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# The SECOND YEAR

VOLUME IV



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EUROPEAN COMMAND

## OCCUPATION FORCES IN EUROPE SERIES

# 1946 - 1947

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF HISTORIAN EUROPEAN COMMAND

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By the authority of the Commander-in-Chief, European Command, as given in Internal Raising Slip, subject: "Downgrading of Official History," from Secretary, General Staff, Headquarters, European Command, to Chief, Historical Division, Headquarters, European Command, dated 23 April 1951, certain volumes, monographs, and chapters contained in the Occupation Forces in Europe Series, by this authority Chapter 37, has been downgraded from RESTRICTED TO UNCLASSIFIED.

REF: Letter of 23 April 1951, from the Historical Division, Headquarters, European Command.

HEADQUARTERS  
EUROPEAN COMMAND

Historical Division

AFO

22 July 1948

HIS 312.1

SUBJECT: Classification of the Official History of the Occupation  
Forces, 1946 - 1947.

XX

XX

1. Pursuant to authority contained in staff study, this division, subject as above, dated 15 June 1948, as approved by the Chief of Staff, this Headquarters, on 14 July 1948, the classification of three of the seven volumes in date comprising the Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1946 - 1947 is changed as follows:

XX

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2. Pursuant to the same authority, all chapters contained in Volume III of The Second Year of the Occupation are downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED with the exception of Chapter XIV, entitled "Chief, Allied Contact Section," and Chapter XIX, entitled "Director of Civil Affairs." Chapter XIX is downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED upon deletion of the sentence beginning on line 10 of Paragraph 7a (page 734) which refers to a proposed civil affairs agreement with France. Chapter XIV retains its CONFIDENTIAL classification.

3. Pursuant to the same authority, all chapters contained in Volume IV of The Second Year of the Occupation are downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED with the exception of Chapter XXIV, entitled "Chief Signal Officer," which retains its CONFIDENTIAL classification.

*Chapter 35 downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED 24 April 1951  
per it. order - 20 July, European Command.*

STANDARD 6629

/s/ HARRY L. LAYTON, JR.  
Colonel, SA  
Actg. Chief, Hist. Di

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Office of the Commander in Chief

APO 757  
August 1947

**SUBJECT:** Occupation Forces in Europe Series


**TO :** All concerned

1. The War Department has directed that the history of the military occupation of Germany and Austria in World War II be recorded and interpreted as the events transpire. The agency which is responsible for preparing this history is the Office of the Chief Historian, European Command.

2. The Occupation Forces in Europe Series, publication of which was begun in 1947, consists of a series of studies, monographs, and narratives of the history of the occupation. From time to time, the Occupation Forces in Europe Series will include a summary volume giving a narrative history of the occupation. All the studies or volumes published in the Series for the year 1945-46 or a subsequent year make up the official history of the occupation for that year.

3. Each publication in the Occupation Forces in Europe Series is based upon a thorough study of the correspondence, directives, and other documents relating to the subject. It serves also as a digest and summary of the pertinent passages of the reports of operations which are made periodically to the Office of the Chief Historian by all staff divisions and major units of the European Command. Each publication in the Series, before being issued, is reviewed by the staff divisions or subordinate command whose responsibilities indicate a primary interest in the subject matter.

4. All persons to whose attention these publications come are invited to forward to the Office of the Chief Historian, European Command, APO 757, their comments and criticisms, in order to make available all facts from which a definitive history may be prepared in the War Department.



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
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# The Second Year of the Occupation



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EUROPEAN COMMAND  
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**PART FIVE**  
(continued)

**The Special Staff**

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CHAPTER XXIX

CHIEF OF TROOP INFORMATION AND EDUCATION

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Chapter XXIX

CHIEF OF TROOP INFORMATION AND EDUCATION

ORGANIZATION 1 JULY 1946

1. The Operating Branches of I&E.

On 1 July 1946 the Information and Education (I&E) Service was divided into four operating branches as follows:

- a. The Education Branch was responsible for supervision and operation of the Command schools and the Armed Forces Institute and for advising the Commander in Chief on matters pertaining to Troop Education.
- b. The Troop Information Branch was responsible for interchange of knowledge and promotion of appreciation between the U.S. soldier and his Allied counterpart, publication and distribution of the I&E Bulletin, supervision and operation of the I&E Staff School and Field Liaison in connection with the School and use of I&E Bulletins.

research and informational surveys, supervision of unit publications, and advice to the Commander in Chief on the above matters.

- c. The Armed Forces Network (AFN) Branch was responsible for providing radio entertainment for troops of the Command and operating the radio network in the Command.
- d. The Stars and Stripes Branch was responsible for providing a daily objective news service (a daily and Sunday newspaper with a supplemental weekly magazine section, Week-end) for troops of the Command.

## 2. Organizational Divisions.

In addition to the operating branches listed above, there was an Office of Technical Information, responsible for providing information, statistics, and publicity matter concerning the I&E Service; an Office Service Section, responsible for management and operation of the various offices in the Service; and a Supply and Fiscal Section, responsible for requisitioning supplies for the various branches and for budgetary management.

## 3. G-3 Supervision.

In matters of supervision and coordination, the I&E Service was a responsibility of the G-3 Division, standing in much the same relationship as special staff sections. Through General Order 36,

published by Headquarters, EUCOM, on 6 May 1947, the I&E Service became the Troop Information and Education Division,<sup>(1)</sup> but its supervision remained a responsibility of G-3.

4. News Policy of AFN and the Stars and Stripes.

On 23 July 1946 the Public Relations Division, later the Public Information Division, was charged with setting policy on news published in the Stars and Stripes and that broadcast over AFN. The Chief of Troop Information and Education, who had complete operational control, implemented these policies through the chiefs of the Stars and Stripes and AFN.<sup>(2)</sup>

5. Key Personnel 1 July 1946.

Col. Edwin Lock was chief of the I&E Service at the beginning of the period and Lt. Col. Lauren Merriam was executive officer. Troop Information Branch was headed by Lt. Col. John D. F. Phillips, Troop Education Branch by Col. Ernest B. Thompson. Lt. Col. Oren Swain headed AFN, with Capt. Alvin Orlian as executive officer, and Lt. Col. William Proctor headed Stars and Stripes, Maj. Richard E. Knorr serving as executive officer.

CONDITIONS AFFECTING PROGRAM

6. Hindrances to Program.

a. At the beginning of the period under review, I&E reported

an almost lack of progress due to the instability of troop units. The high rate of redeployment, the lack of off-duty time resulting from the necessity for troops to make up additional duties as the Occupational Troop Basis was reduced, and the movement of units about in the Theater made organization of an effective education-and-information program difficult.

b. Furthermore, the War Department was revising its informational material. On direction of G-3, I&E delayed revision of its material in order to coordinate it with that of the War Department and avoid conflicts. (3)

c. During the period under review, economy measures were applied generally in the Theater and particularly to I&E, and severe budgetary and personnel cuts were executed in connection with the education-and-information program. (4)

#### OPERATIONS OF I&E SERVICE

##### 7. Operations of Education Branch.

By 1 July 1946, the education program had diminished to two activities, Command schools and the U.S. Armed Forces Institute. The major concern was that the program be fitted to the needs of the Theater and that it be efficiently carried out. Only one attempt was made to enlarge the program to include short leave courses similar to

those which had been operated under Training Within Civilian Agencies during the posthostilities period, and this was dropped when it was found that no funds were available to support it. (5)

a. In August 1946, the War Department prescribed separation from service, on grounds of economy, of "unsuitable enlisted personnel." Falling under this classification were men whose Army general classification test (AGCT) score was below 70. (6) Nevertheless, illiteracy continued to be one of the Theater's serious problems. In October 1946 a directive was issued (7) prescribing literacy training for all soldiers who had completed less than the fifth grade or whose AGCT fell below the score of Grade V. Training was to be on duty time and to have both academic and military features, designed to make the individual a good soldier as well as to teach him to read and write. Those failing to complete the course satisfactorily would be separated under the War Department circular. Literacy training was offered through two types of schools: the consolidated school and special schools established in units with high illiteracy rates where it was impracticable for personnel to leave the unit for training. (8) In many cases, German instructors were employed, either in the interest of economy or for lack of U.S.-trained instructors.

b. While literacy was an immediate concern of the Service during the early months of the period under review, planning for the 1947 education program for the Theater also consumed a large share of the time and effort of personnel in I&E. Planning for literacy training

was woven into an over-all staff study for the 1947 education program submitted to the Chief of Staff early in December 1946. (9) The assumption was made that the Theater would have become stable by February 1947 and resumption of a full-scale education program would be possible. The staff study proposed that the three consolidated schools, located at Berlin, Frankfurt, and Heidelberg, and the one district school at Bremen be continued as consolidated schools and that their number be increased to eight as soon as personnel could be found for operational purposes; that unit schools be opened wherever they were essential and that consolidated schools and unit schools be more closely coordinated; that courses be keyed to those offered by the U.S. Armed Forces Institute; and that a board of regents be established under the Theater Chief of Education and Information. The board would constantly review curricula and arrange for credit in U.S. educational institutions for work completed in command schools. (10)

c. As a result of this staff study, a new directive was published in December 1946. It envisaged a primarily off-duty program, stressed its value, and urged that it receive as much emphasis as the recreational program. The directive provided for a civilian area supervisor on the staff of each consolidated school to promote cooperation between consolidated and unit schools. In addition to the three consolidated schools already in existence, two new ones were planned for Munich and Nürnberg. (11)

d. Before 1 January 1947, new consolidated schools were opened at Nürnberg, Munich, and Wiesbaden. But it was already obvious that the program had been planned on too elaborate a scale. The schools at Wiesbaden and Munich were only partially staffed and efforts to recruit instructors from the United States, which had resulted in recruitment of only fourteen over a period of six months, had to be dropped when the uncertainty of available funds for the program had increased. Unable to make long-range plans in the face of this uncertainty, the I&E Service concentrated upon the possibility of using enlisted personnel qualified for teaching posts and the establishment of unit schools using such personnel. (12)

e. By 1 July 1947 the number of consolidated schools, now redesignated Special Army Education Centers, had been reduced to three, located at Frankfurt, Nürnberg, and Munich. Army Education Center was a term applied to any installation operating any part of the Education Program, such as United States Armed Forces Institute (USAFI) study center, unit school, advisement center, or school library. All major commands were instructed to see that posts within their commands operated such Army Education Centers and made transportation to them available. (13) On 30 April 1947 enrollment in consolidated and unit schools reached a peak of 2,887, serviced by 59 U.S. and 139 indigenous instructors. By 30 June 1947 the enrollment had dropped to 1,824, serviced by 38 U.S. and 113 indigenous instructors. (14)

f. In July 1946 representatives of the I&E Service returning from Madison, Wisconsin, headquarters of USAFI, reported that USAFI headquarters desired that a thorough check be made of course and text requirements for the next two years and that courses offered in the European Theater be made to correspond as closely as possible to those being offered at Madison. The European Branch then drew up a plan whereby the Information and Education officer of any units could requisition and administer tests, thus decentralizing the process for the Theater. Extended USAFI activities in December took the form of an attempt to interest hospital patients in courses. (15)

g. In November 1946 the War Department took steps to revise USAFI courses to fit the requirements of younger men by deletion of certain courses and addition of others. After January 1947 such emphasis was placed on USAFI courses and a coordinated effort was made to integrate USAFI and consolidated school courses as uncertainty of the future of the education program increased. With the close-down of all but three of the consolidated schools in the late spring, a positive program was instituted for enrolling former command school students in USAFI courses and transferring their course record cards to USAFI. This resulted in rising USAFI enrollments during the three-month period when command school enrollment suffered its greatest losses. In April, 766 students in the Theater were enrolled in USAFI; in May, 804; in June, 884. (16)

8. Operations of Troop Information Branch.

The first six months of the period under review witnessed radical adjustments in the Troop Information Program. The need for a change in emphasis had been recognized in April 1946 as a result of two surveys conducted by the Research Section, I&E, which had been passed on to G-1 and G-3 for further study, with a view to improving the indoctrination courses given troops on arrival in the Theater. (17) The surveys revealed a lack of interest in occupational policy and achievement and a lack of informational programs designed to acquaint troops with their role in the over-all mission. (18)

a. In August, as a result of a communication from the commanding officer of the 3rd Replacement Depot, the I&E Service submitted certain recommendations for revising the Six Hour Troop Information Program for replacements. (19) These recommendations included greater stress on the positive side of the occupation mission, with special emphasis on the reeducation of Germany (GYA); revision of the hour on "Prejudice" to bring up to date the section on displaced persons; revision of the "Brothers-in-Arms" section to place greater emphasis on the importance of U.S. troops making a favorable impression upon the Allies. (20) Although the proposal for general revision before receipt of the new War Department material was rejected by G-3, minor revisions were permitted. Publication, in September by the Chicago Tribune of an article by Larry Rue with the headline, "United States Army Still Tells Recruits: Hate Germans," acted as a spur to further

(21)  
change. The article contrasted changing OMGUS policy towards Germans with what it termed the "unchanging attitude" of I&E program.

b. In November a thorough revision of the Information Program was effected. The scope of the new program embraced U.S. policy as enunciated by Secretary of State Byrnes at Stuttgart, organization of the Theater, German history and the psychology of propaganda, German organizations to be supported, with reasons for such support, results achieved by the occupation, and the part of the individual soldier should play. Instructions were issued that a six-week program for troops already in the Theater should start 5 January 1947 and the importance of having responsible personnel assigned full time to the information job was stressed. (22) General McNarney, Theater Commander, advised the War Department of this directive (23) and in December the War Department replied that immediate steps were being taken to revise its orientation program for troops earmarked for the European Theater. (24)

c. Closer Theater supervision over content of the program was provided by establishment of a committee to review orientation and informational literature prior to its publication to insure that it was in keeping with occupation policies. The committee consisted of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 Division, as chairman and one representative each from the G-3 Division, the Public Relations Division, and the I&E Service. (25)

d. In August 1946, plans were contemplated for a four-hour orientation course for dependents, together with a pamphlet to be

(26)  
distributed at the end of the third lecture. This program was revised  
in February 1947 and a new pamphlet, "An Introduction to Germany for  
Dependent Families," was prepared to accompany it. (27) Early in the  
period under review the Troop Information program devoted a large portion  
of the time to GYA, but in February it was revised to omit such of this  
material. Troop Information Branch then prepared a booklet, "Read This--  
Then Help," to encourage troop aid to GYA. (28) The Branch prepared an  
eight-hour program for Constabulary troops in March 1947 and the follow-  
ing month a revision of the program for returning soldiers to bring  
them up to date on conditions in the Zone of the Interior. (29)

e. In September 1946 a standing operating procedure for making  
research studies was outlined (30) and a Theater directive prohibited the  
taking of polls or surveys in the Theater except through the Attitude  
Research Section, formerly known simply as the Research Section. Basis  
for this action was the feeling that only polls conducted scientifically  
by trained personnel were of value. Before being released by public  
relations officers all statistical material having to do with soldier  
attitudes had to be cleared first with the Theater Chief of Information  
and Education. (31)

f. On 30 September 1946 seventy-six unit publications were  
being published in the Theater under guidance of the Information Branch.  
By December 31 the number had dropped to sixty-six. By 30 June 1947  
only twenty-one unit publications were being published. (32) In October  
1946 a staff study for improvement of quality of these publications was  
submitted by I&E Service (33) and, as a result, a course covering make-up,

editing, copy-reading, policy, newspaper ethics and libel, and funds and procurement was established in the Information and Education Staff School, with quotas for all major commands. (34)

g. The Information and Educational Bulletin remained the organ of the Troop Information Program throughout the period under review. On 1 September 1946 a new distribution system, through the Adjutant General, was adopted. This resulted in not only a more effective and timely issue of the Bulletin, but assured a wider distribution to units which had been omitted before on the less formal distribution plan. (35)

h. On 15 March 1947, under the Reorganization Plan, the Allied Liaison Section, responsible for exchange of lectures with Allied and Neutral countries, was deactivated. During the period 1 July 1946 to 15 March 1947, the section had made arrangements for a total of thirty-six lecturers, who had addressed a total of 807 meetings. (36)

#### ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES DURING PERIOD

##### 9. Reorganization of I&E Service.

With its educational program severely curtailed as a result of economy measures, the I&E Service faced the necessity of tightening up its organization for effective operation before the Theater-wide reorganization plan went into effect. During January 1947 plans for an internal reorganization were worked out and on 25 February the

reorganization became effective. All of the functions and responsibilities assumed by the Troop Information and Education Branches, the Office Service Section, Office of Technical Information, and Supply and Fiscal were consolidated under a newly created organization, the 7700 I&E Group. <sup>(37)</sup> This group was later redesignated the 7700 TI&E Group. <sup>(38)</sup> The effect of this reorganization was to consolidate into one organization all of the operating agencies of I&E. In March 1947 the various branches and agencies thus consolidated were transferred, largely from Höchst, to Bamberg, where Group headquarters was set up. The executive office of the I&E Division remained at Headquarters, EUCOM.

10. Key Personnel 30 June 1947.

On 7 May Col. Otis McCormick became chief of the I&E Division, replacing Col. E. J. F. Glavin, who had in turn replaced Col. Edwin Lock. Col. John E. Adkins, Jr., assumed command of the 7700 TI&E Group on 20 June 1947, replacing Col. Ernest B. Thompson, who had assumed command of the Group upon its organization. At the close of the period under review, Lt. Col. Robert F. Curran was executive officer of the I&E Division, having replaced Lt. Col. Lauren N. Merriam; Lt. Col. James Tirey headed the Troop Information Branch of the 7700 TI&E Group; and Lt. Col. Raymond J. Wismer the Troop Education Branch.

## STARS AND STRIPES

### 11. Status and Organization.

a. The Stars and Stripes, an agency under the operational control of the Chief of Troop Information and Education, published a daily newspaper, Stars and Stripes, and a weekly magazine, Weekend, for the benefit of Americans stationed in the European Command. Weekend was a medium for the publication of articles, fiction, and entertaining features. The Stars and Stripes was, from its first publication in the European Theater, a branch of the Information and Education Division. Early in 1946, the Stars and Stripes began (39) operating under nonappropriated funds. On 23 July 1946, the Chief of Public Information was given the authority to fix general policy on the publication of news in the Stars and Stripes, but the newspaper remained under the direction of the Chief of Troop Information and Education, who executed any policies directed by the Chief of Public Information.

b. The organization of the Stars and Stripes was not complicated. Directly under the Editor in Chief were the Executive Manager, the Executive Editor, and the Chief of the Distribution Service. There were five sections under the Executive Manager: Production, Communications, Supply and Procurement, Fiscal, and Administration. The Managing Editor of the Stars and Stripes and the editor of Weekend were (40) under the Executive Editor. Other important members of the staff were the Chief of the Distribution Service and the Comptroller. Edwin

E. Dowell resigned as Executive Editor and was succeeded by John Kelly in March 1947. Bernard J. McGuigan became Chief of the Distribution Service upon its formation in June 1947. At the end of June 1947, the  
(41)  
principal executives were:

*Lt. Col. W.G. Proctor.....	Editor in Chief
*Richard E. Knorr.....	Executive Manager
*Bernard J. McGuigan.....	Chief Distribution Service
John Kelly.....	Executive Editor
*Maurice Kirkwood.....	Comptroller
Kenneth Zumwalt.....	Managing Editor
Richard Jones.....	<u>Weekend Editor</u>

\*Members of Board of Directors.

12. Developments in Operations and Policies.

a. On 16 August 1946, the Stars and Stripes expanded from eight to twelve pages daily. From that date, it placed additional emphasis upon news including sports news, originating within the  
(42)  
European Command.

b. On 19 September 1946, the Stars and Stripes New York Bureau became operative. Its chief function was to edit and transmit news received from the United Press, Associated Press, and International  
(43)  
News Service to the Stars and Stripes at Altdorf, Germany.

c. During the summer of 1946, it appeared that some persons were taking undue advantage of the facilities of the "E-Bag" column, and were writing letters with fictitious signatures and in other ways causing material to be printed irresponsibly. The G-1 Division suggested to the Chief of Staff that a policy statement be issued to the Information and  
(44)  
Education Division. The Stars and Stripes was instructed not to

print any letter in the "B-Bag" column unless it had a signed letter and the writer's address and his unit. The editors were to check the appropriate Adjutant General agency and the postal locator file to make sure that fictitious names were not used. This was not to be construed  
(45)  
that names were to be required in the published "B-Bag" letter.

d. Several times during the autumn of 1946, the terms "Counter Intelligence Corps" and "Civil Censorship Division" appeared in the Stars and Stripes. Because officials thought that the use of these terms had an unfortunate psychological effect upon those Germans who read the newspaper, both it and AFN were instructed to refrain from using these terms. The Public Information Division requested also correspondents to refrain from the use of these terms. The terms "Army Investigator"  
(46)  
and "Army Investigation" were offered as substitutes.

### 13. Moves of Plant and Headquarters.

The Stars and Stripes had two printing plants--one at Altdorf, in southern Germany, where the daily issue of the Stars and Stripes was printed, the other at Pfungstadt, near Darmstadt, Germany, where the weekly magazine Weekend and the weekly comic supplement were published. Weekend had been printed in Pfungstadt since 26 March 1946. A Stars and Stripes printing plant had been located at Altdorf ever since 20 April  
(47)  
1945. During the early fall of 1946, shifts in troop locations and the reduction of troop strength indicated the advisability of relocating the publication site in the Frankfurt area, nearer the center of troop population. It was decided to move the entire publishing installation

from Altdorf to Pfungstadt, which had been the home of the German edition of the Stars and Stripes until its discontinuance on 19 April 1946 because the decline in troop strength no longer warranted two editions. The Stars and Stripes, including its military organization, the 7744th Stars and Stripes Unit, completed its move to Pfungstadt by 5 December 1946 and the first issue of the European Edition to be published at Pfungstadt appeared on 6 December 1946. <sup>(48)</sup> Shortly after the publishing plant was moved from Altdorf to Pfungstadt, Stars and Stripes Headquarters was moved from Höchst to the Park Hotel, Frankfurt. <sup>(49)</sup>


b. The 7744th Stars and Stripes Unit was assigned to Headquarters, EUCOM, and was attached through the 2d Military District to the Darmstadt Military Post for administration. The 7744th Stars and Stripes Unit included officers, enlisted men, United States and Allied civilians, and existed chiefly for administrative purposes. The Stars and Stripes Detachment at the Frankfurt Headquarters was assigned to Headquarters, EUCOM, and attached to Headquarters Command, EUCOM, for administration. <sup>(50)</sup>

#### 14. Improvements in Circulation.

a. Until 6 December 1946, distribution of the Stars and Stripes was made from Altdorf. Trucks hauled the edition to district officers in Augsburg, Salzburg, and Stuttgart for motor delivery in those areas. Two truckloads of papers arrived in Pfungstadt, then a relay point, every morning for trains, planes, or trucks to Berlin, Bremen, Paris,

Chart I

CHEMICAL WARFARE SECTION  
THEATER HEADQUARTERS  
August 1946



SOURCE: CWS, Hq, USFET, Report of Operations, 1 Jul-30 Sep 46.

Frankfurt, and Mulhouse. When the printing of the daily paper began in Pfungstadt on 6 December 1946, the circulation system became more centralized. More convenient highways and rail lines could be used to rush papers to Frankfurt, Salzburg, Augsburg, Stuttgart, Nürnberg, Kassel, and Marburg, while Berlin, Bremen, Paris, and Vienna were guaranteed papers only one day late.

b. A separate distributing agency was set up early in June 1947. Circulation methods were improved by the reorganization of the nine circulation districts. These districts included seventeen military communities and also Trieste. An American or Allied civilian was placed in charge of each district. Pfungstadt remained the central distributing point. The Stars and Stripes agency was responsible for the distribution of all other newspapers and periodicals sold in the Theater. (51) Prior to June 1947, the Stars and Stripes had been responsible for the distribution only of its own publications. This new distribution arrangement marked the culmination of a change from military to civilian personnel. Before approximately September 1946, most persons responsible for the delivery of the Stars and Stripes were enlisted men. By July 1947, the delivery was accomplished by civilians, (52) the bulk of them Germans.

#### 15. Reduction in Staff.

The Stars and Stripes was required to follow Theater policy and reduce its staff in the interests of economy. In September 1946, the Deputy Chief of Staff observed that the Stars and Stripes was using an

excessive number of enlisted men and suggested that many more civilian  
 (53) drivers could be used. The Stars and Stripes, however, believed it  
 advisable to retain enlisted men in this capacity since the drivers  
 served also as circulation and collection men. Moreover, the management  
 believed that, on critical runs where time was an exceedingly important  
 factor, the presence of American soldiers with the trucks would insure  
 (54) more facilities in the event of breakdowns. Nevertheless, it was  
 necessary to continue reducing the staff. The following table, showing  
 the authorized strength of the Stars and Stripes in December 1946 and  
 (55) in March 1947, illustrates the trend:

	<u>31 Dec 46</u>	<u>31 Mar 47</u>
Off	13	5
WO	1	1
EM	98	37
US Civ	68	104
Allied Civ	<u>25</u>	<u>37</u>
Total	215	184

A campaign to "civilianize" the military staff of Stars and Stripes  
 commenced around June 1946. In July 1946 there were still around two  
 (56) hundred military personnel with the organization.

16. Developments since the Move to Pfungstadt.

a. On 15 January 1947, the Stars and Stripes inaugurated a  
 service to Italy. Papers were shipped by train from Strasbourg, France,  
 to Basel, Switzerland, from which point they were transmitted by the  
 American Express Company into Italy to the Army Exchange Service for  
 (57) distribution.

b. In early February 1947, the magazine Weekend ceased

CHAPTER XXXI

CHIEF ENGINEER

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b. The functions of the Administrative Division included all military and civilian personnel work and such service activities as were connected with personal and official mail and transportation. In addition, it was responsible for security in the Office of the Chief Engineer. Lt. Col. S. M. Lipton was head of the Administrative Division until early in 1947 when he was replaced by Lt. Col. H. H. Fisk.

c. The Fiscal Division was headed by two different men during the year under review. F. A. Bradley was chief until 28 April when he was replaced by F. J. Whittle. The Fiscal Division maintained budgetary control of engineer funds within the Theater. All fiscal policy, procedure, and accounts were the responsibilities of the Fiscal Division, and it coordinated such functions with other subdivisions of the Office of the Chief Engineer and other commands and agencies within the Theater.

d. The Control Division, headed by Capt. W. F. Noyes, was responsible for coordinating the planning and activities of the other subdivisions of the Office of the Chief Engineer. It compiled special studies and statistical data, and controlled reports and publications of the other divisions. On 15 March 1947, the Control Division was combined with the planning branches of the other divisions to form a new Planning and Control Division. It was headed by Lt. Col. W. S. Everett and divided into three branches, namely, Planning, Control, and Information. It carried on all the functions of the old Control

Division and in addition planned the future organization and functions, the closing of unnecessary agencies, the budget, and operations. It controlled scales of accommodations and technical standards for installations used by the U.S. forces or persons supported by them, and determined the requirements for equipment and supplies for engineer troops and Allied and German labor engaged in engineer activities or paid from Army funds. Its functions included public relations and press and radio contacts for the Chief Engineer.

e. The Intelligence and Troops Divisions were merged on 3 September 1946 to form the Military Division. The functions formerly performed by the two continued without much change, except that they were now assigned to two branches of a single division. Col. E. G. Daly, who had been chief of the Troops Division, became head of the Military Division. Lt. Col. L. E. Lynn, who had been head of the Operations and Training Section of the Troops Division, became head of the Troops Branch, and the former executive officer of the Intelligence Division, Capt. P. A. Bayorgeon, became head of the Intelligence Branch. The Troops Branch was further subdivided into three sections, namely, Training, Fire-fighting, and Troop Movements. The Intelligence Branch was subdivided into an Information Branch, a Topographic Branch, and an Intelligence Library. This organization continued until early in 1947, when the organization was simplified, so that there were only the two branches under the division chief and his executive. In this reorganization, not only various sections of the two branches, but

also the administrative and planning sections that had been under the executive, were done away with.

f. All matters concerning engineer supply were charged to the Supply Division. In June 1946, it was operating in four branches, namely, Administrative, Planning and Control, Procurement, and Operations. Col. C. S. Urwiller was division chief. Early in 1947, this organization was stream-lined and the old branches were replaced by three new ones, namely Procurement, Operations, and Surplus Property. Col. E. P. Ketchum replaced Colonel Urwiller as chief. On 25 May 1947, the majority of the functions of the division were transferred to the Hanau Engineer Base Depot. A small supply staff was retained in Frankfurt for the preparation of plans and policies, liaison with EUCOM staff sections and to act as an advisory staff to the Chief Engineer.

g. The Construction Division was headed by Col. R. J. Fleming, Jr., until 28 April 1947, on which date Col. A. J. McCutchen became Chief. This division was charged with construction, maintenance, fire protection, procurement and disposal of real estate, and survey and disposal of enemy war installations. The four branches operating at the end of June 1946, namely, Administration, Operation, Real Estate, and Engineer and Planning Branches, were reduced by the end of March 1947 to two branches, namely, Engineer and Operations, and Real Estate.

## 2. Personnel Problems.

a. A serious shortage of engineer officers existed in the Theater at the end of 1946. Approximately 57 percent of the officers

assigned to Engineer units in the Theater were denoted "branch immaterial" and had to be replaced eventually with engineer officers. In order to relieve the shortage of qualified engineer officers, a system of recruiting qualified civilians in the United States was set up, in cooperation with the Office of the Chief of Engineers, War Department. The program was instituted in July 1946 and, by September, civilians were being sought for 399 positions. Only 51 persons had actually been recruited by the end of that month, but by the end of the year 156 civilians had arrived in the Theater. Approximately 380 trained professional men and administrators were secured by the end of June 1947, and commands reported the quality of the personnel as satisfactory.

### 3. Training.

Training functions included supervision and coordination of Engineer training, distribution of training literature and aids, liaison with staff echelons on matters pertaining to training, technical inspection of Engineer units, and staff supervision over the operation of the Theater Engineer Training Center. The Center was assigned to the major command concerned and placed under the operational control of the Chief Engineer until March 1947, when the Chief Engineer took command. <sup>(1)</sup> On 12 April 1947, the Theater Engineer Training Center was redesignated the European Command Engineer School. In 1947, the supervision of Troop Information and Education and German Youth Activities

of troops assigned to engineer installations became added responsibilities.

a. On 1 July 1946, Engineer units were following a training schedule of six hours weekly, including one hour of Troop Information, three hours of basic training, and two hours of technical training. This was in addition to on-the-job training. Toward the end of 1946, the inactivation and reorganization of old units, the activation of new units, and a substantial reduction in strength seriously disrupted this program. These conditions continued and grew worse in 1947. Training of white troops was, for practical purposes, limited to that obtained on the job, but the program was continued to a considerably greater extent in Negro units. During the first half of 1947, Engineer units were availing themselves of quotas at Theater schools conducted by Ordnance, the Quartermaster, the Adjutant General, the Signal Corps, the Troop Information and Education Division, and the U.S. Constabulary. Before the end of June 1947, training in Engineer units was slightly improved, due largely to a European Command directive that made a five-hour weekly program mandatory. The five hours, however, were all devoted to basic training and all engineer training continued to be on-the-job. A program to separate from the service inapt personnel of Engineer units served to improve the level of training and efficiency in these units. An adequate training program was, however, impossible due to the heavy operational demands.

b. Enlisted men were trained in military specialties at the Theater Engineer Training Center at Butzbach, Germany. Until

4 October 1946, it was designated the Engineer Training School.

Too few instructors were available, and those available were not sufficiently qualified. The rosters of inactivated units were examined for possible instructors. In February 1947, the Engineer Training Center was moved from Butzbach to Murnau, Germany, where facilities were better and gave room for future expansion. Some courses were dropped because they were not needed, and the automotive mechanics course was taken over by Ordnance. Several new courses were added, however, and still others planned. On 13 May the first German students arrived for a course in crane and shovel operation. Six other courses were authorized for them, and four more were planned. A capacity of 200 enlisted men and 200 German students was approved, to become effective on 15 July 1947. Only seven German students had actually graduated by the end of June.

#### 4. Fire-fighting.

Both fire-fighting and fire prevention were responsibilities of the Chief Engineer. He exercised supervision through fire officers of the major commands and a Theater Fire Prevention Engineer. The latter arrived from the United States on 9 August 1946. He made field trips and inspections and developed a comprehensive plan that was approved by the G-4 Division.

a. Fire protection at major service installations and several of the major military communities was provided by Engineer fire-fighting units, including platoons and utility detachments assigned to the

major commands. In the larger cities, the Engineer fire-fighting units relied upon the German municipal fire departments for assistance. Protection in smaller military communities was provided by German fire-fighting teams using American equipment under the direction of the community fire marshal. To meet needs for equipment, trucks and trailer pumps were ordered from the United States and other items were obtained from surplus stocks and the German economy. Before the end of 1946 the trucks had begun to arrive at Bremerhaven, but they were in an unserviceable condition as they had been stripped of all appurtenances, including even the fire pumps. Requisitions for the necessary items were sent to the United States, but steps were also taken to procure some items from Chemical Corps surpluses.

b. A special fire prevention program was instituted toward the end of 1946. Posters were distributed and the subject was publicized in Stars and Stripes and over the American Forces Network. Hotel safety regulations as recommended by the National Fire Protection Association were posted, published, and broadcast. Transient hotels in the Frankfurt area were inspected for fire hazards and steps were taken to correct any deficiencies. During March 1947, three fire inspection teams began a survey of fire protection on military posts and the adequacy of equipment. Instructions for winterizing fire equipment and general precautions were issued. Assistance was given to the Criminal Investigation Division in inspecting cases of suspected arson. A six weeks' course for fire-fighters was established at the

Engineer Training Center, to which Germans were admitted. By the end of June 1947, twenty-five American soldiers had graduated and twelve others were enrolled. No Germans had graduated, but twenty-six were enrolled.

5. Troop Movements.

The Chief Engineer supervised the distribution of engineer troops for current and future operations, the return of Engineer units to the United States, and troop movements within the European Command. These functions were performed by the Troop Movements Section of the Military Division, which also supervised labor service units employed on engineer projects. The major problems encountered in the distribution of the available engineer strength were the critical shortage of engineer officers, the overstrength of Negroes, and the reduction of the occupational troop basis. By January 1947, all Engineer units in Western Base Section were inactivated or transferred to Germany.

