


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1945 - 1961**

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AEAGC-XH

30 January 1963

SUBJECT: The U.S. Army in Berlin, 1945-1961 (U)

TO: See Distribution

1. Inclosure 1 is a monograph, subject as above (U)(clas), which provides reference material and background information. The first part of the study sketches the principal military and political events of the years 1945 to 1961 that affected the United States' position in Berlin. The next part covers those Berlin defense and contingency plans that are of interest to the US Army. The third part deals with the various aspects of the problem of access by tracing the origins of precedents that eventually evolved into procedures.

2. It is hoped that the study will be of interest to the staff at your headquarters. A limited number of additional copies can be obtained on request to this headquarters (Attn: AEAGC-XH).

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FOREWORD(U)

(U) The purpose of this monograph is to provide reference material and background information for personnel engaged in Berlin planning and operations. The first part of the study sketches the principal military and political events of the years 1945 to 1961 that affected the United States' position in Berlin. It also acquaints the reader with the most significant changes in the command structure of the U.S. Army in Europe as it affects the Berlin situation. The second part of the monograph covers those Berlin defense and contingency plans—quadripartite, tripartite, and unilateral—that are of interest to the U.S. Army. The third part deals with the various aspects of the problem of access by tracing the origins of precedents that eventually evolved into procedures. In general, incidents involving U.S. personnel in Berlin are included in the narrative only insofar as they created precedents, whereas all other incidents of significance are inserted in the chronology, which forms Part IV of the study.

(U) Prepared by Mr. George E. Blau, Chief Historian, and Mr. James J. Borrer, PFC Donald J. Hickman, Mr. David A. Lane, and Mrs. Marcia D. Wolfe, the monograph is based on research in the files of USAREUR and USCOB headquarters. Additional information has been obtained from interviews with key personnel. For only too obvious reasons, the contents of this monograph cannot be considered as definitive: the problems it discusses are with us every day.

December 1962


EDGAR C. DOLEMAN

Major General, GS

Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations

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PART I. MILITARY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS (U)

Chapter 1

Quadrupartite Control (U)

1. (U) Allied Plans to Occupy Germany and Berlin

In 1943, long before the invasion of Normandy, American and British political and military leaders had discussed plans to occupy Europe in the event of a sudden German collapse. They had assumed that Allied troops would have to disarm the German forces in occupied countries and return them to Germany. Within the framework of these plans, the United States had been expected to occupy France, Belgium, and the southern part of Germany. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, however, had favored a northern zone of occupation for the United States, so that supplies might be routed through North German rather than French ports. He had also objected to the proposed southern zone because he did not want the United States to be involved in the post-war problems of southern Europe.

a. The Zones of Occupation. As the Russian Army continued its drive toward Germany, it became evident that a formal agreement on the zones of occupation was needed. In January 1944, the British representative to the European Advisory Commission (EAC)¹ proposed a plan whereby Germany would be divided into three zones of occupation. Under this plan the Soviet Union would occupy the eastern part of Germany, the United Kingdom the northwest, and the United States the southwestern

¹This commission was composed of representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union who were charged with recommending courses of action on various European questions to their respective governments. France subsequently became a member of this commission. UNCLAS.

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part. This proposal also envisioned dividing the city of Berlin--the capital of Germany--into three sectors of occupation in a similar geographical pattern.

On 12 September 1944 the EAC approved a draft protocol between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, establishing zones of occupation for Germany, as a whole, and sectors of occupation in Berlin. Although the protocol assigned the eastern zone of Germany and the eastern sector of Berlin to the Soviet Union, it did not define the areas of American or British responsibilities.

President Roosevelt subsequently agreed to accept a southwestern zone of occupation, provided that the U.S. forces controlled the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven, with the necessary staging areas, and were granted the right of passage through the British zone. Thus, when the 12 September protocol was amended in November, the so-called amending agreement not only assigned specific zones of occupation and sectors of occupation in Berlin to the United States and the United Kingdom, but also provided the United States with an enclave in northern Germany and access rights to it through the British zone of occupation.²

b. The Allied Control Council for Germany. The European Advisory Commission also reached agreement that an Allied Control Council (ACC), composed of the commanders in chief of the occupying powers, would exercise, as a body, the supreme authority over Germany as a whole. Each commander in chief would be supreme, however, within the particular zone of occupation for which he was responsible.³

c. The Berlin Kommandatura. At the same time it was agreed that an inter-allied governing authority (Kommandatura)--consisting of allied commandants, one from each power, appointed by their respective commanders in chief--would be established to direct jointly the administration of the Greater Berlin area, and would operate under the general direction

² (1) Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command, UNITED STATES IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1954), pp. 348-51; 463-5. (2) "Protocol on Zones of Occupation and Administration of the 'Greater Berlin' Area, September 12, 1944" and "Amending Agreement on Zones of Occupation and Administration of the 'Greater Berlin' Area, November 14, 1944," in Documents on Germany, 1944-1961. Prepared for Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Dec 61 (hereafter referred to as Documents on Germany), pp. 1-5. Both UNCLAS.

³ "Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany, November 14, 1944," in Documents on Germany, cited above, pp. 5-8. UNCLAS.

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of the Allied Control Council. A technical staff, composed of personnel from the occupying powers, would supervise and control the activities of the local authorities responsible for municipal services.⁴

d. French Participation in the Occupation. At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union invited France to participate in the occupation of Germany. It was agreed that a zone of occupation would be created from the areas that had previously been earmarked for occupation by the United States and the United Kingdom, but it was not specified that France would share in the occupation of Berlin.⁵

On 26 July 1945 the MAC reached agreement on the formation of a French zone of occupation (see Map 1)—subsequently ratified by all governments concerned—but was not able to reach an accord on the question of a French sector in Berlin. The commission noted that, in view of the physical conditions then prevailing in Berlin, no attempt had been made to establish a French sector of responsibility.⁶

2. (U) Entry of U.S. Army Forces into Berlin

At the time when the basic agreements for the occupation of Germany and Berlin were being developed, it had not been possible to gauge how far each of the converging armies would penetrate into Germany. In late April 1945, for instance, the Soviet forces seized Berlin, while the U.S. combat forces were advancing far beyond the agreed-upon boundary between the Western and Soviet zones of occupation. By the end of hostilities in Europe—8 May 1945—the U.S. forces occupied a large part of the zone earmarked for Soviet occupation (Map 2).

Since the basic agreements did not include specific provisions for U.S. access to Berlin, President Harry S. Truman wrote Marshal Joseph Stalin on 14 June that the U.S. troops would withdraw to the zonal borders,

⁴Ibid., p. 7. UNCLAS.

⁵"Protocol of the Proceedings of the Crimea (Yalta) Conference, February 11, 1945," in Documents on Germany, cited above, p. 9. UNCLAS.

⁶(1) "Amending Agreement on Zones of Occupation and Administration of the 'Greater Berlin' Area, July 26, 1945," in Documents on Germany, cited above, pp. 20-3. (2) Foreign Relations of the United States: The Potsdam Conference, 1945, Dept of State Pub 7015, p. 293 ff. Both UNCLAS.

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provided that U.S. forces would have free access into Berlin by air, road, and rail from the U.S. zone of occupation and the Bremen enclave. Stalin replied on 18 June that ". . . all necessary measures will be taken in Germany . . . in accordance with the above-stated inter alia access to Berlin plans." To implement this exchange of letters, a tripartite conference was held in Berlin a few days later, during which certain access arrangements were made. Accordingly, U.S. troops withdrew from their advanced positions, and on 1 July elements of the First Airborne Army entered Berlin.⁷

3. (U) The Establishment of the Kommandatura

On 7 July the British, U.S., and Soviet Commandants in Berlin held a formal meeting to establish the Kommandatura. They agreed that they would alternate by rotation in the office of chief military commandant and that this official would be responsible for administering all Berlin sectors of occupation, conferring with the other commandants on matters of policy and on problems common to all sectors. All Kommandatura resolutions would have to be passed unanimously, and orders of instructions issued by the chief military commandant would have to be obeyed in all sectors. His headquarters was to coordinate and supervise the administration of the sectors, and representatives of the occupying powers were to be attached to every section of the city administration.⁸

Four days later, on 11 July, the first Kommandatura order was issued.⁹

⁷(1) Ltr, Truman to Stalin, 14 Jun 45, and ltr, Stalin to Truman, 18 Jun 45, in Documents on Germany, cited above, p. 441. (2) Harry S. Truman, Year of Decisions (Garden City, 1955), p. 307. (3) Oliver J. Frederiksen, The American Military Occupation of Germany, 1945-1953 (Karlsruhe, 1953), p. 24. All UNCLAS.

⁸"Allied Agreement on the Quadripartite Administration of Berlin, 1945. Resolution of the Representatives of the Allied Command on the Joint Administration of Berlin, 7 July 1945," in HICOG Hist Div, Berlin: Development of Its Government and Administration, pp. 209-10. UNCLAS.

⁹"Kommandatura Order No. 1. Confirmation of Previous Soviet Action in Berlin, 1945, 11 July 1945," in Berlin: Development of Its Government and Administration, cited above, p. 211. UNCLAS.



The Inter-Allied Kommandatura has today assumed control over the City of Berlin. Until special notice, all existing regulations and ordinances issued by the Commander of the Soviet Army Garrison and Military Commandant of the City of Berlin, and by the German administration under Allied Control, regulating the order and conduct of the population of Berlin . . . shall remain in force.

This first order had a great impact, for it meant that all regulations and ordinances issued before the arrival of American and British forces would remain in effect. Moreover, since all Kommandatura decisions had to be unanimous, it would be difficult—if not impossible—to make basic changes in the pattern of political life that the Soviets had established in Berlin during the first two months of occupation.¹⁰

On 12 August the French took over the responsibility of administering an occupation sector of Berlin (Map 3), and four days later the French Commandant was seated as a voting member of the Kommandatura.¹¹

4. (U) The Command Structure of the U.S. Forces in Europe

a. The Over-All Command. At the end of World War II the U.S. Army forces in Europe were operationally under Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF), while for administration and supply they were under the control of the European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (ETOUSA). By 1 July 1945 ETOUSA, having served its purpose as a wartime supply and administrative agency and as a post-war transitional organization, was redesignated U.S. Forces, European Theater (USFET). SHAEF was dissolved two weeks later.

On 15 March 1947, as part of an over-all program to unify overseas commands, USFET was replaced by the European Command (EUCOM), a joint headquarters. The Army element—initially designated Headquarters, U.S. Ground and Service Forces, Europe—became the U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), for the time being a nonoperational paper organization whose staff duties were performed by EUCOM headquarters.

¹⁰W. Phillips Davison, The Berlin Blockade (Princeton, 1958), p. 30. UNCLAS.

¹¹Documents on Germany, 1944-1959. Prepared for Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 8 May 59, (hereafter referred to as Documents), p. 442. UNCLAS.



b. The Military Government Functions. The military government functions had been assumed initially by the J-5 division of SHAEF headquarters. Pending the establishment of the quadripartite Allied Control Council, a U.S. planning group--the U.S. Group, Control Council--had been organized in 1944. That group eventually became the policy-determining body for the U.S. zone of occupation, in addition to acting as the U.S. element of the Allied Control Council. On 1 October 1945 it was redesignated as the Office of Military Government, United States (OMGUS).

c. The Berlin District. In preparation for the occupation of a sector of Berlin, it had been decided to activate on 21 May 1945 the Berlin District--an area command that was to exercise administrative control of the U.S. forces to be stationed in the German capital. Its commanding general was designated as U.S. Commandant in Berlin.

In theory the Berlin District was directly subordinate to the Allied Control Council. However, as time went by and the Allied Control Council failed to function effectively, the Berlin District became directly subordinate to the theater commander, except that for military government matters it was responsible to the Deputy Military Governor. Berlin District commanded the troops that garrisoned the U.S. sector, administered military government, and furnished logistical support to U.S. agencies in Berlin.¹²

5. (U) The Deterioration of U.S.-Soviet Relations

When the Allied Control Council undertook its responsibilities in the summer of 1945, Germany's condition was desperate. There were neither central nor state governments, and county and city administrative authorities had ceased to function. Transportation had broken down. Shelter was at a premium. In short, destitution covered the land, and famine was close at hand.

From the beginning the Soviet Union displayed general intransigence in the Allied Control Council, while the United States made constructive efforts to bring order out of chaos. The Soviet representative to the Council used his veto power on 69 occasions during the first few post-war months. The result was that, with the exception of a few decisions concerned basically with formal educational matters, the only agreements reached in the Council were on negative or punitive matters.

¹²Frederiksen, cited above, pp. 14-42; 191. UNCLAS.



a. Disagreement on Economic Matters. A major area of disagreement between the United States and the Soviet Union revolved around the problem of German economic recovery. The United States--in concert with its Western Allies--wanted a self-supporting Germany. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, wished to exploit German industry, agriculture, and labor with the intent of forcing Germany into the Soviet orbit. Despite the Potsdam declaration that Germany was to be treated as a single economic unit, the Soviet Union not only vetoed proposals to accomplish this result, but insisted upon receiving \$10 billion in reparations to be paid from current production. Inflation therefore developed, and a black market flourished.

During the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in 1946 in Paris, the United States charged that Germany was split into "four closed compartments" and that as a consequence none of the zones was self-supporting. The United States therefore proposed the establishment of German central administrative agencies to govern the country as an economic unit, to arrange for free trade between zones, and to develop a balanced program of imports and exports. When the Soviet Union rejected this plan, the United States offered to administer its zone in conjunction with any one or more of the other zones as an economic unit. The British agreed at once to a merger, which led to the creation of Bizonia.

In an important policy address at Stuttgart on 6 September 1946, Secretary of State James E. Byrnes pointed out that the Allied Control Council was "neither governing itself nor allowing Germany to govern itself," and then he proceeded to set forth a positive economic program for Germany.

b. Political Differences. In the following month--October 1946--the first free elections held in Berlin resulted in a resounding defeat for the Communists; they won less than one-fifth of the seats. A Social Democrat, elected as mayor, was repudiated by the Berlin legislature in April 1947, because he had promised to cooperate with the Soviet-sponsored Socialist Unity Party (SED). On 24 June 1947 the legislature elected another Social Democrat, Ernst Reuter, as mayor, but the Soviet Union vetoed his election. Until December 1948, a deputy mayor conducted the city's affairs.¹³

¹³(1) The United States and Germany, 1945-1955. Dept of State Pub 5827, pp. 12-6. (2) Berlin-1961, USIS Publication, 18 Aug 61, p. 7. Both UNCLAS.

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Another attempt to reach four-power agreement on policy regarding the future of Germany had meanwhile been made at a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow in March 1947. Here the United States and the United Kingdom advocated a federal form of government for Germany, while the Soviet Union demanded a strongly centralized state. While professing a desire that Germany be united economically, the Soviet Union refused to make known what food supplies were available in its zone. With regard to reparations, the Soviet Union again rejected the U.S. recommendation that the Soviet plan to remove factories and equipment should be modified to permit Germany to become self-sustaining. Still another area of disagreement was over the temporary German-Polish border. The United States held that the perpetuation of the Oder-Neisse line would deprive Germany of land that in prewar times had provided more than one-fifth of the nation's food supply. The Soviet Union, however, insisted that the line should be made permanent.¹⁴

A final attempt to reach four-power agreement on Germany was made at another meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in November and December 1947. However, no progress was made toward a peace treaty with Germany, and the Soviet representatives renewed their demands for \$10 billion in reparations. On 15 December the U.S. delegation withdrew from the meeting.¹⁵

c. The Decision to Create a West German Government. Following the failure of this conference to achieve any concrete results, the three Western Allies invited Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg to send representatives to London to discuss the German problem. At the conclusion of this meeting in March 1948, France announced that for economic purposes its zone of occupation would be merged with Bizonia. Furthermore, during the meeting the representatives of the six nations agreed on a federal form of government for Germany. The new German government, whose authority and prestige was to be greatly increased by the development of an occupation statute, was also to be invited to participate in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and to apply for Marshall Plan aid.¹⁶

¹⁴The United States and Germany, 1945-1955, cited above, p. 17.
UNCLAS.

¹⁵Frederiksen, cited above, p. 147. UNCLAS.

¹⁶The United States and Germany, 1945-1955, cited above, p. 19.
UNCLAS.

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When the three Western Allies refused to submit the decisions of the London conference to the Allied Control Council, where it would have been subject to Soviet veto, the Soviet chairman adjourned the Council on 20 March 1948. This marked the end of the quadripartite control machinery for Germany.¹⁷

d. The Introduction of the Deutsche Mark. The cleavage between the United States and the Soviet Union became even greater on 18 June 1948, when the Western Allied occupation authorities invalidated the inflated Reichsmark and introduced the Deutsche Mark, in a currency reform considered basic to West Germany's economic recovery. Since Berlin lay within the Soviet zone of occupation geographically, the Western Allies declared their willingness to retain the Reichsmark in that city, provided they shared control over its issuance. When the Soviet Union refused this proposal, the Western Allies introduced the new Deutsche Mark into the western sectors of Berlin a few days later.¹⁸

e. The Berlin Blockade and the Airlift. From the beginning of 1948 the Soviet authorities had made repeated attempts to apply pressure on the Western Allies through interference with travel and communications between Berlin and the Western zones of occupation. In January 1948, for example, they began to interfere with rail and Autobahn (express highway) traffic, and ten days after the adjournment of the Allied Control Council—on 30 March—they announced new restrictions on transportation. For a short time in the middle of April, all passengers between Berlin and the U.S. zone, as well as such cargo as mail and food, had to be carried by air. Thereafter normal civilian transportation regulations prevailed until June, but after the introduction of the Deutsche Mark on 18 June, the Soviets blocked all land and water communications between Berlin and the western occupation sectors, and the entire population of Berlin was cut off from West Germany except for transportation by air.

Air transportation of some military supplies for West Berlin had been in progress for several months. On 26 June, in response to the blockade, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France began the vast air operation—the Berlin Airlift—to transport all supplies to Berlin. For eleven months the Western Allies, rather than to submit to Soviet access demands, supplied West Berlin by air, carrying over two million tons of supplies into the city during this period.

¹⁷Frederiksen, cited above, p. 147. UNCLAS.

¹⁸The United States and Germany, 1945-1955, cited above, pp. 19, 21. UNCLAS.



The airlift came to an end on 4 May 1949, when the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union reached an agreement in New York to remove, by 12 May, "all the restrictions imposed since 1 March 1948" by both sides in the conflict. The following month the four powers agreed to seek improved communications between and across their respective zones of occupation.¹⁹

¹⁹(1) Frederiksen, cited above, p. 147. (2) Berlin - 1961, cited above, p. 13. Both UNCLAS.



Chapter 2

The Creation of "Two" German States (U)

6. (U) Change in the Mission of U.S. Forces

Meanwhile the U.S. Forces' primary mission of supporting military government in Germany in its enforcement of the terms of surrender had gradually become less urgent, and by mid-1948 emphasis was shifting to participation in the defense of Western Europe against the Soviet Union and its satellites. The blockade of Berlin added impetus to this development and the need for establishing a central government in the western zones of Germany in the face of Soviet opposition. The formation of such a government meant combining the three western zones, developing a new Allied organization to control the new government, drawing up an occupation statute to define the relationship between the Western Allies and the new government, and authorizing the new government to draft a constitution.¹

a. The Establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany. To initiate the formation of a new central government, the Western Allies authorized the minister presidents of the 11 Laender (states) of the 3 Western zones on 1 July 1948 to convene a constituent assembly to draft a constitution. Two months later, the West German Parliamentary Council convened in Bonn—the eventual capital—to begin this work. By the following May, a constitution (or "Basic Law") had been drawn up. The first free general election in Germany since 1932 was held on 14 August, and on 21 September 1949 the Federal Republic of Germany came

¹(1) Frederiksen, cited above, pp. 140-7. (2) Harold Zink, The United States in Germany, 1944-1955 (New York, 1957), pp. 44-5. Both UNCLAS.

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into being.²

b. The Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany. With the creation of the Federal Republic, the purely governmental functions of the U.S. military authorities in Germany were transferred from the occupation forces to a new State Department agency, the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG), and the Office of Military Government was discontinued. The U.S. forces continued to exercise their military mission of occupying the U.S. area of responsibility.

The British and French changed their occupation functions similarly, with the result that the Allied High Commission, consisting of the three High Commissioners, replaced the Allied Control Council.³

c. The Occupation Statute. Concurrently with the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany and the establishment of HICOG, an occupation statute was drafted in 1949 to meet the new relationship between the Western Allies and the new German administration. By this statute, the Federal Republic of Germany was granted full domestic authority except for the control of the coal and steel industries of the Ruhr, displaced persons, foreign exchange, and certain other matters. The new government's authority in the international field was also curtailed for the time being, and it was not authorized to create a military establishment.⁴

d. The Status of Berlin. In May 1949, while the occupation statute for West Germany was being drafted, a statement of principles was issued to govern the future status of Berlin. The Western Allies continued to retain their occupation powers in West Berlin, even though the West Berliners were granted certain legislative, executive, and judicial rights.⁵

7. (U) The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Following the communist coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia in 1948, France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg signed the

²The United States and Germany, 1944-1955, cited above, pp. 21-3. UNCLAS.

³(1) Zink, cited above, p. 45. (2) Frederiksen, cited above, p. 148. (3) "Charter of the Allied High Commission for Germany, 16 June 1949," in HICOG Report on Germany, September 21 - December 31, 1949, p. 58. All UNCLAS.

⁴Zink, cited above, p. 168. UNCLAS.

⁵Berlin: Development of Its Government and Administration, cited above, p. 178. UNCLAS

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Brussels Treaty, linking them in a 50-year defense alliance. In June 1948, moreover, the U.S. Senate adopted a resolution that supported the principle of U.S. association with such regional collective security alliances as were sanctioned under the charter of the United Nations.

These developments led to negotiations that resulted in the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on 24 Aug 1949. It was composed of 12 member nations, including the United States. Its major objective was to preserve the peace through unity, strength, and preparedness, and under the terms of the accord, an armed attack against any member of the organization would be considered an attack against all members. During the autumn of 1949, a committee of the NATO council began to prepare a defense plan for the North Atlantic community.⁶

8. (U) Changes in the Command Structure of the U.S. Forces in Europe

With increased emphasis being placed on defense as opposed to occupation, it became essential that the Commander in Chief, Europe (CINCEUR), be freed from operational details so that he could concentrate on his new international responsibilities. At the same time, it was thought desirable to provide an Army commander who would be able to focus his attention on molding the occupation troops into an effective defense force. To achieve these ends, tactical troops and military posts, formerly directly under EUCOM headquarters, were assigned on 11 May 1949 to the U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), which ceased to be a mere paper organization. Another step in the direction of establishing a standing wartime organization in Germany took place five months after the outbreak of the Korean War, on 24 November 1950, when the U.S. Seventh Army was activated.

