principal responsibilities of each. The responsibilities outlined in this letter did not differ from those established prior to 1950 and set forth in an undated draft toward the end of the previous year.[2] But it was the first directive published by USAREUR delineating the chief functions of its subordinate commands. These commands included the U.S. Constabulary, 1st Infantry Division,

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[1] CINC's Wkly Staff Conf No. 21, 14 Jun 50, par. 1.

[2] EUCOM Hist Div, OCCUPATION FORCES IN EUROPE SERIES, Annual Narrative Report of the European Command, 1949, Ch. IV, p. 203. SECRET.

the military posts, Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation, 66th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, and 7756 Audit Agency.[3] Among the responsibilities of the commanding general himself was the maintenance of a reserve force available for employment either within or outside his command, the making of plans and preparations for meeting a general emergency, conduct of the military occupation of the U.S. Zone of Germany, and insuring the security of U.S. and Allied personnel and installations.

2. Security Missions

The U.S. Constabulary and 1st Infantry Division were chiefly responsible for accomplishment of security aspects of the USAREUR mission. To better perform its function as a security force, the Constabulary was reorganized in May and June into a unit resembling an augmented corps but retained responsibility for suppressing civil disturbances, designating post security forces, preparing emergency plans, maintaining one armored cavalry regiment as a Constabulary reserve and two Constabulary squadrons as border reconnaissance groups, and accomplishing intelligence requirements. The 1st Infantry Division, which formed the Army reserve in Europe, had similar security responsibilities. Commanders of military posts and chiefs of technical and administrative services were also charged with preparation of emergency plans at the direction of the commanding general, collection of intelligence, and security of installations assigned to them. (See also Chap. II, below.)

3. Logistical and Administrative Support

As directed by the commander in chief, the USAREUR commanding general was responsible for providing logistical and administrative support to USAFE, USNAVFORGER, USFA (with limitations), HICOG and other State Department agencies, and to agencies of the United States Government, such as ECA.[4] In June the commander in chief expanded USAREUR's mission to include administrative and logistical support to CINCEUR for the execution of his support mission to JAMAG, USFA, and COMGENSAC. (See also 1950 EUCOM Report, Chap. V.)

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[3] USAREUR ltr to Comdrs of All Comds Dir Subord to USAREUR, 18 Jan 50, sub: Letter of Instruction. 322.011 GOT - AGO. See Supporting Documents.

[4] Statement of Mission, CINC, prepared by SGS, Jun 50. In SGS 322 EUCOM, Item 9.

4. American-Russian Liaison Section

On 24 August the commanding general was instructed to organize and maintain an American-Russian Liaison Section to investigate incidents at the eastern border of the U.S. Zone. The section was to negotiate directly with its Soviet counterpart respecting the return of American military personnel from the Soviet Zone and of Russian personnel to Soviet control. It was to be the sole agency representing both EUCOM and USAREUR in such negotiations.[5]

5. Courts-Martial Jurisdiction

The Commanding General, USAREUR, exercised courts-martial jurisdiction over attached units outside the U.S. Zone of Germany, as well as over Army personnel within the zone. These units included the U.S. Military Mission with the Iranian Army; U.S. Military Mission with the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie; U.S. Army Group, Greece; U.S. Army Group, American Mission for Aid to Turkey; Army personnel of the 7950 Joint American Military Advisory Group and components thereof (MAAG's, Country Level, Europe); the 928 Engineer Aviation Construction Battalion; and Army personnel stationed in Tripoli.[6]

6. Statement by General Eddy

In October Lt. Gen. Manton S. Eddy, newly appointed commanding general of USAREUR, issued a statement concerning the development of maximum combat readiness in USAREUR subordinate commands. "My goal," he said, "is to make these forces the finest Army units in the world in a minimum of time." Troop housing criteria were to be established to accommodate prospective troop augmentation, and a vigorous program of conservation of supplies and care of weapons and equipment was to be instituted. "Guided by these standards," General Eddy concluded, "the U.S. Army, Europe, ... will constitute a force with a spirit and striking power ready and able to stand with our allies in stopping aggression."[7]

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[5] Ltr, Col P. B. Mayson to Comdrs of All Comds Dir Subord to USAREUR, 24 Aug 50, sub: Letter of Instruction. AG 322.011 GOT - AGO.

[6] IRS, JA to DCOFS for Opns, 12 Dec 50, sub: USAREUR Organization. In SGS 322 USAREUR, Vol. I, Item 9.

[7] Ltr, Office of CG to Comdrs of Comds Dir Subord to USAREUR, 16 Oct 50, sub: Standards of U.S. Army, Europe. AG 250 SGS - AGO.

7. Operation of Ports in Wartime

During World War II the responsibilities of the Army and Navy in jointly operated ports were governed by the Stark-Lee Agreement of 1944. In August 1950 a study of joint port operations in time of emergency was undertaken, and an agreement between the Commanding General, USAREUR, and the commander of Naval Forces in Germany was drafted, based on the Stark-Lee Agreement.[8] To permit the commander in chief more latitude in effecting changes, the provisions of this agreement were later incorporated in a letter directive published on 19 October,[9] entitled "Assignment of Responsibilities in Ports Used by Forces of the European Command in Wartime." In general this directive invested the Army with responsibility for shore facilities inside the high water mark. As concerns security, the Army port commander and the Commanding Officer, U.S. Naval Advanced Base (COUSNAB) were jointly responsible for internal security of port facilities assigned to U.S. Forces, and were to give mutual support in the event of local attack or disaster. When operational requirements did not permit reference to higher authority, the Army base section commander was to make decisions not covered by the division of responsibilities delineated in the directive. Guarding of warehouses and landings, bomb disposal ashore, and land and antiaircraft defense of ports were responsibilities of the Army. The Navy was charged with antisubmarine operations, mine sweeping and defensive mining, bomb disposal aboard ship, and offshore defenses.

II. Organization of United States Army, Europe

8. Introduction

In 1950, for the first time subsequent to its initial activation, United States Army, Europe (USAREUR), functioned as a fully operational Army headquarters subordinate to, yet administratively separate from, its immediate superior headquarters, European Command (EUCOM). In so functioning during the year, USAREUR displayed concrete evidence of having at last reached a status of relative independence from EUCOM in most matters of administration and operations. Prior to 1950, this headquarters had been either wholly nonoperational, or, if operational, so closely allied with Headquarters,

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[8] IRS, ADir/Log to SGS, 22 Sep 50, sub: Assignment of Responsibility in Ports used by Forces of the European Command in Wartime. In SGS.

[9] Interv, J. Lucas, Hist Div, with Lt Col W. D. Duncan, Log Div, 18 Jan 51.

EUCOM, as to have functions and operations inseparable from those of the next higher headquarters. The duration of USAREUR's status as an independent organization, however, was, at best, short-lived. During the latter part of 1950, concurrent with the establishment of a full-time, completely operational field army within the European Command, USAREUR was again relegated to its original non-operational status and its major functions and responsibilities were absorbed by the new field army which superseded it in the chain of command. At year's end, although still carried on EUCOM rolls as an existing military organization, USAREUR was completely devoid of units. In addition, it was no longer designated as a major subordinate command of EUCOM, and its position as such had been eliminated from the organizational chart. (See Charts and in 1950 EUCOM Report, Chap. II.)

9. General Background

This situation in which USAREUR found itself at the end of 1950 was similar in nature to the status in which it had been originally placed at the time of its initial activation. Although created in March of 1947 as a subordinate command of the European Command, USAREUR -- at that time United States Ground and Service Forces, Europe -- was not, nor was it intended to be, an operational headquarters. As originally conceived, this organization was activated in order to provide for the establishment of a ground and service force commander with command functions normal to the service but without the operational functions required by administration and by logistical support. Specifically, the establishment of this additional headquarters within EUCOM provided space for an Army commander, separate in position and functions from the Commander in Chief, European Command, who would be enabled through such an organization to exercise disciplinary control over all purely Army troops within the theater without having at the same time to assume additional responsibilities for their "general housekeeping."[10] How this Army organization, USAREUR, gradually developed into a fully operational headquarters, and how it became, in effect, the senior Army headquarters within the framework of the EUCOM organizational structure, is a study in conditions and exigencies which arose during the period between the end of World War II and the beginning of 1950, details of which follow.

a. Dissolution of the Combined Command at the End of the European Campaign. When the European phase of World War II ended on 8 May 1945, the United States was faced with the problem of extricating

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[10] EUCOM Hist Div, OCCUPATION FORCES IN EUROPE SERIES, 1946 - 47, The Second Year, Vol. I, pp. 123 - 24. UNCLASSIFIED.

its forces from the intricate web of combined operations and commands which had been set up during the combat phases of the European Campaign. To accomplish this separation at war's end, it was necessary first of all to reorganize those existing solely U.S. military headquarters which would be called upon to assume the functions previously exercised by the combined commands. To this end, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, United States Army (ETOUSA), at that time the highest purely U.S. military headquarters in Europe, was twice reorganized in the spring of 1945. By July of the same year, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF), was discontinued and Headquarters, ETOUSA, had been organizationally readjusted to function as the theater headquarters for all U.S. military commands then in Europe. Accordingly, on 1 July, fifteen days before the final dissolution of SHAEF, Headquarters ETOUSA was redesignated as United States Forces, European Theater (USFET), and on 16 July, Headquarters and the Headquarters Company, Allied Expeditionary Forces, were redesignated as Headquarters and the Headquarters Company of USFET.[11] USFET, after several additional reorganizations and still another redesignation, eventually, on 15 March 1947 became Headquarters, European Command (EUCOM).

b. Reduction in Personnel and Installations Following World War II. Following the designation of USFET as theater headquarters, numerous measures were taken to effect substantial reductions in personnel and installations in the European Theater. By the end of 1946, the program of reduction of forces had been so successfully and so expeditiously carried out that only the Third U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) remained of the many tactical field and air forces which had been in Europe at the end of the war. The organizational structure of which these tactical, as well as all service, forces were a part, however, was still at the end of 1946 somewhat overly complicated. Operational control, although at all times filtering from Headquarters, USFET, was relatively loose and not always economical. To correct these deficiencies as well as to place operations of military forces in Europe on the most efficient basis possible, USFET began early in 1947 to tighten the organization of all units and organizations under its control.[12]

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[11] EUCOM Hist Div, OCCUPATION FORCES IN EUROPE SERIES, 1945 - 46, Organization and Administration of the European Theater and its Headquarters, pp. 1 - 37, 75. UNCLASSIFIED.

[12] (1) EUCOM Hist Div, OCCUPATION FORCES IN EUROPE SERIES, 1946 - 47, The Second Year, Vol. I, p. 5. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) EUCOM Hist Div, OCCUPATION FORCES IN EUROPE SERIES, 1946 - 47, The Second Year, Vol. I, p. 4. UNCLASSIFIED.

c. Inauguration of Unified Command. It was not alone in Europe, however, that this general tightening of controls had become advisable. Recognizing the need for an over-all program of reorganization of military forces in overseas theaters, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1946 had begun to formulate plans for sweeping changes in the command structure of all U.S. forces outside the continental limits of the United States. It was hoped that such a reorganization would effect a greater degree of unified command over all U.S. military forces including those stationed in Europe. Those portions of the JCS plan which concerned European forces only, and which were forwarded to Headquarters, USFET, in late 1946, called primarily for the redesignation of USFET as Headquarters, European Command, and for the setting up in Europe of separate army, army air, and naval headquarters which would be subordinate to this command. The first portion of this JCS proposal posed no particular problem; the second part, however, was one which afforded considerable concern to military commanders in Europe. Strict adherence to the blueprint which the JCS had drawn up would at that time have necessitated the establishment in Europe of two headquarters, both substantially Army, where only one had sufficed before. As personnel to man two such headquarters were not readily available in view of the drastic personnel reductions which had just taken place and since the military occupation of Germany was considered an almost exclusively Army operation, permission was requested by and granted to the European theater commander to exercise command functions over all Army ground and service forces from the vantage point of Headquarters, EUCOM, thus eliminating the necessity for setting up an intermedite Army headquarters.[13] (See 1950 EUCOM Report, par. 21.)

d. Activation of U.S. Ground and Service Forces, Europe. While plans were thus being formulated by the JCS in Washington for the reorganization of the command structure of U.S. forces in Europe, independent arrangements were being carried forward by USFET headquarters for internal changes of its own design. One of these changes, originally prompted by the need for tightened controls (see par. b, above), was the proposed activation of a nonoperational headquarters subordinate to USFET which would tie together more firmly the solely Army units and agencies in the command. Although this new headquarters, U.S. Ground and Service Forces, Europe, was subsequently activated at the same time that USFET was redesignated on 15 March 1947 as EUCOM, it was not intended that it should be the separate Army headquarters which the JCS had originally envisioned in its unified command plan. Whereas the JCS plan had called for a fully operational Army headquarters separate from Headquarters, EUCOM, U.S. Ground and Service Forces, Europe, was little

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[13] EUCOM Hist Div, OCCUPATION FORCES IN EUROPE SERIES, 1946 - 47, The Second Year, Vol. I, pp. 119 - 20. UNCLASSIFIED.

more than a paper organization, being neither fully operational nor even separate from Headquarters, EUCOM. The principal function to be exercised by the commanding general of this new headquarters was that of establishing and maintaining high standards of discipline — using the term discipline in the sense of training troops to a high degree of operational readiness in the case of an emergency. Although U.S. Ground and Service Forces, Europe, eventually became the senior operating Army headquarters in the European Command, it was not at the time of its activation a separate headquarters, nor was it administratively operational.[14]

e. Redesignation of U.S. Ground and Service Forces, Europe, as United States Army, Europe. Eight months to the day after its initial creation, Headquarters, U.S. Ground and Service Forces, Europe, was redesignated Headquarters, United States Army, Europe (USAREUR), on 13 November 1947. This change in title was directed by the Department of the Army along with similar revisions in the nomenclature of Army commands in other parts of the world. However, the new title did not bring with it any change in the existing relationships between USAREUR and Headquarters, EUCOM. After the redesignation, Lt. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner, who had been appointed Commanding General, U.S. Ground and Service Forces, Europe, at the time of this organization's initial activation, continued as commanding general of USAREUR in addition to his other duties as deputy commander in chief and chief of staff of EUCOM. Additionally, staff divisions of EUCOM, which had also been designated as staff divisions of USAREUR, continued to function dually in both headquarters. Though USAREUR at this time remained in the status of a nonoperational headquarters, its commanding general had become increasingly active in the effort to train Army troops to a high degree of operational readiness, and the period in which USAREUR was trending toward its establishment on a fully operational basis was definitely under way.[15]

f. Development of United States Army, Europe, into an Operational Headquarters. Following its redesignation, USAREUR gradually assumed or was assigned additional missions and functions which, in the course of time, made it a fully operational headquarters. Although no orders to this effect were ever published, prior to 1950

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[14] (1) EUCOM Hist Div, OCCUPATION FORCES IN EUROPE SERIES, 1946 - 47, The Second Year, Vol. I, pp. 121 - 24. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USFET GO 49, 10 Mar 47. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) Interv, S. Stone, Hist Div, with Lt Col E. C. Townsend, EUCOM OPOT Div Plans Staff Off, 20 Dec 50.

[15] (1) EUCOM Hist Div, OCCUPATION FORCES IN EUROPE SERIES, 1947 - 48, The Third Year, Vol. I, pp. 29 - 30. RESTRICTED. (2) EUCOM GO 123, 13 Nov 47, UNCLASSIFIED.

USAREUR was officially considered to be an operational headquarters in every sense of the term. An exact date, however, cannot be given for this important transition, but a gradual trend toward operational status reached its culmination considerably prior to the current year. Insofar as official records are concerned, the first mention of USAREUR headquarters as a "major subordinate command of EUCOM" occurred on 5 May 1949 at which time a circular was issued specifying the over-all command structure of the European Command. As far as can now be determined, the first orders effecting change in assignment of units specifically designated as belonging to USAREUR were issued on 9 June of the same year. Neither of these documents, however, proves conclusively that USAREUR was not considered fully operational long prior to that time. Conjecture aside, however, there can be no doubt that by the end of 1949, USAREUR had become well established not only as an operational headquarters, but, in addition, was administratively separate from Headquarters, EUCOM.[16]

10. General Organizational Structure at the Beginning of 1950

By the beginning of 1950, USAREUR was a fully operational headquarters which had been specifically designated as a major subordinate command of Headquarters, EUCOM. Functionally, insofar as the generation of publications is concerned, it was separate from EUCOM, having begun to publish its own orders and directives at the end of 1949. Physically, however, USAREUR remained closely associated with EUCOM during most of 1950, and personnel, as in previous years, continued to function dually within staff divisions of both organizations.

a. Units and Agencies Designated as Commands Subordinate to USAREUR. As in the case of Headquarters, EUCOM, no publications were issued during 1950 officially designating units or agencies as commands directly subordinate to USAREUR. (See 1950 EUCOM Report, par. 20.) In large, this was due to the fact that the problems of internal organization were under continuous study throughout the year, and, in order to keep USAREUR as flexible and as amenable to change as possible, no attempt was made to define precisely its strict composition. Nevertheless, during the year certain units were considered to be major subordinate commands, most of them having been so designated prior to the beginning of 1950. On 1 January, these subordinate commands of Headquarters, USAREUR, were: U.S. Constabulary (USCON) with headquarters at Vaihingen; 1st

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[16] (1) EUCOM Circular 124, 5 May 49, sub: Designation of Commands. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) EUCOM Troop Assignment 14, 9 Jun 49. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) Interv, S. Stone, Hist Div, with Maj C. W. Fletcher, EUCOM OPOT Div Opns Staff Off, 12 Jan 51.

Infantry Division with headquarters at Bad Tolz; 66th CIC Detachment located at Stuttgart; 7756 Audit Agency, USAREUR, at Bad Nauheim; and all military posts, including the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation, but excluding Wiesbaden.[17]

b. Technical and Administrative Services Designated as Commands. In addition, certain technical and administrative services, each of which consisted of the appropriate USAREUR staff division, as well as certain assigned units under the command of the chief of this division, were also considered to be major subordinate commands of USAREUR. Those staff divisions so designated as subordinate USAREUR commands at the beginning of 1950 were: Quartermaster, Signal, Engineer, Ordnance, Medical, Chemical, Transportation, Special Services, Provost Marshal, Finance, and Troop Information and Education.[18]

11. Composition of USAREUR Headquarters at the Beginning of 1950

USAREUR headquarters at the beginning of 1950 was loosely divided into three elements. These elements, as in Headquarters, EUCOM, consisted of the Office of the Commanding General, the general staff, and the special staff.

a. Office of the Commanding General. As at all times subsequent to its initial activation, Lt. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner commanded USAREUR at the beginning of 1950. He also served as deputy commander in chief and chief of staff of Headquarters, EUCOM. This triple responsibility was carried by General Huebner until USAREUR's final physical severance from EUCOM at the time of his departure from the theater in mid-August (See par. 20c, below.). To aid the USAREUR commanding general in exercising his command functions during 1950, General Huebner had at his disposal the personnel of the Office of the Commander in Chief, EUCOM, as well as the EUCOM Secretary, General Staff.

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[17] (1) Draft USAREUR Cir (unpublished), sub: Designation of Commands Directly Subordinate to USAREUR. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 322 EUCOM (1950), Vol. I, Item 6b. (2) EUCOM Cir 124, 5 May 49, sub: Designation of Commands. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) Interv, S. Stone, Hist Div, with Maj C. W. Fletcher, EUCOM OPOT Div Opns Staff Off, 12 Jan 51. (4) IRS, C/N 5, SGS EUCOM to D/OPOT, 11 Apr 50, sub: EUCOM & USAREUR Commands. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 322 EUCOM (1950), Vol. I, Item 6d.

[18] (1) Draft USAREUR Cir (unpublished), sub: Designation of Commands Directly Subordinate to USAREUR. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 322 EUCOM (1950), Vol. I, Item 6b. (2) Interv, S. Stone, Hist Div, with Maj C. W. Fletcher, EUCOM OPOT Div Opns Staff Off, 12 Jan 51.

b. General and Special Staffs. It was in the designation of certain staff divisions of USAREUR as subordinate commands that the most confusion arose over the dual and sometimes triple composition of Headquarters, USAREUR, during 1950. From the date of its inception, USAREUR staff divisions, both general and special, had been identical with EUCOM staff divisions of the same designation. In EUCOM, functions of these divisions were limited to those normal to the staff of any commander in chief. In USAREUR, many of these same staff divisions were, in addition, actual commands with installations, units, and agencies directly assigned. Thus, the chief of a single staff division, located at one desk in Headquarters, EUCOM, could, and sometimes did, at the same time actually hold three separate positions: in EUCOM he acted as chief of a general or special staff division with functions and duties pertinent to all three military services; in USAREUR, he was chief of a corresponding staff division, and, in addition, might be chief of an administrative or technical service, with actions in both cases usually limited to Army forces or Army personnel. In practice, this system was not as complicated as it might appear, and worked, in most cases, in a relatively simple manner, care being taken by the chief of the division or command to see that matters of single moment or single effect were directed to the proper addressees, whether in EUCOM or in USAREUR. Broken down into their actual components, the USAREUR general and special staff divisions were the same as those belonging to EUCOM. (See 1950 EUCOM Report, pars. 21b and 21c.)

12. General Summary of Major Organizational Changes During 1950

With USAREUR so closely associated with EUCOM during its existence, it is not always possible to divide organizational changes into one category containing those changes affecting EUCOM alone, and another dealing with actions pertinent only to USAREUR. Internally, that which affected EUCOM almost invariably had a similar effect upon USAREUR. Thus, if a staff division in EUCOM were reorganized or redesignated, the corresponding staff division in USAREUR would automatically be redesignated or reorganized, only one action being necessary to effect both changes. Conversely, however, this was not always the case. A change in the organizational structure of USAREUR did not automatically effect a similar change in the higher headquarters, EUCOM. An illustration of this may be seen in the fact that by the end of 1950, USAREUR, though still in existence, had reverted to its nonoperational status, whereas EUCOM continued to function in a completely normal manner. In any discussion of USAREUR organizational changes, therefore, it must be kept in mind that only a portion of its activities can be discussed separately from those of EUCOM.

a. Withdrawal of Personnel from USAREUR. Most important of these changes in USAREUR during 1950 was the actual preparation made

for the complete phase-out of USAREUR headquarters itself. By year's end, only the commanding general remained of the total personnel which had previously been assigned to this command, and even the commanding general's retention on USAREUR's rolls was based on somewhat tenuous circumstances. (See 1950 EUCOM Report, par. 25a.)

b. Additional Organizational Changes. In addition to the preparations made for the phase-out of the headquarters itself, various changes were effected in the organizational structure of units and agencies directly assigned to USAREUR. Most significant of these were the reorganization of USCON and the activation of numerous service and tactical units eventually assigned for support of or inclusion in the newly created field army which succeeded USAREUR as senior Army headquarters in the European Command. As in the case of EUCOM, all of these changes were based for the most part on specific trends which in turn were either outgrowths of the general world situation or reflections in some way of the state of domestic affairs in the United States.

13. Major Trends Affecting Organizational Changes

These major trends or dominant forces affecting organizational changes within USAREUR during 1950, which are discussed in detail in the following paragraphs, were of a less complex nature than those at work in EUCOM during a similar period. (See 1950 EUCOM Report, par. 23.) Disparity in missions would in one way account for this, USAREUR missions being those delegated by CINCEUR and consequently of a less diverse nature and of narrower scope than those of EUCOM.

a. Build-up of Tactical Forces. The most significant of these trends affecting USAREUR organizational structure in 1950 was the continuing emphasis placed upon the build-up of tactical forces in the European Command. This program, which actually began as early as 1947 when USAREUR's predecessor, U.S. Ground and Service Forces, Europe, was first activated, resulted in 1950 in the creation of a fully operational field army, the U.S. Seventh, which automatically superseded Headquarters, USAREUR, in the EUCOM chain of command. (See Chart 2 in 1950 EUCOM Report, Chap. II.) In addition to the Seventh Army, several other tactical and service forces were activated by USAREUR during 1950. These were for support of or inclusion in the new field army, and came as a natural result of USAREUR's accomplishment of its primary mission of attaining operational readiness for a general emergency.

b. Program of Economy in Personnel and Operations. Of less dramatic nature, yet of equal importance to the build-up of tactical forces, was USAREUR's general program of economy in handling personnel and operations during 1950. This program, which had been a

continuing one since the end of the European campaign in 1945, was designed in 1950 to place particular emphasis upon instituting sound business management practices in all USAREUR operations and organizations. Keynotes of this 1950 program were efficiency in operations and economy in the use of personnel, funds, and spaces.

III. Build-up of Tactical Forces

14. General Build-up of Forces and Eventual Withdrawal of Troops from USAREUR

Throughout 1950, primary emphasis was given by USAREUR to attaining maximum operational readiness in a minimum amount of time through intensive build-up of tactical forces. This change of emphasis on the part of USAREUR from occupational duties to readiness for war was necessitated by world events which had left no other course open to U.S. forces in Europe. It was now clear that the primary USAREUR mission was not alone the occupation of Germany. The Korean war and the growth of the Bereitschaften (Alert Units) in Eastern Germany brought home conclusively the need to collect available strength under a strong, centralized command and to relocate this available strength in the most efficient and expedient manner to meet all emergencies. In the United States, vigorous measures were being taken to step up armament production and recruit additional military personnel for use by military forces overseas. Although U.S. forces in Europe were actually not increased to any noticeable extent in 1950, definite preparations and plans were made for the reception and subsequent use of additional personnel at an early date in 1951. With the limited personnel available in Europe, however, USAREUR undertook programs of reorganization, redeployment, and reorientation of troops and personnel to the new mission of being operationally ready.[19]

a. Tactical Units Under USAREUR Operational Control at the Beginning of 1950. Proposals for reorganization and redeployment of existing USAREUR forces were not new in the current year. These had long existed, and failure to implement them resulted from material and personnel shortages as well as from political considerations

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[19] EUCOM Memo, CG, USAREUR to CINCEUR, 13 Sep 50, sub: Operational Readiness. SECRET. In SGS 322 EUCOM Operational Plans (1950), Vol. I, Item 18.

beyond the theater commander's control. Changes in the world situation in 1950, however, made it necessary to expedite organizational changes even without the troop and materiel implementation so badly needed. With this in mind, plans were made for the reorganization of certain elements already in the theater. The two major tactical arms of USAREUR at the beginning of 1950 were the U.S. Constabulary (USCON) and the 1st Infantry Division. Both were subordinate to and separate from the chief Army headquarters in the theater, and each was assigned a separate mission in the performance of over-all occupation duties. The first of these two organizations, USCON, had become operational as early as 1 July 1946, and from the date of its activation had assumed responsibility for area security throughout the U.S. Zone of Germany. Like USCON, the 1st Infantry Division, which had been in the theater throughout World War II, was also responsible for area security, but unlike USCON, was a less mobile organization, its functions consisting mainly of static occupation duties.[20]

b. Reorganization of U.S. Constabulary in March. The question of reorganization of the headquarters element of USCON had been one of long and continuous study prior to 1950. As world conditions had trended U.S. forces in Europe more and more toward operational readiness, the adequacy of USCON headquarters to assume command, administration, and logistical support responsibilities for the tactical, service, and service support units of USAREUR in event of an emergency had been seriously questioned. (See 1950 EUCOM Report, par. 24.) By the beginning of 1950, due mainly to the limited number of troops in the command, it was considered expedient to reorganize the Constabulary somewhat along the lines of an augmented corps or a reduced army, thus attaining this organization's maximum defensive capabilities. In March, tentative tables of organization and equipment superseding Constabulary "S" tables of February 1948 were authorized by the Department of the Army and published as a basis for Constabulary reorganization. In May, the headquarters elements of USCON were accordingly reorganized under these new tables. In addition, the Constabulary Flight Detachment was redesignated as the Flight Detachment, U.S. Constabulary, and the Headquarters Troops, U.S. Constabulary, was redesignated as Headquarters Company, U.S. Constabulary. The Department of the Army at the same time authorized the activation of the 19th Medical Detachment, assigned to the Medical Division, USAREUR, but attached for operational control to USCON. This latter detachment was to be

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[20] (1) EUCOM Hist Div, OCCUPATION FORCES IN EUROPE SERIES, 1946 - 47, The Second Year, Vol. I, p. 4. RESTRICTED. (2) EUCOM Memo, CG, USAREUR for CINCEUR, 13 Sep 50, sub: Operational Readiness. SECRET. In SGS 322 EUCOM Operational Plans (1950), Vol. I, Item 18.

considered a continuation of the previous 19th Medical Detachment which had been inactivated on 5 December 1948.[21]

c. Activation of 7880 Military Intelligence Detachment. Shortly after the reorganization of USCON headquarters, and in line with the general policy of strengthening defense forces in Europe, USAREUR turned its attention to the important problem of the collection and evaluation of intelligence material. As a corollary to the build-up of tactical forces, it was felt that all sources of information within Germany should be plumbed even more deeply than heretofore. With this in mind, focus of attention was centered on Berlin, considered by the USAREUR Intelligence Division to be the most lucrative point of positive intelligence collection within the European Command. In order to form a strong and independent detachment in Berlin which would provide this headquarters with a constant and healthy flow of positive information, USAREUR in early June reorganized and redeployed several existing Intelligence units so that they could be absorbed by and included in a single, completely new detachment to be stationed in the former German capital. According to the USAREUR Director of Intelligence, the entire command was "scraped" in order to supply the best qualified personnel for this new detachment. In April, the 7854 Military Intelligence Detachment was moved to Berlin from the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation and, effective 15 June, was combined with the 7829 MID Platoon to form the new 7880 Military Intelligence Detachment. This new detachment was assigned directly to the Berlin Military Post but was attached for operational control to the Intelligence Division, USAREUR. Coincident with the activation of this new unit, the Office of the S-2, Berlin Military Post, was relieved of its mission of positive intelligence collection and reorganized to perform only those intelligence functions characteristic of any normal military post.[22]

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[21] (1) Ltr, CG, USAREUR to CG, USCON, 9 Jan 50. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Interv, J. Lucas, Hist Div, with Col W. D. Long, Chief O&E Br, EUCOM OPOT Div, 5 Oct 50. (3) USAREUR Tentative Tables of Organization and Equipment, 15 Mar 50. UNCLASSIFIED.

[22] (1) IRS, C/N 6, D/Intel to SGS, USAREUR, 3 Jul 50, sub: 7880 MI Detachment. SECRET. In SGS 322, Organization, Activation and Disbandment of Units, Vol. I, Item 31a. (2) USAREUR ltr, 22 May 50, sub: Organization and Discontinuance of Certain Intelligence Units. AG 322 GCT - AGO. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) Memo, Dir/Intel to COFS USAREUR, 7 Jun 50, sub: 7880 MI Detachment. RESTRICTED. In SGS 322, Organization, Activation and Disbandment of Units, Vol. I, Item 22 B-1. (4) USAREUR Trp Asg 8, 17 Mar 50. UNCLASSIFIED. (5) USAREUR Trp Asg 17, 19 Jun 50. UNCLASSIFIED.

d. Activation of the 6th Infantry Regiment. In line with the general policy of strengthening defense forces in Europe, in October USAREUR instructed the commanding general of the 1st Infantry Division to take the necessary action to activate the 6th Infantry Regiment at Grafenwohr, Germany. This new regiment was to be organized under Table of Organization and Equipment 7-11 N, dated 21 April 1948, as amended by applicable Department of the Army special regulations of the 650 (career fields) series, and was to consist of an authorized strength of 155 officers, 26 warrant officers, and 3,617 enlisted men. Upon its subsequent activation, pursuant to General Orders No. 29, 1st Infantry Division, dated 16 October 1950, the 6th Infantry Regiment, less the Service Company and the 3d Battalion, was assigned to the Berlin Military Post where it was used to supplement existing military forces already in that area. This unit was further attached to the 1st Infantry Division which was authorized to requisition, promote, and transfer personnel. Troops for this new unit were furnished by both the 1st Infantry Division and USCON. Personnel and equipment of the 3d Battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment, as well as its regular attachments, all of which had previously been assigned to the 1st Infantry Division, were transferred to the 3d Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment, on 16 October. Somewhat later, on 1 December, personnel of the 16th Constabulary Squadron, already stationed in Berlin were also transferred to the new unit, and the 16th Constabulary Squadron was concurrently inactivated. By the end of the year, at which time all elements of the 6th Regiment except the heavy mortar company and the heavy tank company attached to the Seventh Army at Vilseck, Nuremberg Military Post, had arrived in Berlin, 148 officers and 3,194 enlisted men had been assiged to the Berlin unit.[23]

e. Formation of Cadre for 4th Infantry Division. At almost the same time that plans were being made for the activation of the 6th Infantry Regiment in Berlin, word was received from the Department of the Army that it would be necessary for USAREUR to supply cadres for a new infantry division to be activated in the continental United States. Lack of sufficiently trained personnel already present in the ZI was the reason given for having to draw on the somewhat slim resources of the European Command for these additional troops. To supply the required personnel, USAREUR on 17 October issued instructions to the commanding generals of USCON and the 1st Infantry Division to assemble enlisted cadres at the Kitzingen Training Center on 5 and 11 November, and, further, to issue all necessary orders to provide for the shipment of these cadres, as organized units, to Fort Benning, Georgia. Upon arrival at Benning,

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[23] (1) USAREUR ltr, 12 Oct 50, sub: Activation Organization and Movement of Certain Units in the European Command. AG 322 GOT - AGO. RESTRICTED. (2) USAREUR Trp Asg 33, 23 Oct 50. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) EUCOM Trp Asg 9, 27 Dec 50. UNCLASSIFIED. (4) EUCOM ltr, 5 Feb 51, sub: Analysis of the Monthly Statistical Report, US Army, European Command, for 31 December 1950, p. 3. SECRET.

at an anticipated date of 10 December, these troops were to be reassigned to the embryonic 4th Infantry Division. On 20 November, the Director of the Personnal and Administration (P&A) Division of Headquarters, USAREUR, reported to the USAREUR chief of staff that a total of 1,320 cadremen for the infantry division had been shipped to the United States. This personnel had been divided into three increments, the first containing 123 Negro troops for inclusion in a single infantry battalion; the second containing a total of 827 white troops to form cadres for one infantry regiment minus one infantry battalion, one infantry regiment minus three battalions, one division artillery minus the headquarters and headquarters battery, two field artillery battalions (105-mm. howitzer), and one medical detachment; and the third containing 370 white enlisted men for inclusion in one field artillery battalion (105-mm. howitzer), one field artillery battalion (155-mm. howitzer), one heavy tank battalion, and one reconaissance company.[24]

f. Activation of Additional Tactical and Service Support Units. During most of 1950, and particularly following the outbreak of war in Korea, plans for immediate EUCOM troop augmentation were delayed for reasons usually given as "troops elsewhere committed" or "troops diverted to the Far Eastern Command." Although most of these plans remained on the agenda for future implementation, 1950 saw little change in the over-all program of augmentation which had originally been anticipated. Thus, it was within units already physically present that most reorganizations or redeployments took place. A priority list for organizational actions in the immediate future had been set up in August of 1949, and, with only minor alterations, had been carried out by spring of the current year. This list included, in most instances, troop implementations of critical tactical and service support units with personnel drawn from already existing units on an even-space trade involving little or no cost to the over-all troop basis. Such increases included augmentation of the Tank Training Center at Vilseck, formation of a cadre for a signal heavy construction battalion, increase of authorized personnel for the 97th Signal Squadron, activation of a radio company, signal operations battalion, and augmentation of the 371st Infantry Battalion. Though by no means the only implementations which took place during the year, these were considered of sufficient importance to warrant their

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[24] (1) USAREUR ltr, 17 Oct 50, sub: Cadre for the 4th Infantry Division. AG 322 GOT - AGO. RESTRICTED. (2) IRS, C/N 1, P&A Mil Pers Br to COFS USAREUR, 20 Nov 50, sub: 4th Infantry Division Cadre. GPA 220. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 322 Organization, Activation and Discontinuance of Units, (1950), Vol. I, Item 114a. (3) Interv, S. Stone, Hist Div, with Lt Col E. F. Graham, Jr., EUCOM OPOT Div Plans Staff Off, 20 Dec 50.

being included in special reports to the USAREUR commanding general on organizational changes, which are discussed in detail in the 1950 annual narrative reports of the various USAREUR administrative and technical services, including activations, inactivations, redesignations, and redeployments of Signal, Military Police, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Engineer, Medical, Special Troops, Chemical, and Transportation units and agencies. Particularly in the case of Ordnance and Signal units these were the result of the need to organize support-type units in line with the new tactical mission of operational readiness.[25]

(1) SOP for Incoming Units. To prepare further for the arrival of those units anticipated from the zone of interior during 1951, an SOP covering the reception to be accorded them was developed by USAREUR and subsequently issued on 22 November of the current year. This SOP, designed to insure both uniform and complete processing and treatment of the incoming units, was prepared by OPOT with the assistance of the Logistics, Personnel and Administration, Transportation, Adjutant General, and Public Information Divisions. It covered in detail the handling of new units from the moment notification was received from the zone of interior or other overseas ports of embarkation of the port call of the incoming unit until such time as this unit was installed in its final location.[26]

g. Integration of Tactical and Service Support Units into Seventh Army. With the activation of the U.S. Seventh Army on 24 November (See 1950 EUCOM Report, par. 24f), a general reshuffling of troop and unit assignments within EUCOM took place. Insofar as units previously designated as subordinate commands of USAREUR are concerned, the major shifts in assignments were to the Seventh Army which, upon activation, became the parent organization of all ground force tactical commands in the theater. Effective 24 November, both the 1st Infantry Division and USCON, less its headquarters elements, were relieved from assignment to USAREUR and reassigned to the Seventh Army. This inactivation of the headquarters elements of USCON without the automatic inactivation of its other integral parts was in the nature of a special arrangement unusual in Army administrative procedures. Ordinarily, a unit which has

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[25] (1) Memo, Col Ralph W. Zwicker, Dep/Dir O&T Br, OPOT Div, for Gen Huebner, 11 May 50. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 322 Organization, Activation and Discontinuance of Units (1950), Vol. I, Item 16.
(2) Interv, S. Stone, Hist Div, with Col E. F. Graham, Jr., EUCOM OPOT Div Plans Staff Off, 20 Dec 50.