6. The Intelligence Branch.

a. The Intelligence Branch of the Military Division, not only planned all intelligence activities for the Chief Engineer, but also collected intelligence and disseminated it to other agencies and other nations. Requests for captured enemy material for research and study purposes increased with each quarter, and became increasingly difficult to fill because of destruction, dispersion, conversion, and modification of the German goods and equipment. The Department of

State, Army Map Service, Engineer Board, U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, Naval Intelligence, Texas Agricultural and Mechanical College of Engineering, and Office of the Chief of Engineers were represented among the requests coming from the United States. Within the Theater, requests came from the G-2, G-3, and G-4 Divisions, USFET; Theater Chief of Transportation; Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner; OMGUS; Control Council for Germany (British); and the Greek Liaison Mission, USFET.

b. The Intelligence Branch was also responsible for mapping. The posthostilities mapping project involved the inspection and acceptance for mapping purposes of the Air Forces photography taken in flights over western Europe and the northeastern, northern, and western coasts of Africa. This project was practically complete at the end of 1946, with only small gaps in the photography which had to await better flying conditions in the spring. German mapping agencies working under control of the Engineers compiled and revised maps of Germany. The work included the revision of some sheets, compilation of trigonometric lists for others, and original compilation of still other 1/25,000 scale maps. The Engineer Base Reproduction Plant for maps in Frankfurt attained full operating capacity on 22 April 1946. The greatest number of impressions during the year under review, 1,737,000, was made in September 1946. After that date, reproduction decreased owing to the fact that assignment of map-printing jobs was held up pending the approval of a plan for a Theater map stock level.

Additional duties in connection with maps were the operation of map depots, the Map Reference Library, and the Kodaline Library at the Engineer Base Reproduction Plant. Mapping and intelligence installations were under the Chief Engineer for operations, with administrative control being exercised by the major command concerned until March 1947, when the Chief Engineer assumed command of these activities.

7. The Supply Situation.

a. Long-range procurement to meet general needs was the responsibility of Continental Base Section after 1 October 1946. In addition, the Engineer of Berlin District conducted a limited headquarters procurement for the Chief Engineer. Major commands submitted requests that were filled from depot stocks if possible and, if not, from local sources. Items considered to be indispensable and not available in the European Command were requisitioned from the United States. On 1 April 1947, operational responsibility for headquarters procurement reverted to the European Command and came under the jurisdiction of the Chief Engineer.

b. Few supplies were procured in Austria because of the limited industrial facilities in the U.S. Zone. All requests for supplies from the German economy were submitted to Military Government, which made assignments for production by German industry. The slow recovery of German industry and the limited capacity of engineer depots precluded local procurement for other than current use. The

disposal of scrap and surpluses and the consumption of depot stocks was expected to relieve the storage problem and make it possible to plan procurement on a quarterly basis.

c. During the year under review, approximately \$15,000,000 worth of materials were procured from the German economy. These supplies were paid for with German funds, unless they were shipped to Austria, in which case they were considered to be exports from Germany and were paid for with appropriated funds. Items procured in liberated, Allied, and neutral countries were also paid for with appropriated funds, either in dollar credits or in the money of the country as the directives required. Considerable quantities of plumbing fixtures, electrical supplies, and paint were among the items purchased in Europe outside of Germany. In the last six months of 1946, almost \$7,000,000 was spent for construction materials in Europe outside of Germany.

d. Picking up on accountable records of previously dumped and unreported stocks through the Theater, determination of Theater disposition level requirements through June 1951, and declaration of excess balances as surplus property, were the main supply problems during the first half of 1947.

e. Arrangements were made with various German firms for the establishment of rebuild plants for engineer heavy equipment. Production was started on the rebuilding of cranes, tractors, generators, earth-moving equipment, and spare parts, thereby enabling Hanau Engineer

Depot to rehabilitate many items of unserviceable equipment.

f. Stock record accounting, requisition handling, and stock status and control were transferred from manual methods to business machines during the latter part of the period under review.

8. The Coal Problem.

a. The stock of coal at the end of June 1946 represented a 51-day level of supply, based on average consumption during the year just ending. By the end of September it was evident that no surplus of coal would be received, even though all supply points had been charged with accumulating reserves.

b. On 15 November 1946, the engineer coal conservation teams began visiting major cities in an attempt to reduce coal consumption. They found no outstanding misuse of coal, but they were able to recommend improvements in the distribution and use of coal without creating hardships or inconvenience. The report of the conservation teams showed that the occupancy and heating of excessive floor space was the largest factor contributing to fuel wastage. <sup>(3)</sup> Training of firemen, repair and maintenance of equipment, and use of inferior fuels also offered opportunities for conservation. Daily rates of consumption were established based on the reports of the survey teams and, by February, coal consumption had been reduced by 20 percent.

c. The responsibility for the determination of requirements, the storage, and the distribution of all solid fuel was transferred

from the Chief Quartermaster to the Chief Engineer on 1 March 1947. <sup>(4)</sup>

Responsibility for procurement remained with the Chief Quartermaster.

d. In April 1947 the accumulation of coal for the next winter began, but the quantity stocked during the summer months was limited by the capacity of storage facilities, security from pilferage, and permanence of installations.

#### 9. Construction.

a. The construction program in the occupied area was assumed to have begun on 1 April 1946. It was divided into two phases. The first phase, during which minimum essential requirements were to be provided, was practically completed by the end of 1946, as planned. The final phase, during which accommodations and services were to be provided at a level slightly lower than that in the United States, was to take a year longer. New building comprised approximately 5 percent of the program and was authorized only when repair of existing structures was impossible. At the end of 1946, in spite of the severe winter, the target date for completion of all the currently planned construction remained 1 January 1948, except for the project at the Giessen Quartermaster Depot which was to be completed by 1 July 1948.

b. Military community construction took up the largest portion of the program, or 53,280,000 man-hours of labor and 282,000 long tons of supplies from the total estimate of about 89,000,000 man-hours and 604,000 long tons. The major portion of actual labor

was performed by German civilians, displaced persons, and prisoners of war. German contracting firms were employed where practicable.

c. The remainder of the program included work on headquarters buildings, command schools, hospitals, depots, shops, special installations, bridges, railroads, highways, utilities, ports, inland waterways, and Air Forces facilities. The major work on hospitals consisted of improvements to facilitate the care of dependents. Construction on waterways, railways, highways, and bridges was the responsibility of Military Government, and assistance was furnished by the Army only when military government facilities were inadequate; moreover, it was the policy to transfer the responsibility for the construction and maintenance of public utilities to the German economy. In a few cases it was necessary to help install sewerage systems, water pipelines, and electric generators, but these projects were kept to a minimum. Assistance was given in the installation and maintenance of water chlorinators in all military communities.

d. The major Air Forces project was the installation of complete facilities for a large military and commercial Air Transport Terminal near Frankfurt, known as Rhine-Main Air Base. Limited operations at this airfield were begun by European Air Transport Service and Air Transport Command on 19 May 1946. A larger permanent-type passenger terminal building became available on 1 December 1946, and the first blocks of prefabricated troop quarters were occupied in February 1947. With the advent of more favorable construction weather,

additional troop housing, messing, administrative, utility, supply, operational, technical, community, and recreational facilities were extended from bare minimums toward final requirements, permitting rapid expansion in airfield population and operations during the spring of 1947.

e. Since all supplies and personnel were to be shipped through the port of Bremerhaven, construction there was important. It included the completion of accommodations for 10,000 troops in the staging area and for overhead personnel equivalent to 10 percent of the staging capacity. By the 30 June 1947, the over-all construction program for this facility, requiring just over 500,000 man-hours was 93 percent complete.

f. In order to accommodate the large number of War Department civilians, and the large influx of dependent families, it became necessary to apply a major effort toward provision of adequate housing. Practically all of this work was in the nature of rehabilitation and repair of apartments and houses, requisitioned from the Germans. An indication of the scope of this work was provided by the requirements of Frankfurt, Berlin, Munich, and Stuttgart housing projects, together totaling more than 10,000,000 man-hours. Approximately 50 percent of these man-hours were expended by 30 June 1947. During the summer of 1946, the expansion of housing facilities for displaced persons became a major construction operation. The population of displaced persons increased from 373,758 on 30 June 1946 to 410,158 on 21 September 1946.

Existing projects to house these people were expanded and before the advent of severe cold weather, the housing program for displaced persons was substantially completed.

g. In accordance with the Theater policy of establishing a single consolidated depot and base repair facility for each service, a considerable effort was expended in depot and shop construction, with a total of about 10,000,000 man-hours required. By 30 June 1947, this program was about 50 percent complete.

#### 10. Real Estate.

a. Most real property in the U.S. Zone in Germany was acquired by requisitioning private property from the local German authorities and by confiscating facilities owned by the former German central government and the Nazi Party. These requisitions were placed through Military Government, and military requirements were coordinated with this agency to prevent hardship to the German people. The rent for privately owned property was considered to be a cost of the occupation, but no charges were allowed for confiscated property. Prior to 1 October 1946, a grand total of 90,000 pieces of property had been requisitioned and 3,600 pieces had been confiscated. Of these, 38,450 requisitions were still in effect, the balance having been released through Military Government. By the end of 1946 the number was reduced to 36,500 and remained close to this figure for the first six months of 1947. The cumulative costs of Army-held German real estate

amounted to RM 15,000,000 by 1 July 1946, RM 315,000,000 by 1 January 1947, and RM 415,000,000 by 30 June 1947.

b. The general policy was to release to civil authorities real estate that was determined excess to the needs of the occupation forces. (5) In April 1947, a EUCOM directive formulated a policy of prohibiting the extension of existing real estate holdings without strong justification. (6) A detailed procedure was established which required submission of the requisition for new real estate for review by Headquarters, EUCOM. The new policy required that, in the event that additional property was necessary in a certain locality due to consolidation of troop units or agencies, comparable property must be released to the German economy in exchange. In such cases, post commanders forwarded a request through the military district commander to Headquarters, EUCOM, and designated the comparable property to be released.

11. Survey and Disposal of Enemy War Installations.


a. The destruction of all German fortifications, mine fields, and defensive works in the four occupied zones of Germany was made mandatory by Directive No. 22 of the Allied Control Council, issued on 6 December 1945. The directive classed all such installations into two groups to indicate the priority of demolition. Priority I was assigned to fortifications which constituted an immediate hazard to the occupation forces or which could be utilized for war purposes

without additional construction or production. The target date for the destruction of installations of this category was 6 June 1947. Priority II was assigned to fortifications which, although convertible to war usage, required additional construction or the resumption of German war industries before being capable of use for purposes of war.

b. In November 1946 a directive permitted German buildings, such as barracks, schools, hospitals, headquarters, and administrative installations, previously included on demolition lists, to be reclassified and used as required by the occupation forces. <sup>(7)</sup> Because of the serious shortage of housing and storage facilities, many usable and habitable air raid shelters and fortifications were used by the German people. The Army also used many of these installations for covered storage, and requests for their reclassification were submitted to the Allied Control Council.

c. The original target date of 6 June 1951 on Priority II installations was changed to 6 December 1948 by Allied Control Council Directive No. 48, issued on 27 March 1947. This directive provided that installations not destroyed by 6 December 1948 should be demolished before the end of the occupation, unless still required by the German economy, in which event the installations were to be stripped of all military characteristics. In the U.S. Zone, all Priority I installations were destroyed by 1 January 1947. <sup>(8)</sup> On the same date 3,425 installations of Priority II remained to be demolished. U.S. forces and authorized German civilian agencies were occupying approximately

2,000 of these installations. Engineers of the major commands completed a resurvey of all former enemy fortifications on 15 May 1947. At that time destruction was accomplished whenever practicable, and all installations not demolished were assigned a code symbol. Upon request from the agency most interested in preserving a building the Engineers deferred its destruction. Following the resurveys made by the major commands, the demolition program was intensified, with the result that most of the Priority II installations were either demolished or exempted from demolition by the end of June 1947. The target date for the completion of the project in the U.S. Zone was fixed as 1 August 1947. The accompanying chart indicates the status of demilitarization and destruction of enemy fortifications on 25 June 1947. (9)




Indicated as "Personnel Service" in chart dated 15 January 1947

ORGANIZATION

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ENGINEER

Chart II


June 1947



OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ENGINEER  
 ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

Chart III

October 1946




\*Indicated as "Personnel Service" in chart dated 15 January 1947.

**DEMILITARIZATION AND DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY FORTIFICATIONS**

AS OF 25 JUNE 1947

Chart IV



- |   |   |  |
|---|---|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Minefields and other explosive obstructions.</li> <li>2. Non-explosive obstacles and field obstacles on main Allied lines of communications and across German defensive systems.</li> <li>3. Fundamental defensive constructions on main routes.</li> <li>4. All underground airbases and major underground aviation facilities.</li> <li>5. Bases for submarines and R-boats and E-boats.</li> <li>6. All permanent fortified land constructions other than those reported under Item 3.</li> <li>7. All other types of permanent obstacles not shown in Item 2.</li> <li>8. Special weapon installations for V-1, V-2 and other weapons.</li> </ol> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>9. Naval bases.</li> <li>10. Permanent fortified coastal defense construction including firing installations, etc.</li> <li>11. Fighter control and radar installations, etc. surplus to Allied requirements.</li> <li>12. Base and operational airfields, etc. surplus to Allied requirements.</li> <li>13. AA installations of various types and uses.</li> <li>14. Underground facilities, depots and workshops.</li> <li>15. Military and public air raid shelters.</li> <li>16. Underground communication cables surplus to authorized German civil and Allied requirements.</li> </ol> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>17. Overhead lines of communications surplus to authorized German civil requirements and to Allied requirements.</li> <li>18. Fixed radio stations surplus to authorized German civil requirements and to Allied requirements.</li> <li>19. Underground and surface centers of communication and relay stations, surplus to authorized German civil requirements and to Allied requirements.</li> <li>20. Military scientific research centers etc. also all testing grounds.</li> <li>21. Ranges surplus to Allied requirements.</li> <li>22. Depots of war materials, etc. surplus to Allied requirements.</li> <li>23. Major strategic bulk PCL storage installations surplus to Allied requirements.</li> <li>24. Total, Priority II Projects.</li> </ol> |
|---|---|--|


Source of data: Office Chief Engineer

Chart V

ORDNANCE DIVISION  
HQ USFET  
13 JANUARY 1947

THEATER CHIEF OF ORDNANCE

DEPUTY CHIEF OF ORDNANCE



FOOTNOTES

N.B. This chapter is based principally upon the reports of operations, 1 July 1946-30 June 1947, filed by the Office of the Chief Engineer.

1. "Appendix B--Engineer Plan--to Annex Number Two to Plan for Reorganization of U.S. Forces in the European Theater, 31 January 1947," file AG 322 GCT-AGO, subj: "Plan for Reorganization of U.S. Forces in the European Command." On the status of the Engineer Training Center, sec para II, 3c(1); III, 7a; IV, 12d; tab 4, "Field Organization;" tab 9A, "Interim Plan and Integration Schedule," par 2a(1).
2. Hq, USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference, No 29, 9 Jul 46, pars 27 and 28.
3. Monthly Conference of Commander in Chief with Major Commanders and Deputy Military Governor, 18th meeting, 18 Dec 46, par 7.
4. Hq, EUCOM, Office of the Chief Engr, Rpt of Opr, 1 Jan-31 Mar 47, p 1.
5. Monthly Conference of Commander in Chief with Major Commanders and Deputy Military Governor, 18th meeting, 18 Dec 46, par 9.
6. Ltr, Hq, EUCOM, 18 Apr 47, file AG 602 GDS-AGO, subj: "Renewal of German Real Estate Requisitions."
7. Hq, USFET, Office of the Chief Engr, Rpt of Opr, 1 Oct-31 Dec 46, p 24.
8. Hq, EUCOM, Office of the Chief Engr, Rpt of Opr, 1 Jan-31 Mar 47, p 22; Monthly Conference of Commander in Chief with Major Commanders and Deputy Military Governor, 21st meeting, 26 Mar 47, par 11.
9. Hq, EUCOM, Office of the Dir of SS&P, Statistical Summary, 30 Jun 47, p 23.

CHAPTER XXXII

CHIEF SURGEON

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## Chapter XXXII

### CHIEF SURGEON

#### 1. Organization and Administration.

a. The medical effort in the European Theater was guided by the Theater Chief Surgeon, Brig. Gen. Edward A. Noyes, and his staff. Policies affecting U.S. military forces and civilians coming under their jurisdiction emanated from the Office of the Theater Chief Surgeon and were implemented by the surgeons of subordinate major commands. In addition to the purely administrative divisions, there were those dealing with operations, preventive medicine, professional service, dentistry, veterinary matters, and nursing. A hospitalization and evacuation coordinator served in an advisory capacity to the Chief Surgeon until 15 March 1947, operational responsibility for hospitalization and evacuation having been vested until that date in Headquarters, Continental Base Section. (1) After 15 March, the Chief Surgeon assumed direct responsibility for operations in these fields and reestablished the Hospital-

ization and Evacuation Division in his Office by transferring back to his staff from Continental Base Section the personnel who had carried out the same functions at the latter headquarters, to which they had originally been moved from the Theater Surgeon's Office in January 1946. Operational responsibility for medical supply in the Theater rested with Continental Base Section until late in November and was then placed with the Theater Chief Surgeon. A small staff, named Non-American Medical Activities Branch, was organized within the Operations Division in the winter of 1947 to carry out over-all supervision of hospitals caring for displaced persons, prisoners of war, and civilian internees. (2)

b. Among the leading members of the Chief Surgeon's staff was Col. Alvin L. Gorby, formerly Surgeon of 12th Army Group, who was Deputy Theater Chief Surgeon, and Col. Abner Zehm, who succeeded him in that capacity in May. Col. Daniel J. Waligora served as executive officer until early June and Col. Bryan C.T. Fenton thereafter. Lt. Col. R.F. Kirk served as chief of the Operations Division and Col. G.V. Emerson as Coordinator for Hospitalization and Evacuation and as chief of the Hospitalization and Evacuation Division; Maj. J.K. Bayne served as chief of the Preventive Medicine Division until August and Lt. Col. H.A. Schulze thereafter. Col. Alva B. McKie served as chief of the Professional Service Division until June 1947 and was succeeded by Col. P.E. Duggins. Chief of the Dental Division was Col. M.H. Welch;

chief of the Veterinary Division, Col. J.R. Sperry until late December, when he was succeeded by Col. H.E. Egan. The Nursing Division was headed until early August by Lt. Col. Daisy M. McCommons, until late in September by Lt. Col. Nina M. Maker, and during the remainder of the occupation year by Lt. Col. Louise M. Fitzgerald. The Medical Supply Division was headed by Lt. Col. R.L. Black until late August when he was followed by Lt. Col. E.G. Cooper.

c. Organizationally, the system of rendering medical service in the Theater was changed somewhat from that in force during the occupation year 1945-46. The reduced Theater troop strength, which led to a breaking up of large troop concentrations and the evolution of the military community and military post, led in some areas to a hitherto untried method of medical service: the "visiting" service. Small, isolated units which had no medical services of their own were visited by medical officers who held sick call at designated places. Although not established on a permanent basis, this type of service proved a satisfactory solution to a problem during a period of large-scale redeployment and transition to a stable post-system of organization. <sup>(3)</sup> All fixed medical installations in Germany were under the operational control of Continental Base Section until spring 1947, and those in liberated areas under Western Base Section. Hospitals caring for prisoners of war, displaced persons, and civilian internees were under the control of the Third U.S. Army until 15 February, when they came under the control of the U.S. Constabulary for a month and then were placed under the over-all

supervision of the Chief Surgeon and under the operational control of the  
(4)  
newly created military districts.

d. When Theater Headquarters became Headquarters, European Command, on 15 March, and the Office of the Theater Chief Surgeon became the Office of the Chief Surgeon, EUCOM, the Chief Surgeon's specific operational responsibilities were in several ways modified, although his broad responsibilities to the Theater Commander were in no way altered. Under the Theater medical plan, published on 30 April and made totally effective on 1 June, the Chief Surgeon continued to be responsible for the maintenance of the health of the forces constituting the European Command; for technical supervision over the medical service; for establishment of preventive medicine procedures and supervision of professional treatment and sanitary measures; for recommendation of medical personnel requirements and assignment of medical units; for determining the desirability of hospital sites; for recommendations concerning the adequacy of rations supplied by the Chief Quartermaster; for coordination and supervision of the medical service provided displaced persons, prisoners of war, and civilian internees. (5) Operations which had previously been the responsibility of major commanders and which were placed, in the reorganization, under the direct operational command of the Chief Surgeon included direct command of general hospitals, medical depots, Medical Department training schools, the European Command Medical Laboratory, and units employed in over-all Theater evacuation. Commanders of major commands, namely, the U.S. Constabulary, the American Graves

Registration (AGRC), Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation, Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.), United States Forces, Austria, United States Air Forces in Europe, the First and Second Military Districts, and Headquarters Command, EUCOM, were in turn made responsible for the various phases of the medical service within their commands. Commanders of the two military districts were in addition made responsible for medical installations on army posts and for direct supervision of non-American medical installations.

e. The general medical operational chain of command established at the time of the Theater reorganization was composed of three echelons: the first furnished troop unit medical service to troops and dispensary service to military posts; the second, hospitalization in fixed hospitals on a regional basis; and the third, specialized treatment in general hospitals and certain station hospitals. Commanding officers of troops assigned to installations commanded by the Chief Surgeon were made directly responsible to him on operational and technical matters. Commanders of other medical units were made responsible to the major commands to which they were assigned.

f. The Chief Surgeon was responsible for procurement of medical supplies for depot stock and was authorized to utilize indigenous sources whenever possible. The entire medical supply system was organized on a single depot, the one at Fürth, Germany, which furnished supplies to fixed hospitals. The latter, acting as post medical supply agencies, in turn furnished supply support to satellite organizations such as dis-

pensaries. A 60-day level of supply was established at the Fürth depot for the occupation forces and at the Weinheim medical depot for the needs of Civil Affairs and Military Government. A 30-day level of supply was allowed AGRC and each fixed military hospital, and a 7-day level was set up at each dispensary.

g. As a direct result of the reduced Occupational Troop Basis, the Chief Surgeon was faced with several important personnel problems. The existing War Department authorization of 2.85 Medical Corps officers and 1.1 Dental Corps officers per one thousand troops was an adequate authorization when only the number of troops in the Theater were taken into consideration. However, what actually took place was that, whereas the troop strength went down, thus reducing the number of Medical Department officers, extra military commitment increased. Medical service now had to be provided for many thousands of civilian employees and dependents of both the military and civilians, as well as for displaced persons, prisoners of war, and civilian internees. These factors led the War Department in the fall of 1946 to increase the ratio of Medical Corps officers to 3.9 per thousand troops and dentists to 1.25 per thousand. The allocation of nurses remained at one for every twelve hospital beds. (7) In spite of these increases, however, there continued to exist shortages of specialist personnel due to redeployment. Medical and Dental Corps officers who had studied under the Army Specialized Training Program and had served two years in an active duty status were made eligible for separation. (8) Of Medical Department enlisted men

only some ten thousand were on duty in the autumn of 1946 against an authorized strength of over thirteen thousand. Although it was possible to replace many of the enlisted men with native labor--for example, hospital attendants, kitchen help, barbers, chemists--a shortage of certain specialists continued to exist. Personnel for the medical sections of the newly established military districts was provided in March of 1947 by a blanket 7-percent reduction in the number of Medical Department personnel assigned to medical units of the occupation forces. (9)

h. Existing training programs and facilities for Medical Department personnel were expanded and new ones started during the second year of the occupation. Some enlisted men were trained in basic military, technical, and medical subjects at the Medical Department Training Center, located until 16 June at Lesum, Germany, and thereafter at Nürnberg. Others received on-the-job training as laboratory, surgical, and X-ray technicians and as medical-equipment maintenance men. Courses for non-commissioned officers of the first four grades, started in April, were designed to teach leadership, administration, and methods of instruction. Indigenous personnel, too, received on-the-job training in technical and routine maintenance jobs. For Medical Corps officers, arrangements were made with the Medical School of Vienna for postgraduate training in medicine, surgery, pathology, obstetrics, and eye, ear, nose, and throat. (10)

## 2. Supply.

a. At the beginning of the period under review the Medical Supply Division, Office of the Chief Surgeon, with the exception of its

chief, was physically located at Bad Nauheim for logistical support of Continental Base Section. Late in November 1946 the Division reverted to the Office of the Chief Surgeon in Frankfurt with the exception of the Requirements Branch, which was attached to the Fürth Medical Depot. The Supply Division was responsible for all medical stock in the Theater and for requisitioning from the United States or purchasing within the theater all medical supplies required to support the occupation of Germany and Austria and American troops in the liberated countries. Theater stocks were requisitioned principally from the Zone of the Interior, on the basis of standard consumption rates established by the Surgeon General. These rates were modified as deemed necessary to meet local conditions and as considered consistent with good policy and established supply procedures. All requisitions, other than emergency, were based on a 180 day reorder point.

b. The depot factor remained constant throughout the occupation year, except as noted below. The depots that remained under the control of the Chief Surgeon and their major duties are listed below:

(1) Fürth Medical Depot - operated by the 33rd Medical Depot Company. This depot served as the central medical depot and was responsible for the receipt, storage, and issue of all medical supplies within the Theater to meet the military requirements. In addition, the 33rd Medical Depot Company was responsible for the operation of the Theater optical shop and the Base maintenance shop, and for the physical operation of a surplus property section.

(2) Originally, the Weinheim Medical Depot, operated by the 30th Medical Depot Company, served as an issue point for both military and civilian stocks. It was converted, however, on 1 September 1946 to serve as an issue point for civil affairs/military government stocks exclusively. Original civil affairs/military government stocks for an established 60-day level were withdrawn from stocks excess to the military requirements and these continued to be the principal source of supply for the remainder of the period under review.

3. Hospitalization and Evacuation.

a. The number of hospital beds in the Theater was constantly reduced as the Occupational Troop Basis declined. This was accomplished by closing out some hospitals and reducing other units of smaller bed capacity. Whereas on 1 July 1946 there were 11,282 beds available, by the end of the year the number had declined to 8,600, and by the end of June 1947 to 5,400--a number sufficient to meet Theater needs based on (11) percent of the Theater troop strength. There were 6,598 patients hospitalized on 1 July 1946 and 3,695 on 30 June 1947. There were four general hospitals, thirteen station hospitals, one evacuation hospital, and six field hospitals on 1 July 1946; two general hospitals, fifteen station hospitals, one evacuation hospital, and three field hospitals on 31 December; and two general hospitals, thirteen station hospitals, and two field hospitals on 30 June 1947. There were, in addition, five general medical dispensaries of the "GA" and "GB" types and three medical dispensaries of the "GC" type on 1 July; twelve of the former and two

of the latter on 31 December; and the same number of the former and one of the latter on 30 June. For prisoners of war the Army operated two provisional general hospitals and one provisional station hospital-- each of 500-bed capacity-- at the beginning of the occupation year. By 31 December only one station hospital was in operation and by the end of June 1947 none. (12) These hospitals were staffed by German doctors and nurses and supervised by U.S. Army Medical Department officers. Similar medical responsibility was exercised over hospitals and dispensaries caring for civilian internees and displaced persons. At the end of the occupation year one civilian internee hospital--at Dachau--with a bed capacity of 900 sufficed to meet the army's requirements for that category of patients, and 49 hospitals, with a capacity of 10,245 beds, (13) served displaced persons.

b. Evacuation of patients to the United States was based on a policy of 120 days of hospitalization. There were 4,477 evacuated by sea and 981 by air during the year under review. In the sea movement, two hospital ships were employed in the summer of 1946, but after that only the army transport, Charles A. Stafford. For transportation on the Continent, Diesel auto-rail ambulance cars were utilized in addition to one standard-size hospital train. Ward cars were frequently attached to military duty trains on their regular runs, especially to the train from Berlin. At first carried on from Paris, air evacuation to the United States was shifted to airfields near Frankfurt am Main in mid-December. A number of intra-Theater air evacuations also took place, chiefly emergency cases.

4. Health of the Command.

a. The upward trend in the number of persons admitted to hospitals for both communicable diseases and injury existing at the beginning of the second year of the occupation continued until mid-August. Then it declined steadily until October, when it began to level off. In January 1947 it rose sharply, only to start again on a steady but irregular decline, which continued until the end of June. The incidence of common respiratory disease, fluctuating between levels of 100 and 130 per thousand per annum in the months July through December, rose sharply to about 250 late in January and then declined steadily to a low of about 80 per thousand per annum. Neither primary nor atypical pneumonia presented special problems. Although the incidence rate of the latter was twice as high for the summer of 1946 as for a corresponding period in 1945, it declined during the remainder of the year and by the end of June 1947 was the lowest in two years. The same was true, in a general way, for influenza. The changes were attributable almost entirely to sensational variation. The incidence of diphtheria declined during the summer months of 1946 from its rate of 2.8 per thousand per annum for July, but rose again to between 3.0 and 4.0 in November, December and January. (15) An immunization program ordered by the Theater commander (16) stabilized the rate at about one per thousand per annum after January.

b. The incidence of hepatitis was an exception to the general downward trend in the rate of hospitalization. From a rate of 5.18 per thousand per annum in July, it rose to 7.12 in August, 8.2 in December,

and, after a very irregular movement which set in in January, was about 9.0 per thousand per annum at the end of the second year of the occupation.  
(17)

c. Few cases of typhoid and paratyphoid were reported. Except for several outbreaks of food poisoning, other gastro-intestinal infections presented no problem. The rates of hospital admissions were low.

d. Only a few cases of smallpox were reported in the entire year 1946-47. A small outbreak in Wiesbaden and one in Bremerhaven early in 1947, resulting from noncompliance of ward attendants with isolation regulations, were quickly checked by quarantine of all contacts and vaccination of all those considered near contacts. Scabies rose from a monthly rate of 37.63 for July to 53.0 in November and to over 60.0--its high--in January. The precipitous decline that followed brought the rate down to slightly below 20.0 per thousand per annum--the lowest in two years--at the end of June.  
(18)

The decline was due, it was held, to improved sanitary facilities, change in the type of soldier in the Theater, improved treatment, enforcement of sanitary regulations, and closer supervision by unit commanders of the personal hygiene of their troops.  
(19)

e. The incidence of disease among prisoners of war in the care of the U.S. Army was, in the main, normal. Diseases of highest incidence were tuberculosis and diarrhea.  
(20)

##### 5. Venereal Disease.

a. The most serious health problem in the European Theater was venereal disease. The rate of incidence stood at 275 per thousand per

annum for the month of July 1946, the highest recorded rate for the year under discussion. After this a decline set in, which remained more or less constant until the end of June 1947. The rate of 266 for the month of August was followed by 244 for September and 224 for December, the lowest for the occupation year. Although the rate rose to 251 per thousand per annum in January 1947, it was in the 230's in the succeeding months and 226 in both May and June. The rate of infection in the Negro component of the forces of occupation was especially high. Whereas, for example, the white rate for the Theater's peak month (July 1946) stood at 203, the Negro rate stood at 305, and when the over-all Theater low rate of 224 was reached in December the white rate was 175 and the Negro rate 660 per thousand per annum. The latter never fell below 660; the white rate never rose above 203.

b. Numerous measures of control were resorted to by military authorities, ranging from educational and recreational to prophylactic and disciplinary. An intensive venereal disease control campaign, featuring addresses by the Theater Chief Surgeon, the Theater Chaplain, and the Theater Provost Marshal, was begun in September. Wide use was made of radio skits on the dangers of venereal disease, articles in newspapers, and posters displayed in prominent places. Although improved methods in reporting sex contact histories were introduced, the most successful single method of control was the police raid on areas of known vice concentration. Generally, it was the immaturity and irresponsibility of the troops, rather than any lack of knowledge on their part of the

dangers inherent in the diseases, that caused the spread of gonorrhoea and syphilis. The prevalence of these diseases in indigenous women in occupied areas, although generally the result of postwar conditions beyond the control of the occupying forces, was in part attributed to American troops, since many of the women examined in venereal disease treatment centers named American soldiers as their sources of infection.

6. Nutrition and Sanitation.

a. The supervision and evaluation of diets served in messes for all personnel coming under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Army was the responsibility of the Chief Surgeon. Close liaison was maintained with the Theater Chief Quartermaster and with the Civil Affairs (G-5) Division of Theater Headquarters on questions of feeding displaced persons and civilian internees. The several types of ration served for different categories of people were: the "A" ration, for the forces of occupation; the "Continental Allied" ration, for Allied and neutral personnel working for the U.S. Army in organized units, and for displaced persons; and the "Prisoner of War" ration, for prisoners of war and enemy and ex-enemy civilians organized in mobile labor teams for special projects. (22) The nutritional state of the command was good throughout the occupation year. Caloric intake was adequate. Special attention was paid to the needs of displaced persons. (23)

b. Basic problems in sanitation were largely solved by the end of June 1947. At that time, fifty-three municipal and other fixed water supplies had been approved for use by the United States forces in Germany

and Austria as compared with fifteen in September 1946. The disposal of human excreta was generally accomplished by means of water-borne sewerage systems and only occasionally by pit latrines. Sanitation of mess halls and kitchens improved markedly when adequate washing and sterilization machinery was provided.

c. Insect and rodent control was a part of unit and post commanding officers' general responsibilities for the enforcement of sanitary regulations in the areas under their command. Commanding officers were instructed by the Theater Commander to appoint in every military community and installation of a thousand or more troops an officer to be responsible for executing insect and rodent control activities.  
(24)

#### 7. Professional Service.

a. Surgery was called upon to provide the largest portion of professional service, the majority of hospital admissions being general surgery and orthopedic cases. Urological cases also made heavy demands on the surgical service. This group of patients suffered primarily from urinary tract infections resulting from venereal disease complications.

b. Of medical cases, venereal disease contributed by far the largest number of hospitalization. Next in number was a group classified as general medical.  
(25)

c. Dental supplies were adequate throughout the year 1946-47 and the quality of dental work was satisfactory, although a large proportion of the dentists on duty had less than three years' professional

service. The total of dental officers on duty declined from 360 on  
(26)  
1 July 1946 to 237 in April 1947 and to 197 by the end of June.

d. The Theater was provided with a thorough veterinary service for the inspection of the millions of tons of food which the occupation forces consumed in a year. The major part of veterinary activities had to do with meat and dairy hygiene inspections, to which was later added inspection of canned foods not of animal origin and of food sold by the Army Exchange Service over the counter in post exchanges. Butter, eggs, and milk bought in Denmark for the troops in Germany and Austria were inspected by Veterinary Corps personnel. The care of animals, particularly horses and dogs, continued on a reduced scale during the year under review, as the number of guard dogs and of horses in the hands of military units fell off. The care of pets, constituted something of a problem. During the months July-September alone more than seven hundred dogs were shipped by American personnel returning to the United States through the port of Bremerhaven. Thorough physical examinations were given these pets by the port veterinarian and his staff before they  
(27)  
were allowed to be shipped to America.

e. Nursing service in the Theater throughout the year was of a routine nature. Large-scale redeployment had come to an end in September and only small groups of nurses and individuals were redeployed after that. Nursing service was provided on all trains leaving Bremerhaven with dependents. The morale of officers of the Army Nurse Corps was high throughout the year, in spite of the increased demands made on

their services, resulting from the continued arrival of dependents, many with infants. A number of nurses changed their volunteer duty status, selecting to remain on duty for longer periods of time than they had originally chosen; others applied for integration in the Regular  
(28)  
Army.


f. The Fourth Medical Laboratory, located until April in Darmstadt and thereafter at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Heidelberg, acted as the EUCOM Medical Laboratory, supplying all units in the Theater with specialized laboratory services and facilities. In addition, it prepared and shipped specimens from other laboratories in the Theater to the Army Medical School and the Army Medical Museum in Washington. It was organized in special serology, pathology, bacteri-  
(29)  
ology, chemistry, and veterinary sections.