In Berlin, the command structure was modified by the creation of the Office of the U.S. Commander, Berlin (USCOB) on 1 September 1949, so as to provide a single representative of both CINCEUR and the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany.⁷

9. (U) The Establishment of the "German Democratic Republic"

In an apparent answer to the formation of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Soviet Union announced on 7 October 1949 the creation of the "German Democratic Republic." The new Soviet satellite government

⁶The United States and Germany, 1944-1955, cited above, pp. 22-3.
UNCLAS.

⁷Frederiksen, cited above, pp. 150, 197. UNCLAS.

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administered the German population in the Soviet zone of occupation and had its capital in the Soviet sector of Berlin. Immediately after its creation, the puppet regime declared that it was the only legitimate German government. The Allied High Commission promptly stated that this so-called government represented neither the eastern part of Germany nor all of Germany.⁸

10. (U) The Division of Berlin

After the withdrawal of the Soviet Commandant from the Kommandatura in June 1948,⁹ the Soviets began to interfere openly with the operations of the city administration of Berlin. Soviet pressure reached a peak on 23 August, when a communist-inspired riot broke up an assembly meeting.¹⁰ After several such incidents, it became evident that the Communists did not intend to allow this body to function. The assembly therefore moved to the British sector on 6 September, and its subsequent meetings were held in West Berlin, without the Communist and Socialist Unity Party members.

The final political division of Berlin was completed on 30 November 1948—five days before city-wide elections were to be held. On that day, an "extraordinary session" (sic) of the city assembly, attended only by the 26 Communist and Communist-front members, selected a so-called "magistrate." One day later, the legitimate magistrate was turned out of city hall and forced to move to the British sector. On 3 December the Soviet Commandant of Berlin recognized the newly-formed "magistrate" as the only legal city government. Thus, from that date, West Berlin and East Berlin had separate city administrations.¹¹

⁸(1) Berlin - 1961, cited above, p. 14. (2) The United States and Germany, 1945-1955, cited above, p. 22. Both UNCLAS.

⁹The Kommandatura subsequently functioned on a tripartite basis. UNCLAS.

¹⁰The city hall, housing the magistrate and the city assembly, was located in the Soviet sector of Berlin. UNCLAS.

¹¹Documents, cited above, pp. 455-6. (2) Berlin: Development of Its Government and Administration, cited above, pp. 78-9. Both UNCLAS.



Chapter 3

The Growing Contrast between West Berlin and Its Communist Environment (U)

11. (U) Organizing for the Defense of Western Europe

a. The U.S. Military Buildup. In September 1950 the NATO nations decided definitely to increase their military forces in Western Europe in order to counter the Soviet threat. In implementation of this decision, the United States announced at once that its troop strength in Europe would be greatly augmented, so as to fulfill a new mission--the maintenance of strong and mobile defense forces to face an invader from the east. Although the requirements of the Korean War delayed the shipment of troops somewhat, during 1951 the strength of the European Command was increased from 80,000 to over 240,000, and the number of divisions from one to five.¹

b. More Changes in the U.S. Command Structure. The changes in the U.S. military command structure in Europe that had begun in 1949 culminated in the creation of a new joint command--the United States European Command (USEUCOM) on 1 August 1952. The former European Command (EUCOM) was redesignated as the United States Army, Europe (USAREUR), and the Commander in Chief, USAREUR (CINCUSAREUR) was given the responsibility for all the Army functions previously exercised by the Commander in Chief, EUCOM, except for a few joint responsibilities

¹(1) EUCOM Ann Narr. Rept, 1950, p.v. (2) EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, p. 3. Both SECRET (info used UNCLAS). (3) Frederiksen, cited above, pp. 140-50. UNCLAS.

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that were specifically transferred to the new joint headquarters.²

Subsequently, USAREUR made a number of internal changes that consolidated its military posts and subposts into area commands. The Berlin Military Post was redesignated as the Berlin Command, a major USAREUR subordinate command with a tactical mission.³ The U.S. Commander, Berlin (USCOB), as the personal representative of CINCUSAREUR in Berlin and the U.S. member of the Allied Kommandatura, continued to perform both military and political functions.

c. The Pledge to Protect West Berlin. In 1952, following the signature of the contractual agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany that would end the occupation of Germany when ratified, the United States, France and the United Kingdom pledged themselves to maintain armed forces in Berlin" . . . as long as their responsibilities require d it," and stated that they would" . . . treat any attack against Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon their forces and themselves."⁴ Although the European Defense Community never came into existence, the Federal Republic of Germany was admitted in October 1954 to full membership in the Western European Union, whose other members were the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and the Benelux countries,⁵ and the Western Allied pledge to protect West Berlin remained in effect.

12. (U) Rebuilding West Berlin

a. The City Government. Under a new constitution for West Berlin that became effective on 1 October 1950, the city acquired the status of a quasi-Land (state), as well as a city, with loose ties to the German Federal Republic and with seats—but no voting power except on committees—in the Bonn legislature. West Berlin was not incorporated into the Federal Republic, because such a development would have been tantamount to ending the city's occupation state and would have given the Soviet Union a basis for declaring that the continued presence of Western Allied forces there was illegal. However, a number of federal authorities and

²EUCOM/USAREUR Comd Rept, 1952, p. 1. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

³USAREUR Cir 140, 31 Oct 52. UNCLAS.

⁴(1) Documents, cited above, pp. 475-6. (2) Berlin - 1961, cited above, p. 17. Both UNCLAS.

⁵"Paris Protocols Amending the Brussels Treaty and Establishing the Western European Union, October 23, 1954," in Documents, cited above, pp. 124-7. UNCLAS.



offices were established in West Berlin, and the federal Bundesrat and Bundestag were encouraged to hold sessions and committee meetings there on occasion. The constitution provided for a complete city government, with all the normal legislative, executive, and independent judicial agencies, to be the de jure government of all of Berlin, even though it would in fact operate in the three sectors only for an indeterminate period. It provided for a house of representatives--a legislative body to consist of 200 deputies--and for the election by that body of a senate that would consist of a governing mayor, a mayor, and not more than 16 senators, as the city's executive body. In both the senate and the house of representatives the seats reserved for East Berlin remained unfilled.⁶

b. The Local Economy. During the months following the blockade, and in spite of Western Allied success in breaking it, West Berlin had become more and more an isolated western outpost. In 1950 its economic condition was precarious. Through the ravages of war and because of Soviet dismantling, which had removed the plants of more than 450 firms from its most important industrial areas, the city had lost about 3/4 of its pre-war economic capacity. The subsidies that it had received from the Allies during the blockade through the Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) agency had ceased. The population of Berlin as a whole, which was once 4.3 million, stood in 1950 at 3.3 million--2/3 of whom lived in West Berlin. There was a surplus of women--as in most of Germany after World War II--a preponderance of the higher age groups, and much unemployment. In West Berlin 32 percent of all potential salary and wage earners were without regular work. Moreover, the loss of the city's functions as a national capital was certain to handicap its comeback unless its industrial structure could be restored.⁷

Since the West Berlin Government could not raise sufficient funds to meet its obligations by taxation, subsidies in the form of grants from West Germany and the United States were necessary from the start.⁸ With this assistance, West Berlin--sharing in West Germany's economic recovery, although in many respects lagging behind it--made remarkable strides. Even though every third dwelling in Berlin had been destroyed during the war and effective reconstruction did not begin until after

⁶Pamphlet, Berlin: Figures, Headings, Charts. Press and Information Office, Land Berlin, 1961, pp. 21-5. UNCLAS.

⁷(1) Franz Kluge, Berlin, Pivot of German Destiny (Winston Salem, 1960), pp. 134-55. (2) Berlin: Figures, Headings, Charts, cited above, pp. 29, 33. Both UNCLAS.

⁸Zink, cited above, pp. 349-51. UNCLAS.



the blockade, the expenditure of large sums of money made it possible practically to eliminate the housing shortage and to raise industrial production gradually to pre-World War II levels. West Berlin's political situation prompted West German and Western Allied governmental and commercial agencies to place increasingly larger orders there. Unemployment was also virtually eliminated, except for older persons who presented special problems. With only 20 percent of the industrial production being sold in the city itself, by 1953 goods from West Berlin were being exported to many foreign countries. At the same time West Berlin was increasing its use of raw materials and finished products from all over the world.

13. (U) Revolt in East Berlin

The significance of these developments was not lost on East Berlin and the German inhabitants of the Soviet zone. At mid-morning on 15 June 1953, from 2,000 to 3,000 workers in that zone went on strike, to protest a recently-declared 10 percent increase in the work norm without any compensation. They refused to negotiate with a communist arbitration team, and on the following day marched on the chancellery of the so-called German Democratic Republic in East Berlin, to present a petition. Throughout the day the demonstration grew in size and intensity. Although store windows were broken, police vehicles overturned, and anti-communist posters displayed, the East Berlin police took no action. By evening, however, Soviet armored vehicles, including tanks, began to move into East Berlin.

On 17 June the demonstrations resumed. By mid-day the number of demonstrators had grown to between 30,000 and 40,000, and the East German police were concentrated in large numbers. Early in the afternoon the Soviet Commandant imposed martial law on East Berlin, but rioting continued and the crowds grew to 100,000. More Soviet armor moved in. By evening all East Berlin streets were patrolled by Soviet armored cars and trucks. On the morning of 18 June the Soviet troops were in complete control of East Berlin, and the sector border was sealed.⁹ There could be no doubt thereafter of the Soviet Union's determination to hold on to its East German satellite and to East Berlin.

⁹Berlin Comd Hist Rept, 1 Jan 53 - 30 Jun 54, pp. 90-1. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).



Chapter 4

The Impact of West and East German Sovereignty on the Status of Berlin (U)

14. (U) The Two "Sovereignties"

The 10-year military occupation of Western Germany came to an end on 5 May 1955, when the Allied High Commission for Germany terminated the Occupation Statute. On that date the protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty,¹ signed on 23 October 1954, became effective, and the Federal Republic of Germany, recognized by the Western Allies, acceded to sovereignty over the three zones of Germany hitherto occupied by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, respectively. About 4½ months later the Soviet Union and the East German regime entered into a treaty that ostensibly elevated the so-called German Democratic Republic similarly to sovereign status over the eastern zone of Germany, with full control over its internal and external affairs.² This treaty became effective on 6 October 1955.

In related actions the Federal Republic of Germany was admitted to membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as of 5 May 1955,³ and a week later the so-called German Democratic Republic became one of

¹"Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany, 23 Oct 54. In Documents, cited above, pp. 142-3. UNCLAS.

²"Treaty between the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic, September 20, 1955," in Documents, cited above, pp. 156-7. UNCLAS.

³"Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany, October 23, 1954." In Documents, cited above, pp. 142-3. UNCLAS.

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the adherents to the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact.⁴ The Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany; but the Western Allies, adhering to their policy that insisted upon the reestablishment of a united Germany through free elections,⁵ continued to refuse to recognize the "German Democratic Republic." Berlin remained an occupied area.

15. (C) The East German Struggle for Recognition

The U.S.S.R. implemented its treaty with the East German regime almost immediately, in an agreement of 20 September 1955 stipulating that the German Democratic Republic would thenceforward guard and exercise control over its own frontiers, over the demarcation line between it and the Federal Republic of Germany, at the outer ring of Greater Berlin, inside Berlin, and over the lines of communication between West Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany that lay in East Germany. Moreover, the German Democratic Republic would deal directly with the appropriate authorities of the Federal Republic of Germany concerning rail and road traffic and the passage of citizens and freight from and to the Federal Republic of Germany, West Berlin and foreign states. However, traffic control of personnel and goods of the American, British, and French garrisons in Berlin over the Berlin-Helmstedt Autobahn, the railway, and the three air corridors would continue temporarily to be exercised by the Commander of Soviet Forces, Germany, on the basis of existing four-power agreements and pending the conclusion of an appropriate new agreement.⁶

The three Western Allies lost no time before pointing out to the U.S.S.R. that this agreement would not and did not relieve the Soviet Union of its obligations and responsibilities under existing four-power agreements and arrangements pertaining to Germany and Berlin; and that

⁴"Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between the . . . Peoples' Republic of Albania, . . . the German Democratic Republic, . . . the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, . . . etc., May 14, 1955," in Documents, cited above, pp. 144-7. UNCLAS.

⁵"Western Proposal for Reunification of Germany by Free Elections, November 4, 1955," in Documents, cited above, p. 177. UNCLAS.

⁶(1) "Letter from the Foreign Minister of the German Democratic Republic (Bolz) to the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union (Zorin), September 20, 1955." (2) "Note from the Soviet Foreign Ministry to the American Embassy on the Soviet-GDR Agreements, October 18, 1955." Both in Documents, cited above, pp. 158-60. Both UNCLAS.

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since the Federal Republic of Germany was the only German government freely and legitimately constituted, and therefore the only government entitled to speak for Germany in international affairs, they did not recognize the East German regime or the existence of a state in the Soviet zone.⁷ In short, it was still true that only the Soviet Union, and not the so-called German Democratic Republic, could speak for East Berlin; and in matters regarding East Berlin the Western Allies would deal only with the Soviet authorities, and not with the East Germans.

Subsequent developments included what may best be described as a series of Soviet maneuvers designed to move the Western Allies and the Federal Republic of Germany from this position. In November 1955, for example, when USCOB protested against the detention of two members of the U.S. House of Representatives by East German police, the Soviet commander in Berlin asserted that the German Democratic Republic was "sovereign" in East Berlin. In February and May 1956, when the Western Allied missions protested against the parading of East German military and paramilitary units in the Soviet sector of Berlin in violation of four-power agreements, the protest was rejected by the Soviets--likewise on the ground of GDR sovereignty over East Berlin. In early January 1958 the American, British, and French diplomatic missions in Berlin were notified by the Soviets that their personnel would thereafter be required to obtain East German transit visas for travel through East Germany. In their protest to the Soviet Ambassador in East Berlin, the three Allied Ambassadors stressed that the quadripartite agreements on the issuance of visas could not be rescinded unilaterally, nor could the Western diplomats be expected to apply for visas to a government that had not been recognized by their countries. Nevertheless, on 1 May 1958 the East Germans tried another maneuver by levying a tax on canal traffic. It was apparent that all of these measures were intended to force the West German and Allied Governments to negotiate with the East German regime. However, although routine contacts with East German officials, as agents of the Soviet Government were accepted, the Western Allies refused to deal with them as sovereign authorities.⁸

⁷(1) "Statement by the American, British, and French Foreign Ministers, on the Soviet-GDR Agreements, September 28, 1955." (2) "Note from the American Embassy to the Soviet Foreign Ministry on the Soviet-GDR Agreements, October 27, 1955." Both in Documents, cited above, pp. 158-9; 161. Both UNCLAS.

⁸(1) USAREUR Sp Intel Est 2-59, 27 Feb 59, pp. 9-10. CONF. No Gp. (2) Berlin--Fate and Mission, Press and Information Office, Berlin, 1961, p. 30. UNCLAS.

16. (U) The Soviet Plan for the "Demilitarization" of West Berlin

In November 1958 the Soviet Union, after accusing the United States, the United Kingdom, and France of having "long since rejected the essentials of the treaties and agreements concluded during the war against Hitler Germany and after its defeat," announced formally that in recognition of the "actual state of affairs" it considered all of its agreements made with the Western Allies during 1944 and 1945 to be null and void. It suggested the withdrawal of the Federal Republic of Germany and the so-called German Democratic Republic from NATO and the Warsaw Pact respectively and demanded that all military forces be withdrawn from West Berlin. Although insisting that the "most correct and natural solution" of the Berlin problem would be to absorb West Berlin into the German Democratic Republic, the Soviet Union proposed that West Berlin be converted into "an independent political unit—a free city . . . demilitarized . . . which could have its own government and run its own economic, administrative, and other affairs". If agreement to this effect was not reached within six months, the Soviet Union would "then carry out the planned measures through an agreement with the German Democratic Republic."⁹

It was apparent that what the U.S.S.R. was proposing would leave the Soviet forces in East Berlin, while the three Western Allies abandoned their rights and the agreed-upon presence of their forces in West Berlin and retired in favor of the establishment of a so-called "free" city, obviously envisioned as a temporary expedient pending the "most correct and natural solution." To this proposal the three Allies, supported by the North Atlantic Council, replied merely that they were solemnly committed to the security of the Western sectors of Berlin, that they would not acquiesce in the unilateral repudiation, by the Soviet Union, of its portion of the quadripartite-assumed responsibilities and obligations in relation to Berlin, and that they would not enter into any agreement with the U.S.S.R. which would in effect turn the people of West Berlin over to Soviet domination. The United States not only rejected the Soviet demands but stated that it could not enter into discussion with the Soviet Union "under menace or ultimatum." At the same time, it asked whether the Soviet Union was ready to enter into discussions on the basis of the Western proposals for free all-German elections and free decisions for a united Germany that would include all of

⁹Note from the Soviet Foreign Ministry to the American Ambassador at Moscow (Thompson) Regarding Berlin, November 27, 1958, in Documents, cited above, pp. 317-31. Similar notes were delivered to the Ambassadors of the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany. UNCLAS.

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Berlin.¹⁰ Similar replies were sent by Great Britain and France.

A detailed analysis, in December, of the legal relationships of the three Allied Powers to Berlin since the end of World War II revealed once again that the rights of the United States, both in Germany and in Berlin, did not depend in any way upon the sufferance or acquiescence of the Soviet Union but were derived from the defeat of the German Third Reich and the subsequent assumption, by the victors, including the Soviet Union, of supreme authority in Germany. This authority had been assumed as a joint undertaking in which the participants were deemed to have equal standing, as the right of each power to occupy its zone and the rights of the three Western Allies to have free access to Berlin were an essential corollary of their right of occupation, not bestowed upon them by the Soviet Union. Since these rights did not stem from the Soviet Union, the Soviets could not repeal them by denouncing agreements or transferring certain prerogatives to third parties; nor could the East German regime acquire, in Berlin or in the Soviet Zone, a power which the Soviets were powerless to give.¹¹

While it probably cannot be said that the Soviets acceded to this point of view, their six-month deadline passed without any attempt to bring about changes in the status of Berlin through the threatened bilateral "agreement with the German Democratic Republic."

¹⁰(1) "Statement by the Department of State, Regarding the Soviet Note on Berlin, November 27, 1958." (2) "Four-Power Communique on Berlin, December 14, 1958." (3) "NATO Declaration on Berlin, December 16, 1958." (4) "Note from the United States to the Soviet Union, on Berlin, December 31, 1958." All in Documents, cited above, pp. 332-4; 347-50. All UNCLAS.

¹¹"Statement by the Department of State, on the Legal Aspects of the Berlin Situation, December 20, 1958," in Documents, cited above, pp. 336-47. UNCLAS.



Chapter 5

The Years of Intensifying Crisis (U)

17. (U) The Soviets Suggest a Peace Treaty

In January 1959 the Soviet Union submitted to the three Western Allies the draft of a proposed peace treaty with Germany and stated its intention of convening in Warsaw or Prague, within two months, a conference of representatives of the countries—29 by their count—that had been associated in the war against Germany, to consider the draft and sign an agreed-upon text. It assumed that representatives of both the Federal Republic of Germany and the "German Democratic Republic" would participate for Germany. Included in the treaty draft was another proposal for converting West Berlin into a demilitarized free city "until the re-establishment of the unity of Germany."¹

In February the Western Allies, reiterating that a peace treaty could be negotiated only with a united Germany, stated in reply that they were ready to participate in a four-power conference at the ministerial level, at a time and place to be fixed by mutual agreement, to deal with the German problem in all of its aspects. They suggested that German "advisers" be invited to the conference and consulted. At the same time they reaffirmed their stand against the unilateral abdication of responsibilities and obligations in Berlin, and stressed that they would uphold, by all appropriate means, their right of access to Berlin and their communications with their sectors.²

¹Note from the Soviet Union to the United States, Transmitting a Draft Peace Treaty for Germany, January 10, 1959, in Documents, cited above, pp. 350-70. UNCLAS.

²Note from the American Embassy to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, February 16, 1959, in Documents, cited above, p. 382. UNCLAS.

18. (U) The Foreign Ministers' Conference of 1959

Although the Soviets seemed anxious for either a multi-nation conference on the one hand or four-power summit talks on the other,³ they agreed to a foreign ministers' conference, to be held at Geneva.⁴ This conference began on 11 May 1959, with representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany and the East German regime present as advisers, and continued—with a 4-week recess—for almost 3 months.

a. The Western Plan. Holding that agreement concerning Berlin should apply to the whole of Berlin, and not merely to West Berlin as proposed by the U.S.S.R., the Western Allies proposed the reunification of Berlin as the first step in; and a pattern for, the reunification of Germany as a whole.⁵ As part of the first phase of their peace plan they proposed that Berlin should be made a single city belonging to all of Germany. This was to be achieved through the free election, under quadripartite or United Nations supervision, of a council that would administer the entire city of Berlin. As the future capital of a reunified Germany, Berlin would be guaranteed by the Four Powers, who would continue to be entitled to station troops there.

As the second phase, the Four Powers would set up a mixed German committee of Federal Republic of Germany and "German Democratic Republic" representatives to formulate and submit to a plebiscite, in all parts of Germany, a draft law providing for Germany-wide, free, and secret elections, under independent supervision. If the law was agreed to by the plebiscite, free elections of an all-German assembly would follow, as Phase III of the plan. This assembly would have as one task the drafting of an all-German constitution as the basis of an all-German Government that would replace the government of the Federal Republic of Germany and that of the so-called German Democratic Republic; and this government would negotiate an all-German peace treaty as soon as possible thereafter. After conclusion of the peace treaty, a final peace settlement

³"Note from the Soviet Union to the United States, on a German Peace Treaty, March 2, 1959," in Documents, cited above, pp. 383-9. UNCLAS.

⁴"Note from the American Embassy to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Proposing a Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva, March 26, 1959," in Documents, cited above, pp. 409-10. UNCLAS.

⁵"Statement at Geneva by Secretary of State Herter, Presenting the Western Peace Plan, May 14, 1959," in Documents on Germany, cited above, pp. 457-61. UNCLAS.