[26] EUCOM ltr, Asst AG to CG's USAREUR, USAFE, 7966; Comdr USNAVFORGER, 22 Nov 50, sub: SOP for Movement of Units Arriving in the European Command. AG 370.5 GOT - AGO. RESTRICTED. For further details see EUCOM OPOT Annual Narrative Report, 1950, Chap. II, par. 27.

been decapitated -- in the sense of its having been deprived of its head elements -- would instantly cease to exist. Because it was desired by EUCOM to retain the Constabulary units intact and as already constituted, however, authorization was received from the Department of the Army to eliminate the USCON headquarters elements and yet retain the subordinate parts. Those units unaffected by the inactivation of USCON headquarters, and which continued to be regarded as "constabulary Troops," even though assigned directly to the Seventh Army, were the 1st and 2d Constabulary Brigades, the 7732d Field Artillery Group, and the 51st Armored Medical Battalion. USCON commanding general Maj. Gen. I. D. White continued in command of these troops following their absorption by the Seventh Army. In addition, he became deputy commanding general of the field army, second in command only to Lt. Gen. Manton S. Eddy. In addition to the 1st Infantry Division and Constabulary troops, major units assigned to the Seventh Army at the end of 1950 were: Special Troops, Seventh Army; 12th AAA Group; 555th Engineer Group; 2d Quartermaster Group; 27th Transportation Truck Battalion; 29th Transportation Truck Battalion; 80th Ordnance Battalion; and 97th Signal Operations Battalion.[27]

h. Withdrawal of Troops from USAREUR. With both the 1st Infantry Division and Constabulary troops assigned as integral parts of the Seventh Army from date of its activation, only the 66th CIC Detachment, the 7756 Audit Agency, the military posts, and certain technical and administrative services remained of the units and agencies designated as commands subordinate and directly assigned to USAREUR. (See par. 10a, above.) Further depletion of this latter headquarters occurred on 2 December when USAREUR military posts, including all assigned units, were reassigned to EUCOM headquarters, and on 15 December when the 66th CIC Detachment and the 7756 Audit Agency were also reassigned to EUCOM. The withdrawal of all personnel from USAREUR headquarters automatically eliminated its general and staff divisions; command responsibility which had been previously delegated to these divisions in their capacity as technical and administrative services reverted to comparable staff divisions in Headquarters, EUCOM. (See Chart 2 in 1950 EUCOM Report, Chap. II.)[28]

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[27] (1) EUCOM Trp Asg 6, 22 Nov 50. RESTRICTED. (2) EUCOM GO 54, 24 Nov 50. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) EUCOM ltr, 24 Nov 50, sub: Activation and Organization of Seventh Army and Inactivation of Headquarters, Headquarters Company, and Headquarters Special Troops, US Constabulary. AG 320.2 GOT - AGO. UNCLASSIFIED. (4) 7th Army Trp Asg 1, 7 Dec 50. RESTRICTED. (5) Interv, S. Stone, Hist Div, with Lt Col E. C. Townsend, EUCOM OPOT Div Plans Staff Off, 20 Dec 50.

[28] (1) EUCOM ltr, 2 Dec 50, sub: Reassignment of Military Posts and Assigned Units. AG 322 GOT - AGO. RESTRICTED. (2) EUCOM Trp Asg 8, 15 Dec 50. RESTRICTED. (3) EUCOM Trp Asg 9, 27 Dec 50. RESTRICTED.

15. Organization of Reserve Units, ORC

As a further means of implementing troop strength for use in an emergency, various Organized Reserve units were activated by USAREUR during the year. The EUCOM Organized Reserve Corps program had been inaugurated prior to the end of 1949, and by the beginning of 1950 sixteen USAREUR reserve training units had been organized at various military posts in the occupied zone of Germany.[29] During 1950, this total was increased by addition of four new units. These were the 7901 Reserve Training Unit, ORC, organized at Fritzlar Military Sub-post, the 7843d Reserve Training Unit, at Bad Nauheim, the 7851 Reserve Training Unit, ORC, organized at Karlsruhe, and the 7831 Reserve Training Unit, Bremerhaven. In line with new regulations from Washington reorganizing the entire Organized Reserve Corps program for the Armed Forces, all Organized Reserve Corps units in the zone were redesignated, effective 1 September, from Reserve Training Units to Organized Reserve Corps Control Groups (Table of Organization and Equipment Mobilization Designation), Organized Reserve Corps Control Groups (Voluntary Reserve), Organized Reserve Corps Control Groups (Regular Army), Organized Reserve Corps Control Groups (Honorary Reserve), and Organized Mobilization Designation Detachments.[30]

IV. Program of Economy in Personnel and Operations

16. USAREUR General Program of Economy

Throughout 1950, USAREUR paid strict attention to all measures which would in any way affect economy in personnel and operations. The general programs of economy instituted during the year in both EUCOM and USAREUR headquarters ran parallel and, in many instances, overlapped to such an extent that little differentiation could be made between them. (See 1950 EUCOM Report, pars. 29 - 33.) In USAREUR during 1950, the term "economy" had a special meaning; the use of sound business management principles to control and to use most effectively all manpower, money, and material at every echelon of command.

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[29] See EUCOM OPOT Annual Narrative Report, 1950, Chap. VI, par. 79.

[30] (1) USAREUR GO 5, 6 Feb 50. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR GO 9, 23 Feb 50. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) USAREUR GO 13, 31 Mar 50. UNCLASSIFIED. (4) USAREUR GO 16, 25 Apr 50. UNCLASSIFIED. (5) USAREUR GO 37, 17 Aug 50. UNCLASSIFIED.

a. Remarks by General Huebner. This special meaning of the term "economy" was perhaps best explained in 1950 by General Huebner in a radio address broadcast over the American Forces Network at 1800 hours on 18 May when he elucidated to the command the over-all aims of the economy program in USAREUR. General Huebner pointed out that economy measures of any sort were closely tied to good business management practices and that in order to secure for USAREUR a maximum amount of economy in personnel, spaces, and funds, it was necessary to institute sound business management practices in every echelon. These business management practices, he insisted, should be designed toward a single primary target: maximum effectiveness at a minimum cost consistent with the requisite standards. Business management in USAREUR, General Huebner further explained, involved the complex problem of matching men, materiel, and funds to accomplish a diversity of missions under extremely variable conditions. Management by all individuals at every level, however, would assuredly result in the desired economies despite these variables; such management would enable the Army in Europe to do more with less money and at the same time put more power on the line by saving manpower in the rear.[31]

b. Areas of Economy. Numerous ways were found during 1950 to implement this general program of economy by use of the business management principles which General Huebner deemed so important. The entire year was one of continuous effort toward the tightening of controls, elimination of waste motions and operations, and over-all strengthening of organizational structures. The tools of work measurement, cost accounting, work simplification, and reports control were used effectively while command inspections, audits, and management surveys were held periodically to review achievements within the various areas in which economy measures were instituted. These areas of economy consisted mainly of administration and personnel functions, operations, and materiel or supply.

17. Programs of Economy in Administration and Personnel

During a year in which over-all budgets in the command had not been increased sufficiently to cover added missions and responsibilities, considerable emphasis was placed on the elimination of waste motion in administrative work and waste spaces within personnel allotments. From a management viewpoint, the USAREUR Comptroller was made responsible to the commanding general for recommendations as to the requirements for a work force adequate to carry the

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[31] USAREUR ltr to Comdrs of All Comds Subord to USAREUR, 15 Jun 50, sub: Department of the Army Economy Program Broadcast by Lieutenant General Huebner, 18 May 50. AG 000.77 COM - AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

administrative load, yet one in which the detrimental factors of "feather-bedding," over-organization, excessive use of specialists, "Rube Goldberg" procedures, and overlapping of personnel were not present. From a budget point of view, the Budget Division of the USAREUR Office of the Comptroller was made responsible to the commanding general for assurance that funds for personnel hire were wisely managed and carefully used to further USAREUR missions. Together, these two offices worked steadily throughout the year to bring under constant surveillance every office in the command in which business management principles could be instituted.[32]

a. Establishment of the Offices of Post Comptrollers. Each post commander was directed on 1 February to establish an Office of the Post Comptroller similar in nature and in functions to that office which had been established in USAREUR headquarters in 1949. Post comptrollers were instructed to advise the post commander regarding action necessary to improve and expedite the use of modern management techniques in the business administration of their individual posts. They were also to provide more effective tools for use in the control and operations of these posts. No Additional personnel were authorized by Headquarters, USAREUR, in connection with the organization of duties and responsibilities prescribed for the post comptroller, but every assistance was offered in aiding posts to obtain highly qualified personnel for the job within their established space allocations. Special instructions were given to post commanders to establish comptroller offices at principal staff levels, and directives were issued making the post comptroller directly subordinate to either the post commander or his immediate assistant.[33]

b. Simplification of Administration at the Company Level. Not alone at post level were actions taken by USAREUR to eliminate waste motions in administrative work and to improve and expedite the use of modern management techniques. In both 1949 and 1950, the program of economy in administration and personnel reached as far down the chain of command as the company level. In late 1949, a board of officers, with the comptroller serving as chairman, had been appointed to study the problem of the day-to-day administrative workload of tactical and other unit commanders and to make recommendations for reduction, elimination, and consolidation of forms,

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[32] Management Bulletin, Office of the Comptroller, Vol. III, No. 1, 15 Jan 51. UNCLASSIFIED.

[33] (1) USAREUR ltr, 19 Jan 50, sub: Establishment of the Office of the Post Comptroller. AG 322 GOT - AGO. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) EUCOM Hist Div, OCCUPATION FORCES IN EUROPE SERIES, Annual Narrative Report of the European Command, 1949, Chap. II, par. 2. SECRET.

reports, and useless paper work in these units. The board's findings and recommendations were submitted to the USAREUR chief of staff on 16 January, and those portions approved by the commanding general were disseminated to commanders directly subordinate to USAREUR on 3 March. These subordinate commanders were enjoined to take effective positive action to relieve and, wherever practicable, to eliminate the deficiencies cited by the board. Areas into which the board had made the most exhaustive study were: management and staff procedures; distribution of publications; courts, boards, and investigations; property accounting and supply; and use of company administrative personnel. In regard to management and staff procedures, the board found that reports were being required by higher headquarters even though commanders were empowered by law, regulation, or policy to take final action on certain matters themselves; that policies and procedural directives of higher headquarters often infringed on the command responsibilities of lower echelons; and that staff divisions were becoming too involved in detailed operations. In addition, the board discovered certain practices, particularly prevalent in lower echelons of command, which resulted in the repeated detail of the same junior officers for the administrative functions of courts, boards, and investigations. It was also disclosed that higher echelons, such as regiments and battalions, failed to absorb these administrative burdens whenever practicable. The comptroller was delegated responsibility to assign staff action within USAREUR headquarters to assure that steps be taken wherever possible to alleviate undesirable conditions noted by the investigating board. He was, additionally, to effect positive follow-up to implement the approved recommendations.[34]

c. Revision of the Reports Control System. Partly as a result of the findings of the board of officers on simplification of administration at the company level and partly as a result of the over-all attempt on the part of the Department of the Army in Washington to tighten administrative controls at all echelons of command, new procedures for assigning reports control responsibilities and jurisdictions were set up by USAREUR headquarters in 1950. In January, in compliance with a Department of the Army directive, USAREUR instructed all subordinate commanders and the heads of all staff agencies to make a reports control survey for

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[34](1) USAREUR ltr, Asst AG to Comdrs of All Comds Dir Subord to USAREUR, 3 Mar 50. AG 322.011 COM-- AGO. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Management Bulletin, Office of the Comptroller, Vol. II, No. 1, 15 Jan 50, pp. 4, 10. UNCLASSIFIED. For implementation of these recommendations, see EUCOM Office of the Comptroller Annual Narrative Report, 1950, Chap. III, par. 37.

the purpose of possible elimination, consolidation, and/or reduction in the frequency of all recurring reports. Effective 1 April, the development and supervision of the reports control system was transferred from the Management Branch to the Statistical Branch of the Office of the Comptroller. Concurrently, responsibility for the direct supervision of the system was transferred from the Adjutant General Division to the Office of the Comptroller. During June, following receipt of the review of all recurring reports from staff heads and unit commanders, a new system for assigning responsibilities and jurisdictions was set up. Primary value of this new system, placed directly under the supervisory control of the USAREUR comptroller, was the elimination of all possibility of overlapping or repetition in command publications and directives. To aid in the surveillance and operation of this new system, a Reports Control Office, USAREUR, was set up under the Office of the Comptroller.[35]

d. Civilian Manpower Control Program. While emphasis was being placed on the elimination of waste motions in the administrative work of USAREUR, similar actions were being taken to effect elimination of waste spaces within personnel allotments. Most important of the programs in operation during 1950 to effect more careful control of the utilization of personnel was the Civilian Manpower Control Program. Within the framework of this general program, a responsibility of the Comptroller and the Chief, Budget Division, every effort was made to see that commanders had a clear understanding of the absolute necessity for keeping within civilian personnel authorizations and that the number of personnel employed to accomplish any given mission be kept to a minimum. In particular, this program stressed the necessity of training commanders of subordinate units in their responsibilities for reducing work forces whenever such action was made possible as a result of improved work methods, decrease in volume of work, or cessation of a particular activity. Frequent inspections of manpower control activities and follow-ups to assure that appropriate corrective action had been taken were instituted as essential to the program's success.[36]

18. Programs of Economy in Operations

The USAREUR programs of economy in the field of operations were a part of an over-all Department of the Army program initiated in

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[35] (1) USAREUR ltr, Asst AG to Comdrs of All Comds Dir Subord to USAREUR, sub: Reports Control Survey. AG 319.1 COM - AGO. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR Cir 195, 19 Jan 50, sub: Reports Control System. UNCLASSIFIED.

[36] USAREUR Cir 96, 27 Jan 50, sub: Civilian Manpower Control. UNCLASSIFIED.

August of 1949 and designed to effect all practical economies and management improvements in the operations of the Army without cutting back on requisite standards and needs. As constructed by the Department of the Army, this economy program placed heavy emphasis on the need for a review by all military and civilian personnel of those policies, procedures, and operations directly connected with their own work or work with which they were familiar in order to determine ways, means, and areas in which economies in operations could be effected.

a. Work Simplification and Employee Suggestions. In USAREUR, that phase of the general economy program which embraced the review of operations procedures was given the title of work simplification. Within the framework of the work simplification program, it was desired that all possibilities by which operations could be simplified or better organized would be brought to light and money-saving measures for their correction or improvement be effected. One means used to foster this program of work simplification was the employee suggestion and cash awards program which was carried on in all Army installations throughout the command. Although these were separate programs in installations located in the United States, they were integrated in the European Command. The employee suggestion and cash awards program, which was transferred on 1 January from the Personnel and Administration Division to the Office of the Comptroller, authorized the payment of cash awards to employees for suggestions resulting in improvement or economy in the operations or administration of a Department of the Army agency or function; it was based on the concept that constructive ideas can be obtained from every employee regardless of rank or position. Any proposed methods by which a Department of the Army job could be accomplished better, faster, or more cheaply were to be explored. Suggestions might be ones in which job operations, tools, or administrative routines could be improved, production expedited, or a plant better laid out or organized. Additionally, suggestions might result in the saving of material or property, the promotion of health, the increase of safety, or the improvement of morale. During 1950 a total of 3,946 suggestions under the work simplification program and a total of 2,975 suggestions under the employee suggestion program were received by USAREUR headquarters. Of this number, 1,860 of the work simplification suggestions were installed, while 334 of the employee suggestions were adopted. Estimated first year's savings under both of these programs totaled $1,037,021 and 7,474,960 DM. Awards paid to U.S. and allied/neutral civilian and military personnel of the U.S. Army whose suggestions were recognized and

adopted during the year amounted to $4,047 and 83,049 DM.[37]

b. Work Measurement and Cost Accounting. Another program of management improvement directed toward effecting economies in operations in USAREUR which was carried out in 1950 was that of work measurement. Concurrent with the introduction of new methods of cost accounting, work measurement had been established in all military posts of the command in 1949. The purpose of the work measurement program was to make available to commanders and their staffs a method by which the operations of their activities and installations could be analyzed most effectively. In March of 1950, letter instructions were issued prescribing work measurement procedures for use by military posts. In carrying out these procedures, post commanders were made responsible for the appointment of a work measurement officer, the coordination and supervision of a comprehensive work measurement program, the prescribing of a standard method of recording workload and man-hour data, the establishment and maintenance of work measurement charts or statistical summaries at activity level for the purposes of analysis and comparison, and the initiation of studies on the subject of personnel utilization, organization, methods, equipment, and training to be initiated when out-of-line performance might be indicated by work measurement. Throughout the year, recommendations for additions and changes to work measurement definitions were required to be submitted to Headquarters, USAREUR, and standards were established by post commanders. These, in turn, were submitted to higher headquarters. Lists of approved standards, derived from these post level reports, were published periodically during 1950 by the Office of the Comptroller, USAREUR. At the same time that the original instructions were issued to post commanders, similar instructions were forwarded to chiefs, USAREUR technical services, outlining in detail the responsibility of technical service chiefs for a program of work measurement within the installations of their commands.[38]

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[37] (1) USAREUR Cir 33, 11 Aug 50, sub: Economy, Work Simplification, and Employee Suggestions and Cash Awards Programs. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR Memo, Office of the Compt for all Post Comdrs, 24 Apr 50, sub: Post Commander's Monthly Conference Notes. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) USAREUR Management Bulletin, Vol. 2, No. 8 (15 Aug 50), p. 1. UNCLASSIFIED. (4) EUCOM ltr, Asst AG to CG, 7966 EUCOM Detachment, all Mil Post Comdrs (excluding Wiesbaden Military Post), and Chiefs, Technical Services, 18 Jan 51, sub: Work Simplification and Employee Suggestions Progress Report. AG 230 COM - AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[38] (1) USAREUR ltr to all Mil Post Comdrs Dir Subord to USAREUR (incl BPE), 27 Mar 50, sub: Work Measurement Program in Military Posts. AG 230 COM - AGO. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR ltr to Chiefs, Technical Services, USAREUR, 27 Mar 50, sub: Work Measurement Program - Technical Service Installations. AG 230 COM - AGO. UNCLASSIFIED. For additional information, see EUCOM Office of the Comptroller, Annual Narrative Report, 1950, Chap. VI, par. 80.

c. Discontinuance of the Machine Tabulating Branch, 7771 Documents Center. A concrete example of the manner in which work measurement and cost accounting could result in considerable saving to USAREUR is evidenced by the discontinuance in 1950 of the Machine Tabulating Branch (MTB), 7771 Documents Center, Berlin Military post, an action which came as a result of the effective management of both of these programs. In October of 1949, a survey of the Berlin Military Post conducted jointly by the OPOT Division and the Office of the Comptroller revealed that the MTB, 7771 Documents Center could be discontinued without affecting operations either of the Berlin Military Post or of Headquarters, USAREUR. In addition, it was discovered that discontinuance of this unit would result in considerable economy to both organizations. This branch, although supported by the Army, was engaged principally in preparing tabulations for various statistical agencies of HICOG. Although no agreement concerning HICOG's assumption of responsibility for continued operation of this unit was reached at that time, the question was again brought up in May of 1950, when the work measurement and cost accounting programs were particularly active in USAREUR. At this time a decision between HICOG and USAREUR was reached. Accordingly, instructions were issued to the commanding officer of the Berlin Military Post in late spring to discontinue all processing of records in the Machine Tabulating Branch no later than 30 June, and to close the activity entirely no later than 31 July.[39]

19. Program of Supply Economy

In addition to the programs of economy in the areas of administration and personnel functions, as well as in operations, USAREUR placed great stress during the year on economy in the use of materiel. In March, publications were distributed to all commands subordinate to USAREUR announcing the general policy regarding the continued practice of supply economy in all Army operations and agencies. All commanders were reminded of their responsibility to prevent the careless use of supplies and equipment, extra measures being necessary because of declining dollar and deutsche mark budgets. Each commander was instructed to develop and enforce the

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[39](1) USAREUR Study, Comp (Binns) to CQFS, USAREUR, undated, sub: Discontinuance of MTB 7771 DC, BMP. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 322, Organization, Activation and Discontinuance of Units (1950), Vol. I, Item 22c. (2) USAREUR ltr, EUCOM AG to CO, BMP, undated, sub: Discontinuance of the MTB 7771 DC. AG 322 COM. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 322, Organization, Activation, Discontinuance of Units (1950), Vol. I, Item 26.

practice and appreciation of supply economy by every individual in his command. More specifically he was directed to : include in every phase of training a constant indoctrination of all personnel in the care and conservation of supplies and equipment; provide close supervision of unit and organization supply activities in order to reduce wastage of every sort; require strict adherence to authorized allowances and immediate processing of all excesses; provide close inspection of maintenance practices to insure proper care and conservation of all clothing and equipment; establish a supply economy program, campaign, or competition which would fit the needs of the command concerned; and, finally, to instill in every member of each unit the appreciation of responsibility for the continuing practice of supply economy. To aid subordinate commanders in carrying out the 1950 supply economy program, various lesson plans for instruction purposes were prepared in the Logistics Division of USAREUR. These plans were subsequently distributed to all USAREUR subordinate units. In addition to the over-all campaign of supply economy, a USAREUR Logistics Planning Board was established on 18 April to study available planning data, and to review logistic planning forecasts and five-year construction plans for submission to EUCOM. The board consisted of the Director of Logistics, as president; the Deputy Chief, Engineer Division; Chief, Control Branch, P&A Division; Chief, Operations and Plans Branch, OPOT Division; Chief, Plans and Policy Branch, Office of Comptroller; and one staff officer, Service Branch, Logistics Division, and one staff officer, Plans Branch, Logistics Division, as members. This board continued in existence until the end of December 1950, when it was officially terminated. Its functions and responsibilities were transferred to a similar board in EUCOM.[40]

V. Other Organizational Changes

20. Miscellaneous Changes During 1950

In addition to the major organizational changes resulting from the trend toward tactical forces and the programs of economy in operations and personnel, certain other organizational changes took place within USAREUR during the current year. These included changes

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[40] (1) USAREUR Cir 230, 14 Mar 50, sub: Supply Economy. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR GO 15, Apr 50. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) USAREUR GO 51, 28 Dec 50. UNCLASSIFIED.

in the composition of USAREUR headquarters, unit and agency changes, and shifts in assignments of key personnel.

a. Changes in the Composition of USAREUR Headquarters. Several changes in designation of staff divisions, as well as in the status of headquarters itself, took place in USAREUR during 1950. On 10 March, announcement was made of the establishment of the Troop Information and Education Division, Headquarters, USAREUR, as a special staff division and subordinate command of USAREUR. This command was to consist of the regular staff division and such units as might in the future be assigned thereto. (See 1950 EUCOM Report, par. 33b.) In May, concurrent with the redesignation of the same staff division in EUCOM, the Secretary, General Staff, Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, was redesignated Secretary of the General Staff, Headquarters, USAREUR. Later, in August, the Labor Services Division was established as a special staff division, Headquarters, USAREUR, with the Chief, Labor Services Division, responsible to the Chief of Staff, USAREUR, for staff supervision of USAREUR Labor Service and Industrial Police. (See also 1950 EUCOM Report, pars. 49 - 53.) During the same month, and as a part of the general command-wide reorganization and redesignation of Special Services activities (See 1950 EUCOM Report, par. 33e), the USAREUR Central Welfare Fund was redesignated the USAREUR Welfare Fund.[41]

b. Unit and Agency Changes. In addition to these staff division changes, certain unit and agency changes were made during the year. These, although related, were not always a direct result of the emphasis which USAREUR placed during 1950 on the rebuilding of tactical forces in Europe. One such change was the establishment of the Rheinau Transportation Center at Mannheim-Rheinau on 15 August. This center was assigned to the Transportation Division, Headquarters, USAREUR. A second installation, similar in nature to the Rheinau Transportation Center, was set up at Sandhofen, Germany, on 17 August. This was the Sandhofen Ordnance Automotive Center, which was responsible, as directed by the Chief, Ordnance Division, USAREUR, for the command stocks of general and special purpose automotive materials (other than combat) to include the receipt, issue, storage, repair, overhaul, and reclamation of serviceable and/or unserviceable major items of assemblies. The new installation was assigned to the Ordnance Division, USAREUR. In the interest of reducing excessive administrative procedures and in order better to consolidate related activities of the Adjutant General Division, a separate Publications Branch of this division was established at Hoechst, effective 20 September. Organized under Table of Organization 1007, Headquarters, USAREUR,

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[41] USAREUR GO 11, 10 Mar 50, par. 1. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR GO 21, 25 May 50. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) USAREUR GO 40, 22 Aug 50. UNCLASSIFIED.

with an authorized strength of three officers and twenty-one enlisted personnel, this new branch was designated as the 7879 Publications Depot and Records Center. It was assigned to the Adjutant General Division, USAREUR. On the same date as the establishment of the Depot and Records Center, the 7750 Examining and Computing Unit, USAREUR, with station at Heidelberg, was discontinued, and its personnel authorization, Table of Distribution 1438, was withdrawn.[42]

c. Changes in Assignments of Key Personnel. In addition to the changes in the composition of USAREUR headquarters, as well as the various changes in units and agencies assigned to it, there were various shifts in the status of personnel assigned directly to USAREUR. Most significant was the relief from assignment of the USAREUR commanding general, Lt. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner, who, in August of the current year, departed from the theater to return to the United States, where he subsequently retired from the military service. Succeeding General Huebner as commanding general of USAREUR was Lt. Gen. Manton S. Eddy, who assumed command on 18 August. Of particular significance in connection with this assumption of command on the part of General Eddy is the fact that General Eddy did not additionally become deputy commander in chief and chief of staff, EUCOM, assignments which his predecessor, General Huebner, had held at all times during his period of occupancy of the USAREUR commanding general's position. It was with General Eddy's failure to assume these added assignments that the final physical severance of USAREUR and EUCOM headquarters took place (See par. 10, above). In addition to these changes, the following major assignments to key staff and command positions were made in USAREUR during the current year:

(1) Colonel Paul L. Singer was appointed Deputy Provost Marshal, USAREUR, on 17 February.[43]

(2) Maj. Gen. F. W. Milburn assumed command of USAREUR during the temporary absence of Lt. Gen Clarence R. Huebner, from 2 March until 29 April. On the latter date, General Huebner resumed command.[44]

(3) Brig. Gen. Ray M. Hare was announced as Chief of Ordnance, vice Col. Willis R. Slaughter, on 9 May.[45]

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[42] (1) USAREUR GO 33, 8 Aug 50. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR GO 37, 17 Aug 50. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) USAREUR GO 42, 5 Sep 50. UNCLASSIFIED. (4) USAREUR Trp Asg 27, 18 Sep 50. UNCLASSIFIED.

[43] USAREUR GO 8, 17 Feb 50. UNCLASSIFIED.

[44] (1) USAREUR GO 10, 2 Mar 50. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR GO 17, 29 Apr 50. UNCLASSIFIED.

[45] (1) USAREUR GO 18, 9 May 50. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR GO 24, 22 Jun 50. UNCLASSIFIED.

(4) Col. Edward T. Williams was appointed Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, USAREUR, vice Col. John G. Hill, on 20 May.[46]

(5) Brig. Gen. Rex Van Den Corput, Jr. followed Maj. Gen. Jerry V. Matejka in the position of Chief Signal Officer on 19 June.[47]

(6) Chaplain (Colonel) John S. Kelly was appointed Chief Chaplain, USAREUR, on 5 July.[48]

(7) Col. Porter P. Wiggins replaced Maj. Gen. Roy V. Rickard as Chief of Special Services on 31 July.[49]

(8) Col. Harold C. Fellows was appointed Chief, Troop Information and Education Division, USAREUR, vice Col. Otis McCormick, on 1 August.[50]

(9) Maj. Gen. Truman C. Thorson was announced as Inspector General, in place of Col. Herman O. Lane, on 5 August.[51]

(10) Brig. Gen. Bertram F. Hayford assumed new duties as Chief of Transportation, in place of Col. Calvin De Witt, Jr. on 8 August.[52]

(11) Col. George P. Lynch followed Col. David M. Fowler as Headquarters Commandant, Headquarters, USAREUR, on 11 August.[53]

(12) Col. Bjarne Furuholmen was announced as Chief, Public Information Division, USAREUR, vice Col. David M. Fowler, on 11 August.[54]

(13) Gen. Thomas T. Handy assumed command of USAREUR on 12 August.[55]

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[46] USAREUR GO 20, 20 May 50. UNCLASSIFIED.

[47] (1) USAREUR GO 23, 19 Jun 50. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR GO 24, 22 Jun 50. UNCLASSIFIED.

[48] USAREUR GO 25, 5 Jul 50. UNCLASSIFIED.

[49] USAREUR GO 30, 31 Jul 50. UNCLASSIFIED.

[50] USAREUR GO 31, 1 Aug 50. UNCLASSIFIED.

[51] USAREUR GO 32, 3 Aug 50. UNCLASSIFIED.

[52] USAREUR GO 33, 8 Aug 50. UNCLASSIFIED.

[53] USAREUR GO 34, 10 Aug 50. UNCLASSIFIED.

[54] USAREUR GO 35, 11 Aug 50. UNCLASSIFIED.

[55] USAREUR GO 36, 12 Aug 50. UNCLASSIFIED.

(14) Having reported to the European Command and in compliance with paragraph 1, Special Orders 139, Department of the Army, dated 19 July 1950, Lt. Gen. Manton S. Eddy assumed command of USAREUR on 18 August.[56]

(15) Col. Frank A. Henning was announced as Acting Director of Logistics, vice Maj. Gen Ralph J. Canine, on 19 August.[57]

(16) Col. Charles M. Busbee was announced as the Chief, Labor Services Division, USAREUR, on 22 August.[58]

(17) Col. William H. Quarterman, as Chief of Special Services, USAREUR, assumed the position formerly occupied by Col. Porter P. Wiggins, on 1 September.[59]

(18) Col. Edward J. O'Neill was announced as Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration, USAREUR, on 18 September.[60]

(19) Maj. Gen. Aaron Bradshaw, Jr, became Director, Logistics Division, USAREUR, on 6 November.[61]

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[56] USAREUR GO 39, 19 Aug 50. UNCLASSIFIED.
[57] USAREUR GO 39, 19 Aug 50. UNCLASSIFIED.
[58] USAREUR GO 40, 22 Aug 50. UNCLASSIFIED.
[59] USAREUR GO 41, 1 Sep 50. UNCLASSIFIED.
[60] USAREUR GO 43, 18 Sep 50. UNCLASSIFIED.
[61] USAREUR GO 46, 6 Nov 50. UNCLASSIFIED.