CHART I

OFFICE OF THE THEATER CHIEF SURGEON

ORGANIZATION CHART

1 July 1946



\*This division was physically located at Headquarters, Continental Base Section and functioned under the control of that headquarters, but was assigned to the Office of the Theater Chief Surgeon. Continental Base Section, at this time was operationally responsible for medical supply in the Theater.

CHART II  
ORGANIZATION CHART  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SURGEON





Chart III  
**TOTAL DISEASE**

Admission Rates per Thousand per Annum

EUROPEAN THEATER

1946 - 1947




REPRODUCED FROM OFFICE C/ SURGEON'S CHART

# TOTAL INJURY

Admission Rates per Thousand per Annum  
EUROPEAN THEATER 1946-1947

Chart IV




# VENEREAL DISEASE

Chart V

THEATER INCIDENCE RATE PER 1000 PER ANNUM

- WHITE MEMBERS OF OCCUPATION FORCES
- - - - - NEGRO MEMBERS OF OCCUPATION FORCES
- ..... THEATER TOTALS



PREPARED BY G/HIST, GRAPHIC SECTION




Chart VI  
**COMMON RESPIRATORY DISEASE**  
Admission Rates per Thousand per Annum  
EUROPEAN THEATER 1946-1947





Chart VII  
**HEPATITIS**

Admission Rates per Thousand per Annum

EUROPEAN THEATER

1946 — 1947



REPRODUCED FROM OFFICE C/ SURGEONS CHART

M.K. REPRODUCED FROM OFFICE C/ SURGEONS CHART

FOOTNOTES

1. OTCS, USFET, Rpt of Opr, 1 Jul-30 Sep 46, app 2; 1 Oct-31 Dec 46, annex 4, p 1; 1 Jan-31 March 47, annex 3, p 1.
2. OCS, EUCOM, Rpt of Opr, 1 Jan-31 Mar 47, annex 2, Non-American Medical Activities Branch, p 1.
3. OTCS, USFET, Rpt of Opr, 1 Jul-30 Sep 46, annex 2, Planning Branch, pp 2-5.
4. OCS, EUCOM, Rpt of Opr, 1 Jan-31 Mar 47, annex 2, Non-American Medical Activities Branch, pp 1-4.
5. Ltr, Hq. EUCOM, 30 Apr 47, file AG 322, GCT-AGO, subj: "Plan for Reorganization of US Forces in the European Command," app "D" - Medical Plan.
6. OTCS, USFET, Rpt of Opr, 1 Jul-30 Sep 46, annex 2, Planning Branch, Incl 1, pp 1-2.
7. OCS, EUCOM, Rpt of Opr, 1 Jan-31 Mar 47, annex 2, Planning Branch, p 1; 1 Apr-30 Jun 47, annex 9, p 1.
8. Cable SC-201127, 25 Oct 46, USFET.
9. OCS, EUCOM, Rpt of Opr, 1 Jan-31 Mar 47, annex 2, Troops and Training Branch, p 1.
10. Ltr, OTCS, USFET, 16 Sep 46, file ETMCH-O, subj: "Establishment of Theater Medical Department Training Center;" ltr, OTCS, USFET, 25 Sep 46, 27 Feb 47, 9 Jun 47, subj: "Postgraduate Training for Professional Personnel."
11. OTCS, USFET, Rpt of Opr, 1 Jul-30 Sep 46, annex 3, p 3; 1 Oct-31 Dec 46, annex 3, p 3; 1 Jan-31 Mar 47, annex 3, p 2; 1 Apr-30 Jun 47, annex 4, pp 1-2.
12. List of Medical Department Units in the Theater, OCS, EUCOM file 319.26 Opns, 30 June 46, 31 Dec 46, 1 Jul 47.
13. OCS, EUCOM, Rpt of Opr, 1 Apr-30 Jun 47, annex 3, Non-American Medical Operations Branch.
14. Surgeon, CBS, Rpt of Opr, 1 Jul-30 Sep 46, p 3; 1 Oct-31 Dec 46, p 3; 1 Jan-31 Mar, p 4; OTCS, EUCOM, 1 Apr-30 Jun 47, annex 4, p 3.

15. OTCS, USFET, Rpt of Opr, 1 Jul-30 Sep 46, annex 6, pp 1-3; 1 Oct-31 Dec 46, annex 6, pp 1-3; 1 Jan-31 Mar 47, annex 5, pp 1-2; 1 Apr-30 Jun 47, annex 6, pp 1-2.
16. Ltr, Hq. USFET, 24 Sep 46, file AG 720 MCH-AGO, subj: "Diphtherial Immunization", OCS, EUCOM, Rpt of Opr, 1 Jan-31 Mar 47, annex 6, p 1.
17. OTCS, USFET, Rpt of Opr, 1 Jul-30 Sep 46, annex 6, p 5; 1 Oct-31 Dec 46, annex 6, p 4; 1 Jan-30 Jun 47, annex 6, p 3 and incl 6.
18. OTCS, USFET, Rpt of Opr, 1 Jul-30 Sep 46, annex 6, p 5; 1 Oct-31 Dec 46, annex 6, p 4; 1 Jan-31 Mar 47, annex 5, pp 2-4 and incl 7; 1 Apr-30 Jun 47, annex 6, pp 3-4.
19. Ltr, Hq. USFET, 29 Jan 46, file AG 710 MCH-AGO, subj: "Scabies."
20. OTCS, USFET, Rpt of Opr, 1 Jul-30 Sep 46, annex 6, p 6; 1 Oct-31 Dec 46, annex 6, p 5.
21. OTCS, USFET, Rpt of Opr, 1 Jul-30 Sep 46, annex 6, pp 6-7; 1 Oct-31 Dec 46, annex 6, pp 5-8; 1 Jan-31 Mar 47, annex 5, p 4; 1 Apr-30 Jun 47, annex 6, p 4; Table of figures supplied by VD Control Officer, OCS, on 8 Oct 47.
22. Cir 131, USFET, 14 Sep 46, subj: "Rations and Messing."
23. Ltr, Hq. USFET, 27 Nov 46, file AG 430.2 GEC-AGO, subj: "Ration Scale for German Civilian Internees under Direct Control of US Forces"; ltr Hq. USFET, 11 Oct 46, file 430.2 GEC-AGO, subj: "Care and Feeding in Approved Assembly Centers of United Nations Displaced Persons."
24. Cable SC-18477, 13 Mar 47, USFET; ltr, OTCS, USFET, 23 Sep 47, subj: "Investigation of Hot Water Heating Facilities in Messes"; ltr, Hq. USFET, 27 Sep 46, file AG 729, MCH-AGO, subj: "Insect and Rodent Control."
25. OTCS, USFET, Rpt of Opr, 1 Jul-30 Sep 46, annex 7, pp 6-7 and Exhibit "A"; 1 Oct-31 Dec 46, Annex 5, pp 4-6 and Exhibit "A"; 1 Jan-31 Mar 47, annex 6, pp 4-5; 1 Apr-30 Jun 47, annex 7, pp 4-5.
26. OTCS, USFET, Rpt of Opr, 1 Jul-30 Sep 46, annex 9; 1 Oct-31 Dec 46, annex 8; 1 Jan-31 Mar 47, annex 8; 1 Apr-30 Jun 47, annex 9.
27. IRS, Hq. USFET, to Theater Chief Surgeon, 7 Oct 46, subj:

"Inspection of Food Products Procured in Europe"; ltr, OTCS, USFET, 5 Sep 46, file EPMCH-V, subj: "Procedure for Milk Control"; OTCS, USFET, Rpt of Opr, 1 Jul-30 Sep 46, annex 10; 1 Oct-31 Dec 46, annex 9; 1 Jan-31 Mar 46, annex 9; 1 Apr-30 Jun 47, annex 10.

28. OTCS, USFET, Rpt of Opr, 1 Jul-30 Sep 46, annex 8; 1 Oct-31 Dec 46, annex 7; 1 Jan-31 Mar 47, annex 7; 1 Apr-30 Jun 47, annex 8.

29. OTCS, USFET, Rpt of Opr, 1 Jul-30 Sep 46, annex 6, incl 33; 1 Apr-30 Jun 47, annex 6, p 7.

Chapter XXXIII  
CHIEF OF ORDNANCE

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Chapter XXXIII  
CHIEF OF ORDNANCE

1. Organizational Structure.

Throughout the twelve-month period beginning 1 July 1946, the Office of the Chief of Ordnance was a technical service of Theater Headquarters. The director of Service, Supply and Procurement integrated ordnance activities with those of the other technical services. The Chief of Ordnance was assisted by a deputy chief, who implemented his policies and coordinated the work of the various divisions of the office. The office had been organized on 24 April 1946 as shown in Chart I, <sup>(1)</sup> and continued in this form until 9 August 1946, when the Administration Division was dissolved and its functions and personnel <sup>(2)</sup> were absorbed by the Personnel and Troops Division. As reorganized on 5 September 1946, the Office of the Chief of Ordnance consisted of seven divisions, together with a Director of Training and a Special Ordnance Inspector. <sup>(3)</sup> On 13 January 1947 the Procurement Division was

established to assume the functions previously executed by ordnance supply and maintenance staffs of the Third Army and of Continental Base Section. (4) The divisions and their branches as they existed on this date are shown on chart II. (5) A further reorganization on 15 April 1947 resulted in the following divisions, which operated directly under the Chief of Ordnance and his deputy: Ammunition, Budget and Fiscal, Maintenance, Personnel and Management, Procurement, and Supply. The Office of the Chief of Ordnance was located in the Allianz Building at Frankfurt until May 1947, when it was moved to the Headquarters Building in the Frankfurt compound.

## 2. Office and Division Chiefs.

Brig. Gen. E. L. Ford succeeded Col. T. H. Nixon of Ordnance on 26 July 1946. (6) General Ford came to the European Theater from Washington, D. C., where he had been Chief of the Maintenance Division, Field Service, in the Office of the Chief of Ordnance. Col. E. L. Cummings was the deputy chief of Ordnance during the entire period under review. Col. M. E. Wilson was announced as director of training and Col. F. C. Bothwell as special Ordnance inspector on 5 September 1946. (7) Division chiefs at the beginning of the period were: Lt. Col. L. G. Johnson, Ammunition; Lt. Col. F. Kemble, Jr., Budget and Fiscal; Col. N. M. Lynde, Maintenance; Maj. E. R. Urquart, Personnel and Troops; Col. J. M. Cone, Planning, Control, and School; Col. F. R. Young, Supply. In addition to his other duties, Colonel Cone was also

(8)  
acting chief of the Statistical Division. Chart III lists the names  
(9)  
of the chiefs of the seven divisions as of March 1947. Upon the  
reorganization of the office in mid-April 1947, the following officers  
were designated as chiefs of the six divisions: Maj. M. L. Simkins,  
Ammunition; Lt. Col. F. Kemble Jr., Budget and Fiscal; Col. M. E.  
Wilson, Maintenance; Col. C. W. Reed, Personnel and Management; Col.  
W. R. Huber, Procurement; Col. G. C. Eddy, Supply. The rapidity of  
the shift in ordnance personnel is indicated by the fact that of the  
seven division chiefs appointed in September 1946, Colonel Kemble was  
the only one who still held his office the following April. On 2  
June 1947 Lt. Col. H. H. Haas succeeded Colonel Kemble as chief of the  
Budget and Fiscal Division. A total of 216 persons staffed Ordnance  
Headquarters as of 1 July 1946. (See Chart I.) By April 1947 the  
personnel allotment had been increased to 285, of which number 92  
persons were in military service. The 193 civilians included 84 U.S.  
and 49 Allied employees of the U.S. War Department, and 60 German  
workers. Military men assigned to the Office of the Chief of Ordnance  
were: one brigadier general, seven colonels, nine lieutenant colonels,  
nine majors, seven captains, four lieutenants, three warrant officers,  
and fifty-two enlisted men.

### 3. The Ordnance Mission.

a. Although the organizational structure was altered  
periodically to conform to changing conditions, and the personnel  
assigned to the office shifted even more frequently, the mission of the

Ordnance Service underwent no such revision, remaining fairly stable throughout the period under consideration. As a member of the special staff of the Commander in Chief and as advisor to the higher echelons of command, the Chief of Ordnance continued to provide technical and administrative assistance on all ordnance matters for the Commander in Chief, his deputy, the Chief of Staff, other members of the general and special staffs of the European Command, as well as for the Commanding General, Ground and Service Forces in Europe.

b. Recommendations made by the Chief of Ordnance usually concerned the assignment of key ordnance personnel at lower echelons of the Command, the operations and training of ordnance troops, the coordination of related activities with other services, the allocation of ordnance equipment and supplies, and the maintenance of all automotive equipment in the Theater. Other staff duties of the Ordnance Chief included the technical supervision of all ordnance activities in the European Command, the formulation of policies and procedures regarding the service, the fiscal control of assigned units, the preparation of the budget, and the maintenance of liaison with the Chief of Ordnance at Washington, D.C. On an operational level, the handling of ordnance supplies proved a prime responsibility, involving the determination of excess and surplus equipment, the demilitarization of U.S. combat material, the control of procurement, the preparation of bids for the movement of supplies, and the supervision of stock-control functions at all echelons of the Command.

c. Additional operations of the Office of the Chief of Ordnance included superintending ordnance technical service installations and maintaining training schools which offered instruction in ordnance methods. Ordnance functions were distributed among the various divisions of the service by Office Order No. 55 of the Chief of Ordnance. (10) The missions of the individual divisions during most of the period under review remained substantially as indicated in (11) chart IV.

4. The Ammunition Division.

Functions of the Ammunition Division included procuring and distributing ammunition for the entire European Command, as well as directing the procedures for its storage and disposal; maintaining records and writing reports on the amount of ammunition on hand, required, and expended; controlling all shipments of ammunition within the Command; supervising the disposal of bombs and Class V ordnance materiel; and inspecting ammunition dumps and the units operating them. As of 30 June 1947, ammunition units were located at Bamberg, Münster, Oberdachstetten, Lambach, Berlin, and Lübberstedt. The lack of trained personnel occasioned by continuous redeployment of specialists hampered operations of the Ammunition Division throughout the year. Although most of the ammunition units contained the full complement of enlisted men authorized by the Table of Organization, many of the men, as well as their officers, were untrained in ammunition work. The difficulty of securing experienced personnel was alleviated by on-the-job

instruction at the depots and courses in ammunition procedures at the  
(12)  
training centers.

5. Budget and Fiscal Division.

All fiscal and budget matters affecting the Ordnance Service of the Command were the responsibility of the Budget and Fiscal Division, which computed both quarterly and annual budgets, allocated ordnance funds, provided the Fiscal Director of the Command with monthly reports on reciprocal-aid and lend-lease activities, processed vouchers for supplies delivered to non-military agencies, and prepared such reports and requests for local procurement as were required by the Director of Service, Supply and Procurement. The inactivation of Continental Base Section on 15 May 1947 greatly increased the responsibilities of the Budget and Fiscal Division, which absorbed the Ordnance fiscal work of the base section and handled directly the central accounting of funds for the thirty Ordnance Technical Service  
(13)  
installations.

6. The Maintenance Division.

a. Command policies on the maintenance of Ordnance material were initiated through the Maintenance Division. The Inspection Branch conducted technical inspections of all field maintenance units assigned and operating under military posts. In addition, this branch provided personnel for conducting EUCOM command inspections of automotive equipment throughout the European Command.

b. As of 15 May 1947, effective upon inactivation of Continental Base Section, this division assumed operational control of twelve base maintenance installations where Ordnance materiel is overhauled and rebuilt prior to issue to using units.

c. A Procurement Section was established in the Maintenance Division in September of 1946 to define policies on Ordnance procurement and to issue assignments for the procurement of Ordnance materials to Continental Base Section. This section did not long remain under the jurisdiction of the Chief of Maintenance, however, but became an independent division early in the following January.

d. The Technical Intelligence Branch was placed under the Maintenance Division on 5 September 1946. This branch established close liaison with the Air Material Command in Erlangen, the IG Farben Control Office in Frankfurt, the French Rocket Institute in Paris, the Office of Military Government (US), the Royal Air Force, and the Field Information Agency. Technical data on models of inventions by foreign scientists, including numerous documents on rocket research and manufacture, were sent to the Ordnance Service in Washington, D.C., after being evaluated by the Technical Intelligence Branch of the Maintenance Division.

#### 7. Personnel and Troops Division.

a. The Personnel and Troops Division provided reports for higher headquarters, requisitioned personnel replacements, initiated movement orders for service troops and units between subordinate commands, published Ordnance bulletins, circulars, orders, and other

instructions, provided mail and teletype service, maintained the central files and library, prepared historical reports, and managed public relations. On 9 August 1946 the Administrative Division of the Office of the Chief of Ordnance became a branch under the Personnel and Troops Division without appreciable change in function.

b. The Personnel and Troops Division was merged with the Planning Control and School Division and renamed the Personnel and Management Division on 11 April 1947. <sup>(14)</sup> As reorganized, the division contained six branches: Personnel and Troops, Planning, Training, Statistical, Historical, and the Office Service Branches. Prior to its dissolution, the Planning Control and School Division had supervised the two ordnance training centers at Eschwege and Heidenheim, reviewed briefs and reports, allocated divisional responsibility for the preparation of such reports, and insured compliance with current directives. These functions were assumed by the Personnel and Management Division.

c. Originally a branch of the Supply Division, the statistical Division was instituted as an independent division on 5 September 1946; the following January it became a branch of the Planning, Control and School Division; and in April it was put under the Personnel and Management Division. Consisting of Planning, Control, and Drafting Sections, the Statistical Branch prepared studies, charts, and reports on ordnance activities.

8. The Supply Division.

a. Duties of the Supply Division included supervising the receipt, issue, and storage of Class II and IV material; computing requirements and recommending revisions of the Table of Equipment authorizations of such material; disposing of excess and surplus ordnance property; registering and recording serial numbers of ordnance items; and inspecting Class II and IV ordnance supply installations, together with their operating units. As of 1 July 1946, the Supply Division contained six branches, seven sections, and four units. (See chart I.) By the end of the year the various branches had been consolidated into the following five branches: Administration and Reports, Installation, Major Items, Excess and Surplus Property, and  
(15)  
Parts and Supplies.

b. During the year under review, the Supply Division established central stock records on parts and supplies and initiated the policy that vehicles should be issued only against edited requisitions submitted by fixed-strength organizations after the major commands had determined that a like item was not available within the command. An inventory was made of major items and a cycle inventory of critical or fast moving spare parts. Tire supply was established. Approximately 900,000 long tons of property was declared to OFLC as excess. In Germany some 12,000 long tons were demilitarized, and in France and Belgium demilitarization was completed. Nearly 300,000 long tons were shipped to the Zone of the Interior, and this program

was slated for completion by 1 December. Registration of vehicles was accomplished, affording an accurate count of the number of vehicles in actual operation--over 55,000.

c. When Continental Base Section Headquarters phased out, this division assumed much of its work load in connection with Ordnance supply. All supply depots were placed directly under the operational control of the Office of the Chief of Ordnance, which made possible closer supervision and higher general efficiency.

#### 9. Ordnance Procurement.

a. The Procurement Division was established in the Office of the Chief of Ordnance on 13 January 1947 with the assigned mission of executing policies and formulating plans for ordnance procurement on a Command-wide scale. The division was further responsible for issuing procurement assignments to Continental Base Section, for submitting indigenous requirements for ordnance material to the Office of Military Government (U.S.), for reviewing contracts, requisitions, and agreements of major commands; and for preparing information bulletins for purchasing and contracting officers. (16)

b. The Theater Reorganization Plan of April 1947 established the basic policies governing the procurement of ordnance supplies throughout the European Command. This directive stipulated that whenever possible necessary equipment was to be obtained through headquarters or programmed procurement as distinguished from local or emergency procurement. The plan further provided that such programmed

procurement was to be effected by field agencies under the direction of the Procurement Division; that no procurement requirements would be recognized unless the desired items could not be obtained expeditiously through regular supply channels; and that such requirements would be met insofar as possible from sources within Germany. Emergency procurement, according to the plan, was authorized only when the need was established by the appropriate ordnance supply officer and initiated by the purchasing and contracting officer. Although the major commands performed no procurement functions on ordnance equipment, they supervised local emergency procurement at installations under their (17) control.

c. It was difficult to obtain automotive parts because of the closing of plants during the winter, the lack of satisfactory manufacturing equipment, the scarcity of raw materials, and the (18) difficulty of adapting German industry to United States methods. Of the 2,000 automotive parts required for American- and foreign-made vehicles, some of the most critical were pistons, piston rings, mufflers, windshields, dimmer switches, tires, and tubes. Parts for sedans were especially critical. A request was submitted to military government for the first three months of 1947 for approximately 1,000 metric tons of automotive parts, and production assignments were received for about 600 metric tons. During the last three months of the period under consideration, however, orders were placed for all production assigned.

10. Major Installations and Assigned Troops.

Ordnance troops and installations were under the operational and administrative control of Continental Base Section until it became inoperational on 15 May 1947. At that time, all ordnance troops and installations previously assigned to the base section were transferred to the direct command of the Chief of Ordnance, who had exercised only technical supervision over their activities prior to the middle of May. As of 1 July 1947, the Chief of Ordnance was responsible for the following major installations, together with their supporting troop units:

<u>INSTALLATION</u>	<u>TROOPS ASSIGNED</u>
Griesheim Ordnance Depot	54 Depot H/H Det 196 Ord Bn H/H Det 334,344 Depot Companies 820 Base Depot Co 83,264 Gen Supply Teams
Ordnance Base Maintenance at Esslingen	86 Ord Base Depot H/H Det
Karlsfeld Ordnance Depot	143 OBAM Bn 826 Base Depot Co
Kitzingen Ordnance Depot	87 Ord Base Depot H/H Det 902,912 Ord HAM Companies 76 Gen Supply Team
Butzbach Ordnance Shop	74 Ord Bn H/H Det 98 Ord HM (TK) Co 80 Gen Supply Team
Münster Ammunition Depot	85 Ord Bn H/H Det 501 Amm Renov Plat
EUCOM Ordnance Schools (Eschwege)	7715 EUCOM Ordnance Schools

After 15 May 1947 the Parts and Supplies Branch and the Vehicle Registration Section of the Supply Division were located at the Griesheim Ordnance Depot. On 15 March 1947 the Ordnance Procurement Center was established under command of the Chief of Ordnance and assigned the following units: 88th Ordnance Base Depot H/H Detachment, 10th Ordnance Service Battalion H/H Detachment, and 3300th Ordnance Stock Control Detachment. The Procurement Center was assigned to the Griesheim Ordnance Depot on 15 May 1947.

#### 11. Subordinate Installations.

Besides the major installations indicated above, subsidiary depots were located at Mannheim, Nordenham, Lübberstadt, Bamberg, and Oberdachstetten. The two last-named depots were used exclusively for ammunition. Subcenters of the procurement center at Griesheim were established at Stuttgart, Munich, and Kassel for attachment to the larger installations at Esslingen, Karlsfeld, and Kassel, respectively. Subsidiaries of the Base Maintenance Center were located at Esslingen, Waiblingen, Neckarsulm, Stuttgart, Aalen, Schwabisch Gmünd, Rüsselsheim, Bad Cannstadt, Heilbronn, and Böblingen. Nürnberg was the site of an engine rebuild shop under the Karlsfeld depot. The Kitzingen Ordnance Depot had subsidiaries at Nürnberg, Illesheim, Büttelborn, and Rothenbach, which was the scrap collection point for the Ordnance Service. Under the Butzbach Ordnance Shop were the two installations at Kassel and Ober Ramstadt. Two institutions provided training for indigenous civilian workers: the Ordnance Supply School at Griesheim and the

Ordnance Motor Maintenance School at Esslingen. These schools were subsidiaries of the European Command Ordnance School, formerly the Eschwege Ordnance Technical Training Center, at Eschwege in Hessen-Nassau. The 7716 Ordnance Training Center at Heidenheim was discontinued in January 1947, and its personnel transferred to the Theater Ordnance School at Eschwege the following February. Thereafter the Eschwege school provided all ordnance training for members of the armed forces. The program of instruction, designed for students with no previous technical experience, offered classes in the basic ordnance procedures. Courses varied in duration from two and a half to nine and a half weeks.

12. The Maintenance Program.

a. Unit commanders were responsible for maintenance of their own ordnance equipment. Major commands controlled all ordnance field maintenance, units being assigned for the purpose of preserving ordnance equipment. Air Vehicle Repair Squadrons were responsible for the field maintenance of ordnance equipment at the Wiesbaden Post Area and at Air Force exempted installations. The United States Constabulary was assigned three ordnance companies, whose primary function was to perform all field maintenance on combat equipment of Constabulary units but which performed field maintenance on other Constabulary equipment also. After coordination with the Chief of Ordnance, major commands appointed ordnance units and establishments to maintain minor types of ordnance equipment, including tracked and wheeled combat vehicles,

artillery, and heavy wreckers. Those ordnance items which could not be repaired by field maintenance organizations were sent to the appropriate specialized base maintenance installations. All U.S. Army organizations and their personnel, irrespective of their military post or major command assignments, received emergency service from roadside service stations, which formed a part of the field maintenance organization under the major commands. Map "A" indicates locations of the emergency service stations as of 10 October 1946. The Chief of Ordnance controlled all base maintenance installations, which supported the field maintenance units and conducted all extensive rebuild and repair operations. For all except major, controlled, and excepted items, base maintenance organizations requisitioned operational supplies direct on the Griesheim Ordnance Depot. Approval of the Office of the Chief of Ordnance was required for requisitions of major and controlled supplies.

b. Monthly production figures of the vehicle base maintenance rebuild production are listed below. On 30 June 1947 the number of indigenous personnel working on vehicle maintenance was reduced by 23 percent. To compensate for the lack of workers, it was planned to utilize to a larger extent indigenous plants working on a contract basis. Facilities at rebuild installations were considered adequate, but production was delayed during June by the large number of German holidays and the lack of critical supplies. Procurement of parts and raw materials to implement local manufacture was expected to result

in the achievement of production by the target dates indicated.

<u>Type Vehicle</u>	<u>March Monthly Production</u>	<u>June Monthly Production</u>	<u>Target Monthly Production</u>	<u>Target Date</u>
Sedans, Light	57	60	150	1 Sep 47
Sedans, medium	3	3	3	-
Car, armored M8	6	50	50	-
Truck, $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton	450	600	600	-
Truck, 3/4-ton and $1\frac{1}{2}$ -ton	225	300	300	-
Truck, $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton	310	460	600	1 Aug 47
Truck, 4-ton and heavier	5	35	65	1 Sep 47
Truck, tractor (all types)	85	80	90	1 Aug 47
Motorcycles	100	100	100	-
Semitrailers	-	85	120	1 Aug 47

c. Twenty-five thousand vehicles, representing 40 percent of the total number of U.S. Army vehicles in the Command, were repainted at field and base maintenance shops during the period 15 April to 30 June 1947. (24)

d. The Chief of Ordnance relinquished the responsibility of maintaining and supplying spare parts for materials-handling equipment. This function was assumed by the Chief Quartermaster on 15 April 1947. By the end of the month, the Ordnance Service had transferred to the Quartermaster depot at Giessen a total of 633 pieces of unserviceable powered materials-handling equipment in addition to approximately 40 tons of spare parts.

e. During the first six months of 1947, inspection teams from the Office of the Chief of Ordnance checked the operations of the forty-three field maintenance installations, all but three of which


were rated unsatisfactory. Although later inspections revealed an increase in the technical efficiency of the forty, improvements were not sufficient to justify a rating of satisfactory. Major deficiencies noted in the inspections were: inadequate buildings, lack of vehicle parts, and poor roadways, grading, drainage, and surfacing of the shop areas; insufficient numbers of qualified officers and enlisted men; and shortage of technical publications. Ordnance officers of the major commands in which the installations were located were advised of the deficiencies and requested to assist the installation commanders in improving conditions. To compensate for the lack of ordnance specialists, maximum use was made of the command schools and on-the-job training.

(25)

Sheet II

**THEATER CHIEF  
 OF  
 ORDNANCE**

**DEPUTY CHIEF  
 OF  
 ORDNANCE**



BUDGET &  
FISCAL DIV.

1-1 COL 2-105  
1-1 CAPT 2-88  
1-1/3 1-123  
2-1/3

MAINTENANCE  
DIV.

1-1 COL 1-98

ARMAMENT &  
DEMILITARIZATION

1-104  
1-1/3/5/7

AUTOMOTIVE &  
TIRE BR.

1-104  
1-1/3/5/7


SHOPS  
BR.

1-104  
1-1/3/5/7  
1-1/3

AUTOMOTIVE  
ADVISORS

Chart III

KEY OFFICERS OF  
ORDNANCE - SERVICE  
HQ USFET  
15 MARCH 1947



publication in the Stars and Stripes plant and began using the plant of the Frankfurter Rundschau. At the same time, the magazine went into rotogravure and its size was increased from twelve pages to sixteen. (58)

#### AMERICAN FORCES NETWORK

##### 17. Organization and Staff.

a. AFN operated the Army-sponsored radio stations of the European Theater, which offered music, news, and other information and entertainment. AFN was directly under the Chief, Troop Information and Education Division, EUCOM, for operations and general policies. The policy of AFN with respect to news dissemination was directed by the Public Information Division.

b. On 1 July 1947, AFN had four studio stations, as follows: Frankfurt (key station, 10,000 watts), Munich (100,000 watts), Berlin (1000 watts), Bremen (2,500 watts). It had also four transmitter relay stations, as follows: Stuttgart (100,000 watts), Bayreuth (10,000 watts), Bremerhaven (50 watts), Ismaning near Munich (short wave, 100,000 watts). At the beginning of the period covered by this writing, AFN-Paris, was still operating.

c. Headquarters of AFN was located in Höchst in the same building as AFN-Frankfurt. It consisted of the following officers and their staffs: Chief of AFN, Executive Officer, Chief of Operations,

Program Supervisor, Technical Supervisor, News Bureau Chief, Administrative Officer, and Public Relations Officer. (59) In September 1946, Maj. William E. Rigel was assigned as Executive Officer to replace the acting Executive Officer, Capt. Alvin E. Orlian. In December 1946, Fred C. Johnstone, Station Manager of AFN-Berlin, returned to the United States and was replaced by Capt. Francis J. Allen. At the close of the period under discussion, the key officers of AFN were: Chief, Lt. Col. Oren Swain; Executive Officer, Maj. William E. Rigel; Chief of Operations, Louis Adelman; Program Supervisor, Keith Jameson; Technical Supervisor, Walter Cleary; News Bureau Chief, William Murray; and Administrative Officer, CWO Charles E. Brown. (60)

d. The military and civilian personnel assigned to AFN and the 7706th AFN Company was reduced during the year in line with Theater policy. (61) The Table of Organization authorized the following:

	Before <u>1 Jan 47</u>	After <u>1 Jan 47</u>
Officers	13	6
Warrant Officer	1	1
Enlisted Men	140	123
U.S. Civilians	41	40
Allied Civilians	12	12
Locally recruited Civilians	250	250

18. The 7706th AFN Company.

The 7706th AFN Company was activated on 1 October 1946 with its station at AFN Headquarters, Hochst, Germany. Prior to the activation of this unit, the military personnel of AFN had been assigned to local military units for administrative purposes. At that time, AFN

had a bulk allotment of non-Table of Organization grades and ratings under the Information and Education Division. With the activation of the 7706th AFN Company, AFN had its own company administration and a Table of Distribution and Allowances. This facilitated the issuance of supplies and the preparation of morning reports. (62)

19. Policies.

a. During 1946, AFN received electrically transcribed material from the Armed Forces Radio Service in Hollywood, a branch of Information and Education Division, War Department, sufficient to broadcast sixty hours weekly. (63)

b. During the summer and fall of 1946, AFN "slanted" an increasing number of its programs toward the interests of dependents and American and Allied civilian employees. Broadcasts designed to interest these groups included "It's All Music," "The American Word," "It's a Woman's World," and "International House." (64)

c. Late in 1946, AFN began cooperating with various foreign broadcasting systems with the aim of bringing some phases of foreign culture to its listeners. For that purpose, lines were established to the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, and Sweden. Typical of the resulting broadcasts have been a special broadcast from St. Peters Cathedral in Rome on Christmas Eve 1946, and programs of folk and classical music from Prague. (65)

20. The Closing of AFN-Paris.


AFN-Paris was finally closed on 31 December 1946, to the regret of many French and British listeners. Many attempts had been made to continue this station in operation. It had previously been planned to close AFN-Paris on 1 April 1946. This had been approved by the Chief of Staff, but a request was made to Jefferson Caffery, U.S. Ambassador to France, by the French Ministry of Information that AFN-Paris continue transmission. This request was in response to demands of French listeners. After a discussion between Ambassador Caffery and Maj. Gen. John T. Lewis, Commanding General, Western Base Section, permission was granted to continue operating AFN-Paris. Later, however, a staff study was submitted to AFN recommending the closing of AFN-Paris on 31 July 1946. The Information and Education Division, USFET, recommended that the matter be referred to the American Embassy in Paris. The Information and Education Division, USFET, pointed out that the closing of installations in France and the need for economy in money and men made it necessary to close the station. It suggested that, if there were justification or need for the operation of an American radio station in France for the benefit largely of the French arrangements could possibly be worked out with the U.S. Information Service and with the Comite Francais de Bienvenue aux Armees Alliees. In spite of all these efforts, however, it became necessary to close the station at the  
(66)  
end of the year.

