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The FIRST YEAR

PART V



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OCCUPATION FORCES IN EUROPE SERIES

1945-1946

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF HISTORIAN EUROPEAN COMMAND

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HEADQUARTERS
EUROPEAN COMMAND
Office of the Commander in Chief

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SUBJECT: Occupation Forces in Europe Series


TO : All concerned

1. The War Department has directed that the history of the military occupation of Germany and Austria in World War II be recorded and interpreted as the events transpire. The agency which is responsible for preparing this history is the Office of the Chief Historian, European Command.

2. The Occupation Forces in Europe Series, publication of which was begun in 1947, consists of a series of studies, monographs, and narratives of the history of the occupation. From time to time, the Occupation Forces in Europe Series will include a summary volume giving a narrative history of the occupation. All the studies or volumes published in the Series for the year 1945-46 or a subsequent year make up the official history of the occupation for that year.

3. Each publication in the Occupation Forces in Europe Series is based upon a thorough study of the correspondence, directives, and other documents relating to the subject. It serves also as a digest and summary of the pertinent passages of the reports of operations which are made periodically to the Office of the Chief Historian by all staff divisions and major units of the European Command. Each publication in the Series, before being issued, is reviewed by the staff divisions or subordinate command whose responsibilities indicate a primary interest in the subject matter.

4. All persons to whose attention these publications come are invited to forward to the Office of the Chief Historian, European Command, APC 757, their comments and criticisms, in order to make available all facts from which a definitive history may be prepared in the War Department.


LUCIUS D. CLAY
General, USA
Commander-in-Chief

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The First Year of the Occupation



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OFFICE OF THE CHIEF HISTORIAN
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(*) Contributors to this volume .

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF HISTORIAN
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1946 - 1947

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PART FIVE

A Survey of Occupation Problems

Chapter X

GENERAL ASPECTS OF THE OCCUPATION

THE TERMS OF SURRENDER AND THEIR ENFORCEMENT

1. The Meeting at Reims.

Although surrender terms had long been the subject of study by the European Advisory Commission, the brief document signed at Reims at 0241 hours on 7 May 1945 was drawn up at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. It dealt solely with immediate military requirements. All forces under the German military control were required to cease operations at 2301 hours on 8 May. The German High Command accepted responsibility for issuing and carrying out the surrender orders. No ships, vessels, or aircraft were to be scuttled or damaged. In the event of noncompliance, the Allies were to take such punitive or other action as they considered appropriate.

2. The Signing at Berlin.

A number of circumstances led to the signing of a second instrument of surrender. Although the Supreme Commander had no

intentions of accepting a surrender merely on behalf of the Western Allies, German propaganda was keyed to exaggerate the slightest appearance of a rift between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. Hundreds of German soldiers had surrendered in the propaganda-nourished expectation of being able to join with United States forces in an attack to the east. The Soviet authorities were disturbed by the 5 May broadcasts of Admiral Dönitz, while surrender negotiations were under way, in which he urged Germans to continue the war against the Soviet forces and at the same time not to resist the Allied forces in the West.(1) The Soviet Command was reassured by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 8 May that the unconditional surrender had been made jointly to the Soviet Union and the Allied forces and that it would be actively enforced on this basis, if resistance continued.(2) The surrender had been signed at Reims because this afforded the quickest end to hostilities and further loss of life. General Eisenhower was eager to cooperate with the Soviet leaders in scheduling a second ceremony in Berlin, and the official German and Allied surrender parties were flown there on 8 May. Although the document states that the surrender was signed "on the 8th day of May 1945," the actual signing took place a short time after midnight, which made it early in the morning of 9 May. This surrender act was signed at a slightly higher level than the earlier act had been. At Reims, General Jodl had signed on behalf of the German High Command, with General Souslaparov and General Sevez as the Soviet and French witnesses and Lt. Gen. W.B. Smith

representing the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. At Berlin General Admiral von Friedeberg, Wehrmacht High Command Chief Keitel, and Luftwaffe Chief Stumpff signed on behalf of the German High Command, Air Marshal Tedder for the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and Marshal Zhukov on behalf of the Soviet High Command. Generals Spaatz and de Lattre-Tassigny, of the U.S. Strategic Air Forces and the First French Army, respectively, were witnesses.

3. Terms of the Berlin Surrender.

At the request of the Soviet leaders, the terms of the 8 May document were more specific in regard to the disarmament of the German forces. A clause was added requiring the defeated forces "to disarm completely, handing over their weapons and equipment to the local Allied commanders or officers designated by representatives of the Allied Supreme Command," and the clause forbidding damage of ships, vessels, and aircraft was extended to cover machines of all kinds, armaments, apparatus, "and all the technical means of prosecution of war in general." Apart from these modifications the basic terms were unchanged.

4. The Full Scope of the Surrender Terms.

a. Only the primary conditions of military surrender were set forth in the documents of 7 and 8 May. In both of these acts of surrender a later expansion was implied in a paragraph which stated that they were without prejudice to, and would be superseded by, any

general instrument of surrender imposed by, or on behalf of, the United Nations and applicable to Germany and the German armed forces as a whole.

b. The Berlin Declaration signed on 5 June 1945 by General Eisenhower, Marshal Montgomery and General de Lattre-Tassigny defined in greater detail military requirements of the surrender and dealt also with Allied prisoners of war, displaced persons, and war criminals. It left the door open for further specifications of requirements of political, administrative, economic, financial, and military nature. Under the Berlin Declaration the four governments undertaking the occupation of Germany assumed supreme authority, including all powers possessed by the German Government, the High Command, and any state, municipal, or local government. It was announced, moreover, that they would determine the boundaries of Germany or any part of Germany and the status of Germany or of any area then included in German territory.(3)

c. Further agreement on the terms to be imposed on Germany was reached in the Berlin Conference of July-August 1945, and resulted in the "Potsdam Agreement," signed by President Truman, Prime Minister Attlee, and Marshal Stalin on 2 August 1945. After the Potsdam Declaration, the Allied Control Authority was established and became the machinery for the military government of Germany.

d. Additional requirements imposed upon Germany as a result of her defeat were announced in Military Government Proclamation No 2, issued on 20 September 1945.

5. Prevention of Further Aggression.

The Allies attempted to prevent further aggression by the German nation by requiring complete disarmament and disbandment of the German forces, the surrender of all war equipment and material, including naval shipping and aircraft, and the dismantling or conversion of all plants used in the production of war material. The Allies sought control of the German economy and future production and research, prevention of development of a war potential, destruction of Nazi organizations, including the Nazi Party and all its arms and agencies, removal from office of all Nazis, apprehension and trial of war criminals, and elimination of militarism from German education.

6. Controls over the German Economy.

The future of the German economy presented a two-fold problem to the Allies: first, development of war potential must be prevented; but, secondly, there must be sufficient industry to permit the nation to live. In addition to requiring industrial disarmament, the restrictive provisions of the surrender terms included transfer of merchant shipping to Allied control and prohibition of further building of sea-going ships; removal of excessive productive capacity to other countries as reparations; decentralization of German economic organization to eliminate excessive concentration of power as exemplified by cartels and other monopolistic arrangements; rigid control of production of metals, chemicals, machinery, and similar items of potential war-making

value; prohibition of the manufacture of aircraft; and control of all facilities for the generation of power. On the positive side, prompt measures were instituted to effect the repair of transport, enlarge coal production, maximize agricultural output, and make emergency repairs in housing and essential utilities. In the Potsdam Agreement, it was recommended that central administrative departments, to act under Control Council direction, be established in the fields of finance, transport, communications, foreign trade, and industry. Financial provisions required the surrender of German-held gold, silver, and platinum and of foreign notes and coins, and stipulated, among other requirements, that no Nazi property or assets should be disposed of without sanction of the Allied representatives.(4)

Specific controls over transportation and communications also were included in the surrender terms.

7. Legal and Political Reform.

The Nazi legal and judicial system was abolished and replaced by a democratic system. Local political responsibility was gradually developed. Democratic political parties, with rights of assembly and of public discussion, were encouraged. Civil rights assured by the terms of surrender, subject to the maintenance of military security, included the formation of free trade unions and freedom of speech, press, and religion. Education was freed from Nazi and militaristic doctrines and was reshaped so as to foster democratic ideas.

8. Foreign Relations and Public Safety.

By virtue of the surrender, the diplomatic, consular, and commercial relations of the German state with other states ceased to exist. Consequently the Allied representatives undertook to regulate all matters affecting Germany's international relations. The surrender terms also provided for control of travel of persons in Germany and required that no person leave or enter the country without a permit issued on authority of the Allied representatives. For the maintenance of order and for guard duties, detachments of civil police, armed with small arms only, were to be designated by the Allied representatives. Reform of the police system was envisaged by the terms of the Control Council Proclamation of 20 September 1945.

9. Problems of Persons and Property.

The complex human pattern in Germany and Central Europe, where Nazi importations of labor, wartime shifting of population, capture of Allied military personnel, and internment of a host of unfortunates in different categories had created a heritage of confusion, gave rise to a number of the surrender provisions. The German authorities and people were required to take appropriate steps to insure the safety and welfare of persons not of German nationality and to safeguard their property; to release all prisoners of war belonging to the forces of the United Nations, all other United Nations nationals under restraint, and all other persons who might be confined for political reasons or as a result of any Nazi action, law, or regulation which discriminated

on the grounds of race, color, creed, or political belief. The surrender terms provided for the transfer to Germany of German populations in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. They laid down principles for determining the status of diplomatic, consular, and other personnel and the disposition of property of neutral nations and of enemy nations assisting Germany in the war.

10. Enforcement and Application.

The surrender documents contained provisions requiring full assistance on the part of the Germans. They were to give the occupation authorities access to all records, archives, buildings, and installations, to furnish technical assistance where needed, and to supply any type of labor requested.

INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE OCCUPATION

11. Early Cooperation.

a. During the conflict, little stress was placed on the differences between the Western European and Soviet conceptions of democracy but after the fighting ended there was increasing evidence that Europe was dividing into two groups--one favoring the East and the other the West. To a certain extent the relations between these groups in Europe were a reflection of relations between the United

States and the Soviet Union. The Atlantic Charter and a series of international conferences had provided a basis for cooperation after the defeat of Germany; the European Advisory Commission prepared the basic agreements on policy for the occupation of Germany; the Council of Foreign Ministers, established after the Potsdam Conference, undertook the task of writing the peace treaties. Although major disagreements were avoided during the first year, there were misunderstandings and conflicts on many points.

b. Much of the unity displayed by the Allies during the war was due to the ability of President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin to reach agreements. Relations between the United States and Great Britain were not seriously affected by the death of President Roosevelt in April 1945. In June 1945 Prime Minister Churchill expressed great pleasure in his dealings with President Truman, saying that the latter had been most cooperative in the Venezia Giulia and Trieste negotiations.(5) Churchill admitted, however, that he was discouraged over the Polish question and had little hope of close cooperation with the Soviet Union.

12. Control Commissions.

The most vital points of contact for the Allied Governments were in the Control Commissions, the first three of which were established in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. To a large extent the Soviet Union dominated the Commissions in the Balkan countries. The Soviet military representative in each of the three capitals was the

permanent chairman and the United States and British members functioned in an advisory capacity. At the Potsdam Conference the United States asked for reorganization of these Commissions, but did not gain much influence in them. United States officials had this experience in mind when they undertook the organization of the Allied Control Authority in Berlin.(6)

13. Early Contacts between the United States and Soviet Forces.

a. Maj. Gen. Floyd L. Parks, who entered Berlin late in June to make advance preparations for the Potsdam Conference, met with considerable delay in his negotiations with the Soviet authorities, but all differences were finally resolved. The United States Sector in Berlin was occupied early in July, evacuation of United States troops from Soviet occupied territory in Germany having been previously completed at the insistence of the Soviet authorities.

b. More difficulty was encountered in entering Vienna. The Soviet authorities delayed allocation of airfield facilities there and extensive negotiations were necessary before the city was subdivided for international occupation. Gousev, the Soviet member of the European Advisory Commission, in explaining the situation in Vienna to his colleagues on 24 May 1945, stated that, in the absence of Allied documents on zones and control machinery the Red Army naturally solved in the way which appeared most expedient any practical questions which arose after the liberation of Austria.(7) Other members of the Commission were impressed with Gousev's apparent sincerity and desire to avoid further reproaches for alleged unilateral actions.

c. United States elements arrived in Vienna late in July, but it was September before the control authority was firmly established on a quadripartite basis. There were a number of shootings, arrests, and other disturbances at points where United States and Soviet forces were in contact. These incidents usually resulted in official investigations, but none of them visibly affected relations between the two nations.

14. The Emergency Economic Committee for Europe.

The Emergency Economic Committee for Europe was established in London on 2 June 1945 by the United States, Great Britain, France, and Belgium. Delegates from Norway and Czechoslovakia were present, although their governments did not officially join until later. One purpose of this group was to supplement and coordinate other organizations such as the European Coal Organization and the European Inland Transport Organization. It dealt with broad questions of policy referred to it by the governments involved.

15. Relations with the British.

Churchill's removal from office while the Potsdam Conference was in progress took the second of the three men who had directed the major war effort against the Axis Powers. There was still not much apparent change in United States-British relationships. Although the Palestine question was a difficult one for Great Britain, and Germany through her displaced persons camps became a focal point of the Jewish situation, the United States and British officials worked for both

separate and joint solutions of the problems involved. The action of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Joint United States-United Kingdom Shipping Board in taking the British liners Queen Elizabeth and Aquitania from the redeployment run touched off some anti-British and anti-lend-lease reactions among United States troops awaiting redeployment. Theater Headquarters took steps to inform the men that the removal of the ships was not a British decision alone and also to point out that Britain also had many men overseas who were anxious to rejoin their families.(9) The Soviet and Polish press charged that the British were keeping a million Germans in military units in the British Zone.

16. French Policies.

a. One explanation for French opposition to a central organization in Germany was that the French, who were not represented at Potsdam, connected the proposal with that meeting and disapproved it on the general principle that everything emanating from the Potsdam Agreement was bad. Some French statesmen, however, urged support of the Potsdam Agreement. The United States took the lead in advocating German centralization. Both Britain and the Soviet Union on a number of occasions appeared as supporters of French interests in international negotiations, causing the French public to believe sometimes that the United States opposed France while the other two nations favored her.(10) Some French political leaders considered that, if the Saar, Rhineland and Ruhr were retained by Germany and became a part of a unified and

strong Germany under the domination of the Soviet Union, it might be necessary for France to orient its policy toward the Soviet Union. Molotov, however, made it clear that the Soviet Union's chief concern was that the Ruhr should not in any way bolster a western bloc. He wanted the Soviet Union to participate in any international commission for administration of the Ruhr. He did not indicate any Soviet opposition to internationalization of the Ruhr.

b. France believed that for security reasons it should have control over the agricultural area north of the Saar, including the left bank of the Rhine through Cologne and one or two bridgeheads.(11) French Foreign Minister Bidault emphasized that control, not annexation, was desired. He feared that international control of this area might some day lead to the end of its occupation through some "majority vote" against France. He also pointed out that France wanted the Saar coal but did not desire to annex the Saar. Bidault thought the Ruhr should be under an international regime, but did not specify the nature of this regime.

17. Soviet Publicity.

During the final period of hostilities, the Soviet press carried little which would make clear to its public the scope and significance of what was happening in the West.(12) The explanatory comment that did appear hammered incessantly at the theme that Allied successes were conditioned by the role of the Red Army in absorbing all available German reserves. The surrender of the German forces in

northwest Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark was reported inconspicuously and without editorial comment in the Moscow papers for 5 May. It was buried in Izvestia under an item headed "Yugoslav Troops Take Trieste."

18. Soviet Policy Statements.

Soviet policy at the close of the war was not clearly defined, not was that of any of the other nations. In his victory message, Stalin opposed any dismemberment of the Reich. Evidently the formal cession of large parts of German territory to the Soviet Union and Poland was considered an exception to this general rule. Points of policy which were touched upon in subsequent statements from Moscow included:(13)

- a. Social reforms designed to undermine certain classes or groups in German society which had enjoyed special independence.
 - b. A radical reduction in the German standard of living.
 - c. Extensive use of German labor by the victor countries.
- No mention was made of a political framework.

19. Soviet Actions.

There were early complaints from United States officials regarding Soviet actions. It was charged that the Soviet Union endeavored to hold the western armies back, while Soviet troops occupied as much as possible of the remaining territory, and that Soviet occupation then was used to further Soviet political aims. Lack of cooperation was charged. Illustrations cited included Soviet

refusal to permit United States civil or military representatives to make a preliminary survey in Vienna, and refusal to permit early communications with the Czechoslovak Government. Soviet recognition of the Austrian Government without consultation with the United States was considered a unilateral action.

20. Boundary Adjustments.

There were no major changes in the boundaries between the United States and Soviet Zones of occupation, but the adjustment in the frontier line in the vicinity of Allendorf gave the U.S. Army exclusive right to use the 2.7-mile stretch of railway which ran from Göttingen in the British Zone to Eebra in the United States Zone, thus closing the gap in the railway line between the Bremen Enclave and Frankfurt. The agreement was signed on 17 September at Wanfried, Saxony, by Brig. Gen. W.T. Sexton, commanding the 3d U.S. Infantry Division, and Maj. Gen. V.S. Askalepov, commanding the Soviet 77th Guard Infantry Division. In the exchange of territory effected by the lateration of the frontier line between the Kreise of Witzzenhausen and Heiligenstadt, the Soviet Union received approximately four square kilometers of land east of Allendorf and the United States got approximately the same amount north of Allendorf.

21. Flights over Soviet-occupied Territory.

a. Repeated Soviet protests were received by Supreme Headquarters of violations of the border between Allied and Soviet forces

by American and British air forces and also by individual American and British soldiers. The Military Mission at Moscow reported to General Eisenhower on 10 June 1945 that-incomplete data from General Antonov for the period 1 May to 3 June listed nineteen such single and group flights at heights of from 300 to 1,500 meters. In reply General Eisenhower said that the specific instances reported were being investigated, but that similar violations on the part of the Soviet forces which had come to his attention had not been brought to the notice of the Soviet High Command since they were not considered important in a situation involving allies. He added that these could be detailed if desired. He requested the Military Mission at Moscow to pass this answer to the Soviet High Command and report the reaction. Meantime he requested from his forces as much information as possible on past Soviet violations and full reports on all future instances for possible discussion with the Soviet authorities. The air staff instructed all United States and British flying personnel to refrain from flying over or landing on Soviet controlled territory without obtaining proper clearance.

b. There was difficulty in establishing authorized air routes over Soviet-controlled territory. A corridor was granted from Stendal to Berlin, but Soviet navigators had to be picked up to supervise flights. A request of 25 June to set up immediately a daily courier service from Frankfurt, via Halle, to Tempelhof air field was refused. Requests by the Soviet Union for routine flights were

authorized immediately by the Military Mission at Moscow and it was hoped that this would encourage expedition on the part of the Soviet authorities. General Eisenhower instructed that all flights to Berlin be made only through the authorized corridor and that nonroutine flights be cleared through Supreme Headquarters.

c. When Supreme Headquarters wished to establish a regular air service from Frankfurt to Berlin with no stops en route to pick up the required Soviet navigators, the Military Mission at Moscow answered that they considered it unwise to ask clearance for scheduled air runs between Frankfurt and Berlin, as there should be access to Berlin by all means of transportation without special approval in each case. General Deane said that he had delayed asking for authority because he thought it would set a bad precedent. The request for clearance was therefore not made. For like reasons the Department of State requested General Deane to withdraw a request for clearance to Prague, stating that Czechoslovakia was a sovereign state and clearance should therefore be requested from its Government.

22. Polish Negotiations with Moscow.

a. Negotiations between the Warsaw Poles and the Soviet Union, which led to a pact and subsequently to a boundary dispute regarding the Oder-Neisse line, were conducted in April 1945. It was supposed that the Soviet Union would refuse to accept any treaty regarding German boundaries which did not recognize this line as the frontier of Poland. In justification of the incorporation of German

territory into Poland, the Soviet Union contended, first, that only the Polish population remained in Silesia and Danzig, the German population having departed; secondly, that the basic population of these areas consisted of Poles; and, thirdly, that the transfer of the areas to Polish civil administration had no relation to the question of boundaries.(14) The United States did not accept these contentions as true.

b. United States observers charged that the transfers were portrayed to the public of both the Soviet Union and Poland as straight cessions of territory. The United States adhered to the protocol of 12 December 1944, which described the Germany to be occupied as that within her frontiers as they were on 31 December 1937.(15) It was the United States assumption that Polish-occupied German territory remained enemy territory under Soviet occupation and was subject to agreements and understandings of the Allied powers with respect to occupied Germany.

23. United States Relations with the Warsaw Government.

The United States established diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity on 5 July 1945.(16) As a result of this recognition Theater Headquarters discontinued official relations with the Provisional Polish Military Mission.(17) Prior to this time the United States had received from the latter and from the Vatican appeals not to abandon to the Soviet Union any Poles or other Eastern peoples who did not wish to return to their former

homes or who sought refuge in the United States Zone of Germany.(18) The presence of large numbers of Poles who were unwilling to return to Poland proved to be one of the most complex of the displaced-persons problems. Both the United States and Great Britain organized Polish labor units to give employment to these persons. Those who wished to return to Poland were assisted in doing so, but no pressure was exerted on others.

24. United States Relations with Switzerland.

During the war the Swiss diplomatic service was charged with the protection of United States interests in Germany. At the time of the German surrender, even the Swiss Foreign Office was out of touch with many of its agents in Germany. The Swiss continued to handle routine United States matters in Germany until State Department representatives took over. Where possible, Supreme Headquarters accorded facilities to the Swiss for the discharge of these functions. After the occupation of Germany by the Allies, the principal interest of the Swiss was in the opening of the Rhine for traffic.

25. United States Relations with Belgium.

Belgium had special interests in the inland waterways, coal distribution, and other transportation. There was much need of labor in Belgium, and a program was worked out for the recruitment of workers among displaced and stateless persons.(19) The presence of King Leopold in the United States Zone of Germany resulted in a number of problems before he was provided with transportation to the Swiss border.

26. United States Relations with Denmark.

The principal concern of Denmark was the location of its southern boundary. Many persons in that country opposed any change which would take in former German territory without evacuating the German residents.(20)

27. United States Relations with the Netherlands.

When the war ended, sixteen battalions were being formed in the Netherlands for service in Germany.(21) Five battalions were serving under Supreme Headquarters Command at the end of the campaign and later were transferred to 21st Army Group.(22) At the same time, the Netherland Government was condiering raising three divisions for service in the Far East. During August and September, more than 3,000 Dutch marines were sent to the United States for training in a program designed to help the Dutch merchant fleet.(23)

28. United States Relations with Luxemburg.

On 20 May 1945 three United States officers were attached to the Luxemburg Army to advise and assist in the formation of a small armed force. They served until the end of the year.(24) The French Government agreed to the employment of a Luxemburg detachment in the French Zone of Germany under the provisions of the quadripartite agreement of 5 June 1945, which permitted occupation powers to employ auxiliary contingents from the forces of other nations which fought Germany.(25)

29. United States Relations with Finland and Certain Balkan Countries.

Stalin's proposal of 27 May 1945 to resume diplomatic relations with Bulgaria, Rumania, and Finland, and later with Hungary, brought from President Truman a statement on United States policy. In his reply to Stalin, the President agreed that the period of armistice regimes should be as short as feasible and that prompt recognition should be given to efforts by these former enemy countries to align themselves with Allied democratic principles. The reply continues:(26)

By its elections and other political adjustments Finland has shown genuine devotion to democratic principles, so the United States is ready at once to resume diplomatic relations. Similar encouraging signs are not apparent in the three Balkan countries. The President has been disturbed to find, especially in Bulgaria and Rumania, governments which in his opinion are not responsive to, or representative of, the wishes of the people and which do not allow all democratic elements free expression.