CHAPTER II

Security of U.S. Forces, Personnel, and Property in Europe

I. Security Mission

21. Plans for the Security of U.S. Forces in Europe

European Command security planning in 1950 fell into two categories -- the preparation and implementation of plans anticipating aggression by a hostile power, and the more or less continuing revision of measures for the protection of U.S. personnel and property in case of internal disturbances in the U.S. Zone of Germany. In addition to the maintenance of plans and directives governing the conduct of U.S. forces in either contingency, two far-reaching changes were effected during the year in keeping with the growing trend toward defensive readiness on the part of the Allied powers. A fundamental change was official recognition of the fact that U.S. troops were present in Germany not for the purpose of occupying a defeated nation, but as a defensive force charged with maintaining combat preparedness. This change of mission was evidenced in the phase-out of Headquarters, USAREUR, the concurrent reactivation of the Seventh Army as a field army, and the development of plans for a considerable augmentation of troops in the European Command. A second step toward achieving maximum security was the establishment of a line of communications and supply across France from the Bordeaux-La Pallice complex to the German frontier, thereby reducing dependence on a supply line

through ports unfavorably located from a strategic standpoint and providing an escape route for U.S. and Allied noncombatants in Europe in event of war. The principal development in connection with maintenance of internal security during the year was a further delegation of responsibility, through HICOG, to German law enforcement agencies in quelling local demonstrations and protecting areas and installations vital to U.S. forces during local disturbances. The basic responsibility for security of U.S. forces continued to rest with USAREUR.

II. Internal Security Directives

22. EUCOM Internal Security Directive

Both the EUCOM and USAREUR internal security directives for 1950 were published on 14 July. The EUCOM directive differed from the one issued in 1949 chiefly in that it outlined the over-all security responsibility of USAREUR as one of the major commands, but omitted discussion of the missions of commands subordinate to USAREUR.[1] It included in the internal security mission of the European Command the military occupation of the U.S. area of responsibility; support of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany in the maintenance of security, law, and order; and responsibility for the protection of personnel, property, and installations of U.S. forces in the command. Execution of the Commander in Chief's responsibility was delegated to the major commands. USAFE was to make adequate provisions for the protection of Air Force installations and to provide air support to USAREUR in emergency. The emergency plan of the Wiesbaden Military Post, under USAFE supervision, was to be coordinated with the Commanding General, USAREUR; it was to insure that adequate reserves were maintained and that a unit was prepared at all times to evacuate noncombatants and protect the Kastel-Mainz Highway. COMNAVFORGER remained responsible for Navy installations in cooperation with military post commanders, and was charged with operation of the

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[1](1) EUCOM ltr to CG's USAREUR, USAFE; COMNAVFORGER, Comdrs of All Comds Dir Subord to USAREUR, 1 Oct 49, sub: Internal Security Directive. AG 371.2 GOT - AGO. SECRET. (2) EUCOM ltr to CG's USAFE, USAREUR; COMNAVFORGER; CO 7966 EUCOM Det, 14 Jul 50, sub: as above. AG 371.2 GOT - AGO. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 371.2 (1950), Item 64a - 2a.

Rhine River Patrol. The USAREUR commanding general was charged with the disposition of troops and the military occupation of the U.S. area of responsibility; troop support of HICOG when required to maintain law, order, and security; the security of personnel and installation of the U.S. forces; and the designation of a EUCOM security reserve. The Commanding General of the 7966 EUCOM Detachment was responsible for installations and units assigned to his command, and the preparation of an emergency plan insuring the security of personnel and installations in cases where local police or military authorities could not provide adequate protection.

23. USAREUR Internal Security Directive

The program of separating EUCOM and USAREUR publications instituted late in 1949 necessitated the production of a USAREUR directive, giving in detail the security responsibilities of its subordinate commands. With minor exceptions the responsibilities of these commands remained unchanged. The Commanding Officer, 7888 Special Troops Headquarters, EUCOM, was responsible for the security of his own installation and preparation of security plans in coordination with the Commanding Officer, Heidelberg Military Post. The Constabulary was responsible for suppression of civil disturbances when requested by a Post Commander, designation of a post security force of battalion size for each post, coordination of plans with the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation and Wiesbaden Military Post, and responsibility for the military security of the U.S. Zone border. This last mission involved spot checks of persons moving across the border. Unauthorized Soviet or Czech military personnel found in the U.S. Zone were to be arrested and returned to their respective authorities in accordance with established agreements. When large groups of Germans attempted to cross the border, no show of force was to be made unless U.S. personnel or installations were threatened, or unless a competent HICOG representative requested the Constabulary or post commander to assume control. Military post commanders were to extend protection to personnel of the U.S. forces and to United Nations displaced persons, but were to take other action only if requested by the U.S. resident officer or Land commissioner, unless it was deemed expedient, because of the magnitude of the disturbance, to assume control. If, in a zone-wide emergency, the Commanding General, USAREUR, directed Post Commanders to assume control, the local resident officer became part of the Post Commander's staff and continued to exercise jurisdiction over German law enforcement agencies. If necessary, Post Commanders were authorized to alert and assume operational control of all U.S. troops located in the post area except Constabulary and 1st Infantry Division troops; if these proved inadequate, they were to request the Commanding General, U.S. Constabulary, to assume control. Commanders were also to place such restrictions on the civil population as were

considered necessary, and were to maintain a unit responsible for evacuating U.S. and Allied noncombatants if the situation warranted. Post emergency supply reserves were to be maintained and distributed among post units and installations. These units were required to prepare security plans on the basis of the post's plans. USAREUR technical services, which were responsible to their respective Post Commanders for the security of their own installations, were also to prepare security plans. Additionally, the Commanding Officers of the Frankfurt and Heidelberg Military Posts were responsible for the protection and control of a number of bridges across the Rhine and Main Rivers. The 1st Infantry Division was to constitute the European Command security reserve, and when committed was to be under the command of the Commanding General, U.S. Constabulary. 1st Infantry Division post security forces designated by the Constabulary were subject to call by the Commanding General, U.S. Constabulary. One company of such a force could be called by post commanders during civil disturbances.

24. Coordination with HICOG

The coordination of EUCOM emergency plans with HICOG was the subject of continuous discussion throughout the year. HICOG officials were informed by the Chief of Staff in May that U.S. noncombatants were to be evacuated only in the event of extreme international tension or a general emergency. In case of evacuation before hostilities, U.S., Allied, and certain other noncombatants were to be alerted, assembled, equipped, and dispatched in motor columns to France by Army commanders, and HICOG personnel might be called upon to assist. British and French nationals in the zone were to be evacuated with U.S. personnel, in accordance with reciprocal agreements.[2] At a conference between EUCOM and HICOG officials, it was agreed that local resident officers must assist post commanders in emergency. If they were reserve officers they could be mobilized and assigned to their home posts. If they had no reserve status, they could leave with noncombatants in case the Noncombatant Evacuation Order was implemented prior to EUCOM's top secret operation plan. HICOG agreed to direct these officers to remain at their respective posts until released by Post Commanders.[3] In July a directive was issued governing the employment of German law enforcement agencies under

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[2] Ltr, Gen Noce, EUCOM VCOFS, to Mr. G. G. Wolfe, D/Office of Admin, HICOG, 12 May 50. SECRET. In SGS 371.2 (1950), Item 37a.

[3] Memo, D/OPOT for DCOFS for Opns, 31 May 50, sub: Conference with HICOG Officials. SECRET. In SGS 371.2 (1950), Item 43a-1.

the current USAREUR internal security directive. Military Post Commanders were directed to prepare letters of instruction to be issued to HICOG representatives at the time they came under the control of Post Commanders; i.e., during civil disturbances or upon implementation of internal security directives as the first step of classified emergency plans. These instructions were to require HICOG representatives to: (a) inform local agencies that German police were under the jurisdiction of the Commanding General, USAREUR; (b) order municipal, rural, and border police to halt resident vehicular (excluding rail) traffic; (c) impose a curfew at 1800 - 0600 daily; (d) institute blackouts; (e) clear roads of all traffic except police, emergency repair crews and fire fighters, officials with credentials from HICOG, the U.S. forces, or the Bonn Government, and persons performing essential services (doctors, clergy etc.); and (f) halt the dispensing of gasoline and other motor fuels. Post Commanders were to include in these instructions requests for such actions as were deemed necessary to implement the post security plans and evacuation of noncombatants. They were also to stipulate places of duty for HICOG personnel.[4] This letter was suspended in September pending a restudy by HICOG and EUCOM officials on coordination of emergency plans. It was decided that in the interim Land commissioners might be requested to direct German police to take actions necessary for implementation of the current USAREUR internal security directive.[5] In the meantime, HICOG's executive secretary proposed an amendment to that portion of the USAREUR security directive dealing with the mission of the U.S. Constabulary and Military Posts in the event of civil or other major disturbances, particularly as related to the function of HICOG resident officers and Land commissioners.[6] General Noce suggested deferring action on the proposal until Mr. McCloy had approved an agreement drawn up by a HICOG-EUCOM working committee.[7] (See 1950 EUCOM Report, par. 122.) The agreement had already been approved by General Handy. The committee had agreed

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[4]USAREUR ltr to All Mil Post Comdrs Dir Subord to USAREUR, 14 Jul 50, sub: Employment of German Law Enforcement Agencies under Internal Security Directive. AG 371.2 GOT - AGO. SECRET. In SGS 371.2 (1950), atchd to Item 92a-1.

[5]Cable SX - 2557, USAREUR to BPE and Mil Posts, 27 Sep 50. SECRET. In SGS 371.2 (1950), Vol. II, Item 104.

[6](1) Ltr, James E. King, Jr., Exec Sec, HICOG, to Noce, 15 Sep 50. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 371.2 (1950), Vol. II, Item 98b. (2) Ltr, as above, 26 Apr 50. SECRET. In SGS 371.2 (1950), Vol. I, Item 28c-2.

[7]Ltr, Noce to King, 6 Oct 50. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 371.2 (1950), Item 116.

that all HICOG coordination for emergency evacuation should be with the Military Posts at the local level. It was further agreed that EUCOM would instruct Post Commanders to discuss the matter fully with appropriate HICOG officials, not withholding essential information which they had previously felt unable to reveal.[8] In accordance with HICOG requests, changes were made in security directives, deleting the provision that resident officers become members of the appropriate post commanders' staff. If the situation warranted, the commander concerned could request the local Land commissioner to direct appropriate resident officers to assist and support him in coordinating the activities of the local German police and government officials.[9]

25. Proposed Revision of Internal Security Directives

At the end of 1950 a draft revision of the EUCOM internal security directive rescinding both the EUCOM and USAREUR directives of July was prepared by the OPOT Division in conjunction with HICOG. The plans conformed with the Commander in Chief's wishes concerning relations between HICOG and military forces in the event of an internal disturbance.[10] It stipulated that German law enforcement agencies were responsible for general law and order; the High Commissioner was authorized to call upon the Commander in Chief to commit troops for the preservation or restoration of order when adequate control of disturbances exceeded the capabilities of German authorities.

a. Command Responsibilities.

(1) USAFE. Headquarters USAFE was charged with security measures for Air Force installations, provision of air support as directed by the Commander in Chief, and protection of certain bridges. The headquarters was also to insure that the Wiesbaden Military Post constituted a unit to protect noncombatants and that a post security force was designated, coordinating with Seventh Army.

(2) NAVFORGER. Naval Forces in Germany were responsible for the security of naval installations in cooperation with local military posts and the operation of the Rhine River Patrol as directed by EUCOM headquarters.

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[8] Ltr, Brig Gen E. T. Williams, DCOFS for Opns to Wolfe, 15 Sep 50. SECRET. In SGS 383.2 (1950), Item 84.

[9] IRS, D/OPOT to COFS, 1 Sep 50, sub: Status of HICOG Resident Officers During Civil Disturbances.

[10] IRS, OPOT to SGS, 29 Dec 50, sub: Draft of Int Sec Dir. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 371.2 (1950), Item 157.

(3) Seventh Army. The Commanding General, Seventh Army, was charged with designation of post security forces of battalion size for each Military Post. He was also responsible for the military security of the eastern borders of the U.S. Zone in accordance with separate instructions from EUCOM headquarters. When directed by EUCOM, the Commanding General could assume zone-wide control in suppressing civil disturbances. At such a time, all security forces previously committed by Post Commanders came under his command.

(4) Military Posts. The procedure to be observed by Military Posts in meeting internal disturbances received particular emphasis, since in most cases civil demonstrations would be of a local character. Military Post Commanders were to coordinate internal security plans for the protection of U.S. personnel and installations and the restoration of order with appropriate Land Commissioners as well as with all units (except Seventh Army) on their respective posts. They were responsible for law and order in UN displaced persons assembly centers, and for their protection. On each post a unit was to be designated to protect noncombatants. In case of internal disturbance, measures were to be taken initially for the protection of U.S. and displaced persons installations only. Commanders were to post guards, counter localized action, and make a show of force where advisable. They were to intervene actively, however, only when directed by EUCOM headquarters or when authorized or requested to do so by the Land Commissioner. The Post Commander was to request the latter for assistance of HICOG resident officers in assuming operational control of German law enforcement agencies where German authorities were unable to cope with a situation. If, in the judgment of the commander concerned, the imminence of a civil disturbance precluded waiting for appropriate authority, he was authorized to take prompt local action to protect U.S. personnel and property and the operational readiness of lines of communications for U.S. troops. He was to notify both HICOG and EUCOM headquarters of his action, but was to relinquish control to German police as soon as practicable. Before calling on the Land Commissioner, the Post Commander was to employ troops under his control; thereafter he could alert and control all U.S. Army troops within his post, except those assigned to Seventh Army. Finally, he could ask the Commanding General, Seventh Army, to assign part or all of the post security force if personnel available to him was insufficient. Military units were to draw, maintain, and be prepared to move under full field equipment, with prescribed loads of Class I and III, and basic loads of Class V, supplies. Guard troops were permitted to use force in protecting U.S. persons and property from bodily harm. In the course of restoring order, as distinct from protection, troops were permitted to employ show of force, riot control formations, and minimum essential force. Weapons fire was to be used as a last resort.

(5) Other Commands. Responsibilities of the Berlin Military Post, 7888 Special Troops, 7966 EUCOM Detachment, and technical

and administrative services were in general the same as those of Military Posts. Each command was charged with maintaining an internal security plan and for insuring the security of all elements of its installations. Technical and administrative services were to conduct bimonthly security alerts, calling on Post Commanders for assistance when necessary.

b. Protection of Bridges. Military Posts, USAFE, and Seventh Army shared responsibility for the protection of vital bridges during internal disturbances. Seventh Army was to provide units to Post Commanders for the protection of certain bridges enumerated in an appendix to the directive, and was to coordinate with them on the security of bridges vital to Seventh Army in active operations. Under normal conditions all bridges were to be protected by German guards. This was to include the stationing of twenty-four hour guards on Rhine River bridges and guarding or frequent inspection of others, according to the following priority: autobahn bridges; spans over the Fulda, Neckar, and Danube Rivers; and other bridges on main roads. Military Posts were to insure the effectiveness of German guards by making weekly inspections and coordinating with the Land commissioner. When necessary during civil outbreaks, troop units designated in Appendix 2 of the directive were to be utilized, and Rhine bridges were to come under U.S. military control during large-scale disturbances or upon the assumption of an alert status.[11]

26. Negotiations with HICOG Concerning Bridge Protection

The arrangements for German protection of bridges contained in the revision of the internal security directive had been concluded previously at a series of meetings between EUCOM and HICOG representatives and ministers of the German Laender. In September Mr. McCloy informed an assembly of Ministers President that there had been recent indication of sabotage at strategic bridges and structures. He asked, as General Handy had asked earlier, whether Labor Service units employed by U.S. forces or Land police could not take over the duties of protecting such structures. The German officials agreed that the function of guarding German installations could be turned over to Land police with good psychological effect, but considered the employment of Labor Service troops to be less desirable, since the German public was not particularly familiar with them. This arrangement was satisfactory to EUCOM, as long as

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[11] Draft ltr, Dec 50, sub: Internal Security Directive - EUCOM. AG 371.2 GOT - AGO. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 371.2 (1950), Vol. II, Item 157. See Supporting Documents.

the military enjoyed authority to inspect the bridges and guards and Land police so assigned were thoroughly screened.[12] On 24 November EUCOM representatives met with U.S. Zone ministers of interior. It was learned that some measures had already been taken, especially at Rhine bridges. Since only one bank of the Rhine came under the jurisdiction of Germans in the U.S. Zone, it was suggested that the French and British be requested to institute similar arrangements in their zones. This was especially important because many bridges in the British Zone lay across evacuation routes from Bremen. Accordingly, a letter requesting that British and French High Commissioners be asked to establish similar protective measures was dispatched to HICOG on 29 November.[13] Another problem discussed at this meeting was the inability of Land police to exercise jurisdiction within city limits. Since a number of bridges were located in cities, it had been arranged that the cities themselves would undertake the protection of bridges or permit Land police to guard them. In some instances, arrangements had not yet been made. It was agreed that Rhine bridges would be protected by a permanent guard, and that others would be either guarded or subject to frequent checks. The ministers of interior were to be held responsible for the security of vital bridges under normal conditions. EUCOM authorities retained the right to inspect installations and emphasized that during alerts Rhine bridges were to be guarded by U.S. military units.[14]

III. Emergency Plans

27. Revision of Plans

In addition to participating in plans for the external support

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[12] (1) Ltr, HICOG sgd Col H. A. Gerhardt, Sp Asst, to DCOFS for Opns, EUCOM, 2 Nov 50. In SGS 383.2 (1950), atchd to Item 115a. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Ltr, DCOFS for Opns to Gerhardt, 8 Nov 50. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 383.2 (1950), Item 115a.

[13] (1) Ltr, OPOT to DCOFS for Opns, 28 Nov 50, sub: Protection of Vital Bridges in U.S. Zone of Occupation by German Laender Police. AG 311.5 GOT. SECRET. In SGS 383.2 (1950), Item 130a-3. (2) IRS, D/OPOT to DCOFS for Opns, 15 Dec 50, sub: as above. SECRET. In SGS 383.2 (1950), Item 132.

[14] Cable SX - 4301, CINCEUR to Mil Posts, Seventh Army, 22 Dec 50. SECRET. In SGS 383.2 (1950), Vol. II, Item 160.

of U.S. forces in Germany, EUCOM maintained current plans governing action to be taken in event of emergency. There were three degrees of alerts in the European Command in 1950 -- the Simple Alert (OSA), the Reinforced Alert (ORA), and the Top Secret General Alert Orders (GAO), contemplating an ultimate emergency. All were revised in the summer of 1950.

28. Orders for Simple and Reinforced Alerts

Orders for Simple and Reinforced alerts, previously issued only by EUCOM, emanated this time from both EUCOM and USAREUR headquarters. The former were prepared by a joint committee of EUCOM, USAFE, and COMNAVFORGER representatives, the USAREUR simple alert, by OPOT; and the USAREUR reinforced alert, by the U.S. Constabulary, which also prepared its own order for simple alert.[15] The USCON OSA was published on 20 November just before the activation of Seventh Army. Consequently it referred to USAREUR's alert status as well as to Constabulary functions, both of which were assumed by Seventh Army in a Simple alert. Although it had been suggested by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations that all references to USAREUR and the Constabulary in both USCON OSA and USAREUR ORA be replaced by "Seventh Army," this suggestion had not been acted upon by the time of publication of the orders.[16]

29. Simple Alerts

Both EUCOM and USAREUR orders for Simple alert became effective 1 December 1950. All USAREUR subordinate commands and staff divisions were to complete revision of emergency plans in conformance with the new OSA prior to 26 November and the Constabulary was to issue instructions to units which would be attached to it upon implementation of the alert order.[17]

a. Provisions of EUCOM and USAREUR Simple Alerts. Upon the implementation of a Simple alert, British and French forces were expected to assume similar alert status in their respective

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[15] Memo, OPOT for DCOFS for Opns, 14 Jun 50, sub: Revision of Orders for Simple and Reinforced Alerts. SECRET. In SGS 371.2 (1950), Item 51.

[16] (1) IRS, DCOFS for Opns for D/OPOT, 14 Nov 50, sub: USCON Order for Simple Alert. SECRET. In SGS 371.2 (1950), Item 135b.
(2) IRS, C/N 2, DCOFS for Opns for D/OPOT, 16 Nov 50, sub: USAREUR ORA. AG 371.2 GOT. SECRET. In SGS 371.2 (1950), Item 139

[17] USAREUR covering ltr, sgd D/OPOT, sub: Order for Simple Alert, 11 Nov 50. SECRET. In SGS 371.2 (1950), Item 134c.

occupation zones. Certain areas of the U.S. Zone north of Kassel were to become the responsibility of British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) for military operations, and British engineers were to move to selected demolition sites near Kassel. A reinfored French reconnaissance regiment was to move east of the Rhine and occupy the line from Giessen to Siegen. Major EUCOM commands were to prepare to meet any emergency that might develop and were to submit to EUCOM headquarters lists of units which would be moved west of the Rhine.

(1) USAFE. USAFE headquarters was to be ready to employ aircraft and other facilities in the air defense of Rhine bridges in coordination with USAREUR and to dispatch mobile radar units, communications teams, and equipment to specified air fields west of the Rhine. The Air Force was also responsible for dispatching advance command groups to emergency headquarters, tactical air control parties to specified USAREUR units, and depot detachments to USAFE depots west of the Rhine. It was to conduct border aerial reconnaissance within the U.S. Zone, initiate the rail evacuation of critical USAFE supplies from depots east of the Rhine to depots west of the Rhine, and augment USAFE detachments in France to the strength required to put equipment into operational condition.[18]

(2) USNAVFORGER. At simple alert, USNAVFORGER was to ascertain the position and course of U.S. merchant and government shipping in northern European waters and to dispatch a naval port detachment to Port Complex or to other areas designated by CINCEUR.[19]

(3) USAREUR. The provisions of the USAREUR OSA paralleled those of EUCOM, but detailed the allocation of USAREUR responsibilities among its subordinate commands, as indicated below. It was augmented by an organization list attaching certain units to U.S. Constabulary, 7966 EUCOM Detachment, and USAREUR, upon implementation of Simple alert.

(a) USCON. A number of changes in the new alert orders were reflected in the Constabulary's mission during Simple alert. USCON was made responsible for providing security and antiaircraft forces at Rhine bridges located at Mainz, Worms, Frankenthal, Mannheim, and Karlsruhe; and was to be prepared to assume responsibility for employment of AAA in the air defense of Rhine bridges. This had previously been a military post function at Simple alert, becoming a Constabulary function upon the execution of Reinforced alert. Engineer units which were to construct tactical bridges over the Rhine at Reinforced alert were to move to and bivouac near the bridge sites at Simple alert. The 1st

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[18] EUCOM, 29 Sep 50, Orders for SA and RA. In SGS 371.2, Item 105b. SECRET.

[19] Ibid.

Infantry Division came under operational control of the Constabulary, enabling the latter to alert and motorize all tactical ground troops. The Commanding General of USCON was to assume control of the Rhine General and Ammunition Depots, direct the issuance by Military Posts of POL supplies and ammunition to using crews, and establish and operate round-the-clock teletype conference facilities with the British and French.

(b) Military Posts. Military posts were to prepare secondary mission units for emergency operations and evacuate all patients requiring hospitalization for more than twenty days. Upon the announcement of simple alert, Military Police Service Companies provided by Post were to report to specified bridges to secure them from sabotage. The Frankfurt, Augsburg, and Munich Military Posts were to dispatch selected personnel to augment the 7966 EUCOM Detachment, and the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation was to dispatch a port liaison detachment to the same destination; the BPOE was also to provide a highway route through Bremen for use by British Forces.

(c) USAREUR Technical Services. Technical services were to initiate the rail evacuation of critical supplies and rolling stock to the west side of the Rhine, a departure from previous OSA's based on a transfer of actions from the Reinforced Alert to the Simple Alert, and were to dispatch truck companies, hospital detachments, and traffic regulating detachments to France and certain localities in Germany. USAREUR headquarters was responsible for providing USAFE and USNAVFORGER with additional transportation as previously planned. All leaves and passes were to be canceled and personnel recalled to home stations. Instruction at military schools was to be discontinued, and except for press releases emanating from EUCOM headquarters, there was to be no publicity on the assumption of Simple alert.[20]

(d) 7966 EUCOM Detachment. The EUCOM Detachment at Paris was to initiate arrangements for the establishment of an LOFC from Bordeaux to the USAREUR rear boundary at the execution of Simple alert and the establishment of preplanned depots, Headquarters Base Section, and Headquarters, Advance Section. It was also to furnish logistic support of common-user items to all U.S. military forces in France.

b. Evacuation of Critical Supplies. An agreement between the three Allied occupation zones and the Western Union authorized the

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[20] (1) EUCOM ltr to USAFE, USAREUR, USNAVFORGER, 7966 EUCOM Det, 29 Sep 50, sub: Orders for Simple and Reinforced Alerts. AG 371.2 GOT - AGO. SECRET. (2) USAREUR Order for Simple Alert, 11 Nov 50. SECRET. In SGS 371.2 (1950).

shipment of critical supplies from Army and Air Force depots along approved routes to line of communications depots in the event of a Simple alert. Only peacetime railroad schedules were to be used, and it was anticipated that the evacuation of supplies could be effected without increasing depot personnel. Upon the execution of Simple alert, U.S. military detachments were to establish railroad traffic regulating points at crucial railroad centers along the Franco-German border and in France, in conjunction with local French and German railroad regulating personnel. The Provost Marshal was to secure critical shipments by employing a maximum number of U.S. military railroad police, augmented by Labor Service guards and German railroad police, and was to make arrangements with the French for support by French railroad security guards. Supplies arriving at LOFC depots were to be received and unloaded by the 7966 EUCOM Detachment, empty cars being returned to Germany by complete trains as expeditiously as possible.[21]

30. Reinforced Alert

a. Coordination with Other Forces and Agencies. British and French forces were expected to coordinate with EUCOM upon the assumption of Reinforced alert, and CINCNELM was to concentrate U.S. merchant and government shipping in designated port areas. USAREUR and Military Post Commanders were authorized to utilize HICOG personnel and facilities to assist in the execution of ORA "without thereby releasing such HICOG personnel to military control for other purposes."[22] The High Commissioner agreed to instruct HICOG officials to direct German civil action; prohibit traffic (with the aid of the 7751 Military Police Customs Unit) from the Soviet Zone and Czechoslovakia across the U.S. zonal border; control or stop German and neutral civilian vehicular and rail traffic through the U.S. Zone; control or stop the entry into the U.S. Zone of U.S., Allied, and neutral civilians on business or pleasure, and to cause the pre-emergency evacuation of any such civilians present in the U.S. Zone; to control the German press, radio, long distance phone and cable service; and to impose curfew restrictions on Germans. Maximum use of German police by Military Commanders was authorized, both east and west of the Rhine.

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[21] Brief of Plan, Railroad Evacuation of Technical Service Supplies in Event of Simple Alert, prepared by Log and Trans Divs, Nov 50, sgd Lt Col W. D. Duncan, Asst D/Dir for Plns, Log Div. SECRET. In SGS 371.2 (1950), Item 158.

[22] (1) USAREUR ORA, 20 Nov 50. SECRET. In SGS 371.2 (1950), Item 143. (2) EUCOM ORA, 12 Oct 50. SECRET. In SGS 371.2 (1950).

b. Responsibilities of Major Commands at ORA.

(1) USAFE. Selected Air units were to be moved to designated airfields west of the Rhine and in the United Kingdom in preparation for execution of combat missions. USAFE was to operate a tactical air control center and radar air warning net, and coordinate joint operations with the USAREUR command post from an advance headquarters west of the Rhine. As distinct from previous ORA's, USAFE was also responsible, in cooperation with HICOG, for discontinuance of commercial air traffic.[23] At Reinforced alert, an Air Force supply installation was to be opened west of the Rhine, but distribution of supplies was to be made only by special authority of the Commanding General, USAFE.

(2) USNAVFORGER. The Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Germany was charged with providing and operating ships at the Bremen Enclave for evacuation of that area, and for moving to Port Complex naval personnel and equipment not needed for port operations and demolitions. A Navy rear headquarters was to be operated in the Bordeaux-La Pallice area, as well as a Naval supply point. COMNAVFORGER was also to request CINCNELM to alert U.S. merchant ships in his area to stand by at Reinforced alert, and to direct vessels to ports designated by CINCEUR. Operational control of the Rhine River Patrol was to be relinquished to USAREUR, but the Navy retained responsibility for traffic control on the Weser River, in cooperation with USAREUR headquarters.

(3) USAREUR.

(a) General. The U.S. Constabulary, 1st Infantry Division, Military Posts, and certain other groups under USAREUR were to assemble and redeploy previously designated forces in preparation for combat operations upon implementation of GAO 1 - 50. All units subordinate to USAREUR, whether or not immediately affected by the order for Reinforced alert, were to be placed on an alert status and prepared to move on two hours' notice. At R-hour (time of execution of ORA), both the Rhine General and Rhine Ammunition Depots were to open and commence immediate movement of Class I and III supplies from prestocked locations. Distribution to units was to be accomplished only on order of the Commanding General, USAREUR, who was charged with establishing supply installations west of the Rhine. USAREUR was further

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[23] (1) EUCOM ltr to CG's USAREUR, USAFE; COMNAVFORGER; CO 7966 EUCOM Det, 12 Oct 50, sub: Orders for Simple & Reinforced Alert. AG 371.2 GOT - AGO. SECRET. (2) USAREUR ORA, 20 Nov 50. SECRET. In SGS 371.2 (1950).

responsible for opening the 7220th Replacement Depot at Homburg at R plus 36 hours, movement of Civil Affairs-Military Government liaison groups to selected locations in the French Zone upon completion of NEO, and establishment of necessary liaison with Allied combat forces.

(b) Constabulary and 1st Infantry Division. The U.S. Constabulary and 1st Infantry Division were to make all preparations, short of closing the Rhine River to navigation, for construction of tactical bridges at Speyer, Bruhl, and Oppenheim, and security forces were to be disposed for defense of specified bridges against air, mechanized, or fifth column attack. At the execution of Reinforced alert all demolition teams, with full equipment, were to be moved at once to assigned tactical demolition sites. Crews were to place demolition charges in position, except at Rhine bridges, but no demolitions were to be accomplished prior to the execution of GAO 1 - 50 unless ordered by the USAREUR commanding general or to prevent capture. The 555th Engineer Combat Group (USCON) was to seize and operate bridges and ferries along the Rhine in all three Allied zones. Both the Constabulary and the 1st Infantry Division were to move two company-size units each to the west bank of the Rhine to install planned mine fields with the assistance of the French.

(c) Military Posts. Military posts were to lend logistic support of common-user items to all U.S. military forces located between the Rhine and Saar Rivers, and provide technical service support to tactical and service units redeployed at Reinforced alert to local post areas. All supply and services installations were to be opened at R-hour, and closed on order of Post Commanders. Certain units were to be moved from military posts to the Rhine General Depot, the Replacement Depot at Homburg, and other predetermined destinations. All units vacating installations upon the implementation of ORA were to provide a minimum number of guards to remain until GAO, and to execute nontactical demolition plans. Remaining detachments and vacated installations became the responsibility of the military post concerned. Major items of supply not needed for the first fifteen days after ORA were to be moved west of the Rhine according to the following priority: Class V, Class III, medical supplies, Classes II and IV, and Class I.

(d) Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation. BPE was responsible for loading all personnel and equipment, less a rear detachment, on ships provided by CINCNELM (according to USAREUR ORA. EUCOM ORA gives NAVFORGER) for shipment to Bordeaux upon completion of NEO. BPE was also to coordinate with the Navy in controlling traffic on the Weser River.

(e) Rhine River Patrol. The Rhine River Patrol was to assume operational control of the French naval sectors of Mainz and Speyer, halt nonmilitary traffic on the river, and direct such

craft to tie up on the west bank. It was to make preparations for the execution of demolition plans and for the operation of ferries and LCT's in accordance with approved plans.

c. Responsibilities of 7966 EUCOM Detachment. At Reinforced alert the 7966 EUCOM Detachment became responsible for operation of the Line of Communications and was to establish supply installations in the Southern Base Section and Advance Section. The detachment was to operate supply points for the support of Army, Navy, Air Force personnel and for supporting the movement of U.S. noncombatants across France. Preparations were to be made for the outshipment of such noncombatants, to include certain German nationals and war crimes prisoners delivered to the port area. Upon the completion of NEO, a reception center was to be established at Metz for processing certain designated personnel.

d. Command Posts. The Rear Command Group, EUCOM headquarters, was to move to an alternate command post near Heidelberg, an advance detachment was to prepare a command post site in France, and an augmentation group was to be sent to Headquarters, USAREUR, by EUCOM as soon as practicable. At R-hour, Headquarters, U.S. Constabulary, was to become Headquarters, USAREUR. Headquarters Commandant, USAREUR, (USCON) was to move advance detachments of USAREUR headquarters to prearranged locations near Kaiserslautern and Zweibrucken and the rest of the headquarters to field location in the vicinity of Vaihingen.

31. Practice Alerts

Each Military Post maintained an alert plan consonant with those issued by EUCOM and USAREUR, and practice alerts were conducted monthly. In November the Commanding General, USAREUR, ordered that alerts be scheduled for a different period each month to prevent the operation from lapsing into a routine procedure. He directed that alerts be held on off-duty periods, such as weekends, holidays, or at the end of normal operating hours.[24]

32. Alerting of Tactical Troops at Grafenwohr

Early in the year the Commanding General, U.S. Constabulary, was made responsible for the timely alerting of all tactical units in training at Grafenwohr and, if necessary, for the expeditious outmovement of such troops. Previously this mission had been

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[24] USAREUR ltr to All Mil Post Comdrs Dir Subord to USAREUR, 18 Nov 50, sub: Practice Alerts. AG 371.2 GOT - AGO. CONFIDENTIAL.

delegated to the senior briefed tactical commander present but as such officers were frequently changed during the summer training period, the Commanding General, USAREUR, considered it expedient to transfer the responsibility to Constabulary. Zone-wide march tables maintained by the Constabulary were to be used in emergency and as a guide by the Commanding Officer of the Vilseck Tank Training Center in determining which routes should be taken by tactical units at Grafenwohr in moving into emergency positions. He was to maintain current lists of these units and was responsible for alerting them. In the event of an alert the units were to come under the control of the USAREUR traffic control system upon reaching the autobahn running north and south through Nuremberg.[25]

33. Rewriting of General Alert Orders (GAO)

In March, U.S. Naval Captain J. P. Thew suggested that a joint committee consisting of representatives of the three major commands be set up to discuss the rewriting of EUCOM emergency plans scheduled for the summer of 1950. Shortly thereafter the USAFE chief of staff was requested to delegate a principal staff officer to assist Army and Navy planners in the preparation of such plans. In addition to joint staff planning, certain staff divisions and the Military Posts were asked for suggestions.[26] By 1 September revision of the Top Secret General Alert Orders (GAO) had been completed and all staff divisions were wholly or partially briefed on the revised plans, with the exception of the following: Finance, Budget, Judge Advocate, Inspector General, Chaplain, Dependent Schools, and Historical Divisions. It was decided that the chiefs of these divisions should prepare plans for continuing their activities in the event of emergency (with the exception of Dependent Schools) on the basis of the following: in an emergency there was to be a Headquarters, European Command, and a Headquarters, Communications Zone and the need for these special staff divisions in one or the other headquarters would mean their retention; initially the same staff was to serve both headquarters; there was to be a separate

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[25](1) IRS, D/OPOT to DCOFS for Opns, 16 Feb 50, sub: Alerting and Outmovement of Tactical Troops at Grafenwohr. SECRET. In SGS 371.2 (1950), Item 10a. (2) Ltr, DCOFS for Opns, to CG, USCON, 10 Mar 50, sub: as above. AG 371.2 GOT. SECRET. In SGS 371.2, Item 17.