21. The Setting Up of "Short Operation" Systems.


In March 1947 an experiment was initiated at AFN-Bremen to determine whether the outlying stations such as Bremen could be operated on a "short operation" plan. The programs from the key station at Frankfurt were carried by long lines and merely repeated or relayed at the AFN-Bremen transmitter for a period of about twelve hours per day. The remaining six to eight hours per day were produced by the local staff at AFN-Bremen, including the morning record request show, local news bulletins, dance rebroadcasts, speeches, Special Service shows, shipside broadcasts, the newscast at 2000 hours, and the evening record show. By this means, the staff of AFN-Bremen was reduced from nineteen to eight enlisted men and from six to five United States civilians. This plan proved to be satisfactory and was put into operation on 1  
(67)  
July 1947 in Berlin and Munich.

STARS AND STRIPES  
ORGANIZATION CHART

1 July 1946



AMERICAN FORCES NETWORK ORGANIZATION CHART



FOOTNOTES

Chapter XXXIX

1. GO 36, Hq EUCOM, 6 May 47.
2. S & S, Report of Operations, 1 Jul-30 Sep 46; Cir 174, Hq USFET, 5 Dec 46, subj: "Public Relations."
3. I&E Service, Rpt of Opr, 1 Jul-30 Sep 46.
4. G-3, Education and Training Br, Rpt of Opr, 1 Jul-30 Sep 46 and 1 Oct-31 Dec 46.
5. IRS, Hq USFET, TC I&E, to CS thru G-3, 4 Dec 46, subj: "Educational Advantages per Senator Fullbright's Bill (S1636)."
6. Cir 241, WD, 10 Aug 46, sec III.
7. Ltr, Hq USFET, 23 Oct 46, file AG 353 GCT-AGO, subj: "Literacy Training."
8. Ibid.
9. Staff Study, Hq USFET, G-3, 4 Dec 46, subj: "Education Program."
10. Ibid.
11. Ltr, Hq USFET, 21 Dec 46, file AG 353 GCT-AGO, subj: "Education Program 1 January 47."
12. I&E Service, Rpt of Opr, 1 Jan-31 Mar 47.
13. Ltr, Hq EUCOM, 1 Jul 47, file AG 353, GCT-AGO, subj: "Army Education Program."
14. Troop I&E Div, Rpt of Opr, 1 Apr-30 Jun 47.
15. I&E Service, Rpt of Opr, 1 Jul-30 Sep 46.
16. TI&E, Rpt of Opr, 1 Apr-30 Jun 47.
17. Memo, Hq, USFET, PRD, 3 Apr 46, subj: "I&E Research Section Reports E-149 and E-150."
18. Ibid.

19. Ltr, Hq 3d Replacement Depot, 12 Aug 46, subj: "Recommended changes in the 6-Hour Troop Information Program for Replacements."
20. IRS, Hq, USFET, G-3 to I&E, 27 Aug 46, subj: "Recommended Changes in the 6-Hour Troop Information Program for Replacements."
21. Chicago Tribune, 8 Sep 46.
22. Ltr, Hq USFET, 30 Nov 46, file AG 353 GCT-AGO, subj: "Theater Troop Information and Orientation Programs."
23. Cable S-6564, 30 Nov 46, USFET sgd McNarney to AGWAR.
24. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference No 51, 10 Dec 46.
25. Hq USFET, Staff Memo No 94, 4 Dec 46, subj: "Committee to Review Orientation Literature."
26. Ltr, Hq USFET, 9 Jul 46, file AG 350, GCT-AGO, subj: "Orientation Program for Dependents"; ltr, Hq USFET, 24 Jul 46, file AG 353, GCT-AGO, subj: "Orientation Program for Dependents."
27. I&E Service, Rpt of Opr, 1 Jan-31 Mar 46.
28. Ibid.
29. TI&E, Rpt of Opr, 1 Apr-30 Jun 47.
30. Hq, USFET, SOP 90, 4 Sep 46, subj: "Conduct of Attitude Research Studies."
31. Ltr, Hq, USFET, 6 Sep 46, file AG 330.11 INE-AGO, subj: "Attitude Research Section."
32. TI&E, Rpt of Opr, 1 Apr-30 Jun 47.
33. Hq, USFET, OTC I&E, Staff Study, 8 Oct 46, subj: "Establishment of a Course of Study for Personnel Engaged in the Production of Unit Newspapers."
34. Ltr, Hq, USFET, 7 Nov 46, file AG 352, INE-AGO, subj: "Unit Publications Course."
35. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference, 20 Aug 46.

36. TI&E, Rpt of Opr. 1 Jan-31 Mar 47.
37. GO 28, Hq EUCOM, 13 Feb 47.
38. GO 50, Hq EUCOM, 5 Jun 47.
39. In fact the Stars and Stripes has always operated largely through its own funds. Until early 1946, however, it received liberal grants and subsidies from the War Department. Since early 1946, the only subsidy the Stars and Stripes has received from the War Department has been for the salaries and maintenance of three officers and fifty enlisted men, members of the 7744th Stars and Stripes Unit. Interview with Richard E. Knorr, Exec Mgr S & S, 21 Oct 47.
40. Interview with Richard E. Knorr, Exec Mgr S & S, 26 Aug 47.
41. Interview with Richard E. Knorr, Exec Mgr S & S, 26 Aug 47.
42. S & S, Rpt of Opr. 1 Jul 46-30 Sep 46.
43. Ibid.
44. IRS fr G-1 sig Bevans to C/S dtd 19 Jul 46.
45. IRS fr C/S sig H. R. Bull, Maj Gen, GSC, to Chief I&E Sv dtd 19 Jul 46.
46. Hq USFET PRD, Rpt of Opr. 1 Oct 46-31 Dec 46.
47. S & S, Rpt of Opr. 1 Jul 46-30 Sep 46.
48. IRS fr Chief I&E Svs to G-1 thru PRD dtd 16 Oct 46; cable, F-5689, 3 Dec 46, fr 3d US Army sgd KEYES to maj Comds; S&S, Rpt of Opr. 1 Oct 46-31 Dec 46.
49. S & S, Rpt of Opr. 1 Jan-31 Mar 47.
50. S & S, Rpt of Opr. 1 Jan-31 Mar 47.
51. (Copy title page of Stripes) and date.
52. S & S, 1 Oct 46-31 Dec 46; Rpt of Opr, interview with Richard E. Knorr, Exec Mgr S & S, 26 Aug 47.
53. IRS fr DC/S sig WHITE to G-1 dtd 17 Sep 46.

54. IRS fr G-1 sig BEVANS to DC/S dtd 21 Sep 46.
55. S & S, Rpt of Opr. 1 Jan-31 Mar 47.
56. Interview with Richard E. Knorr, Exec Mgr "Stars and Stripes"  
26 Aug 47.
57. S & S, Rpt of Opr. 1 Jan 47-31 Mar 47.
58. S & S, Rpt of Opr. 1 Jan 47-31 Mar 47; interview with Lt Col  
W. G. Proctor, 20 Oct 47.
59. Interview with Major William E. Rigel, Chief AFN, 26 Aug 47.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid., GO 273 Hq USFET, 1 Oct 46.
63. AFN, Rpt of Opr. 1 Jul-30 Sep 46.
64. Ibid.
65. AFN, Rpt of Opr. 1 Oct-31 Dec 46.
66. IRS fr Chief I&E, USFET, sgd MERRIAN, Lt Col Inf. to Off of  
the Pol Adv. dtd 23 Jul 46; AFN, Rpt of Opr. 1 Oct-31 Dec 46.
67. Interview with Maj William E. Rigel, Chief AFN, 26 Aug 47.

CHAPTER XXX  
CHIEF, CHEMICAL CORPS (1)

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Chapter XXX  
CHIEF, CHEMICAL CORPS (1)

1. General.

During the year 1 July 1946 to 30 June 1947 installations were consolidated, personnel was constantly reduced, and duties were redistributed. By the end of June 1947 there had been a 75-percent turn-over in personnel. An administrative reorganization of the Office of the Theater Chief Chemical Officer was effected on 20 September 1946 for the purpose of providing closer supervision of all branches. In the second quarter of 1947 a consolidation of branches and functions took place. The offices of the Theater Chief Chemical Officer were moved from the Fiat Building in down town Frankfurt to the Holzhausen School Building in the compound.

## 2. Organization.

a. Col. Horace M. Woodward, Jr., was division chief throughout the year. The division was redesignated the Chemical Corps, EUCOM, on 15 March 1947, and Colonel Woodward's title was changed from Theater Chief Chemical Officer to Chief of Chemical Corps, EUCOM. Lt. Col. Roland P. Fournier served as executive officer for the whole year. Directly under these two officers in July 1946 were four divisions: Technical intelligence, Training, Administration and Personnel, and Supply and Fiscal. The first two were headed by Lt. Col. Donald E. Yanka and the third by Capt. Edmund W. Lewandowski. The Supply and Fiscal Division, under Lt. Col. Warren S. LeRoy, was divided into four branches: Operations under Capt. Don E. Robinson, Service Installation and Inspection under Capt. George M. Mudon, Planning and Policy under Capt. Alvin C. Isaacs, and Statistical under Capt. Norman H. Crandell. The Statistical Branch was divided into two sections: Stock Status and Surplus Property under Capt. John S. Hickey, and Reports and Fiscal under 1st Lt. James P. McConnell. (2)

b. When the Office of the Theater Chief Chemical Officer was reorganized on 20 September 1946, an Administration, Mail and Records Section and a Personnel Section were established as parts of the office of the executive and three branches--Technical, Training, and Supply--were set up directly under the executive and Theater Chief. The former division chiefs continued as heads of the corresponding branches. Second Lt. William C. Little, who had been serving as personnel officer, became head of the Personnel Section, and CWO John J. Liscinsky, who had been mail and records officer, became head of the new Administration, Mail and Records Section. Under the Supply Branch were the following sections:

Operations, headed by 1st Lt. James P. McConnell; Executive Plans and Policy, headed by Capt. Robert E. Stoeber; Service and Installations, headed by Capt. George M. Mudon; and Statistical, headed by Capt. John B. Davidson. The old sections of the Statistical Branch were redesignated subsections and headed by two civilians, Robert T. Garrett and Henry Knyzewski. Capt. Joseph N. Klein later replaced Captain Davidson as section chief. (3)

c. By 30 June 1947, there had been further reductions in personnel and a corresponding simplification in the organization of the Office of the Chief of Chemical Corps. The personnel and the Administration, Mail and Records Sections continued under the office of the executive, redesignated the Executive Branch; all other functions and staff were grouped into the Training Branch, the Technical Branch, the Supply and Fiscal Branch, and the Hanau Chemical Corps Depot. Colonel Yanka was transferred to Hanau as Depot Commander and Colonel Fournier, chief of the Executive Branch, acted also as chief of the Training and Technical Branches. Colonel LeRoy continued as head of the Supply and Fiscal Branch. (4)

### 3. Hanau Chemical Corps Depot.

Previously operated by the 63d Chemical Base Depot and Maintenance Company, the Hanau Chemical Corps Depot was reorganized on 15 April 1947. Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 15th Chemical Base Depot, was added and became the depot operating overhead. The Supply and Fiscal Branch transferred all operating personnel, as well as files and records, from

the Office of the Chief of Chemical Corps to the Hanau Chemical Corps Depot. The Depot was assigned all supply operating functions of the Chief of Chemical Corps, including procurement, storage, issue, and maintenance of supplies and disposal of surplus property, and the responsibility of making technical inspections as ordered. Until 30 June 1947 the Depot was engaged principally in reorganization and in establishment of procedures for carrying out its functions. The rewarehousing of the Depot stocks was a major task accomplished during this period. The Command Base Chemical Laboratory, which was operated by the Depot, became operational on 7 June but was hampered by lack of trained personnel and adequate facilities. The four enlisted men assigned were all of high caliber, but an experienced laboratory officer was needed to make the laboratory function efficiently, and German chemists were needed. These were hard to obtain and only two had been hired by the end of the month.

4. Training.

a. An inspection of troops in the summer of 1946 revealed deficiencies in defense against chemical attack, in offensive chemical warfare, and in the use of chemical agents to control of riots and disturbances. The Training Branch of the Office of the Chief of Chemical Corps prepared and submitted to the G-3 Division a plan which emphasized the use of chemical agents in the control of riots and disturbances and provided for the organization of Theater Chief of Chemical Warfare Service Training Teams, each composed of two officers and three noncommissioned officers, which would be responsible for providing lesson plans to units

and for training personnel of the major commands. The plans as revised by the G-3 Division and put into effect by Training Memorandum 7, issued on 26 October 1946, provided training in the use of chemical agents in riot control but failed to consider offensive chemical warfare and paid little attention to defense against chemical attack.

b. When the Air Forces requested that their police-type units be given training in the use of tear gas grenades and similar types of gas munitions, the Chief of Chemical Corps agreed to provide a limited amount of munitions.

c. During the second quarter of 1947, all Chemical Corps training was made the responsibility of the Executive Branch pending the assignment of an officer qualified to advise the chief concerning War Department policies on all phases of Chemical Corps training, to prepare Chemical Corps training directives, and to conduct Command-wide inspections to determine the status of individual and collective chemical training.

##### 5. Technical Branch.

a. The Chief of Chemical Corps, War Department, requested investigations of chemical plants which produced protective equipment for the German chemical warfare service. Only one officer was available for these investigations and he was not qualified in all fields of manufacturing techniques. Therefore, only preliminary reports were submitted, with one exception. Field Information Agency, Technical, (FIAT) assisted as much as possible but it, too, suffered from a shortage of qualified field

investigators. Washington was advised of the lack of qualified personnel and a recommendation was made that technical teams be sent from the Zone of the Interior.

b. A final report was submitted to Washington on the Stöss Gelatin Plant, Eberbach, Germany, inspected early in August by Lt. Col. Donald E. Yanka. This company had used a cold chill roll machine which coagulated a liquid gelatin for photographic purposes. This machine was perfected from an American machine which was never entirely successful. The final report was forwarded to the War Department on 30 September 1946 and a copy was placed in the files of FIAT.

c. A preliminary investigation was made of the Dragerwerk factories at Lübeck, Germany, which had manufactured one-piece concentrically pleated particulate gas mask filters. The investigation, also made by Colonel Yanka, revealed that a pilot plant was still making masks for civilian use. It was recommended to the Chief, Chemical Corps, War Department, that a technical team be sent to Germany to complete the investigation.

d. In answer to requests from the Chief of Chemical Corps, two hundred pounds each of two different kinds of activated charcoal were sent to Washington and a complete set of FE41 canister manufacturing equipment was sent to St. Georgen. The latter was part of the dismantled equipment of the Auer Plant of Kilbermoor, Bavaria, which had manufactured 80 percent of the gas masks for the German Army.

e. The last project undertaken by the Technical Branch was completed early in 1947 and the Branch was scheduled to be closed before the end of the fiscal year. Requests for advice on technical matters and field investigations were referred to the Supply Branch for action. The Technical Branch was not inactivated however, in view of an anticipated approval of an increase in officer personnel for assignment to technical duties.

#### 6. Supply and Fiscal Branch.

The Supply and Fiscal Branch was occupied principally with the disposal of surplus property and captured enemy material; the shipment of excess property required in the United States for war reserve; the close-out of depots no longer needed; and the development of policies relative to supply levels, allowances, and issue of Chemical Corps items for the occupation forces. Before the end of 1946, all chemical supplies for the occupation forces had been moved from the Rheinau CWS Depot to the Hanau Chemical Corps Depot. The inspection and rehabilitation of gas masks and power-driven apparatus was continued at Rheinau until after the reorganization at Hanau in the middle of April. Issue authority for these items for use in fire fighting, insect spraying, and dust control was delegated to the Chief Engineer, although the Chemical Corps remained responsible for storage and maintenance. By the end of March, the Chemical Corps plans and policies relative to the general reorganization of the European Command had been published. Computation of the supply levels necessary to support the occupation troops until July 1949 had

resulted in a total of 862 tons of equipment being declared surplus. By the end of June, 712 tons had been shipped to the Zone of the Interior. The remainder was being held pending a recomputation of requirements based on extension of the Occupation Troop Basis to July 1951.

7. Disposal of Surplus Property.

Surplus property in France and Belgium was turned over to the respective governments under the bulk-sales agreements. Surplus property in Germany was concentrated at Hanau. Itemized inventories were submitted to OMGUS and USFA, which selected as much of the material as possible for use in the peacetime German and Austrian economies. The rest was declared as surplus to the Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner (OFLC). By July 1947, disposal had been completed as follows:

Declared to OFLC . . . . .	456 tons
To Austria through Military Government . . . . .	4 tons
To Germany through Military Government . . . . .	25 tons
To be demilitarized or destroyed . . . . .	<u>40 tons</u>
TOTAL	525 tons

8. Captured Enemy Chemical Material.

Captured enemy chemical material, totaling 5,200 tons of Class II and IV and 113,000 tons of Class V, was concentrated in five depots, located at Frankenberg, Wildflecken, Grafenwohr, Schierling, and St. Georgen. Demilitarization was accomplished by chemical decontamination, detonation, scuttling at sea, and burning. Assistance was given the U.S. forces by the British Army and Air Ministry, especially in the scuttling at sea. Material desired for experimental purposes and for various war

museums was transferred to the United States, and other material was transferred to OMGUS. All demilitarization of toxic material was halted in August 1946 and all remaining stocks were earmarked for conversion into products useful to the German civilian economy. A total of 58,120 long tons of captured enemy toxics was turned over to OMGUS before 1 July 1947. Of the five original depots, four had been cleared of toxic ammunition and turned over to Military Government. All remaining stocks were concentrated at St. Georgen.

9. The St. Georgen Depot.

a. The St. Georgen Depot, the only depot of its kind in the U.S. Zone, was surrendered by the Germans with all facilities in relatively good condition. Natural camouflage so effectively concealed the buildings that the Depot was not subjected to any major bombing raids, and no effort was made by the Germans to blow up the facilities. It was divided into two areas, one for regular ammunition assembling and storage and one for storing, filling, and shipping toxic ammunition. Approximately 40,000 tons of Class V material and 10,000 tons of Class II and IV items were found at St. Georgen.

b. The 193d Chemical Depot Company was in charge of the Depot after January 1946. The work carried on during 1946 included the filling and shipping of mustard bombs to the United States, the destruction of liquid mustard by burning, the shipment of toxic munitions to Bremerhaven for scuttling at sea, the segregation and classification of items found at the depot, and the receipt and storing of captured enemy material shipped from other installations. Many of the German civilian employes

of the Depot were reemployed by the U.S. Army to carry on this work. The Chemical Corps was responsible for technical advice and security.

c. Approximately 4,900 tons of German liquid mustard were burned at St. Georgen from 27 April to 3 July 1946, without serious or permanent injury to life or property. All the work was done by German civilian laborers under the close supervision of U.S. officers and enlisted men. Activities were coordinated with the local authorities and burning was done only on those days when the wind carried the smoke into the previously designated area and when the wind was blowing not less than three or more than ten miles per hour. The inhabitants and livestock were evacuated and sufficient guards provided to keep people out of the area and to prevent looting. The German populace expressed considerable concern at the beginning of the burning, but this subsided when there was no evidence of any damage. During the program, 4,138 metric tons of mustard were burned and 745 tons of Clark I and Clark II. (Clark I was similar to United States Lewisite, but the U.S. Army had no counterpart for Clark II, which had a cyanide content.) About 400 tons were burned each day during the 22 days when weather was favorable.

10. a. Early in 1945, when the Soviet Forces were advancing rapidly from the east, toxic artillery shells and land mines were hurriedly collected by the Germans and shipped to Grafenwohr. The ammunition was found there in an isolated pine woods, without proper segregation, with shells irregularly stacked, directly on the ground and with all types

mixed together. Some of the smaller-caliber shells gave evidence of having been dumped off like so much coal. Items found by the Americans after the capitulation included mustard-filled land mines and toxic artillery shells.

b. The 18th Chemical Maintenance Company was assigned to the Depot in February 1946 and started restacking, collecting, demilitarizing, decontaminating, destroying, and boxing munitions for later shipment. In September 1946 the consolidation of like types of ammunition was completed and inventories were carefully checked for the final step in turning over these stocks to Military Government for conversion into peacetime products. All remaining toxic munitions were shipped to the St. Georgen depot during January and February 1947, and Grafenwohr was closed as of 15 March. The material disposed of included 115 tons of assorted small items which were destroyed in place, 80 tons of shell casing shipped as scrap to Rothernberg, Germany, 38 tons of rockets shipped to the United States, and 2,820 tons of shells, mines, and rockets which were shipped to Bremerhaven for disposal at sea.

#### 11. The Schierling Depot.

Aerial bombs and other items pertaining to air combat were found at the Schierling Depot, about 80 miles south of Grafenwohr. Turned over intact, it was a modern, well-equipped, aerial ammunition depot with a large store of various types aerial bombs, including 2,360 tons of mustard bombs, 1,500 tons of phosgene bombs, 7,700 tons of TABUN bombs, and 1,250

tons of tear gas bombs. The 140th Chemical Warfare General Service Company and the 141st Chemical Warfare General Service Company were activated and assigned to the Depot. During the fall and winter of 1946-47 the out-shipment of all toxics was completed. Large quantities of mustard and phosgene bombs were shipped to the United States and final shipment was made to St. Georgen, as required by Military Government. The Depot was closed as of 15 April 1947.

12. The Frankenberg Depot.

Another air ammunition depot, with approximately 10,000 tons of munitions, was turned over to the U.S. Forces intact at Frankenberg. As no toxic gas munitions were used during the war, the Depot had merely stored them and insured their continued serviceability. Shipments from the depot included:

840 tons	empty bomb casings	to St. Georgen
25 "	" " " "	" Edgewood Arsenal, Md.
1,220 "	250 KC Phosgene bombs	to " " "
2,900 "	" " mustard	" " " "
1,440 "	" " tear gas	" " Bremerhaven for sea dumping.

Samples of various German chemical items to the National War Museum.

The remaining Class V items were turned over to Military Government on 9 September 1946 for demilitarization and conversion. They were shipped to St. Georgen, and the Depot was closed as of 15 April 1947.

13. The Wildflecken Depot.

Unlike the other depots, the one at Wildflecken had been badly damaged by the Germans and by freed slave laborers. Rail lines, bunkers,

and warehouses had been blown up; canteens, firehouses, and other structures were ruined; but the munitions were undisturbed. Mustard, nitrogen mustard, adamsite, tear gas, and smoke munitions of United States, British, French, Soviet, Italian, Czechoslovak, Belgian, and Netherlands manufacture were found. A total of 1,025 long tons of toxics was shipped for disposal in Operation Davey Jones Locker. Most of the material was turned over to Military Government for conversion to peacetime uses. In spite of transportation difficulties, the depot completed all shipment to St. Georgen and was closed as of 15 March 1947.

14. Conversion for Peacetime Economy.

A total of 63,320 tons, 5,200 of Class II and IV and 58,120 of Class V toxic materials, was turned over to Military Government and demilitarized by conversion into products useful to the German civilian economy. Staff supervision of the demilitarization remained with the Chief of the Chemical Corps, EUCOM, while the Commanding General, First Military District, was charged with security and technical supervision of operations. The 193d Chemical Depot Company was directly responsible for security and technical supervision of operations at St. Georgen. Since Military Government had no commercial plants at which conversion of toxic ammunition could be accomplished, and since the Chemical Corps was charged with security and supervision responsibilities, an agreement was made with OMGUS to release a section of the St. Georgen Chemical Depot to the German civilian firm to which Military Government assigned the demilitarization work. The concentration of toxics at St. Georgen

was approximately 75 percent complete at the end of 1946, but actual demilitarization had only begun. Relatively minor progress was made in the first half of 1947, owing to a number of factors, the chief of which were a shortage of vehicles and handling equipment, delay in transportation because of the higher priorities of other freight, and lack of coal and electricity. Nevertheless, the estimated date for completion of the demilitarization remained 31 December 1947. Since it was anticipated that some toxic ammunition turned over would be unsuitable for conversion, or of such a nature that its local destruction would be unduly hazardous, four of the hulks obtained for the scuttling program were retained at Bremerhaven for use in the disposal of such items. During the second quarter of 1947, the hulks were utilized by the Army in disposing of 13,500 long tons of toxic ammunition for OMGUS. This was in addition to the Army's scuttling program completed earlier.

15. Operation Davey Jones Locker.

a. A total of 20,400 tons of captured enemy toxics were disposed of by scuttling at sea in an operation DAVEY JONES LOCKER. Rail shipments were given high priority. All precautions were taken and no casualty was suffered from toxic agents during this entire operation. Five ships were sunk off the coast of Norway in the Skagerrak at approximately 58° north latitude and 9° east longitude, in water 650 meters or more in depth. The Norwegian Government gave permission, but stipulated that the convoy be under the control of a Norwegian pilot while in the Skagerrak.

b. There were three hulks in the first convoy. The Sperrbrecher, a former German boomcutter, was towed by the German tug Sirus and the American tug John O'Reilly, LT-159; the T-65, a former German Flak Ship, was towed by the American tug LT-119; and the U-J 305, a former German trawler, was towed by the German tug Widder. The escorting vessel, the German torpedo boat T-19, constantly circled the convoy. It was under the command of a U.S. Navy officer and had a small crew of U.S. Navy enlisted men for communication purposes, but most of the crew were former German Navy personnel. Constant communication was maintained between the escort vessel and the convoy by means of radio, signal flags, and blinker lights.

c. The Sperrbrecher, loaded with 1,349 tons of toxic munitions, was scuttled on 1 July 1946 at 1555 hours, the seacocks being opened and shells being fired from the escort vessel into the hull fore and aft at the water line where no toxics were stowed. The escort vessel was upwind from the hulk. The T-65, carrying 1,526 tons of munitions, was similarly scuttled on the same day at 2025 hours; and at thirty-seven minutes past midnight the U-J 305, with a 671 ton load, was scuttled.


d. The other two ships were sunk on different days. The Alco Banner, a former Hog-Islander, was sunk on 14 July at 0920. This hulk, loaded with 2,765 tons of toxics, was towed by three tugs and escorted by the T-19. Sinking required forty-five minutes. On 30 August the James Otis, a U.S. Liberty ship carrying 3,653 tons of toxic munitions, was scuttled at 1017 hours.

e. A similar and concurrent operation was conducted by the British, and an agreement was reached under which they scuttled 10,436 tons for the U.S. forces.

f. The history of the toxic ammunition disposal program was thoroughly documented, both in pictures and in writing. Colonel Yanka and Colonel LeRoy were coauthors of the volume entitled "The History of Captured Enemy Toxic Munitions in the American Zone, European Theater, May 1945 to June 1947."

Chart II


ORGANIZATION  
CHEMICAL DIVISION  
THEATER  
HEADQUARTERS  
21 Sept 46



Source: Theater Chief Chemical Officer, Hq, USFET, Report of Operations, 1 Oct - 31 Dec 46.

Chart III


ORGANIZATION  
CHEMICAL CORPS  
EUROPEAN COMMAND  
30 June 1947



Source: Chief of Chemical Corps,  
Hq. EUCOM, Report of Operations,  
10 Apr - 30 Jun 47.

# POSITION OF SHIPS SUNK IN OPERATION "DAVEY JONES LOCKER"

1. SPERRBRECKER 58° 14' N. LAT, 9° 15' E. LONG.
2. T-65 58° 17' 9" N. LAT, 9° 37' 1" E. LONG.
3. U-J 305 58° 16' 4" N. LAT, 9° 29' E. LONG.
4. ALCO BANNER 58° 18' 7" N. LAT, 9° 36' 5" E. LONG.
5. JAMES OTIS 58° 16' N. LAT, 9° 32' E. LONG.



## FOOTNOTES

1. The information contained in this chapter, unless otherwise stated, was compiled from the Reports of Operations, covering the period from 1 July 1946 to 30 June 1947, submitted by the Office of the Theater Chief Chemical Officer, Hq USFET, and the Office of the Chief of Chemical Corps, Hq EUCOM, and from The History of Captured Enemy Toxic Munitions in the American Zone, European Theater, May 1945 to June 1947, Office of the Chief of Chemical Corps, Hq EUCOM.

2. See chart I.

3. See chart II.

4. See chart III.




# Where to Find Army Ordnance Emergency Service Stations

Exactly 20 Ordnance emergency service stations now criss-cross the American Zone. The stations are located on the autobahns and along the main feeder highways to render assistance to personnel driving long distances. In addition to the facilities in the occupation zone, which includes Berlin District and the Bremen Enclave, the Army also maintains stations in France and in Belgium which are operated by WBS. Berlin District operates the single station in its area.

## LEGEND

- ▲ OPERATED BY CBS ORD
- OPERATED BY 3<sup>RD</sup> ARMY ORD
- ≡ AUTOBAHN
- ~ MAIN ROADS

STATION NO. AND LOCATION	OPERATED BY	TELEPHONE NUMBER	MAP COORDINATES
1. Seckenheim	3rd Army	Mannheim 403141 or Heidelberg 5567 (Thru 3517 Ord MAM Co.)	R-6897
2. Heidelberg	3rd Army	Heidelberg 6800	R-7090
3. Lorsch (Bensheim)	CBS	Bensheim 513	M-602175
4. Karlsruhe (Frankfurt)	CBS	Karlsruhe 605	R-625590
5. Pfaunheim (Frankfurt)	CBS	Frankfurt 23383	M-629730
6. Heilbronn	CBS	Heilbronn 16	S-082618
7. Reiskirchen (Giessen)	CBS	Grünberg 105 (Thru Giessen)	O-114228
8. Pforzheim	CBS	Pforzheim 277 (Thru Stuttgart)	R-167370
9. Kirchheim (Hersfeld)	CBS	Kassel Ord. Sta. No. 9	H-298505
10. Geislingen	CBS	Weisensteg 138 (Thru Stuttgart)	S-405015
11. Kassel	CBS	Kassel Switchboard, Ext. 46	C-2302
12. Augsburg	CBS	Augsburg 7135	Y-3480
13. Furth	CBS	Furth 73344, Ext. 51	O-3602
14. Munich	CBS	Munich 2097	Y-8555
15. Bamberg	CBS	Bamberg 7754	O-2749
16. Chiemsee	CBS	Rosenheim 58	Z-4826
17. Würzburg	CBS	Würzburg 6223	N-7927
18. Ingolstadt	CBS	Ingolstadt 633	T-7125
19. Bremerhaven	CBS	Bremerhaven 23551	Holz Hafen & Bismarck Sts. In City
20. Bremen	CBS	Bremen 2939	In City
DEPOT 0-644	Paris (France)	WBS	Dau - 3870 (Thru Paris Military)
DEPOT 0-659-A	Bazancourt (France)	WBS	Call Depot 0-659-A (Thru Reims)
DEPOT 0-6013	Marseille (France)	WBS	Call Depot 0-6013 (Thru Marseille, Ext. 91)
AIR STRIP A-82	Etain (France)	WBS	Call Depot A-82 (Thru Metz)
DEPOT 0-648	Le Havre (France)	WBS	Call Depot 0-648 (Thru Le Havre)
DEPOT 0-654-A	Belcele (Belgium)	WBS	Call Depot 0-654-A (Thru Antwerp)
HELMSTEDT	Berlin Autobahn	BD	Thru Helmstedt



PREPARED BY OFFICE THEATER CHIEF OF ORDNANCE

FOOTNOTES

1. USFET, OTCO, "Ordnance in the European Theater," by Col. T. H. Nixon, 1 Jul 46.
2. USFET, OTCO, Office Order 41, C 1, 9 Aug 46.
3. USFET, OTCO, Office Order 55, 5 Sep 46, subj: "Reorganization of Ordnance Service Hq. USFET."
4. USFET, OTCO, No. 1, Office Order 64, 13 Jan 47, subj: "Reorganization of Ordnance Service Hq. USFET."
5. USFET, Ord Div, 13 Jan 47 - annex 1 A to Rpt of Opr. Jan-Mar 47.
6. GO 22, USFET, 30 Jul 46.
7. Cf n. 3.
8. Ibid.
9. Annex B to Rpt of Opr. Jan-Mar 47 - "Key officers of Ordnance Service" Hq. USFET, 15 Mar 47.
10. Ibid.
11. Annex A 1, Rpt of Opr. Ordnance Service, Apr-Jun 47.
12. EUCOM, OCO, Rpt of Opr. Apr-Jun 47.
13. Ibid.
14. USFET, OCO, Office Order 3, 11 Apr 47.
15. EUCOM, OCO, Rpt of Opr. 1 Apr-30 Jun 47.
16. USFET, OTCO, Office Order 64, 1, 13 Jan 47, subj: "Reorganization of Ordnance Service Hqs USFET."
17. EUCOM, "Plan for Reorganization of US Forces in the European Command," annex 2, app "E," 23 Apr 47, file AG 322 GCT-AGO.

18. EUCOM, SS&P Rpt of Opr. 1 Apr-30 Jun 47.
19. EUCOM, "Plan for Reorganization of US Forces in the European Command," annex 2, app "E," 23 Apr 47, file AG 322 GCT-AGO.
20. Ltr, USFET, 18 Dec 46, file AG 322 GCT-AGO, subj: "Discontinuance of Bulk Allotment Unit (non-T/O)."
21. Ltr, USFET, 31 Dec 46, file AG 353 ORD-AGO, subj: "Ordnance Specialist Training."
22. EUCOM, "Plan for Reorganization of US Forces in the European Command," annex 2, app "E," 23 Apr 47, file AG 322 GCT-AGO.
23. EUCOM, SS&P Rpt of Opr. 1 Apr-30 Jun 47.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.