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and the withdrawal of non-German military forces would be worked out.⁶

b. The Soviet Plan. The U.S.S.R. rejected this plan at once and presented its own plan, calling for the immediate negotiation of a peace treaty with "the two Germanies."⁷ The Western Powers rejected this plan because it would formalize the division of Germany and tend to make its partition permanent. Meanwhile, Premier Khrushchev repeatedly threatened to draft and sign a separate peace treaty with the East Germans which would give them sovereign rights over all of East Germany, including all of Berlin.

c. The Impasse Concerning Berlin. During the course of the conference a number of proposals and counter-proposals were made concerning Berlin. Taking note of a stated decision of the Soviet Union to withdraw its military forces from East Berlin—but not from East Germany—the Western Allies proposed that their forces in West Berlin be limited to the existing levels. If developments permitted, a reduction of forces might be considered from time to time.⁸ The Soviet Union rejected the reference to its projected troop withdrawal and, although the Western Allied forces in Berlin were less than 2 percent as large as the Soviet forces surrounding them, proposed their drastic reduction to only "symbolic" contingents.⁹ Charging, moreover, that the United States was using West Berlin for the release of violent anti-Soviet propaganda, the Soviet Union proposed a four-power commission to supervise and assure the implementation of extensive restraints on West Berlin without any

⁶(1) "Western Peace Plan, Presented at Geneva by the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, May 14, 1959." (2) "Statement at Geneva by Secretary of State Herter, on Western Proposals Regarding Berlin, May 26, 1959." Both in Documents on Germany, cited above, pp. 461-5; 507-12. Both UNCLAS.

⁷(1) "Statement at Geneva by Foreign Minister Gromyko, Presenting the Soviet Draft Peace Treaty with Germany, May 15, 1959." (2) "Soviet Draft Peace Treaty with Germany Presented at the Foreign Ministers' Meeting at Geneva, May 15, 1959." Both in Documents on Germany, cited above, pp. 465-87. Both UNCLAS.

⁸"Western Proposal on Berlin, Handed to Foreign Minister Gromyko at Geneva on June 16, 1959," in Documents on Germany, cited above, pp. 538-9. UNCLAS.

⁹"Statement at Geneva by Foreign Minister Gromyko, Presenting a Soviet Proposal on Berlin, June 19, 1959," in Documents on Germany, cited above, pp. 539-40. UNCLAS.

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corresponding inspection in East Berlin.¹⁰ The Western Allies proposed instead that the United Nations be invited to send a staff to Berlin to report, to the Secretary General, any propaganda activities that disturbed public order, seriously affected the rights and interests of others, or amounted to interference in the internal affairs of others. The U.S.S.R. rejected this proposal.

When this conference, after a recess from 20 June to 13 July, came to an end on 5 August, the opposing Western and Soviet positions had been clarified but not modified, and no agreement had been reached on any matter of substance.¹¹

19. (U) The Disrupted Summit Conference of 1960

In September 1959 Premier Khrushchev, at President Eisenhower's invitation, visited the United States. During a series of personal conversations,¹² he eased international tension for a short while and suspended temporarily the Soviet threat to sign a separate peace treaty with the East Germans. His visit brought about a number of encouraging developments, such as the promulgation of a new U.S.-Soviet cultural agreement in November and the signing of the Antarctic Treaty by the United States, the Soviet Union, and other countries in December. It also led to high-level talks that brought about agreement for a four-power summit conference in Paris, to begin on 16 May 1960. This conference was not held however, because of the so-called U-2 incident, and its spectacular disruption left the general situation more "up in the air"

¹⁰"Statement at Geneva by Foreign Minister Gromyko, on Soviet Proposals Regarding Berlin, May 30, 1959," in Documents on Germany, cited above, pp. 512-21. UNCLAS.

¹¹(1) "Closing Statement by Secretary of State Herter at the Foreign Ministers Meeting in Geneva, August 5, 1959." (2) "Four-Power Communique Issued at the Close of the Foreign Ministers Meeting in Geneva, August 5, 1959." Both in Documents on Germany, cited above, pp. 577-83. Both UNCLAS.

¹²"Joint Communique by the United States and Soviet Union, Regarding Camp David Conversations of President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev, September 27, 1959," in Documents on Germany, cited above, pp. 584-5. UNCLAS.

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than ever.¹³

This Soviet outburst climaxed a series of events that had begun with Premier Khrushchev's vitriolic, though unsuccessful, attack upon the Secretary General of the United Nations during the meeting of its General Assembly in September-October 1959. On 11 November 1959 the Soviets had protested West German plans to build a broadcasting station in West Berlin.¹⁴ On 14 November Khrushchev had boasted, in a speech, of the Soviet Union's missile power and had begun an attack on Chancellor Adenauer and the Federal Republic of Germany that had increased in intensity as the date of the summit conference neared. About 1 December he had repeated his threat to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany. He had reiterated this threat in an address to the Supreme Soviet on 14 January 1960 and in remarks during a visit to Indonesia later in January. On 4 February the Warsaw Pact signatories had issued a formal commitment to sign such a treaty, and on 25 April Premier Khrushchev, in an address at Baku, Azerbaijan, had repeated the threat in harsher terms.¹⁵ Since the Western Allies had continued to stand together effectively in the face of this barrage of threats, they felt that Khrushchev had seized upon the U-2 incident as an excuse for avoiding a plenary conference at which the Soviet point of view could not possibly have prevailed.¹⁶

20. (U) The Vienna Confrontation and Its Aftermath

a. The Meeting. After his inauguration in January 1961, President Kennedy wanted to have a direct exchange of views with Premier Khrushchev.

¹³(1) "Western Communiqué on the Disruption of the Summit Conference at Paris, May 17, 1960." (2) "Report by Secretary of State Herter to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Events at Paris, May 27, 1960." (3) "Statement by Premier Khrushchev at East Berlin on the U-2 Incident and Disruption of the Paris Summit Conference, May 20, 1960." All in Documents on Germany, cited above, pp. 603-14. All UNCLAS.

¹⁴Dept of State Bul., 4 Jan 60, p. 7 ff. UNCLAS.

¹⁵"Address by Premier Khrushchev at Baku, Azerbaijan, on the German Problem and the Outlook for the Forthcoming Summit Conference, April 25, 1960," in Documents on Germany, cited above, pp. 598-603. UNCLAS.

¹⁶"Report by Secretary of State Herter to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee...May 27, 1960," cited above. UNCLAS.

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The resulting talks took place in Vienna, on 3 and 4 June. "I will tell you now," President Kennedy was to state two days later, "that it was a very somber two days. There was no discourtesy, no loss of tempers, no threat or ultimatum by either side. No advantage or concession was either gained or given; no major decision was either planned or taken; no spectacular progress was either achieved or pretended."¹⁷

b. The Exchange of Notes. At the end of the two days the Premier presented to the President an aide-memoire, on the subject of Germany and Berlin, in which he repeated the Soviet Union's previous demands in very harsh tones:¹⁸

The Soviet Union stands for the immediate conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany . . . The U.S.S.R. deems it necessary . . . to normalize the situation in West Berlin . . . At present the Soviet Government does not see a better way to solve the problem of West Berlin than by transforming it into a demilitarized free city. . . The occupation rights will naturally be terminated upon the conclusion of a German peace treaty, whether it is signed with both German states or only with the German Democratic Republic, within whose territory West Berlin is located. . . The Soviet Government proposes that a peace conference be called immediately, without delay, that a German peace treaty be signed, and that the problem of West Berlin as a free city be solved in this way. . . The Soviet Government considers that not more than 6 months are needed for such negotiations. . . This period is quite sufficient for the G.D.R. and the F.R.G. to establish contacts and to negotiate. . . If the United States does not show that it realizes the necessity of concluding a peace treaty, we shall deplore it, because we shall be obliged to sign a peace treaty . . . with those who wish to sign it. . .

¹⁷"Report to the Nation by President Kennedy Following His Visit to Paris, Vienna, and London, June 6, 1961," in Documents on Germany, cited above, pp. 646-51. UNCLAS.

¹⁸"Aide-Memoire from the Soviet Union to the United States, Handed by Premier Khrushchev to President Kennedy at Vienna, June 4, 1961," in Documents on Germany, cited above, pp. 642-5. UNCLAS.

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After consultation with the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States replied to the Soviet aide-memoire as follows:¹⁹

The United States . . . supports the clearly expressed wish of the West Berliners that no change be made in the status of their city which would expose them, at once or gradually over a long time, to the domination of the regime which presently controls the surrounding areas What the Soviet Government proposes, unless the Three Powers formally abandon their efforts to reunify Germany, is to determine by itself the fate of Germany through an agreement with the authorities of the so-called "German Democratic Republic" The United States considers entirely unfounded the claims that this unilateral act could deprive the other three participants in the joint occupation of Berlin of their basic rights in the city It is evident that the present status of the city does not constitute any threat to peace The immediate threat to peace arises from the announced intention of the Soviet Government to present the three Western Powers with a de facto situation based on the false assumption that they would no longer be entitled to remain in Berlin or to have free access thereto. The United States considers the exercise of its rights together with the British and French Allies, in order to maintain the freedom of over two million people in West Berlin, a fundamental political and moral obligation It hopes that the Soviet Government will renounce any idea of [a fait accompli] which, as noted, would have unforeseeable consequences.

c. Presidential Authority for Buildup of U.S. Military Forces. Seven weeks after returning from Vienna, President Kennedy informed the nation that "so long as the Communists insist that they are preparing to end by themselves unilaterally our rights in West Berlin and our commitments to its people, we must be prepared to defend those rights

¹⁹ "Note from the United States to the Soviet Union, Replying to the Soviet Aide-Memoire Handed to President Kennedy at Vienna, July 17, 1961," in Documents on Germany, cited above, pp. 681-7. UNCLAS.



and those commitments."²⁰ He therefore asked Congress for, and obtained soon thereafter, the authority for ordering a substantial build-up of U.S. military forces.

21. (S) August 1961 and the "Wall"

a. The Mass Exodus. One reaction to the uncompromising attitude of Premier Khrushchev in Vienna and his threats to conclude a peace treaty with the East German regime before the end of 1961 was a marked increase in the westward flight of refugees from East Germany and the Soviet sector of Berlin. Already well over three million people had fled since 1945. More than 1.5 million of these had been registered by the authorities of West Berlin, marking it unmistakably as an "escape hatch" from the Soviet zone, where serious manpower shortages were developing. In November 1960 it had been reported that the winter planting and harvesting there were falling behind. The East Germans had admitted to a shortage of 500,000 workers, in all categories, in East Berlin alone. In the professional field, there were only 380 dentists in the Soviet sector, as compared to 700 in 1959.

During 1960 over 150,000 refugees had entered the Western sectors of Berlin; more than 20,000 of them were of military age--a serious loss in East German military manpower resources. During February 1961 this exodus averaged 2,650 persons per week. By the end of May the weekly average had risen to 3,200. By mid-July it was about 1,800 per day, and for July as a whole the number of refugees exceeded 30,000--largest for any month since 1953. When the figures rose to more than 3,000 a day during early August, it seemed certain that the Communists would take some action to stem the tide.²¹

b. Communist Reaction. The ineffectiveness of border control, new passes, and visitors' permits had been clearly demonstrated in October 1960, when thousands of East Germans eluded these controls to

²⁰ "Report to the Nation on the Berlin Crisis, by President Kennedy, July 25, 1961," in Documents on Germany, cited above, pp. 694-701. UNCLAS.

²¹ (1) Extracted fr files of Maj F. J. Holcomb, USAREUR Intel Div. Gen Coll Sec. CONF. Gp-4. (2) Cable UNN, USBER to Sec State, 27 Jul 61. CONF. (3) USAREUR Ann Hist, 1960, p. 59. TS (info used SECRET). Gp-1. (4) Pamphlet, Every Fifth Person, Fed Min of All-German Affairs, 1962, pp. 1, 17. UNCLAS. (5) Berlin - August 13, Fed Min of All-German Affairs, 1961, p. 5. UNCLAS.

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attend the Billy Graham religious meetings held just inside West Berlin. When the employment of almost 5,000 East German police to guard the borders around West Berlin, the construction of new fences on the French Sector/East Zone border, the dismantling of the pedestrian bridge across the Tetlow canal, and the drafting of members of the "Free German Youth" to assist the East Berlin Transportation Police in making S-Bahn checks at the intracity crossing points proved equally ineffective, the East German regime announced without warning, on 12 August, that all except 13 of the existing 120 border-crossing points between the Soviet and Western Allied sectors of Berlin would be closed, effective immediately, to both vehicular and pedestrian passage in either direction. On 12-13 August the regime began to exercise strict border controls and to turn back hundreds of refugees. During the night East German police, armored cars, and tanks were deployed along the entire border of the Soviet sector. Workers erected barbed-wire barricades and shortly thereafter began the construction of a high cement-block wall, with only a few openings, that eventually cut off the Soviet sector and its inhabitants from the rest of Berlin. A series of decrees prohibited East Germans and East Berliners from entering West Berlin and forced more than 50,000 to give up their jobs there. Within 48 hours the flow of refugees was reduced to about 200 per day. Although the Soviet forces attempted to avoid the appearance of being involved, by 15 August three Soviet divisions had apparently established a ring around Berlin, and Soviet supervisory elements and backup troops were observed to be within the city.²²

c. U.S. Counteraction. The foregoing illegal acts, the West Berliners' demand for positive counteraction, and a statement by West Berlin's Governing Mayor, Willi Brandt, that he would welcome a strengthening of the U.S. garrison in Berlin, led President Kennedy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 18 August, to order a reinforced battle group, with appropriate artillery and engineer units, to be sent to Berlin as a concrete political and psychological demonstration of the U.S. attitude. Thus the 1st Battle Group, 18th Infantry, 8th Division moved to Berlin, over the Helmstedt-Berlin Autobahn, on 19-20 August. Concurrently, the President appointed General Lucius D. Clay (Retired), former United States Military Governor, as his special military adviser in Berlin, and stationed him there. Moreover, the strength of the U.S. Army forces in Europe was increased by about

²²(1) Cable SX-4827, CINCUSAREUR to distr, 15 Aug 61. SECRET.
(2) For a detailed account of the August crisis and the building of the Wall, see USAREUR Ann Hist, 1961, pp. 32-5. TS (info used SECRET). Both Gp-1.

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40,700 by the end of 1961, and the Air Force was strengthened correspondingly. Equipment for two additional Army divisions was "prepositioned" in Europe and, a 2-division force aggregating 51,000 was prepared in the United States to move to Europe at short notice. A test made at the end of 1961 showed that the force could be moved overseas and be operational within 10-14 days, and the United States was prepared to take such action if necessary.²³

22. (S) Reorganization of the Berlin Command Structure

As pointed out earlier, in 1952 U.S. military responsibilities in Berlin were assigned to two agencies, both reporting directly to CINCUSAREUR. They were the Berlin Command--a USAREUR major command with a tactical mission--and the Office of the United States Commander, Berlin (USCOB), who was the American member of the Allied Kommandatura, the personal representative of both CINCUSAREUR and the U.S. Ambassador to Germany, and by direction the single point of U.S. military contact, in Berlin, with the Soviet Government and the other governments participating in the occupation of the city. USCOB dealt frequently with his Soviet and Allied military counterparts, and in some matters reported directly to the U.S. Ambassador.

Even before the onset of the Berlin crisis of August 1961, the overlapping of the functions and responsibilities of USCOB and the Commanding General of the Berlin Command, under the dual organization, had been of considerable concern to CINCUSAREUR. As the crisis intensified, directives from USAREUR to the Berlin Command frequently impinged upon USCOB's responsibilities, sometimes precluding the rapid reaction, execution of orders, and reporting of results called for by the situation.

On 1 December 1961, therefore, the USAREUR forces in Berlin were consolidated into a single over-all command--the U.S. Army, Berlin (USAB)--responsible to CINCUSAREUR, and the channels of command and communication were streamlined. The U.S. Commander, Berlin (USCOB), without relinquishing any of the former functions or responsibilities of his office, was designated also as Commanding General, U.S. Army, Berlin (CG, USAB), and the tactical units formerly constituting the

²³ For a detailed account of the military buildup, see USAREUR Ann Hist, 1961, pp. 17-38. TS (info used SECRET). Gp-1.



Berlin Command became elements of a new command known as the Berlin Brigade, subordinate to U.S. Army, Berlin.²⁴

²⁴(1) Ltr, Gen B. C. Clarke, CINCUSAREUR, to Maj Gen A. H. Watson, II, USCOB, 26 Oct 61. In USAREUR SGS Berlin file, FY 62. SECRET. Gp-1.
(2) USAREUR GO 377, 11 Nov 61, subj: Redesignation and Reorganizations. UNCLAS.

PART II - PLANNING (U)

23. (TS) Introduction

a. (U) The Early Post-War Years. Immediately following the German surrender in 1945, U.S. planning in Berlin focused on the administrative problems of feeding, clothing, and reeducating the civilian population within the framework of the victorious Allies' postwar occupational responsibilities. However, the Berlin blockade and other manifestations of communist aggression, as pointed out earlier, brought about a gradual shift in planning emphasis. With the outbreak of the Korean conflict, the establishment of the East German regime, and the continued worsening of East-West relations, new and urgent importance was attached to preparing plans to meet the Soviet threat against West Berlin.¹

b. (S) The Need for Plans. Specifically, the need for detailed plans to counter civil disturbances in Berlin, or even a military attack against West Berlin, became acute. The maintenance of Western Allied access to the city was also a problem of ever-increasing urgency, since the possibility that the Soviets might again attempt to block the routes from West Germany could no longer be considered remote. Plans had to be made for reinforcing the Western Allied garrisons in Berlin and for evacuating their sponsored noncombatants; for although all such plans had been important even during the earlier post-war period, by 1950 the likelihood of their execution, and therefore the priority and importance attached to their preparation, had increased.²

¹Draft Manuscript, Changing Concepts of Strategy in the Ground Defense of Western Europe (U), 31 Dec 59, pp. iv-v. AG TS 17-10. In USAREUR Ops Div. TS (info used UNCLAS). Gp-1.

²

EUCOM Ann Narr Rept, 1950, pp. i, iii. SECRET. Gp-1.



Berlin plans therefore fell into two broad categories: those for occupying and rebuilding the city and those for "containing" the Soviet Union.³ In this study only the latter will be considered.

c. (TS) Planning Responsibilities. USAREUR—and its predecessor, EUCOM—played a significant role in the development of plans to meet the Soviet threat in Berlin. When the joint United States European Command (USEUCOM) headquarters was established in Frankfurt, in 1952, USAREUR, as one of its component commands, was given over-all responsibility for developing and coordinating all Berlin planning activities. In 1954 the Joint Chiefs of Staff shifted this planning responsibility to USCINCEUR, but much of it was redelegated, so that USAREUR, through the U.S. Commander, Berlin (USCOB) and the Berlin Command, continued to be the primary coordinating link between the United States, the United Kingdom, and France in the preparation of tripartite Berlin plans. In this connection USAREUR provided Berlin Command with guidance for the preparation of defense plans and coordinated with USAFE joint plans for airlifting supplies to Berlin and for evacuating noncombatants. In 1954, moreover, a revised U.S. policy directive on Berlin assigned USAREUR the principal responsibility for developing plans and maintaining a readiness posture for testing Soviet intentions to block the surface routes to Berlin and, if necessary, reopening and completely controlling those routes.⁴

³
(1) Frederiksen, cited above, p. 140. UNCLAS. (2) Changing Concepts, cited above, p. v. TS (info used UNCLAS). (3) EUCOM Ann Narr Rept, 1950, p. iii. SECRET. Gp-1.

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(1) TS Suppl, USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1955, pp. 28-30. TS. (2) USCINCEUR OPLAN 200-10, "Berlin Contingency Plan C," 1 Feb 60. TS. (3) USAREUR Mission Regis, 19 Oct 61, pp. 4-6. SECRET. All Gp-1.



Chapter 6

Planning for the Defense of Berlin (U)

24. (TS) Tripartite Planning

a. (S) A Threatened "Invasion" of West Berlin. In divided Berlin, where occupying forces of the East and West faced each other daily, the undercurrents of these forces' basic differences rose rapidly to the surface. In January 1950 the communist-inspired Free German Youth Organization announced that more than 500,000 East German youths would parade and demonstrate in the western sectors of Berlin during their Whitsuntide rally (Deutschlandtreffen), in May. Feeling that such an "invasion" of West Berlin might constitute a serious threat, the Western Allied powers made counter-preparations accordingly. Their announcement, with physical evidence to support it, that they would employ military forces to back up the West Berlin authorities, stimulated the morale of the West Berlin population and police. It also served, evidently, to deter the East German communists because, as it turned out, there was no serious disturbance during this period.¹

b. (TS) The Need for Tripartite Planning. Following the Whitsuntide rally a tripartite study of the capabilities of the Western Allied forces in Germany to withstand an attack by East German forces was drafted by representatives of the American, British, and French Commanders-in-Chief in Germany. The combined study concluded that, if all available East German forces were concentrated for a deliberate attack against the Western sectors of the city, the Allied forces would probably not be able to offer effective resistance. The most suitable countermeasures to be taken immediately were to improve the combat effectiveness of the Western

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EUCOM Ann Narr Rept, 1950, pp. 5-6. SECRET. Gp-1.



Allied forces and to augment those forces by creating West Berlin police-type units capable of limited combat operations. The study group agreed that Soviet aggression should be countered by force of arms, without hesitation, and recommended that the Allied Commanders-in-Chief in Germany approve its conclusions and forward the study to their governments.

Shortly after the completion of the study, however, a new idea arose--that of establishing, in Berlin, a permanent tripartite staff for contingency planning.²

c. (TS) Creation of the Allied Staff, Berlin. The proposal to organize a permanent tripartite staff for the coordination of Western Allied plans and action in Berlin was approved.³ The U.S. Commandant in Berlin recommended that the staff should work with the Berlin Commandants on internal security plans and that it should also represent the three Allied Commanders-in-Chief in discussions with officials of the Allied High Commission for Germany (HICOG) about the non-military plans required to support Berlin, such as stockpiling, economic programs, and propaganda. In September 1950 an interim tripartite planning group, known as the Allied Liaison Officers Standing Committee, was formed to study all aspects of the defense of Berlin. Later that year this committee was renamed the Allied Liaison Committee and before the end of 1950 it was finally designated as the Allied Staff, Berlin. (See Chart 1).⁴

d. (TS) The Proposal for Creating a Unified Emergency Command. With the new emphasis on Berlin defense planning, the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense, in January 1951, approved a proposal for the unification of the Allied military command in West Berlin. When the proposal was discussed at length in the Allied High Commission, the U.S. representatives recommended that a single commander be designated from among the three Commandants. The British High Commissioner took no official position, but suggested that a single military commander be appointed and that the Commandants be replaced by civilians. The French also took no official position, but expressed a preference for continuing the existing arrangement under which one of the Commandants assumed over-all command in times of crisis. No agreement was reached, but discussions continued during the years to follow.⁵

²

TS Suppl, EUCOM Ann Narr Rept, 1950, pp. 111-2. TS. Gp-1.

³

Berlin Mil Post Comd Rept, 1951, p. 75. SECRET. No Gp.

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(1) TS Suppl, EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, p. 86. TS. Gp-1. (2) Berlin Mil Post Comd Rept, 1951, p. 75. SECRET. No Gp.

⁵

TS Suppl, EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, p. 86. TS. Gp-1.