[26](1) Memo, DCOFS for Opns for Gen Noce and Gen Handy, 18 Mar 50, sub: Emergency Plans. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 371.2 (1950), Item 18. (2) Ltr, VCOFS to Maj Gen Robert Douglass, Jr., USAFE, COFS, Mar 50. In SGS 371.2 (1950). (3) IRS, D/OPOT to I&E, PID, IG, Hist, JA, Chem, SpS, AG, Mil Posts, SGS, 20 Jul 50, sub: Emergency Plans. SECRET. In SGS 371.2 (1950), Item 64b.

commander for the Communications Zone; eventually, if necessary, separate staffs would be set up for the two headquarters; and finally, there was to be a Headquarters, USAREUR. The OPOT Division was to insure that the plans devised by these divisions were within the framework of the EUCOM emergency plan.[27] Within a month, however, it became apparent that because of the projected shipment of the 4th Infantry Division from the United States by 1 March 1951 and the arrival of additional important troop augmentations between January and June of that year, EUCOM emergency plans would require further revision.[28] Furthermore, Headquarters, USAREUR, was replaced in November by the Seventh Army, and this alteration of command structure necessitated considerable revision of emergency plans. Work on this latest revision of emergency plans proceeded throughout the remainder of the year and was scheduled for completion on 10 January 1951.[29] The U.S. Constabulary (USCON) was charged in October with preparation of the Top Secret USAREUR GAO (which was changed by the phase-out of USAREUR and the activation of the Seventh Army.)

b. Constabulary Emergency Plans. In April, the general emergency plan issued by Constabulary headquarters was revised, and commanding officers of the 1st Infantry Division, Constabulary Brigades, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, and 7732d Field Artillery Group were instructed to complete necessary amendments to all plans down to regimental and separate battalion level by 20 May. It was directed that personnel authorized for briefing on emergency measures, including military police, security detachment commanders at key bridges, and team leaders of all demolition projects, be informed of their part in the revised plans by 25 May.[30]

c. Supplemental Emergency Plans. In June the Commanding General, USAFE, recommended to the Commander in Chief, EUCOM, that an emergency action plan supplementary to existing EUCOM and USAREUR

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[27] IRS, C/N 2, D/OPOT to DCOFS for Opns, 5 Sep 50 (21 Aug 50), sub: Briefing for Special Staff. SECRET. In SGS 371.2 (1950), Vol. I, Item 88a-1a.

[28] IRS, DCOFS for Opns to D/OPOT, 5 Oct 50, sub: Emergency Plans. SECRET. In SGS 371.2 (1950), Item 113a.

[29] Interv, J. M. Lucas, Hist Div, with Lt Col E. F. Graham, Jr., Plans Staff Off, OPOT Div, 20 Dec 50.

[30] (1) Memo for Record, sgd R. F. Evans (Off of CINC), 3 May 50. SECRET. In SGS 371.2 (1950), atchd to Draft Emergency Plans, Item 30a. (2) Ltr, USCON to CG, 1st Inf, 1st & 2d Constab Brig, 2d Armored Cav Regt, 7732 Fld Arty Gp, 1 May 50, sub: Emergency Plans. SECRET. In SGS 371.2, Item 30a.

plans which had been devised by Erding Air Base personnel be adopted on a zone-wide basis. The suggestion was disapproved and further plans of this type strongly discouraged on the grounds that the idea of individual flight in a "super-emergency," as envisaged in the Erding plan, constituted a bad psychological factor and that such extraordinary plans would be detrimental to the execution of existing plans. The Commander in Chief recommended that a paragraph be added to the current emergency plans, to the effect that "failure of any person to participate in present defense plans will seriously endanger the accomplishment of our mission."[31]

34. Noncombatant Evacuation Orders (NEO)

a. General. In keeping with the separation of joint command and Army publications, the EUCOM noncombatant evacuation order of August 1949 was revised and a USAREUR NEO was published on 31 March 1950. The latter defined the responsibilities of Military Posts and the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation for the evacuation of noncombatants, while the EUCOM order contained instructions to the major commands, including the 7966 EUCOM Detachment. In general, the orders provided that U.S. and Allied noncombatant columns were to be evacuated across the Rhine through France to Bordeaux, for further transport to the United Kingdom. Routes A through I, starting from Mainz-Kastel, Frankfurt, Bad Nauheim, Schwetzingen, Karlsruhe, Wurzburg, Nuremberg, Munich, Garmisch, Salzburg, Brienne, and Deaunne, all terminating at Bordeaux, were listed with the departure time for columns from each post. Military Police units were assigned at N-hour to the U.S. Constabulary for execution of their traffic control mission. A troop list, assigning units destined for cities in France, principally Bordeaux, to the 7966 EUCOM Detachment at A plus H-hour, was contained in an Annex to each NEO. The Administrative Order accompanying the NEO's contained provisions regarding supply, including first aid equipment, and for evacuation and hospitalization.[32]

b. Changes in the NEO's. Changes incorporated in the new plans were as follows: noncombatants in Berlin were to be routed to Orly Field, Paris, instead of previously arranged destinations

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[31] (1) Ltr, Asst Air AG to CINC, EUCOM, 2 Jun 50, sub: Emergency Action Plan for Erding Air Base. SECRET. In SGS 371.2 (1950), Item 44a. (2) IRS, D/OPOT to DCOFS for Opns, 12 Jun 50. SECRET. In SGS 371.2 (1950), Item 50. (3) Draft 1st Ind, Handy to CG, USAFE, 2 Jun 50, sub: Emergency Action Plans for Erding Air Base. AG 371.2 GOT. SECRET. In SGS 371.2 (1950), Item 53.

[32] Ltr, EUCOM NEO, 31 Mar 50. AG 371.2 GOT - AGO. SECRET. In SGS 383.2, Noncombatant Evacuation (1950), Item 38.

in Great Britain; noncombatant columns from Munich and Garmisch Military Posts were to be routed through Germany rather than through Austria; certain routes in France were changed in accordance with agreements reached with the French; and finally, the number of vehicles comprising each march unit was increased from twenty to thirty.[33] The EUCOM NEO of August 1949 had authorized the evacuation of non-U.S. or Allied noncombatants only if NEO were implemented concurrently with General Alert Orders. It had been planned that implementing orders of the new NEO would make the inclusion of such persons optional.[34] However, in February it was decided that implementing orders should state whether or not such persons were to be evacuated, and the Civil Affairs Division distributed to Post Commanders two lists of Germans or other persons who should be included in evacuation operations -- a "K" list, and a general list of persons whom the United States was morally obligated to protect. Inmates of War Crimes Prison Number 1 were to be moved to Bordeaux by the 15 CID of Augsburg either under NEO or at Reinforced alert, whichever occurred first.[35]

c. Information to Noncombatants. Following the publication of the USAREUR NEO in March, that portion dealing with information to U.S. and Allied noncombatants was revised, and the distribution of bulletins of instruction by posts was discontinued. "Stimulating" phraseology and haphazard distribution had caused undue alarm in some cases, and a new bulletin was prepared in accordance with the revised NEO eliminating references to travel by noncombatants beyond Military Posts, individual provisions for food and fuel, and the advisability of possessing travelers checks.[36]

d. Revision of EUCOM NEO 1 - 50. Plans for changing routes and utilizing additional bridges across the Rhine in the event of evacuation, together with the prospective augmentation of troops

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[33] IRS, D/OPOT to DCOFS for Opns, 24 Jan 50, sub: Revision of NEO. SECRET. In SGS 383.2, Item 5.

[34] Ibid.

[35] (1) Ibid. (2) IRS, SGS to OPOT, 7 Feb 50, sub: as above. SECRET. In SGS 383.2, Item 12. (3) EUCOM ORA, 29 Sep 50. SECRET.

[36] (1) IRS, DCOFS for Opns to D/OPOT, 14 Apr 50, sub: Revision of Appendix A to Annex 2 to USAREUR NEO. SECRET. In SGS 383.2, Item 44. (2) Cable SX - 2435, USAREUR to Mil Post, 14 Apr 50. SECRET. In SGS 383.2, Item 45. (3) USAREUR ltr to CG's, U.S. Constabulary, 1st Inf Div, All Mil Post Subord to USAREUR. AG 461 GOT - AGO. (4) Chg 3 to USAREUR NEO, 31 Mar 50. Revised Appendix A to Annex 2 to USAREUR NEO, sub: Information to U.S. and Allied Noncombatants. SECRET. In SGS 383.2 (1950), Item 59.

in the command, necessitated considerable changes in evacuation plans.[37] In November a new EUCOM NEO was drafted, incorporating the provisions of both the EUCOM and USAREUR revised evacuation orders, and reflecting changes in the command structure resulting from the activation of Seventh Army. No USAREUR NEO was to be issued. The new order charged Seventh Army with operational control over the execution of NEO for the U.S. Zone of Germany, less Berlin and the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation (BPE), which were instructed individually regarding evacuation of noncombatants.[38] Other major revisions involved the routing of Wetzlar Military Post traffic across the Rhine River bridge at Koblenz, use of the Frankenthal Bridge north of Mannheim, and the inclusion of additional routes through France. It was estimated that these changes would expedite clearance of noncombatant traffic across the Rhine by eight to ten hours.[39]

(1) Contents. The EUCOM NEO 1 - 50 was published on 1 December, effective 1 January 1951. It included instructions to USAFE, Seventh Army, NAVFORGER, the 7966 EUCOM Detachment, BPE, and U.S. Commander, Berlin. Several annexes to NEO 1 - 50 covered the assignment of troops at N-hour (the time of implementation of NEO), the function of the Provost Marshal in evacuation operations, a description of new routes and departure times from each Post, signal procedures, administration of supply, personnel, hospitalization, etc., details of Military Post evacuation, and briefing instructions for personnel concerned with the implementation of NEO.

(2) Seventh Army Responsibility for NEO. The French-German border was the dividing line between the geographical responsibilities of Seventh Army and the 7966 EUCOM Detachment. The former was charged with instructing and effecting coordination with military posts, controlling evacuation by motor serials from Germany, and establishing aid stations and other support along evacuation routes. The command post of Seventh Army, Traffic Control Section, was to be set up at Kaiserslautern, Germany, and a radio net established between that point and MP units at Rhine bridges to facilitate rerouting of columns should any bridges be destroyed.

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[37] Interoffice memo, sgd CPS (Asst DCOFS for Opns), 13 Oct 50. SECRET. In SGS 383.2 (1950), atchd to Item 90.

[38] IRS, D/OPOT to DCOFS for Opns, 22 Nov 50, sub: EUCOM NEO 1 - 50. SECRET. In SGS 383.2 (1950), Item 123.

[39] (1) Ibid. (2) Ibid., 13 Nov 50. SECRET. In SGS 383.2, Item 117.

(3) 7966 EUCOM Detachment. The 7966 EUCOM Detachment was responsible for control of traffic across France, the movement of military personnel as directed by EUCOM headquarters, the movement of noncombatants evacuated by air from Berlin and Vienna to Orly Field, and establishment of the Bordeaux Staging Area where noncombatants were to embark for Britain on ships provided by CINCNELM. The Bordeaux-La Pallice port, designated Port Complex, was to be operated in conjunction with personnel from BPE and the Frankfurt Military Post. At N-hour, the 7966 Detachment was to move warehoused rations from Cherbourg to Bordeaux sufficient to feed 60,000 persons for seven days, and by N plus 12 hours was to have established Class I and III and water supply points at Montargis and Montlucon (previously at Varennes-sur-Allier). Command posts for the 7966 EUCOM Detachment and the Bordeaux Staging Area were to be located at Paris and/or Orleans and Bordeaux respectively.[40]

e. State Department Responsibility for Noncombatants. The State Department, through the U.S. embassy in London and the London liaison group, was responsible for the further evacuation of noncombatants upon their arrival in Britain. In June the Commander in Chief informed the London embassy that a total of 55,401 persons, including civilian employees, Allied citizens, U.S. citizens living on the German economy, key German personnel, and an undetermined number of tourists would be evacuated from the U.S. Zone to England in the event of an emergency, and that 1,769 persons could be expected from the Bremen Enclave.[41] These 1,769 persons in the Bremen Enclave included Germans or displaced persons married to occupation personnel, but not those married to U.S. citizens who were connected with the occupation. There was no obligation for EUCOM to evacuate such displaced persons, but if shipping and time were available, they might be evacuated as a final priority. If sea evacuation was impossible, no attempt would be made to evacuate them overland.[42]

f. Employment of Civilians after NEO. It was anticipated that most eligible male civilians would be called into service in an emergency. Reserve officers could be called to active duty without their consent for a period of fifteen days upon the implementation of NEO, and could be restrained after that period if their release was considered dangerous to military security. All Department

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[40] Ltr, EUCOM NEO 1 - 50, 1 Dec 50. AG 371.2 GOT - AGO. SECRET. In SGS 371.2, Item 130a.

[41] Cable SX - 3289, Handy to US Emb, London, 7966 EUCOM Det for Info, 13 Jun 50. SECRET. In SGS 383.2, Item 61a.

[42] Ltr, DCOFS for Opns to CG, BPOE, 20 Jul 50, sub: Policy regarding the Evacuation of DP's and Germans Married to U.S. Citizens. SECRET. In SGS 383.2, Item 70.

of Army civilians could be employed on a voluntary basis, as could thoroughly screened foreign nationals with medical skills.[43]

g. Announcements of NEO. In the event that the European Command assumed NEO or any status of alert, the office of the Commander in Chief was responsible for notifying BAOR, CCFFA, the Western Union Commanders in Chief Committee, and the Office of the High Commissioner. The OPOT Division was charged with notifying all military agencies and attaches offices in the European area and the subordinate headquarters of the European Command.

h. NEO Rehearsals. Rehearsals of noncombatant evacuations were conducted monthly, with each march unit of thirty vehicles represented by two vehicles observing the normal time and spacing of a full unit. Dependents were not included in these practice movements, and it was directed that discretion be exercised to avoid alarming either U.S. citizens or local residents.[44] In August military posts were further instructed on refugee and traffic control measures and were warned to be alert for Communist interference along NEO routes. Toward the end of the year they were required to institute a program of training flying squads for the protection of noncombatant columns against such interference. Reports were to be submitted to the Commander in Chief upon completion of the installation of equipment, training, and familiarization firing by designated units. Necessary weapons could be requisitioned for this purpose, but additional vehicles and radios were not authorized.[45]

35. Traffic Control Committee

The Traffic Control Committee (TCC), under the P&A Division, coordinated reconnaissance and preparation of NEO routes, and maintained emergency traffic plans. It was also responsible for control of NEO traffic and operation of a traffic control bridge net, including the use of SCR 399 signal equipment in net operations. Traffic control exercises were conducted by MP units on military posts, and commanders of all commands subordinate to USAREUR held monthly alerts of MP units, as prescribed in USAREUR Training

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[43] Ltr, DCOFS for Opns to CO, 7966 EUCOM Det, 7 Aug 50, sub: Medical Units, Reserve Officers, Civilians with Special Skills. SECRET. In SGS 383.2, Item 73a.

[44] USAREUR ltr to All conc, 6 Nov 50, sub: Rehearsals of Noncombatant Evacuation Orders. AG 371.2 GOT -- AGO. SECRET. In SGS 383.2, Item 108.

[45] Cable SX - 3996, CINCEUR to Mil Posts, 9 Dec 50. SECRET. In SGS 383.2 (1950), Vol. II, Item 137.

Circular Number 3.[46] The TCC was responsible for coordination with British and French occupation forces, and in May completed revision of march graphs for the French War Ministry and the 7966 EUCOM Detachment.[47]

36. Changes in NEO Routes

A suggestion by the Traffic Control Committee was approved in June to reroute traffic out of Griesheim and Nuremberg across the Rhine bridge at Bliebach inasmuch as the Griesheim Ponton Bridge was not to be put into position before a Reinforced alert. It was considered probable that evacuation would be ordered prior to ORA.[48] In November the U.S. Constabulary, which prepared master march tables coordinating military and civilian traffic east of the Army rear boundary, was delegated the responsibility for coordination with the British and French, and TCC was relieved of all but policy-making functions.[49] In December a clearer delineation was drawn between the functions inherited from USCON by Seventh Army in the execution of evacuation plans and those of the Traffic Control Committee. The Seventh Army was to be primarily an operational ground headquarters, responsible for planning and execution of traffic control under current policies which might be modified at any time by the EUCOM TCC. The latter was to retain its policy-making and supervisory functions.[50]

37. Traffic Control Map Exercise

In November a traffic control map exercise was scheduled for January 1951 at EUCOM headquarters to test latest GAO plans. It was to be attended by briefed representatives of military posts,

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[46] Tng Cir No. 3, 17 Mar 50, par. 8. UNCLASSIFIED.

[47] Memo, Deputy Chairman Traffic Control Committee (TCC) for DCOFS for Opns, 11 May 50, sub: Status Rept, TCC. SECRET. In SGS 371.2 (1950), Vol. I, Item 36.

[48] (1) Memo, Maj H. A. Crosby, TCC, for Col E. T. Williams, 2 June 50, sub: TCC Interim Report. SECRET. In SGS 383.2, Item 58. (2) 1st ind, DCOFS for Opns to P&A Div, 7 Jun 50. SECRET. In SGS 383.2, Item 60.

[49] IRS, P&A Div to DCOFS for Opns, USAREUR, 29 Sep 50, sub: Traffic Control Exercises Map. SECRET. In SGS 383.2, Item 87.

[50] IRS, D/OPOT to DCOFS for Opns, 21 Dec 50, sub: Traffic Control and Direction. SECRET. In SGS 383.2, Plans for Evacuation of Noncombatants in EUCOM (1950), Item 157a.

the 7966 EUCOM Detachment, USAREUR Commands, and USAFE.[51] The exercise was to be based on master traffic control plans prepared by the Constabulary.

38. Demolitions

In addition to preparing troops for engaging a potential enemy and providing for the safe departure of noncombatants, EUCOM developed and maintained plans for denying to the enemy certain installations and supplies of strategic value.

a. Preparations for Nontactical Demolitions. Nontactical demolition plans, formulated in March, provided for the destruction or denial to the enemy of equipment, supplies, and installations of major military importance, particularly in the fields of transportation and communications.[52] To avoid confusion, destruction was to be accomplished by mechanical means rather than with explosives. Contact with Germans in connection with demolition plans was prohibited. USAREUR was given over-all responsibility for destruction of installations other than those belonging to the Air Force and Navy. Air Force and Navy installations, as well as technical and administrative services assigned to USAREUR, were to coordinate demolition plans with military post commanders, who were responsible for all other installations and supplies on their respective posts.[53] Two priorities were established -- the first for installations which must be destroyed and the second for installations to be destroyed within the capabilities of each responsible agency. The first priority included POL storage facilities of over 21,000 gallon capacity, Class V supplies, military motor vehicles, key civilian power installations, military and civilian telephone repeater stations, cable leading points, and railroad rolling stock. Radio broadcasting stations, landing airfields, and aircraft which could not be evacuated were to be denied to the enemy. The second priority included POL installations of less than 21,000 gallon capacity, Class II and IV supplies, major military machine shops, separate telephone switchboards which had been used at military headquarters, switchboards at minor installations, and tactical

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[51] Ltr, DCOFS for Opns to 7966 EUCOM Det, Mil Posts, USAREUR Comds, USAFE, 8 Nov 50, sub: Traffic Control MAP Exercise. SECRET. In SGS 383.2, Items 110, 111.

[52] EUCOM ltr to CG's USAREUR, USAFE, COMNAVFORGER, 24 Mar 50, sub: Non-Tactical Demolition Plans. AG 383.2 GOT - AGO. SECRET. In SGS 371.2 (1950), Item 19.

[53] 1st ind, USAREUR to CG's Constab, Inf, Mil Post Comdrs Subord to USAREUR, Chfs Tech and Ad Sv Subord to USAREUR, 24 Mar 50, sub: as above. SECRET. In SGS 371.2 (1950), Item 20.

communications equipment. Food stocks, water storage, hospitals, casernes and civilian community facilities, clothing, and German wire communications facilities for local service were not to be destroyed.

b. Issue of Rocket Launchers to Military Posts. At the end of the year Military Posts were authorized a maximum of ten 2.36-inch rocket launchers each and were required to requisition a specified number of rounds of ammunition for practice and strategic reserve. These weapons were provided to posts for use in accomplishing certain phases of nontactical demolition in emergency.[54]

c. Controversy over Demolition Publicity. An Associated Press article stating that "key roads and bridges in West Germany are being prepared for quick demolition in event of Soviet attack" provoked considerable comment at high levels during the summer of 1950. The article had been written following publication in a German magazine of a photograph showing preparations for blowing up a highway along the Rhine River. The AP correspondent had learned from the French press that while it was not advisable to publicize the fact, similar preparations were being made all over Western Germany and that the French had unsealed chambers constructed in Rhine bridges for the insertion of explosive charges.[55] The reporter concluded that the Allies were preparing to fight a delaying action in Western Germany, and called to attention the existence of an evacuation program and other emergency measures. In a telephone conversation with High Commissioner John J. McCloy, General Noce disclaimed knowledge of the demolition project and dismissed the report as a "lot of nonsense." At the same time, he denounced the unauthorized publication of information useful to a potential enemy, whether or not clearly established as factual.[56] In the absence of press censorship, and because the material had already appeared in German media, no official denial or other action was undertaken.

d. Coordination with other Commands.

(1) Agreement with the British on the Assignment of Engineers. In April, EUCOM strategical demolition plans were discussed with British planners with a view to coordinating efforts

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[54](1) IRS, DCOFS for Opns to D/OPOT, 16 Dec 50, sub: Authorization of Rocket Launchers to Military Post. SECRET. In SGS 470 (1950), Item 198. (2) Cable SX - 4337, CINCEUR to Mil Posts & BPE, 26 Dec 50. SECRET. In SGS 470, Item 207.

[55]AP press release, Frankfurt, 18 Jun 50, Wes Gallagher. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 371.2, Item 51a.

[56]Telecon, Gen Noce with John McCloy, 20 Jun 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 371.2, Item 53a.

and securing British agreement to assignment of U.S. Engineer troops to BAOR. A tentative plan was worked out jointly and on the basis of suggestions by the EUCOM Commander in Chief. Army planners in Washington made several revisions in the plan and requested further information on requirements for additional troops and supplies necessary to its implementation.[57]

(2) Coordination with USFA. In August the Department of the Army Chief of Engineers called to General Noce's attention the apparent lack of coordination between the German and Austrian commands on the strategical demolition plan.[58] Since there were several vital targets along the border between the two zones, especially the Danube River locks at Passau, it was suggested that EUCOM conduct an investigation to insure proper coordination of plans. General Noce replied that, wherever possible, coordination with USFA should be effected, but pointed out that limited resources and the different direction of withdrawal from Austria precluded joint effort to any great extent. He stated that representatives of EUCOM and USFA had agreed in June that the latter should be responsible for bridges at Passau. He said that conversations on the Passau locks would be initiated at once. Accordingly, the OPOT Division was instructed to coordinate the strategical demolition plans with Austria on a priority basis, with special emphasis on the Passau area.[59] General Noce also pointed out that EUCOM railroad demolition was planned independently of the Austrian command, but that Engineer groups were restudying the railroad demolition plan and specific targets on the ground, and that final barrier lines were therefore subject to modification.

e. Railroad Demolition Plans. The plan for disruption of railroad communications east of the Rhine River was to be completed by Seventh Army and made ready for implementation not later than 1 May 1951. Training and detail planning was to be accomplished by the 555th Engineer Combat Group. Studies and field reconnaissance were completed at year's end and approximately 150 railroad bridges and tunnels had been selected as targets. In consultation with HICOG representatives, a procedure had been established for constructing demolition chambers in these installations by German agencies. The 18th Engineer Combat Battalion was assigned responsibility for northern demolition targets and was expected to be in position by February 1951 with Battalion Headquarters at Wetzlar and one company each at Fulda, Fritzlar, and Wurzburg.

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[57] Cable W - 81547, COFSA to CINCEUR, 6 Apr 50. SECRET. In SGS 381 (1950), Item 9a.

[58] Ltr, Maj Gen Lewis A. Pick, Chf of Engr, to Maj Gen Daniel Noce, 21 Aug 50. SECRET. In SGS 381, Item 88a-1.

[59] Ltr, Noce to Pick, 31 Aug 50. SECRET. In SGS 371.2, Item 92b.

Demolition targets to the south were to be handled by the 485th Engineer Combat Battalion, due to arrive in the European Command early in February 1951. It was to go first to Kaufburen for a final check and then move to Regensberg or Augsburg, with one company each at Erlangen, Regensberg, and Dachau.[60]

IV. Line of Communications

39. Establishment of a Line of Communications (LOFC)

In view of the increasing necessity for maintaining strong forces in Western Europe, a strategic line of supply and communications across France to the German frontier was considered to be essential for the support of reinforced U.S. troops in Germany. The existing line of communications from Bremerhaven through the British Zone could not be relied upon in an emergency, and it was considered that a more secure supply line across France to the German border would be of benefit both to France and to U.S. forces in Germany should it be necessary to resist Soviet aggression.[61] Negotiations for a EUCOM line of communications across France had been initiated in November 1949. On 6 November 1950 an "Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of France regarding the Establishment and Operation of a Line of Communications across France," was concluded. (Provisions of the agreement, and negotiations leading to it, are described in the 1950 EUCOM Report, par. 12.)

40. LOFC Mission of 7966 EUCOM Detachment

The Commanding General of the 7966 EUCOM Detachment, acting as General Handy's representative, figured largely in negotiations with the French on the line of communications. In June a letter of instruction to the 7966 EUCOM Detachment gave as its primary mission the establishment, development, and operation of the EUCOM line of communications across France. The Detachment was also responsible for liaison with the U.S. Government, EUCOM agencies in

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[60] Strategic Railroad Demolitions Plan (Feb 1950) n.d. SECRET. In SGS 383.2 (1950), Vol. II, Item 165.

[61] (1) Cable 243, State Dept to Am Embassy, Paris, CINCEUR for info, 1 Jun 50. SECRET. In SGS 371.2 (1950), Item 43a.
(2) Cable SX - 3400, CINCEUR to Am Embassy, Paris, 8 Nov 50. SECRET. In SGS 371.2 (1950), Item 134.

France, and French post and communications relative to Signal facilities.[62] During alerts and upon the implementation of NEO, the Commanding General was responsible for all operations in France. Early in the year there had been a considerable retrenchment in the staff of the detachment, although it was recognized that the peacetime LOFC when fully operational would require large operating units in Bordeaux-La Pallice, Metz-Verdun, and Paris.[63] By August the detachment had been augmented by the 7966 and 7964 Area Commands, (See 1950 EUCOM Report, par. 42a.), and under the command of Brig. Gen. Mason Young had a total military strength of 1,309.[64] The same relationship existed between the detachment and EUCOM staff divisions as existed between EUCOM headquarters and any post in the command, and each staff division bore the same responsibility for policies, operations, and administration of the detachment as for any other organization reporting directly to EUCOM headquarters.[65]

41. Guard Duty Procedures of 7966 EUCOM Detachment

Following the conclusion of the agreement between France and the United States on the establishment and operation of the LOFC, the commanding general of the 7966 EUCOM Detachment was instructed on guard duty procedures for U.S. personnel within France.[66] The carrying of arms and ammunition by military personnel and Polish guards was not restricted by the agreement, but was to be governed by existing EUCOM and USAREUR directives. Weapons were to be issued only to persons qualifying under Army regulations and EUCOM directives. Supply shipments were to be guarded by the French Sureté Nationale and, if sufficiently important, by armed U.S. guards as well. Shipments of gold, narcotics, mail, classified documents, and certain types of ammunition were to be guarded at all times by American personnel. In general, a minimum number of guards were to be employed, and every effort made to avoid incidents. Although this agreement was considered generally satisfactory by EUCOM, the Provost Marshal Division pointed out that, except in self-defense or cases of aggravated assault, guards were prohibited from using

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[62] Ltr, 8 Jun 50, EUCOM to CO 7966 Detachment, sub: Ltr of Instr. AG 322.011 GCT - AGO. SECRET. In SGS 322 EUCOM Det, Item 22.

[63] Memo, D/Log for VCOFS, 5 Jan 50, sub: Retrenchment of 7966 EUCOM Detachment. SECRET. In SGS 322 EUCOM Det, Item 1.

[64] Cable SX - 1859, CINCEUR to COFSA, 21 Aug 50. SECRET. In SGS 322 EUCOM Det (1950), Item 36.

[65] IRS, COFS to D/Log, Compt, Gen, Sp, & Tech Stf Div. 17 Nov 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 322 EUCOM Det (1950), Item 52a.

[66] Ltr, Noce to CG 7966, 24 Nov 50, sub: Use of Firearms on Guard Duty within France. SECRET. In SGS 470, Item 175.

weapons to prevent the accomplishment of pilferage. It was recommended that negotiations be undertaken with the French to permit U.S. guards to use firearms in order to effectively safeguard American property.[67]

42. Emergency Signal Equipment in France

Following the agreement with France, EUCOM Engineers began to install emergency fixed-type radio stations at the forward area, Headquarters, 7966 EUCOM Detachment, and the port area at Bordeaux. Preparations were also made for installation of a permanent-type radio relay system between Western Germany and the port area at Bordeaux as a back-up to the French cable system, thus reducing reliance on the French civil system. Three high power multichannel radio teletypes capable of maintaining communications with Washington were stored west of the Rhine in the Rhine General Depot (RGD) and at Fontainebleau. This mobile equipment could be moved to emergency sites, and it was planned to install one in the port area at Bordeaux and one at Fontainebleau which later could be moved to the French Zone and remotely operated from Heidelberg for peacetime use. One fixed system was currently located at Heidelberg.[68] (See 1950 EUCOM Report, pars. 103 and 104.)

43. Study on Army Rear Areas

In April General Noce directed that a study be made to ascertain the designation of the area in the rear of Army areas in theaters of operations during World War II. The study was to show what nomenclature had been applied to this area in northern and southern France and in Italy and the nomenclature contained in existing Army directives. It was also to define the communications zone currently and in the event of an emergency, and to make recommendations as to whether it should bear the same appelation in both cases.[69] The study, which was approved by General Noce in May, indicated that the current Field Service Regulations (FSR) designation of the area in wartime was "Communications Zone," defined as the "area between

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[67] IRS, C/N 2, PM Div to DCA, 22 Nov 50, (13 Nov 50), sub: Use of Firearms on Guard Duty within France. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 470 (1950), Item 170a.

[68] Memo, Lt Col R. H. Goodrich, Sig C, to Lt Col Stone, 21 Nov 50, sub: Mobile Emergency Equipment. SECRET. In SGS 371.2, Item 140a.

[69] (1) IRS, DCOFS to D/Log, 25 Apr 50. RESTRICTED. In SGS 371.2 (1950), Item 28a. (2) Memo, VCOFS to DCOFS for Opns, 19 Apr 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 371.2 (1950), Item 23d.

the rear boundary of the theater and the rear combat zone." Current EUCOM emergency plans divided the area into an Advance Section and Southern Base Section, both under the direct command of CINCEUR. As a result of this study, it was decided that, in order to assure the French that the United States was not establishing military bases on French soil, the term "Line of Communications," defined as "the network of railroads, waterways, airways, highways, and pipe lines available for transportation," was preferable to "Communications Zone"; that the next revision of emergency plans should provide for a Communications Zone behind the USAREUR rear boundary; and that the French should be consulted as to the advisability of redesignating the 7966 EUCOM Detachment area as a Communications Zone.[70] In October a representative of the Logistics Division talked with Colonel Bertron, G-4 of the French General Staff, and was assured that upon completion of LOFC negotiations at government level the term "Communications Zone" would be entirely acceptable. When the agreement was concluded in November, a general order so designating the area was submitted to General Noce, who withheld action until 26 January 1951, pending decisions which would be reached by General Eisenhower, recently appointed Supreme Commander of SHAPE.[71]

V. General

44. General Eddy's Comments on Reorganization

In September Lt. Gen. Manton S. Eddy, USAREUR Commanding General, suggested the relocation of a number of troop units and logistic installations, with more forces in the Rhineland, particularly infantry or armored units and antiaircraft artillery to protect vital Rhine bridges. He also recommended the increasing and balancing of forces in the command.[72] The latter proposal was predicated on the expected arrival of 18,000 individual replacements from the United States to be formed into an Infantry Division and

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[70] Ltr, D/Log to VCOFS, 11 May 50, sub: Designation of Service Area to Rear of Army Area. SECRET. In SGS 37112 (1950), Item 37.

[71] Interv, Joanne Lucas, Hist Div, with Maj D. S. Cason, Plns Br, Log Div, 18 Jan 51.

[72] Memo, Gen Eddy for Gen Handy, 13 Sep 50, sub: Operational Readiness. SECRET. In SGS 381 (1950), Item 18.

contemplated augmentation of troops throughout 1951. However, by the end of 1950 the proposed augmentationshad scaled down to an expectation that "some additional troops will be sent to Europe before next July."[73] General Eddy further believed that the simultaneous execution of NEO and GAO in a sudden emergency would be impossible, and suggested that the apparent solution was to reduce the number of dependents in the command by eliminating their concurrent travel with newly assigned personnel. He later concluded, however, that the exclusion of dependents for an indefinite period of "watchful waiting" would adversely affect morale and should be avoided unless war were unmistakably imminent.[74]

45. Emergency Responsibilities of Seventh Army

On 24 November the Seventh Army, incorporating the U.S. Constabulary and 1st Infantry Division, was activated. (See 1950 EUCOM Report, par. 24.) In the interim between the activation of Seventh Army and the completion of required revisions of emergency plans, Seventh Army assumed the planning and operational responsibilities previously assigned to USAREUR in the EUCOM and USAREUR orders for Reinforced Alert, General Alert Orders, and Interzonal Agreements. It was to assume, also, the planning and operational responsibilities assigned to the U.S. Constabulary in USAREUR orders for Simple Alert and Noncombatant Evacuation Orders, and execute the Constabulary OSA and NEO. It was also to accomplish all Seventh Army emergency planning. Indications of hostilities received through Seventh Army intelligence teams were to be reported to Headquarters, EUCOM. These teams were conceived to lend intelligence support to a field army engaged in active operations. They were to collect, by noncovert means, intelligence related to the physical security of borders between the U.S. and Soviet Zones and Czechoslovakia, particularly concerning the imminence of hostilities or information on activities threatening the internal security of Seventh Army troops. In December responsibility for certain vital strategic demolition projects was transferred from the Constabulary to Seventh Army, as directed in a cable from General Handy.[75]

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[73] Stars and Stripes, (Eur Ed) December 22, 1950, p. 1.