30. United States Relations with Czechoslovakia.

Czechoslovak proposals for the expulsion of certain of the German and Hungarian minorities were a matter of early concern to both the United States and Great Britain. The subject came up for decision in the Potsdam Conference along with other minority questions. Proposals for civil affairs agreements with the United States and Great Britain had been made by the Czechoslovak Government in 1944 and were renewed in April 1945. Many interested departments in

Washington did not feel that the agreements were necessary.(27) In June 1945 the Czechoslovak Government presented a note stating that the U.S. Army had seized a quantity of foodstuffs, cattle, and horses at Domazliee and requesting return of the property.(28) The claim was investigated, but no evidence was found to substantiate the Czechoslovak charge.(29) United States proposals for the withdrawal of troops from Czechoslovakia received the approval of Marshal Stalin in November, and his suggestion that the departure be completed by the first of December was carried out.(30)

31. United States Relations with Hungary.

The Soviet Government reported the signing of an agreement with the Hungarian Government on 15 June 1945 calling for the delivery of reparations to the value of \$200,000,000 in goods and equipment over a six-year period. Subjects were being considered by the Allied Control Council in Hungary during July 1945, but on which decisions were not reached, included the repatriation of displaced persons other than prisoners of war and war criminals.(31) Marshal Voroshilov, Chairman of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary protested in July 1945 against the arrival of three repatriation trains in Budapest, saying that the movement had not been coordinated with the Soviet authorities.(32) Although an investigation disclosed that the trains had departed under agreement with the Soviet Repatriation Unit at Liezen, Austria, the shipments were embargoed for several weeks until the matter could be cleared up.

b. The Soviet removal of plants producing radio and communications equipment and the Hungarian Communist Party's action in acquiring a motion picture monopoly and tight control over radio and press dispatches were interpreted in many circles as an effort to isolate Hungary from western educational and informational facilities.(33) United States property also was an issue in Hungary. The United States informed the Hungarian Government that, although it did not object to the nationalization of natural resources by sovereign states, it believed that Hungary, while under an armistice regime, should not take such a step affecting foreign-owned property. The United States stated further, that in the event of nationalization after a peace treaty was signed, the United States Government would be bound by its obligations to protect its nationals' interests to require compensation for United States property.(34) Hungarian Minister of Finance Gordon in December 1945 complained that the Soviet Union sought the economic collapse of Hungary in the belief that it would be followed by a revolution which Soviet occupying troops could turn to their advantage.(35)

32. United States Relations with Yugoslavia.

The proposed incorporation of the Mediterranean Theater of Operations into the European Theater made the Venezia-Giulia situation and agreements with Yugoslavia matters of concern to European Theater Headquarters. In December 1945 U.S. Forces, Austria, were holding about twenty tons of records of the Yugoslav general staff covering

the period 1920 to 1941. These were the subject of considerable correspondence before they were restored to the proper authorities at Belgrade.(36) The United States protested against the holding and operation of United States property by the Yugoslav Government, declaring that Yugoslav declarations promising to uphold private industrial rights and to guarantee freedom for foreign investments were being ignored.(37) Yugoslav shipping on the Danube was the subject of extensive negotiations among the governments involved.

33. United States Relations with Bulgaria.

G. M. Divitrov, Secretary General of the Bulgarian Agrarian Party until March 1945, was the target of a number of verbal attacks by Communists who labeled him a "collaborator" and a "Fascist." After he was ousted as party head, his arrest was ordered by the Bulgarian Government, but he was given asylum by a United States official in Bulgaria. The order for Divitrov's arrest was regarded as a step in a steady drive to make a one-party state of Bulgaria.(38)

34. United States Relations with Rumania.

The repatriation of Rumanians was an urgent international problem. In July approval was given for the movement of 20,000 from western Germany and 1,000 from Italy. A special repatriation delegation was in Frankfurt in August 1945 in connection with this movement.

35. United States Relations with Italy.

In April 1945 Washington classed Italians as United Nations

nationals. A directive to this effect was adopted by the European Advisory Commission and changes were made in Supreme Headquarters directives on this subject.(39) The United States was interested in obtaining Silesian coal for cotton mills in northern Italy, but after an investigation it was decided that the problem could best be handled by negotiations between the Italian and Warsaw Governments.(40)

Chapter XI
PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

MILITARY PERSONNEL

36. General.

The recasting of military manpower requirements for the occupation fell into two phases. The first, from V-E Day to the initiation of peace negotiations with Japan, was characterized by readjustment, reorganization, loss of skilled personnel, and retraining of personnel remaining in units of the European Theater to offset the crippling effects of redeployment and demobilization. The second, dating from 17 August 1945, was marked by several salient features: the sharp decline in numbers of military personnel from 3,069,310 on V-E Day to 342,264 on 1 July 1946; the home-front pressure to return the soldiers to the United States; the slashing of replacement sources by Congress through the Selective Service Extension Act of 1946; a drastic downgrading of the Occupational Troop Basis to the figure of 300,000 by 1 July 1946; limitation of procurement efforts to individuals immune to changes of sentiment at home; and a mounting trend toward the use of civilians in lieu of military personnel in the occupation.

37. Requisitions and Arrivals.

a. On 1 May 1945 the War Department halted the shipment to Europe of any new units not urgently needed for the mission of the occupation.(1) With some revisions, however, standing requisitions continued to be honored during the interim prior to V-J Day. For several months thereafter, the demands of redeployment raced far ahead of the availability of incoming troops, despite a War Department promise to deliver 240,000 replacements to Europe between 1 October 1945 and 1 July 1946.(2) On 3 October 1945 the Theater requisitioned 135,000 men against this number, asking chiefly for specialists of the technical services.(3) At the end of 1945, reinforcements were substantially short of allotments and the slowness of their arrival usually left a wide gap between a redeployed soldier's departure and the assignment of his successor.(4)

b. The numerical strength of units continued to decline until late in February, when the inflow of replacements was accelerated to compensate for accumulated deficiencies.(5) At that time reinforcements were shipped in bulk without reference to requisitions and were lacking in specialist training and experience, though a little above the Army average in intelligence. They fell generally into two age groups—from 18 to 19 years of age, and over 30 years of age.(6) On 25 May 1946 the War Department relaxed its requirement that the Occupational Troop basis be attained precisely by 1 July 1946.(7) As of the end of June, shipments were arriving on a current basis and, despite the magnitude of Army-wide personnel losses, the Theater's

promised quota of 240,000 men had virtually been met. Forecasts placed the arrival of reinforcements at 10,000 per month, and the Theater planned to adjust its reception system to this stabilized inflow.(8)

38. Reception and Assignment.

a. Arriving reinforcements were minutely screened in an effort to seek out skilled personnel for withdrawal to the major commands.(9) Two military occupational specialty numbers were assigned to each soldier--one representing his primary, or actual, skill and the other his secondary, or potential, skill. In practice, men were often reclassified according to their secondary skill, trained accordingly, and assigned the number of the new specialty.(10)

b. The receipt of reinforcements was closely related to redeployment. In order to meet a target strength as of a given date, the Theater, in requesting shipping space from the War Department, had to make advance allowance for those men to be displaced by arriving reinforcements in any given month. Major commands were assigned quotas to meet this shipping and were forced to withdraw men from operational use at least fifteen days before their replacements were scheduled to arrive; a replacement could not possibly become an effective member of his unit in less than thirty days following his arrival in a port. Thus, the Theater's effective strength was made to lag continually behind its assigned strength.(11)

39. The Training Status of Replacements.

Handicapped by personnel shortages, the War Department could train men only to the minimum extent prescribed under Regular Army rate tables, which in their revised form were based on normal attrition. As the peak of redeployment approached, even this training was shortened to cover little more than basic training, (12) despite the new Selective Service requirement that inductees should receive not less than six months' training before serving overseas. (13) Completion of training requirements within the Theater was undertaken by the G-3 Division. Conduct of the training fell on units engaged in security missions, which could least afford extraneous infringements on time and manpower. (14) In December 1945 the Theater asked that all individual training, including specialist training, be given in the Zone of the Interior, at least until 1 July 1946, when the major difficulties of redeployment, readjustment, and the phasing-out of units would have been met. (15) This recommendation was not acted upon, however, and the Theater was left increasingly to its own resources--chiefly the recruiting and training of its own personnel--to provide the manpower requisite to its mission.

40. Specialist Training.

a. At the beginning of the occupation, a need arose for clerical and administrative skills. (16) Beginning June 1945, clerk-typist and stenography classes were conducted by the Ground Forces Reinforcement Command, (17) and soon after V-J Day the Office of the Adjutant General established a clerical school to provide basically trained administrative

personnel.(18) Difficulties in procuring suitable recruits among arriving reinforcements led to discontinuation of the Reinforcement Command's classes by the end of January 1946.(19) Thereafter responsibility for the training of replacements as clerk-typists was borne on a reduced scale by the Adjutant General's School.(20)

b. By 1946 there had developed a critical need for parachute-trained infantrymen.(21) The War Department reported that suitable replacements would not be available in quantity until April 1946.(22) Therefore, Theater Headquarters directed the screening of all arrivals for parachutists, and qualified men who were willing to elect such an assignment were transferred to the airborne regiment for training.(23) The importance of this initiative on the part of the Theater in providing for the training of its own parachute specialists was heightened when it transpired that shipment of the troops promised for delivery by the end of June 1946 could not be completed before August.(24)

41. Unskilled Surpluses in Negro Units.

a. Early in 1946 a problem of unskilled overstrength arose in Negro units, harassing all of the major commands and upsetting organizational tables in many branches of service.(25) Theater Headquarters received numerous representations concerning the desired replacement of personnel in Army General Classification Test Class V by named individuals of demonstrated ability.(26) Some preliminary steps were taken locally to review assignments. The real solution

to the problem, however, rested with the War Department, which alone could stem the inflow of Negro enlistees, many of whom had signed for arms and services which were not included in the Theater's Negro Occupational Troop Basis.(27) It was expected that by 1 July 1946 there would be approximately 40,770 Negro soldiers in the occupation forces, representing an overstrength of approximately 75 percent, for whom there was no use. The War Department acknowledged the dilemma and agreed on 19 June 1946 not to ship any additional Negro replacements for assignment in Europe until a decision could be reached on the manner of their utilization. Meanwhile, Theater Headquarters proceeded to dispose of its current surplus by authorizing a 50 percent overstrength in all Negro units and by organizing a provisional Negro infantry regiment.(28) Toward the end of June, a plan was submitted to the War Department,(29) and subsequently approved on 3 July 1946,(30) whereby this provisional regiment and all Negro units slated for inactivation would be returned to the Zone of the Interior at 50 percent overstrength. Any remaining surplus was to be returned at the rate of 3,000 men per month.(31)

42. Recourse to Overstrength.

In order to effect the sudden reversal in mission from combat to administration, it was necessary to exceed authorized manpower allotments pending the inactivation of combat units and the consequent release of sufficient grades to staff the occupation agencies adequately. The assignment of overstrength grades facilitated the organization of

these agencies, but entailed some administrative chaos in the form of hampered manpower planning, blocked promotions, and intricate methods of personnel accounting. These difficulties were lessened through the confinement of overstrength to organizations scheduled for early closing. As units were progressively inactivated, their grades were withdrawn and reallocated to cover overstrength in newer units; hence, as the old organizations were dissolved, the extra grades were gradually eliminated.(32)

43. Procurement of Officers.

a. Temporary Retention of Key Officers. The Theater policy was to effect the redeployment of as many eligible officers as possible where qualified low-score or volunteer officers could be procured through the replacement system. Officers declared surplus to the needs of specific units were, if they possessed special qualifications, re-assigned within the Theater and not returned to the United States until suitable replacements were provided.(33) Shortly after V-J Day, the War Department sanctioned a delay in reporting as eligible for separation key officers who were both needed and willing to remain on active duty but who were unwilling to volunteer for the duration of the emergency plus six months.(34) Eventually, pressure from the home front caused a shift in War Department policy to permit more rapid redeployment in the professional groups, and in February 1946 the Theater was informed that officers could no longer be retained beyond their separation dates except where furnished quotas were insufficient.(35)

b. The Volunteer Plan. High-point officers eligible for separation were retained only through voluntary extension of their temporary commissions. They were first given the option of signing waivers which committed them to remaining on active duty until the end of the emergency--an indefinite date often defined as the declaration of peace.(36) Five volunteer categories, based on the length of extension desired, were created in January 1946,(37) following a protest from the Theater that the better-qualified officers were reluctant to sign the indefinite statement.(38)

c. Regular Army Integration. Meanwhile, the Theater was engaged in recruiting and selecting qualified applicants for commissioning in the Regular Army under Public Law 281, passed by Congress in December 1945, which authorized an increase to 25,000 in the number of Regular Army officers.(39) Six processing centers for applications were established in the United States Zone in January 1946,(40) and continued to function until 30 April 1946, by which date a total of 5,353 applications had been received, of which 4,600 were approved. Of the total number of applicants, 702 were rejected for failure to pass the physical examination or the general survey test. Fifty-one applications were sent to Washington without action, most of them because the applicants had left the Theater before final processing could be completed.(41)

d. Officer Training. Officer candidate schools were continued until mid-July 1945 by the Ground Forces Reinforcement Command at the 9th Reinforcement Depot, at Fontainebleau, France. Under this

program, the first class had graduated less than two weeks before V-E Day, on 26 April 1945. The last two, Classes 29 and 29A, ended on 14 July 1945. During the school's brief history, commissions were awarded to approximately 4,000 candidates, who served opportunely to fill the officer ranks depleted by the redeployment exodus.(42)

e. Termination of Wartime Emergency Commissioning. Awarding of "battlefield" commissions to high-caliber enlisted personnel continued for a short time after V-E Day. Intended strictly as a wartime measure, it proved neither altogether satisfactory nor wholly defensible as a means of meeting peacetime exigencies, and so was abandoned at War Department direction after serving briefly as a stopgap.(43) After the proclamation of V-J Day, the authorization to appoint flight officers and warrant officers as second lieutenants was also discontinued by the War Department.(44)

f. Direct Commissioning. To augment the supply of officers, the Theater in August 1945 announced the temporary appointment of 1,500 second lieutenants, who were selected from among enlisted men then creditably performing work normally done by junior officers.(45) In December 1945 permission was sought to make additional appointments of this kind, the number suggested being 1,000. The War Department in February 1946 approved further appointments, but limited the number to 500 in specified technical branches where officer shortages were most serious.(46) In this instance, however, officer-candidate returns proved inexplicably sluggish, the final examining board receiving only

seventy-seven applicants. Of these, 61 were named to second lieutenantcies in various branches of service.(47) At the end of the first year of the occupation, the Theater was faced with a shortage of about 26 percent of its authorized officer strength. In June 1946, therefore, the major commands were instructed to report all officers not eligible for redeployment as of the end of August 1946 who were in excess of 74 percent of command quotas, so that an equitable distribution could be made proportionate to needs.(48) As outstanding cases of critical officer shortage had developed in phases of the occupation mission not connected with the technical services, the War Department on 17 June 1946 granted the Theater appointing authority in all branches and established a new appointment quota of 2,000 to be effected by the end of December 1946.(49)

44. The Procurement of Enlisted Personnel.

a. The Retention of Key Enlisted Men. When redeployment began after V-E Day, enlisted men qualified as skilled or semiskilled in scarce military occupational specialties were declared ineligible for separation, regardless of their adjusted service rating scores. On 10 June 1945 a list of twenty-one scarce categories was announced by Theater Headquarters.(50) Other enlisted men, not on the critical list, were also retained in service on the grounds of "military necessity." After V-J Day the number of essential military skills was reduced to three. Those holding critical specialty numbers could be retained for a maximum of six months after 14 August 1945.(51) After 20 October 1945

it was no longer possible to keep trained men in the Theater on grounds of military necessity, except that those with critical specialties could be retained for a maximum of six months after their eligibility for redeployment.(52)

b. The Enlisted Volunteer Program. In June it was announced that enlisted personnel whose scores toward discharge totaled 85 points or more could elect to remain in the military service until Japan surrendered.(53) After 22 August 1946 enlisted personnel desiring to remain in the Theater could volunteer in what was termed a "Class II status" for such time as their individual services were required, but not longer than the duration of hostilities plus six months.(54) From 17 October 1945, enlisted men were permitted to volunteer for the Class II category for periods of their own choosing.(55) Latitude in the naming of individual discharge dates proved disadvantageous from a planning point of view, it being simpler to deal administratively with specific groups committed to the Theater for designated periods. Consequently, in January 1946 Theater Headquarters announced the creation of five subclasses, prescribing various set periods for which individuals could elect to remain on duty with the occupation forces.(56) The subclass system was amended in March 1946 by the addition of three subclasses involving termination dates up to 30 June 1948.(57)

c. The Regular Army Enlistment Program. The European part of the War Department's world-wide reenlistment drive was launched as

a priority operation on 17 September 1945.(58) In October 1945 the enactment of legislation providing more favorable reenlistment benefits furnished the impetus for more aggressive prosecution of the recruiting program,(59) which was publicized in all parts of the occupied area.(60) Recruiting gained rapidly. November and December 1945 were record months in the Theater drive, and the total number of enlistees as of the end of 1945 was 37,267,(61) or two-thirds of the number enlisted during the entire campaign. By April 1946 total enlistments had attained the figure of 48,434,(62) and by the close of the drive in July 1946 the total was 51,140.(63) Not all of these soldiers continued to serve in the occupation forces, as individual desires and military exigency took many of them to other Theaters.

45. Reduction of Theater Strength.

a. As of V-E Day, the occupation forces had an estimated strength of 3,069,310 men,(64) which had to be phased out by 1 July 1946, to accord with the War Department's stipulated Occupational Troop Basis of 404,554.(65) By 15 August 1945 the number of troops in Europe was reduced to 2,207,754 through reductions in bulk allotments to the major commands, inactivation of units not essential to the peacetime structure, and redeployment of surplus personnel and personnel with high adjusted service rating scores.(66) Intensive application to the task of consolidation brought about a further reduction to 1,328,000 by 1 November 1945.(67) On that date, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, set an initial ceiling for each staff division and separate command, based on current non-Table of Organization allotments. At the same

time, a forecast of assigned strength was instituted to show the projected troop needs of each command for succeeding months.(68)

b. As of 1 January 1946, the Theater had an approximate strength of 622,000, which included 163,000 ineffectives. These were in the redeployment pipeline, on leave in the United States, sick in hospital, or otherwise not available for useful employment. Reduction in Theater strength occurred automatically and more rapidly than had been expected, due to the accelerated out-shipment of personnel and the rate of arrival of replacements.(69) In December 1945 the Troop Basis for 1 July had been lowered to 300,000, and the Theater Commander had laid down a plan of reorganization to reduce manpower requirements and accelerate redeployment.(70) The implementation of this plan was virtually completed by 1 April 1946 and the strength figure lowered to 401,684. To achieve this reduction, the British ports were closed and the former United Kingdom Base was redesignated the London Area to accord with its lessened geographical scope and curtailed responsibilities. Headquarters, Theater Service Forces, was inactivated and its functions absorbed by Theater Headquarters, while the base sections and the units in the liberated countries were combined in a newly organized Western Base Section with a single headquarters. The Seventh Army was inactivated on 1 April 1946 and its responsibilities were transferred to the Third Army, which became the sole army headquarters in the United States Zone.(71) The Theater rolls were thus cleared of a large number of persons who belonged to the occupation forces as a matter of record only and whose inclusion in strength reports

hitherto induced a false impression of the number of troops actually serving in the occupation.(72)

c. By the end of May 1946 precision in the attainment of the Troop Basis was no longer required.(73) Nevertheless, the Theater attained a reduction to 342,264 by 1 July 1946,(74) as against the figure of 378,424 forecast by the G-1 Division in November.(75) It was expected that the surplus of 42,264 would be absorbed automatically by out-shipments during the next few months.

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

46. General Trends.

At the end of hostilities the term "civilian personnel" applied to all individuals other than United States troops and prisoners of war employed by the United States forces and federal agencies under military control in the European Theater. Because the fraternization ban at first severely limited the use of Germans, manpower needs were met from four main sources. Top priority was given to displaced persons. Second priority, applying particularly in liberated areas, was given to established residents of the vicinity in which the employing agency was located. Third priority was given British nationals, primarily female clerical workers. The lowest priority group consisted of United States citizens recruited from the Zone of the Interior.(76) Large-scale

repatriation of displaced persons after V-E Day cut off this source of labor. Agreements with European governments did not provide for an adequate supply of personnel from Allied and neutral sources. Efforts to employ discharged military personnel were disappointing. Budgetary considerations made desirable the use of an economical source of labor. Hence, the employment of Germans in large numbers was the natural solution to the manpower problem. In September German civilians received an employment priority higher than that of Allied and neutral nationals. Thereafter our labor policies were fairly fixed, resulting in a steadily dwindling military force governing a large German body of workmen. By June 1946 this body had risen to nearly a quarter of a million employees, or 60 percent of all civilian personnel.(77)

47. United States Civilians from the Zone of the Interior.

a. There were few United States civilian employees of the War Department in the European Theater on the day Germany surrendered. Some United States merchant seamen had been hired by Transportation Corps to operate tugs and tankers.(78) Other civilians, mostly on a 90-day temporary duty status, consisted of highly trained technical specialists.(79) Theater policy prohibiting recruitment from the United States of civilian personnel, except specialists, continued throughout the summer of 1945.(80) These were used only when equally qualified personnel was not available within the Theater. In September, under revised policy, both male and female citizens could be recruited from the United States, but were given the lowest priority. This

priority was still in force on 30 June 1946.(81)

b. All requisitions were consolidated in one list by the Adjutant General's Office for submission to its employment representative in Washington.(82) Three types of personnel were requisitioned, namely, individuals requested by name by Theater offices, those recruited as specialists or technicians for a particular position, and skilled clerical employees brought over in groups to alleviate shortages. Personnel in the last category were generally in grades below CAF-5, and were assigned by the Adjutant General's Civilian Personnel Branch to whatever offices in the Theater were in need of them.

c. As the Theater lost key personnel through redeployment and the number of individuals electing discharge to work as civilians in the Theater declined, requisitions for personnel from the Zone of the Interior rose steadily. At the end of June 1946 there were 3,300 requests for civilians in the Washington recruiting office, but from January to June only 743 had arrived in the Theater.(83)

48. Discharged Military Personnel.

In July Theater Headquarters initiated a recruiting drive to convert military men and women into civilian employees.(84) By the end of December 2,154 former soldiers, including 351 of the Women's Army Corps, had actually been placed in jobs.(85) No ceiling was placed on the number of ex-soldiers who could be employed, but obstacles to the "military-civilian" conversion program were encountered. These included slow processing procedures and the unwillingness of soldiers to

sacrifice terminal leave. In October, when redeployment was in full swing, steps were taken to speed up processing by the delegation of discharge authority to the major commands.(86) At the same time, Congressional action permitted payment of the terminal leave bonus.(87) Because it was found difficult to establish quickly a well-organized program and because the bulk of the troops had been redeployed by the end of December, this source of manpower proved disappointing. The lack of key supervisory personnel sufficiently familiar with War Department policies and procedures, the turnover of personnel, difficulties of establishing definite written policy, delay of delegation of authority to lower echelons, and lack of proper coordination were all factors responsible for the retarded progress of the program.(88) After January, the number of discharged military personnel accepting civilian employment was small. Only 170 were placed during the first six months of 1946.(89)

49. Allied and Neutral Personnel.

The need for labor was so urgent when United States units moved into Germany that workmen of liberated countries were transported into Germany without awaiting the approval of the governments concerned.(90) By V-E Day the British Ministry of Labor had authorized the movement to the Continent of only 900 key female personnel, which was only a small fraction of the ten thousand who were carried on the Army payrolls in the United Kingdom.(91) Limited numbers of male citizens and non-citizen residents of the United Kingdom, were, however, permitted to

volunteer for duty on the Continent subject to approval of the Ministry of Labor.(92) SHAEF Missions to the various European governments approached the national authorities in the matter of employing their citizens.(93) Belgium and France restricted the movement of their nationals to those already employed by the U.S. Army, that is, approximately 69,000 French (94) and 26,000 Belgians.(95) Luxemburg had no objection to the movement of its civilians.(96) The Netherlands restricted the movement to 2,000 administrative and clerical employees for both the United States and British forces.(97) Conditions of employment for all Allied and neutral nationals were standardized in June 1946.(98) By that time the number of French employees had dropped to about 18,700 (99) and Belgian to 7,400.(100) The total number of Allied and neutral civilian employees was 42,842 on 30 June 1946.(101)