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e. (TS) The First Tripartite Plan. During 1951-52 the Allied Staff drew up its first tripartite plan for the defense of Berlin, to be executed in case of civil disturbance and/or an attack by enemy military forces. Known as Operations Instructions No. 3, the plan envisaged the establishment of defense perimeters around the three national sector bases--Tempelhof Air Base in the U.S. sector, the Olympic Stadium in the British sector, and Napoleon Barracks (adjacent to Tegel Airfield) in the French sector. (See Map 3). Each of the three Allied garrisons would be responsible for defending its own base; or, if the situation demanded, the three national forces would be regrouped to defend any one of the three strong points.⁶

Each of the Allied Commandants prepared unilateral plans, based on Operations Instructions No. 3, to carry out his particular responsibilities. To test these plans, Exercise FAIR TRIAL was conducted at the Olympic Stadium in November 1953, and a similar exercise was held at Tempelhof Air Base in March 1954.

These exercises and the studies which followed them demonstrated that Operations Instructions No. 3 and its unilateral support plans had one common fault--they would not work. By making separate initial stands at three different points, the Western Allied garrisons would probably be unable to offer more than token resistance. Moreover, the likelihood that they would be able to regroup later, for a combined defense, would be slim.

Meanwhile the ground work for a new defense plan was being laid.⁷

f. (TS) A New Concept. The wartime mission of the Western Allied garrisons in Berlin was redefined during the spring of 1953. Though there were differences of opinion over specifics, the agreed aim was to "keep the flag flying" as long as possible. The British argued against any peacetime political considerations that might interfere with either the making or the execution of general war plans; but both the British and the French Commanders-in-Chief in Germany agreed on the new mission, after CINCUSAREUR had assured them that, whatever wording on the three governments agreed upon, the Berlin Commandants would still be allowed to make a sound military plan for the employment of their forces in the event of a general war.

6

- (1) Berlin Mil Post Comd Rept, 1951, p. 77. SECRET. No Gp.
(2) Draft Study on Berlin, 24 Sep 57, in TS Suppl, USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1958, pp. 20-8. TS. Gp-1.

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- (1) Tng Memo 28, Berlin Comd, 13 Nov 53. (2) Tng Memo 6, as changed, Berlin Comd, 11 Feb 54. Both in Berlin Comd Hist Rept, 1 Jan 53-30 Jun 54, pp. 108; 115-6. Both SECRET. No Gp.

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Upon receiving the revised mission, the Commandants analyzed their own limitations in the light of Soviet capabilities and agreed that their ability to carry out a unified, protracted defense of Berlin would depend upon achieving a maximum concentration of forces from the beginning of hostilities and in the most suitable part of West Berlin. Since the position would have to be prepared in advance, the choice was limited to one of the three national bases. Of these, the British base occupied the highest ground, contained the best terrain for defense, and afforded the strongest natural obstacles. For these reasons the Commandants selected the Olympic Stadium in the British sector as the most suitable position. They decided, however, to prepare all three bases in case the need for protecting noncombatants, the inability to concentrate their forces, or some unexpected occurrence should force them to execute an alternate plan. Therefore, in addition to prestocking the British base with all requirements for the entire Allied force, the American and French Commandants had to stock, at their national bases, sufficient provisions to meet the requirements of their own troops and noncombatants for a 10-day period--the maximum for which the Commandants believed a defense could be maintained.

From all considerations, the Commandants assumed that four courses of action would be open to the Soviet Forces. These were: to launch an attack against West Berlin with whatever forces were available without mobilization; to blockade West Berlin, seal off the Allied garrisons, and eliminate them by air attack, artillery fire, or starvation; to support mob action on the part of either West or East Berlin citizens; or to stage an all-out and preplanned attack on West Berlin.

The most probable of these possibilities was the fourth--that the Soviets would commence hostilities with a planned all-out attack aimed at reducing the Allied garrisons as quickly as possible. In counter-action to such an attack, the Commandants considered a plan to defend the stadium to be the soundest, but since survival would depend upon quick decision, they would have to be prepared for all four contingencies. For this reason, they prepared an outline defense plan covering all of the contingencies and the possibility of carrying out the defense of all or any one of the three national bases. In January 1954 they were authorized to prepare detailed defense plans, based on the outline plan.⁸

⁸ USCOB Study, 3 Nov 53, subj; Estimate of the Military Situation in West Berlin in the Event of War, in TS Suppl, USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jan 53 - 30 Jun 54, pp. 31; 33-4. TS. Gp-1.

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g. (S) Demolitions. In 1952 the Allied Staff had issued instructions for the use of strategic and tactical demolitions in the event of an enemy attack. The instructions had outlined the specific targets which would or would not be demolished in conformance with the then-current defense plans. Each Commandant was held responsible for the demolition of targets in his sector. No guidance, however, was provided concerning the means of demolition or the priority of the targets.⁹

During the first six months of 1954, when the tripartite demolition plan for Berlin was refined and the selection of tactical and strategic targets revised, tactical targets were given first priority. It was agreed that all demolitions of targets specifically outlined by the Allied Staff could be carried out in each sector in approximately 18 hours. The inference was that no peacetime chambering would be done and that all demolitions would be prepared in the face of hostilities.¹⁰

h. (S) The Second Defense Plan. Based on the "keep the flag flying" policy and the Commandants' outline, the Allied Staff prepared Operations Instructions No. 5, dated 27 September 1954. This defense plan provided for an initial state of readiness during which noncombatants would be evacuated, followed by a second stage in which either the Allied base or the national bases would be occupied and defended. The national bases would be defended only if evacuation of noncombatants had not taken place or had been interrupted, if movement between sectors had become impossible, or if enemy pressure became so great that a force could not disengage. Appended to the plan was an outline for tactical and strategic demolitions, the execution of which, however, would be subject to the time available.¹¹

i. (TS) The French and British Attitudes. Though the British and French approved Operations Instructions No. 5, they expressed renewed doubts concerning the feasibility of making a determined defensive stand in Berlin. In 1953 the British had recommended the issuance of instructions to the Commandants covering negotiations for a possible surrender, if and when it was decided that the city could not be held. At that time CINCUSAREUR had objected, on the grounds that a surrender was a political

⁹Berlin Mil Post Comd Rept, 1952, pp. 61-2. SECRET. No Gp.

¹⁰Ltr, ASB, 6 Apr 54, subj: Demolitions - Berlin - Policy, in Berlin Comd Hist Rept, 1 Jan 53 - 30 Jun 54, pp. 111-2. SECRET. No Gp.

¹¹ASB Ops Instr No. 5, 27 Sep 54, in Berlin Comd Hist Rept. FY 1955, pp. 96-7. SECRET. No Gp.



matter, to be discussed by the respective governments. Upon the publication of Operations Instructions No. 5 the British restated their recommendation, but CINCUSAREUR again objected, holding that surrender instructions were neither required nor were they even appropriate topics of discussion. The French Commander-in-Chief in Germany suggested that, if and when it was unanimously agreed that all means of accomplishing the defensive mission had been exhausted, the Commandants should carry out the destruction of resources, assure the security of noncombatants, and order military personnel to escape individually and rejoin other Allied forces as soon as possible. In USAREUR's opinion, however, there was little difference between the French and British views, and the United States therefore non-concurred in both. When other similar plans--such as thinning out the Western Allied garrisons before a Soviet attack, dispersing, attempting to break out to the West, or going underground and continuing the battle as partisans--were proposed, USAREUR's position remained unchanged.¹²

j. (TS) The Forward Concept. Operations Instructions No. 5 remained in effect until September 1956. The preparation of a new plan, however, had been initiated almost a year before when, at a November 1955 meeting, the Berlin Commandants and the Chiefs of Staff of the Allied Commanders-in-Chief in Germany formulated a new concept of "forward" defense. The Allies agreed at that time that making a stand at the British base would not fulfill the defense mission as effectively as would a determined stand on the perimeters of the western sectors. Early withdrawal to the stadium would not only fail to contain as many enemy forces as possible, but would expose the Allied garrisons to being bypassed, isolated, and exterminated at leisure. On the other hand, meeting the enemy forces at the borders of the western sectors would force them to disclose their intentions immediately, contain them in maximum numbers, and keep them from penetrating deeply into the western half of the city. The Western Allies would not only better accomplish their mission, but would win the support of West Berliners and demonstrate that they were defending all of West Berlin, and not merely the Allied garrisons. The directive to be issued under the new concept could also make provision for a withdrawal, under pressure, to the Olympic Stadium for an ultimate stand.

In May 1956 USAREUR forwarded to the British and French Commanders-in-Chief a draft of a proposed defense directive incorporating the new concept, and also providing for certain demolition activities outside Berlin. The draft directive was approved and forwarded to the Commandants

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(1) TS Suppl, USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jan 53 - 30 Jun 54, pp. 35-7. (2) TS Suppl, USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1955, pp. 35-6. (3) Draft Study on Berlin, cited above. All TS. Gp-1.

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shortly afterward, and in September, Operations Instructions No. 6, based on the tripartite directive, was published.

During the first phase of the new plan, the Allied garrisons were to be brought to a high degree to combat readiness, the West Berlin police alerted and deployed, and demolitions groups equipped. During the second phase, the garrisons would deploy to cover all likely avenues of enemy approach into their respective sectors; withdrawal routes from the sectors to the Allied base at the Olympic Stadium would be secured, and demolition groups would be dispatched in accordance with the situation. During the third phase, the defenders would make a coordinated withdrawal to the stadium and the planned demolitions would be executed. The fourth and final phase would consist of the defense of the stadium area.

Operations Instructions No. 6 also provided that, if noncombatants could not be evacuated, they would be moved to certain specified locations as early as possible. The enemy commander would then be informed that these locations were "open areas" that should not be subjected to attack. If noncombatants could not be moved, they would be instructed to take shelter in cellars of substantial buildings.¹³

k. (TS) Further Attempts to Establish a Unified Command. Meanwhile USAREUR continued to insist on the need for designating a single Allied commander in Berlin before the outbreak of hostilities. Although the Commandants had agreed, by 1955, that in an emergency a single commander would be necessary, the British and French governments did not approve the U.S. proposal. The British held that, while the military advantages of designating a commander in peacetime were considerable, they were outweighed by the political disadvantages. They felt that the appointment of a wartime commander before the outbreak of hostilities would give the Russians grounds for alleging that the Allies were making warlike preparations or impairing the quadripartite status of Berlin.

As a result, by the end of 1957 USAREUR concluded that the Commandants would probably be unable to reach a tripartite agreement on a single commander in peacetime, and recommended that further efforts, if desirable, be undertaken at the governmental level. The Commandants agreed informally, however, that in the event of war one of them should

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(1) Draft Study on Berlin, cited above. TS. (2) USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1957, pp. 138-9. SECRET. (3) TS Suppl, USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1957, pp. 46-7. TS. All Gp-1.

act as a combined-force commander.¹⁴

1. (TS) New Instructions for the Accomplishment of Demolitions. Following the adoption of the "forward" defense concept, the Western Allied Commanders-in-Chief agreed that a new demolitions directive for Berlin was needed. The question remained open, however, because of disagreement on whether priority should be given to strategic or to tactical targets. While the French and British advocated the former, USAREUR objected on the ground that the forces might be unduly burdened with strategic demolition tasks that would divert them from their primary mission of defending the city.¹⁵ The French countered with a proposed combined defense-demolitions plan which again called for the dispersal of the Western Allied garrisons following the execution of demolitions. Having already voiced its objections to the dispersal concept, USAREUR prepared a separate demolitions draft directive that was eventually approved by the Allies as an annex to Operations Instructions No. 6.

While placing primary emphasis on tactical demolitions, the new directive also specified the destruction of certain strategic targets. In addition it provided for the demolition of specified targets located outside West Berlin, to facilitate the execution of the primary wartime defense mission. In selecting these targets outside Berlin, the Commandants were to coordinate the establishment of sectors of national responsibility in the Soviet Zone territory surrounding the city. After demolition targets in each sector had been listed in order of priority, each sector commander would review the lists and advise his colleagues as to which he would attack. The timing and methods of attack would remain a national responsibility of each Commandant.¹⁶

m. (TS) Airfield Denial. The potential value of the three West Berlin airfields to hostile air forces had become a matter of concern as early as 1954. A Western Allied staff study on the possibility of denying the airfields to the enemy in the event of war revealed that

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Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 11 Sep 56, subj: Status of Berlin Planning (U), in TS Suppl, USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1957, p. 49. TS. NOFORN. Gp-1.

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TS Suppl, USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1956, pp. 35-6. TS. Gp-1.

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(1) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to USCOB, 1 Sep 56, subj: War Planning for the Allied Garrison, Berlin (C). (2) Ltr, same to same, 2 Jan 57, Subj: Demolitions to Be Performed in the Defense of Berlin. Both in TS Suppl, USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1957, pp. 47-8. Both TS. No Gp.

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existing plans provided for the destruction of the vital installations at each airfield, but not for the destruction of the runways. If these airfields were seized intact, the Soviets would be able to launch atomic-strike aircraft within easy tactical range of the air forces in Western Europe. Moreover, a Western Allied attack upon the fields after their seizure might have both political and psychological repercussions on the German people. USAREUR therefore reexamined two possible courses for destroying the airfields: the use of conventional demolitions to destroy the facilities before withdrawing--a tripartite matter--and the employment of atomic demolitions--a unilateral responsibility to be undertaken in coordination with USCOB.

In 1955 both French and U.S. representatives maintained that preparations for demolitions should be made in advance. The British, however, objected because of a lack of funds and engineering means, as well as because of their doubt that such an operation could be carried out secretly. They proposed instead that a limited-yield atomic device be used to accomplish the destruction. Having previously investigated this alternative, USAREUR did not agree to it because of the extensive casualties that might result.

To break the apparent deadlock, the Allied Commanders-in-Chief appointed a tripartite committee to consider the technical aspects involved. In January 1956 the committee recommended that main reliance should be placed upon conventional peacetime chambering and the use of high explosives. To keep such an operation secret, it was suggested that the work be done concurrently with the installation of equipment or facilities on the airfields.

In February 1957 the Commandants agreed that chambering of the airfields could be undertaken either overtly or covertly. If overtly, the West Berlin authorities and the Federal Republic would be fully informed of the program and political support would be required to obtain financing from Berlin occupation cost funds. If covertly, it would be undertaken as a secret part of an airfield improvement scheme. Because of the political implications involved, the Commanders-in-Chief asked their respective Ambassadors for advice through national channels before making any further decisions. Meanwhile, each Berlin Commandant prepared detailed studies of the airfield in his sector, including estimates of precisely what denial measures could be accomplished in an airfield improvement program and of what their cost would be. In April, however, the American Embassy indicated that tripartite political coordination had been delayed because of the need for further study of the political implications of the plan.¹⁷

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(1) TS Suppl, USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1955, p. 36. (2) TS Suppl, USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1956, pp. 37-8. (3) TS Suppl, USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1957, pp. 48-9. All TS. Gp-1.

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n. (S) Significant Changes in Concepts. Although the concept of forward defense remained valid, Operations Instructions No. 7—published in 1959—and Operations Instructions 1/61 called for the deployment of screening forces along a line that was in general far short of the city borders in the U.S. Sector, and for the establishment of an initial defense line generally following the S-Bahn line. If necessary, a phased withdrawal to the Olympic Stadium would follow.¹⁸ Within the framework of these basic planning concepts, two new and significant ideas were incorporated into Western Allied defense plans. One involved the use of West Berlin police and the other envisaged measures to counter large-scale civil disorders.

(1) The New Role of the West Berlin Police. Over a number of years the Commandants had given increasing consideration to improving the defensive capability of the West Berlin police. A special element of the police forces, referred to as Force "B", had been established and trained to reinforce the "ordinary" police units in emergency situations. In 1953 the Commandants had agreed that, in the event of an armed attack, Force "B" would be employed as a military unit. Two years later they had recommended that authority be granted to employ all police units in the defense of the city. This recommendation was not fully approved, however, because of a fear of possible enemy reprisals against the police. Instead, the Commandants were authorized to increase the capabilities of Force "B", which was to be trained in the use of grenades, mines, and mine field patterns. Meanwhile, two new types of highly-mobile riot control alert units—the Einsatzkommandos and the Revierhundertschaften—were organized within the regular police establishment.¹⁹

By 1959 tripartite plans placed heavy reliance on assistance by police units which were assigned the responsibilities of screening the zonal and sector borders, quelling civil disturbances, and providing early warning of hostile attacks. In addition, elements of Force "B" and the Einsatzkommandos would occupy certain striking points on the defense perimeter in case of civil disturbance, and would be charged with reserve responsibilities in the defense of other areas. Another major emergency task assigned to the police would be the blocking of the S- and U-Bahns (subway and surface transit systems). However, the employment of police units in an attempt to defend the borders against a military attack was not planned, and the police were never informed that they had any defense

¹⁸ (1) U.S. Army, Berlin, Hist Rept, 1961, p. 50. (2) ASB Ops Instr 1/61, dtd 1 Oct 61. Cy in USAREUR Ops Div Trp Ops Br files. Both SECRET. Gp-1.

¹⁹ USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1957, pp. 140-2. SECRET. Gp-1.

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missions.²⁰

In November 1959 the Allied Staff recommended other improvements in the combat potential of the police force. It emphasized the issuance of better weapons to Force "B", then armed with outdated French rifles of inferior fire power. In January 1960, therefore, the Department of the Army authorized the issuance of 2,784 M-1 rifles, with ammunition, to the Berlin police. Of these, 1,869 were issued to Force "B" and the remaining 915 to Force "A", for use in riot control and conventional warfare.²¹

Operations Instructions 1/61, published in October 1961, clarified the command, control, and use of the police in emergency situations. It provided for complete Allied control of Force "B", the alert units, and those policemen attached to Allied headquarters. These units could not be deployed without the consent of the Allied Commandants. Furthermore, if a situation arose that the police were unable to cope with alone, the Allied troop commanders would assume command of the entire police force and mount a combined military-police defense operation. The missions of the police were to maintain normal law and order, keeping troop commanders and the Commandants informed as to the movement and possible intentions of crowds; to protect the military routes within the Allied sectors; to provide mobile forces capable of supporting engaged police units and assisting in repelling armed attacks; and to perform certain emergency duties. In conformance with these missions the new Berlin Command defense plan, prepared in support of the tripartite plan, assigned to Force "B" units the task of actually holding a portion of the defense line in the U.S. sector.²²

(2) Plans to Counter Large-Scale Civil Disorders. In July 1960 the Allies received information that the Communists planned to seize control of West Berlin without committing East German or Soviet military forces. This would be done by deliberately combining the use of large, riotous crowds with commando-type attacks against points that were essential for controlling the western sectors. Since existing plans

²⁰ (1) Berlin Comd OPLAN 1-59, 23 Jul 59. (2) DF, USAREUR Ops Div Trp Ops Br to Hist Sec, 19 Nov 62, subj: Monograph Comments. AEAGC-CO. Both SECRET. Gp-1.

²¹ (1) DF, USAREUR DCSOPS to CofS, 18 Nov 60, subj: Ammunition Allowance for West Berlin Police (S). AEAGC-OP. (2) Cable SX-6694, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 28 Nov 60. Both SECRET. No Gp.

²² (1) ASB Ops Instr 1/61, 1 Oct 61, cited above. (2) Intvw PFC D.J. Hickman, 9th Mil Hist Det, with Maj C. W. Elliot and Capt J. L. Yaden, Berlin Bde G3 Planning Officers, 18 Jul 62. Both SECRET. Both Gp-1.



were not fully responsive to such an attack, the Commandants directed the Allied Staff to prepare a new emergency deployment plan.²³

The resulting plan—Operation WINTER STORM—outlined the automatic deployment of the Allied garrisons and the West Berlin police to counter a surprise attack by enemy civilian and paramilitary forces. Upon the Chairman Commandant's order to execute the plan, troop commanders would automatically take control of all police units and would deploy both troop units and police forces. The strategic points vital to the defense of West Berlin would be secured or recaptured, as soon as possible and, at the same time, a reserve would be formed to counter a military threat and reestablish Allied control. The police would close the S- and U-Bahns immediately, block the canals, keep railway yards under observation, and arrest all persons who might actively assist the enemy. In October 1961, after the Berlin garrison had been reinforced by an additional battle group, a special "Commandants' Reserve", composed of two reinforced rifle companies, was designated to hold the Olympic Stadium as an ultimate defense position.²⁴

o. (S) Subsequent Plans. In February and May 1961 the basic Allied defense plan contained in the Operations Instructions No. 7 was tested during Exercises TRIDENT III and IV. In the subsequently published Operations Instructions 1/61, minor adjustments were made in the initial defense perimeter near the East/West border, the "open area" sanctuary concept was abandoned, dependents were to move to the Olympic Stadium area, and the plan to establish an outpost line just outside the final defense position was deleted. In addition, all tripartite civil disorder and defense plans were incorporated into the one document.²⁵

The new instructions provided for three types of operations: automatic deployment to counter a surprise civil attack (Operation WINTER STORM) as described above; an operation to deal with gradually developing, large-scale civil disturbances; and deployment to meet an attack by enemy military forces. An alert stage would precede any one of these operations.

(1) Gradually Developing Civil Disorders. The planned operation to quell gradually developing large-scale civil disorders consisted of three successive phases that could be executed simultaneously, depending

²³ USAREUR Ann Hist, 1960, p. 60. TS (info used SECRET). Gp-1.

²⁴ (1) U.S. Army, Berlin, Hist Rept, 1961, p. 48. (2) ASB Ops Instr 1/61, cited above. Both SECRET. Gp-1.

²⁵ U.S. Army, Berlin, Hist Rept, 1961, pp. 50;54. SECRET. Gp-1.

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upon the situation. If a civil disturbance endangered the security of West Berlin, the police president would order the execution of Operation KUGELBLITZ, involving the deployment of additional police units to break up the disturbance. Immediately upon execution of KUGELBLITZ the Chairman Commandant would alert the Allied garrison, if this had not already been done. In the case of gradually increasing civil disorders, the Allied Commandants would order execution of PAX ROMANA, a plan under which Allied units would be deployed to locations from which they could be quickly committed to assist the police in maintaining law and order. Allied forces would also deploy to protect vital Allied installations. The protection of other such installations and the quelling of disorders would remain a police responsibility during this phase. If events indicated that the police might not be able to control the situation, the Allied Commandants would implement Operation JULIUS CAESAR. During this phase the police would be placed under the operational control of troop commanders, and combined military/police operations would be conducted to restore law and order.