[74] Memo, Gen Eddy for Gen Handy, 13 Oct 50, sub: Decrease of Burden Imposed on EUCOM by Dependents. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 381 (1950), Item 34b-1.

[75] (1) EUCOM ltr to CG, Seventh Army, 1 Dec 50, sub: Ltr of Instruction. AG 300 GOT - AGO. SECRET. In Hist Div, Doc Br. (2) Cable SX - 4385, Handy to USAFE, Mil Posts, 1st Inf, Seventh Army, Dec 50. SECRET. In SGS 371.2 (1950), Item 156.

46. EUCOM Operational Reserve of Tanks

In order to maintain an operational reserve of tanks in the European Command, fourteen M26 medium and twenty-seven M24 light tanks were requisitioned from the United States in March. In September, when Soviet aggression in Western Europe seemed possible, authority was requested to requisition the heavier M46 tank in lieu of the M26 for both current and future use in the command. A total of 434 tanks, including a sixty-day depot stock, was required to insure the tactical readiness of EUCOM units by providing prompt replacements for tanks undergoing overhaul and repair. Because of the critical status of tank equipment and the operational requirements of the Far Eastern Command, EUCOM was advised by the Department of the Army that it would have to retain the M26 tank. It was hoped that industrial expansion would be sufficient to permit the provision of M46 replacements by the end of 1951, but in the meantime maximum use was to be made of current stocks of battleworthy tanks.[76]

a. Heavy Tank Requirements. In October General Eddy requested USCON and the 1st Infantry Division to prepare a study of EUCOM's heavy tank requirements, assuming that the command's combat strength would include two armored cavalry regiments, one armored division, and two infantry divisions. These studies showed a definite need in the command for heavy tanks armed with 120-mm. guns, particularly in view of the fact that the Russians were known to have some 7,000 JS III heavy tanks plus others even more powerful and better armored. It was stated in the Constabulary study that "we must have a tank capable of being master of the battlefield. We cannot again rely on quantity of inferior quality to defeat enemy armor. The 120-mm. gun / maximum gun power available to the European Command / is the only tank gun we have capable of defeating the JS III." The Constabulary emphasized that the "Heavy Tank" was characterized by both powerful armament and heavy armor; it was capable of withstanding fire from heavy-caliber artillery and antitank weapons and of engaging in heavy assualt actions. USCON recommended that EUCOM's heavy tank requirements be based on the existing T/O&E of the armored division, and that tank battalions of each infantry division be equipped with heavy tanks -- assuming that corps troops (heavy tank battalions) were not available.[77] Although USCON and the 1st Infantry Division

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[76](1) Cable W - 80834, COFSA from G4 to CINCEUR, 20 Mar 50. SECRET. In SGS 470, Item 32b. (2) Cable S - 2431, CINCEUR to COFSA for G4, 20 Sep 50. SECRET. In SGS 470, Item 123. (3) Cable W - 92522, COFSA from G4 to CINCEUR, 25 Sep 50. SECRET. In SGS 470, Item 126.

[77](1) Ltr, DCOFS for Opns to CG USCON, 11 Oct 50, sub: Heavy Tank (T-43) Requirements. 470.8 GOT. SECRET. (2) 1st ind, CG USCON to DCOFS for Opns, 1 Nov 50. SECRET. In SGS 470, Item 139.

differed on some points, they agreed that augmentation planning should include a heavy tank group, and that organic heavy tank battalions sent to the command should be equipped with heavy tanks. It was concluded that all infantry regimental tank companies should use heavy tanks, but that the infantry division tank battalion, currently equipped with M26 tanks, was adequate.[78]

b. USFA Request of Medium Tanks. The importance of tactical preparedness and the absence of effective antitank weapons in the Austrian command prompted USFA to request authority to equip a tank company of the 350th Infantry Regiment with medium tanks rather than the light tanks which had been authorized at the time of the regiment's reactivation.[79] By direction of the Department of the Army, EUCOM issued seventeen M26 tanks to the Austrian command in October and requisitioned necessary replacements for EUCOM stocks from the United States. The over-all tank requirements of the European Command were to be considered at the time authorization was granted for EUCOM augmentation.[80]

c. Policy of Using Steel Tracks. The substitution of steel for rubber tracks on tanks was recommended in July to achieve constant operational readiness as well as a substantial monetary saving. The use of rubber tracks had been adopted chiefly for the preservation of roads but it was felt that a potential emergency in Europe, which might find many tanks unfit for combat because of worn rubber tracks, justified a policy of using steel tracks exclusively. This policy was instituted in the fall, and EUCOM tank units were instructed accordingly.[81]

d. Storage of Tanks. A tank replacement pool was established at the Butzbach Ordnance Shop in April as an operational reserve for the purpose of immediately replacing deadlined tanks to the two

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[78]IRS, C/N 2, USAREUR D/OPOT to COFS, 24 Nov 50, sub: Heavy Tank Requirements. SECRET. In SGS 470, Item 171.

[79]Cable 5461, USFA to COFSA for G3, 22 Aug 50. SECRET. In SGS 470, Item 106.

[80](1) Cable SX - 2320, CINCEUR to COFSA, G3, 14 Sep 50. SECRET. In SGS 470, Item 121. (2) Cable W - 91760, COFSA G3 to CINCEUR, 16 Sep 50. SECRET. In SGS 470, Item 123. (3) IRS, OPOT to D/Log, 6 Oct 50, sub: Issue of Medium Tanks, M-26, in lieu of Light Tank to Tank Company, 350 Inf. SECRET. In SGS 470, Item 135.

[81](1) IRS, OPOT to DCOFS for Opns, 26 Jul 50, sub: Policy on Stockage and Utilization of Tank Tracks, European Command. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 470, Item 93a. (2) Interoff Memo, Office of COFS, sgd G. E. R., 1 Aug 50. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 470, Item 99a (atchd).

tactical commands, USCON and the 1st Infantry Division.[82] With worsening world conditions it was decided that because of its geographical location, Butzbach was unsuitable. Several alternatives were considered, particularly the Rhine General Depot and other points west of the Rhine. But because of inadequate maintenance facilities and personnel these sites were not selected. On the other hand the Sandhofen Ordnance Automotive Center not only had sufficient personnel, but was strategically located near the Rhine River and the Engineer Bridge Park. It was estimated that 50 percent of the tanks stored there could be evacuated in an emergency on tank transporters, and the remainder by rail or under their own power. Location of the pool at the Sandhofen Center was approved in October.[83]

47. Operation of Ports in Wartime

The respective responsibilities of the Army and Navy in joint port operations formed the subject of an Agreement between the services, based upon World War II experience, which was later incorporated in a letter directive published 19 October entitled, "Assignment of Responsibilities in Ports used by Forces of the European Command in Wartime."[84] (For more detailed account of this Agreement, see par. 7, above.)

48. Diminishing Role of BPE in Strategic Planning

The principal reason for setting up a port area at Bordeaux-La Pallice (par. 22, above) was the probability that Bremerhaven would become inaccessible to Allied forces in the course of military operations. Units operating at Port Complex, which was expected to support EUCOM in combat, were receiving more valuable training than those at Bremerhaven in peacetime and there was an immediate need for an increase in military port operations personnel in France. It was further believed that units at Bremerhaven would have little opportunity to move as units to another location in an emergency. Therefore it was suggested by the Director of

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[82] USAREUR ltr to CG 1st Inf Div, 24 Apr 50, sub: Replacement of Tanks. SECRET. In SGS 470, Item 59.

[83] (1) IRS, C/N 3, 8 Sep 50, D/Log to DCOFS, USAREUR, sub: Storage of Spare Tanks. SECRET. In SGS 470, Item 119a-1. (2) IRS, USAREUR SGS to C/Ord through D/Log, 5 Oct 50, sub: as above. SECRET. In SGS 470, Item 133.

[84] IRS, AD/Log to SGS, 22 Sep 50, sub: Assignment of Responsibility in Ports Used by Forces of the European Command in Wartime. SECRET. In SGS 371.2 (1950), Item 101a.

Logistics late in December that a skeleton port which could be augmented locally to support the war plans of the European Command be located elsewhere and that BPE cease to play an important role in the strategic plans of the command.[85]

49. Move of the Army Security Agency to London

In August the Chief of Staff, USA, informed the commander in chief that for reasons of security it was essential that the Command Issuing Office function of the Army Security Agency, Europe, (ASAE) be moved to London.[86] The ASAE, a Department of the Army agency supporting EUCOM in intelligence and signal security matters, was located in Frankfurt. It was felt that this exposed location of cryptomaterial was a serious threat to communications security.[87] Accordingly, surveys were made and space located in a block of buildings on Grosvenor Square which had been purchased by the State Department to house the staff of military attache. Establishment of the ASAE Command Issuing Office (8620 AAU Detachment), attached to the Army military attache in London for administrative and logistic support, was authorized in October. The agency was to remain under the operational control of the Chief, Army Security Agency, Europe.[88]

50. Planning for Joint Hospitalization and Evacuation

In 1949 the Logistics Division had been directed to insure that provisions of JCS Paper 1725/54 were being considered in planning logistic matters connected with joint hospitalization and evacuation, and to coordinate with USAFE, COMNAVFORGER, and CINCNELM on hospitalization and evacuation to the United Kingdom.[89] In the first months of 1950 the matter was under discussion by staff

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[85] IRS, D/Log to COFS, 27 Dec 50, sub: Reorganization of BPOE. SECRET. In SGS 331 (1950), Item 45.

[86] Cable W - 88391, COFSA to CINCEUR, 10 Aug 50. SECRET. In SGS 371.2 (1950), Vol. I, Item 79.

[87] Memo, Intel Div to COFS, 14 Aug 50, sub: Establishment of Command Issuing Office (ASA) in England. SECRET. In SGS 371.2 (1950), Vol. I, Item 87.

[88] Cable W - 95280, COFSA to CINCEUR, 27 Oct 50. SECRET. In SGS 371.2 (1950), Vol. II, Item 126.

[89] IRS, SGS to Log, 16 Dec 49, sub: Policy and Guidance in Logistic Matters on Joint Hospitalization and Evacuation. CONFIDENTIAL.

medical officers representing the three services, and a resume was prepared by the Chief Surgeon entitled Policy and Guidance on Logistics Matters on Joint Hospitalization and Evacuation in the European Command.[90] The paper was prepared in two sections, one pertaining to the occupation mission, and one for incorporation in EUCOM emergency plans. Under the plan, general responsibility rested with the Commander in Chief, i.e., for medical operations of the three services in Europe, control of inter- and intra-theater evacuation of patients, and prosecution of the disease and injury prevention program.[91]

51. Medical Regulating Office

According to the above plan, all major commands were to coorindate their emergency operations. A jointly staffed Medical Regulating Office was to operate at Headquarters, EUCOM, with a forward Medical Regulating Station at Headquarters, USAREUR. This office was to plan and supervise evacuation by air, rail, and water, and assure the availability of transportation from responsible agencies at the proper time and place.

52. USAREUR's Role in Joint Evacuation of Patients

USAREUR was responsible for all hospitalization for the European Command, all means of rail evacuation, including the rail portion of the Joint Air-Rail Holding Center, and operation of air and water evacuation holding points. It also served as the supplying agency for all services. Two hospitals were designated as holding points for patients departing for the United States -- the 97th General Hospital at Frankfurt and the 319th Station Hospital at Bremerhaven. In emergency, USAREUR was to operate all hospitals except medical groups of USAFE and the Navy, and was required to furnish hospitalization to personnel of all services to the fullest possible extent.

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[90] IRS, Med Div to CINCEUR through D/Log, 31 Mar 50, sub: as above. CONFIDENTIAL.

[91] (1) 1st ind, 28 Apr 50, DCOFS for Opns to CINCEUR, sub: Hospitalization and Evacuation Policy in European Command. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) EUCOM ltr to CG's USAREUR, USAFE; COMNAVFORGER; CO, 7966 EUCOM Det, 19 Oct 50, sub: Assignment of Responsibilities in Ports Used by Forces of the European Command. AG 091.311 GLD - AGO. CONFIDENTIAL.

53. USAFE's Role in Joint Evacuation of Patients

USAFE headquarters was responsible for hospitalization at air installations including Wiesbaden and for assignment of a qualified officer to the 97th General Hospital to examine patients about to embark by air. It was to provide inter- and intra-theater evacuation where possible and motor evacuation for USAFE personnel. USAFE was also to establish the air portion of the Joint Air-Rail Holding Center by moving the 495th Medical Group to the location designated in emergency plans; assume responsibility for air evacuation of patients from a point as far forward as possible; and lift essential medical supplies.

54. COMNAVFORGER's Role in Joint Evacuation of Patients

U.S. Naval Forces, Germany, was to furnish station-level hospitalization to Navy personnel and provide for their motor evacuation. All possible shipping space was to be made available for patient evacuation in accordance with EUCOM emergency plans.

55. Study on Mine Barriers

In October a study was submitted to EUCOM by the G4 Division, Department of the Army, with regard to improved mining equipment and mine-laying methods. The study visualized a strategic mine belt across Europe, ten miles in depth, to be established east of the Rhine after the start of hostilities. Certain improved mechanical means of planting mines were proposed. The EUCOM Engineer Division, commenting on the study, reported that the concept of such a minefield should not be permanently discarded, but the European Command would have neither the manpower nor time to erect such a barrier with the type of mines presently available and that, further, its value, if unprotected by fire, was open to question. In this connection, it was recommended that as EUCOM strength increased, division Engineers be released to combat teams for the purpose of establishing more effective barriers east of the Rhine, and that available nondivisional troops be employed on development of extensive minefields on both banks of the Rhine and a system of demolition barriers for the protection of bridgeheads.[92]

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[92] (1) IRS, C/Engr Div to SGS, 26 Oct 50, sub: Employment of Land Mines. SECRET. In SGS 470, Item 148a. (2) Ltr, DCOFS for Opns to Col L. S. Griffing, Chf Research Br, R&D Div, OACOFS G4, 2 Oct 50. SECRET. In SGS 470, Item 130c.

56. Military Highway Net

A survey by military posts, the 1st Infantry Division, U.S. Constabulary, and USAFE to determine which roads should be included in the military highway net was completed in July. Requests were broken down into three categories: (a) those for new roads to be included in the net, (b) those for better maintenance of roads already in the net, and (c) those for changes in priority. Eighteen of the requests were approved by the Engineer Division, and were concurred in by TCC except for one road disapproved by the Engineers. It was estimated that fund requirements for the additional military highway construction, to be financed by direct German cost and capital expenditure, would be 16,780,000 DM for German FY 51.[93]

57. Rhine River Bridges

Plans for the protection and utilization of vital bridges across the Rhine were under constant consideration during the year. The rehabilitation of two partially destroyed bridges at Kaiserslautern to provide a direct autobahn route for U.S. Army classified installations in the French Zone was undertaken, and plans were made for the dismantling of two temporary bridges at Mainz-Kastel and one at Mannheim.[94] French authorities had feared that it might prove impossible to destroy these bridges should the need arise, but in November the EUCOM Engineer Division pointed out that troop increases in the command necessitated retaining them for emergency use. The French agreed to the retention and restoration of the bridges upon being assured that an adequate number of engineers would be included in troop increases to accomplish necessary destruction.[95]

58. Further Engineer Recommendations

On the basis of a survey of Rhine bridges in October, the Engineer Division further recommended that funds for construction of the Kaiserslautern autobahn bridges and by-passes be furnished from the occupation costs budget, and that the U.S. Army undertake

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[93] IRS, Engr to P&A, Attn TCC, 18 Jul 50, sub: Military Highway Net. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 383.2, Item 68b.

[94] Ltr, Noce, VCOFS, EUCOM to McCloy, HICOG, 1 Feb 50. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 383.2, Item 11.

[95] IRS, C/Engr to DCOFS for Opns, 8 Nov 50, sub: Temporary Bridge at Mannheim and Mainz. SECRET. In SGS 383.2, Item 112.

the maintenance and repair of the Mannheim temporary bridge. It was also suggested that the Army install the navigational span of the Mainz highway (General Patch) bridge several meters above its present elevation to permit easy navigation, and that materials in the U.S. General Marshall railroad bridge south of Mainz be relinquished to the Germans.[96]

59. Other Matters

A number of matters bearing on security which have not been considered in this chapter are discussed elsewhere. In particular, special problems relating to internal security which were evoked by the May Day and Whitsuntide demonstrations in Berlin are treated in the 1950 EUCOM Report, par. 5, and in a Historical Division special study, Deutschlandtreffen, 1950. Intelligence activities throughout the year, basic to all security planning, are covered in the EUCOM Intelligence Division's Annual Narrative Report for 1950.

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[96] Interoffice Memo, sgd GPW (Off of COFS) for Snyder, Stone, Thurston, Williams, Noce, 19 Oct 50. SECRET. In SGS 383.2, Vol. II, Item 95.

CHAPTER III

Military Training

I. Program for 1950

60. General

With the reconstitution of U.S. forces in Germany as a joint tactical command by late 1949, primary emphasis in the USAREUR training program for 1950 was given to the elimination of defects previously noted. Improvement in combat readiness of all units also keynoted the program at this level, and all unit training programs were formulated with a view to attaining the highest possible level of peacetime training.[1] The known presence of a German military organization in the Soviet Zone, intensification of the "cold war," and the realities of the Korean action[2] all contributed to development during the year of an accelerated and intensified training program. Units went into the field more often than in 1949, and in the spring and summer months two joint exercises, SHAMROCK and RAINBOW, provided training for USAREUR as the Army

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[1]IRS, D/OPOT to C/PID EUCOM, 8 Mar 50, sub: Request for Information on Troop Training. UNCLASSIFIED. In OPOT Tng Br files.

[2]See C/AFF, Tng Bul No. 1, 8 Sep 50, sub: Lessons Learned (Korea). SECRET. In OPOT Tng Br files.

component of a joint command. Paralleling these developments was the formulation of a program to provide more realistic combat-type training for all personnel of the command. By late 1950, fifteen infiltration courses were either completed or under construction, facilities for training in movement under overhead artillery fire were being intensified, and a mock-up of a town to provide training for combat in towns was being constructed at the Grafenwohr training area.[3] (For military training on the joint command level, see 1950 EUCOM Report, Chap. IV.)

61. Objectives

In the USAREUR training program for 1950 primary emphasis was placed on the improvement of the command's status of combat readiness. The following types of activities were stressed:

a. Conducting joint operations.
b. Physical conditioning.
c. Increasing the efficiency of the individual soldier in his primary duty and MOS.
d. Qualifying individuals for advancement in respective career fields.
e. Developing effective staff procedures.
f. Accomplishing secondary mission training objectives.
g. Stressing supply economy.
h. Developing leadership qualities in commanders of all echelons.
i. Tactical realism in all field exercises.
j. Increasing the proficiency of the individual in small arms markmanship.[4]

62. Obstacles to Program

As in previous training years, several obstacles to training were brought out sharply during the year. Among these were: the inadequacy of ranges and training areas;[5] the necessary provision

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[3]USAREUR Tng Cir No. 12, 6 Dec 50, sub: Battle Indoctrination Training. UNCLASSIFIED.

[4]USAREUR Tng Cir No. 1, 1 Jan 50, sub: USAREUR Training Program for 1950. RESTRICTED.

[5]Ltr, Lt Gen M. S. Eddy, CG, 7th US Army, to CINC, EUCOM, 8 Dec 50, sub: Strength and Training Status Report. AG 319.1 ASEGC - TR. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 353 (1950), Vol. II.

of logistical support for dependents; the strong emphasis on athletics and other extracurricular activities; and inadequate classroom facilities.[6] The most important of these obstacles from the USAREUR (and Seventh Army) points of view was the lack of suitable tank and antiaircraft artillery ranges. Although facilities of the French and British occupation armies were used throughout the year, the imminent augmentation of the entire western defense force in Germany and the consequently heavier load on all ranges were formidable obstacles to their continued use. Throughout the year negotiations were carried on among EUCOM, USAREUR, HICOG, the German Government, and the French and British occupation forces to obtain more firing areas for USAREUR units.

63. Other Aspects of Program

Although the training of a tactical force remained the prime factor in the 1950 USAREUR training program, other aspects of military training were also stressed. The school program, a continuing operation which covered specialized training of technical personnel of the command, was expanded to provide for more than 1,500 foreign military personnel of MDAP member nations, reserve officer training was accelerated, the program of secondary-mission infantry training for service troops was modified and carried on successfully through the year, and a series of special courses in atomic energy indoctrination was conducted for virtually all military and civilian personnel of the command. During 1950 Labor Service guard and technical personnel also received training as prescribed by Headquarters, USAREUR. Finally, the command continued to emphasize military courtesy, the troop information program, and character and moral guidance.

II. Firing Ranges and Training Areas

64. Problem

The most persistent problem of the 1950 training year was the inadequacy of firing ranges for tank and antiaircraft artillery within the U.S. Zone of Germany. Throughout 1950 negotiations were carried on with the French and British occupation headquarters for increased use of their facilities, but even if these negotiations had been completely successful, the distances involved would have constituted a serious security risk to U.S. forces in Germany. The implications of this obstacle to proper training of USAREUR tank

[6]Interv, G. R. Kaplan, Hist Div, with Lt Col H. M. Exton, C/Tng Br, OPOT Div, 28 Nov 50.

and antiaircraft artillery units were obvious. In the absence of ranges within the U.S. Zone of Germany suitable for the firing of 90-mm. antiaircraft artillery and inadequate ranges available for limited tank and 40-mm. antiaircraft artillery firing, the training of units of these types to meet a tactical emergency was seriously handicapped.

65. Action Taken in 1950

a. Tank Firing Ranges. In May, Maj. Gen. Daniel Noce, Chief of Staff, USAREUR, requested that a study be made of the problem of obtaining serviceable tank firing facilities. The purpose of the study was to investigate the requirements of such a range and the possibilities of further use of Munsingen in the French Zone and Hohne in the British Zone of Germany.[7] The study, prepared by the OPOT Division, showed that no expanded use of the Munsingen, Hohne, or Baumholder ranges was possible; it recommended that the possible expansion of Grafenwohr and Wildflecken be investigated.[8] Although the investigation was reopened,[9] other possibilities were examined. A list of potential sites was supplied by a former German general,[10] but none of the possibilities mentioned was feasible.[11] The 1st Infantry Division and the U.S. Constabulary were also requested to assist in solving this problem.[12] A suggestion by the Commanding General, U.S. Constabulary, that a Table VII tank firing range be constructed near Langenbruck at a cost of DM 185,000[13] was rejected because sufficient funds were not available.[14] On 26 May 1950 USCON

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[7] IRS, VCOF to D/OPOT, 10 May 50, sub: Tank Firing Range. In SGS 353 (1950), Vol. I.

[8] Memo, D/OPOT for VCOFS, EUCOM, 18 May 50, sub: Acquisition of a Tank Firing Range. In SGS 353 (1950), Vol. I.

[9] IRS, DCOFS for Opns for D/OPOT, 23 May 50, sub: Tank Firing Range. In SGS 353 (1950), Vol. I.

[10] Ltr, Gen of Inf Hans von Greiffenberg (Ret) to COFS, EUCOM, 9 Jun 50. In SGS 353 (1950), Vol. I.

[11] (1) IRS, VCOFS to D/OPOT, 22 Jun 50, sub: Letter from Gen von Greiffenberg to Gen Noce, 9 Jun, re Former Training Localities of German Armies. In SGS 353 (1950), Vol. I. (2) IRS, D/OPOT to VCOFS, 28 Jun 50. In SGS 353 (1950), Vol. I.

[12] (1) Cable S - 1264, CG USAREUR to 1st Inf Div, 18 Jul 50. RESTRICTED. In SGS 353 (1950), Vol. II. (2) Cable SC - 18272, CG USAREUR to USCON, 26 May 50. RESTRICTED. In SGS 353 (1950), Vol. I.

[13] Ltr, Maj Gen I. D. White, CG USCON, to Lt Gen C. R. Huebner, CG USAREUR, 5 Jun 50. RESTRICTED. In SGS 353 (1950), Vol. I.

[14] Ltr, Lt Gen C. R. Huebner to Maj Gen I. D. White, 26 Jun 50. In SGS 353 (1950), Vol. I.

was directed to appoint a board to study the requirements for a tank range, including an examination of the possibilities of expanding Grafenwohr or Wildflecken, and was directed to submit recommendations. This Board, headed by Brig. Gen. Bruce Clarke, recommended that a tank firing range be constructed at Grafenwohr similar to the Battle Course at the Hohne Range in the British Zone. Toward the end of the year, after it had been determined that funds were available for this purpose, the Seventh Army was directed to prepare the detailed plans for the range.

b. Antiaircraft Artillery Ranges. Paralleling the problem of tank firing ranges was the equally urgent one of providing U.S.-operated ranges for antiaircraft artillery firing. The only completely adequate ranges for the firing of both 90-mm. and 40-mm. antiaircraft guns were at Putlos, on the Baltic Sea, and the Isle of Sylt, in the North Sea opposite the Danish-German border.[15] The only feasible solution to this problem seemed to be construction of a range on the North Sea near Bremerhaven,[16] but the fiscal aspects of this solution made it virtually impossible.[17] In October, General Handy requested that the Department of the Army conduct as much range practice as possible in the zone of the interior for AAA units and personnel to be shipped to this theater. The reasons cited were: lack of AAA ranges in this zone, seasonal weather complications, and the expense involved in moving units to ranges in the British Zone.[18] While these actions were in progress, a board under Brig. Gen. C. E. Hart, Commanding General, Division Artillery, 1st Infantry Division, prepared an AAA firing range study. It recommended that existing facilities at Grafenwohr be used to the maximum extent, that Putlos and the Isle of Sylt be used as often as possible, and that a range be constructed at Nordholz, north of Bremerhaven, if additional AAA units to be received in this theater required further training.[19] Subsequently, it was found that due to the

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[15] (1) Both used by the 48th and 552d AAA Battalions. See OPOT Div, Notes for CINC's Wkly Staff Conf, 29 May 50. In OPOT Tng Br files. (2) IRS, C/Tng Br, OPOT Div to Control Off/OPOT, 23 Feb 50, sub: Wkly Rept of Important Subjects Pending. 319.1. In OPOT Tng Br files.

[16] IRS, C/Tng Br, OPOT Div, to Ctl Off/OPOT, 7 Dec 50, sub: Wkly Rept of Important Subjects Pending. 319.1 GOT. In OPOT Tng Br files.

[17] (1) Memo, C/Tng Br, OPOT, for Lt Col P. V. Tuttle, Jr., Tng Br, 29 Nov 50, sub: Antiaircraft Ranges. In OPOT Tng Br files. (2) This study was reopened in December. See ltr, Hq EUCOM to CG, 7th Army, 11 Dec 50, sub: Study of AA ranges. In OPOT Tng Br files.

[18] Cable S - 2777, CINCEUR to COFSA for G3, 9 Oct 50. SECRET. In SGS 353 (1950), Vol. II.

[19] IRS, C/Tng Br, OPOT, to Ctl Off/OPOT, 7 Sep 50, sub: Wkly Rept of Important Subjects Pending. 319.1. In OPOT Tng Br files.

nature of the ground in the Bremerhaven area, the establishment of an AAA firing site was impractical. In November a partial but temporary solution was reached when a tentative agreement was concluded for the use of the Isle of Sylt for approximately three months during 1951.[20]

66. Unit Training Areas

Although the Grafenwohr and Wildflecken training areas were adequate for unit training of the relatively small number of troops in this command during 1950, the proposed augmentation of the command in 1951 indicated that additional areas would be needed. On 12 October, General Handy asked the cooperation of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, Mr. John J. McCloy, in obtaining additional areas. General Handy asked that the German Government be approached to designate an area which could be utilized for the training of additional forces.[21] Another suggestion was made in December by Lt. Gen. Manton S. Eddy, CG, Seventh Army. Citing the inadequacy of ranges and training areas as the major deterrent to Seventh Army training, General Eddy inquired about the possibility of publishing a HICOG or civil government ordinance directing the use of German land for training purposes in the same manner as that in which, it was understood, the German Government had authorized its use for training by the German Army.[22] A study on the use of private property in exercises and maneuvers of the German Army in peacetime was prepared by the EUCOM Historical Division in December 1950.[23]

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[20] (1) Memo, Lt Col J. L. Erickson, Tng Br OPOT for C/Tng Br OPOT, 13 Nov 50, sub: Report of Conference at Headquarters, BAFO, re AA Firing by American Units on the Isle of Sylt. In OPOT Tng Br files. (2) IRS, D/OPOT to C/PID EUCOM, 11 Dec 50, sub: Query from Reuters Correspondent. 319.2 GOT. In OPOT Tng Br files.

[21] Ltr, Gen T. T. Handy, CINC EUCOM, to Mr. J. J. McCloy, US High Commissioner for Germany, 12 Oct 50. SECRET. In SGS 353 (1950), Vol. II.

[22] Ltr, Lt Gen M. S. Eddy, CG, 7th Army, to CINC, EUCOM, (undated but written in early December), sub: Strength and Training Status Report (Reports Control Symbol ATTNG-EX-10). AG 319.1 ASEGC - TR. CONFIDENTIAL.

[23] EUCOM Hist Div, Opn Hist Br, MS P - 073, Use of Private Property in Exercises and Maneuvers of the German Army in Peacetime.

III. Battle Indoctrination

67. Background

Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Korea in June 1950, Headquarters, EUCOM, had taken steps to formulate a training program to insure more realistic training of all troops and units under conditions closely resembling those encountered in actual combat. Joint maneuvers and command post exercises held in 1949 had provided a type of experience more beneficial than any since World War II in this command, but individual troops had not, by 1950, undergone overhead artillery fire or participated in village fighting and infiltration courses to the extent required in the Zone of the Interior under the new Army Field Forces Training Program initiated after the outbreak of the Korean War.[24] Although many noncommissioned officers had considerable battle experience, and all troops had operated in the field, conditions peculiar to the occupation had precluded intensive training under live ammunition, and a feeling of "battle-consciousness" had not been achieved. It was the feeling of staff personnel planning training exercises at all levels that restrictions on "digging-in," violating trespass rights, movement under live ammunition, and combat in towns had operated as substantial deterrents to a successful training program.[25]

68. Development of Program Within European Command

With the early lessons of the Korean action as a base, the Department of the Army published Training Circular Number 13, Battle Indoctrination, on 1 November.[26] The draft of this circular, which was implemented in Germany on 6 December as USAREUR Training Circular 12, served as a basic guide to the formulation

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[24]Interv, G. R. Kaplan, Hist Div, with Lt Col P. V. Tuttle, Jr., Tng Br, OPOT Div, 12 Dec 50.

[25]Interv, G. R. Kaplan, Hist Div, with Col Paul A. Gavan, OPOT Div, 25 Sep 50.

[26]DA Tng Cir No. 13, 1 Nov 50, sub: Battle Indoctrination. UNCLASSIFIED.

of the program in the command. As interpreted by the Training Branch, OPOT Division, it specified three types of training: infiltration courses, combat in towns, and training under overhead artillery fire.[27]

69. Infiltration Courses

The construction of infiltration courses in the U.S. Zone of Germany was begun in mid-1950. It was planned that fifteen courses would be completed and in operation by 1 January 1951. All members of USAREUR T/O&E units, and all personnel of T/D units for whom secondary combat missions were prescribed, were to receive training under infiltration courses. The frequency of this training was left to the individual commander, but it was anticipated that a yearly ammunition allowance of twenty-five rounds to be fired over the head of each participating soldier and one-fourth pound of dynamite per man would be expended.[28]

70. Combat in Towns

Strict occupation policies against the use of German cities and towns for combat-type training had until late 1950 denied USAREUR units the opportunity to train in house-to-house combat. Maneuver exercises covering large areas of West Germany had always taken place primarily in wooded areas, on farmland, at the Grafenwohr reservation, along rivers, or in the outskirts of towns and villages. The rigid restrictions against interfering with normal German economic life were such that all operations covering urban areas had either to be simulated or played in an unrealistic manner. In late 1950 action was initiated by the OPOT Division to construct a mock-up of a town at the Grafenwohr area. In late November construction of this "town" was begun at a cost of DM 9,500.[29] It was planned that all infantry, engineer, and cavalry units would utilize this village and that other units -- particularly artillery -- would receive some training in combat in towns.[30] Although this "town" was to be small, it was to include a crossroads and a main street with five "houses" on each side. The Director, OPOT, also specified that two adjacent houses on each side should have second floors.[31]

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[27]USAREUR Tng Cir No. 12, 6 Dec 50, sub: Battle Indoctrination. UNCLASSIFIED.

[28]Interv, G. R. Kaplan with Lt Col Tuttle, 12 Dec 50.

[29]EUCOM ltr to CG, Nuremberg Mil Post, 7 Dec 50, sub: Construction of Model Village at Grafenwohr. AG 353 - GOT.

[30]Interv, G. R. Kaplan with Lt Col Tuttle, 12 Dec 50.

[31]IRS, D/OPOT to C/Engr Div, 30 Oct 50, sub: Cost Estimate for Mock Village. 353. GOT. In OPOT Tng Br files.