50. Enemy Nationals.

By V-E Day the nonfraternization policy had been liberalized to allow the employment of Germans in 112 skilled and semiskilled trades and 15 clerical and supervisory occupations, but Germans were still restricted to tasks at which they did not come in contact with troops except for their supervisors.(102) In September, Germans were given employment priorities second only to United States discharged military personnel.(103) By October there were 149,000 Germans in the employ of the U.S. Army.(104) In November when redeployment cut deeply into the military strength, employment of Germans in positions where they did not have access to information classified "confidential"

or higher was authorized.(105) German civilians were also hired as guards and armed with carbines to safeguard military supplies and installations.(106) Theater personnel officers relied more and more heavily on German civilians as an economical source of manpower, as other sources of labor continued to dwindle. In the spring of 1946 Germans comprised no less than 60 percent of all civilians employed by the United States forces.(107) On 30 June 1946 over 262,000 Germans were employed, as teachers, clerks, typists, technicians, mechanics, guards, drivers, interpreters, mess attendants, hospital workers, and laborers.(108)

51. Displaced Persons.

Before V-E Day displaced persons were used widely by the Army in labor battalions and as individual workers. At that time they received top priority and preferential treatment.(109) Their employment was not allowed to delay their repatriation, except when they were engaged in work essential to the Allied forces, in which case they were detained at their posts only until they could be replaced.(110) This source of manpower was never developed to the degree anticipated because of the large numbers repatriated after V-E Day. By October, when mass repatriation had come to an end, over 26,000 displaced persons were employed as drivers of military vehicles,(111) as guards of prisoners of war, and as workers at various Quartermaster installations.(112) Polish displaced persons were used in labor service companies and Polish guard companies, which replaced troops redeployed from the Theater.(113) At the end of 1945, 37,500 displaced Poles were working

in guard companies, and an additional 13,750 volunteers were awaiting the activation of new companies.(114) Polish officers assigned to these units were in direct command. The total number of displaced persons employed in the European Theater at the end of June 1946 was 60,000, or 15 percent of the total civilian labor force.(115)

52. Administration of United States, Allied, and Neutral Civilians.

a. Responsibility for the procurement and administration of civilian personnel in the Theater was divided among the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-1, and the Adjutant Generals of Theater Headquarters and Theater Service Forces. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, of Theater Headquarters formulated and directed over-all policies such as the order of priority according to which various groups could be employed and the general conditions under which they were to work. The Theater Adjutant General interpreted the applicability of over-all policies to the various groups of labor, submitted requisitions to the Zone of the Interior, administered United States and British civilians, and maintained locator files. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, of Theater Service Forces formulated policies and procedures regarding civilian personnel to include priorities, processing of requisitions, procurement, contracts, employee relations, and training; coordinated the activities of the Engineer Labor Procurement Service, the General Purchasing Agent, and the civilian personnel sections of the major headquarters; and compiled statistical information relative to the establishment of supply requirements of civilians employed by the Army, including clothing, feeding, quartering, and hospitalization.(116)

The Adjutant General of Theater Service Forces supervised and assisted subordinate offices, tabulated reports and statistics, supervised the processing of United States and British civilians, and handled normal correspondence regarding civilian personnel.(117)

b. The Engineer Labor Procurement Service under the Theater Engineer controlled and operated the procurement and distribution of all civilian employees from Allied or liberated countries, except for United States and British civilians. The General Purchasing Agent negotiated agreements and established procedures with European governments for the procurement of civilian labor and for the settlement of labor disputes or questions. He also maintained liaison with the labor ministries of liberated governments. The Military Labor Service was responsible for civilians employed in organized mobile labor units. The assignment of personnel to these units was coordinated by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, but the units were used chiefly by services for which the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, was responsible.(118)

c. To bring about greater uniformity in the hiring and management of civilian personnel, Theater Headquarters on 18 September defined the responsibilities of its staff divisions and adopted a uniform system of terminology to be used in civilian personnel management. From that date, the G-1 Division controlled the procurement and management of all civilian personnel, analyzed future requirements, and coordinated the requirements of other staff divisions. The G-3 Division was responsible for organizing labor service units composed of civilians

recruited in Allied or occupied countries. The G-4 Division was responsible for the administration of labor service units, the supply of goods to civilian personnel, and the maintenance of personnel forecasts for its own activities. The G-5 Division had jurisdiction only in occupied areas. It controlled German labor offices, supervised wage levels for indigenous and displaced persons, kept statistics on the over-all labor situation in the United States Zone of Germany, and allocated indigenous personnel and displaced persons to the employing agencies.(119)

d. A further change took place early in October, when the G-1 Division decentralized its supervisory functions and placed full responsibility for civilian personnel matters with commanding officers of subordinate echelons.(120) Commanding officers selected civilian personnel administrators, who supervised matters pertaining to placement of employees, employee relations, on-the-job training, and pay.(121) A Civilian Personnel Section was established in Headquarters Command to administer all civilians employed at Theater Headquarters.(122) The Theater Adjutant General's functions were confined to maintaining necessary locator files on all civilians employed by the United States forces, serving as a final receiving agent for all employment applications, keeping major commands and other United States agencies informed as to the type and number of civilians available for employment, requisitioning personnel from the United States, and collecting and maintaining statistics concerning civilian personnel operations.(123)

When Theater Service Forces were inactivated on 1 March 1946, the responsibility for civilian personnel matters was transferred to the Adjutant General at Theater Headquarters.(124)

53. Conditions of Employment of United States, Allied, and Neutral Civilians.

a. United States citizens were employed by the War Department under laws and regulations affecting federal employees in the United States, but subject to War Department or Theater regulations. A statement of standard conditions of employment applying to all United States citizens was issued on 22 September 1945.(125) Contracts were generally for a minimum of one year, but persons discharged in the Theater were permitted to sign for six months.(126) Pay rates were the same as for other federal employees, but a 25 percent differential bonus was paid for overseas duty.(127)

b. Nationals of Allied and neutral countries were employed under special agreements between the United States forces and the respective nations. Employment was governed in general by a standard contract adopted in May 1945, but varying wage scales applied.(128) With the exception of British citizens, Allied and neutral nationals were required by their governments to receive payment of as much as two-thirds of their salary within their native country. Thus, a portion of their pay was deducted and transmitted to designated agencies of the various governments for transfer to an allottee or for eventual payment to the employees.(129)

New uniform agreements were negotiated toward the close of the first year of the occupation. Compensation was thereafter in accordance with the Continental wage scale, applying to all non-Americans, who were permitted to draw up to one-third of their salary in the country in which they were employed.(130)

c. In Germany, civilians were under the jurisdiction of the various Offices of Military Government and subject to military law.(131) For reasons of security the wearing of a modified uniform--without military buttons and insignia--was compulsory until the spring of 1946, when the wearing of civilian clothes was permitted.(132) Quarters and accommodations were provided at a cost to the civilian employee of \$180.00 per annum.(133) Various welfare services, such as medical care, were provided through Army facilities at no cost to the employee.(134) Early in May 1946, councils were inaugurated to provide an organized medium for group expression on matters affecting the welfare and interests of civilian employees.(135)

54. Administration and Conditions of Employment of Enemy Nationals and Displaced Persons.

a. Management and administration of enemy nationals and displaced persons was largely the responsibility of local German labor offices, acting under military government regulations. Such civilian workers were divided into two categories: static and mobile. Static personnel resided within the area of employment and were often transported to and from work daily. The U.S. Army assumed limited, if any,

responsibility for clothing, feeding, or sheltering members of this group, except that a noon meal costing 50 pfennigs was furnished. Mobile workers were employed under contract, organized into units under military command, and subject to being moved from place to place. For these the military forces provided quarters, subsistence, and clothing.(136)

b. Military units that required the services of indigenous civilians placed their requisitions with the nearest German labor office or bürgermeister, who met the requirements from local sources. Provision was made, in cases where demands could not be met locally, for German labor offices to request additional labor from outside areas.(137) Displaced persons and Germans applying for work had to pass a physical examination and were investigated by the Counter Intelligence Corps. They were not hired if they were members of the Nazi Party.(138)

c. Wage rates for enemy nationals and displaced persons were established by military government to conform to German standards. Displaced persons received the highest approved rate in each occupation.(139) The German authorities prepared payrolls, making deductions to cover charges for meals furnished, and contributions to health insurance, pensions, unemployment relief, taxes, and any other authorized German agencies. Displaced persons were subject to the same deductions as German nationals for social insurance, the German agency assuming the employer's obligation in their behalf.(140)

55. General Mission and Program.

a. Prior to V-E Day, detailed plans had been formulated to expand the recreational facilities in the European Theater for the men awaiting redeployment, and to establish a long-range program for the occupation troops.(141) An attempt was made to provide for the varying needs and tastes of individuals. Library service was increased, and handicraft workshops established. An enlarged entertainment program included motion pictures, shows, and music. Wider social activities, in the form of clubs, served as a morale-builder in large troop concentrations in liberated countries and as a weapon against undesirable fraternization in occupied territory. Leave and rest centers were changed from areas of recuperation to vacation spots and tours were instituted, so that the American soldier might have an opportunity to see some of Europe's important monuments and gain a better understanding of its cultures and peoples. Athletic activities were encouraged at all levels. To implement these plans, supplies were requisitioned and personnel trained or recruited from the Zone of the Interior.(142)

b. All fields of recreation were expanded during the summer of 1945. Vast numbers of men in the staging and assembly areas, suddenly finding themselves with leisure time, required entertainment. Special emphasis was placed upon the needs of the troops bound directly for the Far East, and efforts were made to provide them with recreation while

they awaited shipment and to supply Special Services equipment for their transports. Welfare activities within the occupied zone were limited by the lack of facilities and also by security and nonfraternization regulations.

c. Although V-J Day simplified the problem to a certain extent, other factors arising thereafter made the fall of 1945 a particularly difficult period as far as recreation was concerned. The anticipated termination of lend-lease and reciprocal aid called for an examination of costs. The morale of men awaiting redeployment to the Zone of the Interior reached a low ebb. Recreational activities suffered from shortages of trained personnel. Lack of transportation hampered the delivery of supplies and limited the possibilities of travel to leave areas. The unstable situation, due to changing troop concentrations, made the routing and booking of shows difficult. Soldiers awaiting redeployment showed little enthusiasm for long-term activities. They were not interested in learning complicated crafts, acting in soldier shows, or forming part of an athletic team, since they hoped to depart from the Theater before such projects were completed. Furthermore, plans for expansion were limited by the knowledge that, although at the moment facilities and accommodations were taxed to the utmost, as soon as the Theater settled down to an occupation basis there would be fewer men with leisure time at their disposal. Thus, overextension to meet immediate, temporary needs could not be justified.

d. With the initiation of the stabilized occupation period in early 1946, the recreational program was changed from one intended to fulfill first a combat and then an emergency redeployment mission and was adapted to provide extensive and diversified activities for the occupation forces. Provision was made not only for members of the armed forces, but also for civilian employees, both American and Allied, and for dependents arriving in the Theater. Steps were taken to return recreation to a peacetime, rather than an emergency, basis. Library books became accountable property as of 1 February 1946. A Theater leave program not requiring appropriated funds was initiated in May. Arrangements were completed for the payment of admission fees to motion picture theaters, effective on 1 July 1946. All these moves were part of the return to a peacetime economy, where the individual receives better service, but shares in its cost.(143)

56. Administrative Organization.

a. Primary responsibility for broad policy in connection with recreation and maintenance of morale of the armed forces in the European Theater rested with the G-1 Division, specifically with the Morale and Special Activities Branch of G-1, U.S. Forces, European Theater, and with the Services and Special Activities Branch of Theater Service Forces, European Theater. Coordination was maintained, however, with other interested branches and staff sections.(144)

b. Over-all planning, coordination, and technical supervision were carried out by the Special Services Division, responsibility being

divided, according to field of activity, between its Athletic and Entertainment Divisions, which were in turn divided into various branches and sections.(145) Responsibility for the execution of the program was delegated to command, division, and unit levels.

c. Several other organizations and agencies assisted in carrying out the recreational program. Chief among these were the American Red Cross, which continued its wartime functions in the field of clubs and cooperated in other recreational activities.(146) United Services Organization Camp Shows, Incorporated, presented shows which were an important factor in entertainment.(147) The French organization, Comité Français de Bienvenue aux Armées Alliées (Franco-Allied Good Will Committee), did much to make the American soldier's stay in France more pleasant by providing guided tours, making arrangements for the reduction of costs in French night clubs, and performing numerous other services.(148) Tours to European countries such as Switzerland, Denmark, and the Netherlands were made possible through the cooperation of their respective governments. In order to continue the leave and tour program in the spring of 1946, when the Army found it necessary to withdraw its funds and personnel, the American Express Company was permitted to take over a major part of this program.(149)

57. Library Service.

To provide recreational and instructive reading material, the Library Branch of Special Services greatly expanded its wartime operations. Unit libraries, collections for troop concentrations in

leave and assembly areas, and hospital libraries were established. Small, isolated detachments were serviced by traveling "bookmobiles." Reading material was supplied by the automatic distribution of paper-bound books and magazines and by consignment of standard collections of fiction and nonfiction. Special book purchases augmented the available material, and brought it up to date. Publication of certain periodicals in the Theater and loans of books by European libraries were arranged.(150) During combat and the redeployment period, emphasis was placed on the use of reading materials rather than on their preservation. Library books were considered expendable property, although measures were taken to insure that unnecessary dissipation of supplies did not take place. As of 1 February 1946, however, when redeployment was substantially completed, full property accountability for library books was imposed in the Theater.(151) To conserve and distribute reading matter, competent library staffs were necessary. Army Civilian Librarians were procured from the United States, and nonprofessional librarians were trained in schools established for the purpose. During 1946 increased use was made of German civilian employees as librarians, these being individually trained and supervised by the Army Civilian Librarian responsible for the area.(152)

58. Handicraft Program.

The handicraft program was announced in June 1945, little use having been made of this type of recreation during combat, except in

hospitals and rest centers.(153) Workshops were established within hospitals, in clubs, and as separate entities. Craft materials were obtained from the United States, or from surplus, salvage, and captured enemy material. In order to provide skilled and trained supervisory personnel, training schools were established, field teams visited the various shops, and guides and manuals were widely distributed. The handicraft program suffered greatly from the instability due to redeployment, both because of loss of its skilled personnel and because of lack of incentive and interest on the part of the participants. In January 1946 a reorganization within the Handicraft Section of Special Services, combined with increased stability of troops within the Theater, permitted great expansion of the program. The number of shops rose from nineteen in January to fifty-nine in June, and by 30 June a weekly participation of 33,890 persons had been attained.(154)

59. Motion Pictures.

Motion pictures were the most popular of all forms of recreation in the European Theater. The trend throughout the first year of the occupation was toward an increase in the quantity and quality of films exhibited and improvement in methods of distribution and facilities for exhibition. Films were made available through the Army Motion Picture Service, which negotiated rental agreements with the motion picture industry. Distribution was effected in the European Theater through the Motion Picture Branch of Special Services, the

6814th Motion Picture Company, and a series of film exchanges and subexchanges.(155) In June 1946 the USFET Motion Picture Service Section was established and charged with the supervision and technical operation of the motion picture program, its operating agency being the 6814th Motion Picture Company.(156) Films were exhibited by means of 16 mm. and 35 mm. units. The former were used widely during the war and the early stages of the occupation because of their mobility and adaptability to small and improvised theaters. As facilities for installing more permanent equipment became available, the use of the larger 35 mm. units increased. Various changes and adjustments were made in the regulations governing admission of different classes of persons. In January restrictions were broadened to permit attendance of United States citizens employed by United States embassies or other organizations. When uniform regulations were liberalized for civilian employees of the War Department, attendance was permitted by those wearing civilian clothes, provided identification was shown. In March authorization was received from the War Department for the admission of the immediate families of American personnel in Germany and Austria. The motion picture industry, however, remained cold to the suggestion that bona fide guests of military personnel, regardless of nationality, should be admitted to showings.(157) Films were exhibited free of charge to authorized audiences, payments being made with Central Welfare funds out of Army Exchange Service profits. As the recreation program returned to a pay-as-you-go basis, plans were laid for a system of

paid admission to motion pictures. It was announced that beginning on 1 July 1946, the 35 mm. entertainment film program would be placed on a paid admission basis, profits to be used to finance the entire program, both 16 mm. and 35 mm., within the Theater.(158)

60. Shows.

a. Live entertainment was provided by United Services Organization Camp Shows, the Red Cross, and Allied civilian enterprise. These three forms of entertainment were strained to the limit during the early months of the occupation and phased out as redeployment progressed and the need for entertainment in the staging and assembly areas became less urgent. To take the place of departing United Services Organization units and decreasing Allied civilian and Red Cross entertainment, two new types of shows were instituted: Soldier Shows and German civilian entertainment.

b. Soldier participation in dramatic productions had the double value of offering entertainment to both spectators and participants. During the war, Jeep Shows were used with great success, but in the period immediately following V-E Day this type of entertainment suffered severely from personnel losses. To attain the planned level of twenty-five Soldier Shows touring the Theater, Civilian Actress Technicians were obtained from the Zone of the Interior. This group of experts worked out technical stage and costume details and acted with the soldiers. Little active interest was shown in the soldier program, however, during the fall of 1945. A subsequent reorganization

of the project, upon a command basis, led to expansion and increased interest in the early months of 1946.(159) By May it became desirable to consolidate this activity upon a Theater basis. The USFET Soldier Show Center was established at Assmannhausen, Germany, and charged with the responsibility of providing all Soldier Shows for troops in the European Theater.(160)

c. The use of German nationals as entertainers was at first restricted by security and fraternization regulations. As these rulings were gradually relaxed and the need for entertainment within the occupied area increased, more German artists were employed. The local hiring of German bands was authorized in July 1945,(161) and permission to employ other properly screened Germans as entertainers was obtained in September.(162) In June 1946 a Standing Operating Procedure regularized the employment of German entertainers.(163) Under the supervision of Special Services, a unit was organized to produce shows with German artists. Bad Schwalbach was the location chosen for production and rehearsal. This group was to operate as a civilian agency and to present productions for military audiences, mixed audiences, and strictly German audiences. No show units were actually formed, however, during the first year of the occupation.(164)

61. Music.

The stimulating effect of music as a morale-builder was recognized in the encouragement of official bands, soldier orchestras, and group and individual musical activities. To combat personnel

shortages due to redeployment, a Band Replacement Depot was established in June 1946 for the purpose of screening, testing, classifying, and assigning potential bandmen. Field Music Corps bands were organized on regimental level. Members of these units often formed the nuclei of other, informal bands, orchestras, and musical groups. Instruments were procured and distributed by the Music Branch of Special Services. Music Bulletins, the Army-Navy Hit Kit, a publication of current popular music, and numerous technical letters and musical guides were supplied. In the field of recorded music, phonographs, V-discs, and classical record library sets were issued.(165)

62. International Exchange of Entertainment.

To augment the variety of entertainment available to the armed forces, arrangements were made for the international exchange of theatrical troupes, which had the added advantage of improving the opportunities for friendly contacts between the American soldier and his Allied contemporaries. Particularly successful were the interchange of Franco-American entertainment and the arrangement at Bremen for an exchange of Soldier Shows with the British.(166)

63. Clubs.

a. Clubs in the European Theater were divided roughly into two main categories: nonrevenue-producing or Class "A" clubs, including Army Service, Allied Expeditionary Force, and American Red Cross clubs; and revenue-producing or Class "B" clubs, deriving income from their own activities and dues, contributions, or membership fees.

b. Army Service Clubs were operated by Special Services and staffed with Army Civilian Hostesses. This type of club was almost entirely a postwar development. On V-E Day there were only thirteen Army Hostesses in the European Theater, assigned to the Allied Expeditionary Force Clubs in Paris and Brussels. So great was the demand for this type of personnel that air priority from the Zone of the Interior was authorized for the transport of hostesses from May to December 1945. By January 1946 there were about one hundred Army Hostesses on duty in the Theater, assigned to the sixty-odd Service Clubs and assisting in the establishment of day rooms and unit clubs in areas where troop strength did not warrant the establishment of Service Clubs. Service Clubs ranged in size from small clubs in tents to installations in the staging areas accommodating up to 10,000 a day. They included such facilities as lounge rooms, games rooms, music studios, photographic dark rooms, handicraft shops, ball rooms, snack bars, mending services, shoe shine parlors, barber shops, and parcel-wrapping counters. The sale of food in snack bars was under the supervision of the Army Exchange Service.(167) From January to June 1946, there was no appreciable change in the number of hostesses employed in the Theater, although the number of clubs decreased.

c. During the war, several Allied Expeditionary Force Clubs had been established to provide recreation for enlisted personnel of Allied nations. After the dissolution of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, and the reestablishment of United States and British

forces as separate and independent commands, it seemed desirable to discontinue this type of club. The Paris club was closed on 15 August 1945, the Frankfurt club was turned over to the Red Cross and Special Services for joint operation, and the Brussels club was closed in October 1945.(168)

d. American Red Cross Clubs were an established part of the recreational program long before V-E Day. Immediately following the cessation of hostilities, plans were made to increase and extend this welfare program for the troupes in the assembly and staging areas and for those in the occupied areas. After the termination of hostilities with Japan, the question of the future of the Red Cross in the European Theater was considered. General Eisenhower said that, as long as any American soldier was in the Theater, he desired the presence of the Red Cross.(169) In October the Red Cross submitted its plan for services during the occupation period. A gradual reduction of installations and personnel in the United Kingdom and the liberated countries, as need declined, and additional service within the occupied zone, was proposed.(170) A Standing Operating Procedure published in September consolidated all directives and policies governing Red Cross operations in the European Theater.(171) During the first six months of 1946, the Red Cross increased its activities within Germany and Austria, but, owing to necessity for economy, began the reduction of its personnel.(172) Shortly before the end of June the War Department informed the Theater of policy decisions of the National Red Cross Headquarters, permitting operation by the Army

of snack bars in Red Cross Clubs and admission to Red Cross Clubs of United States civilians employed by the War Department, and dependents of military and civilian personnel.(173)

e. The revenue-producing, or Class "B" club, included unit clubs for enlisted personnel, officers, and civilians. The management of these varied with their location, size, and general policy. They operated independently, in accordance with general Theater and local regulations.(174)

64. Tours.

a. The leave and furlough program reached its greatest expansion in the summer and fall of 1945, October being the peak month when 14 percent of Theater strength participated. Facilities were expanded, tours organized, and transportation provided to the various centers. Existing rest centers, such as the U.S. Riviera Recreational Area and the Paris and Brussels centers, and the leave program in the United Kingdom were expanded.(175) The Switzerland Leave Tour commenced on 15 July.(176) A series of French tours, sponsored by the Comité Français de Bienvenue aux Armées Alliées, included trips to Marseille, Lourdes, Toulouse, Bordeaux, Limoges, the Châteaux de la Loire, Alp d'Huez, Val d'Isère, and Chamonix.(177) Luxembourg was opened as a leave center in August,(178) and exchange agreements with the Mediterranean Theater provided for visits to Italy.(179) The Denmark leave program was initiated by Bremen Port Command on 28 August, and the use of its facilities were extended shortly thereafter to other commands.(180)

b. With the cessation of hostilities in the Far East, and the anticipated termination of reciprocal aid, the cost of the leave program was examined. As the fall progressed, transportation became a critical factor, and it was realized that it would become more critical during the winter months. To discuss problems and to make an estimate of the requirements of occupation troops, a meeting was called on 26 October of representatives from U.S. Forces, European Theater; Theater Service Forces, European Theater; Special Services; and the major commands and base sections responsible for the operation of Theater leave centers.(181) In addition to making decisions to meet conditions due to redeployment, this conference formulated long-range policy for the operation of leave centers during the occupation period. The projected basis for operation of leave centers and tours outside occupied territory after 1 June 1946 was announced to the Theater on 6 November. United Kingdom, Paris, Rome, Brussels, the Riviera, Switzerland, Denmark, and the French Alps were included, all operating at greatly reduced capacities.(182) Although the number of accommodations planned in November was a great reduction from original estimates, patronage fell off even more rapidly than had been anticipated.

c. After a second policy meeting on 16 January 1946, the major commands were informed of the complete revamping of the Theater leave and furlough program. Quotas were reduced, effective 1 February, and the target date of 1 April was set for the shifting of the leave program to a basis not requiring appropriated funds.(183) A license

was issued to the American Express Company to establish offices within the United States Zone and to operate tours for the benefit of members and employees of the United States forces and attached civilian agencies and their families.(184) Agreements were reached between the American Express Company and the Special Services as to the manner of operation.(185) The American Express leave program was initiated on 8 May 1946, with the Paris and Riviera tours. A tour of the United Kingdom was added on 1 June. Tours currently under U.S. Army supervision and operation, through agreement with foreign governments, remained under Army sponsorship at the request of those particular foreign governments, although they were also placed on a pay-as-you-go basis and tour prices increased to insure operation at no expense to the U.S. Army. These included the Switzerland, Denmark, and Rome tours.