In the event of a surprise civil disturbance or a move by the Communists to take control of West Berlin with paramilitary forces under the guise of civil disorders, the Allied Commandants would order implementation of Operation WINTER STORM. Thus the actions directed by PAX ROMANA and JULIUS CAESAR would be executed immediately.²⁶

(2) An All-Out Military Attack. Operations Instructions 1/61 did not change, to any major extent, the tripartite plan to counter an attack on West Berlin by military forces. The plan—Operation TROJAN TRIUMPH—consisted of three phases: the occupation of a reconnaissance and security line near the East/West border and an outer defense line generally following the trace of the S-Bahn; a withdrawal to an intermediate defense line; and a final withdrawal to the main defense position in the Olympic Stadium area. The outer defense positions would be held as long as possible, so as to compel the enemy to deploy his forces and reveal the scope of his threat, to allow time for preparing the final position and for evacuating the noncombatants, and to permit emplacing and blowing demolitions as far forward of the final position as possible.

(3) Demolition Plans. As previously mentioned, the Western Allies had long experienced difficulties in reaching agreement as to which category of demolitions should be given priority. ASB Operations Instructions 1/61 provided that the execution of demolitions, either

²⁶Ltr, USAB to CINCUSAREUR, 28 Nov 62, subj: Review of Draft Monograph "The U.S. Army in Berlin, 1945-1961" (U). AEBAB-GC. In USAREUR Ops Div Hist Sec files. SECRET. Gp-1.



tactical or strategic, would be at the discretion of each troop commander, acting within his own national sector. Should military attack seem imminent, the preparation of demolitions would start simultaneously in each sector. The execution of demolitions would be governed by the time factor. If the Allied base had to be occupied hurriedly or under enemy pressure, only enough time and engineer effort to deal with certain demolitions might be available. If, on the other hand, there was a period of mounting tension, with war seeming inevitable, there might be sufficient time to prepare a wide range of both tactical and strategic demolitions. The instructions also provided for the demolition of specific targets in and around Berlin outside the Western Sectors.²⁷

(4) The Allied Position on Airfield Denial. Up to the end of 1961, neither tripartite nor unilateral Berlin defense plans provided for the effective denial of the three West Berlin airfields to enemy aircraft. The British and French governments continued to refuse the use of any type of peacetime chambering method, and the United States had not approved plans that would utilize atomic devices after the beginning of hostilities. The most recent plans therefore envisaged inflicting maximum damage on airfield facilities, thereby handicapping their use by the enemy but leaving the runways intact. Plans to destroy the bases completely had been deemphasized, primarily because of Allied disagreement but also because the facilities and capabilities of the Soviet Schoenefeld Airfield, located just outside West Berlin, had been continually increased and the value of the three West Berlin airfields to the Soviets had been proportionately reduced.²⁸

(5) Planning for the Event of an Uprising in East Berlin and/or East Germany.

(a) The Quadripartite Rules of Conduct. When the erection of the Berlin "wall" in August 1961 increased the possibilities of frequent incidents along the sector border, the three Western Allies and the Federal Republic of Germany prepared plans for quadripartite action to be taken in the event of an uprising in East Berlin or in the zonal area surrounding West Berlin. The "rules of conduct" included in the plans were approved by the Four Powers in December.

According to these rules of conduct, attempts to escape from East Berlin or East German territory should not lead to any active intervention

²⁷ ASB Ops Instr 1/61, 1 Oct 61, cited above. SECRET. Gp-1.

²⁸ Intvw, PFC Hickman with Maj Elliot and Capt Yaden, 18 Jul 62, cited above. SECRET. Gp-1.

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by Western Allied elements. However, any refugee who gained West Berlin or West German soil should be given instant asylum and protection. Soviet or East German fire directed at refugees who had reached West Berlin or West German territory should be returned, and pursuit of these refugees into "free" territory should not be tolerated. Allied or West German troops were not to cross the border to support East German insurgents, nor should they assist them with arms or ammunition. They might be given food and medical supplies, however.

The rules of conduct were to be incorporated into instructions issued to personnel whose duties brought them in close proximity to the Communists.²⁹

(b) Comments. The reaction to the rules of conduct was mixed. Assuming that there would be no decision to intervene, CINCUS-AREUR believed that the rules would cover the contingencies for which they were designed, but added that detailed instructions that might fit all possible contingencies could not be prepared in advance. He recommended a set of instructions to implement the proposed rules, and disagreed to any increase in boundary patrolling. USCOB commented that the rules did not clearly indicate whether the Western Allies wished to see a rebellion perpetuated or quickly crushed. He also recommended that additional contingencies be covered.

Both the U.S. Ambassador at Bonn and General Lucius D. Clay (Ret.), the President's personal representative in Berlin, were highly critical of the rules. The Ambassador raised objections to the assumptions on which the rules had been based, and agreed with USCOB that more contingencies should be covered. General Clay argued that detailed instructions of this nature were of no value; that the situation in Berlin could not be controlled by Washington, Paris, or Heidelberg; and that the Berlin Commandant should be given guidance and allowed within that framework to use his own judgement in meeting emergency situations. Clay felt very strongly that "we must get away from any thought that emergency problems can wait for instructions from on high."³⁰

25. (TS) Unilateral Planning

a. (S) Defense of the U.S. Garrison. The Berlin Military Post's internal security plans, which had been prepared initially for the

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Cable JCS-2442, JCS to USCINCEUR, 2 Dec 61. SECRET. Gp-1.

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USAREUR Ann Hist, 1961, pp. 63-5. TS (info used SECRET). Gp-1.

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Whitsuntide rally in 1950, were revised repeatedly and maintained until late 1956 as the only plans that dealt with the defense of the U.S. garrison only. While all other U.S. defense plans had been prepared in conjunction with tripartite instructions and had envisaged the defense of either Tempelhof Airport or the entire U.S. sector, the internal security plans had been prepared primarily to establish standards of readiness and to prescribe courses of action applicable to the various stages of a civil disturbance that might threaten the internal security of Berlin Command. At the same time, provisions were made for a final defense of certain strong points, such as Tempelhof Air Base or McNair Barracks, should the disturbances be large-scale and pose a dangerous threat.³¹

In 1956, however, another contingency was taken into consideration: that a sudden military attack might be launched without any prior warning, creating a situation that would preclude the implementation of tripartite defense plans. Though this contingency was remote, in early 1957 Berlin Command prepared the first plan in its "Emergency Action" series. This series, which continued to be in effect through 1960, provided for the organization of a defense perimeter around the general area in which the U.S. headquarters was located. Units not located within the perimeter were to make every effort to gain the perimeter, fighting to join if necessary.³²

In late 1961 Berlin Command initiated the development of a new unilateral defense plan that would depart from the former concept. Instead of attempting to concentrate all U.S. forces in the headquarters area, the units located in each caserne would initially defend and secure their own areas. If and when each area was secured, efforts would be made to "branch out," to join forces, and finally to form a perimeter around the entire U.S. military area. This plan--Berlin Command Operations Plan 3-1--was still in the draft stage at the close of 1961.³³

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(1) Berlin Mil Post Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 56-7. (2) Berlin Mil Post Comd Rept, 1952, p. 62. (3) Berlin Comd Hist Rept, 1 Jan 53 - 30 Jun 54, p. 108. All SECRET. No Gp.

32

(1) Berlin Comd Hist Rept, FY 1957, p. 112. (2) Berlin Comd Hist Rept, FY 1958, p. 115. (3) Berlin Comd Hist Rept, FY 1959, p. 73. All SECRET. No Gp.

33

(1) Draft, Berlin Comd OPLAN 3-1, undated. In Berlin Bde G-3 Plans Br 1962 files. (2) Intvw, PFC Hickman with Maj Elliot and Capt Yaden, 18 Jul 62, cited above. Both SECRET. Gp-1.

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b. (TS) Reinforcing the Garrison in Cases of Major Civil Disturbances. In November 1956 USAREUR prepared a contingency plan providing for the reinforcement of the U.S. garrison with men and equipment to improve its defensive capabilities.³⁴ As forwarded to USCINCEUR for approval in February 1957, this draft USAREUR EP 104 was based on the concept that troops and supplies would be marshalled and airlifted from bases in West Germany. Supplies and forces would fall into the following three general categories: medical supplies and equipment as required; small arms to equip forces mobilized to reinforce the West Berlin police; and troop units, ranging in size from a reinforced company to a reinforced infantry battalion. The troops would be furnished by Seventh Army and would be airlifted from Neubiberg Airbase to West Berlin, where they would pass to the control of USCOB.³⁵

USAREUR EP 104 was revised in December 1957 to provide for Berlin reinforcement by two infantry companies to be airlifted from Rhein/Main Air Base, instead of from Neubiberg as outlined in the earlier plan. Logistical support would be supplied by USACOMZEUR and delivered to the Toul-Rosiere Airfield for airlift to Berlin.³⁶

In April 1959 EP 104 was rescinded³⁷ and USAREUR EP 115 substituted. The new plan was based on the same basic concept as EP 104 but provided for a larger unit to be airlifted and for the periods when elements of the Berlin Garrison would be away from Berlin for training in West Germany. Specifically, an entire Infantry battle group, minus all vehicles except those essential for command, control, and communications, would be airlifted to Berlin in the same manner as outlined for the infantry companies in earlier plans. In addition, if units of Berlin Command were training in West Germany, they would be prepared to close at Rhein/Main Air Base so promptly that the first elements would be ready to return to Berlin eight hours after an alert order, and would then follow the reinforcing battle

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DF, USAREUR G3 to G4, 6 Nov 56, subj: Emergency Plan (U), TS Suppl, USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1957, p. 50. TS. Gp-1.

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(1) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 27 Feb 57, subj: USAREUR Berlin Reinforcement Plan (TS). (2) USAREUR EP 104 (U), 7 Feb 57. Both in TS Suppl, USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1958, pp. 24-5. Both TS. NOFORN. Gp-1.

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Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 5 Dec 57, subj: USAREUR Berlin Reinforcement Plan (EP-104), in TS Suppl, USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1958, p. 25. TS. NOFORN. Gp-1.

³⁷USAREUR Ann Hist, FY 1959, p. 32. TS(info used SECRET). Gp-1.

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group into Berlin via the airlift.³⁸

Following the movement of a third battle group to Berlin in August 1961,³⁹ the need for immediate reinforcement in an emergency was reduced, but not eliminated. Therefore, Seventh Army was still to maintain one battle group, or its equivalent, at a readiness that would allow commencement of an airlift from Rhein/Main to Berlin within eight hours after issuance of the alert order.⁴⁰

c. (TS) The Use of Special Forces Demolition Teams Outside West Berlin. In November 1955 CINCUSAREUR agreed to a USCOB proposal that the possibility of a wartime breakout of at least a portion of the U.S. Berlin garrison, in connection with Special Forces activities in the area, should be considered. During that same month, at a conference attended by the chiefs of staff of the three Western Allied headquarters in Germany and the three respective Berlin Commandants, agreement was reached that demolition squads should be used to destroy strategic targets located outside of West Berlin. Consequently, USAREUR took steps to assign six Special Forces teams and a staff element to the 6th Infantry Regiment in Berlin. The concept of operations envisioned was that immediately upon the outbreak of general hostilities, or under certain conditions of a localized war, the teams would cross from West Berlin into East Germany and attack targets selected by USCOB as being vital in his fight for the city, as well as priority targets indicated in USEUCOM's Unconventional Warfare Plan.

In May 1956 CINCUSAREUR authorized USCOB to commit the assigned Special Forces teams, in conjunction with his defense plan, when and if necessary. The designated priority targets were rail lines, rail communication systems, military headquarters, telecommunications, POL facilities, storage and supply points, utilities, and inland waterways, in that order. After the completion of the missions assigned by USCOB, the teams would conduct operations as directed by the Commander, Support Operations Task Force, Europe (COMSOTFE). USCOB was also authorized to discuss with the

³⁸
(1) USAREUR EP 115 (Formerly EP 104), 6 Mar 61. (2) Seventh Army EP 115 (Formerly EP 104), 30 Mar 61. Both TS. NOFORN. Gp-1.

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This movement took place on 20 August 1961 for the primary purpose of showing U.S. determination to honor its commitments there and to reassure the West Berlin population. USAREUR EP 115 was not executed. Instead, the force was moved over the Berlin-Helmstedt Autobahn. (Source: USAREUR Ann Hist, 1961, pp. 34-6) TS. Gp-3.

⁴⁰
Cable SX-6060, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army, 3 Oct 61. TS. Gp-3.

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Western Allied Commandants in Berlin the general peacetime Special Forces training activities, the wartime operational sectors and general missions of the teams, and the French and British target requirements in his sector, as outlined in tripartite plans. However, he was not to discuss the support of the teams, including resupply to be arranged by USAREUR, or clandestine activities in connection with unconventional warfare.⁴¹

At the end of 1961 the above initial plan was basically unchanged. In a revision dated 1 July 1959, the six demolition teams were reorganized into five task groups and the actions of each group upon completion of its USCOB mission were more clearly defined. After having accomplished the assigned demolitions in their respective target areas, the five groups would pass to the control of the 10th Special Forces Group. Two of them would be prepared to move to predesignated areas or to return to West Berlin for "stay behind" operations.⁴²

d. (TS) Emergency Arms Reserve. In May 1960 USAREUR asked for authorization to establish an emergency arms reserve in Berlin. The original proposal envisioned the storage of approximately 16,000 U.S. weapons, with appropriate ammunition, at Tempelhof Air Base and Andrews Barracks, and their distribution by Special Forces personnel to West Berlin police and known pro-western civilians. It was assumed that, in the event of an emergency, the police and civilians would assist the U.S. garrison in the defense of the city. USCINCEUR approved the proposal the following month, but stipulated that the Special Forces should not be made responsible for distributing the weapons. USAREUR thereupon directed USCOB to develop a plan for the cover, security, storage, maintenance, and distribution of the weapons, which USAREUR was to obtain, pack, and ship to Berlin.

In October 1960 Berlin Command proposed a new concept according to which the weapons would be distributed in two successive actions. The first action would strengthen the tactical defense of the city by providing rifles and carbines to qualified West Berliners who desired to fight alongside the Allied garrisons as quasi-military elements. The second action would involve maintaining an armed resistance potential within Berlin and the surrounding area by providing these same individuals with easily-concealed harassing and self-defense weapons and a limited amount of ammunition that they could keep after the final perimeter of the Western Allied garrisons had been overrun. The second action would be

⁴¹ TS Suppl, USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1956, pp. 36-7. TS. Gp-1.

⁴² Berlin Comd Ops Order No. 2, 1 July 1959. In USAREUR Ops Div TS Control. TS. NOFORN. Gp-1.

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ried in with subsequent Special Forces stay-behind operations. The proposal also provided for notifying West Berlin police who were included in current defense plans. The police would be informed of the location of the weapons and their suggested use and would be directed to pick up, distribute, and control them, consistent with planned tactical employment. It was assumed that the West Berlin police were in a position to distribute the weapons and impose stringent controls so that they would not fall into the hands of unreliable individuals. Although the concept was approved in early March 1961, no authority to inform the West Berlin police was granted.

By the end of 1961 all weapons to be used in the Emergency Arms Reserve with the exception of 6,000 pistols that were being shipped from the United States, had arrived in Berlin. According to a proposal made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, small arms were to be provided for West Berlin civilians, who would be trained as "police auxiliaries," and committed in the event of disturbances or military actions aimed at seizing West Berlin. Meanwhile, the planning that could be accomplished in this area was limited by the fact that the subject could not be discussed with the West Berlin police.⁴³

⁴³ (1) Memo, C/USAREUR Ops Div Plans & Rqmnts Br to Asst DCSOPS, 2 Nov 1961, subj: Emergency Arms Reserve (U). AEAGC-PW. Gp-3. (2) Berlin Bde Plan for Emergency Arms Reserve, 15 Nov 61, subj: Unilateral Plan for Arming Civilians (TS). In USAREUR Ops Div TS Control. Both TS. (3) DF, USAREUR Ops Div Trp Ops Br to Hist Sec, 19 Nov 62, cited above. SECRET. Both Gp-1.



Chapter 7

Airlift Planning (U)

26. (TS) A Full-Scale, Tripartite Airlift

a. (TS) Conflicting Concepts. Negotiations toward a tripartite agreement on a plan for supporting Berlin by an airlift began shortly after the Soviet blockade of 1948-49.¹ Differences of opinion existed, however, both between USAREUR and the State Department and between the United States and its two Allies. The State Department favored a full-scale airlift capable of sustaining Berlin indefinitely without dipping into the existing stockpiles. The other two governments felt that an operation large enough to meet these conditions would be too extensive.² Working from a position between the two extremes, USAREUR attempted not only to modify the State Department's requirements but also to increase the contribution of both France and the United Kingdom, hoping to get at least a plan for a reduced-scale airlift before attempting to make plans for a larger operation.

In August 1953 a tripartite committee proposed to the three Allied Commanders-in-Chief and their governments an airlift of 4,000 metric tons per day. This lift, with the existing stockpiles in Berlin, would sustain the city for one year.³ Since the British and French felt unable

¹ TS Suppl, EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp.95-8. TS. Gp-1.

² IRS, USAREUR G3 to DCSOPS, 22 Apr 54, subj: Tripartite Berlin Airlift Planning, in TS Suppl, USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jan 53 - 30 Jun 54, pp. 37-8. TS. Gp-1.

³ Ibid. TS. Gp-1.

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to obligate themselves to lift more than 1,300 and 500 metric tons a day, respectively, the assumption was that the United States would accept responsibility for lifting 2,200 tons. CINCUSAREUR agreed to assume this responsibility if the other governments recognized that the extra commitment was not permanently binding. Thus, if requirements decreased, or if the French and British capabilities increased, the United States would assume responsibility for only one-third of the total tonnage.

Objecting to this plan on the grounds that the tonnage figures were inadequate,⁴ throughout 1953 the Department of State was still thinking in terms of 12,000 metric tons a day. The French and British were unwilling to discuss any figure above 4,000 tons, and there appeared to be no probability of early compromise.

However, in January 1954 the National Security Council issued a revised policy concerning Berlin that modified considerably all planning for a Berlin airlift.⁵ Under previous agreements and policies, an open Soviet attack on Berlin would have involved the United States in a war with the Soviet Union but, as in 1949, the U.S.S.R. would have been able to restrict or interrupt Allied access to the city, without making a direct military attack and without necessarily causing a general war. The revised policy toward Berlin recognized that several elements of the situation had changed since 1949. The Soviets were in a better position to interfere with an airlift or other Allied counterblockade measures. On the other hand, the military position of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom was stronger; the Western Allies had established stockpiles in West Berlin, and they had declared and demonstrated to the Soviets their intention to remain in Berlin. Therefore, with the prestige of the United States deeply committed in Berlin, the new policy advocated that the Western Powers take forceful action if the Soviets threatened their access to Berlin, even though such action might lead to a general war. It recommended that the Allies take a firm stand that would leave no doubt that they would resist, forcefully and promptly, any Soviet challenge to their position. To minor Soviet harassment they would react with vigorous protest and reprisal and take positive action to improve the

⁴ Cable CS-6101, CINCUSAREUR to CofSA, 17 Jul 53, in TS Suppl, USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jan 53 - 30 Jun 54, p. 38. TS. Gp-1.

⁵ (1) IRS, USAREUR G3 to DCSOPS, 22 Apr 54, subj: Tripartite Berlin Airlift Planning, cited above. (2) Memo, USAREUR CofS, 20 Apr 54, subj: U.S. Policy Paper on Berlin, dtd 25 Jan 54. Both in TS Suppl, USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jan 53 - 30 Jun 54, pp.38-9. Both TS. Gp-1.

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morale and economy of Berlin, to enlarge the stockpiles, and to intensify intelligence activities. In the event of an actual blockade, or even a threat of blockade, the new course of action would proceed from protests to threats of force, backed up by mobilization measures designed to convince the Soviets of the seriousness of the situation and constituting actual preparation for war, and finally to the use of limited force, which might lead to a general war.⁶

The new policy appeared to rule out any plans for a long-term airlift and to replace it by the concept that an airlift, if resorted to at all, would be supplementary to the use of force and therefore of limited duration. Following this clarification,⁷ the Western Allied Commanders-in-Chief agreed, on 30 August 1954, upon an Allied capability of moving 4,000 metric tons of supplies per day to supplement existing stockpiles in the event of a blockade of Berlin.

The Allied High Commission plan (HICOM P 54) was completed during the fall of 1954, and in early 1955 the Commanders-in-Chief of the Allied air and ground forces prepared a tripartite military plan for a Berlin airlift. It called for moving the agreed tonnage from 4 airfields in West Germany to the 3 fields in West Berlin, in two phases. Immediately upon receipt of the execution order, airlift operations would begin from Rhein/Main Airport and from bases in the British zone of responsibility; but as soon as practicable the United States would shift its efforts to bases in the British zone. Only high-cost and perishable items would be airlifted.⁸

b. (S) U.S. Unilateral Support Planning. (C) To carry out U.S. responsibilities set forth in tripartite plans, EUCOM had established, in 1951, a U.S. Army Air Support Command (USAASC) which would be capable of delivering the required tonnage of supplies to aircraft for transport to Berlin. HICOG--and later the U.S. Embassy, Bonn--would be responsible for procuring German supplies and moving them to USAASC-designated railheads or transfer points.⁹

⁶ Memo, 20 Apr 54, cited above. TS. Gp-1.

⁷ Cable SX-3025, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 5 Jun 54, in USAREUR TS Suppl, USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jan 53 - 30 Jun 54, p. 40. TS. Gp-1.

⁸ Cable DA-963996, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 2 Jul 54, in TS Suppl, USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1955, p. 34. TS. Gp-1.

⁹ Annex 3, EUCOM Support Plan to Alternate Operations Plan for a Berlin Airlift (Reduced), 28 May 1951, with IRS, EUCOM Log Div to EUCOM OPOT Div, 30 Jul 51, in EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 227-8. SECRET (info used CONF). Gp-1.

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(S) In each revised unilateral airlift support plan the USAASC continued to be the responsible ground agency despite the objections of USAFE, which wanted to control the ground support to facilitate coordination with the air operations. USAREUR, on the other hand, preferred to follow the pattern that had been used successfully during the 1948-49 blockade, when the Army had been responsible for ground operations. In 1956 USCINCEUR resolved the matter by directing that USAFE should provide adequate port squadrons at all airfields contemplated for use, making plans for an extensive USAASC unnecessary. However, CINCUSAREUR would still be responsible for the maintenance of the airfields when the airlift became operational, and would also retain the authority to implement the airlift at his discretion.¹⁰

27. (S) Quadripartite Airlift Planning

a. West German Responsibilities. The question of West Germany participation in a Berlin airlift was raised in tripartite discussions as early as 1955. USAREUR recommended that the Federal Republic participate in any future airlift because without this assistance USAREUR's commitments of personnel and equipment would be too heavy. In 1956, Allied and German officials reached agreement on the point.¹¹ Planning coordination evidently proceeded slowly, however, for it was not until 1958 that the Federal Republic was actually given specific airlift responsibilities. Under a revised plan the Germans would provide, equip, and maintain four airfields for an airlift, and would also furnish the POL products required at those airfields and at Rhein/Main Air Base.¹² In December 1960, all existing airlift plans were incorporated into the Quadripartite Berlin Airlift Plan (QBAL), which was based on HICOM P 54 and included West German participation and support.¹³

b. U.S. Support Plans. The U.S. objective specified in USAREUR's supporting plans was the attainment of the capability to move 1,965 metric tons of supplies per day, within 90 days after the start of airlift operations. The U.S. airlift would operate from Rhein/Main for seven days and

¹⁰ USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1956, pp. 169-70. SECRET. Gp-1.