IV. Maneuvers

71. USAREUR Exercises

The continuing identity of USAREUR and EUCOM headquarters as one and the same during 1950 and the subsequent tendency of training staff officers to function as both EUCOM and USAREUR staff personnel had a peculiar effect upon maneuver planning. Although joint maneuver headquarters was staffed by personnel of all three services, the EUCOM-USAREUR headquarters carried out virtually all preliminary joint maneuver planning by virtue of its role as the supreme joint headquarters. Air Force and Navy planning personnel were generally officers serving on temporary duty with Headquarters, EUCOM, and were integrated into the Joint Planning Staff. This situation did not imply an overbearing position on the part of the EUCOM-USAREUR staff but rather an acknowledgement by all services that the land-bound nature of most joint European Command exercises placed most of the responsibility in the hands of this staff. Throughout the planning and operational stages of both exercises the ratio of personnel from the three services who served on the joint staff was almost identical with that existing within the European Command as a whole. The same ratio held in the field.[32]

72. Unit Exercises

Throughout the year both the 1st Infantry Division and U.S. Constabulary concentrated heavily on unit training at all levels from the individual soldier through regiment. Battalions of both units were rotated frequently through the Grafenwohr and Wildflecken training areas, and frequent command post and field training exercises were held. Except at the level of the division -- 1st Infantry and U.S. Constabulary -- training was carried out in accordance with broad USAREUR directives[33] as implemented by unit commanders. At higher levels, there was close cooperation between USAREUR headquarters and the headquarters of major subordinate commands in the planning and

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[32]Interv, G. R. Kaplan, Hist Div, with Col Howell, 19 Oct 50.

[33]USAREUR Tng Cir No. 1, 1 Jan, sub: USAREUR Training Program for 1950.

execution of field training exercises. On 17 - 20 January the 1st Division conducted a division command post exercise (SLEET) held in the area generally enclosed by the Rhine, Main, and Neckar Rivers.[34] Three days after the conclusion of this exercise, U.S. Constabulary also conducted a command post exercise (SHOEPAC) in the same area and with the same general objectives: to plan and conduct a command post exercise; to organize, train, and test staffs under field conditions; and to establish and operate communications systems under field conditions.[35]

73. USAREUR Role in Joint Exercises

The role of USAREUR in joint training exercises (paragraph 71 above) was somewhat different from its relative position on the command and organizational charts of the two maneuvers. In Exercise RAINBOW (11 - 18 September), for example, Lt. Gen. Manton S. Eddy, Commanding General, USAREUR, was Deputy Director for Army, since the augmented maneuver staff was composed largely of officers then acting as EUCOM staff officers. Theoretically, General Eddy was to exercise direct control over the participating Army forces and concerned himself with activities of the joint staff as they concerned Army matters. Maj. Gen. I. D. White, Commanding General, U.S. Constabulary, was the actual field commander directly responsible to General Eddy. The staff of U.S. Constabulary functioned, therefore, as the staff of U.S. Army Forces, FTX - 50, with the 1st Infantry Division, and the two Constabulary Brigades as major subordinate units. (See 1950 EUCOM Report, pars. 62 and 63.)

V. Secondary Mission Training

74. Changes in 1950

The program for secondary mission infantry training of USAREUR technical and service personnel, instituted in 1949,[36] underwent

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[34]USAREUR ltr to CG 1st Inf Div, 28 Oct 49, sub: Command Post Exercise for 1st Infantry Division. AG 354 GOT - AGO.

[35]USAREUR ltr to CG USCON, 28 Oct 50, sub: Command Post Exercise for U.S. Constabulary. AG 354.2 GOT - AGO.

[36]EUCOM ltr, 13 May 50, sub: Secondary Infantry Training. AG 353.6 GOT - AGO. CONFIDENTIAL.

one major change during 1950. Whereas the original program had prescribed several types of infantry training, the program established in 1950 was limited to the training of riflemen. On the basis of a staff study prepared by the OPOT Division,[37] the following actions were taken:

a. All training in crew-served weapons was deleted.
b. Personnel under the purview of the secondary mission were to be trained as riflemen.
c. Combat units trained their own replacements for crew-served weapons.

The recommendations effecting these deletions were based on conclusions reached late in 1949 that training in crew-served weapons had proved impracticable,[38] that rifle training had been successful, and that combat units, because of ranges, weapons, and instructional considerations, could more efficiently train replacements for mortars, machine guns, and BARs.[39]

75. Effect of Changes

From a logistical standpoint, the change from training in several types of weapons was immediately beneficial. When the new program became effective on 6 February,[40] personnel of all units receiving training under the program were equipped with M1 rifles,[41] and all mortars, machine guns, automatic rifles, and other equipment rendered excess by the new program was turned in to appropriate depots.[42] From a training standpoint,

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[37](1) Ltr, D/OPOT to COFS, 5 Jan 50, sub: Staff Study, Training Under the Infantry Secondary Mission Program. (2) EUCOM ltr to Comdrs of All Comds Dir Subor to USAREUR (except BMP; 7888 Sp Troops, Hq EUCOM; and 66 CIC Det), 21 Mar 50, sub: Secondary Mission Training. AGO 353 GOT - AGO. CONFIDENTIAL.

[38]Memo, C/Tng Br, OPOT to D/OPOT, 17 Jan 50, sub: Interim Report, Inspection of Secondary Mission Training. 353.6 GOT. SECRET.

[39]Ltr, D/OPOT to COFS, 5 Jan 50, sub: Staff Study, Training under the Infantry Secondary Mission Program.

[40]EUCOM ltr to CG USAREUR, 6 Feb 50, sub: Infantry Secondary Mission Training. AG 353.6 GOT - AGO. CONFIDENTIAL.

[41]Personnel of T/D units were issued the M1 as their basic weapon, while personnel of T/O units retained their basic weapons and were also issued M1s. Ibid., 1st Ind, 6 Feb 50.

[42]Ibid.

the effect of the change was to furnish the command an additional 4,500 - 5,000 riflemen replacements for duty in rear installations when needed. A marked improvement in secondary mission infantry training was observed immediately;[43] continuing improvement was noted during the year.[44]

VI. USAREUR Schools

76. Scope of School Program

In 1950 the United States Army, Europe, operated six technical service schools (Engineer, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Signal, Finance, and Medical), three training centers (Tank Training Center, Kitzigen Training Center; and the Transportation Training Center), the Intelligence School, the Band Training School, and the Troop Information and Education Staff School.[45] The major factors governing attendance at these schools were a continuing need in the command for personnel with technical skills and the requirements of career guidance and other Army personnel and morale programs.[46] The program was frequently reexamined with a view to gearing it more closely to the current and long-range requirements of the command. To this end, there was close coordination during the year between the Chief, Army Field Forces, and the Commanding General, USAREUR. On 5 May, Gen. Mark W. Clark, Chief, Army Field Forces, advised this command of details of a new program for training the maximum number of personnel possible in the zone of the interior prior to their shipment to overseas theaters. He stated that "critical specialists" were to be defined, that Army-wide publicity was to be given to the schooling and training of these specialists, and that a mechanical screening of the Army would be conducted to determine the actual number and location of personnel potentially qualified to fill critical MOS positions. After this process, appropriate school quotas were to be allocated and filling them made mandatory. General Clark did not believe it desirable for overseas commands to conduct schools which duplicated those in the zone

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[43] IRS, D/OPOT to COFS (no date), sub: Quarterly Secondary Mission Status Report, 1 Feb 50. SECRET. In OPOT Tng Br files.

[44] IRS, D/OPOT to COFS, 23 Jun 50, sub: Quarterly Secondary Mission Status Report. 353.6 GOT. SECRET. In OPOT Tng Br files.

[45] (1) Annex to USAREUR Tng Cir No. 4, sub: USAREUR School Catalogue, 10 Nov 49. (2) USAREUR School Catalogue, 15 Nov 50.

[46] Interv, G. R. Kaplan, Hist Div, with Lt Col C. F. Nelson, C/Sch Sec, Tng Br, OPOT Div, 10 Jan 51.

STATUS OF USAREUR LEVEL SCHOOLS



COMMENT (a) INCLUDES USAFE, USNAVFORGER, USFA, TRUST, AND FOREIGN NATIONALS.
(b) DOWNWARD TREND IN SEPTEMBER IS A RESULT OF CURTAILED COURSES TO PERMIT MAXIMUM PARTICIPATION IN FTX-50.

Source: Monthly Statistical Report, US Army Europe 30 September 1950.

Chart 1

AGL (1) 6-51- 60-20479

of the interior, but felt that some duplication would have to continue until such time as the replacement system provided suitable trained replacements in required numbers.[47] On the basis of this program and with the Korean war siphoning off considerable numbers of technical personnel, the USAREUR school system continued its planned program. In several instances, it was expanded to include certain short courses in specialities which were potentially critical within USAREUR.[48]

77. Attendance During 1950

Although training of military personnel of MDAP member nations taxed USAREUR schools considerably, attendance levels of USAREUR personnel during 1950 were as high as in previous years. As in the past, attendance was largely seasonal. The highest levels were reached in November and April and the lowest during the command-wide maneuver period in September and during the summer months when intensive unit and individual training was in progress.[49] On an average, approximately 3,000 persons were in attendance during 1950; overhead personnel totaled approximately 1,750. Instructor and cadre personnel also participated in command maneuvers in September.[50] Although attendance at some schools was limited to USAREUR personnel, quotas at others were established by Headquarters, EUCOM, for personnel of USAFE, COMNAVFORGER, TRUST, and USFA. The Intelligence School at Oberammergau had an average daily capacity of 425 students of whom 127 were from commands other than USAREUR. The student enrollment of the Signal School at Ansbach included 71 non-USAREUR students in its total daily average of 450.[51] Details of MDAP participation in the USAREUR school program are given in the 1950 EUCOM Report, par. 99.

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[47] Ltr, Gen Mark W. Clark, C/AFF, to Lt Gen C. R. Huebner, CG USAREUR, 5 May 50.

[48] Interv, G. R. Kaplan with Lt Col Nelson, 10 Jan 51.

[49] (1) Ibid. (2) IRS, D/OPOT, USAREUR to C/Sig Div, USAREUR, 8 Jun 50, sub: Temporary Closing of USAREUR Schools. 352 GOT. In OPOT Tng Br files.

[50] (1) See Chart 1. (2) IRS, D/OPOT to Comp, USAREUR, 10 Oct 50, sub: Report on Status of USAREUR Schools. 319.1 Incl 4, sub: Analysis of USAREUR Level Schools, Quarter Ending 30 Sep 50. In OPOT Tng Br files.

[51] Ibid.

78. Developments During 1950

a. General. With the Army-wide acceleration of training in the summer of 1950, the weekly instruction period in all USAREUR schools was increased from forty to forty-four hours per week. The resulting proportionate reduction in length of course allowed students to return to units more promptly than in the past.[52] Another potentially important development was the planning for expansion of USAREUR schools begun in November by the OPOT Division. It was believed that despite heavy augmentation of troop strength in the command, the school system would not have to be expanded more than 50 percent. The Director, OPOT, envisioned increased training at the division level and increased concentration of purely technical training in USAREUR schools.[53] At the end of the year there was also a possibility that some Labor Service guard and technical personnel, of Polish, Baltic, and German nationality, would attend USAREUR technical schools.[54]

b. Rocket Launcher Training. Prior to the receipt by this command of 3.5-inch rocket launchers, approximately 900 instructors in this weapon were trained in fifteen different classes held at the Grafenwohr training area between 10 August and 30 September 1950.[55] These courses were given by an officer and two enlisted men from the Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, and were attended by personnel from USAREUR, USFA, and TRUST.

c. Negro On-Duty Education Program. A continuing training program which was carried out throughout 1950 was the on-duty education program for Negro enlisted personnel of this command. This program, which had also been in operation in 1949 was aimed at affording Negro personnel of this command maximum opportunities for educational advancement in order that their individual skills and abilities could be used most profitably in their chosen career fields.[56] Of the average total of 4,710 personnel who participated in the program during 1950, 910 completed basic educational training equivalent to five years of formal schooling, 1,473 completed the equivalent of eighth

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[52] (1) Memo, Lt Col H. M. Exton, C/Tng Br, OPOT Div, for Ctl Off, OPOT, 25 Aug 50, sub: Notes for Commander-in-Chief's Weekly Staff Conference. In OPOT Tng Br files. (2) USAREUR ltr to Comdrs of All Comds Dir Subor to USAREUR, 11 Aug 50, sub: Accelerated and Intensified Training Program. AG 353 GOT - AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[53] IRS, D/OPOT to COFS, EUCOM, 30 Nov 50, sub: Utilization of USAREUR Schools. In SGS 354 (1950), Vol. II.

[54] IRS, C/Lbr Svc Dir to DCOFS for Opns, 31 Aug 50, sub: Policies Pertaining to the Responsibility of Labor Service Unit Commanders. SECRET. In SGS 214.1 (1950), Vol. I.

[55] USAREUR Qtr Narr Tng Ltr, 1 Jul - 30 Sep 50, Lt Gen C. R. HUEBNER, CG USAREUR, to Maj Gen Clift Andrus, D/O&T, USA. RESTRICTED.

[56] EUCOM Tng Cir 1, 13 Feb 51, sub: On-Duty Educational Training Program. UNCLASSIFIED.

grade education, and 381 finished General Educational Development (GED) high school level courses prescribed by the command. Carried out at posts, units, and installations by Negro enlisted instructor personnel of the 7744th Educational Training Unit, this program called for ten hours of on-duty educational training per week. On 1 January 1951, objectives of this program were revised to afford training only through the intermediate or eighth grade level for all Negro enlisted personnel requiring it.[57]

VII. Organized Reserve Corps Training

79. Scope of Program in 1950

During the first quarter of 1950 it was possible to evaluate the reserve officer training program inaugurated in this command in 1949. With approximately 1,500 reserve officers on hand within the U.S. Zone of Germany,[58] it was apparent that this command was unusually well-manned in potential reserve officer strength. Since approximately half of these reserve officers were employed as civilians by the United States Government, there was little difficulty in setting up a program by which they could be trained in reserve units and on short terms of active duty.[59] Most reserve officers received training at the designated mobilization unit; the quarterly average of officers training on short tours was approximately one hundred.[60] Sixteen reserve units were set up within the European Command, and a total of 636 reserve officers were regularly enrolled in the various units.[61] Interest in

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[57] (1) Chart, On-Duty Education, January - December, 1950. (Available at Schools Section, Tng Br, OPOT Div, EUCOM). (2) Interv, G. R. Kaplan, Hist Div, with Lt Col C. F. Nelson, C/Sch Sec, Tng Br, OPOT Div, 14 May 51.

[58] USAREUR Qtr Narr Tng Ltr, 1 Jan - 31 Mar 50, Lt Gen C. R. Huebner, CG USAREUR, to Maj Gen Clift Andrus, D/O&T, USA.

[59] Interv, G. R. Kaplan, Hist Div, with Maj J. S. Robinson, ORC Branch, OPOT Div, 11 Jan 51.

[60] (1) Ibid. (2) See Qtr Narr Tng Ltr for three quarters of 1950.

[61] Interv, G. R. Kaplan with Maj J. S. Robinson, 11 Jan 51.

reserve officers' affairs was high throughout the command. The percentage of reserve officers who participated in the training program was far greater than corresponding figures in the zone of the interior. Although facilities for training reserve officers were generally limited to personnel residing within the U.S. Zone of Germany, considerable interest in the program was evidenced by the reserve officers living in other European countries. American students in Paris, Rome, and Switzerland were also interested in both the officer and enlisted reserve training activities.[62]

80. Training Activities

On 15 December 1949 the basic USAREUR directive for organized reserve activities was published. This directive prescribed conditions of attendance and participation in the program and prescribed general training courses to be given by units. Subjects within the scope of the sixteen units were generally of a "refresher" nature although courses in comparatively recent developments, such as career guidance, the field type army, and atomic energy, were also offered.[63] As the program developed, it became possible to devote more attention to topical subjects (the Russian army, new army equipment, and post-World War II weapons). Whenever possible, reserve officers were recalled to active duty for participation in command maneuvers, schools, or other special training activities. Approximately seventy reserves participated in Exercise RAINBOW,[64] and thirty-five reserve officers of all three services took a two-week combat intelligence course at the USAREUR Intelligence School at Oberammergau in December.[65]

81. Enlisted Reserve Training

Although only a limited number of enlisted reservists participated in the program, considerable progress over 1949 was reported. Because of the limited number (less than fifty) within the command, enlisted reservists received training prescribed for officers.[66] During the year, many queries were received from American students in Europe who were interested in the program.[67]

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[62] Ibid.

[63] USAREUR Tng Cir No. 5, 15 Dec 49, sub: Organized Reserve Corps Training.

[64] Qtr Narr Tng Ltr, 1 Jul - 30 Sep 50.

[65] Interv, G. R. Kaplan with Maj J. S. Robinson, 11 Jan 51.

[66] (1) Cf fn. (2) Changes 1 to USAREUR Tng Cir No. 5, 15 Dec 49, 21 Apr 50, sub: Organized Reserve Corps.

[67] Interv, G. R. Kaplan with Maj J. S. Robinson, 11 Jan 51.

82. Request for Additional Authority in Reserve Affairs

On 7 December, General Handy requested a considerable extension of EUCOM authority over reserve affairs in Europe. In view of the tense world situation and the consequent desire of the European Command to utilize all available personnel at the discretion of the commander in chief, it was requested that the scope of this command in reserve affairs include the whole European continent except the U.S. Zone of Austria and the British Isles. North Africa was also included. General Handy asked, too, for authority to make assignments of mobilization designations of reservists to any unit, station, or activity actually under his jurisdiction or contemplated in the EUCOM mobilization plan. This request was further amplified to include the provision that such assignments could be made without regard to the type of unit, station, or activity; the number of reservists so assigned or designated; or the rank, grade, or branch of service of the individual concerned. Authority was requested at the same time for EUCOM to train reservists under its jurisdiction both by short terms of active duty training and by reserve duty training in the French and British Zones of Germany, in areas of sovereign nations of Europe (excluding the U.S. Zone of Austria), in the British Isles, and in North Africa. Such arrangements would be subject to agreements made by this command with the governments concerned.[68]

VIII. Atomic Energy Indoctrination

83. Objectives

As part of the world-wide Department of the Army Atomic Energy Information Program formulated in 1949,[69] Headquarters, USAREUR instituted a command-wide program of atomic energy indoctrination in November 1949. There were no local reasons for the program within USAREUR although this command, like others responsible to the Department of the Army, had long been aware of the need for such training. The purposes of the program, as

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[68]Cable S - 3953, CINCEUR sgd Handy to COFSA for G3, 7 Dec 50. SECRET. In OPOT ORC Br files.

[69]SR 350 - 80 - 1, 18 Aug 49, sub: Education and Training, Program for Dissemination of Atomic Energy Information.

specified in paragraphs 1, a and b, of SR 350 - 80 - 1, were primarily to dispel misconceptions, misunderstandings, and false apprehensions concerning the effects of atomic warfare.[70]

84. Scope of Program

a. Attendance. The program for dissemination of atomic energy information within USAREUR was planned to orient all commanders, staff officers, enlisted personnel, reserve officers, and Department of the Army male civilian employees in those phases of atomic energy training with which they would be most concerned in case of an emergency.[71] The program was carried out by Headquarters, USAREUR, since this command served as the EUCOM agency in atomic matters. Key commanders and staff officers of USAFE and COMNAVFORGER attended Phase I and II. Instructor training given in Phase II was given to personnel of these commands and of TRUST and USFA.[72]

b. Phase I. The initial phase of the 1950 program was given on 30 November and 1 December 1949 to major commanders and their deputies of all three U.S. services. This instruction, given by a special team from the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project of the Department of Defense,[73] was divided into two presentations. In addition to a general discussion of atomic energy, this phase included a highly classified discussion of the development of all known atomic weapons and their tactical and strategic employment.

c. Phase II (Instructor's Course). Prior to implementation of Phase II of the Atomic Energy Indoctrination Program in this command a special instructor's course was conducted from 20 February to 31 March. In a series of five-day courses, 154 Army, 34 Air Force, 5 Navy, and 28 civilian instructors were trained.[74] Selection of instructors for training which was held at the Kitzingen Training Center, was based on the following qualifications:

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[70]Interv, G. R. Kaplan, Hist Div, with Lt Col L. A. Hedges, Tng Br, OPOT Div, 11 Jan 51.

[71]Ibid.

[72]Ibid.

[73]Ltr, Lt Gen C. R. Huebner, CG, USAREUR, to Maj Gen Clift Andrus, D/O&T, DA, 17 Jan 50, sub: Quarterly Narrative Training Letter (1 Oct - 31 Dec 49). RESTRICTED. In OPOT Tng Br files.

[74]Ltr, Lt Gen C. R. Huebner to Maj Gen Clift Andrus, Qtr Narr Tng Ltr (1 Jan - 31 Mar 50). RESTRICTED.

(1) Adaptability to instruct at a later date in courses to include protection against biological warfare, radiological safety, and atomic warfare.
(2) Clearance to teach CONFIDENTIAL material.
(3) Ability as instructors.
(4) Rotation date no earlier than March 1951.
(5) Wherever possible, prior knowledge of, or instruction in, physics, chemistry, and mathematics.[75]

d. Phase II. Instruction at a CONFIDENTIAL level was given during the period 1 April through 31 July to all officers, warrant officers, and certain selected civilians of major implementing agencies responsible to Headquarters, USAREUR.[76] Prior to this phase of instruction, the question of orientation of key civilian personnel was covered by provisions of a USAREUR letter of 7 February 1950. Citing paragraph 8b, SR 350 - 80 - 1, this letter stated that selected civilian employees of the Department of the Army could be given pertinent instruction and information with the security classification of CONFIDENTIAL or lower on atomic tactics and techniques, radiological defense, and related subjects.[77] Included in the quotas to attend the instructor's course were civilian safety directors of all military posts, civilian safety directors of U.S. Constabulary and 1st Infantry Division, civilian safety directors of the Quartermaster, Signal, Engineer, and Special Service Divisions, USAREUR, and three safety directors from Headquarters, USAREUR.[78]

e. Phase III. The final phase of the Atomic Energy Indoctrination Program, Phase III, was conducted 1 August - 15 November at a RESTRICTED level for all active reserve officers of all three services not on extended active duty, all U.S. Army enlisted personnel, and selected Department of the Army civilian employees whose duties required familiarity with the subject as determined by their immediate military superiors.[79] Somewhat less technical

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[75]USAREUR ltr to Maj Comdrs Subor to USAREUR, 13 Jan 50, sub: Instructor's Course for Atomic Energy Indoctrination.

[76](1) Ibid. (2) USAREUR Qtr Narr Tng Ltr, Lt Gen C. R. Huebner, to Maj Gen Clift Andrus, 1 Apr - 30 Jun 50.

[77]USAREUR ltr to Comdrs of All Comds Dir Subor to USAREUR, 7 Feb 50, sub: Orientation of Civilian Employees of the Department of the Army in Atomic Energy Matters. AG 350 GOT - AGO.

[78]Ibid.

[79]EUCOM ltr to C/AFF, 20 Dec 50, sub: Report of Completion-- Phase III Atomic Energy Information -- Indoctrination Program (BCS ATTNG - EX (OT) - 10). AG 350.05 GOT.

than Phases I and II, Phase III covered the following subjects:

(1) Introduction to atomic weapons.
(2) Atomic weapons effects.
(3) Medico-biological effects of atomic weapons.
(4) Radiological defense - general.
(5) Radiological defense - organization.
(6) Radiological defense - techniques and equipment.
(7) Decontamination.[80]

85. Expansion of Program

Late in the year, studies were being completed aiming at the intensification of training in radiological defense.[81]

IX. Training of Labor Service Units

86. Impact of Reorganization

Early in 1950, the question of more effective utilization of German, Baltic, and Polish personnel who were members of Labor Service units and the Industrial Police was brought into sharp focus within the command. With such a large potential manpower reserve available to relieve U.S. forces of menial guard, and unskilled technical, responsibilities, it appeared that such personnel could contribute substantially to the primary mission of preparing the command for any emergency. Inevitably, however, the activities of Labor Service personnel had come to the attention of the German press. Since several German publications had tried to create the impression that USAREUR was training a paramilitary reserve force,[82] the whole subject of

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[80]USAREUR ltr to Comdrs of All Comds Dir Subor to USAREUR, 30 Jun 50, sub: Phase III Atomic Energy Indoctrination Program. AG 350.05 GOT - AGO.

[81]Incl 2 to IRS, C/N 2, D/OPOT, EUCOM to C/Hist Div, 16 May 51, sub: Historical Manuscript, "Military Training (USAREUR)." SECRET. In Hist Div files.

[82]Among these were the Muenchener Illustrierte, September 1950, and the Stuttgarter Nachrichten, October 26, 1950.

training Labor Service personnel had to be handled delicately. For their most effective employment, Labor Service units were reorganized -- regardless of whether they were actually guard or industrial police units -- into a single Labor Service guard organization totaling approximately 31,000 men.[83] (For details on Labor Service units, see 1950 EUCOM Report, pars. 49 - 53.)

87. Training Program for 1950

On 30 March 1950, a training program for all Labor Service units directly subordinate to USAREUR was prescribed. The basic requirements were that six hours per week be devoted to training and that the training cycle be of twenty-four weeks' duration with two weeks of free training time between cycles. The prescribed program conformed closely to the training program of 1949. Both Labor Service guard and technical service units received a total of seventy-two hours of English instruction and twelve hours of first aid and sanitation; they went into the field for two overnight bivouacs each cycle. In addition, at least five men per company received additional training in first aid to enable them to perform the duties of Medical Corps aid men. For Labor Service technical units the remainder of the program consisted of twenty-four hours in use, care, and maintenance of individual and organization equipment, thirty-six hours of training in connection with assigned technical missions, and continuous on-the-job training. Labor Service guard units received twelve hours in use, care, and maintenance of equipment, sixteen hours in communications with special emphasis on the use and maintenance of field telephone, eighteen hours of weapon instruction and familiarization firing including range firing once each cycle, and sixteen hours of movements and bivouacs emphasizing the most efficient entrucking and detrucking of personnel and loading and unloading of equipment. On-the-job training was continuous.[84]

88. Weapons Training

Prior to July 1950 only Labor Service guard units had been authorized weapons for duty and supervised training.[85] On

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[83]Cable SX - 1681, CINCEUR to COFSA for G3, 10 Aug 50. SECRET. In SGS 231.4 Case 1 (1950), Vol. I.

[84]USAREUR ltr to all Mil Post Comdrs Dir Subor to USAREUR (except Berlin) and Chiefs, Tech Svcs, USAREUR, 30 Mar 50, sub: Training of Labor Service Units. AG 353.01 GOT - AGO. RESTRICTED.

[85]Changes No. 1 to USAREUR Cir No. 12, 30 Jun 50, sub: USAREUR Labor Service, par. 10. RESTRICTED.

19 July all Labor Service technical units and liaison detachments were authorized 30-caliber carbines.[86] In addition, the training period allotted Labor Service technical units for training in connection with assigned technical missions was reduced from thirty-six to twenty hours and a sixteen-hour period of weapons instruction and familiarization firing was substituted. Units affected by the change were engineer bridge maintenance, engineer dump truck, transportation service, ammunition depot, signal construction, and signal depot units.[87]

89. Proposed Changes to Training Program

With the increase in size of the Labor Service force during 1950 and a sizeable augmentation envisioned for 1951, a new and more intensive training program was drawn up late in the year. The attendance of Labor Service personnel at USAREUR technical schools,[88] advanced technical training at a later date, assignment of more specialized missions to Labor Service units, and a forty-eight hour training week for newly recruited personnel[89] were among the changes proposed. Although a special training directive was actually drawn up,[90] it was withheld from publication during the remainder of the year.[91]

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[86]USAREUR ltr to all Mil Post Comdrs Dir Subor to USAREUR (incl BPE) (less Berlin) and Chiefs, Tech Svcs, USAREUR, 19 Jul 50, sub: Weapons and Weapons Training for USAREUR Labor Service Technical Units and Liaison Detachments. AG 353.01 GOT - AGO. RESTRICTED.

[87]Ibid.

[88]IRS, C/Lbr Svcs Div to DCOFS for Opns, 31 Aug 50, sub: Policies Pertaining to the Responsibility of Labor Service Unit Commanders. SECRET. In SGS 231.4, Case 1 (1950), Vol. I.

[89]Ibid., Tab D. SECRET

[90]Draft ltr, USAREUR to CGs, 1st Div and USCON; Chiefs of All Tech Svcs, Comdrs of All Mil Posts, undated, sub: Special Training Directive, Labor Service Units. AG 353.01 GOT - AGO. SECRET. In OPOT Tng Br files.

[91]IRS, C/Tng Br OPOT to Ctl Off OPOT, 28 Dec 50, sub: Weekly Report of Important Subjects Pending. CONFIDENTIAL.

CHAPTER IV

Morale, Discipline, and Welfare

90. Trends During 1950

During 1950 the morale and disciplinary standards of USAREUR troops continued high, and existing facilities and programs were retained or expanded.[1] Special emphasis was given to orientation of troops and to developing more cordial relations between American personnel and the German population. In addition, such problems as the housing shortage, the continuance of dependents in the command, changes in marriage policy, the treatment of Negro troops, and the increased strain on EUCOM facilities expected under the troop augmentation program had to be faced. These are described in detail below.

91. General Orientation Problems

In July General Eddy, CG, USAREUR, called the attention of his subordinate commanders to the dangers of psychological warfare directed at USAREUR troops. A survey of radio listening habits had revealed that between 55 and 60 percent of the men owned radios; that about 35 percent listened daily to German broadcasts; that 15 percent listened to non-German European broadcasts; and that 5 percent listened to English-language broadcasts emanating from behind the Iron Curtain. This survey highlighted both the importance of an effective Army information program and the need for the continued interest of all officers in conveying to the soldier the problems of the command and how he could help solve them.[2] In

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[1]For a concise description of these facilities, see EUCOM Annual Narr Rept, 1949, Chap. XI. SECRET.

[2]CG USAREUR's Notes for Conf with Subor Comdrs, 28 Jul 50. RESTRICTED. In SGS 337/3 (1950), Item 39.

General Eddy's opinion, there was "no excuse for any solider in USAREUR not to know why he is here, and if war comes, why he is fighting."[3] Therefore, in early September the Troop Information and Education (TI&E) Division was directed to concentrate on indoctrinating troops with the necessity for a continuous state of combat readiness.[4] As a constant reminder, General Eddy recommended that placards with statements of mission be posted in the lower hallways of all barracks in the command.[5] In addition to the effort to orient USAREUR troops, General Eddy directed that TI&E maps and clippings be posted in the dayrooms of the Labor Service companies. The TI&E Division also worked in cooperation with the Labor Services Division on a program for the Labor Service troops.[6]

92. Orientation of Incoming Troops

Although the actual increase in command strength during 1950 was comparatively slight,[7] much thought was given to the orientation and training of incoming troops. As the bulk of the new troops were expected to arrive in the command with little or no training, plans were made to bring these men up to USAREUR levels in the shortest possible time. No reduction in the standards of training and conduct was contemplated, and subordinate commanders were directed to raise them wherever possible.[8] It was recognized that achieving this goal would be difficult because the reinforcements were expected to include a large number of draftees and

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[3]Comments by Gen Eddy at Post Comdrs Conf, 25 Sep 50. In SGS 337/1 (1950), Vol. II, Item 175a.

[4]IRS, Maj Gen Daniel Noce, USAREUR COFS, to C/TI&E, 13 Sep 50. In SGS 322.01 (1950), Item 37.

[5](1) Memo, Lt Gen M. S. Eddy, CG USAREUR, for COFS, 13 Oct 50, sub: Inspection Notes, Berlin Military Post, SECRET. In SGS 333 (1950), Vol. II, Item 129. (2) Memo, Lt Gen M. S. Eddy, CG USAREUR, for COFS, 23 Oct 50, sub: Inspection Notes, Wurzburg-Nurnberg Areas, SECRET. In SGS 333 (1950), Vol. II, Item 134.

[6](1) General Eddy's Notes Concerning His Visit to Posts, undated (c.19 Sep 50). UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 333 (1950), Vol. I, attached to Item 117. (2) Memo, Col McClure to Gen Noce, 13 Sep 50, sub: Action Taken on Gen Eddy's Notes. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 333 (1950), Vol. I, Item 116a.

[7]Figures in USAREUR Monthly Statistical Reports show it to have been less than five thousand men out of a total of about one hundred thousand.

[8]Ltr, Lt Gen M. S. Eddy, CG USAREUR, to comdrs of all comds directly subor to USAREUR, 16 Oct 50, sub: Standards of US Army, Europe, AG 250 SGS - AGO. RESTRICTED.

reservists, less amenable to Army life than were the professional soldiers hitherto comprising USAREUR.[9]

a. Preparations for Orientation. In order to give incoming troops a feeling of belonging in EUCOM, a broad program was planned, although by the end of the year the program had not yet gone into effect. Selected cadres were to be returned to the zone of interior to form the cores of new units. Before leaving the United States, these units were to be informed not only on their mission, but on conditions they could expect to find upon reaching their permanent stations. A guide to Germany was to be printed and distributed. Copies of post newspapers were to be sent to the training camps in the ZI. Possibly most important, a booklet on spoken German, adapted from the wartime guide but with all disparaging or hostile references to Germany or the Germans removed, was to be given wide distribution. As the year closed, Generals Handy and Eddy were writing welcoming messages to be distributed to incoming troops at the Marburg Replacement Depot as part of a kit of orientation literature, which was also to include relevant I&E bulletins, details of the educational opportunities open to the USAREUR soldier, and a map of the American Zone showing the location of all Army Education Centers.[10]

b. Manner of Reception. In addition to encouraging the development of an adequate I&E orientation program, General Eddy realized the importance of the first impressions which the newly arrived soldier would receive of Germany: "Starting at Bremerhaven and continuing through the chain to the individual's final destination, he must be made to feel at each step that his presence in the command is appreciated. Consequently, I desire that all commanders take particular steps to see that these individuals are accorded warm welcome, are processed rapidly and efficiently, and are made to feel at home as soon as possible."[11] On 20 October, General Eddy wrote a personal letter to Gen. Charles D. Canham, Commanding General, Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation, requesting him to review the steps then being taken to process new arrivals and to recommend additional measures to make them feel, as far as practicable, that they were getting personal attention and that they "belonged" to USAREUR.[12] In this connection, General Eddy also desired to reduce the amount

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[9]Minutes of HICOG-CINCEUR Monthly Conf with maj elms of EUCOM, 30 Oct 50. Comments of General Handy. In SGS 337/1 (1950), Vol. II, Item 191.

[10]Interv, M. C. Niles, Hist Div, with CWO B. G. Grover, AFI&E Div, Admin Br, 25 Jan 51.

[11]Statement by Gen Eddy at Monthly Comdrs Conf, 30 Oct 50. In SGS 330.11 (1950), Item 41.