65. Unit Rest Areas and Tours.

Numerous units operated rest areas, established during the last months of hostilities for the benefit of combat troops. These existed both in the liberated countries and in Germany. The problem facing those responsible for the leave program was to consolidate unit centers in liberated countries, eliminating those rendered undesirable because of transportation difficulties or lack of disciplinary control, and to encourage the establishment of such facilities in the occupied area. Such rest centers were useful in France and Belgium during the summer of 1945, since they relieved pressure upon Theater accommodations, and few were closed down at that time, although the operation of new

areas of this type was seldom approved. By Fall, however, as the demand for leave accommodations eased, many were eliminated. The last unit installation, in Belgium, was closed during December.(186)

Many unit rest areas were established within occupied territory, particularly in prewar vacation areas, such as the lake and mountain district south of Munich and the lake district of Bad Ischl in Austria. Persons were encouraged to use these rather than to expend time and overtax transportation by traveling to leave centers outside occupied territory. The unit program developed so rapidly that it was necessary for the Theater to supplement it. Among the most popular localities were Seventh Army's Alpine Chalet and Oberjoch, and Third Army's Garmisch, Berchtesgaden, Ausmannshausen, and Chiem See. Bremen Port Command, having no facilities available within the Enclave, established a leave tour to Denmark, which operated under its sponsorship until 1 June 1946, when U.S. Forces, European Theater, assumed the management of it. Third Army was assigned responsibility for the Munich-Rome tour in December 1945 and continued its operation until 20 April, but quotas for this tour were extended to other commands.(187)

66. Jeep Tours.

To add variety to the leave program Soldier Vacation Tours, or Military Vacation Tours, were authorized. Small groups of men, each under the leadership of a responsible noncommissioned or commissioned officer, were supplied with a vehicle, sufficient gasoline, and provisions and permitted to plan their own excursions and by on their own

for a brief period. This idea was recommended personally by Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, to General Eisenhower,(188) and was announced to the major commands in August 1945.(189) Although this form of tour never attained the numerical proportions of other recreational activities, and was limited by transportation shortages, disciplinary problems, and other factors, the feeling of temporary independence was appreciated by those officers and men who were able to participate.

67. Athletics.

a. The Theater athletic program was planned to provide extensive and highly diversified activities for individuals and teams on all levels. It was useful in aiding participants to maintain physical fitness, providing opportunities for spectator diversion, and giving vocational training to instructors.(190) In order that the program should be able to function on a broad scale immediately after cessation of hostilities, supplies and equipment were procured and stocked for distribution and personnel was trained to organize and supervise the various activities. A school for athletic officers was operated in Paris from 4 March to 7 July 1945. Thereafter instruction was given in sports clinics and unit schools. A Theater ski school and ski safety patrol school functioned during the winter of 1945-46. Water safety instruction clinics were established in the spring of 1946, and in April the Theater Athletic Staff School held sessions to prepare competent athletic officers and enlisted men for teaching, coaching,

and administration of spring and summer sports.(191)

b. Leisure time activities included such sports as boating, hunting, skating, and skiing. Estimates place participation in athletics at 5,000,000 during the six-month period from October 1945 through March 1946.(192) The athletic program allowed participation during duty time in certain sports.

c. Exhibition athletics provided spectator entertainment and stimulated interest in the program. The largest planned program of organized competitive athletics in history was initiated in the European Theater shortly after V-E Day. Competition was carried on at all levels of command, culminating, by process of elimination, in Theater championship tournaments. Sports that did not result in Theater championships usually had their own intracommand or intraunit tournaments. Since all Theater contests began with unit play-offs and worked up through the various echelons of command, they represented the final phase of a series of games which had involved thousands of members of the armed forces. The first Theater championship meet took place in July 1945, and in the following months events were held in some twenty different sports. Following a challenge by the Mediterranean Theater, the inter-Theater athletic program opened in August and September 1945.

d. A separate program was planned for the Women's Army Corps Athletic Advisory Committee. This program also culminated in championships.(193)

e. To encourage athletic competition among Allied troops in occupied territory and in the countries of Western Europe, invitations

were issued to the armies of Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Denmark, Norway, Czechoslovakia, and Poland to send representatives to a meeting in Frankfurt in February 1946 for the purpose of organizing an international athletic council.(194) As a result, the Allied Forces Sports Council was formed, and by 30 June 1946 it had held several meetings and planned a program for the summer.(195)

68. Results.

a. Comparative participation in the various recreational activities is best shown by the table entitled "Attendance Theater Special Services Programs from V-E Day to 30 June 1946," on the following page. This tabulation shows the development of each field of entertainment, and indicates the proportionate importance and relation to Theater strength.(196)

b. Further details on the Theater recreational area and tour program appear in the table entitled "Leaves and Furloughs," on page 71, which gives the breakdown according to the various centers.(197) Figures on this program prior to July 1945 are not available.

ATTENDANCE THEATER SPECIAL SERVICES PROGRAMS FROM V-E DAY TO 30 JUNE 1946

FIGURES IN THOUSANDS

	Special Service Companies (a)	Athletic (b)	Motion Pictures	Live Shows	Tours	Service Clubs	Libraries	Handicraft	Music	Total Sp. Sv. Activ.	Average Theater Strength	Sp. Sv. Atten. per. man per. Mo.
MAY 45	3,338	1,200 (a)	26,691	1,259		322 (a)	10 (a)	5	25 (a)	32,840	3,200	10
% of Total	10.3%	3.6%	80.7%	3.6%		1%	.03%	.015%	.08%			
JUNE	2,511	1,750 (a)	30,668	2,711		1,670 (a)	40 (a)	10	75 (a)	39,435	2,900	13.7
% of Total	6.3%	4.4%	77.4%	6.8%		4.2%	.1%	.025%	.2%			
JULY	1,730	2,300 (a)	22,814	2,117	251	2,100 (a)	100 (a)	11	100 (a)	31,523	2,600	11.9
% of Total	5.5%	7.3%	72.1%	6.7%	4/5%	6.7%	.3%	.04%	.3%			
AUG.	3,045	2,500 (a)	22,231	3,118	265	2,370 (a)	152	15	100 (a)	33,796	2,364	14.3
% of Total	9%	7.4%	65.7%	9.2%	4/5%	7%	.45%	.04%	.3%			
SEPT.	1,482	1,487	22,216	2,220	235	1,901 (a)	321 (a)	20	300 (a)	30,182	1,954	15.3
% of Total	5%	5%	74.3%	7.4%	4/5%	6.4%	1%	.07%	1% (d)			
OCT.	1,137	6,653	21,907	1,495 (e)	215	2,529 (a)	450 (a)	24	350	34,760	1,603	21.7
% of Total	3.3%	19.1%	63%	4.3%	3/5%	7.3%	1.3%	.07%	1%			
NOV.	770	2,373	23,172	892 (e)	106	2,780 (a)	460 (a)	20	200	30,773	1,346	22.9
% of Total	2.5%	7.7%	75.3%	2.8%	3/4%	8%	1.5%	.07%	.6%			
DEC.	246	2,235	17,172	737 (e)	66	2,789 (a)	475 (a)	42	609	24,371	938	26.
% of Total	1%	9.2%	70.5%	3%	27%	11.4%	1.9%	1.7%	2.5%			
JAN.	127	2,844	11,817	466 (a)	48	2,962 (a)	496 (a)	28	358	19,146	701	27.3
% of Total	0.7%	14.2%	61.7%	2.4%	2%	10.3%	2.6%	.15%	1.9%			
FEB.	69	1,326	9,185	353 (e)	27	2,422 (a)	452 (a)	28	160	14,022	565	24.8
% of Total	0.5%	9.5%	65.8%	2.5%	1%	17.3%	3.2%	.2%	1.1%			
MARCH	19	1,107	9,074	392 (e)	22	2,380 (a)	423 (a)	29	219	13,665	515	26.5
% of Total	0.14%	8.1%	66.4%	2.9%	16%	17.4%	3.1%	.21%	1.6%			
APRIL	35	776	6,083	355 (e)	16	2,119	387	23	163	9,957	401	24.8
% of Total	.35%	7.8%	61.1%	3.9%	16%	21.3%	3.9%	.23%	1.64%			
MAY	79	876	5,342	351 (e)	13	2,222	322	34	214	9,463	377	25.2
% of Total	.83%	9.2%	56.5%	3.7%	13%	23.5%	3.5%	.36%	2.3%			
JUNE	107	1,028	3,848	289 (e)	8	1,750	427	136	267	7,860	343	22.9
% of Total	1.4%	13.0%	49.0%	3.7%	10%	22.3%	5.4%	1.7%	3.4%			

LEAVES AND FURLONGS

	<u>Riviera</u>	<u>U. K.</u>	<u>Paris</u>	<u>Lourdes</u>	x <u>Brussels</u>	<u>Lucem- burg</u>	<u>Switzer- land</u>	<u>Denmark</u>	<u>Rome</u>	* <u>Chan- onix</u>	<u>Total Leaves</u>	<u>% of Theater Strength</u>
JUL 45	47056	83380	91027	8740	19649	-	2430	-	-	-	252,284	10%
AUG 45	47587	83943	97943	1008	18332	-	17030	-	-	-	265,843	12%
SEP 45	40014	72977	77883	1150	17537	1513	23751	-	-	-	234,825	12½%
OCT 45	27678	63016	74535	1002	19082	3403	26242	-	-	-	214,958	14%
NOV 45	12970	27777	23433	-	15542	1955	19765	2352	-	1200*	105,994	9%
DEC 45	6860	17169	14169	-	5994	-	18425	1378	-	1389*	65,384	8%
JAN 46	6956	8715	8786	-	-	-	16904	2130	3531	433	47,455	7¾%
FEB 46	2386	3897	3660	-	-	-	12367	1696	2470	644	27,120	5%
MAR 46	1317	2591	2967	-	-	-	9836	1808	2600	334	21,453	5%
APR 46	907	1314	1151	-	-	-	8186	1780	2000	-	15,339	4.0%
MAY 46	516	1658	500	-	-	-	6446	1539	1970	-	12,629	3.4%
JUN 46	512	87	675	-	-	-	4434	931	1433	-	8,072	2.4%

x - Includes Chateaux de la Loire

* - Includes French Alps

69. Planning.

a. The Army Exchange Service made no plans, either before or after V-E Day, for the postwar period in general. For the redeployment period, plans for the limited service that alone was possible were pushed forward quickly. The enormous numbers involved, and the speed with which the results had to be accomplished, made it impossible to do more than supply basic rations, such as tobacco, candy and toilet articles, and beer and coca-cola.(198)

b. Plans for the occupation were first submitted on 28 December 1945. They envisaged a greatly expanded service, to be attained by the setting up of Community Exchanges, which would supply all that was required, except food, including services such as tailoring and watch and radio repair. In order to cope with the greatly diversified service that the Army Exchange Service was to undertake, it was proposed that the Theater Chief of the Army Exchange Service should have complete supervision over the Community Exchange and the warehouse and dispersal points. Regional offices were to be set up, which would have limited supervision over smaller exchanges under the control of local commanders. Slight alterations were to be made in the internal organization of Headquarters, Army Exchange Service.(199) Theater policy dictated changes in this plan. Community Exchanges were placed under the control of the community commander, and new building was forbidden as long as any adequate buildings could be

found in the community.(200) The final plan was submitted on 15 January 1946 and approved on 4 March. The directive prepared by the Army Exchange Service was submitted on 25 March and was published by Theater Headquarters in June.(201)

70. Financial Operations.

a. The Army Exchange Service had three sources of financial support: normal trading profits; the Army Exchange Service, New York, which provided loans at critical moments; and the Theater Central Welfare Fund, which temporarily took over the Army Exchange Service's bills for motion pictures when the Service could not meet them.(202)

b. At V-E Day the Army Exchange Service was allowed to charge a net profit of 5 percent on goods procured in the United States, and a gross profit of 20 percent, but no net profit, on goods supplied by the Quartermaster. On 18 August 1945, authorized net profits were increased to 7 percent, and it was directed that the extra 2 percent be passed on to the Theater Central Welfare Fund. In March 1946 an increase to 10 percent was authorized, of which 2 percent was still to go to the Fund. For the first time since V-E Day, prices were actually increased. To simplify and speed this process a block system was introduced, the effect of which was that average gross profits of 25 percent on Post Exchange goods and 20 percent on clothing were charged. The Inspector General's Department contested these increases, but offered no practical alternative.(203)

c. The Army Exchange Service was in debt to a varying degree throughout the first year of the occupation. Sometimes it succeeded in reducing one or other of its debts at the expense of its liquid assets, but these bookkeeping devices made no real difference in its financial position.

d. Until August 1945 Post Exchange accounts had been balanced separately, and any Post Exchange which showed a profit might, with permission, make an appropriation to the fund of the unit which it served. This system was then altered. Army Exchange Service accounts were balanced as a whole and the surplus, if any, was paid to the Theater Central Welfare Fund. The Army Exchange Service was directed to mark up its net profit by 2 percent in order to transmit to the Central Welfare Fund sufficient profits to finance authorized welfare projects. These were calculated at \$5,523,395.32. Three million dollars of this was a debt to the Army Central Welfare Fund, payable over six months beginning in March 1946. In that month the Army Exchange Service reported its inability to meet this debt at once, and payments were postponed for six months. In the fiscal year of 1945-46, only \$518,679 was paid.

e. Inefficiency in accounting and other fiscal procedures caused considerable trouble to Army Exchange Service Headquarters. One of the important processes that was slowly or inefficiently carried out was the submission of cash. This tied up large sums in the "cash in transit" account, which could not be spared from the already scanty

liquid assets of the Service. This shortage of liquid assets was the greatest financial difficulty of the Army Exchange Service. By cutting down its expansion and reducing its inventories and its debts it could have gone back to solvency, but with the prospect of dependents arriving in the Theater this was impossible. The Army Exchange Service was authorized to raise its prices and its capital, and meanwhile was granted a credit of \$12,000,000 by the Army Exchange Service, New York.

f. In the early postwar period the question of recovery of losses was neglected. In 1946, however, a representative from the Army Exchange Service, New York, arrived to help the Theater authorities institute claims and insurance procedure. In addition to this task he reported to the Theater authorities, and later and in more emphatic terms to the Army Exchange Service, New York, on certain deficiencies in the Theater and suggested remedies, such as checking old invoices to detect short shipments and not concentrating more merchandise in any single warehouse than was covered by the insurance policies held at the time. A Claims Division was activated to handle insurance and other claims before June 1946.(204)

71. Procurement and Local Services.

a. Procurement in Germany, despite its inconveniences, had one great advantage. German products were far cheaper than those of any other nation. Great efforts were therefore made to secure contracts with German manufacturers. Military government regulations had to be grappled with, permits secured for the manufacturers to operate, and

raw materials procured in the United States Zone, in other zones, and abroad. In the first half of 1946 contracts to the value of nearly \$4,000,000 were placed. In the rest of Europe things were rather easier. In Switzerland especially the Army Exchange Service procured large quantities of salable goods, especially watches. In the same period \$20,000,000 worth of goods was ordered. In 1945 the armies procured their own goods, directly in Europe and through the Quartermaster in the United States. This arrangement was not altogether happy, and the Army Exchange Service in Europe took over the functions of the armies on 1 January 1946. (205) Efforts by the Quartermaster to send to the overseas Theaters goods that were unsalable in the United States led to the Army Exchange Service, New York, taking over the functions of the Quartermaster in April. Some goods were received from the Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner, the Army Exchange Service indicating what goods it wanted and these being transmitted if available.

b. The Army Exchange Service itself supervised production of beer, soft drinks, and ice cream, using German facilities as far as possible. The Community Exchange project greatly widened the range of local services provided by the Army Exchange Service. Auto maintenance and repair, tailoring, laundry and cleaning, hairdressing, and watch and radio repairs were the most important of the services undertaken.

72. Distribution.

a. One of the greatest difficulties under which the Army

Exchange Service operated immediately after the German surrender was shortage of transportation. No vehicles were assigned to it permanently. A few were obtained in the next few months, but not until a year after V-E Day did the Army Exchange Service have what it considered an adequate number of motor vehicles. Before this time the difficulties involved in running Exchange vehicles in accordance with Army regulations had convinced the Chief of the Army Exchange Service that the Service must own its vehicles. By 30 June 1946, the process of equipping the Army Exchange Service with its own vehicles and turning back the assigned vehicles to the Army was well under way.(206)

b. Goods came to three bulk warehouses from manufacturers in Europe and from Bremen--the port where most, and finally all, of the goods from the United States were unloaded. From the warehouses they were transferred to eight Post Exchange Distribution Points, and from those to the Exchanges. For various reasons distribution was uneven in the early postwar months. Transportation was one cause of this, and another was the decentralization of control, which caused local variation in policy and difficulty in transferring goods from one Distribution Point to another. This decentralization also caused great variation in the efficiency of operation of the different exchanges.

c. The story of rationing in the Post Exchange in the Theater was one of gradual relaxation of restrictions and increase in the rations of goods that remained restricted. The policy was always that

soldiers of all ranks and grades had equal, and first, priority for all scarce articles. Dependents were at first allowed basic rations only on condition that the rations of the soldiers were unaffected. Certain rare gift items were rationed by means of lotteries, some of them open to all United States nationals working in the Theater and some to men who had been in the Theater before V-E Day. Allied employees were at first barred from buying gift items, but as the supply increased they were allowed to buy all kinds of goods except cameras, watches, optical and electrical goods, and automobiles.(207)

d. Pilferage was one of the difficulties the Army Exchange Service had to face, and to combat this an international agency, the Societe Generale de Surveillance, was retained to guard goods in transit, in addition to other duties.(208)

73. Automobiles.

a. The main obstacle to the project of selling motor cars from the United States was the early refusal of the War Department to agree to the proposal. Once the War Department did agree to it, in March 1946, Theater Headquarters was able to get its scheme, already prepared, quickly into action. It was decided to distribute the cars by means of a lottery. Owing to conditions in the United States, however, no cars were delivered in the Theater before 30 June 1946.(209) War Department opposition also delayed the procurement of jeeps from the Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner. This opposition

was also withdrawn in March 1946, and the Army Exchange Service accepted the first deliveries in June.(210) These jeeps were in poor condition, but a workable scheme to guarantee the delivery of jeeps with minor deficiencies was produced.

b. The Army Exchange Service also took responsibility for the servicing and repair of private cars in the Theater. As the Ordnance Service could not supply spare parts for jeeps, steps were taken to procure repair parts for them, as well as for other cars, in the United States. German garages operating under Army Exchange Service supervision did repair work, the Quartermaster took responsibility for the sale of gasoline and lubricants, and the Army Exchange Service itself carried out all other servicing. Insurance was undertaken by the Army Exchange Service pending the arrival of representatives of two United States insurance companies. Gasoline for private use was at first limited to a ration of 104 gallons a month.

74. Personnel and Organization.

a. The normal loss of staff which all offices suffered from during the redeployment period was aggravated for the Army Exchange Service by the fact that it relied on local civilian labor more than any other staff division or agency. When the move into Germany was made, all French workers in the headquarters office had to be left behind. To fill their places, civilian technicians in large numbers were requisitioned from the United States. The results were not always satisfactory. The arrival of civilians requested from the Army Exchange

Service, New York, was sometimes delayed as much as six months; many of those who arrived were not of high ability;(211) and in any case there were many positions in the Army Exchange Service where the place of an officer could not adequately be filled by a civilian. German labor was much used. Here too there were difficulties, especially the tendency to thievery, which no doubt was natural among employees who, with their families, were underfed. Another handicap was the fact that most Germans of sufficient caliber for skilled or executive work were ex-Nazis.

b. During the redeployment period, Post Exchange staff was provided by the expedient of training 6,000 French workers at a school near Reims. During the three months before Christmas 1945, a school was open near Paris for Exchange officers. It was, however, closed for lack of support.(212)

c. The organization of the Army Exchange Service was altered considerably during the first year of the occupation. At V-E Day it was fairly simple, as the headquarters had no command functions and all the subordinate installations were under local control. As it took upon itself the functions of procurement, transportation, and warehousing, it grew more and more complex. In March the Army Exchange Service was placed under control of the Theater Chief of Special Services.(213)

75. Controversial Aspects of Nonfraternization.

The policy of nonfraternization, which lasted, with certain modifications during its final two months, from its initiation on 12 September 1944 until 1 October 1945, was one of the most controversial phases of the entire occupation of Germany. Although it was abandoned in October 1945 except as regards billeting and marriages, numerous questions remained as to social relations between Americans and Germans. The general failure of the nonfraternization policy after World War I, attributed largely to the American soldier's friendly nature, and to his being billeted with German families, stood as a warning to promulgators of nonfraternization orders in World War II to avert such a breakdown if possible.

76. Origins of the Policy of Nonfraternization.

a. The initial order establishing a nonfraternization policy was communicated through War Department channels to the Supreme Commander. The first official statement of the policy was made in the "Directive for Military Government in Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender," known as CCS 551, and communicated to the Supreme Commander by a letter of 28 April 1944, which stated: "You will strongly discourage fraternization between Allied troops and the German officials and population." The principle of nonfraternization, expressed in the same words, was

carried over in later basic directives on military government in Germany.

b. While the European Theater did not receive the order requiring nonfraternization until May 1944, British-American discussions anticipatory to the drafting of such policy were initiated late in 1943. A tentative draft of policy, emphasizing the need for vigorous efforts to make clear to troops the reasons for nonfraternization and the necessity for distracting troops from fraternization by an educational and recreational program, was communicated in July 1944 from the Civil Affairs Division, War Department, to the G-5 and G-1 Divisions of Supreme Headquarters. The Morale Services Division, War Department, prepared a Pocket Guide to Germany, containing a brief general statement of a nonfraternization policy, which was delivered to the European Theater in June 1944. A Handbook for Unit Commanders (Germany), also containing a brief statement of nonfraternization policy was published by the G-1 Division of Supreme Headquarters in the summer of 1944. All the discussions and preliminary drafting on this subject culminated in a directive on nonfraternization, prepared by the G-1 Division of Supreme Headquarters and issued over the signature of the Supreme Commander as an inclosure to a letter of 12 September 1944, which was disseminated to commanding generals of major commands.

77. Scope of the Policy of Nonfraternization.

The ban on fraternization was effective throughout all ground, air, and naval forces of the United States, Great Britain, and France, insofar as they were under the Supreme Commander and in contact with

the Germans. Thus, the policy was established in both the United States and British Zones. Since no orders were issued within the French forces, the ban applied only to French elements under the Supreme Commander, and the policy was not established in the French Zone. The Soviet forces had a nonfraternization policy, but no orders prescribing conduct were issued.

78. Reasons for the Policy of Nonfraternization.

The nonfraternization policy was primarily a security measure to prevent leakage of information and a device to protect the lives of individuals, although it was intended also to prevent the Germans from influencing the minds of American soldiers. It was, in addition, conceived as insurance against a German campaign of propaganda designed to divest Germany of war guilt and as a measure to promote respect for the Allied armies. Nonfraternization was believed to be a natural balance to the German character. A desire to impress upon the Germans the prestige and superiority of the Allied armies and to make them realize that they had earned the distrust of other peoples, and were completely defeated, were other reasons advanced in official documents for the policy. Nonfraternization was also urged as a means of avoiding unfavorable public opinion at home.