¹¹ Ibid. SECRET. Gp-1.

¹² Ltr, USEUCOM J3 to AMEMB, Bonn, 20 Oct 58, subj: Tripartite Berlin Airlift Plan (S). ECJJCJ 381. SECRET. No Gp.

¹³ Quadripartite Berlin Airlift Plan (S) (QBAL), 10 Dec 60, EUCOM S-59-2708. SECRET. No Gp.

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then move to the British zone if possible. In any event, Rhein/Main would be used no longer than 15 days. CINCUSAREUR would have control of ground operations, and the USAASC was reorganized to integrate Federal Republic of Germany support.¹⁴

28. (S) Bipartite Airlift Planning

If a blockade was imposed on Berlin and an airlift operation initiated, the plan to be implemented would probably be quadripartite. In early 1961, however, it seemed possible that a situation might arise in which an airlift would have to be initiated before quadripartite governmental agreement could be reached or before equipment could be made available by France and the United Kingdom. The United States therefore prepared plans for a U.S.-West German airlift that would be executed until the other Western Allies could join in the operations.¹⁵

29. (S) Unilateral Airlift Planning

In addition to developing plans to supply the Berlin civil population in the event of a surface blockade, USAREUR maintained plans to airlift supplies to the U.S. garrison if only the surface military supply lines were blocked. These plans paralleled other airlift plans, but would be implemented on a smaller scale and would involve only the Rhein/Main and Tempelhof Airports.¹⁶

¹⁴(1) USAREUR EP 101, 5 Jul 59, revised 13 Jul 61. (2) Berlin Comd EP 101, 1 May 61. Both in USAREUR Ops Div Trp Ops Br files. Both SECRET. Gp-1.

¹⁵Ibid. SECRET. Gp-1.

¹⁶(1) USAREUR EP 131, 5 Jun 59. (2) Berlin Comd EP 131, 18 Nov 59. Both in Berlin Bde G3 Plans Br files. (3) Intvw, PFC Hickman with Major Elliot and Capt Yaden, 18 Jul 62, cited above. All SECRET. Gp-1.



Chapter 8

Access Planning (S)

30. (TS) Ground Access to West Berlin

"Access planning" with regard to Berlin was initiated by a National Security Council paper published on 25 January 1954 and entitled "U.S. Policy on Berlin." Up to that time only the possibility of maintaining access to Berlin by airlift had been considered, because of the tripartite policy that, if Berlin was blockaded, the Allies would counter with an airlift similar to the successful operation of 1948-49. However, since the United States was so deeply committed in Berlin and since its prestige was at stake, it would have to take a firm stand, clearly indicating to the Soviets that the Western Allies would forcefully resist any challenge to their position, that they would react to minor Soviet harassment with vigorous protest, and that in the event of an actual blockade or even a threat of a blockade, they would proceed, even though such action might lead to a general war. Thus when USCINCEUR assumed the over-all Berlin planning responsibility in December 1954, he became responsible for preparing U.S. unilateral access plans in conformance with this policy and, where appropriate, coordinating them with the French or British in an attempt to arrive at a tripartite course of action.¹

a. The First Plan. In February 1955 USCINCEUR directed CINCUSAREUR to act as his planning representative and prepare plans for two unilateral courses of action: one, the use of force to determine Soviet intentions

¹C/N 1 to IRS, USAREUR DCSOPS to G3, 12 Jan 55, subj: Directive for Accomplishment of Berlin Planning, in TS Suppl, USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1955, pp. 29-30. TS. Cp-1.

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if the Soviets imposed a blockade; the other, the use of force to break such a blockade.

(1) Use of Force to Determine Soviet Intentions. Planning was to be based on the assumption that any Soviet refusal of passage to Allied or West German air, rail, or vehicular traffic would be a blockade, unless the Soviet action was obviously of only a temporary or harassing nature. The first U.S. reaction to a blockade would be vigorous public and private protests, followed by several attempts by properly documented U.S. military personnel and vehicles to get past the blockade. At the same time, the United States would speed up traffic on any routes that might remain open.

If these actions failed to open the blockade, and if Soviet intentions had not been determined definitely by other means, the United States would officially notify the U.S.S.R. of its determination to keep its right of access to Berlin even if it became necessary to resort to force. Next, a small mounted force—not to exceed a reinforced platoon at either end of the Autobahn—followed by a convoy of from 5 to 10 U.S. military trucks, would approach the soviet roadblock, present the proper credentials and documents, and request passage. If the Soviets honored the credentials and let the convoy pass, the armed force would withdraw as soon as the convoy had passed the check point. On the other hand, if the Soviet guards refused passage through the check point to either the armed force or the convoy, the commander of the armed force would indicate, orally and in writing, that he intended to use force to pass the check point, but that he would first wait a reasonable length of time to permit the guards to consult their superior officers. If again refused, the commander of the armed force would order his armed vehicles to proceed, crashing through any barrier blocking the road. If no additional resistance was offered, he would then return and order the convoy to proceed through the corridor. However, if the guards, either Soviet or satellite, opened fire with aimed shots, or if the armed vehicles ran into a mine field or physical barriers too large to pass, the commander would interpret any such occurrence as resistance by force and would withdraw, applying only such countermeasures as necessary to protect his force. The convoy would not proceed.

Firm plans for a similar test in the event of Soviet interference with military trains were difficult to make because all members of train crews—except for the train commander—were employees of the West German railroad system, and especially because the movement of trains might be stopped by technical as well as physical means. However, if operating personnel were available, an armed train would be sent in either direction,

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with instructions to return if the Soviets fired at the train or disrupted the tracks.²

(2) Use of Force to Break a Blockade. The objective of the second course of action would be to determine whether the Soviets were prepared to risk war in order to force the Allies out of Berlin. This time the armed force would be no larger than a reinforced battalion, if committed at the Helmstedt end of the Autobahn, or a reinforced company if at the Berlin end. In addition, the force moving up from Helmstedt would have to be prepared to bridge the Elbe River if necessary. Either force would be ostensibly an escort for a military convoy, but personnel in the trucks would be armed. Properly documented, the armed force and the convoy would approach the roadblock, present their credentials, and request passage, which the Soviets would either grant or refuse. In either instance the convoy would proceed toward the opposite end of the Autobahn, attempting to overcome resistance on the way. If unable to overcome the resistance, the forces committed would disengage and withdraw, subject to CINCUSAREUR's approval.

Both courses of action provided for employing air observation planes and tactical air support and for using armed trains. The plans could be implemented either from Berlin or from Helmstedt or simultaneously from both points. USCINCEUR had the authority for ordering the execution of either course of action, with CINCUSAFE responsible for air support.³

b. Preparations for Tripartite Planning. Although the question of discussing the new U.S. access plans with the French and British was considered on several occasions during 1955-56, no definite action was taken at first because the Departments of Defense and State failed to agree about it. The Department of State held that since a primary U.S. objective in Europe at that time was to conclude an agreement concerning West German sovereignty and rearmament, and since obtaining French ratification of such an agreement was a delicate task, it would be inappropriate to discuss with France a new Berlin policy that contemplated the use of force to break a blockade. Moreover, the British had already indicated that their government considered an airlift to be the most logical answer

² Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 21 May 55, subj: Berlin Planning. GOT 381, in TS Suppl, USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1955, pp, 30-1. TS. Gp-1.

³ Ibid. TS. Gp-1.

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to a blockade and had expressed the hope that U.S. policy on the subject would not change.⁴

In February 1955, USCINCEUR instructed CINCUSAREUR to initiate tripartite discussions concerning access plans. The directive, based upon JCS instructions, specified that tripartite military planning was to be carried on in coordination with simultaneous political discussions. However, American diplomatic officials in Germany continued to be reluctant to discuss the subject with the British and French, because it seemed improbable that they would agree to a tripartite position that tied them in advance to the strong policy suggested.⁵ USAREUR delayed the tripartite discussions until late September 1955, when the Department of State issued formal authority and guidance; and on 1 October, when the French and British Ambassadors did receive the "U.S. Policy on Berlin" paper, all references to U.S. unilateral action for the use of force to gain access to Berlin in the event of a Soviet blockade had been deleted from this version.⁶

c. Tripartite Draft Study. At a tripartite conference held on 4 May 1956, the use of military force was discussed. At that time the British and French representatives demurred to the proposed U.S. terms of reference. They did not agree to any step beyond inviting their commanders to study the military implications of the American proposals. The British and French position was consistent with their previously expressed reluctance even to infer the use of force to maintain access to Berlin.⁷

At the request of the Allied Ambassadors, however, the three Commanders-in-Chief agreed to prepare a study of the military feasibility of such a plan. On 11 June USAREUR forwarded to the British and French a draft study on the use of Allied military force to maintain access to

⁴(1) Ltr, Dept of State to Mr. N. P. Fales, USAREUR POLAD, 21 Oct 54.
(2) Ltr, Mr. Fales to Dept of State, 27 Nov 54. Both in TS Suppl, USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1955, pp. 31-2. Both TS. Gp-1.

⁵Cable 723, HICOG, Bonn to Dept of State, 11 May 55, in TS Suppl, USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1956, p. 39. TS. Gp-1.

⁶Memo, C/USAREUR G3 P&P Br to ACofS G3, 8 May 56, subj: Tripartite Discussions in Implementation of NSC 5404/1, US Policy on Berlin, in TS Suppl, USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1956, p. 39. TS. Gp-1.

⁷Ibid. TS. Gp-1.

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Berlin as a basis for a coordinated paper to be submitted to the respective ambassadors in July. The study concluded that the use of limited Allied military forces to determine Soviet intentions to reopen access would not be feasible via rail and water routes. However, the use of force via the Autobahn could be envisaged. In the air corridor the use of limited military force would be possible if air travel was restricted by Soviet aircraft, but if air travel was restricted by physical obstruction and jamming, force should not be used. In general, it was thought that the Soviets would not react if force was used to break the blockade by air or road.

To discuss this draft, a tripartite meeting was held in Heidelberg in July 1956, at which time the British and French made certain recommendations that were incorporated into the text. The French accepted the new draft, but the British recommended two further changes: that a reinforced alert should be declared before limited force action was undertaken and that the Allied forces employed for this operation should be designated as NATO forces.

Early in the discussions it became apparent that the British and French were still opposed to the use of limited force because of its impact on NATO and the inherent danger of bringing on a general war. As a result, the action recommended in the study's final form was of a much milder nature than the United States had sought.⁸ It was obvious that the reasons why the study did not lend full support to the National Security Council's policy on Berlin were political rather than military.⁹

Based on this tripartite study, the Allies prepared a plan which outlined their intended actions to counter a possible access threat. In the event of serious harassment, such as the substitution of East German for Soviet officials at the check points, the Allies would protest and negotiate at ambassadorial levels, and ultimately in the United Nations. These moves would be accompanied by public statements and news releases at appropriate levels.¹⁰ The Soviets would be held responsible for any

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(1) Draft Study, Use of Allied Military Force to Maintain Access to Berlin, 26 Jul 56. NOFORN, except U.K. (2) DF, USAREUR G3 to DCS, 3 Nov 56, same subj. Both in TS Suppl, USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1957, p. 49. Both TS. Gp-1.

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Ltr, Gen H. I. Hodges, CINCUSAREUR, to Hon James B. Conant, U.S. Ambassador to Germany, 6 Nov 56, in TS Suppl, USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1957, p. 49. TS. Gp-1.

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Cable SX-6934, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 8 Nov 57, in TS Suppl, USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1957, p. 49. TS. Gp-1.

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action against the Western position in Berlin, whoever carried out such action. If access to Berlin was seriously threatened, the Allies would intensify the use of all remaining means of access in an effort to gain public support and to arouse world opinion.¹¹ Other tripartite plans were prepared calling for the use of limited military force at both ends of the Autobahn to determine Soviet intentions and to demonstrate that the Allies refused to relinquish voluntarily their right of access to Berlin. If this course of action disclosed that the Soviets were prepared to deny Allied access forcibly, however, no additional action would be taken and no additional forces would be committed to Berlin. Instead, appropriate mobilization measures would be initiated, with the dual purpose of convincing the Russians of the seriousness of the situation and of preparing the Allied forces for general war. Actually, most of the planned action would be taken by the United States, but in coordination with the other two powers.¹²

d. Unilateral Planning. In addition to the foregoing plans, and in conformance with USEUCOM Joint OPLAN 10-55, USAREUR prepared EP 103 on a unilateral basis. This plan outlined measures to be taken to determine Soviet intentions and to regain access to Berlin, if necessary. For this purpose, a reinforced battalion was to move along the Autobahn toward Berlin and a reinforced infantry company toward Helmstedt, with the mission of clearing the routes to Berlin until stopped by a superior force.¹³

e. The "Use of Force" Concept Grows. The basic difference between tripartite and unilateral access concepts continued to be evident throughout 1957-1958: in the event of a blockade, tripartite policy called for mobilizing world opinion against the Soviets as a first step, whereas the United States intended to reopen access routes by force.¹⁴ During the last four months of 1958, however, a significant change began to take place. By then the Soviets had begun to step up their harassment of land, water, and air access routes to Berlin in an obvious attempt to force the Allies to recognize the so-called German Democratic Republic (GDR). On 13

¹¹ Draft Study on Berlin, 24 Sep 57, cited above. TS. Gp-1.

¹² JCS 1907/154, 7 May 58, subj: Broad Policy Guidance Under Which USAREUR Planned for Defense of Berlin, 27 Aug 58, in USAREUR Ops Div Trp Ops Br files. TS. Gp-1.

¹³ Draft Study on Berlin, 24 Sep 57, cited above. TS. Gp-1.

¹⁴ Ltr, Dept of State to AMEMB, Bonn, 12 Mar 59, subj: Berlin Contingency Planning. In Berlin Bde G3 Plans Br files. SECRET.

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September the Soviet Commandant in Berlin declared that the GDR was competent to deal with the Western Allies on all matters affecting Berlin and East Germany. In October USAREUR EP 103 was revised to stress the fact that in the event of an attempted Soviet blockade the United States would take immediate and forceful counteractions even though they might lead to a general war. However, the planned courses of action—first probing Soviet intentions and subsequently committing a battalion-size tank-infantry force to reopen the Autobahn—remained the same.¹⁵

The 6-month ultimatum, issued by Mr. Khrushchev in November 1958, according to which all protocols and agreements entered into by the U.S.S.R. with respect to Berlin were abrogated and the city was to be demilitarized and declared a free city by 27 May 1959,¹⁶ led to a new state of tension. In the face of the ultimatum, however, the Western Allies initiated policy discussions, and on 4 April 1959 issued a new tripartite ambassadorial policy directive, entitled "Berlin Contingency Planning," which provided for a contingency force to reopen ground access routes to Berlin.¹⁷

f. Revision of USAREUR EP 103. Meanwhile, USAREUR had prepared a new version of EP 103. In addition to the two courses of action listed in the previous plan, the new plan included three others that called for more definite counteraction to a Soviet blockade. The first of these provided for the use of a combat command to reopen the access route in much the same manner as had been prescribed in the first two courses. The second stipulated that an entire armored division would perform the task. Both the first and the second envisioned that the forces responsible for reopening access would subsequently assume control of the Autobahn. The third course of action provided for the extrication of personnel and equipment detained by Soviet or GDR authorities in the vicinity of Helmstedt, if that contingency should arise.¹⁸

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(1) USAREUR Sp Intel Est 2-59, 28 Feb 59, cited above, pp. 5-10. CONF. No Gp. (2) USAREUR EP 103 (U), 3 Oct 58. AEAGC-PL 250/18 GC. TS. Gp-1.

16

Cable 320, USMLM to Dept of State, 12 Nov 58, in USAREUR Ann Hist, FY 1959, pp. 26-7. TS (info used SECRET). Gp-1.

17

Annex B, USEUCOM Ann Hist Rept, 1960, pp. 15-6. TS. Gp-1.

18

USAREUR EP 103, 29 May 59, in USAREUR Ann Hist, FY 1959, pp. 30-1.

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g. New Tripartite Plans. Based on the tripartite policy directive of April 1959, the Allies coordinated their plans for probing Soviet intentions as to a possible Berlin blockade and regaining ground access in the event of a blockade. In the spring of 1960 both the British and French published plans providing for a probe force at each end of the Autobahn and also outlining the action of a reinforced battalion to reopen that access road. Later in the year, USAREUR published EP's 112 and 113, and Berlin Command completed Operations Plans BACK STROKE and LUCKY STRIKE, providing for similar actions. These plans, along with four Allied Staff instructions, on which they were based, were still in effect at the end of 1961.¹⁹

h. Larger Forces and Nuclear Weapons.

(1) EP 103 (Expanded). On 19 May 1961 the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed USCINCEUR to develop new plans for reopening ground access to Berlin. These plans were to outline the employment of larger units and were to be based on the assumptions that all operations would be opposed ostensibly by East German forces only, that nuclear weapons would not be used, and that the forces of the Federal Republic would participate. By mid-June USAREUR had completed a new draft outline plan, referred to as EP 103 (Expanded). Bundeswehr participation in operations on East German territory, however, was not planned because it was thought to be politically unsound and that it would undoubtedly evoke intervention by Soviet as well as Satellite forces. Moreover, since the German ground forces were not ready for sustained offensive combat in East Germany, they could be committed more effectively for defensive missions in West Germany.

As outlined in the draft, the reinforced U.S. VII Corps would be assembled just west of Helmstedt, if the United States was denied access to the Autobahn. On order, the corps would move the 4th Armored Division, followed by the 24th and 8th Infantry Divisions, eastward along the Autobahn. If East German military forces opposed the movement, the corps would attack with the objective of securing a 12 to 20-mile corridor centered on the Autobahn. Consideration would also be given to the employment of helicopter-borne troops to seize the bridge over the Elbe River. The corps would proceed as rapidly as possible along the axis of advance, and would be disposed along the entire length of the route to insure the uninterrupted flow of traffic between Helmstedt and Berlin.

19

(1) CINCBOAR's (Live Oak) Plan "Operation Free Style" (U), 12 May 60. EUCOM TS 4474. (2) CINCBOAR's (Live Oak) Plan "Operation Trade Wind," 11 Jun 60, B 1161/5/4G. EUCOM TS 4550. (3) USAREUR EP 112, 20 Sep 60. (4) USAREUR EP 113, 20 Sep 60. All TS. Gp-1.

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A Hawk missile battalion would be deployed to provide air defense of the Elbe River crossing site. If the VII Corps attack was endangered by substantial East German forces, Seventh Army would be prepared to assume control of tactical ground operations, and on order, would commit the V Corps in an attack in the general direction of Kassel-Berlin.

Upon initiation of ground action, USAFE would establish a 24-hour air patrol of the Autobahn and would provide a mixed strike and air defense force. Additional forces on ground alert would be available on call. Before the initiation of operations, however, Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) forces--presumably from the United States--would be positioned to reinforce the line weakened by the commitment of VII Corps; the German I Corps would be moved to an area near its General Alert Order (GAO) positions north of Helmstedt; the German III Corps would be moved to an area near Kassel; the German II Corps would be redeployed initially to cover the sector vacated by the U.S. VII Corps, then move to its GAO positions after STRAC forces were positioned; and logistical support units and supplies would be moved to locations from which the operation could be supported.

After careful study, USCINCEUR submitted the outline plan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in late July, listing both his own and CINCUSAREUR's objections to the basic assumptions. First of all, the assumption that only East German forces would oppose the access operation was considered totally invalid. In addition, the general war posture of U.S. ground and air forces would be materially reduced. CINCUSAREUR believed that, before committing major forces to an access operation, a smaller force should be employed to test East German intentions, as provided in the then-current plan. The use of such a force might bring about Soviet intervention, in which case decisions concerning expansion of the operation could be made. To impress upon the Soviets the seriousness of their access denial, NATO and U.S. forces might even move to their battle stations before the execution of probe operations.

A decision to commit a U.S. force of sufficient strength to prevent defeat by Satellite forces would have to be based on the possibility, and even the probability, of Soviet military intervention and the resultant "clear-cut" possibility of general war; measures would therefore have to be taken first to insure that the West would be fully prepared for this contingency. The President should declare American intentions to the Soviets, outlining the general actions they could expect if a second force was denied access. At least two, and possibly three, STRAC divisions should be moved to Europe to strengthen positions weakened by the commitment of USAREUR forces and to pose a strategic threat to the East Germans. All U.S. general war forces should be placed on an appropriate alert status and NATO units should be mobilized to full strength. LANDCENT elements should be deployed to their GAO positions and dependents should

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be evacuated both from Berlin and from the remainder of Europe. If these measures brought no results, U.S. access operations could begin.²⁰

(2) Augmentation and Nuclear Weapons. Following the construction of the Berlin wall in August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that a second series of plans be developed. One of these plans would incorporate the use of nuclear weapons, and all would be based on the assumption that USAREUR had been augmented by either a 2, 4, or 6-division force. They were to be both unilateral and tripartite.

The four outline plans, prepared by USCINCEUR and his component commanders, were based on the previously submitted corps access plan and the more recent guidance. In his introductory statement, USCINCEUR warned that a major risk would be involved in implementing any one of the four plans. In addition to the possibility of explosive escalation to general war, they would offer the Soviets an opportunity to seize the initiative in the use of conventional weapons, and in enlarging the arena of their employment.²¹

(3) A Third Concept. In early November CINCUSAREUR was asked to comment on a third planning concept, envisioned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that provided for four types of military action—all designed to maintain Allied access to Berlin and to preserve the NATO alliance.

As the first type of military action—Phase I—the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed that, if Soviet or East German action interfered with Berlin access but was short of definitive blockage, the three Allied Powers should execute Berlin contingency plans, to include tripartitely-agreed probes of Soviet intentions by a platoon-size force, with provision for tactical air support. In his comment CINCUSAREUR added that the Allies should attempt to visualize the various actions that their opponents might take and should develop tripartitely-approved counteractions, so that they could react quickly and keep the Soviets and East Germans off balance.

²⁰ (1) Cable EGJGJ-9-100451, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR; CINCUSAFE; COMSOTFE, 23 May 61. (2) Ltr, USAREUR to USCINCEUR, 13 Jun 61, subj: Berlin Contingency Planning (U). AEAGC-OP. (3) Ltr, USEUCOM to JCS, 24 Jul 61, subj: Revision of US Unilateral Berlin Contingency Plans (U). EGJG-J. All TS. Gp-3.