[12]In SGS 330.11 (1950), Item 39.

of time the enlisted man had to spend in the pipeline.[13] It was found, however, that the average of five days at the Marburg Replacement Depot could not be materially reduced without interfering with the orderly processing of replacements.[14]

c. Orientation after Arrival at Permanent Station. While a general conception of the mission of the U.S. Army, Europe, and of the standards of conduct expected of him could be given in advance the soldier could not become familiar with details of life in Germany until after his arrival at his permanent station. An SOP published by the Frankfurt Military Post in late 1949 listed the following topics to be covered in orienting newly arrived soldiers; mission of the unit in the framework of the occupation mission; recreational and special services activities available; regulations on passes and furloughs; regulations on billets and unit areas; facilities for laundry, shopping, etc.; policy on promotions; religious, moral, and personal standards, including problems of venereal disease and the black market; military bearing, discipline, and dress; off limits areas; traffic problems; restaurants and taverns; protection of property from theft; weapons; vehicle registration; drivers licenses; hunting and fishing; and cooperation with German and military police.[15] This orientation was the responsibility of post and unit commanders.

93. Relations with the Germans

An important aspect of the conduct of occupation personnel concerned relations between Americans and Germans as individuals. Efforts to coordinate EUCOM and HICOG policy in this regard are described in the 1950 EUCOM Report, par. 123. They resulted in the appointment by General Handy of a EUCOM board to study the problem.

a. Recommendations of EUCOM Board. The EUCOM Board appointed by General Handy made the following recommendations:

(1) That the command, in close cooperation with HICOG, initiate a continuous educational campaign, aimed primarily at members of the occupation forces and their dependents. Stress should be laid on: (a) the lack of any reason for ill-will between Americans and Germans, since the Americans were in Germany to demonstrate a fair-minded democracy in action and the Germans were honestly trying

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[13]Gen Eddy's Notes concerning his visit to posts (Sep 50). In SGS 331.1 (1950), Vol. I, attached to Item 117.

[14]Memo, Col McClure, DCOFS for Admin, for Gen Noce, 13 Sep 50. In SGS 333 (1950), Vol. I, Item 116a.

[15]FMP, SOP on Orientation of Newly Arrived Soldiers, 1949. Incl 1 to Minutes, HMP Character Guidance Council, 30 Dec 49. Reports Control Symbol WD GPA - 89. HMPBA 726.1. In EUCOM AG Library.

to establish one; (b) the essentiality of mutual understanding and friendly relations in accomplishing this aim, and (c) gaining a working knowledge of German.

(2) The educational program should include the orientation of all personnel prior to their departure from the United States. This orientation should be repeated upon arrival at permanent station and periodically thereafter.

(3) HICOG should be requested to launch a simultaneous educational campaign directed at the German people and stressing the above points. A day-by-day report of steps taken by the command to further friendly relations should be made in German information media.

(4) USAREUR troops should be permitted to compete with Germans in all forms of authorized sports, regardless of whether bodily contact was involved.

(5) The command should publish a statement of policy, containing the following points: (a) that the morale of the occupation forces was of paramount importance and would not be sacrificed; (b) that post commanders would study requisitioned property to determine what could be released or shared; (c) that needlessly discriminatory signs should be prohibited; (d) that attendance by both Americans and Germans at athletic contests should be encouraged; and (e) that post commanders should give personal attention to the program, making full use of TI&E bulletins, post newspapers and radio stations, dependents school facilities, athletic contests, and liaison with German civic leaders.[16]

b. The Issuance of EUCOM and USAREUR Directives. A EUCOM directive embodying all of the above recommendations was issued on 4 August, and forwarded to USAREUR subordinate commanders on 8 August.[17] This action was followed on 21 September by a

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[16]Brief, Coordination of Reorientation of Army and HICOG Personnel, undated. Prepared by Brig Gen McKee, EUCOM Provost Marshal and Chairman of EUCOM Board on German-American Relations; at General Handy's request and submitted on 26 Jul 50 to VCOFS, EUCOM. SECRET. In SGS 322 Germany (1950), Item 8.

[17]EUCOM ltr to CG USAREUR, 4 Aug 50, sub: German-American Relationships. AG 000.7 GPA. RESTRICTED. 1st Ind, Hq USAREUR to Comdrs of all Comds Dir Subor to USAREUR, 8 Aug 50. AG 000.7 GPA - AGO. RESTRICTED.

USAREUR letter on spoken German classes which directed the expansion of the language instruction program to cover, if possible, all American personnel who did not speak German. Both on and off duty classes were to be organized. Conversational German was to be taught, and the objective of the program was to enable all personnel to gain a sufficient mastery of German to be able to converse freely.[18] As of the end of November, the Armed Forces I&E Division reported that there were 789 spoken German classes in the zone, with a total enrollment of 13,243 students, 10,826 of whom were military personnel.[19]

c. Implementation by the U.S. Constabulary. Maj. Gen. I. D. White, Commanding General, U.S. Constabulary, took immediate and vigorous action to implement the EUCOM directive. On 25 August, he directed that the following steps be taken: (1) that forums be conducted for all officers, married enlisted men, and dependents over sixteen to discuss the mission of the occupation and the need for bettering relations with the Germans; (2) that all other enlisted men be oriented through I&E classes; (3) that all personnel and dependents be encouraged to study German; (4) that units be encouraged to sponsor needy German institutions; (5) that both the German and American press stress friendly relations; (6) that commanders of outlying posts, in coordination with HICOG resident officers, schedule monthly conferences between prominent German and American personnel; (7) that both competitive sport events with the Germans and German attendance at Constabulary athletic contests be encouraged; and (8) that each battalion sponsor a GYA group or German scout troop within its kaserne.[20] In November, General White was able to report that, with minor exceptions, his program had been well received by both Germans and Americans, and that his most serious problem was the lack of funds with which to defray the expense of entertaining Germans at official and semi-official functions.[21]

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[18]USAREUR ltr to Comdrs of all Comds Dir Subor to USAREUR, Attn: TI&E Officers, 21 Sep 50, sub: Spoken German Language Classes. AG 352 TIE - AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[19]Ltr, C/AFI&E Div to President of EUCOM Board (German-American relations), PMD, 18 Dec 50, sub: Progress Report, German-American Relations. RESTRICTED. In SGS 322 Germany (1950), Item 62a.

[20]Ltr, Maj Gen I. D. White, CG USCON, to Comdrs of all USCON Units, 25 Aug 50, sub: German-American Relationships. AG 000.7 GA - 1. In SGS 322 Germany (1950), Item 26a

[21]Ltr, Maj Gen I. D. White, CG USCON, to Lt Gen M. S. Eddy, CG USAREUR, 10 Nov 50. In SGS 322 Germany (1950), Item 50a.

d. Armed Forces I&E Survey. In an effort to determine what the attitude of the occupation forces towards the Germans really was, the Armed Forces Information and Education Division was directed to make an attitude research survey of troop opinions on the occupation of Germany. A preliminary report, based on a subsample of five hundred enlisted men, indicated that USAREUR soldiers were anything but unfriendly toward the Germans. Their personal contacts with the Germans were largely with German girls: nine tenths had gone out with German girls, two thirds during the week preceding interview, and three-fifths were either "going steady" with a German girl or had done so. The other major source of contact was the German workers: about two thirds of those surveyed had worked with or supervised German employees of the Armed Forces, and about half considered them good workers. A majority had developed more favorable attitudes toward the Germans since arriving in the command, and they seemed more likely to accept favorable stereotypes of the Germans than unfavorable ones. Two thirds favored closer relationships as a means of creating better understanding, but only one quarter thought that most Germans were really friendly to Americans. While four fifths could speak or understand some German, most of them had picked it up informally and believed that an Army program of teaching German to all soldiers would be worthwhile. There was little support for turning back requisitioned facilities to the Germans, but a majority favored allowing German guests or sharing facilities, joint athletic competition, and close relationships between American and German children through scout camps or the German Youth Activities (GYA). Despite this evidence of a friendly and open-minded attitude toward the Germans, there was little indication that the GI's accepted either the stock German protestations that they had been tricked by Hitler or German justifications for the war. Significantly, three quarters were opposed to letting Germans work out their own political problems. Although optimistic about the chances of eventually democratizing the average German, most thought this had not yet been accomplished.[22]

e. Action by the Armed Forces I&E Division. The Armed Forces I&E Division actively supported the American-German goodwill drive by giving it full coverage in the Stars and Stripes, over the American Forces Network, and in I&E bulletins and orientation courses. On 16 August, Stars and Stripes carried a banner headline on the drive. The brief story, across the top of page one, summarized the aims of the EUCOM policy. A statement by High Commissioner McCloy promising his support was also

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[22]EUCOM AFI&E Div, Attitude Research Sec, 7700 TI&E Gp, Attitude Research Preliminary Report No. 108: Troop Opinions and the Occupation of Germany, 4 Oct 50, pp. iv, v. RESTRICTED. In SGS 350.09 Germany, B/P for Item 47.

quoted. This article was reproduced by the AFI&E Division and distributed to all new arrivals in Germany. In addition to giving full coverage to steps taken by EUCOM to promote German-American good will, Stars and Stripes added a daily German lesson to its regular features and expanded its coverage of German news. As the year closed, the I&E Division was drafting a bulletin entitled "You and the German People," which was intended to be the basic orientation on German-American relations.[23]

f. General Eddy's Position. Both General Eddy and General Handy considered the attitude of the troops toward the German people so important that statements setting the tone on this subject were to be submitted for their personal approval before issuance. General Eddy, while giving the policy his full support, was equally insistent on realism. He pointed out that the main issue, which could not be dodged, was that American soldiers were in Germany as the armed forces of a foreign nation.

> If I were trying to tell a soldier in a few words how he should behave toward the Germans, I would tell him simply to be himself, to be a good American soldier. Sound public relations, whether at home or abroad, stem fundamentally from being a good Army. If we know our jobs as soldiers and behave decently and as respectable representatives of the American people, the Army will stand the best chance of having good relations with people, no matter where we may be stationed. If our troops behave (so far as possible) as nearly as they could be expected to [sic] at home, the problem of German-American relations is substantially solved.... If our troops do act as good American soldiers, the Germans will be very likely to react favorably.[24]

A critique of the draft TI&E bulletin, "You and the German People," mentioned above, indicated not only General Eddy's thinking on the program but also the lines of its future development. The critique expressed doubt that friendship could or should be the goal of a deliberate effort, but stressed the importance of mutual respect and the practical military and political reasons for encouraging

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[23](1) "EC Opens American-German Good-Will Drive," Stars and Stripes, August 16, 1950, p. 1. (2) Ltr, C/AFI&E Div to president of EUCOM Bd (German-American Relations), PMD, 18 Dec 50, sub: Progress Report, German-American Relations. RESTRICTED. In SGS 322 Germany (1950), Item 62a.

[24]Memo, Gen Eddy for Gen Noce, 16 Nov 50, sub: Draft of EUCOM Information Bulletin, "You and the German People." RESTRICTED. In SGS 322 Germany, Item 61a.

improved relations. It was made quite clear, however, that the dual task of occupation and preparing for combat precluded any extensive missionary work.[25]

g. German-American Relationships Program. The EUCOM Dependents School Division was also used to implement the U.S. policy of establishing better relations with the German population. This included teacher participation in German community activities and pupil participation through planned exchange of school visits, attending programs at German schools and inviting German children to American programs, joint sports, discussions, and GYA activities, taking part in local festivals, and making excursions to places of historical interest. Parents held programs on German-American relations, invited Germans to P.T.A. meetings, and scheduled talks by HICOG representatives on the German people, their schools, and customs.[26]

94. Marriage to German Nationals

Although the basic EUCOM policy that American personnel could marry German nationals three months prior to departure from the theater remained unchanged during the period,[27] two important events required its modification. The first was the extension of all tours of duty for six months; the second, the passage of the Internal Security Act.

a. Extension of Tours of Duty. The extension of all overseas tours of duty for six months raised the problem of handling applications for marriage which had been submitted before 25 July. Initially, it was decided that approval granted prior to 25 July would not be withdrawn, but that all other requests would be processed with due regard for the new rotation policy.[28] This rule was later relaxed. All applications which had been submitted prior to 25 July were processed without regard to the new rotation dates, and personnel were returned to the United States

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[25]Ibid., Tab B.

[26](1) IRS, D/DSD to D/P&A, 1 Dec 50, sub: Educational Campaign on German-American Relationships. RESTRICTED. In DSD files, No. GPA 000.7. (2) Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with R. Stutzman, DSD Hist, 15 Dec 50.

[27]EUCOM Cir 3, 1950.

[28]Cable SX - 1459, USAREUR sgd Huebner to Mil Posts, 1st Inf Div, USCON, 28 Jul 50. RESTRICTED.

within three months after marriage.[29] (See 1950 EUCOM Report, par. 47c.)

b. Impact of the Internal Security Act. The Internal Security Act, which became law on 23 September, prohibited the entry into the United States of any persons who had been members of the Nazi Party or its affiliated organizations. Pending clarification of this ambiguous phraseology and a specific listing of organizations which were to be considered affiliates of the Nazi Party, U.S. consulates suspended the issuance of immigration visas. Inasmuch as command policy prohibited approval of marriage to a German who was denied entry into the United States, approval of marriage applications was also suspended for a time.[30] On 26 October, the P&A Division stated that there were 572 applications for marriage to Germans under consideration. The division recommended that an arrangement with American consulates be worked out whereby commanders could be advised prior to the approval of an application whether the alien fiancée concerned would be considered eligible for a visa.[31] This recommendation was approved,[32] and a EUCOM letter outlining the new procedure was issued on 15 November.[33] Despite this solution, the command was still faced with the problem of dealing with several couples who had been married prior to the passage of the Internal Security Act and whose wives were not eligible for entry into the United States. This problem was still pending as the year closed and the soldiers concerned were remaining in the command until their cases were settled.[34]

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[29](1) Ltr, Gen T. T. Handy, CINCEUR, to Gen J. Lawton Collins, COFSA, 11 Oct 50. In SGS 291.1 (1950), Item 34. (2) EUCOM ltr, to CG's, USAREUR, USAFE, 7966 EUCOM Det, COMNAVFORGER, 15 Nov 50, sub: Marriage. AG 291.1 GPA - AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

[30]Ltr, Gen Handy to Gen Collins, 11 Oct 50. In SGS 291.1 (1950), Item 34.

[31]IRS, C/N 4, P&A to EUCOM SGS, 26 Oct 50 (3 Oct 50), sub: Policy of Servicemen Marrying German Nationals. In SGS 291.1 (1950), Item 44.

[32]Ibid., C/N 5, EUCOM SGS to P&A, 31 Oct 50.

[33]EUCOM ltr to CG's, USAREUR, USAFE, 7966 EUCOM Det, COMNAVFORGER, 15 Nov 50, sub: Marriage. AG 291.1 GPA - AGO.

[34]Interv, M. C. Niles, Hist Div, with SFC Gerald H. Baldwin, Hist Div, Jan 51.

95. Dependents

a. Number of Dependents in the Command. Throughout 1950, the number of dependents in the command gradually increased, as follows:[35]

	Individuals		Families	
	Total	DA & HICOG	Total	DA
January	40,616	31,817	17,678	11,800
February	40,057	31,169	18,193	12,566
March	40,452	31,676	18,271	12,702
April	40,344	31,540	18,122	12,564
May	40,829	31,986	18,142	12,579
June	40,994	32,161	18,161	12,596
July	40,980	32,169	18,147	12,633
August	41,422	32,365	18,243	12,656
September	42,869	33,592	18,465	13,154
October	43,528	34,169	18,173	12,996
November	43,432	34,174	18,924	13,582
December	44,337	34,904	19,043	13,565

The age distribution remained fairly constant. At the end of December there were 19,894 dependents over seventeen years of age, 8,222 between six and sixteen, 7,057 between three and five, and 9,164 two years old or under.[36] The presence of this large number of dependents was of great concern to the command because of the tense international situation. In the event of an invasion of Germany, they would be a primary responsibility of the Army that could greatly interfere with combat effectiveness.

b. Reasons for Permitting Dependents to Remain in Europe. In October, General Eddy, in a memorandum addressed to General Handy, stated his view that the advantages of allowing dependents to remain in the command outweighed the disadvantages. He said:

> For ten years the armed forces have been in varying degrees of emergency. A large number of our officers and enlisted personnel have been separated from their wives and children much of that time. We cannot revert to the spartan life of field soldiers with every international crisis and still retain our integrity and morality as an Army. In the changed world of today, we should accustom ourselves to the atmosphere of tension that surrounds us

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[35] Compiled from USAREUR Monthly Stat Repts, Jan - Dec 50. RESTRICTED.

[36] Ibid., especially Dec 50.

and seek as normal an existence as possible. This includes the right to have our dependents with or near us if this is at all reasonable. Whether an individual will accept the risks and inconveniences of this should, in general, be up to him. Until some method of frequent rotation to the United States is established for our forces overseas, we must continue some arrangements for dependents. I am convinced that to do so will act more as a spur to efficiency and morale than as a detriment.[37]

General Handy concurred in this view and subsequently wrote to General Collins, the Army chief of staff, that, in his opinion, dependents should be permitted to remain in the command unless and until the situation clearly indicated war in the near future. He based his decision not only on the "moral, morale, and stabilizing influence of dependents in the command," but also on the psychological effect that returning dependents would have on the Germans and other Western Europeans, who, he thought would then leap to the conclusion that we were abandoning them to the Russians. General Handy further mentioned the practical difficulties, chiefly in terms of housing, that would be involved if dependents were sent home and then at a later date permitted to return to the command.[38]

c. Concurrent Travel to EUCOM. Because of the housing shortage, discussed below, consideration had been given in 1949 to suspending concurrent travel of dependents to EUCOM.[39] By the fall of 1950, with the added prospect of troop augmentation, the situation had become so acute that the Department of the Army was requested to suspend concurrent travel of dependents, effective 1 January 1951.[40] Since no decision was forthcoming by the end of the year, General Handy wrote personally to General Collins requesting immediate action.[41]

96. Billeting and Housing

a. Troop Accommodations. During the year, there was little actual change in the standard of troop accommodations. However,

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[37]Memo, Lt Gen M. S. Eddy, CG USAREUR, for Gen Handy, 13 Oct 50, sub: Decrease of Burden Imposed on EUCOM by Dependents. In SGS files.

[38]Ltr, Gen T. T. Handy, CINCEUR, to Gen J. Lawton Collins, COFSA, 1 Jan 51. SECRET. In SGS 510/1 (1951), Item 1.

[39]EUCOM Annual Narrative Rept, 1949, Chap. XI, par. 10.

[40]Cable SX - 3130 to DA, referred to in IRS, SGS EUCOM to P&A, 26 Oct 50, sub: Coordinated Travel. SECRET. In SGS 510/1 (1950), Item 49.

[41]Ltr, Gen T. T. Handy to Gen J. Lawton Collins, COFSA, 1 Jan 51. SECRET. In SGS 510/1 (1951), Item 1.

plans to reinforce the command led to the prospect of an acute shortage of barracks, which General Handy proposed to meet in four ways: (1) by increasing the troop density in casernes; (2) by developing plans for cantonment-type construction; (3) by accelerating the turnover of IRO casernes to the Army; and (4) by starting essential rehabilitation of available casernes immediately.[42] Revised standards for troop accommodations, in line with this program were published on 25 September.[43] These standards reduced the authorized squad room space from seventy to fifty square feet per man, and set a minimum of forty square feet. Double deck beds were to be used; recreational and administrative space was to be reduced; messes, and barber and tailor shops, were not to be in barrack space; attic space was to be utilized; and all company supply activities were to be placed in basements.[44]

b. Family Quarters. Throughout the year the command was troubled by a shortage of family housing. Families were housed, sometimes for long periods, in transient hotel billets or in dependents centers at Bad Mergentheim, Bad Kissingen, and Chiemsee.[45] The causes of this shortage lay in part in the rising number of dependents in the command, in part in the redeployment of tactical units which led to congestion in particular areas, and in part in the policy of not requisitioning family-type dwellings from the German economy except in cases of urgent military necessity.[46] During 1950, only one such dwelling was requisitioned.[47] It was planned at the beginning of the year to alleviate the shortage by renovating and furnishing substandard requisitioned property, by converting excess troop-type billets into apartments, and by building new apartments.[48] In order to prevent the backlog of unhoused families from becoming unmanageable and still permit concurrent travel of dependents to the command, a limitation on incoming shipments of noncommissioned officers was requested during the early part of the year. For this reason, at the end of May the command was 3,500 understrength in

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[42]Ltr, Gen T. T. Handy, CINCEUR, to Mr. John J. McCloy, U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, 13 Sep 50. SECRET. In SGS 620 (1950), Vol. II, Item 112g.

[43]Change 3, Engr Bul No. 4, 25 Sep 50. See EUCOM CINC's Wkly Staff Conf Rept No. 37, 17 Oct 50, par. 7. RESTRICTED.

[44]Ibid.

[45]Cable S - 1315, CINCEUR sgd Handy to COFSA, 30 Jan 50. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 620 (1950), Vol. I, Item 12.

[46]Cable S - 1297, CINCEUR sgd Handy to COFSA, 27 Jan 50. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 620 (1950), Vol. I, Item 11.

[47]Ltr, Maj Gen D. N. Noce, COFS, to Roger N. Baldwin, American Civilian Liberties Union, 18 Dec 50. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 322 Germany, Item 62.

[48]Cable S - 1297, CINCEUR sgd Handy to COFSA, 27 Jan 50. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 620 (1950), Vol. I. Item 11.

this category. Prior to the Korean conflict, the average of married NCO's in the entire Army was 67 percent, in contrast to the command average of 31 percent. Thus, even filling existing vacancies would have created a housing problem of major proportions. To add to this, in implementation of the career guidance program, an additional 1,500 NCO vacancies were created in EUCOM.[49] At the end of the year, with the expected troop augmentation counterbalanced by the smaller number of men who were bringing their dependents with them and a lower percentage of married NCO's, the situation was still in a state of flux. However, as stated above, the Department of the Army had been requested to suspend concurrent travel.

c. Temporary Quarters. Dependents awaiting assignment of permanent quarters were housed in transient billets, for the most part on the posts to which they were assigned. Dependents housing centers at Bad Mergentheim, Bad Kissingen, and Chiemsee were also utilized, particularly for large families or those with children under five years of age. The number of dependents in these centers reached its peak in August, but fluctuated during the year, as follows:[50]

January	493	July	704
February	408	August	728
March	324	September	706
April	390	October	369
May	464	November	140
June	528	December	62

Conditions in these centers were well below American standards of housing. During the month of August at the Bad Mergentheim center there were seventy-eight rooms in each of which was one mother and two children, and eighteen single rooms in which one mother was living with three children.[51] General Noce, characterizing these conditions as "too much like a rabbit hutch," ordered that doors be driven between the rooms in the hotel so the families could be spread out.[52] In addition to the crowded conditions at the dependents housing centers, the cost of living was higher. A survey made in October of expenses at Bad Mergentheim revealed that it cost the average family of 3.3 persons forty-five dollars more per month for food alone to live at a dependents housing center than in permanent

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[49]Memo, H.A.D. (Col H. A. Doherty, C/Pers Svcs Br, P&A Div) for Col Murphy (D/P&A), 26 May 50, sub: Housing Policy for Female Heads of Families. In SGS 620 (1950), Vol. I, Item 70.

[50]Figures from USAREUR Monthly Stat Repts, Jan - Dec 50. SECRET.

[51]Telecon, Gen Noce with Gen Gross, 31 Aug 50. In SGS 620 (1950), Vol. II, attached to Item 107.

[52](1) Ibid. (2) Memo for rcd, Gen P. E. Gallagher, 31 Aug 50. In SGS 620 (1950), Vol. II, Item 107a.

quarters, if the sponsor were an enlisted man eating at a Class A mess; if the sponsor were eating at a special mess, the additional cost was sixty-five dollars.[53]

97. Problems of Negro Personnel

a. Impact of SR 600 - 629 - 1. On 16 January 1950, the Department of the Army published SR 600 - 629 - 1 on the utilization of Negro manpower in the Army. This special regulation stated the policy of the Department of the Army as "equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the Army without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin. All manpower will be utilized to obtain maximum efficiency...." Commanders were vested with the responsibility for seeing that this policy and its provisions were "unreservedly accepted." USAREUR immediately launched a study to see if its policies were in line with the regulation. On 26 January, the Deputy Director of the OPOT Division recommended that the Kitzingen Training Center retain its mission and continue to process reinforcements since the on-duty education program and courses of training and instruction for Negro replacements, although segregated, provided for better than equal treatment of Negro soldiers.[54] General Huebner approved these recommendations as being within the spirit and intent of the regulation, and stated that he would assume responsibility for any repercussions arising from the continuance of the program.[55] On 23 August, however, Lt. Col. Marcus H. Ray, EUCOM Adviser on Negro Affairs, in a comprehensive memorandum on the status and treatment of Negro troops, stated that inasmuch as the Kitzingen Training Center made assignments only to Negro units, the segregated replacement center was a violation of DA policy.[56] It was therefore decided that, effective on 1 January 1951, Negro soldiers would be processed through the 7720 EUCOM

53(1) IRS, C/N 2, P&A to SGS, 30 Oct 50 (21 Oct 50), sub: Comparison between Expenses of Families. In SGS 620 (1950), Vol. II, Item 140b. (2) Memo, G.P.W. (Lt Col G.P.Winton,SGS) for Col Snyder, Col Edwards, Col O'Neill, Gen Eddy, 31 Oct 50. In SGS 620 (1950), Vol. II, Item 140c.

54Memo, Col Zwicker, Deputy Dir, OPOT, for COFS, 26 Jan 50, sub: Impact of SR 600 - 629 - 1, 16 Jan 50, Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Army, on Certain Activities in this Command. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 291.2 (1950), B/P, Tab H.

55Memo for rcd, Col Zwicker, Deputy Dir, OPOT, 27 Jan 50, sub: Attached Memorandum for COFS. In SGS 291.2 (1950), B/P, Tab H.

56Memo, Lt Col Marcus H. Ray, EUCOM Adviser on Negro Affairs, for COFS USAREUR, 23 Aug 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 291.2 (1950) Item 17.

Replacement Center at Marburg.[57]

b. Assignment of Negro Personnel. In December, the P&A Division recommended that priority of assignment of Negro personnel arriving in the command be to Negro units up to battalion size and that Negro individuals with qualifications excess to needs of Negro units or not included in such units be assigned without regard to race.[58]

c. On-Duty Education Program. Although it had initially been decided to continue the on-duty training of Negro personnel at Kitzingen, the increased urgency of combat training after 25 June caused the OPOT Division to recommend phase-out of the mandatory on-duty education program for Negro personnel by 1 April 1951, and enrollment of Negro personnel requiring basic education (through fifth grade) in either basic education centers or unit schools. Unit commanders would continue to be authorized to conduct on-duty classes above the eighth grade level during the winter months, but most of this training was to be on off-duty time.[59] This recommendation received the tentative approval of General Eddy, but was disapproved by General Handy.[60] OPOT then recommended that the on-duty educational program be reduced to the eighth grade level effective 1 January 1951, and that basic training for Negroes be accomplished at unit level.[61] At the end of the year a draft training circular had been prepared which required participation in the program through the eighth grade. This circular also transferred the responsibility for training instructors from the Kitzingen Training Center to the Troop Information and Education Division.[62]

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[57](1) Memo, Col McClure, DCOFS for Admin, for Gen Noce, 11 Sep 50. In SGS 291.2 (1950), attached to Item 24. (2) Staff Study, D/OPOT for COFS USAREUR, undated (c.6 Oct 50), sub: Review of Policies Affecting the Training and Utilization of Negro Personnel in this Command. In SGS 291.2, B/P. (3) IRS, C/N 2, D/P&A to DCOFS for Opns, EUCOM, 8 Dec 50 (4 Dec 50), sub: Utilization of Negro Personnel in EUCOM. In SGS 291.2 (1950), Item 33.

[58]IRS, C/N 2, D/P&A to DCOFS for Opns, EUCOM, 8 Dec 50 (4 Dec 50), sub: Utilization of Negro Personnel in EUCOM. In SGS 291.2 (1950), Item 33.

[59]Staff Study, D/OPOT for COFS, USAREUR, no date (c. 6 Oct 50), sub: Review of Policies Affecting the Training and Utilization of Negro Personnel in this Command. In SGS 291.2, B/P.

[60](1) Ltr, Lt Gen M. S. Eddy, CG USAREUR, to Lt Gen C. R. Huebner, 25 Oct 50. In SGS 291.2 (1950), Item 28a. (2) IRS, D/OPOT, EUCOM to CINC EUCOM, 7 Nov 50, sub: On-Duty Education for Negro Personnel. 353. In SGS 291.2 (1950), Item 32. This IRS mentions a decision by the CINC to continue on-duty educational program beyond the fifth grade level.

[61]IRS, D/OPOT to EUCOM CINC, 7 Nov 50, sub: On-Duty Education for Negro Personnel. 353. In SGS 291.2 (1950), Item 32.

[62]IRS, D/OPOT to DCOFS for Opns, 22 Dec 50, sub: On-Duty Education. 352. In SGS 352 (1950), Vol. II, Item 129a. The circular was published on 13 Feb 51 as EUCOM Training Circular No. 1, sub: On-Duty Educational Training.

The decision to continue the on-duty education program through the eighth grade meant that the bulk of Negro troops arriving in the command would be receiving this training. Early in the year, a survey of nearly six hundred Negro reinforcements showed the following spread in educational level:[63]

Grades 1 - 5	17.0 percent
Grades 5 - 8	70.7 percent
High School and above	12.3 percent

d. Negro Representation on Courts-Martial. In his memorandum of 23 August, Colonel Ray suggested that Negroes sit as members of courts-martial in all cases where Negroes were defendents, in order to avoid any suspicion of racial prejudice influencing the decisions. He pointed out that, even when no prejudice was involved, Negroes would have a better understanding of the problems of their race than would whites. This recommendation was rejected because Congress had recently reaffirmed the provisions of the Fourth Article of War requiring members of courts-martial to be appointed by virtue of such qualifications as judicial temperament, age, training, and experience.[64]

98. The Army Education Program

The educational program for soldiers was one of many activities supported as an adjunct to morale. This was done through off-duty classes offered by the Army Education Centers, the University of Maryland, and the United States Armed Forces Institute (USAFI). Soldiers who did not have at least a fifth-grade education were required to attend on-duty classes.

a. Basic Education Students. During 1949, over three thousand EUCOM students had been graduated from the fifth grade,[65] and, as of the end of January 1950, 2,116 soldiers were enrolled in the basic education program carried on at three basic education centers and in unit schools. The average cost of raising

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[63]Memo, Col R. W. Zwicker, Deputy Dir, OPOT, for COFS, 21 Feb 50, sub: Results of Grade Placement of Negro Reinforcements. 352. In SGS 291.2 (1950), Item 4.

[64]IRS, C/N 2, JA USAREUR to SGS, 31 Aug 50 (24 Aug 50), sub: Review of Policies Affecting the Training and Utilization of Negro Personnel in this Command. In SGS 291.2 (1950), Item 21. The IRS refers to Public Law 506, 81st Congress, entitled "Uniform Code of Military Justice."

[65]Ltr, EUCOM COFS to Gl, USA, 29 May 50, sub: Soldiers with less than Equivalent of 5th Grade Education. AG 350 TIE. In SGS 342 (1950), Vol. I, Item 57.

an individual to the fifth grade level was estimated at $273, figured on an average of 280 hours of instruction per student and including the cost of pay, food, clothing, etc., during the time in which the soldier was lost to Army duty.[66] This drain on command efficiency prompted a request to the Department of the Army not to ship to the command soldiers who needed basic education. As of the end of May, there were more than 1,800 such soldiers in the command, about 1,600 of whom were attending school. A survey of 340 men at basic education centers had revealed that 71 percent had AGCT scores below 70; and that 59 percent reported having completed grades above the fifth. It was therefore urged that greater care in recruiting be exercised and that prospective enlistees be given an attainment test unless their educational status was definitely known.[67]

99. Recreation Facilities

a. Existing Facilities. During 1950 military personnel could make good use of their free time regardless of their tastes. Every military post had its Special Service clubs, offering entertainment ranging from dances and community sings to the use of hobby shops and darkrooms. At midyear there were 91 such clubs, with 374 hostesses. Attendance for the first quarter of the year had approached a million and a half men. Special Services libraries all over the zone were also widely used. Attendance averaged 300,000 per month, and book circulation over 200,000. In addition, many soldiers were assigned on temporary duty at the Garmisch and Berchtesgaden reereation centers, which offered excellent entertainment and sports facilities at low cost.[68] General Eddy was so impressed with the quality of these recreation facilities that, following his inspection trips to the military posts, he requested the Public Information Division (PID) to write a story for stateside publication on the role that Special Service clubs played in the command. The high attendance, no liquor rule, and hobby shops were to be stressed as contributing to the high disciplinary standards and good morale of USAREUR troops.[69]

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[66]Ltr, Gen T. T. Handy, EUCOM CINC, to Hon. Carl D. Perkins, House of Representatives, 10 Mar 50. In SGS 352 (1950), Vol. I, Item 28.

[67]Ltr, EUCOM COFS to G1, USA, 29 May 50, sub: Soldiers with less than Equivalent of 5th Grade Education. AG 350 TIE. In SGS 352 (1950), Vol. I, Item 57.

[68]Briefing for Congressman Leroy Johnson by Col Murphy, D/P&A, 31 Jul 50. In SGS 337 Briefings (1950). For a fuller description of these facilities, see the EUCOM Annual Narrative for 1949, and the 1950 Annual Narrative of the Special Activities Division.

[69](1) Gen Eddy's Notes Concerning His Visit to Posts (c.19 Sep 50). SECRET. In SGS 333.1 (1950), Vol. I, attached to Item 117. (2) IRS, Lt Col Yeuell, Admin Asst to CG USAREUR, to PID, 7 Oct 50, sub: Feature Story re: Special Activities Division. In SGS 333 (1950), Vol. II, Item 28.

b. Possible Curtailments. Although command recreation facilities were the "most luxurious, complete and well-operated facilities of any unit in the world" at the end of the year, it was recognized that troop augmentation would necessitate a lowering of existing standards. At the request of the chief of staff, the Special Activities Division initiated a study of the impact of additional troops on these facilities.[70] The division assumed that existing facilities would not be reduced, but that they would accommodate more troops than formerly, forcing some reduction in standards and service. It estimated that most Special Service Clubs could take care of about 30 percent more men and most snack bars could serve from 20 to 30 percent more men without falling below acceptable standards. The division expected that greater use would be made of dayrooms, snack bars, and small exchanges where the reduced standard would not permit new installations.[71]

100. Athletic Program

a. Participation in Army-Wide Competition. EUCOM policy, established by General Clay, was that teams would be sent from the command to Army-wide competitions only in major sports where the level of play was the same as that of the command and where the timing coincided with its programs. In early 1950, this policy was modified for both EUCOM and USAREUR. The over-all EUCOM athletic program was to be conducted so far as possible at levels and within dates which would facilitate command participation in service-wide competition. The value of each program to players and spectators was, however, to be given primary consideration. USAREUR was to send teams or individuals to Army-wide and interservice competitions whenever the EUCOM program in the sport concerned was completed by a date that would make the champion available to be sent. When the level of play differed from that of EUCOM leagues, an adjustment satisfactory to the commander of the organization furnishing the champion was to be made.[72] During 1950, USAREUR teams participated in several Army-wide competitions; the EUCOM boxing team won the all-Army championship on 31 December.[73]

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[70] IRS, COFS USAREUR to D/P&A, 14 Sep 50, sub: Reduction of Standards for Recreation Facilities re Additional Housing for New Troops in Theater. SECRET. In SGS 353.8 (1950), Vol. III, Item 207a.