79. Promulgation of the Policy of Nonfraternization.

To inform the individual soldier more thoroughly as to what was expected of him a leaflet entitled "Special Orders for German

American Relations," prepared by the G-1 Division of Supreme Headquarters was distributed to troops at or near the front in January 1945, and later at replacement depots and to all units arriving in the Theater. Soldiers were instructed to carry the folder at all times inside the helmet liner. Later editions of The Pocket Guide to Germany, mentioned above, carried a sticker on its cover designed to point up the orders against fraternization.

80. The Basic Directive.

The basic directive on nonfraternization, entitled "Policy on Relations between Allied Occupying Forces and Inhabitants of Germany," specified that high standards of conducts should be adhered to in Germany, specifically prohibited certain types of conduct, required orientation of troops on the subject, defined policy as to official contacts, and anticipated the need to substitute for friendly relations with the civil population an educational and recreational program and liberal policy of leaves and furloughs. Nonfraternization was defined as "the avoidance of mingling with Germans upon terms of friendliness, familiarity, or intimacy, whether individually or in groups in official or unofficial dealings."

81. Orientation of Troops in Nonfraternization.

Various modern publicity devices were used to explain the policy of nonfraternization. The soldier press gave much space to the subject,--Stars and Stripes, Yank, Army Talks, all published numerous

articles concerning it. The film "Your Job in Germany" was shown to all personnel in the Theater. The Allied Forces Network was used extensively for propaganda on nonfraternization after the beginning of the rapid advance into German territory in the spring of 1945.

82. Fraternalization with German Military Personnel.

A Theater directive of 9 November 1944 forbade selling and bartering of articles between Americans and German prisoners of war, and made it clear that the ban on fraternization covered military as well as civilian personnel. When it was realized that this ban was in violation of existing War Department regulations, a directive of 5 February 1945 permitted the acquisition of souvenirs from German prisoners of war, provided the practice did not circumvent the policy of nonfraternization.

83. Observance of Orders on Nonfraternization up to V-E Day.

Violations of the nonfraternization rule were on a comparatively small scale and not serious in nature up to V-E Day, partly because troops were themselves convinced of the need for avoidance of contacts with Germans for security reasons and partly because rapid movement of troops left little leisure time for development of local contacts. The little documentary evidence available shows that violations were mostly cases of men seeking company of German women or visiting German homes. The cessation of hostilities, with an increase in the leisure time available to the troops, brought fraternization into the foreground as one of the major problems of the occupying forces.

84. Attitude of the Troops after V-E Day.

Intensified efforts to orient troops in the policy of nonfraternization, sometimes by exaggerated poster and radio campaigns, marked the period after the German capitulation. The reaction left much to be desired, as no amount of orientation or propoganda could have convinced the troops of the soundness of the policy. Although the vast majority of Americans were convinced of the necessity for the policy of nonfraternization as long as the campaign continued, there was a rapid change in attitude with the end of hostilities. The reaction from battle conditions, natural curiosity about the country they were occupying, a desire to obtain certain material benefits, a belief that members of Allied armies should have more freedom of action in the social sphere, some knowledge of the friendly relations between Americans and Germans after World War I, the redeployment program with its threat of further combat—each of these had its place in the change in attitude. Concerning the "temptations" placed by the German woman before the American soldier, it can be said that the American soldier found that German girls and women were, on the whole, willing to cooperate in his violation of the strict military orders against fraternization.

85. Employment of German Civilians.

a. In the summer of 1944 Theater Headquarters interpreted Supreme Headquarters policy as altogether excluding the employment of enemy nationals in liberated countries. As the occupied area of Germany increased, so did the labor problem. The transport of civilian employees

from liberated countries was considered in Supreme Headquarters late in 1944 and early in 1945. Negotiations for the transportation of liberated civilians proved disappointing. A total of 80,660 were requested from France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, but the number authorized was much smaller, with the result that Supreme Headquarters was forced to liberalize its policy relating to the employment of Germans. The policy of nonfraternization was an important factor working against the authorization of German labor. A Theater Headquarters directive of October 1944 listed 112 skilled and semiskilled trades, 15 clerical and supervisory occupations, and 14 mess and hospital occupations in which the employment of German civilians was authorized. A controversy regarding employment of Germans in post exchange stores or welfare and recreational services was solved by the communication of policy to the effect that Germans could be employed in such services, provided that they did not come into contact with troops other than those engaged in their supervision. A further liberalization occurred when Supreme Headquarters stated that unskilled gang labor could be used for outside work where required and available, and skilled labor to the extent required and available and consistent with the policy of nonfraternization.

b. A retrogression in the liberalization of the labor policy occurred when Supreme Headquarters issued a statement to the effect that German civilians would be employed only as a last resort and then only in menial tasks where they would offer no temptation to fraternization. After thorough discussion of the necessities for obtaining labor and the

effect of the employment of Germans upon fraternization, Supreme Headquarters again affirmed its former liberal policy. Germans were not to be limited to menial tasks; within the limits of the fraternization ban, the employment of Germans in professional, technical, and other skilled positions was authorized. This new policy was incorporated into basic directives published just before or soon after V-E Day.

c. By July 1945 employment of Germans in civil censorship, in bands and orchestras, and as other types of entertainers was authorized. The private employment of German civilians in officers' billets and messes was checked within the Frankfurt Restricted Area in August 1945, and the employment of all domestic servants was placed under control of Headquarters Command. Use of German instructors in the Army education program was authorized at the same time. In September 1945, the employment of German civilians as drivers of military vehicles was permitted by Theater Headquarters.

86. Violations of the Policy.

a. Estimates of the extent of violations of the policy of nonfraternization can be based on only fragmentary evidence. The rising venereal disease rate and the increase in courtmartial cases involving fraternization indicate that violations increased weekly after the close of hostilities. All observers agree that violation of the rule of nonfraternization began with German children. Regulations to the contrary, soldiers could not resist passing out candy and gum and talking with children.

b. For understandable reasons, the vast majority of clandestine contacts were with German girls and women. Allied soldiers rarely sought out German men. Though it is impossible to state the percentage of Allied soldiers who associated with German women, unquestionably the vast majority of violations of the nonfraternization rule, after the relaxation of that rule as respects children, were in the nature of sexual contacts.

c. Pursuit of material advantages accounted for many of the violations. Laundry and sewing services were sought, and there was widespread barter for cameras, glassware, and other objects. Contacts once formed for these reasons often developed into friendly intercourse. Since all contacts had to be accomplished surreptitiously, problems of law enforcement and maintenance of public order confronted both American and German authorities. In September 1945 Military Government published a notice declaring it unlawful for Germans to acquire, sell, barter, or exchange articles supplied for the use of United States forces, placing upon the German civilian the burden of proof for showing that such articles found in his possession were legally acquired. The question of shopping in German stores was settled after long controversy when the list of articles which United States troops were prohibited from purchasing was extended to include clothing, footwear, textiles, soap, and fuel. A theater-wide prohibition against engaging in business, announced in the spring of 1945, applied in Germany as well as liberated countries and was calculated to prevent purchases of Allied troops from taking the form of a business for profit.

d. Troops with German relatives provided a difficult problem with regard to fraternization. A policy of transferring Americans having German relatives was never thoroughly enforced and was repealed shortly after abandonment of the nonfraternization policy.

87. Enforcement of the Rules against Fraternization.

a. Responsibility for the enforcement of the rules against fraternization passed through the chain of command to the company and platoon commanders. Severity in enforcement varied. The unit commander had at his disposal methods of company punishment as recognized in Article of War 104, reprimand, withdrawal of privileges, or other disciplinary measures. A much used device was a rigorous bed check. Military police who had the task of observing and detecting violations and apprehending offenders usually overlooked all but the most flagrant violations. In some commands special nonfraternization patrols were used to enforce the rules. Many summary and special courts martial and a few general courts martial were held in all major commands; but, in spite of severe sentences, the threat of a court martial was not a sufficient deterrent. Regulations for the punishment of enlisted men were not precise, and no table of penalties for violation of the rules on nonfraternization was ever published.

b. As a means of enforcing the rules on nonfraternization, some persons advocated the punishment of Germans for their share in the offenses. After much discussion and experimentation, a directive issued by Supreme Headquarters on 10 March 1945 stated that the punishment of

Germans for fraternization was contrary to the policy of the Supreme Commander. This view was based upon the belief that nonfraternization was a policy internal to the Allied forces, which should be enforced solely by normal disciplinary action within the Allied forces. All efforts to prosecute Germans for fraternization were therefore discontinued.

88. Problems Produced by Violation of the Nonfraternization Policy.

Violation of the policy of nonfraternization produced a number of serious problems. Discipline became more lax. The predominant German reaction was not one of resenting that such a policy existed, but rather one of chagrin that there were Germans willing to associate with the conquerors. Manifestations took place in the form of assaults, and the circulation of handbills and posters criticizing and threatening German girls and women for association with American troops. Although the original impetus for the increase in venereal disease rate among United States troops came from contacts outside of Germany, by the end of the summer contacts made within Germany were the chief resource of infection. Use of penicillin in the treatment of infected Germans, began in September 1945.

89. Fraternization with or by Special Groups.

Rules against fraternization were never enforced as seriously in Austria as in Germany. The ban lasted for only a short time in Czechoslovakia. Sudeten Germans and Czechoslovaks were difficult to distinguish and both were extremely friendly with American troops.

b. The basic directive prohibiting friendly relations with "Germans" was interpreted as meaning all persons dwelling or residing permanently in Germany. Later, fraternization with displaced persons became the rule in some areas; with this development the nonfraternization policy was undermined. The identity of a displaced person was difficult to prove and many Germans slipped under the line in the guise of displaced persons.

c. Reports indicate that Negro troops were enthusiastic fraternizers both before and after the ban was lifted. The well-known generosity of the Negro soldier often opened German doors more quickly than overtures from white troops.

90. Substitutes for Fraternization.

Many parts of the educational and recreational program planned and put into effect in the posthostilities period received added impetus from the nonfraternization policy. Orientation courses, sports programs, theater and motion-picture entertainment, and other activities were designed in large part to fill idle time and to remove the temptation to fraternize. The original directive on nonfraternization contemplated that rest centers would be established insofar as possible outside of Germany. Suggestions that membership in women's services should be increased greatly and early plans for shipment to the Theater of families of occupation forces in Germany were advanced in order to provide female companionship. A partial solution was the eventual admission of displaced persons to military social affairs.

91. Abandonment of the Policy of Nonfraternization.

Relaxation of the nonfraternization rules came piecemeal.

Fraternization with children was authorized on 8 June 1945; on 15 June 1945 it was announced that venereal disease infection was not prima facie evidence of fraternization; on 10 July Allied troops were authorized to "engage in conversation with Germans in public places"--a development which led to free and open fraternization in many localities. On 24 August all restrictions on fraternization in Austria were removed except for known Nazi elements of the Austrian population. Marriages with Austrian nationals were still not authorized. Effective 1 October 1945, all restrictions on fraternization with Germans were lifted by the Allied Control Council, except that marriage with Germans and billeting of troops with German families would depend upon authorization by the respective zone commanders.

92. Marriage and Illegitimate Children.

a. An administrative memorandum of June 1945 prescribed procedures to be followed by Allied nationals who wished to marry non-Germans in Germany and provided for the performance of such marriages by German authorities.

b. The idea of preventing marriages with Germans by prohibiting officials of the civil administration from solemnizing them was embodied in the draft of a law designed to be enacted by the Allied Control Council. The law was never enacted, however, as there were religious and moral issues involved. A regulation providing that a

member of the Allied armed forces had to obtain consent for his marriage and go to the German marriage registrar with properly authenticated papers or be subject to disciplinary action was a simple solution to this complicated problem and one consistent with the continued ban on marriages with Germans.

c. Various loopholes were found by American soldiers in the restrictions against marriage with German women as early as the summer of 1945. The principal one was to marry a German girl in a religious ceremony without complying with the civil rules. Soldiers who were detected in this evasion of the ban on marriage were subjected to disciplinary action. Until it was made clear that civilians employed by or accompanying the armed forces were likewise subject to the ban on marriage, a few discharged veterans legally married German women. Another loophole was closed by the announcement of a policy that any renunciation of United States citizenship for the purpose of evading the prohibition against marriage with Germans would not be recognized as valid. Marriages between Americans and Austrians were authorized on 29 November 1945.

d. A German wife of an American serving with the occupation forces gained status as a war bride, and like any other alien wife had the right to be transported at government expense to the United States. Whether or not the marriage was in contravention of military regulations, the German wife gained full rights to allotments from the soldier's pay and public funds.

e. The War Department policy regarding illegitimate children was that the Army would not concern itself with cases of disputed paternity of children. In cases of voluntary admission of parenthood, however, commanding officers were authorized to assist soldiers in providing financial or other assistance to the women involved.

SHIPMENT OF DEPENDENTS TO THE EUROPEAN THEATER
AND ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COMMUNITIES

93. Planning for the Accommodation of Dependents.

a. Since maintenance of high morale among troops occupying a defeated country is of prime importance in the success of the occupation, shipment of families to Germany was one of the first concerns of occupation authorities.(214) In July 1945 naval officers stationed in the United Kingdom began making inquiries as to the possibility of bringing their families overseas.(215) In response to a query from the Navy as to Army opinion on the subject, the Theater Commander stated that he believed it was still too early for such planning.(216) All Army planning for the occupation, however, took into consideration the shipment of dependents at some future date as a necessary long-term morale measure.(217)

b. Late September saw the establishment of a Special Occupational Planning Board headed by the Deputy Chief of Staff, the purpose of which was to oversee general planning for the entire occupation. This Board considered such subjects as living quarters; recreational, medical, merchandising, and supply facilities; and the establishment of military communities.(218) All plans were aimed at creation of a standard of living equal to that prevailing on a U.S. Army post in 1937, and provided for military personnel and authorized War Department civilians and their dependents.(219)

c. Although it was impossible to predict the eventual Occupational Troop Basis, the figure chosen arbitrarily for planning purposes was 300,000. On the basis of the War Department decision that only dependents of officers, of noncommissioned officers of the first three grades and of civilians would be authorized to live in occupied territory, it was estimated that a total of approximately 90,000 dependents would arrive in the Theater.(220) It was anticipated that some accommodations would be ready for the first shipment of dependents by 1 April 1946. Troops and War Department civilians and their families were to be stationed in military communities of regimental size wherever possible. Planning duties were allocated to the various services--military communities, installations, and necessary facilities to the Chief Engineer; medical facilities for troops, civilians, and dependents to the Theater Chief Surgeon; merchandising and post exchange

facilities to the Chief, Army Exchange Service; and commissaries to the Chief Quartermaster.

d. Basic planning assumptions were dispatched to the War Department. The reply of the Chief, Operations Plans Division, General Staff, indicated that the War Department was in general agreement with Theater planning already formulated.(221)

e. In October 1945 the Special Occupational Planning Board requested major commands to choose sites for communities to be established in their respective areas.(222) A total of 112 sites was chosen; of these, 79 were tentatively approved.(223) Among the problems which confronted the Board were disposition of approximately 100,000 displaced persons then residing in forty-five of the chosen military communities, establishment of a system of priority for housing and transporting dependents, categorization of civilians for purposes of dispensing supplies, and establishment of a school system for dependent children.

f. In November 1945 the G-1 Division recommended that priority in shipment of dependents be based on the cumulative overseas service of the head of the family since September 1940, provided that the individual agree to remain in the Theater for a period of one year.(224)

g. A directive of 5 December addressed to major commands set forth planning assumptions and delineated responsibilities.(225) The War Department was apprised on 15 December 1945 of the status of

Theater planning and was requested to approve the plans.(226) On 12 January 1946 the Theater received general War Department approval of the plans already promulgated except for two important points. The War Department did not approve the Theater priority system and substituted another plan, whereby applicants with the least overseas service on their current tour would receive highest priority. In addition, the War Department ruled against new construction for the housing of dependents. The Department agreed to transport dependents to the port of debarkation upon receipt of priority lists from the Theater Commander.(227)

b. After considerable effort, the Theater convinced the War Department that some outside help was necessary for preparation of housing facilities for incoming dependents. On 4 May 1946 the Department allocated funds for this purpose.(228)

94. Development of Procedures and Policy.

Theater Circular No 17, published 12 February 1946, established application procedures and provided information on transportation and billeting accommodations for dependents of military personnel. Subsequent circulars stated that procedures for War Department civilians and employees of other governmental agencies were similar to those for military applicants.(229) Pending a change in the current rule, authorizing the transportation of dependents of enlisted men of only the first three grades, those of lower grades were authorized to bring their dependents over at their own expense if they so desired.(230)

Effective 1 April 1946, the travel of dependents of military attaches in Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, France, and the United Kingdom was authorized, subject to established priorities for military personnel.(231) The question of the entry of dependents into Rumania awaited decisions of the Paris Conference regarding the status of that country.(232)

95. Planning for Military Communities.

a. A projected reduction in the Occupational Troop Basis, consolidation of commands, and changes in Theater organization rendered the selection of final sites for military communities more difficult. Communities serving the Air Force, the Constabulary, Theater Headquarters, Berlin District, and Vienna District were allotted first priority for development. Second priority went to all other communities.(233)

b. Since nonavailability of materials precluded any wholesale new construction, it was decided that the ability of a community to receive dependents would depend, in general, upon existing facilities. Potable water, a sewage disposal system, an adequate supply of electric power, sufficient fuel for household use, a commissary, a post exchange, utility maintenance services, a community security organization, medical and evacuation facilities, a fire fighting organization--these were the facilities considered essential.(234) In the case of communities serving two headquarters, responsibility would be assigned to the secondary users to negotiate, for allocation of required facilities, with the command having primary responsibility.(235)

96. Supply Facilities.

The Theater set up categories of personnel for whom supply responsibility would have to be assumed. Dependents were classed as Category II personnel. Within the occupied areas of Germany and Austria, Category II personnel were to be completely supported. Elsewhere, Category II personnel would receive the same support as military personnel insofar as supplies existed over and above the requirements of the military force.(236) Merchandise and service facilities for military communities were to include post exchanges, commissaries, bakeries, shoe repair facilities, laundries, and dry cleaning plants. Post exchanges and commissaries were to be established in all communities, or in communities which could be reached by all dependents. They were, insofar as possible, to stock merchandise found in department stores in the United States--food, clothing, household furnishings, general merchandise, and automobiles.(237) Filling stations and garage service were to be provided at all communities. Post exchange ration cards and clothing cards were to be furnished to all dependents.(238)

97. Quarters for Dependents.

Although early planning had set the living standard of the military community at the level of an Army post in 1937, existing facilities in German towns in many cases fell far short of expectations.(239) A table of allowances allocating billets according to military ranks and civilian ratings was established by the G-3 Division.(240) Quarters were to be assigned in accordance with rank, with due consideration for

the wishes of individuals within the same grade. Once assigned quarters, the individual was not to be displaced by reason of rank, nor was he to be reassigned for his own convenience.(241) Some difficulties in the requisitioning program were encountered; it was natural that German opposition should be evidenced, but the number of difficulties was small. Instructions were issued to major commands to inform German officials of the contents of directives pertaining to military communities and to disseminate a memorandum explaining the need for the requisition of German homes and requesting cooperation.(242) A critical housing shortage in the Paris area was solved by a liberal interpretation of the rule permitting the grant of emergency government housing in cases where aid was essential.(243) Housing shortages and rehabilitation problems continued to be primary concerns of Theater planners throughout 1946.

98. Education of Dependent Children.

a. Planning for an educational system for dependent children in Germany was initiated in September 1945.(244) At the request of the G-1 Division, the Information and Education Division presented a plan of organization for schools in which provisions were made for kindergartens, six-grade grammar schools and six-year high schools. The original estimate of 17,000 pupils, exclusive of children of civilians, proved to be much too high.(245) A single salary schedule was recommended for all teachers, elementary and secondary, irrespective of their individual qualifications.(246)

b. Plans for schools were submitted to the War Department with a request for allocation of funds for the project, but the War Department made no such allocation.(247) The allocation of Class VI Supply Funds was then investigated as a possibility and approved in the amount of \$365,000 on 25 May 1946.(248) Tuition fees were set up on the following scale: free tuition for children of enlisted men of grades 5, 6, and 7; \$4.00 monthly for each child of enlisted men of grades 1, 2, 3, and 4; and \$8.00 monthly for each child of officers and civilians.(249) The Dependents Schools Service Fund was established 6 June 1946.(250)

c. The Dependents Schools Service itself, delegated to take over responsibility from the Information and Education Division, was activated on 4 May 1946.(251) It was established as a special staff section operating under the Dependents Section, G-1 Division, and was charged with the responsibility of organizing and maintaining schools on both elementary and secondary levels throughout the United States occupied area of Germany. A subsidiary function of the Service was to provide advice on private schools and colleges in Switzerland and other European countries.

d. All schools for dependents were to be open for observation by German teachers and school administrators, and thus serve German educators as models for reorganization and democratization of the German educational program.

e. It was planned to have only four schools in Austria. These would be under the jurisdiction of U.S. Forces, Austria, and

related to the Dependents Schools Service only for coordination of certain administrative matters.(252)

99. Medical Service.

Plans for medical service for dependents included a system of community dispensaries in coordination with regular Army hospitals.(253) Medical and dental officers were to be provided from troops assigned to the community. Dispensaries were to provide preliminary attention to illnesses and injuries, while specialized treatment or long hospitalization would be provided in Army hospitals. A child health program was to be handled by Army physicians experienced in the field.(254)

100. Reception of Dependents.

Since all dependents were scheduled to arrive at Bremerhaven, extensive facilities were planned for that port. Accommodations for 500 dependents and 100 husbands were to be provided. Other features included information bureaus, Army Exchange facilities, barber shops, recreation facilities, nurseries, and playgrounds. Medical care and long-distance telephone facilities were to be provided. A peak load of 10,000 per week was planned.(255)

101. Conditions in Liberated Areas.

Conditions for dependents in liberated countries and the United Kingdom, were notably different from those in occupied territory, where the U.S. Army had complete control of services and facilities. A directive of 21 February 1946 was addressed to the Commanding General,

Western Base Section, giving broad premises for planning for dependents and requesting that a plan for Western Base Section be submitted, covering provisions for reception, transport of persons and baggage, housing facilities, medical care, merchandising, and necessary visas. Applicants were required to make their own arrangements for housing accommodations. It was planned to establish a commissary in the Paris area, but dependents in other areas would be required to eat in military messes.(256)

102. Orientation for Dependents.

It was necessary to apprise dependents en route to the Theater of prevailing conditions. An informative letter, dated 28 March 1946, giving general information regarding living conditions, and service facilities, was prepared by the Dependents Section, G-1 Division, in coordination with G-4 Division, and forwarded to the War Department for dissemination to all dependents.(257) Radio scripts pertinent to separate communities were considered.(258) Some communities prepared letters or pamphlets on their areas; in addition, they established information bureaus.(259) A four-hour lecture course was planned in May 1946 for newly arrived dependents.(260) The subjects to be covered in these lectures were: "The Occupation and Your Part in It," "The Germans and You," "The People on Our Side;" while a film, "Here is Germany," was to be shown in the fourth hour to tie together information given in the lectures.(261)

103. Provisions for Servants.

Quarters furnished to military and civilian personnel with dependents were to be provided with servants, including cooks, as required for the maintenance of the household. Additional servants as desired were to be obtained through labor offices under the same procedure as that applying to the procurement of labor paid from the German economy but to be paid for by the individuals concerned.(262)

104. Arrival of First Dependents.

The first dependents arrived on 28 April 1946. At that time nineteen of the fifty-two military communities chosen to accommodate dependents were ready to receive them.