²¹ (1) DF, USAREUR DCSOPS to Cofs, 15 Sep 61, subj: Access Plans (U). AG TS 40-91. Gp-3. (2) Min, Component Commanders' Conference, Hq USEUCOM, 21 Sep 61. AG TS 75-101. NOFORN. Gp-1. Both TS.

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In Phase II, which might occur if the Soviets or East Germans were determined to block Allied access to Berlin in spite of the first tripartite military probes, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed such non-combat activities as an economic embargo, maritime harassment, and United Nations actions. During this period the Allies would also mobilize and reinforce rapidly, thus improving their capability to execute military actions. CINCUSAREUR commented that his first concern pertained to military readiness measures, and more specifically to the strengthening of the Army forces in Europe. He again recommended that in conjunction with a buildup by the Allies, USAREUR be reinforced with additional divisions not later than during the period immediately following the failure of a platoon-size probe. A 2-division balanced force, deployed and ready for employment, would be the minimum requirement. Another matter to be considered before the outbreak of hostilities was the evacuation of non-combatants from Europe to the United States. If evacuation was ordered, it would have to be completed--at least in Germany--before Phase III was initiated.

Phase III of the plan specified military actions to be taken by the Allies if the Soviets still blocked either air or ground access. The Allies would either expand non-nuclear air actions, against a background of expanded ground defensive strength, in order to gain local air superiority, or they would expand non-nuclear ground operations into East Germany by using division-size or larger forces, with strong air support. CINCUSAREUR pointed out that while the plan provided for the selection of one of two courses of action, depending upon which access route was blocked, the Allies would have to be prepared to execute both actions simultaneously. Moreover, planning for expanded air actions would have to be based on clearly-defined military objectives and missions. CINCUSAREUR recommended that the tripartite force, considered necessary to accomplish the action to be taken in Phase III, should not exceed a maximum of one division, including one U.S. armored combat command.

In Phase IV the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided for the employment of nuclear weapons if the Soviets continued to encroach upon vital Allied interests. At first the Western Allies would launch selective nuclear attacks for the preliminary purpose of demonstrating their will to use nuclear weapons. They would next make limited tactical use of nuclear weapons to achieve an additional significant tactical advantage. Finally, they would execute general nuclear war measures, if necessary. CINCUSAREUR commented here that because of the special problems involved in selecting and releasing nuclear weapons, SACEUR should be responsible for the release of each weapon during the first stage of Phase IV and that targets should be within the area of operations. CINCUSAREUR believed that the releasing authority contained in the land battle program was adequate for the next stage, but that an essential part of any plan would be a selective R-hour message giving appropriate commanders the releasing



authority for the use of nuclear weapons in and adjacent to the access area. No new or special release system was required. The essential factor would be a positive command communication link between USEUCOM headquarters and the releasing commander, so that the decision to employ nuclear weapons could be acted upon immediately.²²

31. (TS) Other Access Plans

a. (TS) USAREUR Support of Air Access Planning. USAFE was given the responsibility for preparing tripartite and unilateral plans designed to maintain access to Berlin through the three air corridors. USAREUR, of course, always had a direct interest in such plans because of the support functions it would have to assume. Following the joint Soviet-East German "air corridor declaration" of 1957 and repeated Soviet and GDR actions in early 1958, the United States had to prepare for additional contingencies. The USEUCOM Air Contingency Plan, published in June 1958, outlined specific responsibilities for USAFE and USAREUR in the event of an effective blockage of the air corridors.

To carry out ground support responsibilities, USAREUR--when directed by USCINCEUR--was to move, by surface means, the cargo and personnel normally transported by military aircraft. In addition, USAREUR alert measures would be executed, forces would be maintained in readiness for general war, and intelligence efforts would be intensified to determine Soviet and East German intentions. Strong news coverage efforts would be made to mobilize world opinion against the Soviet Union.²³

b. (S) Access to East Berlin. The erection of the Berlin wall in August 1961 spurred the preparation of two local plans that were to be implemented upon USCINCEUR's orders if the Soviets or East Germans attempted to block access to east Berlin completely. Berlin Command Operations Plan 3-6, published late in October, outlined action to be taken should the Friedrichstrasse entry point to East Berlin be closed, and Berlin Command OPLAN 3-7, published in November, made provisions for "nosing down" sections of the newly-erected wall.

If the execution of OPLAN 3-6 was ordered, the U.S. garrison in Berlin would assume a state of alert and move a 2-team task force to

²² USAREUR Ann Hist, 1961, pp. 57-62. TS. Gp-1.

²³ (1) Cable SX-6941, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 8 Nov 57, in USAREUR Ops Div Trp Ops Br files. CONF. (2) CINCUSAFE's Plan "Operation JACK PINE" (U), 12 May 60, in Annex B, USEUCOM Ann Hist Rept, 1960, pp. 15-6, (3) USAREUR ep 1013 (formerly EP 107), 14 Sep 59. In USAREUR Ops Div TS Control. Both TS. All Gp-1.

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the Friedrichstrasse crossing point. With one force acting as a reserve some 500 yards away, the other force would remove the barriers blocking the crossing, demolish all obstacles, and then withdraw immediately.

OPLAN 3-7 provided for another action which might or might not be performed simultaneously with the reopening of the Friedrichstrasse entry point. Should the order be given to execute this plan, five additional teams, each composed of two tanks and one or more armored-personnel-carrier-mounted infantry squads, would deploy with orders to "nose down" sections of the wall at scattered, designated locations. These teams would also withdraw immediately after completing their assigned missions.²⁴

c. (TS) Steinstuecken Access Planning. (S) Following the August 1958 incident when approximately 800 East German policemen entered Steinstuecken and captured a refugee,²⁵ the problem of guaranteeing U.S. access to the exclave became acute. Since the situation would be greatly improved if the United States controlled an access route to the island, consideration was given to offering the Soviets two other West Berlin exclaves in exchange for a land corridor between West Berlin and Steinstuecken. Such a transaction would be no great loss to the United States, since access to Nuthe Wiese had not been permitted since 1952, and for all practical purposes, Wueste Mark had been integrated into the Soviet Zone. The West German government agreed to the proposal, and in late 1958 the Soviets were approached with regard to an exchange of land. These efforts, however, were unsuccessful.²⁶

(S) In early 1960, the danger that a Steinstuecken incident might present a major challenge to U.S. prestige and intentions led to a detailed study aimed at clarifying U.S. and West Berlin access rights to the exclave. It was proposed at that time that, if an incident developed at Steinstuecken, two West Berlin police officials should attempt to visit the island to investigate. If they were denied access, two U.S. officials would make a

²⁴ (1) Berlin Comd OPLAN 3-6, 28 Oct 61. (2) Berlin Comd OPLAN 3-7, 20 Nov 61. Both in USAREUR Ops Div Trp Ops Br files. Both SECRET. Gp-4.

²⁵ For background information, see Chapter 15. UNCLAS.

²⁶ (1) USBER Memo, Mr. Burns to Richard V. Hennes, 16 Oct 58, subj: Possible Resolution of the Steinstuecken Problem. SECRET. (2) Airgram CN 1169, USBER to Secy State; AMEMB, Bonn, 23 Oct 58. (3) Foreign Service Dispatch 261, Dept of State to USBER, 7 Oct 58, subj: Further Developments Concerning Steinstuecken. All in USAREUR Ops Div Trp Ops Br files. Both CONF.

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similar attempt; and if they were also refused passage, the United States, itself, should propose the establishment of a land corridor to the exclave in exchange for a part, or--as a last resort--all of the other two exclaves.²⁷

(S) After careful study of these proposals it was decided that a land exchange offer would probably be futile, since a similar effort had failed in 1958. The essence of the Steinstuecken problem was that the United States had apparently hesitated to treat it in the same manner in which other Berlin problems were handled; and that this hesitation, in the face of an incident, would probably arouse as much public indignation as the August 1958 incident. For these reasons, it would be essential that, in case of an incident, the U.S. forces execute immediately some form of overt, readily identifiable measure. In May, USCOB was therefore directed to prepare a plan based on the assumptions that the Soviets and/or East Germans might create an incident at Steinstuecken and that a political decision would be made to reestablish access to the island.²⁸

(S) The resulting plan--Berlin Command OPLAN 3-3, published in April 1961--outlined three courses of action: Should an incident occur at Steinstuecken, USCOB would ask USAREUR to approve the dispatch of a vehicle-mounted and/or heliborne military police patrol that would test Soviet intentions of blocking U.S. access. The second course of action provided for a Berlin Command alert and the dispatch of a tank-infantry task force to an assembly area near the exclave. While this unit stood by, the military police patrol would be dispatched with instructions to proceed to the scene of the incident, capture or reject unauthorized personnel, restore order, and evacuate persons seeking asylum. If the patrol was unable to handle the situation, the third course of action would be taken: the task force would proceed to the exclave, using such

²⁷ (1) Ltr, USBER to Dept of State: AMEMB, Bonn, 2 Mar 60, subj: Steinstuecken Proposal. (2) Ltr, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR, 4 Mar 60, subj: Steinstuecken. USCOB 250/17. (3) DF, USAREUR ACoFS G3 to CofS, 18 Mar 60, subj: Steinstuecken Proposal. AEAGC. All in USAREUR Ops Div Trp Ops Br files. All SECRET. No Gp.

²⁸ (1) Ltr, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR, 5 Apr 60, subj: Steinstuecken USCOB 250/17. (2) 2d Ind, same to same, 1 Jun 60, same subj. (3) DF, USAREUR DCSOPS to CofS, 24 Jun 60, subj: Steinstuecken (U). AEAGC-OP 250/17. All in USAREUR Ops Div Trp Ops Br files. All SECRET. No Gp.

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force as required to gain access and to accomplish this mission.²⁹

(S) The question of access rights became acute in August 1961, when the East Germans isolated the island by erecting barbed wire entanglements. In order to reduce the reaction time in the event of an incident, USAREUR proposed that USCOB be authorized to implement, at his discretion, the first two courses of action specified in OPLAN 3-3 without further reference to higher headquarters.³⁰

(TS) This proposal, however, was not approved. At a White House meeting on 16 September it was decided that if an incident occurred at Steinstuecken, or if access to the exclave was interrupted, USCOB would be authorized to implement Course of Action A of the plan by dispatching a vehicular-mounted and/or heliborne military police patrol to test the communist intentions of blocking U.S. access. If the situation required movement into the assembly area or the dispatch of the task force, instructions would have to be obtained from Washington. This directive was subsequently modified when USCOB was instructed to notify CINCUSAREUR or USCINCEUR even before implementing Course of Action A. If the need for implementing the remaining courses of action arose, USCOB would have to obtain authority from USCINCEUR and keep CINCUSAREUR informed.³¹

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(1) Ltr, USCOB to Subor Units, 19 Apr 61, subj: Berlin Plan for Steinstuecken (S). AEABGC. SECRET. Gp-4. (2) Berlin Comd OPLAN 3-3 (U), 18 Apr 61, Berlin Comd Plan for Steinstuecken (S). SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-3.

30

Cable COB-498, USCOB/CG USAB to CINCUSAREUR, 27 Dec 61. SECRET. Gp-4.

31

(1) Cable SX-5370, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 5 Sep 61. SECRET.
(2) Cable JCS-1517, CJCS to Gen Norstad, 16 Sep 61, as quoted in ECJGJ-9-101212, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR; USCOB, same date. TS. Both Gp-3.



Chapter 9

Evacuation Planning (S)

32. (TS) Early Unilateral Planning

a. (TS) For Evacuation by Air. EUCOM's 1951 General Alert Order contained an annex that called for the air evacuation of Berlin non-combatants from Tempelhof Airfield to Orly Air Base. In that same year, however, CINGEUR directed that airfields in southern England be used as primary destination points, and also that there should be a "crash" evacuation plan. A liaison group was established in London to arrange with the British Government for the use of Burtonwood Air Base, and a revised plan was developed. This plan provided for a brief warning period, evacuation by elements of Twelfth Air Force directly from Berlin to Burtonwood, and the staging and reception of evacuees in England by the liaison group. In addition, Twelfth Air Force would be prepared to airlift noncombatants to Orly, if a crash plan was ordered, and COMZ would be prepared to provide logistical support and to move the evacuees to other points for subsequent evacuation to the United States.¹

b. (S) For Surface Evacuation. Evacuation Plan OVERLAND, first drafted in 1951, was the only existent Berlin surface evacuation plan until 1953. Though it could be executed only under normal conditions, OVERLAND was considered the primary plan for evacuation, on the assumption that surface movement could be accomplished without Soviet interference, thereby eliminating the need for an air evacuation. The plan envisaged evacuation operations by military trains and privately-owned vehicles at a

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TS Suppl, EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 89-92. TS. Gp-1

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steady but not an emergency pace.²

In 1953 it was felt that a plan was needed to evacuate the U.S. noncombatants from Berlin more rapidly. A plan was developed, therefore, for a rapid phase-out of dependents (RAPOD) and certain other personnel under conditions "short" of a full emergency. The operation itself would be similar to that previously planned, but at a much faster pace. This plan was also based on the assumption that the Soviets would not interfere with surface travel.³

33. (TS) Tripartite Planning

a. (S) Operation TRIPLE PLAY. In December 1951 the Allied Commanders-in-Chief had agreed on over-all emergency measures for the tripartite air evacuation of noncombatants from Berlin. Each commander, however, reserved the right to take unilateral action after consultation with the other two. In support of this agreement, tripartite draft plans were completed on two occasions, but they were in each case deficient because of the omission of detail.

Throughout 1953 and the first half of 1954, a tripartite group worked on the draft of a new plan--Operation TRIPLE PLAY. As originally conceived, TRIPLE PLAY was to be implemented by order of the three Commanders-in-Chief. Each nation would begin the air evacuation of its own noncombatants before entering into a joint effort; zonal airfields would not be used as destination points except with the approval of the respective Commanders-in-Chief.⁴ The plan called for the air evacuation of dependents and civilian employees in Berlin, for whom the Allies were responsible, on a non-crash basis and directly to destinations in France and Great Britain. In addition, selected German nationals, members of friendly missions, tourists, and local residents who were citizens of the three Allied countries would be evacuated. If the evacuation had to be conducted on a crash basis, French and American nationals would be moved by air to Rhein/Main and British nationals to Duesseldorf. From those

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(1) Berlin Mil Post Evacuation Plan "Overland," 23 Feb 51, in Berlin Mil Post Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 77-8. (2) Berlin Comd Hist Rept, 1 Jan 53 - 30 Jun 54, p. 110. Both SECRET. No Gp.

3

Ltr, Berlin Comd to CINUSAREUR, 13 Jan 54, subj: Rapid Phase-Out of Dependents and Certain Other Personnel (RPD), in Berlin Comd Hist Rept, 1 Jan 53 - 30 Jun 54, p. 112. SECRET. No Gp.

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IRS, USAREUR ACoFS G3 to DCoFS Ops, 5 Sep 53, subj: TRIPLE PLAY. in USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jan 53 - 30 Jun 54, p. 191. SECRET. Gp-1.

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points British evacuees would be flown to off-continent destinations, French nationals would be moved to France by land routes, and Americans would be transported overland to staging areas in accordance with the then-current USAREUR plan.⁵

b. (S) Plans to Evacuate the U.S. Garrison. Participation in tripartite noncombatant evacuation planning did not prevent USAREUR from preparing unilateral plans for the evacuation of the U.S. garrison.

It was a firmly announced U.S. policy that the maintenance of the Western position in Berlin was of paramount importance to the Western Allies, and that, since Berlin could not be abandoned except at the cost of a major political reversal, they should not leave the city for any reason. On the other hand, because of the risk of a general war, the United Kingdom and France had hesitated to approve the idea of making a stand in Berlin if a communist invasion appeared imminent. Though the United States had convinced its two Allies of the wisdom of maintaining the Western position in Berlin, U.S. contingency plans still had to take into account the possibility of a unilateral air evacuation of the U.S. garrison. Therefore, all USAREUR air evacuation plans for Berlin prepared up to 1958 included a "U.S. eyes only" annex providing for the continuation of airlift operations, after the completion of the non-combatant evacuation, which would allow for the evacuation of the U.S. troops should a decision be made.⁶

c. (TS) USAREUR-USAFE Disagreements. USCINCEUR assigned CINCUSAFE and CINCUSAREUR certain areas of responsibility for the preparation of joint Berlin air evacuation plans, but delegated to CINCUSAREUR the responsibility for directing the implementation of these plans. USAFE, however, apparently objected that the principle of unified command did not apply to the field of air evacuation. Thus specific areas of disagreement arose concerning command relationships, evacuee movement control from the alternate to the primary destination, and the determination of the western terminal of the airlift, all of which revolved around the basic issue of CINCUSAREUR's authority.⁷

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Draft, Operation TRIPLE PLAY (Final), undtd, in USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jan 53 - 30 Jun 54, pp. 191-3. SECRET. Gp-1.

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(1) USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jan 53 - 30 Jun 54, pp. 191-3. Gp-1.
(2) Berlin Comd Hist Rept, FY 1958, p. 116. No Gp. Both SECRET.

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(1) Ltr, USAREUR CofS to USAFE CofS, 12 Mar 56. In USAREUR SGS (1956) files, Item 5. TS. No Gp. (2) Wkly Sum of Maj Actions Taken by CINCUSAREUR and Gen Offs of USAREUR, 8 Feb 56, in USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1956, pp. 169-75. SECRET (info used CONF). Gp-1.

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These differences of opinion were brought to light during the staffing of the draft of Operation TRIPLE PLAY in 1955. USAFE objected to the designation of Burtonwood Air Base as the primary destination for approximately 3,000 U.S. noncombatants from Berlin, with the Air Force responsible for their logistical support. It would have preferred to terminate the airlift at Rhein/Main, or some other West German airfield, so that its aircraft would be released as soon as possible. In addition, USAFE asked for the latitude to accomplish the evacuation in the manner best suited to the situation existing at the time. Another USAFE suggestion was separation of the Berlin evacuees into two groups: those for whom the Department of State was responsible, who would be airlifted to Benelux fields, and those for whom the Department of Defense was responsible, who would be transported to West Germany. CINCUSAREUR, however, did not approve of the use of such close-in destinations under alert conditions, except on a crash basis. He proposed Bordeaux as an alternate to Burtonwood, and a Benelux field (if available) instead of Rhein/Main.⁸

d. (TS) Approval of TRIPLE PLAY. During the USAREUR-USAFE dispute the British became seriously concerned over USAREUR's failure to act on the proposed Operation TRIPLE PLAY. Since reaching an agreement on a tripartite evacuation plan for Berlin was in the best U.S. interests, USAREUR suggested that USAFE concur in the plan as written and that revisions be made at a later date if necessary. USAFE agreed, and in July 1956 CINCUSAREUR approved the proposed plan. The British and French agreed to it shortly afterward, and late that year, after almost four years of work and negotiations, the plan for Operation TRIPLE PLAY was published.⁹

34. (S) Changes in Evacuation Concepts

a. Deemphasis of Surface Evacuation. By 1956 there were three evacuation plans for U.S. noncombatants in Berlin: an air plan, which could be executed either unilaterally or in conjunction with Operation TRIPLE PLAY, and two surface plans, both similar except for the rapidity with which they would be implemented. CINCUSAREUR insisted that reliance

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(1) Ltr, USAFE CofS to USAREUR CofS, 3 Apr 56. In USAREUR SGS (1956) files. TS. (2) Sum Sheet, USAREUR ACofS G3, 17 Apr 56, subj: Noncombatant Air Evacuation of Berlin. (3) DF, USAREUR ACofS G3 to CofS, 13 Apr 56, subj: TRIPLE PLAY. Both in USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1956, pp. 169-70. Both SECRET. All Gp-1.

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(1) Ltr, USAFE CofS to USAREUR CofS, 4 Jun 56. In USAREUR SGS (1956) files. TS. (2) DF, USAREUR ACofS G3 to CofS, 14 May 56, subj: Outline Plan Operation TRIPLE PLAY, in USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1956, pp. 169-75. SECRET. Both Gp-1.

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be placed upon an airlift; CINCUSAFE thought that surface transportation should be given priority. USCINCEUR directed that major planning emphasis be placed on surface transportation, with air evacuation to be used only when surface travel was impossible.¹⁰ The idea that Berlin could probably be evacuated through the exclusive use of surface means, however, was by necessity gradually abandoned. Increased Soviet and East German harassment on the Autobahn and at the rail check points proved that it would be unrealistic to assume there would be no interference with a surface evacuation. Evacuation Plan OVERLAND was subsequently cancelled, and the rapid phase-out plan was revised to combine the use of air and surface transportation.¹¹

b. Change in Off-Loading Points. In early 1957 USCINCEUR directed that Burtonwood be deleted as a destination airfield in the U.S. portion of the recently published tripartite plan because of its vulnerability. Instead, Bordeaux and Rhein/Main were designated as off-loading points for the evacuees, with USAREUR assuming responsibility both for their logistical support at temporary stopovers and for their movement to an established safehaven. Although USAREUR objected, because the established safehavens were already overtaxed, the decision stood, and in May 1957 TRIPLE PLAY was revised accordingly.¹²

c. Evacuation of Specified Aliens. In addition to U.S. non-combatants, certain non-U.S. nationals also had to be air-evacuated from Berlin. Specifically, it was in the interest of U.S. intelligence agencies in Berlin to evacuate certain alien noncombatants of critical importance to protect them from exposure that might damage their future usefulness. In 1956 and 1957 USEUCOM provided the necessary guidance, which was incorporated into an appendix to the evacuation plan in 1958 and published as a separate USAREUR plan in early 1959. A number of air evacuation spaces for specified aliens were reserved and each U.S.

¹⁰(1) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to USCOB, 9 Jul 56, subj: Emergency Evacuation of U.S. Noncombatants from Berlin by Surface Means (C). AEAGC-PL 371.2 GC. (2) DF, USAREUR ACoFS G3 to CoFS, 13 Mar 56, subj: Non-combatant Evacuation from Berlin. Both in Berlin Bde G1 Plans Br files. Both SECRET. Gp-1.

¹¹Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to USCOB, 18 Aug 58, subj: Noncombatant Evacuation from Berlin, in USAREUR Ann Hist, FY 1959, pp. 28-30. TS (info used SECRET). Gp-1.

¹²Cable EC-9-190, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR; CINCUSAFE, 11 Jan 57, in USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1957, p. 138. SECRET. Gp-1.