Chapter XXXIV

CHIEF QUARTERMASTER

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Chapter XXXIV  
CHIEF QUARTERMASTER

1. Plan of Organization.

a. During the year ending 30 June 1947, the Office of the Chief Quartermaster functioned as a technical service of the European Command, coordination with other services being effected by the Director of Services, Supply and Procurement, who was formerly the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, of Theater Headquarters. As a member of the special staff of the Commander in Chief, the Chief Quartermaster served the higher echelons of command in an advisory capacity on all matters pertaining to the service. Command Headquarters provided the normal chain of communication with the War Department, although direct correspondence with chiefs of services in Washington was authorized on purely routine and technical matters. <sup>(1)</sup> The Office of the Chief Quartermaster was located at the Lurgi Haus in Frankfurt until the end of April 1947, when it moved to the Elizabethen School on Eschersheimerlandstrasse, within

the Frankfurt compound.

b. At the beginning of the period under review, the Office of the Theater Quartermaster, as it was then called, consisted of five divisions and three independent branches, all of which were directly responsible to the Theater Chief Quartermaster. (See Chart I.) After its reorganization on 19 July 1946, the Office comprised the following divisions: Control and Plans, Administrative and Service, Procurement, Supply, and Storage and Distribution. On 20 December 1946 the Procurement Division was reorganized as a result of the transfer of several of its procurement functions to the 56th Quartermaster Base Depot at Giessen. The Division, as reorganized, consisted of the Administration, Coordination, and Contract Review Branches. With this single exception, the organizational pattern of the Office of the Theater Chief Quartermaster remained as instituted on 19 July 1946 until the following May, when the administrative system was again revised in conformance with the reorganization of the entire staff of Theater Headquarters. Chart II includes the names of the branch and divisional chiefs as of 6 February 1947.

c. The Theater Chief Quartermaster throughout the period under review was Brig. Gen. Milton O. Boone. Coincident with the redesignation of Theater Headquarters on 15 March 1947, General Boone's title became Chief Quartermaster of the European Command and the word "Theater" was dropped from the name of his office. Col. R. P. Hollis was the Deputy Theater Chief Quartermaster until 7 August 1946, when he was succeeded

by Lt. Col. R. T. Evans, Jr. While retaining his post as chief of the Planning Control Group, Lt. Col. Charles P. Bellican assumed the additional duties of Deputy Chief Quartermaster on 27 May 1947, when Colonel Evans followed his predecessor to the Zone of the Interior. Col. Harold H. Shaller became special assistant to the Chief Quartermaster on 25 January 1947; in April he was assigned as chief of the Personnel and Training Policy Division, vice Lt. Col. Henry H. Manverse.

## 2. The Quartermaster Mission.

The Theater Organization Plan imposed specific duties on the Chief Quartermaster. (5) As a member of the special staff of the Commander in Chief, he was responsible for advising the Commander and his general staff officers on the wide range of subjects that pertained to the Quartermaster service. Those topics normally included such matters as the assignment of technical specialists in subordinate commands, operations of quartermaster service troops and military labor units, supply levels and equipment allocations, as well as the integration of related activities of other arms and services. As the technical representative of The Quartermaster General in Washington, the Chief Quartermaster interpreted his policies as they affected procedures in the Command. On an operational level, the functions of the Quartermaster Corps in furthering the occupational program comprised: procurement, storage, issue, and security of food, clothing, organizational equipment, fuels, lubricants and other general supplies

for the occupation forces and Military Government; Theater stock control and maintenance of reports and records pertaining thereto; disposal of scrap, salvage, surplus property, and captured enemy material; budgeting and disposal of Quartermaster funds; operation of bakeries, refrigeration plants, and laundries; and, finally, training of its staff in Quartermaster procedures. (6) The Chief Quartermaster formulated the plans and policies necessary to effect these activities and supervised their execution. In addition to his staff and operational functions, the Chief Quartermaster was responsible for all installations comprising the European QM Depot and for the QM School Center.

### 3. Service Troops and Installations.

a. The European Quartermaster Depot. Originally the responsibility of Continental Base Section, supply operations of the service devolved on the Office of the Chief Quartermaster on 15 May 1947, only to be delegated two weeks later to the commander of the Quartermaster Depot at Giessen. The primary mission of the Depot consisted in receiving, storing, and distributing all Quartermaster equipment, clothing, subsistence, and supplies required for the maintenance of Theater Headquarters and major commands. As a secondary mission, the Depot staff assisted Quartermaster supply officers at lower echelons throughout the zone by supervising their activities and instructing their personnel in technical Quartermaster procedures. The commanding officer of the European Quartermaster Depot was responsible to the Chief Quartermaster

of the Command for the performance of all supply functions of the Depot as prescribed in its mission. Assisting the Depot commander in his duties were the executive officer, the commander of troops, the director of administrative services, and the director for supplies. The organizational plan of the European Quartermaster Depot further provided for a Depot Control Group, whose function was to collect and evaluate data concerning the management of the Depot, to recommend improvements as required, to prepare statistical reports, to determine personnel allotments, and to coordinate all demobilization planning. The director of Administrative Services supervised operations of the following divisions: Administrative, Personnel, Repair and Utilities, Maintenance, Fiscal and Transportation. The director of supply controlled the Procurement, Stock Control, and Storage Divisions. In the execution of his mission, the director of Supply was aided by four officers: the assistant for Subsistence, the assistant for Clothing and Equipage, the assistant for Petroleum Products and Fuel, and the assistant for General Supplies. (7) The subdepot at Munich was directed by its own commanding officer, with the aid of a commander of troops, a director of administrative services, and a director of supply; a Control and Planning Group completed the organizational structure of the installation. At the end of the period under review, an estimated 75,000 long tons of property remained to be moved to the Quartermaster Depot from installations which were scheduled for deactivation, an additional 17,000 long tons of surplus commodities were awaiting shipment to the Zone of the Interior, and approximately 22,100 long tons

were being held at inoperational depots pending disposal by the Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner.

b. Quartermaster Units. Quartermaster troops were used principally to supervise indigenous personnel in the performance of their technical and administrative functions. The following table shows the total number of Quartermaster service troops, both white and Negro, as of 31 August 1946, and percentages of Table of Organization (8) strength. Efficiency ratings are also indicated.

<u>Troops</u>	<u>PERSONNEL STRENGTH</u>			<u>EFFICIENCY PERCENTAGES</u>		
	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Percentage of Officers</u>	<u>T/O EM</u>	<u>Occupational Mission</u>	<u>Limited Operations</u>	<u>Major Operations</u>
White	10,607	83	151	91	83	82
Negro	4,789	119	175	90	61	53

Total: 15,396

The 15,396 Quartermaster troops were grouped into 92 units in August 1946. The number of troops and units gradually diminished during the year, until by June of 1947 there were only 50 units under assignment to the Chief Quartermaster. The following table shows the number and types of units operating in the Command in June 1947, the major commands to which they were assigned, and the authorized T/O of each unit.

TYPE UNIT	EUROPEAN BREMER-					TOTAL T/O STRENGTH
	QM DEPOT	HAVEN POE	US CONSTAB	BERLIN	USFA	
H/H Co, QM Base Depot	1					243
H/H Det, QM Group	1	1		1	1	134
H/H Det, QM Bn	4		1			100
QM Bakery Co (M)(Spec)	1 L/Det			Det	Section	101
QM Bakery Co (M)(Spec) cadre						11
QM Depot Supply Co	5 L/Plt	1		Plt	Plt	1168
QM Gas Supply Co	3 L/Plt			Plt	Plt	425
QM GRC Plt	2 L/Plt			Det		46
QM Laundry Det (EJ)					1	16
QM PPL (FB) (M)	1					6
QM PPL (FA) (Base)		1				12
QM Railhead Co	1					177
QM Refrig Co (M)	2					206
QM Refrig Co (F)	1 & 1 Det	1 L/2 Det		Det	Plt	256
QM Salv Rep Co (F)	1					206
Labor Supervision Co	2					18
Trans Trk Co (T)	6					660
Trans Trk Co (H)	1					117
						<u>3,902</u>

Not included in the above tabulation are those Quartermaster units which were controlled by the American Graves Registration Command, the Transportation Corps, or the Army Exchange Service.

c. The Quartermaster School Center. Continental Base Section operated the Quartermaster Center at Darmstadt, Germany, until 15 May 1947, when the Chief Quartermaster assumed operational as well as supervisory control of the school. The mission of the School Center was fourfold: to instruct officers, warrant officers, and noncommissioned officers on supply procedures, food service supervision, and food conservation; to train enlisted men and indigenous personnel in the various specialties prescribed by current directives of the War Department and Theater Headquarters; to conduct such special courses as

required by the Chief Quartermaster; and to provide teams for field service throughout the European Theater. These visiting teams assisted unit kitchens, sales commissaries, bakeries, Class I supply points, and Quartermaster field units to increase the efficiency of their operations. In cognizance of the world-wide food shortage, the School Center teams, as well as the class instructors, emphasized the necessity for strict food conservation. The School Center was under the immediate direction of a commandant, who was aided by an executive officer and an assistant commandant. As of 1 July 1946, the battalion assigned to the School Center was composed of the following companies: Headquarters Company, 6996, QMSC, the 4245 QM Service Company, the 3021 QM Bakery Company, and three training companies. At the beginning of the period the rosters of these units contained a total 1,058 names, including the student body of 233 men and the cadre of 39 officers and 786 enlisted men. The cadre was complemented by 379 indigenous workers employed at the Center as janitors, draftsmen, mechanics, interpreters, and typists. (10) By 29 April 1947 the personnel allotment of the training center had dropped to 58 officers, 4 warrant officers, and 344 enlisted men. At the end of June service men at the school numbered 249 students and 299 cadre, who formed a battalion of five companies. (11)

d. Service Centers. From the beginning of the period under review plans were under way to provide twenty consolidated Quartermaster service centers throughout the U.S. Zones of Germany and Austria. By the end of June 1947, sixteen of the centers had been established,

providing shoe repair, dry cleaning, and laundry facilities for enlisted men and women, hospitals, and organizations. These service centers were located at Kassel, Fulda, Würzburg, Bamberg, Dorheim, Mannheim, Augsburg, Frankfurt, Wiesbaden, Regensburg, Bremen, Berlin, Stuttgart, and Darmstadt in Germany; and at Vienna, Linz, and Salzburg in Austria. At the end of the period an additional center was being established at Sonthofen, with another planned for Munich. As the centers became operational, indigenous laundry, cleaning, and shoe repair installations were declared excess and derequisitioned to the civil economy. Approximately 340 such laundries were released during the twelve-month period under review. (12) After 1 June 1947, responsibility for operation of the service centers was vested in the individual post commanders; (13) however, the Installations Branch of the Supply Division, Office of the Chief Quartermaster, continued to supervise the plants and to formulate the policies governing their operations.

e. Other Establishments.

(1) Upon the arrival of dependents in the Theater, sales commissaries had been established in the military communities of the U.S. Zones of Germany and Austria. By 1 July 1946 fifty commissaries were operating throughout the Theater under the technical supervision of the Chief Quartermaster, who also requisitioned their food stocks. Two additional commissaries were opened during the course of the year. Commanders of the twenty-one military posts directed the operations of the commissaries under their respective jurisdictions. Standard

Operating Procedure No. 78, with changes, of Headquarters, USFET,  
(14)  
dictated the procedures for operation of the sales commissaries.

(2) Previously an Ordnance responsibility, the maintenance and supply of spare parts for materials-handling equipment became a Quartermaster function on 15 April 1947. In order to provide such service, the Chief Quartermaster established a base maintenance shop at Giessen. By 30 April the shop had received about 40 tons of spare parts and more than six hundred pieces of unserviceable powered materials-handling equipment from the Ordnance Service. Although lack of essential parts curtailed repair work at the plant, it was planned that eventually the Giessen shop would have sufficient capacity to repair approximately forty-five powered vehicles per month.

(3) On 1 January 1947 the four clothing repair installations were consolidated into a single establishment at Mannheim, which was under the direction of the Assistant for Installations of the Office of the Chief Quartermaster. The Mannheim repair depot received only those items of clothing and shoes which could not be made serviceable at the post repair shops.

(4) At the beginning of the period under review, the 53rd and 59th Quartermaster Base Depots operated nine plants which dyed uniforms for the use of displaced persons, prisoners of war, civilian labor supervision companies, and ex-enemy civilians employed by the U.S. Army. Seventy-five percent of the clothing dyed by Quartermaster installations was turned over to the Office of Military

Government (U.S.). In order to prevent unauthorized persons from gaining access to undyed uniforms, the G-4 and G-5 Divisions of Theater Headquarters disapproved a request of the Chief Quartermaster to transfer the responsibility for dying clothes to Military Government. After the Quartermaster base depots were deactivated, the clothing was dyed by German firms on a contractual basis at an estimated cost of \$24,390 per month.

(5) All matters pertaining to dogs or horses were the responsibility of the Office of the Chief Quartermaster. In the execution of this charge, the Assistant for Installations of the Chief Quartermaster maintained the Quartermaster Remount Depot at Donauworth, Germany. Staffed entirely by indigenous personnel, the Depot included a canine section for the training of dogs in guarding various U.S. Army installations. In July 1946 inventories of the Office of the Chief Quartermaster listed approximately 2,800 horses, all but 500 which were used for recreational purposes. Fifty operational horses were maintained at the Remount Depot as emergency mounts for Constabulary regiments. All but 670 horses were declared surplus to the Director of Services, Supply and Procurement, by the end of June 1947.

(6) On 1 July 1946 the Chief Quartermaster assumed responsibility for the execution of the European Mortuary Service. Circular No. 139 governed the procedure for administering the current deceased program in the European Theater. According to the provisions

of that circular, all decedants were to be moved to the nearest Theater mortuary, where they would be prepared for shipment to the Zone of the Interior or for internment in one of the U.S. military cemeteries. At the beginning of the period under review, mortuaries were in operation in the following cities: Munich, Nürnberg, Frankfurt, Berlin, and Bremen in Germany; Cambridge, England; and Paris and Marseille, France. By the end of the period the three mortuaries in France and England had been closed, and one put in operation at Vienna, Austria.

4. Reallocation of Quartermaster Responsibility.

The Office of the Chief Quartermaster was reorganized on 15 May 1947 into three groups: an executive group, a planning control group, and a depot-installations, supply and procurement control group. Effective with this change, the operational responsibilities of the Chief Quartermaster were delegated to the European Quartermaster Depot and the European Quartermaster School Center, as is indicated by Chart (15) III. Those installations, organizations, and service troops of the Quartermaster Corps which supported the European Command were assigned to Command Headquarters for attachment to the military posts in which they served. Although administrative control of such units was vested in the respective military post commanders, the Chief Quartermaster exercised technical supervision and operational control over all Quartermaster services and units in the European Command.

Functions and responsibilities of the district and post commanders in regard to Quartermaster services were delineated in Annex No. 2 to the Plan for Reorganization of U.S. Forces in the European Theater. (16)

5. Consolidation of Depots.

a. In July 1946 Quartermaster depots were in operation at Rognac, Paris, Reims, and Le Havre in France; at Antwerp, Belgium; and at Bremen, Giessen, Mannheim, Munich, and Berlin in Germany. With the exception of the installation at Paris, the Quartermaster depots in Belgium and France were discontinued by 31 March 1947, when Western Base Section was deactivated. Prior to its deactivation, Western Base Section shipped approximately 5,000 long tons of Quartermaster supplies to depots in the U.S. Zone of Germany. Until 15 May 1947 Continental Base Section exercised operational control over Quartermaster depots in U.S.-occupied territory. As early as July 1946, however, Theater Quartermaster planning was directed toward consolidation of all stocks at a central depot in Giessen and a subsidiary depot at Munich, and to this end stocks were gradually transferred to these two permanent installations. The Giessen depot was eventually to contain about 60 percent of the supplies, the remaining 40 percent to be stored at the Munich subsidiary. On 15 May 1947 the 56th Quartermaster Base Depot at Giessen was officially named the European Quartermaster Depot and the 53rd Quartermaster Base Depot at Munich redesignated as Subdepot Headquarters of the European Quartermaster Depot. (17)

b. Estimates indicated that 900,000 additional square feet of covered storage space would be required at the Giessen depot to handle the increased stocks of supplies. Because of anticipated personnel reductions in the Command, however, construction of only 500,000 square feet was authorized. Plans provided for the building of ten new warehouses, of which one was completed and four were begun by May 1947. The 41,000 feet of rail trackage at the marshaling yards in Giessen proved insufficient to handle the increased numbers of railcars needed by the depot. Construction in progress at the end of the June 1947 would increase the amount of trackage by 37,000 feet, thus insuring greater protection against pilferage, enabling the depot to handle the railcars more efficiently, and reducing the amount of time required to spot the cars. Forty percent of the additional work required at the depot was completed by June 30. Originally set at 1 July 1947, the target date for completion of the depot plant and concentration of its stocks was deferred until 1 November 1947.

c. Difficulties attendant upon the consolidation of Quartermaster stocks at Giessen and Munich were the shortage of manpower and the inadequate number of trucks and baggage cars.

(1) Besides handicapping the building program, the lack of manpower retarded the loading and unloading of supplies at the Giessen installation. The necessity for filling large numbers of requisitions for military posts diverted personnel from stock consolidation. As the primary mission of the Quartermaster Depot was to supply troops in the

field, the policy was to give priority to the maintenance of post supply levels. To relieve the labor shortage, a Baltic Labor Company was assigned to work at the Depot, and plans were made to obtain the service of former prisoners of war who had been released from the camps at Heilbronn and Dachau.

(2) During the winter months of 1946, 50 percent of the trucks assigned for depot use were temporarily diverted for use in the German economy to transport fuel, and the number of railroad cars obtainable was insufficient to supplant their loss. The Depot Operations Branch of the Office of Chief Quartermaster kept strict control of all shipments and cleared all shipping orders to insure that supplies were moved in accordance with their priorities and that maximum use was made of available transportation. In spite of the handicaps, however, it was believed possible to complete the consolidation of depot stocks to meet Command levels by the target date of 1  
(18)  
November 1947.

#### 6. Distribution of Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants.

Throughout the year under consideration, the Chief Quartermaster acted as the representative of the Army-Navy Petroleum Board on matters regarding the distribution of petroleum products in the  
(19)  
European Command. The Army-Navy Petroleum Board was an agency established in Washington, D.C., under the Joint Chiefs of Staff to coordinate the procurement of petroleum, oil, and lubricants by the armed forces and to prescribe supply levels for such products in the

various commands. The Office of Chief Quartermaster issued shipping orders covering all movements of petroleum, oil, and lubricants from the port to inland depots for the U.S. Army as well as for military government agencies. The Army-Navy Petroleum Board arranged delivery of such products to the European Command in accordance with requisitions submitted through the Office of the Chief Quartermaster. A 45-day supply of bulk petroleum and a 180-day supply of allied products was authorized for the Command. The Quartermaster controlled the consumption of petroleum products through the use of POL coupon books. The Army Exchange Service sold the coupons to drivers of private vehicles; coupon books for official purposes were distributed through the Office of the Chief Quartermaster. Unit allowances of such products were based on troop strength, past consumption, and the number of vehicles in the organization.

7. Scrap and Salvage Operations.


Staff supervision of the disposal of scrap, salvage, and waste materials was exercised by the Chief Quartermaster in accordance with policies dictated by the Director of Services, Supply and Procurement. The Scrap Disposal Service was established in the Administrative and Service Division of the Office of the Chief Quartermaster to determine selling prices of the different types of scrap and to insure proper disposition of such materials. Other Quartermaster functions in regard to the program were: formulation of methods and procedures for the sale of scrap; review of all contracts pertaining to such sales; supervision

of post scrap and waste installations; maintenance of records on tonnages sold, approved bidders, contracts, and agreements; and coordination of scrap-generating activities of the technical services. Contracting officers of Western and Continental Base Sections, the American Graves Registration Command, and U.S. Forces, Austria, conducted the actual sales operations. As of 1 October 1946, inventories of U.S. Army scrap material revealed a total of 573,000 metric tons. Of that amount, 250,000 tons were sold or shipped by the end of 1946. An additional 310,000 tons were allocated to OMGUS, 50,000 tons of which were to be turned over to Command Headquarters after some processing by German firms. Salvaged material required for use by the U.S. Army was issued directly to procurement teams of the technical services before the remaining scrap was put on the market for sale to private concerns. At the end of June approximately 185,000 tons of scrap remained to be delivered in fulfillment of contracts. The target date for completion of these deliveries was set at 1 January 1948. It was anticipated that considerable quantities of scrap would be generated in the future from unsalable surplus supplies, demilitarization of combat material, and materials used by the technical services of the U.S. Army.

(20)

OFFICE OF THE THEATER CHIEF QUARTERMASTER


1 JUL 1946



6 January 1967


CHART 1

# OFFICE OF THE THEATER CHIEF QUARTERMASTER



COMMAND POLICY

Chart III



## FOOTNOTES

1. USFET, 8 Jun 46, file AG-322, "Theater Basic Administrative Plan."
2. Office Order No 11, OTCQM, 19 Jul 46.
3. GO 1, USFET, OTCQM, 19 Jul 46.
4. Chart No 6, Annex "A," to OCQM, Rpt of Opr. 1 Jan-31 Mar 47.
5. GO 200, USFET, 26 Jun 46.
6. USFET, "Theater Organization Plan." pt 11, 25 Feb 46.
7. EUCOM, QMC, Organization and Procedures Manual, 15 Jun 47,  
p 46 ff.
8. USFET, OTCQM, Rpt of Opr. 1 Jul-30 Sep 46.
9. EUCOM, OCQM, Rpt of Opr. 1 Apr-30 Jun 47.
10. Cf n. 8.
11. Cf n. 9.
12. Ibid.
13. USFET, "Plan for Reorganization of the U.S. Forces, European Theater," QM Plan to Annex No 2, App "F," par 5e.
14. USFET, SOP 78, with changes.
15. OCQM, Rpt of Opr. 30 Jun 47, chart No 8 Annex "A." (Organization Chart V, OCQM).
16. USFET, "Plan for Reorganization of the U.S. Forces, European Theater," QM Plan to Annex No 2, "F," par 5e.
17. Ltr, EUCOM, OCQM, 15 May 47, file 600.1, subj: "Designation of Major Installations of the European Quartermaster Depot."
18. Cf n. 9.
19. EUCOM, "Organization and Functions, Hq European Command," 31 Jul 47, p 35.
20. Cf n. 9.

Chapter XXXV  
CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO:  
AUTHORITY *Commander-in-Chief  
European Command*

*per DA 25 Apr 1951*

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO: **CANCELLED**  
AUTHORITY *Commander in Chief*  
*European Command*  
*On 25 Apr 1951*

Chapter XXXV

CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER

1. Mission.

The second year of the occupation was a period in which the mission of the Chief Signal Officer was losing more and more of its operational aspects. Technical supervision and inspection of signal functions at every echelon of the European Command was a part of the mission of the Chief Signal Officer, but actual operating tasks were being transferred as rapidly as feasible to the Reichspost. By 30 June 1947, the Office of the Chief Signal Officer (OCSigO) no longer had the mission of providing all communications needed by United States installations in Europe. Instead, the mission was to provide only an essential core of communications and to make recommendations on, or assist in arranging, provision of services by the German Reichspost under the supervision of OMGUS. The signal staff of the major commands and military posts continued to provide special communications

(1)  
facilities for military use.

2. Organization.

a. In its main lines, OCSigO retained the organization established during the first year of the occupation. (2) The principal functions of OCSigO continued to be performed by divisions dealing with supply, personnel, and communications. Signal Corps photographic and training film operations, unrelated to the communications mission, remained the function of the Army Pictorial Division.

b. Absorption by OCSigO of the Theater Signal Communications Service (TSCS), originally organized on 17 July 1945, and established as a technical command on 4 November 1945, (3) (4) (5) began in June 1946. On 27-29 July 1946, TSCS moved from the Reichspost Building in Wiesbaden and OCSigO from the FIAT, or "Arbeitsfront," Building at 69 Bürgerstrasse, Frankfurt, to newly assigned space in the Navy, or "Commando," Building within the Frankfurt Compound. Although some integration took place in the following weeks, the two agencies were not officially merged until 15 November 1946, when TSCS was inactivated. (6) The staff and functions of the inactivated agency were assigned to OCSigO and equipment was transferred to the 3118th Signal Service Group. The status of TSCS units attached to major commands remained unchanged, although it was provided that future changes in attachment would be by order of Headquarters, USFET.

c. Functions added to OCSigO through the reorganization of 15 November 1946 included the following:

(1) Control of intrazonal, interzonal, and international primary and secondary routes and means of military signal communications in the European Theater.

(2) Engineering, construction, installation, operation, and maintenance of military signal communications, including air, rail, and motor messenger service within the Theater.

(3) Operational control of all units assigned or attached to TSCS at the date of its discontinuance.

(4) Control of such portions of the Reichspost communications facilities in the U.S. Zone as were required for the long-lines system.  
(7)

d. After the initial move to the Commando Building, several changes were made in the organization of OCSigO.  
(8)

(1) On 29 July 1946, a Repair and Maintenance Section was established in the Supply and Procurement Division.

(2) Radio Group of Long Lines Branch, TSCS, was combined with Communications Division, OCSigO, to form Radio Branch, TSCS.

(3) An Exchange Engineering Group was organized in Telecommunications Branch TSCS, to install, repair, and maintain switchboards throughout the Theater.  
(9)

(4) On 27 July 1946, the Troops and Personnel Branch, TSCS, was absorbed into a new Methods and Results Branch, TSCS. This new Branch was assigned the function of evaluating the organization, methods, and procedures of TSCS.

(5) In September the administrative sections of TSCS and OCSigO were consolidated, completing the practical integration of the two organizations.

e. In accordance with the Theater policy of consolidating technical installations, a central signal depot and maintenance shop was established at Hanau in July 1946. The 22d Signal Service Group, (11) formerly located at Mannheim, moved to Hanau to operate the new depot. Movement of reserve stocks from other depots to Hanau and the disposition of surplus property progressed throughout the remainder of the (12) period. The close of Continental Base Section (15 May-15 June 1947) involved the scheduled transfer of signal depot operating responsi- (13) bilities to OCSigO. Resulting command relationships are shown in Chart "A," "European Command Signal Organization."

f. On 4 June 1947 the Plans Branch, formerly an advisory unit reporting directly to the Deputy Chief Signal Officer, was brought into (14) the framework of the Personnel and Training Division.

g. As a result of the discontinuance of TSCS, supervision and control of the Headquarters Signal Office in Frankfurt became a direct responsibility of OCSigO. Its function continued to be the provision of communications services for Theater Headquarters and for authorized (15) United States agencies and establishments in the Frankfurt area.

### 3. Key Personnel.

Carrying top responsibilities in the Office of the Chief Signal Officer during the period 1 July 1946-30 June 1947 were the following

officers:

Chief Signal Officer.

Brig. Gen. Francis H. Lanahan, Jr. (to 15 May 1947)  
Col. Edward F. French, Acting Chief Signal Officer (15 May-  
9 July 1947)

Deputy Chief Signal Officer.

Col. William L. Bayer (to 15 June 1947)

Executive Officer.

Lt. Col. J. S. Tennery (to 9 June 1947)  
Maj. Harry E. Tabor (Acting Executive Officer from 10 June  
1947)

Fiscal Officer.

Lt. Col. Isaac A. Crapo

Director Army Pictorial Division.

Lt. Col. A. E. Holland (to 7 Aug 1946)  
Capt. John A. Herod (Acting) (7 Aug-28 Aug)  
Lt. Col. W. W. Lindsay (28 Aug 1946-30 June 1947)

Director, Personnel and Training Division.

Col. John C. Monahan (to 26 Dec 1946)  
Col. R. G. H. Meyer (after 26 Dec 1946)

Director, Communications Division.

Col. E. F. French

Director, Supply and Procurement Division.

Col. William M. Mack.

The following officers served as Headquarters Signal Officer during this  
period:

Col. Eugene Kenny (to 17 May 1947)  
Maj. Mervin Bowers (after 17 May 1947)

Lt. Col. Ruben Abramowitz served as commandant of the Theater Signal School throughout the year.

4. Strength of Signal Communications Agencies.

a. Military. As the operational tasks of the organization dwindled, through transfer of operations to the Reichspost and general reduction of installations, the number of troops assigned to OCSigO continued to diminish. At the end of June 1947, the authorized strength of the Signal Corps in the European Command was 5,570. Actual totals on 30 June 1947 were 515 officers and 4,918 enlisted men, compared with (16) 709 officers and 8,741 enlisted men on 1 July 1946.

b. Civilian. Civilians employed in Signal Corps activities totaled 9,053 on 1 July 1946. At the end of September, civilian workers (17) included 644 in the liberated areas and 8,781 in the occupied areas. On 1 May 1947, one U.S. and 42 French civilians were employed in the liberated areas (by American Graves Registration Command), and 6,198 civilians were employed in the occupied areas. This second group included 261 U.S. civilians, 54 British, 167 other Allied, 239 Austrians, 5,094 Germans, and 383 displaced persons. This made a total of 6,241 (18) civilians as of 1 May 1947.

5. Personnel and Training.

The Personnel and Training Division was responsible for securing officer and enlisted personnel to accomplish the Signal mission throughout the European Theater. In July 1946 there was a shortage of

approximately 330 officers. By June 1947 the estimated officer shortage had dropped to thirty-nine, because of decreasing needs and reduced authorizations. At the same time, the shortage of enlisted men was estimated at 843.<sup>(19)</sup> Critical shortages existed in the following specialties: photo laboratory technicians, radio operators, radio repairmen, supply clerks, message center chiefs, cryptographic technicians, powermen, repeatermen, teletype operators, and mechanics. The most serious personnel problem was the shortage of trained men to operate the Signal depots. Training was centered in the Theater Signal Corps School, redesignated the Theater Signal School on 24 August 1946.<sup>(20)</sup> At the end of September 1946 the school had an enrollment of 660, while the number of graduates was 1,447, including 716 graduated prior to 30 June 1946. By the end of June 1947, graduates numbered 2,939. Enrollment as of 30 June 1947 was 470.

#### 6. Army Pictorial Division.

The Army Pictorial Division operated through an administrative Service Branch, a Training Films Operations Branch, and a Photographic Operations Branch.

a. The Administrative Service Branch took the lead in arranging for Special photographic projects and in negotiating with representatives of other services in regard to photographic coverage and supplies.

b. The Training Films Operations Branch in 1946 prepared for disposal some twenty tons, or approximately 16,000,000 feet, of obsolete training film. Training film showings numbered 5,267 in August 1946 and

6,768 in September, with attendance of 832,749 and 935,388, respectively, for the two months. (21)

c. The Photographic Operations Branch employed the 3264th Signal Photo Service Company to provide motion and still picture coverage of major events. The trials at Nürnberg were the main subject of motion picture coverage. The making of identification photos of all enlisted men in the Theater was the outstanding project in the field of still photography. (22) Operation GROUNDHOG, a classified project, began with the training of photographers in May 1946 and was completed on 20 June 1947. This project involved processing 46,220 negatives and supplying 150,654 prints. (23) Effective 18 June 1947, the 3264th Signal Photo Service Company was redesignated the 69th Signal Photo Service Company. (24)

#### 7. Supply and Procurement.

Activities of the Supply and Procurement Division of OCSigO included, in July 1946, supervision of Signal Corps depot operations, formulation of policies and supervision of operations with respect to captured enemy material, repair and maintenance of signal equipment, procurement and production of signal equipment, disposition of surplus signal property, determination of Theater requirements for signal items, and control of Theater levels of signal supply.

a. Constabulary Requirements. During the third quarter of 1946, the U.S. Constabulary continued to place heavy demands for signal

equipment on the Supply and Procurement Division. Radios (SCR-399, SCR-508, and SCR-528), aluminum plates for installing radios in 1,400 jeeps, and photographic supplies constituted the bulk of these requirements.

b. Surplus Property in Liberated Areas. On 30 September 1946, surplus property on hand in six depots in France and Belgium totaled 120,585 long tons. No items remained for shipment to the United States or to Germany. This surplus in the liberated areas was disposed of by Western Base Section before 31 March 1947.

c. Depot Stocks in Occupied Areas. On 30 September 1946, signal supplies on hand in Germany were as follows:

<u>Depot</u>	<u>Long Tons</u>
Mannheim	28,835
Berlin	600
Neu Auring	26,251
Bremen	8,249
Nürnberg	12,121
Hanau	<u>5,368</u>
Total	81,424

To allow the closing of all depots except the central depot at Hanau, inventories were made as a step toward proper disposition of existing stocks. The disposition program provided that all items needed for Theater reserve levels be moved to Hanau; items requested by the War Department, an estimated 20,000 tons of equipment, be returned to the Zone of the Interior; demilitarized captured signal equipment be released to OMGUS; and remaining signal equipment in specified depots be reported surplus, for transfer to other services or declaration to the

Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner.

d. Procurement. An outstanding air of the Procurement Branch, established in the Supply and Procurement Division, on 1 July 1946 was to obtain maximum quantities of signal equipment from the German economy. (29) A field organization was therefore created to survey facilities for production of required equipment. The necessary controls over German production, the differences between German products and standard Signal Corps requirements, and the difficulty of obtaining certain raw materials often slowed procurement. Samples sometimes proved unsatisfactory. Extreme cold, drought, and the shortage of coal further delayed production. Orders were occasionally cancelled because of slow delivery rates, while others were canceled because of reduced military requirements. (30) Items accepted by OCSigO during June 1947 included photo chemicals, telephone central maintenance parts, measuring instruments, fuses, repeater station maintenance parts, radio and repeater tubes, signal lamps, magnetophones, telephone poles, (31) telephone desk sets, and jumper wire.