SHIPMENT OF WAR BRIDES

105. War Department Policy.

The War Department early anticipated problems in connection with marriages contracted by soldiers in foreign service and warned that shipping shortages would delay transportation of dependents to the United States.(263) Government transportation was, however, authorized for the dependents of officers and enlisted men of all grades;(264) and wives and children could precede the person on whom they were dependent.(265) In a further extension of policy on 11 August 1945, the War Department listed wives, husbands, and children of military personnel,

of honorably discharged veterans, and of civilian employees of the Army, the War Department, and the American Red Cross as entitled to transportation at government expense.(266) Fiancees were required to pay their own expenses. The movement of dependents of deceased persons was governed by Section XIV of War Department Circular 140, 1945. Those eligible for government transportation who traveled at their own expense were authorized reimbursement.(267)

106. Delegation of Authority.

The Theater Commander designated the commanding generals of Theater Service Forces and the United Kingdom Base as his authorized representatives in the war brides program.(268) In December 1945 the United Kingdom Base became the London Area Office, which continued to administer the war brides program in Great Britain. When Theater Service Forces was inactivated at the end of February 1946, its authority was decentralized to Western Base Section and Continental Base Section. The former supervised shipments of dependents from France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg, the latter dependents from other European countries, including occupied territory. On 23 January 1946, Theater Service Forces assigned Camp Philip Morris, at Le Havre, to Chanor Base Section as the staging area for war brides, and the staging area passed to Western Base Section upon the absorption of Chanor Base Section in February.(269)

107. Planning.

Representatives of bureaus and agencies concerned met in

conference in London on 11-12 October 1945 and in Paris on 18-20 October 1945. At these conferences, representatives of the Operations and Planning Division of the War Department requested monthly reports on applications, with figures on the number processed.(270) It was decided to start the movement early in 1946, and persons interested were informed of the program through a publicity campaign.

108. The War Brides Act.

Petitions for nonquota immigration visas were filed with the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization in Philadelphia and, after approval by the Attorney General, were referred to the Department of State, which authorized consuls to issue the visas. This involved long delay and Theater Headquarters asked the War Department to sponsor legislation abolishing quota restrictions for the brides. This was done, and on 28 December 1945 Congress passed Public Law No. 271, the War Brides Act, which exempted alien dependents, except step-children and adopted children, from quota requirements. It eased the requirements regarding physical and mental condition, but did not remove the requirement of physical examinations. After a conference in Washington in late December 1945, immigration officials were sent abroad to establish liaison between the consulates and the Immigration Service and to prevent entrance of persons guilty of moral turpitude. Upon the recommendation of the Army, physical examinations and customs inspections were made at assembly areas. Abbreviated forms were prepared for shipping manifests, identification forms, medical certificates, and fingerprint records.(271)

109. Modifications in Procedure.

Army or Navy transports were first priority ships for the project, with vessels of the War Shipping Administration second, and other ships of United States registry third. Commercial and foreign vessels could be used only in the event other ships were not available and with War Department approval. Application forms finally adopted gave all information needed for transportation of the dependents to their ultimate destinations rather than only to the port of debarkation, as had been the case earlier.(272) Applications could be made only by the person upon whom dependence was claimed, and the applicant could cancel his request any time prior to the embarkation of the dependent. Dependents of persons already deployed to the United States had priority over dependents of persons overseas. Within these two categories, precedence was given according to date of application. After the deaths of several infants, the War Department prohibited embarkation of women more than six months pregnant and of children under six months of age, and limited children under six years of age to 25 percent of the passenger loads.(273) Later amendments permitted children three months of age to sail if they were in good physical condition.

110. Staging Areas.

In Great Britain, Kingstom Lacy Camp, Parham Downe Camp, and Tidworth Camp were used as staging areas, as well as the Carlton Hotel in Bournemouth. Tidworth, which was the principal staging area in Great Britain, had accommodations for 4,000. On the Continent, Camp Philip

Morris at Le Havre, France, and the Alien Dependents' Staging Area at Hanau, Germany, were used. Camp Philip Morris had a static capacity of 806, while Hanau could accommodate 200.

111. Welfare Agencies.

The Red Cross clubs at the staging areas, supplied canteen and first aid facilities at ports and transfer points, and furnished entertainment aboard ships. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration supplied layettes for needy brides who were displaced persons. Housing was available in displaced persons camps to women who were delayed en route by advanced pregnancy or by children too young for embarkation.(274)

112. Finances.

Brides whose husbands were in the United States could use military payment orders not to exceed \$200, which sum, together with funds derived from allotment checks, was entered on currency control books and later converted into dollar instruments. Spearhead deposits of \$200 were authorized for dependents whose husbands were still in the Theater.

113. Travel Permits.

European countries had different regulations on exit visas. Great Britain granted permits without much delay, and Western Base Section obtained permission from the governments of the liberated countries for dependents to cross their borders on presentation of military travel

orders. War brides entering Germany required exit visas from their home governments and military entry permits issued by the Combined Travel Security Board in Berlin. The Adjutant General of Continental Base Section maintained direct liaison with the Berlin Board, and this facilitated the procedure, but slow mail service in the occupied countries caused frequent delays.(275) Military attaches of American embassies handled applications and arranged travel permits in countries where there were no Army installations.

114. Responsibilities of Base Sections.

Applications were checked by the Adjutant General of the base section and, if papers were in order, war brides were requested to confirm their intentions to travel. After confirmation was received, the Adjutant General issued travel warrants or military orders for movement to staging areas, where dependents were oriented on baggage, money exchange, vaccinations, and other matters. Passenger lists were sent to reach commanding generals of ports of debarkation before arrival of the ships. Continental Base Section sent war brides in groups of about one hundred from Hanau to Paris, where Western Base Section arranged their future movement.(276) All dependents who resided in Great Britain embarked in Southampton. Scandinavian brides were sent in one group in a transport which sailed from Oslo in June 1946. War brides residing in Czechoslovakia were processed in Prague by a representative of Continental Base Section, who arranged for their transportation on the Oriental Express direct to Paris after coordination with Western Base Section.

115. Start of Program.

Shipment of war brides was inaugurated from Southampton on 26 January 1946, when the Argentina sailed with 626 on board. The Goethals, the first bride ship to leave the Continent, sailed from Le Havre with 450 passengers on 8 March 1946. By the end of June 1946 45,285 dependents had embarked and applications had been received from 15,678 for whom travel accommodations had not been arranged.(277) Applications for about 740 others were expected, so that the total remaining in the Theater was about 16,418. Shipments from the three base sections from January until 30 June 1946 were distributed as follows:

Base Section	Adults	Children	Total
United Kingdom	28,299	10,424	38,723
Western Base	5,300	673	5,973
Continental Base	526	63	589
Totals	34,125	11,160	45,285

BUDGETARY AND FISCAL ASPECTS OF THE OCCUPATION

116. Establishment of a Budget System.(278)

a. Four types of funds were expended in the support of the occupation forces in Germany and of the purposes of the occupation.

Appropriated funds of the War Department purchased supplies in the United States for dispatch to the Theater. Theater-appropriated funds were spent exclusively in Allied and neutral countries in Europe. Funds from the German economy provided for local purchases and services. In addition to these, there were the nonappropriated funds described in a later paragraph.

b. During the war, though appropriated funds were closely supervised, no budgeting or estimates of future expenditures were required. Soon after V-E Day supervision became closer, and on 28 September 1945 a War Department cable called for estimates and justification for all expenditures for the last three quarters of Fiscal Year 1946 (i.e., October 1945 to 30 June 1946).

c. One of the factors that led to a Theater budget was the end of reciprocal aid, which came early in September, although reciprocal aid procedures, subject to eventual cash reimbursements, were continued up to 31 December 1945. Another factor leading to the budget was the necessity for closer supervision over German funds.

d. The Fiscal Director's Office was directed to prepare budget estimates pending the establishment of a Theater Budget Office. A letter was published ordering all procurement and contracting officers to obtain prior permission from the local fiscal officer before obligating any government funds. Civilian personnel strength in the Theater was more carefully watched.

e. The decision to activate a Theater Budget Division was taken at a conference of Assistant Chiefs of Staff on 11 October 1945.

The Assistant Chiefs of Staff of the Theater also agreed to make their association for budgetary purposes a permanent one by forming the Budget Advisory Committee, of which they or their representatives were the members. General Order 306, announcing these actions, was published on 6 November 1945. On 29 November an officer from the War Department arrived to take over the post of Theater Budget Director, and on 7 December the table of organization and strength of the Budget Division, drawn up by him, was submitted, and later approved. The new Budget Division took over the last of the Fiscal Director's budgetary functions in February 1946.

f. Estimates for the 1947 budget were called for in November 1945, and were consolidated and ready for the War Department by January. The Budget Director took them to Washington on 25 January. They were approved, but in May a cable was received from the War Department saying that, owing to the general cutting of the War Department's own budget, the Theater budget must be cut considerably. With some difficulty this was done.

117. The Theater Central Welfare Fund and Other Nonappropriated Funds. (279)

a. In October 1944 the Theater Chief Quartermaster reported that a dividend from the Navy, Army, and Air Force Institutes had been handed to him, and he proposed that the sum, amounting to over \$80,000, should be used to set up a charitable fund in Britain. This suggestion was submitted to the War Department, which disapproved it and suggested

that the sum should be used to start a Theater central welfare fund, proposing that this fund should become the depository of all surplus nonappropriated funds throughout the Theater. This suggestion was adopted, and the fund was established in February 1945.(280) A Board of Directors was set up, including the Fiscal Director as Chairman and the Chief of Special Services as the Custodian of the Fund. The other members were the Secretary to the General Staff, the Chief of the Army Exchange Service, and the Chief of the Information and Education Service. The Fund was expected to derive its income from surpluses of welfare and revenue-producing funds and from funds of units inactivated in the Theater. Its expenditures were expected to be loans and grants to the staff sections concerned with welfare activities, transfers to welfare funds of major commands and of organizations not under a major command, and loans to specific revenue-producing funds temporarily short of capital. At its second meeting, in April 1945, the Board agreed to request \$6,000,000 from the Army Central Welfare Fund.

b. In June 1945 a Theater Circular was published regulating all nonappropriated funds in the Theater.(281) One of its main provisions was that the Board of Directors of the Central Welfare Fund should have the power to inspect the books of all funds and to approve or disapprove any transfers of money between one fund and another. At its third meeting the Board anticipated the loan from the Army Central Welfare Fund by making grants totaling \$1,450,000 to the Chief of Special

Services. In July a loan of \$2,000,000 (later increased to \$3,000,000) was granted from the Army Central Welfare Fund. In August, at the instance of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, who had general staff supervision over the Fund, the Board of Directors was replaced by a new board, consisting of the Theater Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, and representatives (Deputy Chiefs of Staff or Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-1) of the most important commands in the Theater. The Fiscal Director was named custodian, but was no longer a member of the board. An inspection was made by the Inspector General's Department in November 1945. The main delinquency reported was the failure of the Board to supervise the other appropriated funds in the Theater in accordance with the circular mentioned above.

c. In August 1945 the question of payment for motion picture rentals was raised, and the Chief of the Army Exchange Service suggested that his Service should pay for these through the Fund. In consequence, an order was published directing the Army Exchange Service to raise the net profit by 2 percent in order to cover this and other commitments of the Fund. With the end of the redeployment period and the reorganization of the Army Exchange Service so that it was earning some money, this became a main source of the Fund's income.

d. A large part of the loan from the Army Central Welfare Fund was distributed to the welfare funds of major commands. In January 1946 a Theater circular withdrew the direct supervision of welfare funds throughout the Theater from the Board of Directors of the Central

Welfare Fund and gave it to the Inspector General's Department. In April 1946 central post funds were authorized for all military posts in occupied territory. Common central welfare funds were authorized to make grants to start these. In June 1946 another directive was published, restoring the power of inspection of other funds to the Board.(282) The only welfare funds that were never under the jurisdiction of the Central Welfare Fund were the Central Hospital Fund and the funds of each hospital.

118. Need for Currency Control.

a. Several factors led to the conditions that necessitated currency control. One was the great depreciation of most European currencies, and especially the German mark. Another was the very active German black market. In combat there were always chances for the unscrupulous soldier to enrich himself at the government's expense. Thus, there was always the necessity for measures to prevent the soldier with large quantities of almost worthless currency from changing it into dollars at the artificial rate which the Army had set up between the dollar and European currencies. Attempts to adopt such measures were sometimes thwarted. For instance, United States proposals might be opposed by an Allied power; a proposal sponsored by one staff division might be blocked by another; or the dealings of an Ally in a matter which apparently concerned only its own troops might bear heavily on the United States authorities.

therefore, a directive slightly more restrictive and more carefully worded was published. A definite limit was set to remittances to the United States in the provision that no person could exceed in any month that month's pay and allowances plus 10 percent, and for the first time it was clearly stated that only money derived from pay and allowances was eligible for remittance.

120. Introduction of Currency Control Book.

a. At the end of August the G-1 Division proposed a more drastic form of currency control.(283) This was the currency control book system, whereby all pay and allowances, and cash derived from dollar instruments, were entered on a permanent record, and purchases of dollar instruments were entered on the debit side of this record. This suggestion, approved by the Theater Commander, was forwarded to the War Department.

b. Meanwhile, the Theater Commander proposed to give men in the Theater who had saved money and were to be redeployed a chance to get it home before the system mentioned above went into effect. For the month of October all restrictions on the amount of money that could be sent home were lifted. This action was not concurred in by the War Department, but it had gone into effect by the time the opinion of the Department was received in the Theater.

c. Use of the Currency Exchange Control Book became effective 10 November 1945.(284) The book consisted of a single sheet of paper folded over to make four pages. The inside pages were divided into

nine columns, in which entries were to be made as follows: date, nature of transaction, amount paid in or exchanged into marks or schillings, amounts exchanged from marks or schillings into dollars, balance in marks and schillings, amount paid in or exchanged into other European currencies, amount exchanged from other European currencies into dollars, balance in other European currencies, initials of person making the entry. The chief structural defects of the book were that it was too flimsy to bear hard use, and consequently had to be kept for the most part in company offices rather than on the owner's person, and that in the authentication column, there was space only for initials, which could easily be forged.

121. Operation of the Currency Control Book System.

a. The Fiscal Director's Office almost immediately reported the following defect to the Director: an individual could send his whole pay home and live in the Theater on black-market profits. To prevent this it was suggested that the cost of meals in messes should be deducted from officer's pay at the source instead of being charged in cash, and that purchases at official installations should be deducted from the currency control book if amounting to over two dollars. A month later the same office reported to the commanding general of Theater Service Forces that the system had undoubtedly been beneficial and that complaints in the Theater had been comparatively few.

b. As a control on money spent in official installations in

the Theater, it was ordered later that all purchases of over \$10, and eventually \$5, should be entered on the debit side of the Currency Control Book. In spite of special instructions for safe custody of issued and unissued books, intended to prevent acquisition by one person of more than one book, many persons had in their possession two, three, or even four books.

c. A difficult problem for the Theater authorities was the conversion of marks and other currency for telegraph companies operating in Europe for the benefit of troops. It was decided that, with the exception of money received for transmission of messages ordering flowers, which were banned soon after the Currency Control Book was instituted, finance offices in the Theater would have to exchange the money involved into dollars. United States businessmen in occupied territory were authorized assistance from the Army insofar as it involved no financial burden on the Army. This was interpreted to mean that, though they might hold Currency Control Books and change dollars into marks or schillings, no reconversion would be allowed. Currency control in Switzerland proved another problem. The high cost of living made the methods that were effective elsewhere worse than useless there. The final decision was that, on departure of a person from Switzerland after a period of temporary duty, the balance on his Currency Control Book should be reduced to the actual amount that was in his possession.

d. Many minor infringements occurred at first. Men were sent on leave without books, or had money changed while on leave without

entries being made. Ports and reinforcement depots neglected to issue books or certificates of exchange of currency. Cases occurred of grossly excessive initial declarations being approved without question.

e. Two months after the introduction of the Currency Control Book it was felt that the system should be revised. Major commands were instructed to make suggestions to be incorporated in a contemplated second circular.(285) The following changes were proposed: a much stouter book which could be retained by the individual; serial numbering of books; space for a full signature in the last column to prevent forgery; and entry in the appropriate debit column of all expenditures in official installations, if over fifty cents. But meanwhile the War Department had also got its currency control plans under way, and this Theater circular, although issued in April, never went into effect.

122. Scrip Currency.

a. In February the War Department announced to the Theater that the Treasury was recommending the introduction of a military scrip. The plan, as then announced, included the most important feature of the final scrip system, namely, that the scrip, which would be issued as pay and accepted in all Army installations, could be changed into local currency but could not be obtained in exchange for local currency under any circumstances. The Theater Fiscal Director's Office had come independently to the conclusion that introduction of scrip was desirable. Although the Office of Military Government opposed the plan, a message was sent early in April to the War Department to the effect that the

Theater recommended the use of scrip. A conference held in Washington on 22 April 1946 finally decided in favor of this form of money.

b. In May the authorities in the British Zone announced the forthcoming introduction of a similar system. This led to rumors of like action in the United States Zone and also to a clear view of one of the problems that would be involved, one concerning persons in the zone not paid from United States official sources. Either introduction of scrip must be announced in advance, or such people must be given time to get dollar currency to exchange for scrip. To meet this problem, the inoperative circular that had been issued in April was reissued, with an extra paragraph directing all such persons to arrange for dollar backing for their marks by 1 August.(286) International agreements securing this backing were almost complete by that date. Meanwhile, the War Department felt that too much money was getting out of the Theater through the unrestricted sale of postage stamps, and a circular was issued regulating this. Just before the actual introduction of scrip, all Currency Control Books were inspected and any holdings on them not backed by actual holdings in currency were canceled in the column showing balances.

c. In Japan an experiment was being carried out to test the reaction of the soldier to a nonreconvertible foreign currency. A type of military yen which had never gone into use was introduced in military installations, and issued as pay, and ordinary yen could no longer be converted into this or spent in messes or post exchanges. At the same

time the scrip itself was being printed in the United States. The Theater was alarmed at the delay that the experiment would entail, but was reassured by the news that it would be possible to introduce scrip on 15 September. The extra time, it was claimed, would be well spent on making the scrip as good and forgery-proof as possible.

d. On 12 September 1946 the TOP SECRET classification on the proposed date of the scheme was lifted, and next day, under the protection of a moratorium which closed all official installations for three days, conversion began.(287)

e. There was little informed hostile criticism of the scheme. In Germany it was accepted with sorrowful resignation, and in France, where there was something to spend black-market profits on, with comparative calm. The total amount handed in for exchange was eventually estimated as about \$59,000,000.

f. In September Theater Headquarters was asking military Government to issue a law prohibiting the possession by Germans of Military Payment Certificates, but the law was not passed until January 1947.(288) In Berlin a local ordinance to the same effect was opposed in the Allied Kommandatura by the Soviet representative.

123. Other Systems.

a. The main difference between the British and American scrip systems was in the method of their introduction. The British authorities announced their scheme two months ahead, while one of the most important features of the American scheme was its secrecy. The reason for this

lay in the difference in the earlier history of currency control in the two zones. While the amount that could be exchanged in the United States Zone was limited by the entry in the Currency Control Book, only the amount of the last pay drawn might be exchanged in the British Zone. As this was only one week's pay, it was felt that imposition of so small a limit without warning would be unfair. The only other difference in the systems was that, in certain circumstances, reexchange from marks into scrip was permitted by the British.

b. In Berlin District, from the beginning of August to the introduction of scrip, a validating coupon system was in use. The peculiarity of this system was that coupons were not used as a substitute for cash, but were surrendered along with cash. Coupon books were deducted from the Currency Control Book, and if unused might be restored to it. In Munich the same system was used, but with less good results since there were installations near by which were not affected by the system. In Berlin all the United States installations accessible to the whole command were controlled by the parallel action of Berlin District and the Office of Military Government. The disadvantage of this system was that the labor involved in accounting for coupons was almost as great as for cash. In a small area this might not matter, but it was a final argument against introducing the system throughout the Theater.

124. Relation between Income and Output.

The figures show that, up to September 1945, United States

troops in Europe were spending more than they were earning; that in October and November they sent home and spent in official installations more than their pay; that for the months of December and January the balance was restored; but that in the next five months the situation grew worse, until in June 1946 they sent home and spent in official installations more than twice as much as the amount of their pay.

THE DISARMAMENT AND DISBANDMENT OF THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES

125. Formulation of Disarmament Plans.

When indications of a German surrender or collapse appeared in late 1944, Supreme Headquarters issued instructions outlining the policy and procedure governing the disarming of the German armed forces.(289) As the fighting progressed, these general instructions were followed by directives giving in greater detail the procedure to be observed in disarming the enemy forces.(290) The plans which called for primary and secondary disarmament of the German armed forces, provided as follows: Enemy ground forces would be required to deposit their arms, ammunition, and other equipment in dumps guarded by their own personnel pending its transfer to the Allies;(291) enemy warships and other vessels would proceed to port; naval ammunition, warheads, and other explosives were to be unloaded and all personnel of warships were to go ashore except those needed for care and maintenance; merchant and fishing vessels were to wait for further instructions;

naval forces on shore were to disarm completely, except for weapons needed for guard duty;(292) German aircraft were to be grounded and immobilized;(293) and disarmament of the German land forces, naval forces and air forces was a responsibility of comparable Allied forces, except that Allied ground forces were to give assistance to the Allied naval and air forces.(294)

126. Disarmament During Combat.

Most Germans were impelled by common sense and by instructions contained in surrender leaflets distributed by the Allies to surrender with their hands in the air and without weapons. Consequently, disarmament of individuals and of relatively small groups during combat consisted mainly in searching the prisoners for concealed weapons and explosives and in collecting abandoned weapons found on the terrain. Submachine guns, machine guns, antitank weapons, antiaircraft artillery, artillery, mortars, and rocket launchers were generally left in place when overrun by combat units and later collected and hauled to Ordnance collecting points, except those whose recovery value had been destroyed by the Germans.(295) Surrender of large groups of Germans was, however, more formal. Whenever a unit let it be known that it desired to surrender, its representatives were permitted to cross Allied lines to receive proper instructions. Surrender was always unconditional. The emissaries were usually told to disarm all enemy elements immediately, hold them in their areas with all mess and transportation equipment, and concentrate all personnel and equipment. Instructions were also

given to retain under arms a force sufficient to guard arms and equipment and to preserve order.(296)

127. Disarmament of the German People.

As the Allied armies advanced into Germany, military government was established to enforce policies of the Supreme Commander and certain laws, ordinances, and notices were posted. One ordinance stated that all firearms, including shotguns, and all other weapons, ammunition and explosives were to be surrendered immediately. Violations were to be punished by death or imprisonment.(297) When Supreme Headquarters terminated in July 1945, U.S. Forces, European Theater, which became the highest military authority in the United States Zone of Germany, announced that all military government rulings issued by the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, would continue in force.(298) This automatically included provisions to disarm the German people in the United States Zone. When the Allied Control Council ratified a similar ruling in January 1946, a uniform system to disarm German civilians in the four occupied zones was established.(299) To further effect the disarmament of the enemy, large-scale search operations were conducted in July and November 1945. These resulted in the confiscation of small arms, ammunition, and other unauthorized items. The searches continued on a smaller scale, with decreasing numbers of weapons and other items being found.(300)

128. Long-Range Program to Render Germany Incapable of Waging War.

After the defeat of Germany in May 1945, steps were taken by the Allies to render that country incapable of ever again becoming a menace to the peace of the world. When Germany surrendered unconditionally, there was no central government in Germany capable of accepting the responsibility for maintenance of order, administration of the country, and compliance with the requirements of the victorious powers. Consequently, the representatives of the supreme commands of the four powers declared in June that their governments assumed supreme authority over Germany. They ordered that Germany and all German armed forces immediately cease hostilities in all Theaters, completely disarm, and hand over their weapons and equipment to local Allied commanders, and that all arms, ammunition, explosives, military equipment, stores, supplies, other implements of war of all kinds, and all war material in possession of the German armed forces be held intact for disposal as the Allied representatives might decide.(301)

129. Enemy Fortifications.

a. In accordance with the Berlin Declaration of 5 June 1945, the Commanding General, U.S. Forces, European Theater, announced in July the policy governing the demolition of fortifications and defensive works in the United States Zone. Major commanders, who were held responsible for this demolition and also for the location and clearance of mine fields in their areas, immediately started necessary operations

to perform the tasks assigned to them.(302) Work of systematically surveying and demolishing fortifications was started late in October 1945 and progressed satisfactorily, but because of the extent and number of fortifications the work of demolishing them was to be one of the long-range tasks of the occupation.(303) Progress was hampered by redeployment and the shifting of units from one area to another.

b. On 6 December 1945, the Control Council published Directive No. 22, which established two priorities for the demolition of enemy fortifications, defense works, and military installations, and set definite dates for these to be completed. In General, Priority I included those installations which presented an immediate security hazard or which were readily capable of adaptation for war purposes without extensive preparation. The deadline set for these to be destroyed was 6 June 1947. The second priority included installations which, though not an immediate security hazard, were an integral part of the German security plan. The deadline for the destruction of Priority II installations was 6 June 1951.

c. Great advances had been made toward the complete elimination of Germany's war potential by destroying war plants, by converting them to peacetime use, or by dismantling and removing them for reparations. By 30 June 1946, surveys and destruction work had been advanced sufficiently so that meeting the planned target dates seemed to be assured.