[71] Ibid., C/N 3, D/SAD to D/P&A, 2 Oct 50. SECRET. In SGS 353.8, Vol. III, Item 211a - 1.

[72] (1) IRS, D/P&A to COFS, 5 Jan 50, sub: 1950 Army-Wide Basketball Championships. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 353.8 (1950), Vol. I, Item 1b. (2) Ibid., C/N 2, SGS EUCOM to D/P&A, 25 Jan 50. In SGS 353.8, Vol. I, Item 8a.

[73] Stars and Stripes, January 1, 1951, p. 9.

b. Participation in International Competition. In January 1950, the Department of the Army forwarded to EUCOM an invitation to the U.S. armed forces to become a member of the International Council for Military Sports, inasmuch as EUCOM would be expected to represent the armed forces if the invitation were accepted. General Clay had directed withdrawal of the U.S. forces from this council in 1948, ostensibly because furnishing teams interfered with the occupation mission. However, according to officers in the P&A Division who were in the command at the time, General Clay's real reasons were that U.S. forces play few sports in common with other countries, and often these have conflicting rules; that participation was of no value to U.S. troops, and of doubtful or negative value in creating international good will; and that U.S. forces were called upon for a disproportionate share of support of international meets.[74] After study by the Special Services Division, which concluded that there were some sports in which international competition would be of benefit to the command, EUCOM recommended acceptance of membership in the council, but reservation of the right to consider separately each event sponsored by the council in relation to the requirements of the mission and activities of the command.[75] In any event, clearance was to be obtained from the office of the chief of staff before an athletic team could leave the command.[76]

c. EUCOM Championship Competition. At its January meeting, the EUCOM Athletic Board approved a plan for organization into five athletic conferences: USAFE, USFA, 1st Division, U.S. Constabulary, and Military Posts. USNAVFORGER personnel were to compete as part of the command in which they were lodged. Throughout the year the problem of an equitable system for determining EUCOM championships was under much discussion. The EUCOM Athletic Board considered it in several meetings, but USAFE nonconcurrence made agreement impossible. USAFE wanted to continue the interservice USAFE-USAREUR play-off.[77] This deadlock continued throughout the year, and, with one exception, no championship games were played. This exception, a baseball play-off between the Rhine-Main Rockets, USAFE champions, and the Heidelberg Hawks, representing USAREUR, in which the Hawks

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[74]Memo, D/P&A for DCOFS for Admin, 27 Jan 50, sub: International Council for Military Sports. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 353.8 (1950), Vol. I, Item 9b.

[75]EUCOM CINC's Wkly Staff Conf Rept No. 8, 21 Feb 50, par. 2. UNCLASSIFIED.

[76]Memo for rcd, Lt Col E. W. Edwards, Asst to DCOFS, for Admin, 18 Apr 50. In SGS 353.8 (1950), Vol. I, Item 60.

[77]Staff Study, Brig Gen R. V. Rickard, C/Sp Svcs, 21 Mar 50, sub: Representation into EUCOM Sports Championships. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 353.8 (1950), Vol. I, Item 35.

were victorious, was played as a championship rather than an exhibition only because of USAFE insistence.[78] Toward the end of the year, General Handy requested Generals Cannon and Eddy and Admiral Wilkes to meet with the Commanding General, U.S. Forces, Austria, to decide whether or not there should be a championship football game in EUCOM, and, if so, to determine rules for selecting the competing teams and eligibility.[79]

d. Competition with German Nationals. Although the EUCOM board on German-American relations had recommended athletic competition with German nationals regardless of whether bodily contact was involved or not and the EUCOM letter embodying these recommendations had called upon commanders to encourage participation between Germans and Americans in all forms of athletics, careful study was given to the implications of this policy. It was recognized that differing rules or styles of play in the same sport might give rise to unpleasant incidents. Therefore, in October 1950, it was decided that occupation personnel were to be authorized to compete with German nationals only if no remuneration to individual contestants resulted from the events. Boxing contests were to be conducted under the International Amateur Boxing Association rules, wrestling contests under the National Collegiate Association rules, and other sports contests under the rules established for EUCOM interservice competitions.[80]

101. Central Welfare Funds

The recreational programs of the command continued to be supported by EUCOM Central Welfare Funds. Toward the end of the year, the prospect of troop augmentation led to the decision to cut welfare fund expenditures to essentials in order to have funds available for new requirements.[81] Throughout the year, income equalled or exceeded expectations, largely due to higher rates of profits on EES and liquor sales than had been expected. Studies were initiated in both cases to determine the advisability of cutting the profit margin, but in each case it was concluded

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[78](1) Telecons, Noce with Douglas, Noce with Col Wiggins, Noce with Douglas, 8 Sep 50. In SGS 353.8 (1950), Vol. III, Item 205b. (2) Stars and Stripes, September 18, 1950.

[79]Memo, Gen T. T. Handy, CINCEUR for Gen Cannon, Gen Eddy and Adm Wilkes, 26 Oct 50, sub: Football Championship Games. In SGS 353.8, Vol. III.

[80](1) IRS, C/N 4, D/P&A to SGS EUCOM, 26 Oct 50, sub: Participation with German Nationals in Sports. AG 353.8 GPA. In SGS 353.8 (1950, Vol. III, Item 224c. (2) Ibid., C/N 5, SGS EUCOM to P&A, 31 Oct 50. In same file, Item 225d.

[81]IRS, Compt to CG USAREUR, 12 Oct 50, sub: Analysis of Post Central Welfare Funds. In SGS 334 CWB, Item 42, Tab B.

Table 1 -- Comparison of Estimated EUCOM Central Welfare Fund Income and Expenditures for Fiscal Years 1950 and 1951

	Fiscal Year 1950		Fiscal Year 1951	
Total Estimated Income		$17,100,442		$13,163,990
Balance Prior Year		2,278,342		4,723,990
Total During Year		14,822,100		8,440,000
U.S. Officers and NCO Club	$ 3,620,000		$ 3,000,000	
EUCOM Exchange System	10,344,163		5,000,000	
EUCOM Motion Picture Service	360,000		425,000	
Reimbursable Dayroom Furnishings	161,702		000	
Miscellaneous	336,235		15,000	
Total Estimated Expenditures		12,376,452		10,260,540
EUCOM Special Services	3,117,625		113,899	
Armed Forces I&E	412,760		000	
American Forces Network	309,766		320,672	
Blue Danube Network	113,884		64,000	
Dependents Schools	390,015		727,117	
Welfare Fund Personnel	23,408		11,640	
Command Grants:				
USAREUR Welfare Fund	5,974,710		6,728,609	
USAFE Welfare Fund	1,372,741		1,527,630	
USFA Welfare Fund	661,543		766,973	

Total Reserves		4,723,990		2,903,450
General Reserves	4,723,900		2,110,250	
Dependents Schools	000		135,000	
Contingencies	000		658,200	

Source: SGS 334 CTB, B/P for Item 36b, Tab H.

that the prospect of rising costs made any decreases inadvisable.[82] Table 1 shows the EUCOM Central Welfare Fund budgets for the fiscal years 1950 and 1951.

102. Health of the Command

The health of the command, as reflected by the military non-effective rate, continued to be good. Throughout the first six months of the year, the USAREUR rate was well below that of the U.S. Army in the United States. The following tabulation shows the rate throughout the year:[83]

	Total	Disease	Injury
January	22.6	19.1	3.5
February	23.7	20.2	3.5
March	22.4	19.3	3.1
April	20.4	17.7	2.7
May	19.4	16.3	3.1
June	19.5	15.7	3.8
July	20.6	16.5	4.1
August	20.7	16.9	3.8
September	20.3	16.7	3.6
October	20.4	17.3	3.1
November	21.0	18.0	3.0
December	20.2	17.0	3.2

103. Venereal Disease Rate

During 1950, venereal disease (VD) rates, after an initial plunge, continued at a relatively constant level, well below those

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[82](1) Memo, D/P&A for VCOFS, 19 Apr 50, sub: Minutes of 19 Mar 50 EUCOM Exchange Council Meeting. AG 334 GPA. In SGS 334 EES, Item 19. (2) Ltr, VCOFS to Chm, EUCOM Exchange Council, 29 Aug 50, sub: High Profits by EUCOM Exchange System. In SGS 334 EES, B/P for Item 42, Tab D. (3) Rept, Financial Conditions of EUCOM Exchange System, no date (submitted to 27 Sep mtg of EUCOM Exchange Council). In SGS 334 EES, B/P for Item 42, Tab D. (4) IRS, C/N 3, US Off and NCO Club, QM Div, to SGS USAREUR, 22 Aug 50 (21 Jun 50), sub: Overall Price Structure of Class VI Supplies. In SGS 435, Item 26. See Also SGS 435, Items 27 and 28.

[83]Compiled from USAREUR Monthly Stat Repts, Jan - Dec 50. RESTRICTED. Average daily noneffective rate per 1000 equals $\frac{(1000)\ (\text{days lost})}{(\text{Mean strength for period})\ (\text{days of period})}$. The rates include all personnel excused from duty due to disease or injury.

of 1949. The following tabulation shows the comparative rates:[84]

	Average		White		Negro	
	1949	1950	1949	1950	1949	1950
January	121	64	113	63	208	76
February	107	46	93	45	233	56
March	93	51	76	48	206	78
April	82	48	64	41	212	101
May	111	44	84	39	309	79
June	102	48	75	44	308	82
July	79	51	68	45	167	97
August	68	49	59	43	146	98
September	66	43	59	38	124	82
October	65	40	60	35	107	82
November	57	43	49	37	120	96
December	58	43	53	38	94	80

The improvement in the Negro rate is particularly striking. The validity of these rates is, however, open to some question. Some VD cases were treated outside of Army medical channels and went undetected and unreported. A surprise physical check by the U.S. Constabulary revealed sixty-five previously unreported cases of gonorrhea and three of syphilis among the 12,454 men inspected. As a result, General White planned to continue such checks at irregular intervals.[85] Despite these unavoidable inaccuracies, the downward trend of reported VD cases can be assumed to reflect an actual downward trend in VD incidence.[86]

104. Discipline in the Command

a. Serious Incidents. The rate of serious incident in 1950 was slightly higher than in 1949, although not significantly so. The rate is based on the number of incidents reported as involving

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[84]Compiled from USAREUR Monthly Stat Repts, 1949 - 50, RESTRICTED. Annual rate = $\frac{(\text{"New" VD cases in period})(1000)}{\text{Mean strength for period}} \times \frac{52 \text{ weeks}}{\text{No. of weeks in period}}$

[85]Ltr, Hq USCON to Gen Huebner, CG, USAREUR, 14 Feb 50. In SGS 720 (1950), Item 6g - 1.

[86]Ltr, Gen F. W. Milburn, Actg CG USAREUR to Gen I. D. White, CG, USCON, 10 Mar 50. In SGS 720 (1950), Item 16.

U.S. military personnel in crimes against persons and property. The following tabulation shows both the rate and number of incidents, month by month, for 1950:[87]

	Rate per 1000 Troops			Number of Incidents		
	Average	White	Negro	Total	White	Negro
January	0.94	0.92	1.06	77	67	10
February	0.68	0.67	0.86	56	48	8
March	0.78	0.78	0.75	64	57	7
April	0.89	0.89	0.88	72	64	8
May	1.11	1.10	1.20	89	78	11
June	0.94	0.84	1.66	72	56	16
July	0.68	0.68	0.67	54	48	6
August	0.89	0.91	0.78	71	64	7
September	0.82	0.86	0.55	67	62	5
October	1.06	1.09	0.89	89	81	8
November	0.95	0.94	1.00	79	70	9
December	0.95	0.92	1.22	81	70	11

b. Courts-Martial. The total number of courts-martial per month declined somewhat during 1950. The variations, however, were not significant. For instance, the increase in summary courts-martial in August has been traced to the substitution of this form of disciplinary action for company punishment by one battalion and to strict enforcement of limits imposed on passes by the Kitzingen Training Center.[88] The command totals for the year were as follows:[89]

	Total number of Courts-Martial	Summary Courts-Martial	Special Courts-Martial	General Courts-Martial	Cases awaiting General Courts-Martial
January	1,585	1,096	424	65	47
February	1,417	1,014	361	42	31
March	1,699	1,165	487	47	38
April	1,379	977	355	47	46
May	1,482	1,058	360	64	25
June	1,418	1,042	335	41	25
July	1,287	939	315	33	28
August	1,397	1,047	321	29	43
September	1,069	781	240	48	35
October	1,394	990	366	38	34
November	1,309	948	318	43	24
December	1,391	1,033	335	23	32

[87]Compiled from USAREUR Monthly Stat Repts, Jan - Dec 50. CONFIDENTIAL.

[88]IRS, P&A to SGS, 6 Oct 50, sub: Summary of Court-Martial Cases for August 1950. In SGS 250.4, Vol. II, Item 132c - 1.

[89]Compiled from USAREUR Monthly Stat Repts, Jan - Dec 50. RESTRICTED.

c. Admittance of German Press Representatives to Courts-Martial. A significant development during the year was the admittance of the German press to court-martial trials in which Germans were involved either as plaintiffs or defendents. The U.S. Constabulary initiated this practice and, through combining the invitations to attend with such amenities as serving coffee beforehand and furnishing interpreters familiar with court-martial procedure to assist the German press in their understanding of the trials, was successful in obtaining generally good and sympathetic coverage of courts-martial.[90] In September, Heidelberg Military Post successfully experimented with a standing operating procedure on court-martial attendance by German nationals. This procedure provided for inviting all accredited German correspondents within the area to courts-martial where Germans were involved, and making available not only interpreters but also, where technical legal problems were involved, a qualified legal officer to explain the legal points at issue and the law and procedure followed by courts-martial. As a result of this experiment, within a short time the German press had carried three very complimentary stories, indicating that the German reporters present had understood the court-martial procedures and regarded them as just.[91] The policy of admitting German reporters to courts-martial where Germans were involved was therefore extended throughout the command. Berlin was excepted, however, since East Berlin newspapers habitually used court-martial stories to ridicule and slander the American form of government, and it was believed that granting admittance to reporters would intensify this tendency. Therefore, Berlin continued its former procedure of informing the German victim of the results of the trial by means of a personal letter.[92]

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[90](1) Ltr, Maj Gen I. D. White, CG USCON, to Lt Gen M. S. Eddy, CG USAREUR, 11 Sep 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 250.4, Vol. I, Item 126a. (2) IRS, JA EUCOM to SGS thru PID, 20 Sep 50, sub: Publicity re Incidents Involving US and German Personnel. AG 250 JAG. In SGS 250.4, Vol. I, Item 127a.

[91]Memo, Col Damon M. Gunn, USAREUR JA, for COFS, 25 Oct 50, sub: Monthly Conference with USAREUR Commanders, German Press Coverage of Trials by Courts-Martial. In SGS 337.3 (1950), Item 55.

[92](1) Memo, G.P.W. (Lt Col G.P.Winton), Office of the Chief of Staff, to Lt Col Snyder, Lt Col Edwards, Col O'Neil, 1 Dec 50. In SGS 250.4, Vol. II, attached to Item 156. (2) IRS, COFS to PID, 4 Dec 50. In SGS 250.4, Vol. II, Item 156.

CHRONOLOGY TOPICS

USAREUR

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CHRONOLOGY

Note: This chronology is based on information contained in the foregoing chapters, references to which are made following each item. For example, (I, 3), denotes Chapter I, paragraph 3. The items are listed chronologically under topics arranged in alphabetical order.

I. Alerts

14 June	Work started on revision of EUCOM and USAREUR orders for simple and reinforced alerts. (II, 27a).
1 September	Top Secret general alert order revised. (II, 26a).
29	EUCOM published revised orders for simple alerts. (II, 28).
11 November	USAREUR published revised order for simple alert. (II, 27b).
20	USCON order for simple alert revised. (II, 27a).
	USAREUR issued revised order for reinforced alert. (II, 27a).
—	Plan drawn up on railroad evacuation of technical supplies in case of simple alert. (II, 29).
1 December	Revised USAREUR and EUCOM orders for simple and reinforced alerts effective. (II, 27b).

II. Bridges

18 June	Alleged preparations for blowing up Rhine bridges and highways revealed by AP release; this information not confirmed by EUCOM authorities. (II, 51c).
19 October	Construction and rehabilitation of certain Rhine River bridges recommended by Engineer Division. (II, 46c).

2 November	EUCOM informed by HICOG that German authorities had approved protection of vital bridges by German Laender police. (II, 58).
24	Conference on protection of bridges by German Laender police held by EUCOM representatives and German Ministers of Interior. (II, 58).

III. Demolition Plans

-- February	Strategical railroad demolition plan set up, to be completed 1 May 1951 by Seventh Army. (II, 51e).
24 March	Directive issued on emergency nontactical demolition plans. (II, 51a).
21 August	Lack of coordination between EUCOM and USFA on strategic demolition plans noted by DA Chief Engineer. (II, 51d (2)).
31 August	OPOT instructed to coordinate strategic demolition plan with USFA. (II, 51d (2)).

IV. Emergency Planning

31 March	Resume of emergency plans developed by staff medical officers of three services on joint hospitalization and evacuation of patients completed. (II, 48).
31 May	Conference held with HICOG officials on cooperation between resident officers and post commanders in emergency. (II, 57c).
2 June	Individual emergency action plan prepared by Erding Air Base. (II, 26c).
12	Erding Air Base emergency plan disapproved by General Eddy. (II, 26c).
19 October	Letter issued on joint operation of ports in wartime. (II, 52).

V. German-American Relations

23 June	Board of officers appointed by General Handy to study problem of improving German-American relations. (IV, 93c).

4 August	Directive issued by EUCOM embodying recommendations of Board on German-American Relations. (IV, 93c).
16	Opening of German-American good-will drive announced by Stars and Stripes. (IV, 93g).
23 September	Internal Security Act adopted, prohibiting entry of members of the Nazi Party, or its affiliated organizations into the United States. (IV, 94b).
15 November	EUCOM letter issued outlining new procedure for approval of applications for marriage to Germans. (IV, 94b).

VI. Highway Net

18 July	Survey by military posts, USCON, and 1st Infantry on military highway net completed. Eighteen requests for inclusion of roads approved by Engineer Division. (II, 47).

VII. Labor Services

30 March	Training program for Labor Service units and personnel published. (III, 87).
19 July	All Labor Service technical units and liaison detachments authorized carbines. (III, 88).
22 August	Labor Services Division established as a special staff division, Headquarters USAREUR, with the Chief, Labor Services Division, responsible to the Chief of Staff, USAREUR, for staff supervision of Labor Services and Industrial Police. (I, 20a).

VIII. Line of Communications (LOFC)

8 June	Letter of instruction issued to 7966 EUCOM Detachment, charging it with establishment and operation of the line of communications across France. (II, 23a).
6 November	Agreement for line of communications across France completed. (II, 22).

IX. Logistics

18 April	USAREUR Logistic Planning Board established to review logistic planning forecasts and five-year construction plans for submission to EUCOM. (I, 19).
11 May	Study completed by Logistics on designation of service areas to rear of Army areas. (II, 25).

X. Noncombatants

31 March	EUCOM revised noncombatant evacuation orders. (II, 36).
	USAREUR published noncombatant evacuation orders. (II, 36).
14 April	Bulletin of instruction and information to noncombatants revised to prevent undue alarm. (II, 38).
12 May	Discussion held between General Noce and Director of Office of Administration, HICOG, concerning evacuation of HICOG personnel. (II, 57c).
22 November	EUCOM NEO (noncombatant evacuation order) 1 - 50 drafted, revising USAREUR and EUCOM previous evacuation orders. (II, 39).
13 June	U.S. embassy in London advised that in an emergency, 57,170 noncombatants from EUCOM would be evacuated to England. (II, 40).
1 December	EUCOM NEO 1 - 50 published. (II, 39a).
9	Posts instructed to train flying squads for protection of noncombatant columns against Communist interference. (II, 43).

XI. Officers

2 March	Command of USAREUR during the temporary absence of Lt. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner, from 2 March to 29 April, assumed by Maj. Gen. F. W. Milburn. (II, 20c).

12 August	Lt. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner departed from the command. (II, 20c).
18	Command of USAREUR assumed by Lt. Gen. Manton S. Eddy. (II, 20c).
1 September	All Organized Reserve Corps units in U.S. Zone redesignated from Reserve Training Units to Organized Reserve Corps Control Groups (Table of Organization and Equipment Mobile Designation), Organized Reserve Corps Control Groups (Voluntary Reserve), Organized Reserve Corps Control Groups (Regular Army), Organized Reserve Corps Control Groups (Honorary Reserve), and Organized Mobilization Designation Detachments. (I, 15).
7 December	Department of the Army requested by General Handy to grant a considerable extension of authority for this command in reserve affairs. (III, 82).

XII. Organization

1 January	Responsibility for employee suggestion and cash awards program transferred from Personnel and Administration Division to the Office of the Comptroller. (I, 18a).
16	Findings and recommendations of board of officers on simplification of administration at the company level submitted to USAREUR chief of staff. (I, 17b).
1 February	Each post commander directed by USAREUR to establish an Office of the Post Comptroller, similar in nature to that office already established in USAREUR headquarters. (I, 17a).
3 March	Approved findings and recommendations of the board of officers on simplification of administration at the company level disseminated to all subordinate commanders of USAREUR. (I, 17b).
10	Troop Information and Education Division established as a special staff division and subordinate command of USAREUR. (I, 20a).
1 April	Responsibility for direct supervision of reports control system transferred from the Adjutant General Division to the Office of the Comptroller. (I, 17c).

25 May	Secretary, General Staff, Headquarters, USAREUR, redesignated as Secretary of the General Staff, Headquarters, USAREUR. (I, 20a).
15 June	7854 Military Intelligence Detachment combined with 7829 MID Platoon to form the new 7880 Military Intelligence Detachment in Berlin. (I, 14c).
19	New system for assigning reports control responsibilities and jurisdictions set up. (I, 17c).
15 August	Rheinau Transportation Center established at Mannheim-Rheinau and assigned to the Transportation Division, USAREUR. (I, 20b).
17	Sandhofen Ordnance Automotive Center established at Sandhofen and assigned to the Ordnance Division, USAREUR. (I, 20b).
22	USAREUR Central Welfare Fund redesignated as USAREUR Welfare Fund. (I, 20a).
13 September	Reorganization of command and balancing of forces in the interest of operational readiness recommended by General Eddy. (II, 50).
20	7879 Publications Depot and Records Center established at Hoechst and assigned to the Adjutant General Division, USAREUR. (I, 20b).
	7750 Examining and Computing Unit, USAREUR, at Heidelberg, discontinued. (I, 20b).
16 October	6th Infantry Regiment activated, assigned, less Service Company and 3d Battalion, to Berlin Military Post, and attached to 1st Infantry Division. Personnel and equipment of 3d Battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment, plus attachments, transferred from 1st Infantry Division to 3d Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment. (I, 14d).
17	Commanding generals of USCON and 1st Infantry Division instructed by USAREUR to assemble enlisted cadres at Kitzingen Training Center on 5th and 11th of November and to issue necessary orders to provide for shipment of these cadres, as organized units, to Fort Benning, Georgia, for inclusion in the new 4th Infantry Division. (I, 14e).

1 December	16th Constabulary Squadron inactivated and personnel transferred to 6th Infantry Regiment. (I, 14d).
2	USAREUR military posts, including all assigned units, reassigned to EUCOM Headquarters. (I, 14h).
15	66th CIC Detachment and 7756 Audit Agency reassigned from USAREUR to EUCOM. (I, 14h).

XIII. Security

14 July	USAREUR and EUCOM internal security directive revised. (II, 57a).
	Letter issued on employment of German law enforcement agencies. (II, 57c).
10 August	Movement of Army Security Agency, Europe, to London for security reasons directed by COFSA. (II, 54).
15 September	Amendment of USAREUR internal security directive concerning role of resident officers and land commissioners in emergency proposed by HICOG executive secretary. (II, 57c).
27	Letter on German law enforcement agencies suspended pending restudy of evacuation plans by HICOG and EUCOM officials. (II, 57c).
6 October	Action on HICOG request for amendment to USAREUR internal security directive deferred by General Noce pending McCloy's approval of agreement developed by HICOG-EUCOM working committee. (II, 57c).
26	G-4, U.S. Army, suggestions on mine barriers reported to be impracticable under current conditions by EUCOM Engineer Division. (II, 56).
27	Establishment of Army Security Agency, Europe, in London authorized. (II, 54).
24 November	Letter published on use of firearms on guard duty within France. (II, 23).
29 December	Draft revision of internal security directive (EUCOM) completed. (II, 57d).

XIV. Seventh Army

24 November	U.S. Seventh Army activated. 1st Infantry Division and U.S. Constabulary, less its headquarters elements, relieved from assignment to USAREUR and reassigned Seventh Army. (I, 14g).
1 December	Seventh Army activated as a field Army. (II, 49).
21	Operational and planning role of Seventh Army in traffic control during emergency, as distinct from policy function of Traffic Control Committee, clarified. (II, 44).

XV. Tanks

24 April	Tank replacement pool established at Butzbach Ordnance Shop. (II, 55d).
10 May	Study on obtaining serviceable tank firing facilities requested by chief of staff, USAREUR. (III, 65a).
1 August	Steel tracks substituted for rubber tracks on EUCOM tanks for operational readiness. (II, 55d).
22	Medium rather than light tanks for 350th Infantry Regiment requested by USFA. (II, 55b).
20 September	DA authority to equip command with heavy rather than medium tanks requested by EUCOM. (II, 55).
5 October	Sandhofen Ordnance Automotive Center approved as location for tank replacement pool. (II, 55d).
6	Seventeen medium M-26 tanks issued to USFA by EUCOM. (II, 55b).
11	Study on EUCOM heavy tank requirements requested by General Eddy. (II, 55a).
1 November	Need for heavy tanks in the command indicated by USCON and 1st Infantry study on heavy tank requirements. (II, 55a).

XVI. Training

1 January	USAREUR Training Circular Number 1, prescribing program for year, published. (III, 61).
17-20	1st Division CPX - Exercise SLEET - held. (III, 72).
23-26	U.S. Constabulary CPX - Exercise SHOEPAC - held. (III, 72).
6 February	Decision made to confine secondary mission training program to rifleman replacements. (III, 74).
20 February-31 March	Phase II Instructor's Course in Atomic Energy held, with 151 Army, 34 Air, 5 Navy and 28 civilian personnel attending. (III, 84c).
1 April-31 July	Phase II, Atomic Energy Indoctrination Program held. (III, 84d).
1 August-15 November	Phase III, Atomic Energy Indoctrination Program held. (III, 84e).
12 October	Cooperation of U.S. High Commissioner for Germany in obtaining additional training areas requested by General Handy. (III, 66).
6 December	USAREUR Training Circular Number 12 prescribing program for training in battle indoctrination published. (III, 68).

XVII. Troops

16 January	SR 600-629-1 on utilization of Negro manpower published. (IV, 97a).
6 April	Plans for assignment of U.S. Engineer troops to BAOR discussed with British. (II, 51d(1)).
23 August	Memorandum to chief of staff, recommending major changes in treatment of Negro personnel, submitted by Lt. Col. Marcus M. Ray, Adviser on Negro Affairs. (IV, 97).
13 September	TI&E Division directed to concentrate on indoctrinating troops with necessity for continuous state of combat readiness. (IV, 91).

20 October	General Canham, CG, BPE, requested by General Eddy to review processing of new arrivals and recommend additional measures to give them a sense of "belonging" to USAREUR. (IV, 92b).
22 November	USAREUR SOP issued, covering the reception to be accorded new units arriving in the European Command. (I, 14f (1)).
31 December	All-Army championship won by EUCOM boxing team. (IV, 100a).

XVIII. U.S. Constabulary

16 February	U.S. Constabulary made responsible for alerting tactical troops at Grafenwohr. (II, 35).
— May	Headquarters elements of USCON reorganized under new tables of organization and equipment. (I, 14b).

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

Note: The following glossary of abbreviations used in the text and footnotes of this report does not include abbreviations contained in SR 320-50-1, 28 October 1949, and its C1 of 22 August 1950.

A-Hour	Time hostilities begin
AP	Associated Press
Asst	Assistant
ASAE	Army Security Agency, Europe
BAOR	British Army of the Rhine
BPE	Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation
C/	Chief
CCFFA	Commander in Chief, Forces Françaises en Allemagne (French Forces in Germany)
Ch	Chapter
CINCEUR	Commander in Chief, European Command
CINCNELM	Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
C/N	Carrier Note
CWB	Central Welfare Board
CWF	Central Welfare Fund
COMGENSAC	Commanding General, Strategic Air Command
COMNAVFORGER	Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Germany
COUSNAB	Commanding Officer, U.S. Naval Advanced Base
D/	Director
DAF	Department of the Air Force
DCINC	Deputy Commander in Chief

ECA	Economic Cooperation Administration
ETOUSA	European Theater of Operations, United States Army
EUCOM	European Command
FMP	Frankfurt Military Post
FSR	Field service regulation
FTX	Fall training exercise
GAO	General alert order
Gp	Group
GYA	German Youth Activities
HICOG	High Commissioner for Germany
IRO	International Refugee Organization
JAMAG	Joint American Military Advisory Group
"K" List	List of key scientists
Lbr Svc Div	Labor Services Division
LCT	Landing Craft Tank
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
Med	Medical
MID	Military Intelligence Detachment
MTB	Machine Tabulating Branch
N-Hour	Time of implementation of noncombatant evacuation order
NAVFORGER	Naval Forces, Germany
NEO	Noncombatant evacuation order
O&E	Organization and Equipment
OCAFF	Office of the Chief, Army Field Forces
OPOT	Operations, Plans, Organization and Training

ORA	Order for reinforced alert
OSA	Order for simple alert
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OTB	Occupational troop basis
P&A	Personnel & Administration
Plns	Plans
R-Hour	Time of execution of order for reinforced alert
Rcd	Record
RGD	Rhine General Depot
SAD	Special Activities Division
Sgd	Signed
SHAEF	Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters, Atlantic Powers in Europe
Stf	Staff
Sub	Subject
Sup Docs	Supporting Documents
TCC	Traffic Control Committee
USAFE	United States Air Forces in Europe
USAREUR	United States Army, Europe
USCON	United States Constabulary
U.S. Emb	United States Embassy
USFA	United States Forces, Austria
USFET	United States Forces, European Theater
USNAVFORGER	United States Naval Forces, Germany
VCOFS	Vice Chief of Staff
Vol.	Volume
Wkly Staff Conf	Weekly Staff Conference

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

Accompanying USAREUR Report*

Folder Number	Description of Contents
1	USAREUR General Orders 1-51, 1950.
2	USAREUR Staff Memorandums 1-10, 1950.
3	USAREUR Circulars, 1950.
4	USAREUR Circulars, 1950.
5	USAREUR Circulars, 1950.
6	USAREUR Circulars, 1950
7	USAREUR Training Circulars 1-12, 1950
8	USAREUR Troop Assignments 1-37, 1950.
9	Selected USAREUR Directives:

1950

24 March	Nontactical Demolition Plans. Secret. AG 388.3 GOT-AGO.
30	Training of Labor Service Units Restricted. AG 353.01 GOT-AGO.
5 April	Activation, Reorganization, and Redesignation of Certain U.S. Constabulary and Medical Division Units. Unclassified. AG 322 GOT-AGO.
10	Reorganization of Certain Constabulary Units. Restricted. AGAO-1 322 (7 Mar 50) G1-M.
15	Activation, Reorganization, and Redesignation of Certain U.S. Constabulary and Medical Units. Unclassified. AG 322 GOT-AGO.
2 June	Information Bulletin for Noncombatants. Secret. AG 461 GOT-AGO.
15	Activation, Reorganization, and Redesignation of Certain Units in the European Command. Restricted. AG 322 GOT-AGO.

*Limited distribution.

Folder Number	Description of Contents	
	1950	
	22 June	Activation and Inactivation of Certain Ordnance Units in the European Command. Restricted. AG 322 GOT-AGO.
	14 July	Employment of German Law Enforcing Agencies under Internal Security Directives. Secret. AG 371.2 GOT-AGO.
		Internal Security Directive - European Command. Confidential. AG 371.2 GOT-AGO.
		Internal Security Directive - USAREUR. Confidential. AG 371.2 GOT-AGO.
	19	Weapons and Weapons Training for USAREUR Labor Service Technical Units and Liaison Detachments. Restricted. AG 353.01 GOT-AGO.
	6 September	Internal Security Directive - USAREUR. Confidential. AG 371.2 GOT-AGO.
	29	Orders for Simple and Reinforced Alerts. Secret. AG 371.2 GOT-AGO.
	9 October	Emergency Information for Military Posts. Secret. AG 371.2 GOT-AGO
	12	Orders for Simple and Reinforced Alerts. Secret. AG 371.2 GOT-AGO.
10	Selected USAREUR Directives:	
	1950	
	19 October	Assignment of Responsibilities in Ports Used by Forces of the European Command in Wartime. Confidential. AG 091.311 GLD-AGO.
	28	Command Post Exercise for 1st Infantry Division. Unclassified. AG 354 GOT-AGO.
	18 November	Practice Alerts. Confidential. AG 371.2 GOT-AGO.
	20	Orders for Simple and Reinforced Alerts. Secret.
	1 December	EUCOM NEO 1-50. Secret. AG 371.2 GOT-AGO.
11	Miscellaneous Selected Documents:	
	1950	
	31 March	Quarterly Narrative Training Letter. Unclassified.
	30 June	Quarterly Narrative Training Letter. Unclassified.

Folder Number	Description of Contents
1950	
1 November	Battle Indoctrination. Unclassified. DATC No. 13.
6	Agreement between the United States and The Republic of France regarding the Establishment and Operation of a Line of Communication across France. Secret.
24	Use of Firearms on Guard Duty within France. Secret.

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