8. Communication Achievements.

It was the responsibility of the Chief Signal Officer to maintain communications services for U.S. military forces occupying Germany. This mission included technical control and engineering of long lines; control of radio frequencies for military use; maintenance of air, rail, and motor messenger service; operation and maintenance

of a military radio network; and operational control of the military  
(32)  
long-lines network. After the integration of TSCS into OCSigO,  
these functions were carried on by the Theater Signal Communications  
Division, named, on 15 March 1947, the Communications Division.

a. Wire Circuits. In January 1947 approximately 5,000 speech  
circuits were controlled by OCSigO. The total circuit mileage of over  
600,000 miles included 11,514 miles of United States-built open wire  
and 29,720 miles in United States-controlled cable. Some 62,000  
circuit miles of the total were located outside the U.S. Zone, both  
(33)  
in Germany and in other countries. Twenty-three carrier repeater  
stations were also under OCSigO control. Eleven open-wire instal-  
lations in the liberated areas were released to the Signal Officer,  
WBS, for disposal, and five to the Office of the Foreign Liquidation  
(34)  
Commissioner.

b. Teletype Traffic. Signal Center traffic remained fairly  
constant at Theater Headquarters throughout this period, while de-  
(35)  
clining heavily at Bremen and tending to increase at Berlin.  
Messages handled at Frankfurt totaled 120,602 in December, 144,230 in  
January, and 142,775 in June.

c. Telephone Traffic. Figures on long distance telephone  
calls remained steady at Frankfurt, showed definite decreases at  
Wiesbaden and Bremen, and increased at Berlin, Munich, Paris, and Kassel.  
The total number handled at Frankfurt was 22,754 in July 1946, 23,812  
in January, and 22,380 in June.

d. Signal Messenger Routes. Messenger service was provided by OCSigO to supplement Army Post Office and telecommunications channels. At the end of September 1946, there were in operation eleven air messenger trunk routes, twelve train routes, and six motor trunk routes. <sup>(36)</sup> By the end of June 1947, messenger routes had decreased to <sup>(37)</sup> four air routes, nine train routes, and six motor routes.

9. Extent of the European Command Communications System.

Under the Signal Plan included in the organization of the European Command, the EUCOM Signal Communications System comprised the following major installations: <sup>(38)</sup>

a. Repeater Stations.

Ginnheim (Frankfurt)  
Wiesbaden  
Berlin Fernamt Building

b. Military Telephone Switchboards and Associated Facilities.

Frankfurt Military	Bad Tölz Military
Frankfurt Switch	Erlangen Military
Mannheim Switch	Wiesbaden Military
Heidelberg Military	Friedberg Switch
Kassel Switch	Bad Kissingen Switch
Berlin Military	Paris Military
Bremen Switch	Regensburg Switch
Stuttgart Switch	Augsburg Switch
Nürnberg Switch	Bamberg Switch
Munich Switch	

c. Military Teletype Switchboards and Associated Facilities.

Frankfurt	Bamberg
Wiesbaden	Berlin
Heidelberg	Bremen
Fürth	Paris
Munich	Bad Nauheim
Regensburg	Bad Kissingen
Augsburg	Erlangen

d. Signal Centers.

Frankfurt	Stuttgart
Nürnberg	Munich

e. (Very High Frequency) (VHF) Radio Systems.

Frankfurt to Berlin	Helmstedt to Berlin
---------------------	---------------------

f. Decimeter Systems.

Frankfurt to Bremen	Frankfurt to Heidelberg
Frankfurt to Nürnberg	(under construction)
Frankfurt to Munich	Munich to Wendelstein

g. (High Frequency) Circuits.

Frankfurt to Berlin	Frankfurt to Bucharest
Frankfurt to Bremen	Frankfurt to Prague
Frankfurt to Vienna	Frankfurt to Budapest
Frankfurt to Trieste	Frankfurt to Sofia
(under construction)	Frankfurt to Minden
Frankfurt to Warsaw	Frankfurt to Washington
Frankfurt to ships at sea	

h. U.S.-Built Open-Wire Lines.

Aachen-Cologne-Frankfurt  
Frankfurt-Jesberg-Bremen  
Frankfurt-Mannheim-Karlsruhe-Strasbourg  
Frankfurt-Kaiserslautern-Metz-Verdun-Versailles  
Frankfurt-Nürnberg-Munich  
Karlsruhe-Stuttgart (under construction)  
Heidelberg-Mannheim

10. Communications Policies.

The second year of the occupation witnessed the shaping of agreed policies by Military Government and military authorities in Germany concerning the relative responsibilities of OCSigO and of the Reichspost, supervised by OMGUS, for civil and military communications in the U.S. Zone. On this main question of relative responsibility

hinged the determination of future policies on such matters as the providing of communications for nonmilitary, quasi-military, commercial, and international agencies operating in the occupied areas; the future extent of Army-controlled communications installations; the sharing of installations by army and Reichspost agencies; the transfer of United States-owned equipment to the Reichspost; and the degree of control to be exercised by the Chief Signal Officer over interzonal and international communications under German operation.

a. Control of Communications Facilities. On 13-14 March 1947 representatives of OMGUS and OCSigO met to discuss the question (39) of control of communications facilities in occupied Germany. The OMGUS representatives presented the view that civil communications facilities were not being turned back to Reichspost control fast enough. The Chief Signal Officer advocated a gradual transfer of facilities as the most economical procedure and the only one through which communications services could be maintained at the standards demanded by the military forces, OMGUS, and other United States agencies. A schedule of definite dates for the transfer of certain switches was approved at the conference. The Chief Signal Officer agreed to prepare a plan for a separate military communications system, covering purely military facilities such as United States-constructed open-wire lines, decimeter, and VHF facilities. The conferees foresaw the necessity of assuring communications support for authorized non-military agencies whenever the U.S. Army should require the latter to

withdraw from the use of the military system. In the final military plan were included Constabulary, Air Forces operational, and Counter Intelligence Corps operational circuits, and through teletype circuits from EUCOM Headquarters to all military posts. Signal centers and motor, rail, and air messenger service would also be part of the basic military system. As soon as the Reichspost was able, it would take over communications support of Military Government and of authorized United States and Allied agencies and individuals.

b. Transfer of Responsibilities to OMGUS. On 26 April 1947 an outline of responsibilities, facilities, and plants to be transferred from OCSigO to OMGUS was published in a EUCOM directive entitled, "Responsibilities for Providing Telecommunications Service for (40) the U.S. Zone of Occupation in Germany."

c. Signal Support for Paris Agencies. Plans to provide signal support for agencies in the Paris area were prepared by OCSigO during the last quarter of 1946. These plans crystallized in 1947 with the transfer of signal support for all remaining units from (41) Western Base Section to the American Graves Registration Command.

d. Reduction in Facilities. As a result of policies agreed upon by OCSigO and OMGUS in April, reduction of Signal Corps communications proceeded at a much faster rate than had been envisaged up to that time. A steady reduction in wire circuits, accompanied by turnover of circuit facilities to the Reichspost, brought the total number of military circuits from 3,500 at the end of February 1947 down

to 2,650, comprising 500 telegraph and 2,150 telephone circuits, at the end of June. It was anticipated that by the end of 1947 this total would be reduced to approximately 1,550 circuits, the lowest number practical for occupation purposes. (42) Between 15 April and 30 June 1947 the following switches were turned over to German control: (43)

Garmisch	Amberg
Giessen	Augsburg
Hanau	Bad Kissingen
Nürnberg	Bamberg
Würzburg	Bad Nauheim
Darmstadt	Regensburg
Fulda	Stuttgart

Chart II shows the most important stations remaining in the continental teletype network at the end of June 1947. Radio circuits remaining in operation as of 30 June are shown in Charts III, IV, V, and VI.

11. Special Functions of the Chief Signal Officer.

In addition to providing communications for occupation headquarters and forces, the Chief Signal Officer performed a number of other functions during the period 1946-47. A summary of these, prepared on 11 April 1947, cited the disposition of surplus signal property; Operation GROUNDHOG; liaison with the Wendelstein Observatory, through which information was transmitted daily to the U.S. Bureau of Standards at the request of the War Department; supervision and control of amateur radio operations in the U.S. Zone; operation of the Cherbourg trans-Atlantic cable head; operation of radio terminals to

provide communications between Frankfurt and State Department offices in the Balkans; the provision of communications to United States military, quasi-military, and other approved agencies in liberated areas, including the operation and maintenance of communications (44) between the liberated areas and Germany.


13. Summary.

At the end of June 1947 OCSigO was preparing to maintain permanent control over a strictly limited system of wire, radio, and messenger communications essential for military security and operations. At the same time, it was in process of relinquishing to OMGUS the control over an agreed number of facilities previously under military control, with a view to enabling the Reichspost to assume all other communications functions in Germany. A central depot had been established to supply occupation needs, and all other stocks were being returned to the United States, declared surplus, or otherwise disposed of in accordance with War Department policies. Personnel requirements were far smaller than they had been a year earlier, and shortages in assigned troop units were far less serious. The Theater Signal School, by its continual training program for Signal Corps specialists, was helping to meet the critical shortages in many lines. Although it was plain that OCSigO would not again, in the expected course of events, hold such wide authority or maintain so large an organization as had been required during the first year of occupation, it was also apparent

that it would continue to safeguard and maintain the essential communications of the military establishment in Europe.

# EUROPEAN COMMAND SIGNAL ORGANIZATION

Chart I





\_\_\_\_\_ TECHNICAL CHANNELS  
 x-x-x-x-x COMMAND CHANNELS  
 >>>>>>> PROVIDES SUPPORT

SOURCE: TAB "A" TO SIGNAL APPENDIX  
 HQ EUCOM, "PLAN FOR REORGANIZATION OF US FORCES IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER," MARCH 1947



HF - MANUAL (CW)  
HIGH FREQUENCY (MANUALLY-OPERATED)  
(CONTINUOUS WAVE)


20 MAR 1947



FOR HISTORICAL RECORD 1 JUL 46-30 JUN 47

HF - RTT  
HIGH FREQUENCY (RADIOTELETYPE)



20 MAR 1947



FOR HISTORICAL RECORD 1 JUL 46 - 30 JUN 47

VHF AN/TRC SYSTEM  
VERY HIGH FREQUENCY


20 MAR 1947



**LEGEND:**  
 AN/TRC 1+4 ———  
 AN/TRC 6 - - - -

UHF DECIMETER SYSTEM  
ULTRA HIGH FREQUENCY

20 MAR 1947



FOR HISTORICAL RECORD 1 JUL 46 - 30 JUN 47

## FOOTNOTES

1. OCSigO, Rpt of Opr. 1 Jan-31 Mar 47, p 2.
2. See charts dated 10 Dec 46, in annex 5, OCSigO, Rpt of Opr. 1 Jul-30 Sep 46. These charts give complete functional statements and organizational structure.
3. GO 169, USFET, 18 Jul 45.
4. GO 314, USFET, 24 Nov 45, par 2a.
5. See directive, USFET, Office of CofS, subj: "Consolidation of Activities of the Office of the Theater Chief Signal Officer," 15 Jun 46.
6. GO 329, USFET, 14 Nov 46.
7. OCSigO, Rpt of Opr. 1 Sep-31 Dec 46, p 4.
8. See, in general, OCSigO, Rpt of Opr. 1 Jul-30 Sep 46.
9. OCSigO, Rpt of Opr. 1 Jul-30 Sep 45, p 16.
10. Ibid, 1 Jul-30 Sep 46, p 14.
11. Ibid, p 25.
12. Ibid, 1 Mar-30 Jun 47, p 46.
13. See Hq, EUCOM, file AG 322 GCT-AGO, subj: "Plan for Reorganization of US Forces in the European Theater," Mar 1947, app "G" tab "C."
14. OCSigO, Rpt of Opr. 1 Apr-30 Jun 47, p 21.
15. Ibid.
16. Figures obtained from Maj Cowan, Asst Ex Off, OCSigO, 9 Sep 47. Arrival of replacements during Aug and Sep brought the total of enlisted men to 9,709 as of 30 Sep 1946, temporarily easing the shortage of trained personnel. OCSigO, Rpt of Opr. 1 Jul-30 Sep 46, p 40.

17. OCSigO, Rpt of Opr. 1 Jul-30 Sep 46, p 41.
18. Ibid.
19. Figures from Maj Cowan, Asst Ex Off, OCSigO, 9 Sep 47.
20. GO 243, USFET, 24 Aug 45.
21. OCSigO, Rpt of Opr. 1 Jul-30 Sep 46, p 48.
22. Ibid. 1 Jul-30 Sep 46, p 48.
23. OCSigO, Rpt of Opr. 1 Mar-30 Jun 47, p 25.
24. GO 59, EUCOM, 11 Jun 47.
25. Ibid. 1 Jul-30 Sep 46, p 29.
26. Interview with Capt Roth, Sup and Procurement Div, OCSigO, 30 Jul 47.
27. OCSigO, Rpt of Opr. 1 Jul-30 Sep 46, p 29.
28. Ibid. 1 Apr-30 Jun 47, p 56.
29. Ibid. 1 Jul-30 Sep 46, p 30.
30. Ibid. 1 Apr-30 Jun 47, p 53.
31. Ibid., p 54.
32. Ibid. 1 Jan-31 Mar 47, p 43.
33. Interview with Lt Col W. W. Sturdy, Chief Engr, Comm Div, OCSigO, 30 Oct 47.
34. IRS, OCSigO, OIC Wire Branch, Comm Div, to Hist Div, EUCOM, 4 Sep 47, subj: "Disposal of Open Wire Installations."
35. Based on figures provided by Maj Cowan, Asst Ex Off, OCSigO, 9 Sep 47.
36. OCSigO, Rpt of Opr. 1 Jul-30 Sep 46, p 17.
37. Ibid. 1 Apr-30 Jun 47, p 33.

38. Signal Plan, app "G" to annex No 2 to "Plan for Reorganization of US Forces in the European Theater, 31 Jan 1947," inclosure to ltr, Hq, EUCOM, 5 May 47, file AG 322 GCT-AGO, subj: "Plan for Reorganization of US Forces in European Command."

39. See "Minutes of Meeting between Representatives of Military Government and the Chief Signal Officer, European Command, 13-14 March 1947," included as app 43 in OCSigO, Rpt of Opr. 1 Jan-31 Mar 47.

40. Provisions of this directive, and the plans formulated for its application, are summarized in OCSigO, Rpt of Opr. 1 Apr-30 Jun 47, pp 2-7.

41. See ibid, p 7, and ltr, Hq, USFET, 5 Mar 47, file AG 322 SIG-AGO, subj: "Signal Support in Liberated Area after Close of Western Base Section." Annex "A" to this directive lists the agencies which were authorized access to long distance military circuits between Paris and Frankfurt.

42. Interview with Lt Col W. W. Sturdy, Chief Engr Comm Div, OCSigO, 30 Oct 47.

43. IRS, Central Office and Equip Sec to Chief, Wire Br, OCSigO, 3 Sep 47, subj: "Close-out and Establishment of US Repeater Stations and Military Switches."

44. Memo, EUCOM, OCSigO, 11 Apr 47, "Rpt of Non-occupational Functions," for Dir, SS and P.

Chapter XXXVI  
CHIEF OF TRANSPORTATION

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Chapter XXXVI  
CHIEF OF TRANSPORTATION

1. Mission.

Although the Office of the Chief of Transportation (OCT) withdrew still farther from the actual operation of German railroads, its primary mission--the movement of men and materials on behalf of U.S. military forces in Europe--remained unchanged in the second year of the occupation. Reorganization of the European Theater, however, affected the range of the responsibilities of the Chief of Transportation, placing a larger share of operating tasks upon transportation staffs of military districts and posts. In its relations with the German Reichsbahn, OCT continued to follow the policy of placing maximum operational responsibility in German hands. The fulfillment of its mission, at least in regard to rail transportation, was therefore increasingly a matter of applying effective controls to a situation over which it had no first

hand authority. Shipping to and from the European Theater remained under the control of the Chief of Transportation.

## 2. Organization as of 1 July 1946.

As the second year of the occupation opened on 1 July 1946, OCT was one of the special staff sections of the Commanding General, USFET. Headed by a Chief and Deputy Chief of Transportation, the office included six divisions, concerned with control and planning, administration, supply, marine operations, movements, and motor transport. (1)

## 3. Reorganization.

Plans for reorganizing OCT were put into effect soon after 1 July 1946. Chart I shows the existing structure, while Chart II illustrates the pattern on which the revised organization was based. In this revised structure the Control and Planning Division was continued; rail, highway, water, and air responsibilities were placed within an Operations Division; and the Administrative Division was reorganized to comprise Administration, Fiscal, Troops and Training, and Supply Branches. Modified only by the addition of a EUCOM Transportation Corps Center, and the substitution of the name Office Services Branch for Administrative Branch, this form of organization was continued through 30 June 1947. (2)

## 4. Relationships within Headquarters.

Subsequent to the transfer of railroad operating responsibilities to Military Government and civil agencies on 1 January 1946, most of the functions of the Chief of Transportation were in the field of planning,

coordination, supervision, and advice. As a member of the commanding general's special staff, the Chief of Transportation was responsible for preparing plans, policies, and procedures on all transportation matters and for advising him on the assignment of key personnel and on the use of funds. <sup>(3)</sup> Acting for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, USFET, and subsequently for the Director of Supply, Services, and Procurement, EUCOM, the Chief of Transportation was responsible for preparing programs <sup>(4)</sup> to move Army supplies and personnel by land, air, and water. The Office also worked closely with G-1. To correct a situation in which first-class passengers waited an indefinite time at Bremerhaven for return to the United States, OCT developed a procedure for notifying G-1 of the number of spaces to be available on a specific date. These were assigned by G-1 to major commands, and passengers were sent forward accordingly.

##### 5. Lower Echelons and Subordinate Units.

During the year there were changes in the major commands within the Theater, and in addition there were readjustments in the relations between the Chief of Transportation and the agencies or units responsible for specific tasks within the transportation mission. At the beginning of the period the major commands consisted of West African District; Western Base Section; Continental Base Section; U.S. Forces, Austria; U.S. Air Forces in Europe; Berlin District; Third Army; and Headquarters Command, USFET. By the end of June 1947, the major commands were First and Second Military Districts; Berlin Military Command;

Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation; American Graves Registration Command; U.S. Air Forces in Europe; U.S. Forces, Austria; and Headquarters Command, EUCOM. The relations of the Chief of Transportation both with major commands and with lower echelons were different for each type of transportation--air, water, rail, and highway. A different pattern of organization existed for each of these, especially in the matter of units assigned to particular operational or supervisory tasks.

a. Air Transportation.

The Chief of Transportation, through the Air Branch of Operations Division, was responsible for processing requests for and for providing special air transportation. In order to meet the requirements of VIP (Very Important People) passengers, dependents destined for out-of-the-way places, and other special applicants for air transport, small pools of aircraft were maintained at key points throughout the Theater to fly special passenger missions.

b. Rail Transportation.

With railway operating responsibility transferred to the German Reichsbahn, the task of the Chief of Transportation was one of arranging, rather than of providing, rail transportation for military movements. (5) Throughout most of the year, District Transportation Offices and Rail Transportation Offices (RTO's) served as channels for requests to the Reichsbahn and for such technical supervision and control as was exercised by the Chief of Transportation. As of 15 March 1947,

operation of freight ETO's was assumed by Reichsbahn personnel. (6)  
Passenger ETO's were taken over in the following weeks. Commanders of districts, posts, and service installations thereafter secured necessary rail transportation by direct arrangement between their transportation officers and local Reichsbahn personnel. The Chief of Transportation retained responsibility for negotiating with railroad agencies of other European countries to meet military requirements outside the occupied areas. (7) At the end of June, the only command authority of the Chief of Transportation was that exercised over fifty train commanders (known after 1 May as "supervisors" and subsequently as "inspectors") assigned to the EUCOM Transportation Corps Center. (8)

c. Motor Transportation.

Until the discontinuance of Continental Base Section in May-June 1947, highway transportation was provided by truck companies and similar units assigned to Continental Base Section. Truck units were subsequently allocated to the First and Second Military Districts of the U.S. Zone. Only technical supervision was exercised over highway transportation by the Chief of Transportation.

d. Water Transportation.

The principal day-to-day activities of the Water Branch, Operations Division, concerned the operation of the Port of Bremerhaven. Inland waterways had small military significance, being useful only for the transport of cargoes of low value and no urgency, in situations

where a complete haul could be accomplished without reloading. Although the ports in the United Kingdom and the liberated countries were no longer handling troops and military supplies, the Chief of Transportation supervised their use by the American Graves Registration Command.

#### 6. The Field Organization.

In the reorganization of the European Theater as the European Command, it was provided that after 15 May the transportation field organization would consist of the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation and of transportation sections and motor transport units assigned to major commands, military districts, technical service installations, and military posts. (9) The EUCOM Transportation Corps Center, consisting of the 7795th Traffic Regulating Detachment, was established under the direct command of the Chief of Transportation to perform varied duties such as providing train supervisors, taking care of depots containing surplus property, and maintaining the British War Brides Office in London (10) and an RTO in Poland.

#### 7. Transportation Personnel.

a. Throughout the period 1 July 1946 to 20 June 1947, OCT retained the same officers in key positions, namely: Col. S. R. Browning, Chief of Transportation; Col. G. E. Wrockloff, Deputy Chief of Transportation; Col. R. C. Tripp, Chief of Operations Division; Col. H. H. Heumann, Chief of Control and Planning Division; Col. L. D. Bunting,

Chief of Administration Division.

b. Until its close, Continental Base Section was the largest employer of transportation personnel in the Theater. As of 1 August 1946, the following units, with a total authorized strength of 647 officers, 16 warrant officers, 8,121 enlisted men, and 2,205 civilian truck company personnel, were assigned to Continental Base Section: (11)

- 1 Major Port (TC)
- 1 Port Battalion
- 5 Port Companies
- 2 QM Groups, Truck
- 6 QM Battalions, Truck
- 36 Truck Companies (Troop)  
(1 inoperative)
- 15 Truck Companies (Heavy)
- 21 Civilian Truck Companies
- 2 Traffic Regulations Groups
- 1 Detachment Traffic Regulation Group
- 1 QM Car Platoon attached to 514th Group
- 781st TC Base Depot (less Det "A")
- 780th TC Base Depot

c. Although officer strength at the beginning of July 1946 was 60 percent of that authorized, arrivals during the next two months brought it up to 100 percent by the end of September. Units were generally overstrength in enlisted grades. Shipments to the United States up to the end of 1946 reduced Continental Base Section troop units to 85 percent of authorized officer strength and 90 percent of enlisted strength. (12) In general, the loss of military personnel made the employment of additional civilians necessary during the fall and winter of 1946. At Berlin, transportation units were employing 2,728 civilians as of 1 October 1946. (13) On 1 July 1946, civilian personnel in Continental Base Section units totaled 95 United States employees, 166 Allied and neutral, and approximately 21,000 Germans. (15)

8. Procedures Governing Military Movements.

(16)

Rail movements throughout this period were governed by SOP 67.

This directive required the monthly submission by using agencies of estimated transportation needs, and established a release system to insure maximum use of rolling stock within the U.S. Zone.

a. Part One of SOP 67 governed the personnel and supply movement program for Germany. Responsibility for screening military movement requirements was placed on the Chief of Transportation, who accordingly prepared monthly movement estimates for submission to OMGUS, the agency charged with direct responsibility for Reichsbahn operations. In practice, Military Government rail officials used these military estimates to ascertain the approximate number of freight cars that would be left over for civilian freight movements during the coming month. (17)

b. Part Two set forth procedures in the release, reception, outloading, and movement of military personnel and supplies in both liberated and occupied countries. It directed military users of transportation to submit their requirements monthly to the Chief of Transportation. Estimates were to cover tonnages to be moved from liberated countries to Germany, Bremen to U.S. Zone and Berlin, and depots to ports, as well as movements within a single base section and into Austria. After review and consolidation, these requirements were to be forwarded to Movements Branch, Transport Division, OMGUS (Rear), on the 19th of each month.

c. The Chief of Transportation was not concerned with the methods employed by OMGUS and the Reichsbahn to supply cars for military needs. Since military traffic carried top priorities, military requests for rail cars were met by station masters without delay. Remaining cars were used in filling civil needs under a priority system established by OMGUS. At the end of June 1947, only 5 percent of available freight cars were being used in military movements.

9. Movement Program Estimates.

Estimates of rail movements were assembled for planning purposes in the monthly personnel and supply movement programs prepared by OCT. On the other hand, OCT did not receive detailed reports on actual movements.<sup>(18)</sup>

10. Transportation Release System.

SOP 67 also set up a procedure designed to cut down the time during which rail cars were detained by Army shippers, so that more cars would be continually available for the civilian economy.<sup>(19)</sup> All shipments of military supplies, were required to have a Transportation Corps Release (TCR) Number before being loaded or released to the railroads for movement. The chiefs of services of CBS, WBS, USFA, and USAFE were made responsible for limiting the dispatch of supplies to the terms of approved TCR's. At Theater level, the chiefs of services and the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-1 and G-3, were made responsible for coordinating the requirements of their corresponding staffs in the major commands.

The Chief of Transportation was directed to submit movement estimates to OMGUS, assign ships to ports as required by the movement program, operate a Movements Control Office, and issue the necessary technical instructions to supplement the release system. The outstanding purpose of the system was to require clearance of all military freight shipments through the Office of the Chief of Transportation, so that the quantity, rate, and time of every shipment would be subject to centralized control. (20)

11. Issuance of Transportation Corps Releases.

The TCR system went into effect on 1 August 1946, and the following weeks witnessed a persistent drive by OCT to have it enforced, especially through the chiefs of services. (21) From October to June, (22) releases were issued for the movement of rail cars as follows:

<u>Month</u>	<u>TCR's</u>	<u>No. of Cars</u>
Oct	3,261	64,539
Nov	4,037	59,143
Dec	<u>4,109</u>	<u>53,953</u>
Total	11,407	177,635
Jan	5,054	49,555
Feb	4,924	64,014
Mar	<u>5,883</u>	<u>52,410</u>
Total	15,861	165,979
Apr	5,589	42,167
May	4,393	38,625
Jun	<u>4,757</u>	<u>46,216</u>
Total	14,739	127,008

12. Rail Passengers.

Until the late spring of 1947, the movement of rail passengers

was facilitated by the existence of RTO's at the principal stations in Germany and the liberated countries. During April and May, RTO operations were transferred to the Reichsbahn in Germany and discontinued within the liberated countries. For some time thereafter, rail passenger traffic was supervised by military supervisory teams and small group of train commanders. In addition to leave and duty passengers within the Theater, replacements and redeployed troops using the port of Bremerhaven accounted for a large share of rail travel. War brides and dependents also created special demands on rail passenger service.

a. Daily Passenger Averages.

From October 1946 to June 1947 the railroads carried daily averages of 1,381 passengers on military duty trains and 703 passengers on redeployment sets ("red sets"). Figured by the month, the daily averages were as follows:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Month</u>	<u>Daily Average Number of Passengers</u>	
		<u>Military Duty Trains</u>	<u>Red Sets</u>
1946	Oct	1,089	1,048
	Nov	981	1,123
	Dec	883	1,247
1947	Jan	1,489	777
	Feb	1,322	715
	Mar	1,820	504
	Apr	1,639	320
	May	1,788	342
	Jun	1,423	251

b. Types of Passengers.

Totals by categories of rail passengers carried during July.

August, and September 1946, as reported by Continental Base Section,  
 (24)  
 are shown below:

U.S. Military Personnel, including duty, leave, and redeployed. . . . .	334,601
Allied Military personnel. . . . .	14,269
U.S. Civilians. . . . .	1,625
UNRRA. . . . .	670
German civilians employed by U.S. or authorized to travel. . . . .	5,754
Displaced persons. . . . .	313,366
Prisoners of war . . . . .	79,603
Others . . . . .	3,559

13. Port Operations.

a. Cargo and Passenger Traffic.

Cargo and personnel handled by military ports in the Euro-  
 (25)  
 pean Theater were as follows:

Month 1946	Long Tons Discharged	Long Tons Outloaded	Personnel Embarked	Personnel Debarked
Jul	126,454	72,714	39,765	18,354
Aug	146,564	70,200	19,141	9,835
Sep	147,870	71,689	18,821	11,695
Oct	177,540	52,578	38,010	8,780
Nov	215,487	33,069	31,386	7,085
Dec	171,440	48,603	30,449	5,108
1947				
Jan	211,972	23,727	26,960	8,314
Feb	107,696	9,542	18,302	5,220
Mar	116,468	20,128	15,287	7,880
Apr	104,328	15,927	13,376	6,038
May	118,885	19,662	12,506	2,117
Jun	<u>105,553</u>	<u>19,313</u>	<u>10,310</u>	<u>3,889</u>
TOTAL	1,708,258	453,697	274,313	94,315

Cargo was discharged at the ports of Bremerhaven and Bremen during June 1947 as follows (in long tons):

QM	17,325	TC	48
Refrigerator	4,180	AAF	389
Vehicles	744	Med	367
Ordnance	1,554	POL	70,852
Engr	496	Misc	353
RES	7,928	Mail	900
Sig	39	Household goods	346

b. Western Ports.

On 9 July 1946, with the sailing of the Sea Flyer, Le Havre ceased to operate as a redeployment port and Bremerhaven became the sole port on the Continent for the handling of U.S. military personnel. (26)

During July, Marine Operations Division, Western Base Section, off-loaded a total of ninety-eight ships and coasters carrying 608 tons and 20,955 passengers. Forty-two ships sailed from Western Base ports carrying 13,889 passengers and 67,836 tons of cargo. (27) Seven troop ships carrying 1,076 passengers sailed from Southampton during 1946. During August 1946, Western Base Section ports handled the following movements of personnel and cargo: (28)

<u>Port</u>	<u>Tons In</u>	<u>Tons Out</u>	<u>Personnel In</u>	<u>Personnel Out</u>
Le Havre	0	2,088	1,400 POW 50 Mil	0
Southampton	0	0	19	1,504
Marseille	15,190	10,126	0	0
Antwerp	<u>19,686</u>	<u>20,632</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>3</u>
TOTAL	34,876	32,846	1,469	1,507

On 22 November Marseille closed down with the sailing of the Army Trans-  
 (29) (30)  
 port Linksplice. Activities during November were as follows:

<u>Port</u>	<u>Tons In</u>	<u>Tons Out</u>	<u>Personnel In</u>	<u>Personnel Out</u>
Antwerp	0	0	0	0
Marseille	0	9,959	0	0
Dover	<u>0</u>	<u>894</u>	<u>115</u> POW	<u>0</u>
TOTAL	0	10,853	115	0

During December there was no shipping activity by OCT in either French or Belgian ports.

c. Operations at Bremerhaven.

By July 1946 the port of Bremerhaven was serving as the main funnel for United States military cargo and passengers entering and leaving Germany. The Water Branch, Operations Division, OCT, supervised the discharge and out-loading operations of the port, obtained shipping space to meet requirements, and maintained records on incoming ships. Ship arrivals and sailings and cargo discharged at Bremerhaven, including Bremen, during July 1946 were as follows: (31)

U.S. Army cargo discharged at Bremerhaven. . . . .	31,327 tons
Daily average discharged at Bremerhaven. . . . .	1,205 tons
Percent of total U.S. Army cargo discharged. . . . .	15.2%
Other than U.S. Army cargo (miscellaneous, mail, baggage, personal vehicles, civil Affairs I)	
discharged at Bremerhaven. . . . .	4,856 tons
Daily average discharged at Bremerhaven. . . . .	18.7 tons
Percent of total cargo other than U.S. Army. . . . .	2.3%
Bulk POL discharged at Bremerhaven . . . . .	89,964 tons
Daily average discharged at Bremerhaven. . . . .	3,460 tons
Percent of total bulk POL discharged . . . . .	43.4%
Civil Affairs I Grain discharged at Bremerhaven. . . . .	79,399 tons

Daily average discharged at Bremerhaven. . . . .	5,054 tons
Percent of total Civil Affairs I Grain discharged. .	38.1%
Daily average number of in-bound cargo ships on berth at Bremerhaven. . . . .	3
Daily average number of out-bound cargo ships on berth at Bremerhaven. . . . .	4
Daily average number of troop and dependents ships, either for out-loading or for discharging .	3
Number of arrivals of troop and dependents carriers . . . . .	21
Number of sailings of troop and dependents carriers . . . . .	18

d. Civil Relief Supplies.

During January 1947, twenty-nine vessels chartered by the Transportation Corps transported 195,000 long tons of grain and 66,000 long tons of flour to the U.S. Zone of Germany. (32) Extremely cold weather seriously interfered with cargo operations at Bremen and Bremerhaven during the winter months, while scarcity of labor and the shortage of rail cars added further handicaps. A total of 324,000 tons of civil relief supplies was programmed for shipment to Austria during the first six months of 1947. (33)

e. Transportation of War Brides.

Transportation of European war brides to the United States continued to be an important activity of the Transportation Corps. By 21 September 1946, a total of 48,029 had been shipped to the United States, including 41,403 from England, 4,705 from France, and 1,581 from Belgium. At the end of September, more than 14,000 awaited shipment. (34)

The ports of Le Havre and Southampton made their final shipments of war brides on 28 July and 18 October, respectively. (35) The shipment of war brides through Bremerhaven began with the sailing of the President Tyler at the end of August. (36) During the first quarter of 1947, 1,067 war brides were embarked for the United States. (37) As of 15 March, a total of 55,529 brides had been shipped. (38) During the second quarter of 1947, war-bride shipments reported to OCT totaled 235 children and 398 adults in April, 236 children and 644 adults in May, and 171 children and 471 adults in June. (39)

f. Transportation of Dependents.

In the third quarter of 1946, 6,230 dependents arrived at Bremerhaven, three times the number arriving at the port in the preceding quarter. (40) During the fourth quarter, 5,120 dependents arrived by ship. (41) A peak number, 3,861, reached the European Theater in November, through all channels. (42) Total arrivals by ship were 1,246 (43) in the first quarter of 1947, and 2,761 in the second quarter.

14. Highway Transport.

The principal problems encountered in the operation of motor transport were the lack of adequate ordnance support and a shortage of trained personnel. In spite of these handicaps, motor transportation played an impressive part in Operation SPUD and Operation SPLINTER, the Army programs for hauling German harvest crops and wood for German fuel.

a. Theater-Wide Figures.