130. Formulation of Disbandment Plans.

Plans for the disbandment of enemy military formations were made in late 1944 concurrently with the plans for their **disarmament**.(304) The disbandment plan specified that the enemy forces, except prisoners of war and certain others, would be controlled by their own officers under Allied supervision; that captured troops would be used to satisfy the labor needs of the Allies in occupied areas and in Allied and liberated countries; and that, when discharge occurred, certain categories of laborers would be given first priority. According to the plan, responsibility for the documentation and discharge of personnel of all three branches was given to zone commanders. Briefly, zone commanders were to discharge individuals residing in their zones of occupation and to transfer others to their zones of residence, giving the Counter Intelligence Corps information on proposed discharges when requested and giving all individuals a discharge certificate to enable them to receive ration cards at home. Finally, the plan stated that stragglers, deserters, and personnel discharged without authority were to report to certain centers for registration without risk of disciplinary action, and that non-Germans would be treated and disposed of in accordance with policies agreed upon with their respective governments.(305)

131. The Status of "Disarmed Enemy Forces."

To have taken into custody as prisoners of war, who would be entitled to rations equivalent to those of American base troops, the

large numbers of Germans who were surrendering in April and May would have involved feeding patently beyond the ability of the Allies, even if all available German supplies were tapped. Moreover, it would have been undesirable to furnish troops with rations far in excess of those available to the civil population.(306) Consequently, the War Department approved treating all members of the German armed forces captured after the declaration of ECLIPSE conditions, or the cessation of hostilities, and all prisoners of war not evacuated from Germany immediately after the conclusion of hostilities, as "disarmed enemy forces," and specified that such captives would be responsible for feeding and maintaining themselves. This ruling did not apply to war criminals, wanted individuals, and security suspects, who were to be imprisoned, fed, and controlled by Allied forces. The War Department further directed that there be no public declaration made on the status of the German armed forces.(307)

132. Statistical Analysis.

In September 1944, German prisoners of war who had been captured by the Allied Expeditionary Force numbered 545,756.(308) Each day thereafter a few more thousand prisoners were apprehended, and when the year ended 811,796 had been recorded.(309) The one-millionth was captured on 8 March 1945(310), the two-millionth on 16 April(311), and the three-millionth on 1 May.(312) Supreme Headquarters authorized army group commanders on 4 May, to consider the great masses of German troops then surrendering, not as prisoners of

war entitled to the privileges prescribed in the Geneva Convention, but as disarmed enemy forces. The captured troops were disarmed, retained in their own organizations, and moved into concentration areas to be disbanded as soon as practicable.(313) When hostilities ceased, 4,005,732 prisoners of war had been captured.(314) Additional prisoners continued to be reported after V-E Day, and revised statistics show that the total number captured was 6,155,468.(315) Of this total, 2,057,138 were prisoners of war and 4,098,330 were disarmed enemy forces.(316)

133. The Course of Events from V-E Day to the Slowing Up of Disbandment.

Members of the Volkssturm who were prisoners of war or who were wearing a uniform when captured were disbanded as members of the disarmed enemy forces. Others were permitted to go home.(317) On 15 May 1945, Supreme Headquarters gave authority to discharge certain categories of prisoners of war and members of the disarmed enemy forces. Those to be discharged first were all men of German nationality who were agricultural workers, coal miners, transport workers, and other urgently needed workers provided that they lived in the area in which they were imprisoned and were not war criminals, security suspects, or members of the SS. All women members of the German armed forces were also to be promptly discharged, provided that they lived in the area in which they were imprisoned and were not war criminals,,security suspects, or members of the SS.(318) Three days later, Supreme

Headquarters gave authority to discharge all prisoners of war over fifty years of age, provided that they lived in the area in which they were imprisoned and were not war criminals, security suspects, or members of the SS.(319) On 5 June 1945, nationals of France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg who were prisoners of war or in the status of disarmed enemy forces and not wanted for war crimes by a country other than their own were released to their respective governments.(320) General discharge was authorized late in June for all Germans except war criminals, security suspects, and those in automatic arrest categories. Those whose homes were in the Soviet Zone were held until an agreement on their transfer could be reached. At the same time, it was announced that war crime suspects would be discharged and reimprisoned as civilian internees, and that automatic arrestees and security suspects might be discharged if held in custody for interrogation.(321) In July, authority was given to release to their governments all non-Germans who were not security suspects or wanted as war criminals by a country other than their own, with the exception of Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, and Poles not claiming Soviet citizenship, and dissident Yugoslav and neutral nationals with ardent Axis sympathies. The last directive relating to the mass disbandment of the German armed forces was issued in August.(322) It required that automatic arrestees be discharged and reimprisoned as civilian internees before being tried as war criminals, and provided that SS members who had joined that organization subsequent to 1 August

1944 and who were privates could be discharged if cleared by the Counter Intelligence Corps.(323)

134. Situation in July 1946.

a. In July 1946, 216,657 prisoners of war and 66,868 internees were in the custody of the U.S. Army. Of the prisoners of war, 29,900 were in Italy, 242 were in Austria, 176,265 were elsewhere in Europe, and 250 were in the Zone of Interior. Members of the SS still held as prisoners of war totaled 11,064 and consisted of all members of the Waffen-SS above the grade of Scharführer (sergeant) and all members of the Allgemeine-SS above the grade of Unterscharführer (corporal). They were held as members of an indicated organization pending decision of the International Military Tribunal with reference to the criminality of that organization. The total of 7,969 individuals held in the category of other automatic arrestees included General Staff Corps officers, senior members of paramilitary organizations other than the SS, and high officials of the Nazi Party. These were held in confinement nominally as prisoners of war but really as war crime and security suspects.

b. There were 42,498 prisoners of war who were in the process of discharge. They included individuals recently returned from the United States, personnel of Labor Service units recently rendered surplus, individuals released from hospitals, and those in the routine process of being disbanded.

c. In the United States Zone and in the liberated countries, there were originally almost 750,000 prisoners of war in Labor Service units. By July 1946 this number had decreased to 105,100, organized into 420 units. It was anticipated that Labor Service units in the United States Zone would be disbanded and the personnel discharged by 30 November 1946. Those units performing tasks in liberated countries were to be disbanded as the need for them ceased, and in any event by 1 July 1947.

d. Prisoners of war in hospitals totaled over 175,000 in August 1945. By July 1946 this number was reduced to 9,634. The hospitals were staffed to a considerable degree with technical personnel of the former German Medical Corps. Although the hospitals operated under the direct supervision of United States medical battalions, they were not military organizations in any sense and were preserved to render necessary medical service to prisoners of war. Individuals requiring hospitalization in excess of thirty days were discharged. The intention was to release all hospitals for civilian use when the military need no longer existed.

e. A total of 71,794 civilian internees of various Nazi and paramilitary organizations other than the SS were being held in internment camps throughout the United States Zone, awaiting decisions as to their culpability under war crimes provisions.(324)

Chapter XII

INTELLIGENCE

LAW, ORDER, AND SECURITY

135. General.

a. During the first year of the occupation, law, order, and security were maintained, in general, satisfactorily, except as respects security of material and information. In regard to material, pilferage attained alarming proportions reaching two million dollars for the month of December 1945. Security of information was often neglected, owing to indifference after the conclusion of hostilities. As the first year of the occupation drew to a close, nothing spectacular had happened to support or confirm the suspicions of those who had feared underground movements or zone-wide resistance to the occupation forces. The breaches of law and order which did occur received perhaps undue emphasis in intelligence reports.

b. Most effective in the maintenance of law and order was the policy of completely sealing-off Germany from the outside world and, in a somewhat lesser degree, sealing off the United States Zone from the rest of Germany. From the beginning, the U.S. Army maintained a strict border control. Originally designed as a security measure to prevent the movement of members of the German intelligence services, this later proved valuable in controlling the movement of displaced persons, prisoners of war, and refugees.

c. The zone-wide curfew for the civilian population was lifted on 30 March 1946. This action precipitated a controversy, as some major commands and the G-2 Division of Theater Headquarters were in favor of reinstating the curfew. It was finally determined that the curfew could be reinstated by local tactical commanders, after consultation with Military Government, if the security situation warranted such action.

d. Unannounced check and search operations, covering at times areas as large as one of the two Military District, helped to maintain law and order. During an operation all troops in the area were alerted, road blocks were set up, and search parties systematically combed the area for security suspects, firearms, and black-market operators.

e. The rapid redeployment of trained personnel left military police, the Counter Intelligence Corps, the Criminal Investigation Division, and the Judge Advocate's Offices greatly understaffed.

This problem was in some instances so acute that the security and law enforcing functions of these agencies were seriously impaired.

136. The Counterintelligence Directive for Germany.

a. The basic policies for security were outlined in the counterintelligence directive for Germany, first issued by Headquarters, 12th Army Group, on 10 April 1945, and remained in force on a Theater-wide basis throughout the first year of the occupation. In addition to providing security for American military interests, the basic counterintelligence missions of the United States forces in Germany were the following: to destroy the enemy secret intelligence services and all security or secret police and affiliated para-military organizations; to dissolve the Nazi Party and prevent its rebirth in any form; to aid in the disposal of the German General Staff Corps; and to detain selected enemy scientists and industrial technologists.

b. All personnel of the German intelligence services, including the secret field police and the security service, were to be interned. All security suspects and war criminals were in the automatic arrest category, as were all members of the Gestapo, all higher police officials, Nazi Party officials, high civil servants, the German general staff, and members of the German paramilitary organizations, with the exception of the lowest ranks.

137. Civilian Internees.

a. About 150,000 persons were arrested during the first year of the occupation, the large majority in the period immediately following V-E Day. The first decrease in the number of civilian internees, was in October 1945. By the end of 1945 there were 128,000 civilian internees in internment camps in the United States Zone. Concentration of such a large number of security suspects, besides creating problems of supply and guarding, offered the danger that new Nazi cliques might be formed behind barbed wires. Many who had not been connected with the Nazi regime had been interned on technical grounds. In view of these considerations, the automatic arrest policy was amended several times during the first year. On 1 July 1946, the total number of civilian internees in United States enclosures had been reduced to about 70,000.

b. Internment camps were administered by the Theater Provost Marshal. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, was charged with providing trained personnel to screen the internees and to determine whether their confinement was in accordance with directives.

c. War Criminals were not segregated from other security suspects. All civilian internees were kept in enclosures, the population of which was constantly changing as new suspects were added and others released or brought to trial. The camp occupants were inconvenienced by serious overcrowding, unsatisfactory sanitary conditions,

and lack of educational, religious, and recreational facilities. The war criminals, security suspects, automatic arrestees, and other internees received a basic food ration of 1,700 calories per day-- a ration decidedly above that of the German civil population, which was first 1,500 then 1,250 calories per day. Workers in internment camps received an extra allowance of 700 calories per day, while a hospital ration of between 2,300 and 3,000 calories was provided. In the spring of 1946 Theater Headquarters began preparations for transferring civilian internment enclosures to German authorities.

d. On 20 June 1946 the Chief of Staff of Theater Headquarters ordered that the release of civilian internees be expedited. Accordingly, Third U.S. Army established a board of officers familiar with counterintelligence processing. This board went into civilian internment enclosures in the Third Army area and reviewed the cases of all persons who had been arrested and were held solely on grounds of being security threats. In four weeks the board reviewed approximately 1,800 cases, of which more than 1,100 were ordered released.

138. General Trends in the Security Situation.

During combat it had been impossible to assess accurately the potentialities of German underground movements which were believed to exist. The first two months of occupation, however, proved that no major German opposition was to be encountered. Nazi plans for

underground activities were not fully formulated at the time of the collapse. The early apprehension of members of the SS, SD, and Gestapo deprived a potential underground resistance of leadership. There were some signs of subversive activities, but they were uncoordinated and showed none of the characteristics of large-scale planning. The legendary Werwolf organization was soon exploded as a myth of Nazi propaganda. A greater nuisance to occupation authorities were the Edelweiss Piraten, who throughout the first year of the occupation figured prominently in field reports of subversive activities. While there was conclusive evidence of Edelweiss Piraten meetings and planning, the long-range aims of the group appeared to vary in different localities. Basically, the Edelweiss Piraten were groups of disgruntled youths who gathered to annoy occupation authorities, to threaten German women who associated with occupation troops, and to deal extensively in the black market. Other groups, similar in character, were the EORGA organization and the Bundschuh and Regenbogen groups.

b. In October 1945, the first signs of unrest were noted in the civilian population. Petty acts of sabotage such as wire cutting were on the increase and the wall-smearing campaign, more or less insignificant in scope, which had so far been directed against German women associating with American troops, now defied the occupation authorities. Furthermore, a slight increase was noted in the

number of attacks on United States personnel. Generally, the Germans assumed a bolder attitude, which was expressed in a slight but growing disregard for military government legislation. Illegal mail traffic and other petty security violations increased, and revival of anti-Semitic feeling was reported.

c. From December 1945 until the middle of March 1946 there was a general improvement in the security situation, resulting largely, it appears, from the arming of the civilian police in many areas and the increased use of mobile patrols. Strangely enough, the dreaded winter months with their many hardships produced no adverse effects on civil security. The G-2 Division of Theater Headquarters reported also that the large-scale withdrawals of tactical troops under the redeployment plan did not cause the civil population to disregard security controls and that apprehension in this respect had "proven to be unfounded."

d. During the last two weeks of March, the security situation deteriorated appreciably and remained at a lower level until the beginning of June 1946. The G-2 Division, reversing its previous position, stated that the hasty withdrawal of United States troops contributed "primarily to the boldness of the German people." With the disappearance of the symbol of authority, German self-confidence returned, together with the belief that the United States would soon withdraw from the occupation altogether. During the

spring of 1945 security violations of all descriptions, from attacks on American personnel to curfew violations, were on the increase. There was some criticism by Germans of Military Government and of occupation policies. The number of civilians apprehended for carrying weapons increased. Although improvements in the situation were noted in the first week of June, the previous high level was not attained during that month.

139. The Theater Protective Security Plan.

a. A zone-wide security plan evolved by Theater Headquarters included an estimate of the situation in the United States-occupied areas of Germany and Austria and in adjacent territories, stated the courses of action open to the occupation forces in meeting civil disturbances, and set forth principles to be used as a basis for the security plans of the lower echelons. It was supplemented by a Theater alert plan, containing a checklist of actions to be taken by major commanders in the event of emergencies which were given code word designations. Both the security and the alert plans provided for mutual assistance among major commands and coordination of action by Theater Headquarters.

b. The security plan dealt in great detail with minor uprisings, in the event of which provision was made for vigilant frontier control and for demonstration flights by the Air Force, but reprisal action against German communities was forbidden. A major uprising was deemed less likely and was considered in less detail.

140. Security Aspects of the Displaced Persons Problem.

a. Displaced persons were responsible for some crimes of violence, for looting, pilferage, and a large amount of black-market activity. Establishment of camps, shake-down inspections, and stepping-up of patrol activities contributed to control.

b. From the outset the military authorities were responsible for the enforcement of law and order with respect to displaced persons. The agreement with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration of 18 February 1946 provided, however, that the military authorities would consult with camp directors, particularly when the displaced persons in the latter's care might be subjected to search, arrest, and detention. Search operations had to be approved by Military Government. The displaced persons were well aware of the stringent regulations covering the entry into and search of their camps and believed that they were relatively immune from action by law-enforcement agencies. Check and search operations were conducted, however, from time to time in displaced persons centers, and usually yielded large numbers of lethal weapons and black-market supplies.

c. Prior to 30 March 1946, German police were permitted to conduct searches in displaced persons assembly centers, provided concurrence had been obtained from Military Government. But this caused friction, culminating in the Stuttgart riot of 29 March 1946, when displaced persons moved against German police conducting a search

operation. Shots were fired from both sides and one Jewish displaced person was killed. Order was not restored until an armored car and several jeep loads of District Constabulary arrived. The immediate result was that the Theater Commander prohibited the use of German police in searches and seizures in camps housing persecutees. Six weeks later, on 16 May 1946, Theater Headquarters promulgated Standing Operating Procedure No. 81 on check and search operations in United Nations displaced persons centers, which was intended to establish uniform procedures throughout the United States occupied area of Germany. To prevent recurrence of incidents like the one in Stuttgart, authority to approve check and search operations in Jewish displaced persons centers was limited to the commanding generals of the Third U.S. Army and the Berlin District. Germans were not permitted to participate in such operations in Soviet-administered or Jewish centers, except when required to identify persons or material evidence. In this event their number was to be limited to one or two essential individuals. German police could participate in search operations in other than Soviet-administered or Jewish centers, provided that they did not exceed the number of United States troops engaged in the operation and that they remained under the direct supervision of United States personnel. Troops taking part in such an operation were to be commanded by an officer of at least the rank of captain and were to be carefully briefed as to their objectives, powers, and conduct.

d. Contributing to the security aspects of the displaced-persons problem was the fact that Allied and neutral nationals were assigned as static guards in depots and large military communities, and on prisoner-of-war details where United States manpower was insufficient. The men used for these purposes were almost entirely displaced persons, mainly from the Eastern European countries. Because of the large number of Poles employed, these organizations were often termed "Polish Guard Companies." This was a misnomer, as the companies were not composed entirely of Poles. During the last week of January 1946, the number of Poles used for guard duties was 23,340, but the total of foreign nationals so employed was 31,836. By 30 June 1946, the Theater total of foreign civilian guards had risen to 41,500 persons, organized into 199 units.

e. The widespread use of these foreign guards was not without perplexing ramifications. The Secretary of State questioned the wisdom of using Polish personnel inasmuch as political repercussions might result from it. Theater Headquarters had to assure the War Department that steps were being taken to effect the repatriation of these displaced persons, but recommended that, since they were available, foreign nationals be retained in service on guard detail until the prisoner-of-war labor companies were disbanded. A more immediate and no less disturbing problem was the conduct of these civilian guards. Frequent reports of crimes perpetrated by uniformed displaced persons, ranging from capital crimes to minor offenses,

presented a problem with which the German police could not cope and which military police found difficult. Culprits were often mistaken for United States personnel and the American soldier was discredited in the eyes of the civil population. Theater Headquarters ordered in December 1945 that all uniforms in possession of non-Americans be dyed blue or brown, but it was not until April that this order was complied with.

141. War Criminals.

a. The first comprehensive directive on bringing war criminals to justice was the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1023/10 of 8 July 1945. By its terms, responsibility was imposed upon the Theater Commander to bring about punishment for the following crimes:

(1) Atrocities and offenses against persons or property constituting violations of international law, including the laws, rules, and customs of land and naval warfare;

(2) Initiation of invasion of other countries and of wars of aggression in violation of international treaties;

(3) Other atrocities and offenses, including atrocities and persecutions on racial, religious, and political grounds, committed since 30 January 1933.

b. The term "criminal" was defined as including all persons, "without regard to their nationality or capacity in which they acted," who had committed any of the crimes defined above. It included also

all persons who had been accessories to these crimes, who took a consenting part therein, who were connected with plans or enterprises involving their commission, or who were members of groups or organizations connected with the commission of such crimes. With reference to crimes against peace, invasion of other countries, and wars of aggression, the term "criminal" included persons who held high political or military positions in Germany or one of its allies or cobelligerents.

c. The Theater Commander was directed also to cause the arrest of all persons whom he suspected of having committed other atrocities and offenses, including persecutions on racial, religious, or political grounds, and of all persons whom the Control Council, or any one of the United Nations or Italy, charged as criminals.

d. As a result of Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067/10, the Theater Commander not only was charged with the punishment of crimes committed against the laws and customs of war in connection with military operations or occupation, but also was directed to punish all crimes, except common law crimes, committed in Germany and territories conquered or annexed by Germany since 1933.

e. By Theater directive of 14 December 1945, the 970th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment was responsible for the apprehension of suspected war criminals and witnesses. The Counter Intelligence Corps was not to initiate investigations or uncover war criminals, but merely to apprehend those persons designated by the

Theater Judge Advocate, intern them, and render an immediate report of arrest. Issue to counterintelligence agents of such items as food, gasoline, cigarettes, lipsticks, and similar supplies could be requested through channels when required to facilitate the apprehension of war criminals.

142. Military Justice.

a. The statistics of general court-martial cases from July 1942 to February 1946 revealed that the number of purely military offenses constituted 58.1 percent of all cases tried. The number of accused tried for murder and sex crimes was 10.17 percent of the total, and the rest were miscellaneous offenses, of which black-market deals accounted for the largest number. V-E Day brought a sharp drop in rape cases. The number of purely military offenses began to decline in a somewhat less marked manner in June 1945. There was, however, a corresponding rise in the number of noncapital common-law crimes.

b. Approximately 10 percent of all troops in the European Theater were Negroes. The amount of violent crimes, murder, and rape committed by this minority was far out of proportion to its numbers. An analysis of the death sentences executed in the European Theater through 31 October 1945 showed that, of 70 soldiers executed, 55 were Negroes, all of whom died for murder or rape, or both. The one soldier executed for desertion was white. During the same period of time a total of 260 white soldiers and 253 Negroes had been condemned

to death, the sentences in the cases of 245 whites and 198 Negroes having been commuted. The largest number of Negro offenders had committed violent crime, while with white troops desertion, misbehavior before the enemy, and sentinel offenses were more prevalent.

c. The decline in serious offenses after V-E Day was not in proportion to the decline of troop strength in the Theater and the volume of court-martial cases did not fall as anticipated. In view of the fact that personnel in the Office of the Theater Judge Advocate had been diminished by redeployment, the processing of general court-martial cases through that office was considerably slowed down. Excessive delays often occurred between initial confinement and trial of military personnel. The shortage of trained officer lawyers in the European Theater was the most pressing single problem encountered in the administration of military justice.

d. At the end of the first year of the occupation, the total general-prisoner population of the European Theater was concentrated in the Würzburg Rehabilitation Center, Würzburg. On 30 June 1946 a total of 1,175 military personnel were in confinement.

143. Censorship Policy.

Press censorship policy was formulated by the Press Censorship Branch of the Public Relations Division of Theater Headquarters and executed by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, through the Censorship Branch. Operational censorship units in the theater were supervised by the Public Relations Division. From V-E Day until V-J Day, the main mission of military and press censorship was to safeguard information on troop movements from Europe to the Pacific.

144. Military Censorship of Private and Press Communications.

A week after V-E Day, Theater Headquarters notified all major commands of eased censorship restrictions. Locations and identities of units and descriptions of combat experiences could then be passed. Unit censorship for units not alerted for the Pacific was discontinued on 15 May. Base censors still made spot checks to determine whether personal communications contained vital information on the war against Japan or on the European occupation. Material that had been impounded or detained was reviewed and most of it forwarded to the addressee. All censorship stamps were destroyed on 30 May 1945. On V-E Day, there were 300 officers and 180 enlisted men engaged in censorship duties; by V-J Day, this number had been reduced to 250 officers and 125 enlisted men. All military censorship of mail and press in the European Theater was ended on

10 September 1945, and the last military censorship unit was disbanded on 25 September 1945.

145. Civil Censorship.

a. Civil Censorship was imposed on all forms of civilian communications--letters, books, maps, recordings, plans, etc. The purpose of this censorship before V-J Day was to obtain all possible information of value in the prosecution of the war and to prevent the transmission of harmful information. After V-J Day, the censorship of German communications was continued as a valuable source of intelligence for the occupation authorities and as a means of controlling information. There were four phases in the control of communications in Germany. At first all communications were prohibited, all mail in the Reichspost was impounded, and all message service suspended. Later, communication facilities within Germany were reopened under strict regulations which permitted no communication with the rest of the world except through prisoner-of-war, civilian-internee, or International-Red-Cross messages. Still later, restrictions for internal communications were relaxed and limited external communication was permitted. Finally, only moderate control was exercised over internal and external communications.

b. The Civil Censorship Division was under the operational control of the Censorship Branch of the G-2 Division. For operational purposes it was divided into four groups, located at Orfenbach, Munich,

Esslingen, and Berlin. From these groups, the Telecommunications Sections operated field stations and mobile teams, the former fixed, permanent stations, and the latter, as the name implies, staying a short time in one location and then moving on to another.

c. Civilians were recruited in the United States, beginning as early as February 1945, for censorship duty in Germany. Most of them had had censorship experience in America during the war. Those who left the United States in April and May received training in France before going to Germany. In July permission was granted for the use of 3,500 Germans in postal censorship. Many proved very efficient, and no evidence was found of willful failure to carry out instructions. Stateless persons were hired in England for work in Germany, and early in 1946 the first Danish employees arrived.