As of 1 July 1946, motor transport units were allocated  
(44)  
to base sections and other headquarters as follows:

	<u>Groups</u>	<u>Battalions</u>	<u>Companies*</u>		<u>Tech.</u>	<u>Car</u>	<u>Car</u>
			<u>Light</u>	<u>and Heavy</u>	<u>Labor Sv</u>	<u>Co's</u>	<u>Plat's</u>
CBS	2	9	39	14	42		6
Berlin Dist		1	2	1	10	2	
USFA			1	1	1	1	
USFET			1	1	4	2	
WBS			4	4	49		1
	<u>2</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>47</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>106</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>7</u>

\* Does not include seven Technical Labor Supervision Companies assigned to American Graves Registration Command.  
(45)

As of June 1947, motor transports units were assigned as follows:

<u>Number of Companies</u>	<u>Installation or Headquarters</u>
6	1st Military District
5	2d Military District
11	QM Depots
1	Engineer Depot
2	USFA
5	Bremerhaven POE
6	AGRC
12	OMGUS
11	Hq Command, Frankfurt
34	1st District Mil. Posts
29	2d District Mil. Posts

b. Operations for 1946.

Motor transport operations for the year ending 31 December  
(46)  
1946 are summarized below:

Average no. of companies operative	112.3
Average no. of 2½-ton equivalent companies	148.3
Average no. of vehicles assigned per company	51.0
Average no. of vehicles available per company	33.9
Average daily tons hauled per company	213.8
Average daily tons hauled per vehicle	6.3
Average daily trips per vehicle	2.1
Average daily tons per vehicle trip	3.1
Average distance forward per vehicle trip	9.8

c. Western Base Section.

Motor transport operations diminished markedly in WBS throughout the second half of 1946. On 30 June 1946 there were thirty-eight truck companies operating in the Section. This number was reduced to thirty-six as of 31 July, twenty-five on 31 August, and twenty on 30 September. (47) Operations during the second half of 1946 may be summarized as follows: (48)

<u>1946</u>	<u>Tonnage hauled</u>	<u>Personnel hauled</u>	<u>Miles traveled</u>
3d quarter	502,805	521,115	4,484,187
4th quarter	124,805	134,943	1,325,248

d. Continental Base Section.

At the beginning of October, seventy-four truck companies were assigned to CBS. (49) By the end of 1946, approximately 1,150 German drivers were being employed in these units. Motor transport units assigned to CBS on 1 February 1947 were as follows: 1 group, 6 battalions, 19 light-truck companies, 24 technical labor service companies, and 1 car platoon. (50) Effective 15 April 1947, the following units were transferred to Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation: (51)

Hq & Hq Det 3d TC Truck Bn w/Med  
Det "A" 9th Traffic Regulation Group  
Det "A" 11th Traffic Regulation Group  
1001 TC Warehouse Team  
3396 TC Truck Company  
3424 TC Truck Company  
3493 TC Truck Company  
3985 TC Truck Company  
4002 TC Truck Company  
4007 TC Truck Company  
4224 TC Car Company

19. Air Transport.

It was the function of OCT to establish policies controlling special air life for both personnel and cargo within the European Theater. This involved the screening of high priority passenger and cargo requests in the light of availability of scheduled aircraft and necessity. (52) for air travel or delivery. Rules governing individual air travel on military air lines in the European Theater were clarified by USFET Circular No. 120, published 28 August 1946.

a. Aircraft Pool System.

On 1 November 1946, aircraft previously assigned to offices or headquarters were withdrawn and a system of aircraft pools was established for the Theater. (53) These pools established as shown below, began functioning in November. (54)

<u>Location of Pool</u>	<u>Controlling Command</u>	<u>Major Commands or Agencies Entitled to Service</u>	<u>No. and Type of Aircraft</u>
Frankfurt	Hq, USFET, OCT	Hq, USFET	1 - C54
			7 - C47
		Hq 3d U.S. Army	2 - C45
		Hq CBS	-----
Paris	Hq, WBS	Hq U.S. Constabulary	-----
		Hq WBS	1 - C47
		Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner	-----
		AGRC	-----
Berlin	Hq, OMGUS	Hq OMGUS	1 - B17
			2 - C47 (C117)
Vienna	Hq, USFA	Hq, USFA	1 - B17
			2 - C47
Nürnberg	Office of the U.S. Chief of Counsel	Office of the U.S. Chief of Counsel	1 - C47
			1 - L5

b. Missions Flown.

(55)

Flights handled during the year were as shown below:

<u>Type of Flight</u>	<u>3rd qu. 46</u>	<u>4th qu. 46</u>	<u>1st qu. 47</u>	<u>2d qu. 47</u>
VIP	52	36	63	96
Evacuations	37	24	9	11
Cargo	26	13	7	6
Routine	22	5	-	-
Special	-	7	26	34
Revenue	<u>4</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
TOTALS	153	83	82	147

c. Movement of Dependents.

In Operation REUNION, 800 dependents were flown to the Theater during the closing months of 1946. (56)

20. German Harvest and Fuel Program.

One of the more striking accomplishments of the Transportation Corps was the assistance given to OMGUS in hauling farm products and fuel wood. The German harvest program, known as Operation SPUD, was in effect from 31 October 1946 to 1 January 1947. By direction of the Theater Commander, forty-six military communities made 20 percent of their trucks available for use within a 50-mile radius. In addition, thirty-one organized truck companies participated in the program. A total of 4,500,000 cubic meters of cord wood was delivered to cities throughout the zone, and 80,000 tons of potatoes were moved by Army trucks. (57) At the end of forty-nine working days of operations, 136,046 tons had been hauled, and trucks engaged in the program had driven a total of 1,131,228 miles. (58)


21. Summary of Problems.

OCT had to overcome many obstacles in accomplishing its mission for the year 1946-47. In the field of rail transportation, problems centered about the lack of skilled German personnel and the shortage of refrigerator cars, passenger coaches, sleeping cars, and locomotives. (59) Motor transport suffered from a loss of trained personnel, shortage of officers, and inadequate maintenance support. The main problem in water transport was a shortage of shipping space, particularly of first-class passenger space. In line with the current policy of assisting the German economy, OCT endeavored to aid the development of transportation. The major problem encountered in this field was that of maintaining the inadequate German equipment.

Chart II

HEADQUARTERS  
 UNITED STATES FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER  
 Office of the Theater Chief of Transportation  
 APO 757

FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION CHART



APPROVED 1 JULY 1946


Source: OCT, "Report of Operations, vol. XVIII, chap II, sec II, appendix "B".

S. B. BROWNING  
 COLONEL TC

Theater Chief of Transportation



Chart III




————— Command Channel

- - - - - Technical Channels

Source: Hq, USFET, 27 Feb 47, file AG 322 OCT-AGO, subj: "Plan for Reorganization of USFET," annex 2 appendix "H; Transportation Plan."

Chart IV  
 HEADQUARTERS  
 EUROPEAN COMMAND  
 Office of Chief of Transportation  
 FUNCTIONAL AND ORGANIZATION CHART



APPROVED: 16 June 1947

S. R. BROWNING  
 Colonel TC  
 Chief of Transportation

## FOOTNOTES

1. See chart I, reproduced from Historical Report of the Transportation Corps in the European Theater, vol XV, Apr 46, chap I.
2. See Chart IV, reproduced from "Plans for Theater Reorganization," in files of Documents Branch, Office of the C/Hist, EUCOM.
3. See ibid. appendix "H," "Transportation Plan."
4. Ibid., sec II, p 37; see also OTCT, Rot of Opr, vol XIX, chap II, pp 27-28. The following reports were the main sources for this study: OTCT, Rot of Opr of the TC in the European Theater, vol XVIII (pts I, II, and III), Jul - Sep 46, and vol XIX (pts I and II), Oct - Dec 46; OCT, Rot of Opr of the TC in the European Theater Command, vol XX, vol XXI, Jan - Mar 47 and Apr - Jun 47. Hereafter these reports will be cited by volume number, not by title.
5. Vol XVIII, pt I, chap II, sec I, appendix "C."
6. "Plans for Theater Reorganization," appendix "H," "Transportation Plan," p 5, par 17.
7. Ibid., sec II.
8. Interview with Lt. Col. William B. Bunker, Chief, Opr Div, OCT, 10 Sep 47.
9. "Plans for Theater Reorganization," Appendix "H," "Transportation Plan," p3, sec III.
10. Interview with Lt. Col Barry, Planning and Control Div, OCT, 8 Sep 47.
11. Vol XVIII, pt III A, Chap IV, p 2.
12. Vol XIX, chap IV, p 1.
13. Vol XVIII, pt III, chap V, p 8.
14. Ibid., pt II, chap IV, p 4.
15. Vol XIX, chap IV, p 6.
16. SOP No 67, USFET, subj: "Development and Implementation of Continental Personnel and Supply Movement Program," 12 Jul 46.

17. Interview with Captain McClooney, Assistant Superintendent of Railroads, OMGUS (Rear), 8 Oct 47.

18. For estimates prepared during this period see vol XVIII, pt I, chap II, appendix; ltr, Hq, USFET, 19 Dec 46, file AG 370.5 RYT-AGO, subj: "Personnel and Supply Movement Estimate for January 1947," incl 1-7; ltr, Hq, EUCOM, 5 May 47, file AG 370.5 RYT-AGO, subj: "Personnel and Supply Movement Estimate for June 1947," incl 1-7.

21. Problems encountered in applying the system are described in vol XVIII, pt I, chap 2, pp 41-44.

22. Vol XIX, chap 2, p 34; vol XX, chap 2, p 56; vol XXI, chap, 2, p 24.

23. Figures supplied by Mrs. R. Mackie, Control and Planning Div, OCT, 6 Oct 47.

24. Vol XVIII, chap IV, pp 25-26.

25. Figures supplied by Mrs R. Mackie, Control and Planning Div, OCT.

26. Vol XVIII, chap 2, p 24.

27. Ibid., chap 3, p 21.

28. Ibid., p 23.

29. Vol XIX, chap II, p 58.

30. Ibid., chap III, p 5.

31. Vol XVIII, chap IV, pt II, appendix "A."

32. Vol XX, chap II, p 106.

33. Ibid., p 105.

34. Vol XVIII, chap I, pp 2-3.

35. Vol XIX, chap II, p 58.

36. Vol XVIII chap II, p 32.

37. Vol XX, chap I, p 3.

38. Ibid., chap II, p 135.
39. Figures supplied by Water Br, OCT, 1 Oct 47. An indefinite number of commercial shipments are included.
40. Vol XVIII, chap I, p 2; see ibid., chap IV, p 25, for list of ships, with arrival dates and number of dependents carried.
41. Vol XIX, chap IV, p 42.
42. Ibid., chap II, p 8.
43. Figures supplied by Water Br, OCT, 1 Oct 47.
44. Vol XVIII, chap II, p 36.
45. Vol XXI, chap 2, pp 36-39.
46. Vol XX, chap 2, p 97.
47. Vol XVIII, chap III, pp 8-9.
48. Ibid.; see also vol XIX, chap 3, p 4.
49. Vol XIX, chap IV, pp 18-19.
50. Vol XX, chap II, p 75.
51. Vol XXI, chap 3, p 1.
52. Vol XIX, chap II, pp 59-60.
53. Ibid., p 61.
54. Ibid., p 63.
55. Vol XVIII, chap II, p 46; vol XIX, chap II, p 59a; vol XX, chap II, p 147; vol XXI, chap II, p 56.
56. Vol XIX, chap II, pp 60-61.
57. Ibid., chap I, p2.
58. Ibid., chap II, pp 42-43. For detailed figures, see pp 44-45.
59. This discussion is based on interview with Lt Col W.B. Bunker, Chief, Opr Div, OCT, 3 Sep 47.

Chapter XXXVII  
CHIEF OF FINANCE

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Chapter XXXVII  
CHIEF OF FINANCE

1. Organization and Operations of the Office.

a. On 1 July 1946 the Theater Fiscal Director was a special staff officer of USFET Headquarters. Col. R. A. Koch was Fiscal Director until 14 October 1946, when he was relieved by Col. Ray B. Conner, the former deputy. <sup>(1)</sup> Col. Fiorre J. Stagliano became deputy to Colonel Conner, with Lt. Col. George R. Gretser as executive officer. The principal branches of the division had to do with technical research, audits, fiscal control, currency, reciprocal-aid, lend-lease and property transfers, savings and insurance, receipts, disbursements and allotments, and the USFET Central Welfare Fund.

b. On 1 March 1947 the Office of the Theater Fiscal Director was redesignated as the Office of the Theater Chief of Finance. Responsibility for fiscal accounting was transferred to the office of the Theater Budget and Fiscal Director. The Chief of Finance continued <sup>(2)</sup> to prepare periodical disbursing reports. The staff division was

redesignated as the Office of the Chief of Finance, European Command,  
(3)  
on 15 March 1947.

c. On 16 and 17 May 1947 the Office of the Chief of Finance was moved from the Allianz Building in Frankfurt to the Headquarters Building, inside the Frankfurt compound.

## 2. Technical Operations Branch.

a. The Technical Operations Branch was created, effective 12 October 1946, with the consolidation of the Technical Research and  
(4)  
Currency Branches. Lt. Col. Albert W. Widmer, chief of the currency Branch, became chief of the new branch and headed it until its  
(5)  
inactivation 1 June 1947.

b. The Branch gave technical advice to disbursing officers concerning the operation of the Armed Forces Leave Act of 1946 and in connection with the currency conversion of 16 September 1946. It  
(6)  
prepared the Theater directive on currency conversion. When counterfeit certificates appeared, units in the field were warned and given information regarding methods of detecting counterfeit.

c. In December 1946 the Branch issued to disbursing officers directives which were intended to correct laxity and prevent delay in processing civilian employees' payrolls. Employees who were nationals of Allied or neutral countries had suffered especial hardships, because in many instances their families were dependent upon allotments. Plans for cashing prisoner-of-war military payment orders and making payments  
(7)  
to prisoners of war and their dependents were prepared early in 1947.

### 3. Personnel and Bonding Branch.

On 8 August 1946 the Personnel and Control Division was redesignated the Personnel and Bonding Branch, which had duties concerned with personnel and handled surety bonds in favor of the United States. Maj. Walter P. Lang was in charge of the branch until the end of November 1946, when he was succeeded by Lt. Col. Lowry R. Harris, with Maj. Charlie M. Parker as assistant chief. Major Parker became chief 31 March 1947. On 25 April 1947 all finance disbursing sections, the 7752 Finance Center, and all audit detachments came under operational control of the Chief of Finance, EUCOM. As shifts in troop strength occurred, the Branch, in cooperation with the Operations, Plans, Organization and Training Division, EUCOM, effected the movement of a number of Finance Disbursing Sections between stations and major commands.

### 4. Receipts and Disbursements Branch.

a. The Receipts and Disbursements Branch, or the 337th Finance Disbursing Section, initially located at Wiesbaden, was transferred to Friedberg, Germany, effective 28 December 1946, with Maj. Gilbert W. Neill, FD, Commanding Officer of the 337 FDS, as chief of the Branch. The former chief, Lt. Col. Esthel O. Stroube, was assigned to the Audit Branch, in Frankfurt. With the inactivation of the 337 Finance Disbursing Section on 15 March 1947, the personnel of that installation was transferred to the 7752 Finance Center. In consequence, the Receipts and Disbursements Branch underwent reorganization, but

(11)  
without change of location or loss of personnel. Effective 1 June 1947, however, it was transferred to the Office, Chief of Finance, at Frankfurt, except for the Liquidation Accounts and Family Allowance Sections.  
(12)

b. This branch processed vouchers, capital papers, and proceedings of boards of officers on losses of public funds; administered the Liquidation Account, processed and distributed Class "F" Allotment Payment Authorization Forms, and in the quarter ending 30 June 1947 established a system of quarterly inspections of Class "B" Agent Offices by the parent accountable disbursing offices.

c. On 4 April 1947 Headquarters, EUCOM, announced that the system of Personal Transfer Accounts (PTA) for transfer of funds to the United States was discontinued, because other methods of money transfer, nonexistent in wartime, were available to military and civilian personnel.  
(13)  
To relieve Army Finance officers as far as possible of administrative duties connected with personal financial services, the Receipts and Disbursements Branch recommended the issuance in July 1947 of a banking license to the American Express Company,  
(14)  
Inc.

##### 5. Audit Branch.

a. This branch supervised and administered Theater audits, reviewed reports of survey at Theater level, and gave technical advice to the field on audit matters.  
(15)  
The Property Audit Section implemented the new property accounting and auditing program effective 1 July 1946.

Each accountable property officer, other than sales officer, in the occupied areas was required to set up formal property accounting records covering all property for which he was accountable. (16)

b. The functions and duties of the Branch were expanded with the establishment, effective 1 April 1947, of the EUCOM Audit Agency, for auditing service on a Command-wide basis under jurisdiction of the Chief of Finance, EUCOM. (17) The latter was directed to provide the necessary advice and supervision for the regional audit offices. Audit detachments were organized at Bad Tölz for Austria and Bavaria south of the Danube; at Heidelberg for Württemberg-Baden and Hessen, as well as for American Graves Registration Command installations outside the U.S. Zone; at Nürnberg-Fürth for Bavaria north of the Danube River; and at Fulda for the rest of the U.S. Zone, the Bremen Enclave, and the U.S. Sector, Berlin. (18) In May 1947, upon completion of an inspection of Finance Department activities in the European Command, Brig. Gen. Eugene M. Foster, Assistant Chief of Finance, War Department, recommended that responsibility for the audit of nonappropriated funds be vested in a single agency, preferably the Chief of Finance, EUCOM. Preparatory steps were taken by the interested staff divisions of the headquarters and the Office of the Chief of Finance, EUCOM, to carry out the (19) recommendations.

c. Lt. Col. Elmer W. Gude, FD, was chief of the Audit Branch from 12 October until late April 1947, when upon his return to the Zone of the Interior he was succeeded by Lt. Col. Harold F. Mericle, FD.

6. Budget and Fiscal Control Branch.

This branch was an outgrowth of an earlier Fiscal Control  
(20) Branch. Effective 12 October 1946 the Office of the Theater Fiscal  
Director was reorganized and the Branch was redesignated Budget and  
Fiscal Branch, without important changes in operational responsi-  
(21) bilities. On 1 March 1947 the Branch was dissolved when fiscal  
accounting and reporting were transferred to the Theater Budget and  
(22) Fiscal Director. Maj. Emil B. Jagow was chief of the Branch from  
12 October 1946 except for the tenure of Maj. Wayne D. McConnell in  
the last quarter of 1946, when the former was on leave in the Zone of  
the Interior.

7. Surplus Property Accounting Division.

This division was established on 7 October 1945 in the Office  
of the Theater Fiscal Director, with responsibility for the accounting  
for all surplus property within the Theater as well as functions in  
(23) connection with the Foreign Liquidation Commission. The unit was  
transferred on 1 September 1946 to the Office of the Foreign Liquidation  
(24) Commissioner pursuant to agreements between State and War Departments.  
At that time Maj. Joseph R. Goode, Jr., was chief.

8. Reciprocal-Aid and Lend-Lease Branch.

a. The Reciprocal-Aid and Lend-Lease Branch prepared and  
audited the reports of the lend-lease and cash-reimbursable transfers of  
the U.S. Forces to 29 different Allied governments. It also reported

the transfers of U.S. Army supplies and services to other Governmental departments and agencies and to UNRRA. After inactivation of the Reciprocal-Aid and Lend-Lease Offices of the Theater Fiscal director in Paris, London, and Brussels in the second quarter of 1946, the Branch assumed responsibility for compiling all Reciprocal-Aid and Lend-  
(25)  
Lease records in the Theater. Upon dissolution of the Budget and Fiscal Branch, the Reciprocal-Aid and Lend-Lease Branch became the Reciprocal-Aid, Lend-Lease, and Reimbursable Transfers Branch and was assigned the functions of the Theater Chief of Finance covering surplus property cost accounting and other functions not transferred to the  
(26)  
Theater Budget and Fiscal Director. Lt. Col. Carl W. Heflin became chief of this branch effective 12 October 1946.

b. Reports of documents submitted periodically to the Chief of Finance, Washington, D.C., included reciprocal-aid reports covering supplies and services received from various Allied governments, lend-lease reports of supplies and services furnished various Allied governments in the European Theater, documents covering lend-lease transfers to Allied governments; reports of cash-reimbursable transfers covering supplies and services furnished to various Allied governments, with documents; reports of cash-reimbursable transfers to UNRRA in the European Theater, and monthly reports of interdepartmental transfers. Vouchers supporting reciprocal-aid and similar transactions were forwarded to the War Department Records Branch, Alexandria, Va. A plan for the inspection of French post-reciprocal-aid accounts in Paris,

prepared in coordination with the Supply Services and also submitted to the Director of Services, Supply and Procurement, EUCOM, was approved by the War Department on 28 May 1947. (27)

9. Savings and Insurance Branch.

The administration of the Theater Savings and Insurance Program was the responsibility of the Savings and Insurance Branch, which engaged in the dissemination of publicity to all major commands and savings and insurance officers, as well as to various unit commands, through the Technical Operations Branch. It conducted interviews with savings and insurance officers and individuals from all parts of the Theater. (28) Maj. Jerre L. Dowling was chief of this branch. In the first quarter of 1947 a new insurance training program was conducted for Savings and Insurance Officers of commands and units. (29) Fifteen insurance schools were conducted at military posts throughout the Command during the first six months of 1947. A U.S. Savings Bond campaign was also carried on from 17 February through 31 March. (30) Information was distributed regarding the recently formed Armed Forces Mutual Benefit Association.

10. Central Welfare Branch.

The Central Welfare Branch was responsible for maintaining Theater Central Welfare Fund Accounts, receiving and disbursing funds in connection with them, and advising the field concerning directives relating to the fund.

11. Liquidation Accounts Branch.

Two new subdivisions were added to the Office of the Chief of Finance during the second quarter of 1947. A Liquidation Accounts Branch, was activated effective 28 May 1947 at the 7752 Finance Center, Friedberg. (31) Its function was the liquidation of closed (32) limited depository accounts of disbursing officers, which had previously been handled by the Receipts and Disbursements Branch. All personnel of the Liquidation Accounts Section of the latter branch remained to comprise the staff of the Liquidation Officer, Maj. G. W. Neill, FD, chief of the new branch.

12. Family Allowance Branch.

Major Neill was also chief of the other new branch, the Family Allowance Branch, activated 16 June at the 7752 Finance Center. (33) This branch was responsible for the receipt and distribution, or other appropriate disposition, of family allowance (Class "F") authorizations received in the European Command, the exercise of proper control and administration in connection with the receipt and disposition of such authorizations, and the maintenance of necessary (34) files and records pertaining to them.

13. Agreements with British and French.

Late in January 1947 an agreement was reached with the British Army of the Rhine for reciprocal use by authorized persons in the respective occupation zones of Germany of the British Armed Forces

special vouchers and U.S. military payment certificates. Announcement was made on 7 February 1947 by Theater Headquarters that U.S. military and authorized civilian personnel might purchase French occupation francs at U.S. Army finance offices for use in the French-occupied zones of Germany and Austria, but that this medium of exchange was not reconvertible into military payment certificates. (35) Possession or use of U.S. military payment certificates was prohibited to all persons in the U.S. Zone and Land Bremen except members of the U.S. military and naval forces and their dependents, U.S. civilian employees and their dependents, and certain other authorized persons.

14. 7752 Finance Center.

a. The 7752 Finance Center was established at Friedberg on 15 November 1946 to centralize finance activities which could be released from the office of the Theater Fiscal Director in Frankfurt. It also provided training for persons engaged in finance work. Col. Joseph Harris was the first commandant. (36) Personnel and equipment were transferred to the Center as units were inactivated, and on 15 June 1947 the 126th Signal Company was inactivated and personnel and equipment were used by the Center for the establishment of a consolidated mess, the first that had been operated by the Center. The strength of the Center 30 June 1947 was 55 officers, 114 enlisted men, 15 U. S. civilian employees, 3 Allied or neutral civilian employees, and 59 German employees. On 25 April 1947 the Center as well as all finance disbursing sections and all audit detachments came under the

(37)

operational control of the Chief of Finance, EUCOM.

b. During the latter part of 1946 the 333d Finance Disbursing Office (Central Disbursing Office) at Paris, the 337th Finance Disbursing Section, Wiesbaden, and the 38th Finance Disbursing Section, Erlangen, were transferred to Friedberg and became part of the Central Disbursing Office. Previously disbursement offices had operated in Paris and London under the supervision of, but not as a part of, the Fiscal Director, EUCOM. After the closing of the London office, finance operations in the United Kingdom developed upon a finance office attached to the office of the Military Attache at the U.S. Embassy and a Class "B" Agent office at Southampton. (38) Prior to the move from Paris to Friedberg on 12 December 1946, the Paris Disbursing Office had received by air from the United States \$247,791,200 of military payment certificates, which were distributed to offices in the European and Mediterranean Theaters prior to "C" Day, 16 September 1946, the date on which they were exchanged for occupation currency. The section received all excess foreign currencies in the hands of disbursing officers and its accountability from \$266,868,000 on 1 October 1946 to \$463,831,000 on 31 December 1946. During the move from Paris to Friedberg more than \$98,000,000 was transferred by government motor transportation without incident.

c. In January of 1947 the Finance Disbursing Sections at Marburg, Giessen, and Bad Nauheim, Germany, were inactivated and replaced by Class "B" Agent officers. Personnel from the inactivated

offices was assigned to the Center, as was personnel from the Swiss Leave Center at Mulhouse, France, which was replaced by a Class "B" Agent. On 10 May 1947 the 7768th Finance Disbursing Section was activated at Giessen, the 7762d at Karlsruhe, and the 7763d at Mar-  
(39)  
burg. On 26 June 1947 the War Department authorized the inactivation  
(40)  
of all Finance Disbursing Sections in the U.S. Zone of Germany.

d. The new Series 471 military payment certificates were received early in 1947 and were distributed 10 March 1947. All preliminary plans for the conversion were kept top secret. The superseded series 461 was called in, recorded, and burned by a currency destruction committee of thirty officers under the supervision of Col. A. G. Wing. The committee verified more than \$233,600,000 in notes of denominations of from five cents to ten dollars. By 30 June 1947 its  
(41)  
work was about 80 percent completed.

e. On 6 January 1947 the USFET Finance School was opened at the 7752 Finance Center and on 17 January the first class in property audit was graduated. During the period 1 January to 30 June 1947 more than 400 students were enrolled for courses ranging from property audit to the complete finance course. Colonel Harris was the first commandant  
(42)  
of the School.

#### 15. Central Welfare Fund.

At the beginning of the second quarter of 1946 the board of directors of the USFET Central Welfare Fund comprised the following: Maj. Gen. J. M. Bevans, USFET, Chairman; Brig Gen. John C. McCormick,

USAFE; Col. A. J. Regnier, Continental Base Section; and Col. P. M. Margin, Third U.S. Army (replaced in September 1946 by Lt. Col. W. A. Luther, USFA). Regular nonmember advisors to the board included the following: Col. R. A. Koch, Custodian (replaced in the third quarter by Col. R. B. Conner); Lt. Col. D. K. Griffith, G-1, USFET Morale Branch; Maj. L. J. Coyne, A-1, USAFE; and Capt. R. Resse, Assistant Custodian. Captain Resse was replaced on 1 August 1946 by Lt. E. Q. Adams, who resigned from the Army in the first quarter of 1947 and continued as a civilian employee. With the change in the designation of the fund from USFET to EUCOM, changes were made in membership: the U.S. Constabulary member was redesignated the Second Military District member, and representatives from the First Military District, Headquarters Command, EUCOM, and the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation were included. The composition of the board reflected the policy of having area major commands administer nonappropriated funds of all units within their respective geographical limits. (43)

b. The Central Welfare Fund was derived chiefly from profits of Army Exchange Service, U.S. officers' and noncommissioned officers' clubs, U.S. Army Motion Picture Service, Civilian Show Circuit, and the Stars and Stripes. Balance of funds on hand as of 1 July 1946 was \$2,067,886.05. As of 11 June 1947 estimated funds on hand totaled \$2,359,672.15. Income for the fiscal year 1948 was estimated at \$5,377,250.00 and expenditures for the same period were estimated to total \$4,825,878.00 (on the basis of quarterly \$1.00 per person (44) (45)

dividend) or \$5,493,956.00 (on the basis of quarterly \$2.00 per person dividend), which would leave an estimated balance on hand 30 June 1948 of \$2,911,044.15 (\$1.00 dividend deduction) or \$2,242,966.15 (\$2.00 dividend deduction).<sup>(46)</sup> On 23 June 1947 Headquarters, EUCOM, announced that preliminary studies indicated that the funds that contributed to the Central Welfare Fund and nonappropriated welfare fund requirements for the fiscal year 1948 would be adequate for the needs of that year.<sup>(47)</sup>

c. Two decisions were adopted by the board pursuant to the pay-as-you-go policy which became effective 1 July 1946. Inasmuch as the profits from the Theater Motion Picture program accrued to the benefit of the Central Welfare Fund, the board decided not to direct the Motion Picture Fund to replace funds used for purchase of equipment and service charges obligated prior to 1 July 1946. The board also ruled that effective 13 July 1946 grants to military or civilian clubs would be approved only in exceptional cases. It was also decided that nonappropriated funds or bonds owned by units should be included in computation of funds on hand by the owning units. Bonds did not have to be converted into cash before transmittal to this fund. Approval was given at the 6 November 1946 board meeting to establishment of a new Central Welfare Fund by American Graves Registration Command and to a request from USEET Motion Picture Fund for grace until 1 January 1947 for repayment of a \$250,000 loan.<sup>(48)</sup> In the second quarter of 1947 the EUCOM Motion Picture Service completed payment and

(49)

also remitted \$100,000 as excess profits.

d. With the diminution of appropriated funds for Theater Special Services, that activity became increasingly dependent upon the Central Welfare Fund, and the Fund assumed financial support of the Theater Information and Education Command and Unit Schools, as well as  
(50)  
of American Forces and Blue Danube radio networks. The board repeatedly rejected proposals for support of German Youth Activities. Toward the close of the second quarter of 1947 the Chief of Finance, EUCOM, was granted \$150,000 to cover expenses incurred in the employment of auditors to audit the nonappropriated funds of the European  
(51)  
Command.

FOOTNOTES

1. GO 286, USFET, 14 Oct 46.
2. GO 36, USFET, 21 Feb 47.
3. GO 48, USFET, 10 Mar 47.
4. Office Memo 32, USFET, Office of the Theater Fiscal Director, 7 Oct 46.
5. Office Memo 90, OCF, EUCOM, 28 May 47.
6. Circular 130, USFET, 46; also Cir 256, WD, 46.
7. Cir 2, USFET, 18 Jan 47.
8. Ltr, EUCOM, 24 Apr 47, file AG 370.5 GCT, subj: "Troop Assignment (No. 4)."
9. EUCOM, OCF, Rpt of Opr. 1 Apr-30 Jun 47, p 3.
10. USFET, OTFD, Rpt of Opr. 1 Oct-31 Dec 46, p 6f.
11. EUCOM, OCF, Rpt of Opr. 1 Jan-31 Mar 47, p 7.
12. Office Memo 90, OCF, EUCOM, 28 May 47.
13. EUCOM, Press Release No. 59, 4 Apr 47.
14. USFET Press Release No. 183, 4 Mar 47.
15. Office Memo 32, OTFD, USFET, 7 Oct 46.
16. USFET, OTFD, Rpt of Opr. 1 Jul-30 Sep 46, p 10.
17. GO 9, EUCOM, 22 Mar 47.
18. EUCOM, OCF, Rpt of Opr. 1 Apr-31 Mar 47, p 4f.
19. EUCOM, OCF, Rpt of Opr. 1 Apr-31 Jun 47, p 9.
20. USFET, Theater Organization Plan, 25 Feb 46, chart XIX.

21. Office Memo 32, OTFD, USFET, 7 Oct 46.
22. Office Memo 69, OTFD, USFET, 28 Feb 47.
23. USFET, Theater Organization Plan, 25 Feb 46, chart XIX.
24. Ltr, USFET, 6 Sep 46, file AG 400.703 GAP-AGO, subj: "Surplus Property Accounting Division (SPAD)."
25. USFET, OTFD, Rpt of Opr. 1 Apr-30 Jun 46, p 2.
26. EUCOM, OCF, Rpt of Opr. 1 Jan-31 Mar 47, p 14.
27. Cable W-98994, 28 May 47, WD to EUCOM.
28. Office Memo 32, OTFD, USFET, 7 Oct 46, p 3.
29. Ltr, USFET, AG 019 FDD-AGO, 11 Mar 47.
30. EUCOM, OCF, Rpt of Opr. 1 Jan-31 Mar 47.
31. Office Memo 90, OCF, EUCOM, 28 May 47.
32. Memo 35-4, WD, 12 Sep 44, as amended.
33. Office Memo 94, OCF, EUCOM, 16 Jun 47.
34. EUCOM, OCF, Quar Rpt. 1 Apr-30 Jun 47, p 15.
35. PRD Release No. 144, USFET, 19 Feb 47; ltr, USFET, 4 Feb 47, file AG 010.8 GEC-AGO, subj: "Military Government Ordinance No. 10."
36. GO 32, USFET, 13 Nov 46.
37. Ltr, EUCOM, 14 Apr 47, file AG 370.5 GCT, subj: "Troop Assignment (No. 4)."
38. USFET FD, Quart Rpt. 1 Apr-30 Jun 46.
39. GO 43, US Constab., 9 May 47.
40. Cable W-80928, 26 Jun 47, AGWAR to EUCOM.
41. SO 63, EUCOM, 16 May 47, par 10.
42. EUCOM, OCF, Quar Rpt. 1 Jan-31 Mar 47, p 17; ibid. 1 Apr-30 Jun 47, p 14.

43. EUCOM, OCF, Rpt Opr. 1 Apr-30 Jun 47, p 18.
44. EUCOM Press Release No. 300, 10 Jul 47.
45. USFET, OTFD, Rpt Opr. 1 Jul-30 Sep 46, p 17.
46. EUCOM, OCF, Rpt Opr. 1 Apr-30 Jun 47, pp 19f.
47. EUCOM Press Release No. 257, 23 Jun 47.
48. USFET, OTFD, Rpt Opr. 1 Oct-31 Dec 46, p 20.
49. EUCOM, Rpt Opr. 1 Apr-30 Jun 47, p 19.
50. EUCOM, OCF, Rpt Opr. 1 Apr-30 Jun 47, p 19.
51. EUCOM, OCF, Rpt Opr. 1 Apr-30 Jun 47, p 19.