146. Methods of Censorship.

When an intercepted communication revealed information of interest, the information was reported on a form called a submission and passed to what was known as a user agency, i.e., one which could make use of the information either for action or for information. There were about 150 user agencies, which submitted their requirements to the Civil Censorship Division. Censorship maintained a watch list of persons or firms whose communications were to be given special attention.

147. Postal Censorship.

a. Resumption of postal communication within the United States Zone was authorized in October 1945; in December mail between the United States and displaced persons was authorized; international postal service, except between Germany and Spain or Japan and their dependencies, was resumed 1 April 1946. During June 1946, civil censorship examined 3,500,000 international postal communications and prepared 105,000 submissions on them.

b. On being received from the Reichspost, mail to be censored was checked against the watch list for both sender and addressee. If either name appeared on the list, the communication was examined in a special unit. Mail containing no reportable information seldom remained in the censorship station for more than twenty-four hours; that on which a report had to be prepared might remain almost fifty. Small bits of objectionable matter were excised and the communication was released. An objectionable enclosure was extracted. An objectionable communication which could not be rendered unobjectionable by excision or extraction was condemned. An impression of the examiner's stamp was placed on each communication before it was released to the Reichspost. Documents carried by travelers were examined by the postal censorship department.

148. Telecommunications Censorship.

a. Telephone service in Germany was slowly reestablished.

Intracity service was functioning in Frankfurt by the end of June 1945. Intrazonal service for essential civilian needs was authorized in the United States Zone in October, and in February 1946 interzonal service was established. Telegraph service was opened in November 1945. International telecommunications had not been opened by the end of June 1946 because the Allied powers had not been able to reach an agreement.

b. Civilian and common-user telephone lines were monitored, selected lines being connected with observing sets. In Frankfurt, which had 7,000 subscribers, 300 lines were under observations. Recordings were made of conversations which might be of interest to user agencies, and submissions were prepared.

c. Telegraph messages were delivered by the Reichspost to the censorship station and were checked against the watch list before being examined.

149. Accomplishments.

During the first year of the occupation, Civil Censorship served as a security and intelligence agency, and revealed the trend of German thinking. Its findings were of special value to the Finance Division, police and fire officials, officers engaged in denazification, and the Decartelization Branch of the Economics Division.

PUBLIC SAFETY

150. Responsibilities and Administration.

a. When the Allied Armies swept across the German border in September 1944, public safety was the responsibility of the Public Safety Branch of the G-5 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. Administration was carried out through normal staff and command channels, the principal operational agencies being the Public Safety Branches of the armies. The Supreme Headquarters handbook for Civil Affairs and the technical manual Public Safety contained detailed instructions applicable to this field of operations. With the dissolution of Supreme Headquarters on 16 July 1945, control passed to U.S. Forces, European Theater.

b. Full responsibility for the maintenance of public safety rested with the field forces from V-E Day to 31 December 1945, at which time responsibility for all military government operations in the field passed to the Offices of Military Government for the three German Länder.(1) From 1 January 1946, some public safety functions, relating to displaced persons and the maintenance of security of the forces, remained the responsibility of Military District Commanders.(2) After 1 April 1946, the staff supervision of some public safety responsibilities continued under the Public Safety Branch of the newly reestablished G-5 Division of Theater

Headquarters.(3) These included execution of policy for the establishment and maintenance of law and order; denazification, reorganization, and reactivation of the German police and fire-fighting forces; supervision of German police operations; investigation of public officials; enforcement of security measures; disposal of staffs, guards, and internees of concentration camps in conjunction with the Counter Intelligence Corps; and control of refugees and displaced persons.(4)

151. Public Safety in Liberated Countries.

The policy placing the responsibility for the establishment of public safety agencies and the restoration of law and order upon the national authorities of each country liberated from German domination was agreed upon at the Quebec Conference in August 1943 and carried out in combined operations in Europe in 1944-45. National police authorities, therefore, restored order in liberated countries and cooperated with the Counter Intelligence Corps and the Provost Marshal in the general maintenance of law and order and in apprehending delinquent soldiers and staging raids where United States soldiers were involved in criminal activity.

152. Public Safety Operations in Aachen.

a. Principal Problems. As the first large German city to surrender to United States forces, Aachen became the proving ground for military government policy. Military Government Detachment: FLG2

administered the city under the First Army and tackled many problems which were to face all public safety authorities, namely: the re-organization of the police force and the maintenance of law and order until it could assume responsibility; the selection of personnel that would meet the tests of political reliability and efficiency; the opening of police schools for the training of police in democratic police practices and procedure and for the training of cadres for use in later police schools; the designing of police uniforms to mark a break with authoritarian traditions; the rearming of the German police; formation of policy on the character and extent of duties to be assigned to the German police, and the type and amount of supervision to be given in order to assure a high degree of cooperation, discipline, and conformance with Allied directives.

b. Denazification. The denazification of police in Aachen was carried out by the Special Branch of Public Safety, established on 30 October 1944. By the end of the year denazification was generally complete, but some Nazis were retained because no other professional police were available.(5)

c. Prison Administration. Public safety officers were responsible for the supervision of prisons. Difficulties in administering the Aachen prison arose as a result of its use by the First Army, the Counter Intelligence Corps, the Public Safety Branch, and the local German police. On 5 December, a German penal expert was appointed for the prison under the supervision of public safety officers.

d. Fire Fighting and Civil Defense. As retreating Nazis

had removed all fire-fighting equipment from Aachen to the east bank of the Rhine, there was considerable delay in reorganizing the fire department. Civil defense plans were prepared in November for use in case of air raids, but they were never required.(6)

e. Administration of Justice. Military government summary

courts tried German and other civilians pending the reorganization of German courts. German civil law which existed prior to 1933 was reinstated by the Allies and, together with military government laws and ordinances, provided the legal basis of the courts' decisions. (7) Heavy fines and long sentences soon impressed upon the population that violations would not be tolerated.

f. Crime Control. Owing to the apprehensive attitude of

Aachen residents, crime control was not a pressing problem. In December an alarming increase in juvenile delinquency was controlled by making the parents responsible for their children's offenses.(8) Incidents involving looting by United States troops, over whom German police had no power, were soon brought to a minimum by military police.(9) Black-market activity was negligible, as was at first the problem of displaced persons. As tactical operations proceeded, however, millions of displaced persons were uncovered and they became involved in numerous criminal incidents in the vicinity of Aachen. Steps were taken to gather them into centers, and tactical commanders

assumed responsibility for their care, control, and repatriation.

Policy developed in the Rhineland by the Public Safety Branch, G-5, Fifteenth Army, for the handling of displaced persons proved valuable in operations east of the Rhine.

153. Reorganization and Supervision of the German Police.

a. On V-E Day not only displaced persons, but also criminals, refugees, and surrendering Wehrmacht personnel roamed the countryside, and practically no German police force existed to control them. Public safety officers coordinated their activities with other security agencies of the Army to control this unhealthy situation, and tactical commanders assigned combat troops to assist.(10)

b. Plans for the reorganization of the German police and fire-fighting forces became effective with the issuance of a Theater directive on 7 July 1945.(11) United States policy for the reorganization of German public safety agencies was based on the concepts of decentralization, demilitarization, denazification, and the abolition of the national command hierarchy of the German police, fire, and civil defense agencies.(12) All central control of the German police system was abolished by turning over responsibility to the municipalities and the LÄnder, and by abolishing altogether certain Nazi organizations, such as those which had formed a part of the SS.(13)

c. The Railway and Waterways Police and various other units were reconstituted as separate units. The Border Control Police,

abolished by the first forces entering Europe, was reorganized within each Land with authority over German civilians only. By May 1946 the Border Control Police had a strength of 3,723, with 1,000 employed in carrying out customs police duties.(14) Land Bureaus of Criminal Identification were organized in December 1945 to assist in the control of crime.(15) Strictly civilian in character, these bureaus operated under the Land Ministers of the Interior and served as mediums for exchanging information among police departments. During the last six months of 1945, German civilian police increased in strength from 12,000(16) to 24,500.(17)

d. Public safety officers screened appointed and trained municipal and rural police and supervised their operations. Procedures developed during operations in liberated countries were carried over and used successfully in Germany. Drastic limitations were placed upon the powers of the new police, especially in their relations with Allied personnel.(18) All remaining records, property, and equipment were reclaimed for the use of the new police, and suitable persons dismissed by the Nazis were reappointed and gave willing cooperation. A monthly Police Situation Report and a monthly Crime Report were required of all police chiefs and were the basis for supervising arrest procedure, booking of charges, actions in bringing offenders before the proper court, and inspection of prisons.(19)

154. Denazification and Training.

By December 1945 denazification of the police, carried out through investigation of information given in their individual questionnaires, or Fragebogen, was officially announced as complete in the United States Zone, although dismissals continued for months.(20) In March responsibility for further denazification passed to the Germans. The shortage of politically reliable experienced personnel made it necessary to set up basic training schools. By the end of January 1946, twenty schools were in operation throughout the zone.(21) Courses were conducted by German police instructors under the supervision of the police chiefs and public safety officers, and were supplemented by in-service training. Special courses were conducted to train German civilian investigators.(22) A selected group of prisoners of war was trained for police work at Chateau Tocqueville, near Cherbourg, France. The program for the training of German prisoners of war for government service, including police work, known as Special Project No. 2, or the "Sunflower Project," was initiated on 30 July 1945.(23)

155. Uniforms and Arms for German Police.

The newly formed police suffered loss of prestige and morale because they were without uniforms. Third and Seventh Armies therefore expedited the release of captured enemy stocks of material to be used for uniforms.(24) The German police authorities were permitted

to design their own uniforms, subject to the approval of public safety officers. By 30 April 1946 all police, including the newly formed border police, were uniformed. The rearming of the German police was undertaken first on a local basis upon the request of local public safety officers. Without weapons the German police were helpless to cope with many local situations such as robbing, burning, looting, and murdering of German civilians by displaced persons. A majority of German police remained unarmed through October 1945, but on 6 November the Allied Control Council reached an agreement whereby weapons and limited amounts of ammunition were subsequently supplied to the German police.(25) Progress made in extending and perfecting means of communication and transportation also improved the efficiency of police operations.

156. Reorganization of German Fire-Fighting Agencies.

a. In general, German fire agencies had suffered severe damage as a result of bombings, and the equipment which had been moved by the Nazis to the east side of the Rhine in the early days of the occupation was dispersed in small towns and on the outskirts of municipalities for their protection. The shortage of fire-alarm systems, fire-fighting vehicles, hose, pumps, gasoline, oil, nozzles, and other requirements for efficient fire fighting created serious problems in rehabilitation. The situation was met in various ways,

and policies were adopted for the strategical distribution of fire-fighting equipment throughout the Eastern and Western Military District.(26)

b. Upon entry into cities and towns, specialist public safety officers proceeded with the reorganization of German fire-fighting forces. Obligatory fire services were dissolved. All fire chiefs and personnel were screened in accordance with regulations relative to the removal from office of Nazis and militarists. As raw recruits often made up the majority of the fire departments, schools and in-service training programs were established. To assist chiefs in clothing their personnel, tactical commanders released captured German stocks of uniforms which were dyed and remodeled before use.(27)

c. Fire protection in each Stadtkreis, in each Gemeinde of 20,000 population or more, and in each smaller city having its own professional fire-fighting service before 1938 was made the responsibility of the Bürgermeister. The Landrat was responsible in rural areas and in all Gemeinden not possessing their own fire-fighting forces. Public safety officers maintained constant liaison between the agencies concerned at their level of government in order to insure that military government instructions were carried out. Land Bureaus of Fire Prevention were organized as purely statistical and advisory agencies exercising no administrative or operational control over German fire services. They submitted monthly reports

to military government authorities, who used them in supervising the fire services.(28)

d. By the end of December 1945, Bavaria had 7,144 fire companies; Grosshessen 2,746, and Württemberg-Baden 1,301.(29) These companies were required to render assistance to United States military fire-fighting units to augment the protection of military installations.

157. Maintaining Public Safety.

To facilitate the maintenance of law and order and the enforcement of security controls (30), the following restrictions were placed upon the German civil population: curfew and travel restrictions; exclusion from designated military areas; prohibition of meetings, parades, and public assemblies; and a ban on possessing certain articles. Public safety authorities were more concerned with crimes incident to or affecting the military occupation than with crimes among the German civil populace. Objectives were, however, the same in both cases--crime prevention, control, investigation, and prosecution. Although the German police was made responsible for the detection and investigation of crimes among the civil population,(31) assistance was given them by military police and by security guards employed by local commanders of tactical forces.(32) Three classes of crime--juvenile delinquency, black-market operations, and depredations of displaced persons--constituted

the greatest threats to the maintenance of law and order in the United States Zone. As time went on, there was a steady increase in burglary and thievery of all kinds.

158. Juvenile Delinquency.

Disillusioned, drifting, sometimes homeless, Nazi-indoctrinated German youth was a threat to the security of the occupation. There was no evidence during the first year of the occupation, however, to indicate that this lawlessness was organized. The problem was attacked by both military government and local tactical groups, and American correction techniques were introduced. First offenders were remanded to welfare workers or their parents. Parents were made responsible for second offenses of their children under Military Government Notice 23-222.(33) These measures helped German institutions and civil authorities to cope with the problem.

159. Black-Market Operations.

The black market was one of the most serious threats to the orderly maintenance of the occupation. It offered a means of subsistence for possible subversive groups intent upon creating resistance and at the same time led to a vicious circle in that it devaluated the mark and undermined German economy,(34) which resulted in increased use of the black market by the citizenry. Public safety authorities tried in every way to check these activities. Attempts

were made to bolster the German economy and to support the efforts of the civil administration to ration food and clothing.(35) A price-control police was organized (36), and violators of price regulations were tried before military government, rather than German civil courts, sentences being imposed on both seller and buyer.(37) Prompt action of local tactical commanders and security agencies kept localized operations in check. Cooperation of German civil authorities and police with Army agencies through public safety officers was valuable, and one of the most important control measures was the restriction of displaced persons.

160. Depredations of Displaced Persons.

The depredations of displaced persons created such a menace to public safety that all agencies concerned took decisive, coordinated action.(38) When responsibility for military government passed from tactical commanders on 1 January 1946, the Army retained responsibility for the control of displaced persons camps.(39) Every effort was made to segregate displaced persons into centers where they could remain until repatriation. As time went on, conditions grew worse. Security guards posted at displaced persons camps, raids by military police and tactical units, and road blocks set up to recover stolen vehicles from displaced persons were only a few of the control measures undertaken. Under operation SYNDICATE, informers were placed in camps to gain

information.(40) In May 1946 a Theater directive ordered the prosecution in military government intermediate or general courts of displaced, stateless, and other persons possessing firearms or other deadly weapons. Forced repatriation followed conviction.(41) Curtailment of aid to certain classes of displaced persons was finally resorted to in the effort to stem the resurgent tide of plundering. In May 1946 approximately 336,000 registered and 100,000 unregistered and uncontrolled displaced persons were still in the United States Zone.(42)

FOOTNOTES

Chapter X

1. Cable MX-24200, 7 May 45, Military Mission Moscow from Dean and Archer to SHAEF.
2. Cable WX-79065, 8 May 45, ACGMAR CCoFS to Military Mission Moscow.
3. Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany, Enactments and Approved Papers, ACA, 5 June 45, vol I, p 10.
4. Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany, Sup No I, p 10.
5. Memo, Off Pol Adv, SHAEF, 4 Jun 45, file SGS 319.1.
6. Ibid, 12 Jul 45.
7. Ibid, 30 May 45.
8. Ibid, 2 Jun 45.
9. Ibid, 24 Oct 45.
10. Ibid, 16 Dec 45.
11. Ibid, 25 May 45.
12. Ibid, 28 Apr 45.
13. Ibid, 25 May 45.
14. Ibid, 26 Apr 45.
15. Ibid, 11 Jul 45.
16. Ibid, 10 Jul 45.
17. Cable W-87519, 26 May 45, ACGMAR to ETOUSA.
18. Cable W-67749, 21 Sep 45, ACGMAR to USFET.
19. Ltr, Belg Mission, 12 Sep 45, file SGS 322.1 Belg & Lux, from Maj A. D. Berten to Col A. D. Biddle.

20. Memo, Off Pol Adv, SHAEF, 26 Apr 45, file SGS 319.1.
21. Ltr, SHAEF, 12 May 45, file SGS 091 Netherlands, subj: "Battalions for Use in Germany," Prince Bernhard to Lt Gen W. B. Smith.
22. Cable N-1813, 16 Jun 45, SHAEF Mission Netherlands to SHAEF Rear.
23. Cable S-15388, 3 Aug 45, USFET to AGWAR.
24. Cable BL-646, 9 Aug 45, USFET MISSION BELGIUM to USFET.
25. Memo, Off Pol Adv, SHAEF, 27 Apr 45, file SGS 091 Luxembourg.
26. Memo, Off Pol Adv, SHAEF, 15 Jun 45, file SGS 319.1.
27. Cable W-58462, 2 Sep 45, AGWAR to USFET.
28. Cable QX-24015, 15 Jun 45, 12th AG to 3d US Army.
29. Cable S-13691, 24 Jul 45, USFET to AGWAR.
30. Memo, Off Pol Adv, SHAEF, 16 Nov 45, file SGS 319.1.
31. Cable Z-283, 18 Jul 45, ACC Hungary to AGWAR for JCS.
32. Cable Z-288, 18 Jul 45, ACC Hungary to AGWAR for JCS.
33. Memo, Off Pol Adv, SHAEF, 23 May 45, file SGS 319.1.
34. Ibid, 16 Dec 45.
35. Ibid, 17 Dec 45.
36. Cable FX-56777, 19 Dec 45, AFHQ to AGWAR.
37. Memo, Off Pol Adv, SHAEF, 25 Apr 45, file SGS 319.1.
38. Ibid, 28 Apr 45.
39. Ibid, 26 Apr 45.
40. Ibid, 12 Jun 45.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter XI

1. Cable W-75415, 1 May 45, AGWAR from Hull, sgd Marshall, to ETOUSA personal to Eisenhower.
2. Cable E-41727, 8 May 45, ETOUSA (thru SHAEF) to AGWAR.
3. USFET, G-1, Report of Operations, 1 Oct-31 Dec 45, narrative entires of 3 and 5 Oct 45.
4. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 1, 18 Dec 45, Rpt of ACofS, G-1; memo, ACofS, G-3, 6 Dec 45, for CofS (copy in USFET SGS, file 370.5, vol II).
5. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 8, 12 Feb 46, Rpt of ACofS, G-1.
6. Cable WX-87933, 15 May 46, AGWAR to USFET.
7. Cable W-89263, 25 May 46, AGWAR (WARCOS) to USFET.
8. Cable W-90337, 5 Jul 46, AGWAR to USFET.
9. Seventh Army, Report of Operations, 1 Oct-31 Dec 45, narrative, p 7.
10. Memo, USFET, 24 Nov 45 for Maj Com, (in G-1 Div, file 200.3, vol I).
11. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 1, 18 Dec 45, Rpt of ACofS, G-1.
12. Cable W-80642, 2 Nov 45, AGWAR to USFET.
13. Cable WX-79473, 9 May 45, AGWAR to ETOUSA.
14. Memo, USFET, ACofS, G-3, 6 Dec 45, subj: "Training of Replacements," for CofS (copy in SGS, file 370.5, vol II).
15. Cable S-34223, 8 Dec 45, USFET to AGWAR.
16. History of the Ground Forces Reinforcement Command, European Theater, Part III, V-E Day to Inactivation, chap I, introd pp 22, 23, and 30.

17. Ibid.
18. USFET, AG Div, Report of Operations, 1 Jan-31 Mar 46, narrative.
19. History of the Ground Forces Reinforcement Command, European Theater, Part III, V-E Day to Inactivation, chap I, introd pp 22, 23, and 30.
20. Memo, USFET, AG Div, 5 Feb 46, file AG 352 GAP-AGP, subj: "The Adjutant General's Clerical School," for Chiefs of Gen and Staff Secs.
21. Cable #-39196, 30 Jan 46, USFET to AGWAR.
22. Cable W-95636, 2 Feb 46, AGWAR to USFET.
23. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 9, 19 Feb 46, Rpt of ACofS, G-1.
24. Cable W-89721, 30 May 46, AGWAR to USFET.
25. Ltr, USFET, 10 May 46, subj: "Recruiting for a Specific Branch, Unit, or Theater," to AGWAR personal to Maj Gen Willard S. Paul, ACofS, G-1, sgd W. H. Barnes, Col, Acting ACofS, G-1 (in G-1 Div, file 342.18).
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 26, 19 Jun 46, Rpt of ACofS, G-1.
29. Ibid., No 29, 9 Jul 46, Rpt of ACofS, G-1.
30. Cable W-93524, 3 Jul 46, AGWAR to USFET.
31. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 29, 9 Jul 46, Rpt of ACofS, G-1.
32. Interview with Col L. E. Jacoby (formerly Chief of SERSAC Br, G-1, TSFET), Frankfurt a/M, 5 Apr 46.
33. Ltr, USFET, 10 Jul 45, file AG 210.3, subj: "Officer Readjustments," to maj comds.

34. Cir 15, USFET, 15 Jan 46, subj: "Personnel Readjustment Policies and Procedures."
35. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report, No 8, 12 Feb 46, Rpt of ACofS, G-1.
36. Interview with Col L. E. Jacoby, as cited.
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38. Cable S-22289, 8 Sep 45, USFET to AGWAR.
39. Cable WCL-32780, 29 Dec 45, AGWAR to USFET.
40. Memo, USFET, OACofS, G-1, 25 Mar 46, subj: "Regular Army Integration Program," to Col W. H. Barnes, Actg ACofS, G-1 (in G-1 Div file, 201.1).
41. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 20, 7 May 46, Rpt of ACofS, G-1.
42. History of the Ground Forces Reinforcement Command, European Theater, Part III, V-E Day to Inactivation, chap I, introd p 15.
43. Ibid.
44. TWX, SC-9867, 11 Sep 45, USFET to Maj Comds,
45. USFET, G-1 Div, Report of Operations, 8 May-30 Sep 45, narrative; TWX, SC-9867, 11 Sep 45, USFET to maj comds.
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47. IRS, USFET, OACofS, G-1, 15 Apr 46, subj: "Application for Appointment in AUS," to AG Mil Pers. (including memo for record) (in G-1 Div, file 201.1)
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56. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 3, 15 Jan 46, Rpt of ACofS, G-1.
57. Ibid, No 11, 5 Mar 46.
58. IRS, USFET, G-1 to SGS, Min 6, 17 Sep 45; ltr, USFET, 17 Sep 45, file AG 342.06 GAP-AGP, subj: "Enlistments and Reenlistments in the Regular Army," to maj comds; cir 124, USFET, 17 Sep 45.
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63. Ibid, 31 Jul 46.
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70. Ibid, No 1, 18 Dec 45, Rpt of ACofS, G-1.
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75. Cable W-90337, 5 Jul 46, AGWAR to USFET.
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77. 3d Army US, G-2 Sec, Historical Report, June 1945.
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106. Ltr, USFET, 5 Nov 45, file AG 370.003 GAP-AGO, subj: "Army of German Civilian Guards."
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