Chapter XXVIII

CHIEF, MILITARY LABOR SERVICE

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## Chapter XXXVIII

### CHIEF, MILITARY LABOR SERVICE

#### 1. Establishment of Military Labor Service.

The Theater Military Labor Service was created on 15 February 1947 as a special staff section of Headquarters, USFET, under the supervision of the G-4 Division. (1) The mission of the Military Labor Service was to control the procurement of personnel for, and the training and technical supervision of, all organized civilian labor service units employed by the U.S. forces within the European Theater.

#### 2. Prior Employment of Labor Service Units.

The tasks confronting the new staff section stemmed from the wartime and postwar practice of employing prisoners of war and locally-recruited civilians to supplement military guard and labor personnel.

##### a. Labor Sources.

On the Continent, this practice dated back to the first months of combat operations, when the Army employed German prisoners of war,

(2)

Italians, and indigenous civilians in organized labor companies.

After V-E Day, large number of Recovered Allied Military Personnel (RAMP's) and displaced persons joined the military labor ranks as guards or skilled laborers.

b. Types of Units.

Labor service units consisting of guards or unskilled laborers were known as nontechnical, and those authorized operational equipment, as technical labor service units. Certain technical labor service companies were authorized equipment, but no personnel. The labor for these companies was supplied by locally-hired civilians, while the equipment was issued to the supervising units. First utilized in the liberated areas, these mobile equipment units were retained in the occupied areas, where they made use of local German civilian labor.

(3)

c. Decrease in Labor Units.

The number of labor service companies employed by the Army reached a peak of 2,430 on 31 August 1945, decreasing to 2,058 on 31 December 1945 and to 1,100 on 1 March 1946.

(4)

3. Supervision of Labor Service Units.

Organized guards and laborers required special military units for their supervision and training. Prior to the creation of the Military Labor Service the command structure of military labor units within major commands of the European Theater was as shown in Chart I. Labor Supervision areas, under the command of Third Army (after 15 February 1947,

of the Constabulary) and Continental Base Section and the technical supervision of the G-4 Division, USFET, exercised command over labor supervision companies, and service companies. Whenever these subordinate units worked in service installations they were employed under the operational control and technical supervision of the chief of service of the major command concerned. Prior to 15 February, all labor supervision units and labor service companies assigned to Third Army were under the command of Headquarters, 9th Labor Supervision Area, four labor supervision centers commanded the labor supervision and civilian guard and labor units in Württemberg-Baden, Greater Hesse, Northern Bavaria, and Southern Bavaria, respectively. Headquarters, 9th Labor Supervision Area, was also responsible for operating the Theater Civilian Guard Training and Replacement Center, located at Kafertal. Units under the control of Continental Base Section were commanded by Headquarters, 7th Labor Supervision Area.

4. The Command Structure after 15 February 1947.

a. Effect of Establishment of Military Labor Service.

The establishment of the Military Labor Service had little direct effect upon the military labor supervision and command structure. The order creating the Military Labor Service announced that the Commanding Officer, Headquarters, 9th Labor Supervision Area, was also to serve as Chief of the Military Labor Service, and that the Headquarters of 7th and 9th Labor Supervision Areas would provide the personnel required by the new agency. In practice, it was the 9th Labor Supervision Area which

served as the carrier unit for Military Labor Service personnel. The fundamental effect of the order was therefore, to cast the Headquarters, 9th Labor Supervision Area, in a dual role, rather than to create a distinct new agency. The Military Labor Service was charged with technical supervision over all labor supervision and labor service units. Its chief command function was the operation of the Theater Civilian Guard Training and Replacement Center.

b. Reassignment of Third Army Labor Service Units.

Effective 15 February 1947, all Third Army labor service units were transferred to the Constabulary. <sup>(5)</sup> Effective 15 March, the Constabulary units were transferred to posts, districts, and technical services. <sup>(6)</sup> This transfer relieved the Headquarters, 9th Labor Supervision Area, of all command responsibilities except those relating to the operation of the training center. Between 15 February and 31 March, the Chief of the Military Labor Service assisted the commanders of districts and posts in assuming their new functions of command over the labor service and supervision units officially transferred on 15 March. On 31 March 1947, only two United States units, containing 21 officers and 47 enlisted men, and 12 labor service companies made up of Americans, containing 237 simulated officers, and 2,448 simulated enlisted men, were assigned or attached to Headquarters, 9th Labor Supervision Area. <sup>(7)</sup> The same headquarters had been in command of 68 United States units, containing 126 officers and 469 enlisted men, and 75 labor service companies, containing 900 simulated officers and 17,741 simulated enlisted men, on 31 January 1947. <sup>(8)</sup>

c. Status of Continental Base Section Labor Service Units.

(9)  
Activated early in 1945, and assigned to Continental Base  
(10)  
Section effective 14 January 1946, Headquarters, 7th Labor Supervision Area, continued to command all labor supervision and service units in Continental Base Section until 15 June 1947, except for a short period in the spring of 1946, when these units were assigned to the technical services. There was no appreciable change in the command functions of the 7th Labor Supervision Area when the Military Labor Service was created, but on 15 March 1947 a large number of its units were transferred to the  
(11)  
command of districts, posts, and the technical services. After that date, eleven supervision units remained under the command of the 7th Labor Supervision Area.

5. Governing Policies.

The basic policy document governing the use of organized civilian labor during this period was USFET SOP No. 80, published on 20 May  
(12)  
1946. This directive contained detailed provisions governing the organization, employment, administration, and supply of labor supervision and service units. Additional policies, such as the scheduled replacement of organized guard units by industrial police and United States troops, were determined by the Commander in Chief, EUCOM.

6. Functions of Military Labor Service.

The functions of the Military Labor Service were stated in the general order which created it, and restated on 31 July in the EUCOM

pamphlet, Organization and Functions. The primary function of the Military Labor Service was to advise the Commander in Chief, EUCOM, and the general and special staff divisions of the headquarters, on the employment of organized civilian guard and labor units and industrial police. Other functions included the making of recommendations on the allocation of labor units to the various commands, maintaining technical supervision over units (in coordination with the chief of the technical service concerned, in the case of technical labor service units), making inspections, and operating the Theater Civilian Guard Training and Replacement Center.

#### 7. Organization and Structure.

The work of the Military Labor Service was carried on by the Office of the Chief of Military Labor Service, at Headquarters, EUCOM, level; by labor supervision centers at major command level; and by labor supervision centers and companies at post level. (13) The organization of the Office of the Chief of Military Labor Service is illustrated in Chart II, while the pattern of assignment and attachment of labor supervision and service units, as of 11 March 1947, is shown in Chart III. Labor supervision units, organized in accordance with Table of Organization and Equipment No. 20-20F, published on 9 January 1945, commanded, administered, and supervised the non-American civilian labor and guard units. Supervision units were of the following types:

- Headquarters, Labor Supervision Area
- Headquarters, Labor Supervision Center
- Headquarters, Labor Supervision Company

A Headquarters, Labor Supervision Area, was capable of serving as a

special staff section or as a subdivision of a general staff section. A Headquarters, Labor Supervision Center, usually operated at major command or subordinate command level. A Headquarters, Labor Supervision Company, was normally charged with the administration and supervision of one or more organized labor service companies or labor service units assigned for equipment only the equipment being used by static indigenous employees. (14) The organization of the Military Labor Service as of 30 June 1947, including units serving the headquarters of the major commands, is shown in Chart IV.

#### 8. Technical Inspection of Labor Service Units.

In line with the transfer of command functions away from the Headquarters, 9th Labor Supervision Area, the inspections carried on by the Military Labor Service were concerned mainly with the technical supervision of labor supervision and service units. An inspection team, with an attached group of non-United States personnel, inspected all labor service units throughout the European Command. Points recommended for improvement were brought to the attention of post and district commanders concerned, and also presented to Office of the Director of Services, Supply and Procurement. (15)

#### 9. Main Lines of Development. 15 February 1947 - 30 June 1947.

Apart from the organizational changes marking the earlier months of its existence, a number of policy developments characterized the operations of the Military Labor Service during the period 15 February

to 30 June 1947.

a. Use of Labor Service Companies.

This was a period of diminishing need for the type of mobile labor unit which had proved highly valuable in earlier months. Technical units of all types dwindled from 855 on 1 July 1946 to 114 a year later. (16) A directive of 30 June 1947 designated 236 technical labor service units, and listed the equipment authorized for Engineer, Ordnance Quartermaster, Signal, and Transportation type units. (17) As the missions of posts and districts became stabilized, it was the policy of the European Command to discontinue organized labor service units. Labor service designations were permitted to remain assigned to the using command or service as a basis for drawing equipment to be operated by static civilian labor.

b. Use of Organized Displaced Persons Units.

The outstanding development of this period, and one which was to lead to the eventual discontinuance of the Military Labor Service as a separate staff section, was the increasing stress given to the policy of replacing organized guard units with individually hired industrial police. This policy, initiated by the Commander in Chief, EUCOM, (18) in May 1947, aimed to put displaced persons on the same footing as Germans in the matter of incentives for employment with the Army, in order to encourage their repatriation or resettlement. A 50 percent cut in organized guards, between May and September 1947, was the specific goal to be achieved by the Military Labor Service. The first major

step toward this goal was taken by Headquarters, EUCOM, on 19 May, when major commands were directed to transfer to local civil police the responsibility for security of billets and quarters, clubs, messes, and parking lots, except in special areas. (19) In line with this directive, the authorized number of organized civilian guards was reduced from 31,725 on 30 April to 23,430 in July, a 26 percent cut. (20) On 24 June a second directive, calling for immediate action in turning over to civil police the above-named security functions, was issued. (21) This directive prescribed, for the first time, rules on the employment of industrial police, ordered that the safe-guarding of captured and surplus material turned over to Military Government for the German economy be transferred to the civil police, specified the type of guard to be maintained on prisoners of war, and required the submission of progress reports on the replacement of organized displaced persons guards with industrial police. Thus the end of June 1947 found the Military Labor Service at work to reduce the number of organized guards employed throughout the European Command, with a view to their extensive replacement by industrial police or, where necessary, by United States troops.

c. Employment of Industrial Police.

An experiment in the training of industrial police was made in May 1947 at the training center in Kafertal. (22) As the reduction of organized units became an established goal, however, the Military Labor Service became more and more deeply engaged in the development of policies to govern the recruitment and employment of industrial police. Details of these policies were still in the planning stage at the end of June.

10. The Military Labor Service Training Center.

a. Background.

The Civilian Guard Training and Replacement Center was in operation for more than year prior to the establishment of the Military Labor Service. In April 1945 the Kafertal Kaserne, near Mannheim, had been designated as an assembly center for Recovered Allied Military Personnel (RAMP's) and organized as Prisoner-of-War Exchange (PWX) No. (23)

1. A "company" of guards from the assembly center was organized in May 1945, and approximately 3,200 men were later sent out as guards for U.S. Army installations. By December 1945, Polish guard companies were proving effective, alongside of United States units, in guarding the 40,000 German prisoners of war then being employed in labor service companies. On 15 January 1946, the assembly center was attached to the 8th Labor Supervision Area for use as a training center, and later it was named the Civilian Guard Training Center. In February 1946 the 160th Labor Supervision Center was placed in charge of the Training Center. On 31 March 1946, Seventh Army was inactivated. The 8th Labor Supervision Area was subsequently inactivated and guard units in the U.S. Zone were assigned to the 9th Labor Supervision Area, pending further transfer of same to Continental Base Section. (24) On 20 June 1946, the training center was renamed the Theater Civilian Guard Training and Replacement Center. (25) Using assembly-line production methods, the training center completed the organizing, equipping, and training of two new guard companies nearly every week throughout 1946. Effective on 10 October, the 6856th Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment,

Theater Civilian Guard Training and Replacement Center, replaced the  
(26)  
160th Labor Supervision Center as the overhead detachment. This  
unit was later redesignated the 7711th Theater Civilian Guard Training  
(27)  
and Replacement Center Headquarters and Headquarters Company.

b. Operations, 15 February - 30 June 1947.

On 15 February 1947, the 7711th Headquarters and Headquarters Company, under Headquarters, 9th Labor Supervision Area, was operating the Theater Civilian Guard Training and Replacement Center. Its mission was to organize, equip, train, and retrain civilian guard  
(28)  
and labor service units. Between 15 February and 31 March, ten companies, including five Polish, two Estonian, two Lithuanian, and one Latvian unit, were trained and shipped out by the Center. During the following three months, companies were trained and sent into the field, as follows:

- 1 Guard Police Company (Polish)
- 5 Guard Companies (2 Polish, 3 Estonian, 1 Lithuanian)
- 2 Truck Companies (Polish)
- 3 Engineer Construction Companies (1 Lithuanian, 2 Latvian)
- 3 Labor Companies (1 Lithuanian, 1 Latvian, 1 Ukrainian)
- 1 Ordnance Depot Company (Estonian)
- 1 Engineer Dump Truck Company (Latvian)

These companies had an over-all strength of 40 simulated officers, 305  
(29)  
simulated noncommissioned officers, and 2,543 simulated enlisted men. Replacements sent out during the same quarter numbered 29 simulated officers, 139 simulated noncommissioned officers, and 386 simulated enlisted men. In addition, seven simulated noncommissioned officers and twenty simulated enlisted men were trained as specialists and sent

into technical units. Effective on 16 April 1947, the overhead unit was redesignated as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 7711th Military Labor Service Training Center. (30)

c. Curtisburg.

Training in specialized course during the period 1 April - 30 June was as follows:

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Length</u>	<u>Classes Trained</u>	<u>Men Trained</u>
Guard Officers	2 weeks	9	121
Noncommissioned Officers	3 weeks	12	541
Cooks and Mess Managers	4 weeks	5	119
Medical Aid	2 weeks	2	44
Drivers	5 weeks	7	264
Mechanics	8 weeks	4	71
Carpenters	8 weeks	1	13
Shoemakers	8 weeks	2	15
Physical Training Instructors	2 weeks	2	59

In addition, 280 German civilians were trained for use as industrial police. (31)

d. Overhead.

As of 30 June, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 7711th Military Labor Service Training Center, had an actual strength of seven officers assigned, three officers attached unassigned, and twenty-two enlisted men. The 1307th Labor Supervision Company, with one officer and one enlisted man, also was attached to the Training Center. (32)

11. Key Personnel.

The key personnel of the Military Labor Service between 15

February and 30 June 1947 were as follows:

Chief

Col. Richard G. Prather (15 February-14 June)  
Col. Vance W. Batchelor (15 June - 30 June)

Deputy Chief

Lt. Col. Eric A. Rundquist (15 February - 24 June)

Commanding Officer, Training Center.

Maj. Jack H. Remele (15 February - 10 June)  
Maj. George E. Hudson (11 June - 30 June)

12. Strength of Military Labor Service Units, 30 June 1947.

a. Units under Direct Command.

At the end of June 1947, the following labor supervision units (United States personnel) and labor service companies (non-United States personnel) were under the direct command of the Chief of Military Labor Service.  
(33)

I. Labor Supervision Units (U.S. Personnel)

<u>Type</u>	<u>Assigned Units</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>
Area Hq	1	9	9
Hq/Hq Det			
771st MLSTC	1	7	22
Company Hq	1	1	1

II. Labor Service Companies (Non-U.S. Personnel)

<u>Type</u>	<u>Assigned Units</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>
Mobile Civilian Guard	10	170	2,024

III. Attached Non-U.S. Personnel

<u>Simulated Officers</u>	<u>Simulated Enlisted Men</u>
1	199

IV. Grand Total Assigned or Attached.

<u>Units with U.S. Personnel</u>			<u>Units with Non-U.S. Personnel</u>		
<u>number</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>Simulated Officers</u>	<u>Simulated EM</u>
3	17	32	10	171	2,223

Non-United States personnel shown as attached were attending the training center while assigned to other commands. (34)


b. Units under Command or Supervision.

At the end of June, the Military Labor Service comprised 122 labor supervision units (U.S. personnel) containing 266 officers and 971 enlisted men, and 364 labor service units (non-U.S. personnel) containing 1,246 simulated officers and 34,109 simulated enlisted men. (35)

The total of 364 labor service units included 127 organized civilian guard companies, 42 organized civilian labor companies, and 195 labor service companies without personnel. Of the non-U.S. personnel then employed, only 16,000 organized civilian guards were scheduled to remain at the end of September. (36)

# Chart I

## COMMAND STRUCTURE OF MILITARY LABOR UNITS WITHIN THEATER MAJOR COMMANDS



**LEGEND:**

- Command & Administrative Channels. (Note 1)
- Technical Channels.
- o-o-o-o- Operational Control. (Note 2)

**Note 1.** Where supervision units are assigned to subordinate commands, the labor supervision command channel becomes a technical channel.


**Note 2.** Labor Supervision Centers and Companies, Labor Service Companies and Guard elements working in service installations are employed under the operational control and technical supervision of the chief of service of the major command concerned.

Source: USFET SOP No. 80, Appendix B, p.24

Chart II

# OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY LABOR SERVICE


(EFFECTIVE 15 FEB TO 30 JUN 1947)



SOURCE: ADMINISTRATIVE O, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY LABOR SERVICE 20 OCT 1947

DRAWN BY OFFICE C/HIST GRAPHIC SEC

**CHART III**  
**ORGANIZATION OF**  
**THEATER MILITARY LABOR SERVICE**



**LEGEND**


- Assignment
- |— Attachment
- - - - - Technical Supervision

Source:  
 G-4 Weekly Staff Conference, 11 March 1947  
 G-4 Division, Hq USFET

REDRAWN BY OFFICE G/HIST GRAPHIC SEC

Chart IV

ORGANIZATION CHART  
**MILITARY LABOR SERVICE**  
 DIRECTOR SS&P, TROOPS AND LABOR



COMMAND CHANNELS  
 TECHNICAL CHANNELS  
 30 JUN 1947  
 Source: OCMLS, revised by SS&P, Troops and Labor, 15 Nov 1947

\* USAFE Service Companies were supervised by U.S. units other than labor supervision units, or by staff personnel. During this period, labor supervision units were used by USAFE as base units, not to supervise labor service companies.

NOTE:  
 Throughout the existence of Continental Base Section the 7th Labor Supervision Area was in command of all labor supervision units working for CBS. The 7th LSA was inactivated 15 Jun 1947, attendant upon the discontinuance of CBS. A large number of CBS units were transferred to districts, posts and services on 15 Mar 1947 and the remainder were transferred between 15 Mar and 15 Jun.

- Abbreviations
- SUPV ----- Supervision
  - SERV ----- Service
  - USAFE ----- United States Air Forces in Europe
  - BPOE ----- Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation
  - USFA ----- United States Forces Austria
  - AGRC ----- American Graves Registration Command
  - MLSTC ----- Military Labor Service Training Center
  - LSA ----- Labor Supervision Area
  - OCMLS ----- Office of the Chief, Military Labor Service

Chapter XXXVIII

FOOTNOTES

1. GO 30, USFET, 14 Feb 47.
2. Hq, USFET, G-4 Division, Notes of Daily Conference, "Utilization of POW's and Civilian Personnel in Performing the Theater Service Mission," presented by Maj W. Kerr, Troops and Labor Branch, G-4, 15 Mar 46.
3. Hq, EUCOM, SS & P Division, Notes of SS & P Weekly Staff Conference, "Employment of Labor Service Units," presented by Lt Col J. M. Palmer, 15 Jul 47.
4. Hq, USFET, G-4 Division, "Utilization of POW's and Civilian Personnel in Performing the Theater Service Mission" (see footnote 2).
5. Ltr, Hq, USFET, 29 Jan 47, file AG 370.5 GGT-AGO, subj: "Troop Assignments (No. 5)" effective 15 Feb 47.
6. The command of labor units was transferred from the Constabulary, for which Hq, 9th Labor Supervision Area, served as Military Labor Service staff section to districts and posts by Ltr, Hq, USFET, 7 Mar 47, file AG 370.5 GGT, subj: "Reassignment Order (No. 1)", effective 15 Mar 47.
7. OCMLS, Rpt of Opr. 15 Feb-31 Mar 47, p 1.
8. Ibid.
9. Organization Order 108, ETOUSA.
10. Assignment Order 2, TSFET, 15 Jan 46, effective 14 Jan 46.
11. Interview with Lt Col Joseph L. Driskell, former Chief, Military Service 28 Nov 47. See also Reassignment Order (No. 1), Hq, USFET, 7 Mar 47.
12. SOP 80, USFET, 20 May 46, subj: "Administration and Employment of Non-US Personnel by US Forces, European Theater in Units, Detachments, and Teams." See also C 1, 23 Apr 47 and C 2, 12 Jun 47.
13. Hq, USFET, G-4 Division, Notes of G-4 Weekly Staff Conference, "Organization and Functions of the Theater Military Labor Service," 11 Mar 47.
14. Ibid.

15. OCMLS, Rpt of Opr. 15 Feb 47-31 Mar 47.
16. Hq, EUCOM, SS & P Division, "Employment of Labor Service Units" (see footnote 3).
17. Hq, EUCOM, 30 June 47, file AG 400 GSP-AGO, subj: "Equipment for Labor Service Units (Non-US Personnel)."
18. This statement is based on information obtained from M/Sgt Carleson, Troops and Labor Branch, SS & P Division, 13 Nov 47, and information in SGS files, Hq, EUCOM.
19. Ltr, Hq, EUCOM, 19 May 47, file AG 371 GDS-AGO, subj: "Security of Residential Type Installations."
20. Hq, EUCOM, SS & P Division, "Employment of Labor Service Units" (see footnote 3).
21. Ltr, Hq, EUCOM, 24 Jun 47, file AG 370.093 GSP-AGO, subj: "Employment of Civilian Guards and Industrial Police."
22. OCMLS Rpt of Opr. 1 Apr 47-30 Jun 47.
23. Hq, USFET, G-4 Division, Notes of G-4 Semi-Weekly Staff Conference, "The Theater Civilian Guard Training and Replacement Center," presented by Col R. G. Prather, 6 Dec 46.
24. Hq, USFET, G-4 Division, Notes of G-4 Semi-Weekly Staff Conference, "The Theater Civilian Guard Training and Replacement Center," 6 Dec 46, states that on 31 March, when Seventh Army was inactivated, "our headquarters became the 9th Labor Supervision Area (the 8th being inactivated) and was assigned all guard units in the Zone." The 8th Labor Supervision Area was inactivated on 30 June 1946, while the 9th Labor Supervision Area had been assigned to Third Army effective 22 June 1945, according to OPOT, Organization, Movements and Assignments Section.
25. Ltr, Hq, EUCOM 20 Jun 46, file AG 370-093 GDS-AGO, subj: "Theater Civilian Guard Training and Replacement Center."
26. GO 173, Third Army, subj: "Organization of 6856th Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment Theater Civilian Guard Training and Replacement Center," 8 Oct 46.
27. GO 178, Third Army, 16 Oct 46, effective 1 Nov 46 (reference supplied by OPOT, Hq EUCOM, 17 Nov 47). The designation of the training

center was changed from "Theater" to read "European Command," by ltr, Hq, EUCOM, 19 Mar 47, file AG 322 GCT-AGO, subj: "Redesignation of Bulk Allotment Units (non-T/O) and Installations," and the full designation was amended by a EUCOM directive, same file and subject, 3 Apr 47, to read "Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 7711 European Command Civilian Guard Training and Replacement Center."

28. OCMLS, Rpt of Opr. 15 Feb 47-31 Mar 47, p 4.

29. Hq/Hq Det, 7711th Military Labor Service Training Center, Rpt of Opr. 1 Apr-30 Jun 47.

30. Ltr, Hq, EUCOM, file AG 322 GCT-AGO, 16 Apr 47, subj: "Redesignation of Bulk Units (Non T/O) and Installations."

31. Hq/Hq Det, 7711th MLSTC, Rpt of Opr 1 Apr 47-30 Jun 47.

32. Ibid.

33. OCMLS, Rpt of Opr. 1 Apr 47-30 Jun 47, p 3. This report gives 2 officers and 6 enlisted men as the strength of the Company Headquarters assigned to the training center, whereas the Report of Operations of the Hq/Hq Det, 7711th MLSTC for the same period states that the 1307th Labor Supervision Company contained only one officer and one enlisted man. The latter report, having been prepared at the training center, has been accepted as more reliable, and the figures in this table have been corrected accordingly.

34. Interview with Capt M. R. Bright, formerly of Military Labor Service, 25 Nov 47.

35. Interview with M/Sgt Carleson, Troops and Labor Branch, SS & P Division, Hq, EUCOM, 14 Nov 47. This number of labor service units includes 127 organized civilian guard companies as compared with the total of 126 cited by Lt Col Palmer on 15 July 1947, reference footnote 3 above.

36. Hq, EUCOM, SS & P Division, "Employment of Labor Service Units" (see footnote 3).

Chapter XXXIX  
AIR PRIORITIES BOARD

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## Chapter XXXIX

### AIR PRIORITIES BOARD

#### 1. Establishment.

The Theater Air Priorities Board was established on 4 March 1945 under the direct supervision of the Theater Commander, through the Deputy Chief of Staff. <sup>(1)</sup> The composition, duties, and functions of the Board were set forth in USFET Circular No. 129, published on 29 September 1945.

a. Membership. The Board consisted of the Assistant Chiefs of Staff of G-1, G-3, and G-4, USFET; one member appointed by the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe; a president appointed by the Commanding General, USAFE; and a secretary appointed by the Commanding General, USFET. <sup>(2)</sup>

b. Mission. The mission of the Board was to control the use of air lift in the European Command. In practice this was achieved through development of policies for Theater-wide application, coordination of requirements submitted by principal users of air lift, and

administration of a priorities system controlling military passenger travel and movement of cargo.

c. Organization. The organization of the Air Priorities Board and its permanent secretariat, as of 1 July 1946, is shown in the accompanying chart. The Paris Branch was discontinued with the closing of Western Base Section. In other respects, the organization remained the same throughout the period under review.

## 2. Functions.

The Board met monthly to consider basic policies respecting air priorities, and the air lift requirements of using agencies for the three succeeding months. Apart from these meetings the Board functioned only through its permanent staff. In addition to its control of air lift and issuance of priorities, the Board provided liaison between the commercial air lines in Germany and various Army agencies, served as an information bureau on military air travel, and was responsible for such special tasks as serving in an advisory capacity to the U.S. Army missions in Greece and Turkey.

## 3. Meeting Air Lift Requirements.

The Air Priorities Board provided a single, centralized control over military air lift within the European Command and to and from the United States. Air lift requirements for the Theater were coordinated each month and a consolidated request for air lift was forwarded to the War Department for approval. Requests for air lift were due to reach

the Board by the 15th of the second month prior to the date of the intended air movement. By the 25th of the same month the Board completed its consolidated list of requirements and submitted it to the War Department. Within the War Department, the request went to the Office of the Director of Services, Supply and Procurement (SS&P), where it was coordinated with the Air Transport Command on the question of feasibility and with the Air Forces for approval. (3) The War Department made its allocation in terms of personnel to be carried, cargo tonnage, and mail tonnage. This allocation, stating the exact number of passenger spaces to be available and the total air lift in tons, ordinarily reached the Board by the middle of the following month. The figures were broken down by the Board in terms of allocations to the requesting agencies, which were then notified of their assigned lift. Because of this procedure, and the time required to handle the average requisition for aerial shipment, commitments for at least 95 percent of the entire allocation for cargo were made approximately one month in advance. Under normal conditions, the allocated cargo lift easily met the needs of the using agencies.

#### 4. Passenger and Cargo Operations.

Air travel was controlled by the issuance of priorities to individual passengers. Control over specific consignments of cargo was left, as a rule, to the SS&P Division, subject only to the tonnage limitation indicated by the Board. For the transport of persons to the United States, the usual requirement at the close of the period under

review, was one plane daily for ordinary passengers and five evacuation planes monthly for patients. Most of the west-bound passengers were persons being flown to the Zone of the Interior for urgent personal reasons, hospital patients, military personnel on temporary duty, or civilian employees and high ranking officers returning home at the end of a tour of duty. The west-bound passenger load totaled around 700 persons monthly, including some 200 emergency returnees. Cargo averaged thirty to thirty-five tons monthly on east-bound planes, and approximately two tons on west-bound.

a. Emergency Returnees. Persons being returned to the United States for urgent personal reasons were known as emergency returnees and were, as a general rule, transported by air. They were divided into three classifications depending on the degree of the emergency. Cases designated "urgent," the highest classification, were to be in the United States within ten days. Although air mail was assigned the highest priority, emergency returnees took precedence to the extent that at least six, if that number were waiting, were sent on every returning plane.

b. Eastbound Loads. The fact that the movement of freight by air was mostly from the United States to Europe meant that additional space was available for the transport of passengers to the United States. At the end of June 1947, only four or five "bucket-seat" or cargo-type planes were being flown monthly on this route. Planes used to evacuate patients to the United States carried cargo in

the litter space on their east-bound trips. The passenger space from the United States included a Theater "band," controlled by the Air Priorities Board, and a reserve "band" controlled by the War Department and the Air Transport Command. West-bound passenger travel, however, was controlled exclusively by the Air Priorities Board. In addition to temporary duty travelers, the Theater travel "band" brought approximately 200 military replacements and 80 War Department civilians monthly from the United States, in all, a total of approximately 350 passengers.

5. The Air Priorities System.

The Air Priorities Board was the sole agency in the Theater authorized to establish air priorities for transportation furnished by the Air Transport Command (ATC) and the European Air Transport Service (4) (EATS).

a. Machinery.

In applying the priorities system, the Board was assisted by traffic officers of ATC and EATS, who served as its authorized representatives in assigning priorities to certain types of personnel and cargo, and by designated agencies whose task was to receive and evaluate requests for air transportation and to recommend appropriate priorities. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, was designated to receive, evaluate, and make recommendations as to priorities upon all requests for air transportation of personnel traveling under United States military orders to and from the United States under Theater

allocations. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, was designated to set in a similar capacity as respects all requests for the shipment of cargo by air between the United States and the Theater, and U.S. embassies, legations, and consular representatives as respects all requests for civilian and Allied military personnel traveling on a revenue basis, as well as requests for shipment of nonmilitary cargo handled on a revenue basis.

b. Classifications. The priority system made use of four classes. Class I, granting precedence over all other traffic, was reserved for passenger, cargo, and mail movements of paramount national urgency. Class II covered transportation of "an extremely urgent nature."<sup>(5)</sup> Class III provided transportation "vital to the war or peace effort but not of an extremely urgent nature." Class IV was broader than the other classifications, covering transportation vital to the national interest, to relief and rehabilitation activities, or to the resumption of activities necessary for the establishment of peacetime conditions.

c. Application. The actual use of the air lift approved for any given month was controlled on a day-to-day basis by the Air Priorities Board, so that it was impossible for any of the using agencies to use their allocated air lift in advance. Each approved cargo shipment or passenger was granted a priority by number, and blocks of numbers (not to be confused with the four priority classifications) were assigned in advance to the Air Transport Command, U.S.

Naval Forces in Europe, the G-1 Division, the G-4 Division (for cargo),  
(6)  
and occasionally to the Mediterranean Theater of Operations. These  
agencies submitted to the Air Priorities Board daily reports on all  
priorities granted. All Class I and Class II priorities were cleared  
with the Board. In addition, many requests for priorities came  
directly to the office of the Board, especially from travelers stationed  
in or passing through Frankfurt. The Board submitted daily reports on  
air priorities to the War Department.

d. Special Control Measures. Because the approved monthly  
lift tended to be slightly more than the amount requested, and  
because the Air Priorities Board exercised day-to-day control over the  
use of air lift, it was not ordinarily necessary to apply any special  
measures of control. Two circumstances, however, sometimes made  
readjustments necessary. Allocated space might have to be reduced  
on account of unexpected and specially authorized travel of top  
priority passengers. Or, as happened frequently during the winter  
months, unsatisfactory flying conditions might reduce the available  
lift. Under such circumstances the Board endeavored to spread the  
hardship of the reduced lift so that it would be felt as little as  
possible. (7) Although the average plane could carry a load of about  
8,500 pounds in summer, this load might be reduced to only 4,500 or  
4,000 pounds in winter, to provide space for emergency supplies of  
gasoline.


6. Air Lift Figures.

In the ten months ending on 30 June 1947, the Air Priorities Board approved the transportation of 737,994 pounds of mail, 25,592 pounds of cargo, 4,878 passengers, and 719 patients on ATC aircraft to the United States. By using it as filler cargo, the Board was able to send all first-class mail to the United States by air during the summer of 1947. Air mail, both personal and official, had top (8) priority on all flights. Figures for each month were as follows:

<u>Month</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Mail(lbs)</u>	<u>Cargo (lbs)</u>	<u>Passengers</u>	<u>Patients</u>
Sep	1946	67,299	1,572	1,096	77
Oct	1946	60,445	1,061	629	83
Nov	1946	48,914	2,053	618	100
Dec	1946	41,328	2,174	457	19
Jan	1947	92,116	1,770	443	60
Feb	1947	74,840	653	310	36
Mar	1947	67,243	1,966	164	139
Apr	1947	79,084	4,758	405	95
May	1947	92,218	2,015	314	54
Jun	1947	114,507	7,570	442	56

AIR PRIORITIES BOARD

1 July 1946



Source: Secretariat, Air Priorities Board

#### FOOTNOTES

1. GO, 27, ETOUSA, 4 Mar 45. The composition, duties, and functions of the Board were set forth in Cir 129, USFET, 29 Sep 45.

2. Cir 129, USFET, 29 Sep 45, sec I, subj: "Theater Air Priorities Board."

3. Interview with Maj Joseph E. Johnson, Ex Off, Air Priorities Board, 29 Oct 47.

4. The priorities system is outlined in USFET, Cir 83, 5 Jun 46, sec IV, subj: "Requests for Air Transportation."

5. Ibid.

6. Interview with Capt P. F. Wormwood, Deputy Ex Off, Air Priorities Board, 22 Sep 47.

7. Interview with Maj Joseph E. Johnson, 29 Oct 47.

8. IRS, EUCOM, Air Priorities Board to Hist Div, 29 Oct 47, subj: "Air Movements."