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intelligence agency in Berlin was allocated a share of these spaces. Upon issuance of the evacuation order, each agency would assemble its sponsored aliens and place them in the evacuation channel. Escorts would be provided when desired, and intelligence coordinators would be stationed at the West German destination point to provide for the security of the alien evacuees upon their arrival.¹³

35. (S) Subsequent Planning

By 1961 the U.S. plans for Berlin evacuation were contained in two documents, both of which provided for the use of surface transportation but placed emphasis on air evacuation. The Allied Staff revised its air and surface evacuation plans and republished them as operations instructions. All the plans were based on the assumption that the Soviets would permit the evacuation of noncombatants from Berlin.

a. The Rapid Phase-Out of Dependents. Under Berlin Command's RAPOD, from 14 to 21 days would be necessary for the completion of the entire evacuation operation. The plan called for the phasing-out of dependents on an accelerated rotation basis, with the noncombatants departing Berlin by air and rail within 4 days and their sponsors turning in privately owned vehicles and household goods for shipment within 21 days. The noncombatants would be transported to Rhein/Main by air and to Bremerhaven by military train. USAREUR would be responsible for their subsequent evacuation either to the United States or to safehaven areas in other parts of Europe.

b. Emergency Evacuation. If an emergency order for the immediate evacuation of U.S. noncombatants from Berlin was given, all available means of transportation would be used. First priority, of course, would be given to air evacuation. Noncombatants would be flown from Tempelhof Air Base to Rhein/Main, and from there they would be transported to France, Spain, or other safehaven areas. This plan would be executed either unilaterally or as a tripartite operation under TRIPLE PLAY. Though designed for completion in 72 hours, evacuation could be accomplished within 36 hours.

If air evacuation could not be attempted and surface routes still remained open, overland evacuation would be accomplished through the use of the Autobahn and military trains. The primary plan relied on the use of some 1,700 requisitioned privately-owned vehicles, organized into a

¹³(1) USAREUR Ann Hist, FY 1959, p. 29. TS (info used SECRET. NOFORN). (2) USAREUR EP 109, 2 Feb 59, in USAREUR Ops Div P&R Br files. SECRET. Both Gp-1.

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convoy with march units and moving over the Autobahn from Berlin to Helmstedt. Military trains, with a capacity of 2,500 persons within 72 hours, would also be used to carry noncombatants to Braunschweig. The remaining evacuees would be taken to Braunschweig by military buses operating a shuttle service.

Under the above plans there would be no briefing of noncombatants, no requirement for maintaining food, medical, or POL storage, and no rehearsals by evacuees. Noncombatants would be told only that plans had been made for their safety in case of an emergency. The reasons given for this deviation from existing noncombatant evacuation policies were the isolated position of Berlin, making enemy permission necessary for evacuation, and the political repercussions that would result if the Soviets, East Germans, or West Germans became aware of the details of such plans. Actual preparations were to be made only by those military personnel who would be responsible for evacuation. The procedures outlined in the plan were to be rehearsed periodically without noncombatant participation.¹⁴

c. Tripartite Operations Instructions. In September 1961 the Allied Staff republished its air evacuation plan under the title Operations Instructions 2/61. According to the new instructions the Allied Staff would coordinate activities in Berlin and each Allied Air Force would be responsible for controlling its transport aircraft both on the ground and in the air. U.S. noncombatants would be transported to Chateauroux, France and Rhein/Main, Germany unless a crash evacuation was ordered, in which case they would be airlifted exclusively to Rhein/Main. Each Allied Air Force would evacuate its own country's non-combatants before assisting the others. The categories of evacuees remained unchanged.¹⁵

A plan was also published for the tripartite surface evacuation of Berlin, using the Autobahn and rail facilities. This plan, however, was designed for either non-emergency conditions or a situation when air access had been blocked but surface routes remained open.¹⁶

¹⁴(1) Berlin Bde G1 Briefing, 30 Nov 61, p. 3. (2) Berlin Comd Manual for Emergency Evacuation of Noncombatants (C), Berlin Comd EEN (U), 1 Aug 61. Both in Berlin Bde G1 Plans Br files. (3) Intvw, PFC Hickman with Capt J.R. Mason, Berlin Bde G1 Plans Br, 19 Jul 62. All SECRET. Gp-1.

¹⁵ASB Ops Instr 2/61, 25 Sep 61. In file above. SECRET. Gp-1.

¹⁶ASB Ops Instr 3/61, 13 Sep 61. In file above. SECRET. Gp-1.

PART III. ACCESS (U)

Chapter 10

The Right of Access (U)

36. (U) Introduction

The problem of access to Berlin goes back to the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in October 1943 and the work of the European Advisory Commission in London. In the fall of 1944 and 1945 several four-power agreements and declarations mentioned Berlin, but none contained specific provisions for the supply of the city or the troops stationed there. This vagueness reflected rivalry between Great Britain and the United States, on the one hand, and both of these countries' suspicions of the U.S.S.R., on the other. The Western Allies did not insist on written agreements defining access, since at a later stage the U.S.S.R. might have interpreted a permanent allocation of specific routes as limiting the Western right of access over any and all routes.¹ Even when the Council of Foreign Ministers of the four powers met in June 1949 after the Berlin Blockade, no specific delineation of military corridors to Berlin was made, nor had the matter of access been included in any arrangements among the four powers.²

¹(1) Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City, 1950), pp. 25-6. (2) Davison, cited above, p. 6. (3) Intvw, Mr. G. E. Blau, USAREUR Ops Div Hist Sec, with General L. D. Clay (Ret.), 19 Apr 62. ALL UNCLAS.

²The Berlin Crisis, International Review Service, Vol V, (1959), No. 49, p. 12. UNCLAS.

37. (S) The Basic Agreements

(U) On 14 and 18 June 1945, a little more than a month after the fighting had ended in Europe, President Truman and Marshal Stalin exchanged letters concerning arrangements for positioning U.S. and Soviet troops and providing for free access by air, road, and rail from Frankfurt and Bremen to Berlin for United States forces.³

(S) On 29 June 1945 representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union met in Berlin. Marshal Zhukov, the Soviet representative, opened the meeting by tying the entry of the troops of the Western Allies into Berlin with their withdrawal from the parts of the Soviet Zone not yet under Soviet control. In his view, one was contingent upon the other. Throughout the discussion, leading to the decision that each of the occupying powers would have approximately 25,000 troops in Berlin, Zhukov was careful to reiterate that Western Allied withdrawal from the Soviet Zone should be coincidental with the move into Berlin. He agreed to let a small advance party of the U.S. and British forces enter Berlin on 1 July, when the withdrawal from the Soviet Zone was scheduled to start, for the purpose of arranging quarters for troops. The other forces would be admitted into Berlin on succeeding days as the redeployment of forces into their respective zones continued.⁴

(S) The discussion of railroads and highways from the U.S. and British Zones to Berlin consumed a large part of the time of the conference. General Clay, who represented the United States, stated that the U.S. forces would move into Berlin over three rail lines, two highways, and such air spaces as would be needed. Zhukov did not recognize that these routes were essential and pointed out that the demobilization of Soviet forces was taxing existing facilities. General Clay countered that he was not demanding exclusive use of these routes, but merely access over them, without restrictions other than the normal traffic control and regulations that the Soviet administration would establish for its own use. General Weeks, the British representative, supported his contentions strongly. Both the American and the British representatives knew that there was no provision covering access to Berlin in the agreement reached by the European Advisory Commission, and they did not wish to accept specific routes that might be interpreted as denying the right of

³For details, see Chapter 1, Entry of U.S. Army Forces into Berlin. UNCLAS.

⁴Diary of the CG, Berlin District (Gen Parks), "Special Extracts," 8 May - 8 August 1945, in EUCOM Hist Div, A Survey of Soviet Aims, Policies, and Tactics (Karlsruhe, 1948), pp. 62-4. SECRET. Gp-1.

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access over all routes. However, there was merit to the Soviet contention that existing routes were needed for demobilization purposes, since both the British and the Americans had found transport to be a bottleneck in the redeployment of their forces. They, therefore, accepted as a temporary arrangement the allocation of a main highway and rail line and two air corridors, reserving the right to reopen the question in the Allied Control Council.⁵ To General Clay's demand for unlimited access to the Hannover-Magdeburg-Brandenburg-Berlin Autobahn route, Zhukov replied that it would be necessary for vehicles to be governed by Soviet road signs, military police, and document checking, but that there would be no inspection of cargo; the Soviet authorities, he said, were not interested in what or how much was being hauled or how many trucks were moving. Agreements were reached on air lanes, telephone and telegraph communications, and their maintenance.⁶ Rail access along the Helmstedt-Magdeburg-Berlin railroad was also granted for American-British use.⁷

38. (S) The Legal Basis for Allied Access

(U) In recent years the United States has taken the position that Soviet attempts to undermine its rights to be in Berlin and to have access thereto are in violation of international law. It contends that it holds these rights as a joint occupying power in Berlin and that they derive from the total defeat and unconditional surrender of Germany.

a. (S) The Agreements of 1943-45. (S) Unfortunately, and as pointed out earlier in this study, formal agreements for air and land access to Berlin from Allied Zones were never entered into on a high governmental level. The three Western Allies can thus cite only an exchange of notes, ambiguous Allied Control Council decisions, low-level working papers, and oral understandings concerning access routes by air and surface means. The basic provision of the Allied Control Council for air access was the only one formally agreed to on a significantly high level. However, even that paper left open the question of whether the occupying powers had exclusive right to the corridors or only priority in their use. Further, the question of maximum and minimum altitudes has been in disagreement since the beginning of the occupation.

(S) At the conference that took place on 29 June 1945 Marshal Zhukov stated that while he did not deny the right of Western Allied access, the

⁵Clay, cited above, pp. 25-6. UNCLAS

⁶General Parks' Diary, cited above, pp. 62-4. SECRET. Gp-1.

⁷Sp Intel Est 2-59, 28 Feb 59, cited above, p. 7. CONF. No Gp.

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Soviet authorities were not expected to "give a corridor," and that the details of the right to access were left open to interpretation by both the Soviets and the Western Allies. Thus the degree of control--control in Russian means "checking"--that the Soviets sought in order to establish the bona fide character of surface entrants and freight was never clearly defined to the satisfaction of all parties.⁸

(U) Allied rights of access to Berlin obviously embraced the right to transport food and other supplies for the civilian population of Berlin. The right of the people of Berlin to receive goods from, and export goods to, the Western zones and beyond was inherent in the special political status accorded to Berlin; it was further buttressed by the Potsdam Agreement that Germany should be treated as an economic unit. In fact, Marshal Zhukov insisted in July 1945 on a step that made Berlin more dependent on shipments from the West than it otherwise would have been. He notified his opposite numbers that the Soviet Zone could not supply the food that normally had gone to Berlin. The Western Powers were thus compelled to assume instantly the responsibility for feeding the inhabitants of West Berlin--a task that implied transporting food across the Soviet Zone.⁹

b. (U) The Four-Power Agreement of 20 June 1949. After the Berlin blockade was lifted, the U.S.S.R., as a member of the Council of Foreign Ministers, assumed "an obligation to take the measures necessary to ensure the normal functioning and utilization of rail, water, and road transport" for "the movement of persons and goods and communications between the eastern zone and the western zones and between zones and Berlin." At the same time the Soviet Union pledged its word "to mitigate the effects of the present administrative division of Germany and of Berlin" by "facilitation of the movement of persons and goods and the exchange of information between the western zones and the eastern zone and between Berlin and the zones."¹⁰

⁸ Extracted from USBER file 341, Access, 1959. SECRET.

⁹ Berlin-1961, cited above, p. 5. UNCLAS.

¹⁰ "Communique on the Sixth Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, June 20, 1949," in Documents on Germany, cited above, pp. 94-5. UNCLAS.

39. (S) Definition of U.S. Access Responsibilities

(C) Executive Order 10608 designated USCINCEUR as the U.S. military commander with area responsibility for Germany. It gave him the authority, which he could further delegate, with respect to all military responsibilities, duties, and functions of the United States in all parts of Germany. USCINCEUR, in turn, delegated to CINCUSAREUR the responsibility for the documentation and control of U.S. military trains, vehicles, convoys, and U.S.-sponsored vehicles moving between Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany.¹¹

(S) CINCUSAREUR retained immediate control of clearance and documentation for military travel to Berlin by land, but delegated to the U.S. Commander, Berlin (USCOB) the authority to approve and document requests for travel originating in Berlin. CINCUSAREUR also delegated to Berlin Command the general direction of U.S. military surface access, including the operation of the U.S. check points on the Helmstedt-Berlin Autobahn, the supervision of the Helmstedt detachment, and the control of military trains.¹²

¹¹USCINCEUR Directive 55-4, 31 May 60, subj: Responsibilities Relating to Germany (U). CONF. No Gp.

¹²Incl "A" to Current Intel Wkly Summary, 30 Apr 59, Road, Rail, and Air Access--Administration and Procedures. In USBER file 341. SECRET.



Chapter 11

Military Trains and Travel Documentation (U)

40. (S) The Rail Route from Helmstedt to Berlin

Rail transportation into Berlin was restricted to a single track line, without signal facilities, which the Soviet authorities had made available for the joint use of the United States and the United Kingdom. This line, from Helmstedt to Berlin, had previously been double-tracked and completely equipped with signal communications, but one track and all signal equipment had been carried away by the Soviet forces. Repeated requests made by U.S. Army authorities to the Soviet authorities for the return of the rails and signal equipment brought no results. Moreover, the line was unusable until the end of July 1945, when the Soviet forces finished repairing the bridge over the Elbe River at Magdeburg. On the 27th of that month the first U.S. military train traveled to Berlin through the Soviet Zone, by way of Helmstedt and Magdeburg, but it was not until 8 December that daily passenger service from Frankfurt to Berlin was begun.

Quadripartite Agreement CONL/P(45)27, dated 10 September 1945—the only agreement governing rail transportation to Berlin known to be in existence—provided for the movement of 16 trains a day, to transport American, British, and French military maintenance materials and Allied and civilian coal and food for the three Allied sectors. There were to be 6 U.S. and 6 British trains daily, with an approximate total capacity of 5,800 tons per day. The agreement did not provide for any other requirements, such as Allied or German passenger trains, or for westbound

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trains other than empty freight cars.¹

While the Soviet authorities maintained that the line had a capacity of 16 trains daily, during the first few months congestion in the Soviet Zone often prevented the dispatch of the allotted number of American and British trains. During the last quarter of 1945 freight trains moving over this route took an average time of 17 hours. During the following quarter transit time was reduced to 15 hours.²

41. (S) Supplementary Route by Way of Stendal

Suggestions that one line be reserved for the Americans and another for the British were opposed by U.S. transportation officers as likely to evoke too many questions concerning policy and operations. Thus neither American nor British authorities insisted on the use of the line from Braunschweig to Berlin via Stendal, until it was demonstrated that the Magdeburg route could not carry the volume of Allied traffic. At the end of August 1945 the Soviets authorized trains of empty freight cars returning from Berlin to use the Stendal route, so as to alleviate the congestion on the Magdeburg line.³ However, in October 1945 it was reported that, although the Soviets had agreed to open the Stendal line, they had not kept their promise.⁴

¹(1) Memo, Hq, 2d MRS, 22 Aug 45, Lt Col R. O. Jenson for Lt Col O. H. Osborn; Ltr, Inter-Allied Railway Commission, 21 Jul 45, subj: Train Operations over Line of Communication Seelze Yards to Berlin via Hannover, Magdeburg, and Brandenburg, to Dir Gen MRS, COMZ, from Col M. M. Shappel, in A Survey of Soviet Aims, Policies, and Tactics, cited above, pp. 137-8. Gp-1. (2) DF, Berlin Bde Trans Office to USCOB Deputy Commander/CofS, 4 Dec 61, subj: Effect of Closing of Sector and Zonal Borders on U.S. Military Duty and Freight Trains. Gp-4. In USAREUR Ops Div Hist Sec files. Both SECRET.

²A Survey of Soviet Aims, Policies, and Tactics, cited above, pp. 137-8. SECRET. Gp-1.

³Daily Berlin Log, Berlin Div, 2d MRS, furnishes a nearly complete record of railway operations to Berlin during the period discussed. UNCLAS.

⁴Minutes Special Conference, Diary of CofS, Berlin District, 9 Oct 45, in A Survey of Soviet Aims, Policies, and Tactics, cited above, p. 139. SECRET. Gp-1.

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42. (U) Initial Difficulties with Soviet Personnel

The first difficulties in the operation of the military train service to Berlin arose in 1945, when Soviet soldiers tried to enter trains to check the identities of passengers. General Clay first called attention to these incidents in the Allied Control Council--without results--and then conferred with General Sokolovsky on this subject. Reminding Sokolovsky of the discussions relating to the U.S. entry into Berlin, he reiterated that the only Germans carried by military trains would be those employed by the U.S. Forces or persons with quadripartite permits.⁵ If the United States was forced to use armed guards, unhappy incidents might result. When Sokolovsky replied that there would be no further trouble, General Clay reemphasized that the United States would not recognize any Soviet right to inspect U.S. military trains.⁶

43. (U) Interference with Military Rail Traffic before the Airlift

Contrary to quadripartite agreements, the Soviet occupation authorities gradually endeavored to apply to military rail traffic between Berlin and the western zones the type of restrictions that might have been applied at an international frontier. In January 1948, for instance, Soviet inspectors boarded American military trains and insisted that they had a right to check the identity of individual passengers. As a result, U.S. train commanders were instructed to prevent the entry of these inspectors, and guards were placed on the trains. Attempts to board U.S. trains were continued in February and March, and frequently trains were delayed for hours because the Soviet inspectors were not permitted to board them.⁷

On 31 March 1948 the Soviets issued new regulations that subjected Allied military passenger trains to a baggage and passenger check at the border, ostensibly to thwart black market activity.⁸ The order not only

⁵Quadripartite-Issued Permits, 13 Sep 46, (Final) Establishment of ACA Interzonal Facilities Bureau, CORC/P(46)286. UNCLAS.

⁶Clay, cited above, p. 115. UNCLAS.

⁷Ibid., p. 354. UNCLAS.

⁸(1) Ltr, Dep CINC, Soviet Military Administration in Germany, to distr, 30 Mar 48, subj: Certain Supplementary Regulations Governing Traffic between Berlin and the Western Zones. (2) Frank Howley, Berlin Command (New York, 1950), pp. 192-3. (3) Davison, cited above, p. 64. All UNCLAS.

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violated the Allies' right to be in Berlin but also conflicted with Marshal Zhukov's promise that U.S. personnel would not be subject to customs or border controls. The Soviet Kommandatura also decreed on 1 April that no freight could leave Berlin by rail unless it had been granted permission. As a result, incoming traffic was limited to civil and military freight, while freight trains returning from Berlin were empty.⁹

Rather than agree to Soviet search, in April U.S. authorities suspended military rail traffic between Berlin and the western zones and established an airlift of military supplies. The lift lasted only 11 days, since on 12 April military supply by rail was resumed, subject only to normal inspection of shipping documents. Passenger travel and outshipment of military freight and household goods continued to be by plane only.

Late in May Soviet rail authorities raised the question of labeling all rail cars, military as well as civilian, with the name of the siding at which the car was to be unloaded, and submitting a list of the contents. The U.S. authorities took the view that military supplies could not be inspected. They agreed to furnish detailed lists of contents, but refused to let the rail cars be opened.

On 19 June the Soviets blocked both rail and highway passenger travel to Berlin at the border of their zone, but let a trickle of freight shipments by rail continue for three more days. The total blockade of West Berlin then began as Soviet officials issued orders prohibiting the movement of any supplies whatever into the city's western sectors.¹⁰ During the first four weeks of this blockade, the Soviets tried to convince people that something was wrong with the railway tracks between Berlin and Helmstedt and announced that, following an investigation, two high-ranking German railway officials had been discharged for allowing the right-of-way to fall into a state of disrepair.¹¹

44. (S) New Quadripartite Agreements

(C) During quadripartite discussions that preceded the raising of the blockade in early March 1949, the Western position was a demand for 19

⁹Clay, cited above, pp. 358-9. UNCLAS.

¹⁰EUCOM Hist Div, The Berlin Airlift (Karlsruhe, 1952), pp. 2-4. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

¹¹(1) Neues Deutschland, 8 and 9 Sep, 48. (2) Davison, cited above, p. 127. Both UNCLAS.

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trains per day, to be shared by the Western Allies according to their requirements. The Soviets finally accepted, though not in writing, a daily quota of 5 passenger trains and 13 freight trains.¹²

(S) On the subject of rail transportation the New York Agreements, which terminated the blockade of Berlin and restored conditions to those that had existed before 1 March 1948, read as follows:

4. Since the conclusion of the Agreement . . . the following arrangements have been established without formal or written agreements and are now preserved by virtue of the fact that since they were in effect before 1 March 1948 the Soviet authorities are now obliged under the agreement to maintain them.

a. The running of military trains as follows:
2 American trains nightly in each direction between Berlin and West Germany; 2 French trains weekly in each direction; 5 additional paths per week at night are also available if required; 1 British train nightly and 1 British day train when required in each direction; 1 German passenger train daily in each direction; special trains as required for important persons.

(S) The 1949 negotiations resulted in an agreement that the East German Reichsbahn (State Railroad) would provide the locomotives and personnel necessary for the operation of the 19 daily trains from the West through Helmstedt to Berlin, in accordance with usual railroad procedures.¹³

45. (S) Clearances for Special Trains

(S) On 16 January 1956 the Soviet headquarters in East Germany informed the Berlin Command that future requests for clearances of special trains to and from Berlin would have to be submitted to the commander of the Soviet forces in Germany through the Soviet Military Liaison Mission in

¹²TPT/SPEC/M(49)2 of 21 May 1949 in AHC Paper ECO/Fin/Trans/Sec (53)103, 23 Sep 55. In USBER Mission file 341. CONF.

¹³(1) DF, Berlin Bde Trans Off to USCOB Dep Comdr/CofS, 4 Dec 61, cited above. Gp-3. (2) EUCOM Ann Narr Rept, 1949, pp. 33-4. Gp-1. Both SECRET.

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Frankfurt.¹⁴ These clearances had previously been handled by the West and East German railway administrations, acting as agents of the four occupying powers of Berlin. Constituting a significant departure from these longstanding procedures, the new instructions opened the way to more stringent control of Allied access to Berlin.¹⁵ Under the new Soviet procedures, clearances for special trains, other than the 13 regular trains allotted USAREUR by agreement, would be granted only to the Commander in Chief and Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, Europe and to the U.S. Ambassador in Bonn. Any other unscheduled train would be given clearance only as a substitute for one of the regular duty trains.¹⁶

(C) USAREUR immediately lodged a verbal protest, pointing out that any change in clearance procedures would be acceptable only if it was of an administrative nature and if clearances continued to be granted promptly.¹⁷ There were no further difficulties concerning clearances for special trains.

46. (S) The Issue of Travel Documentation

a. (C) U.S. Policy on Leave Travel. Existing quadripartite agreements gave the Allied Powers an unassailable basis for insisting upon the right of travel to and from Berlin for personnel stationed there. The right of personnel stationed elsewhere to travel freely to and from Berlin in the performance of their official duties was equally incontestable. On the other hand, leave travel, according to the U.S. Embassy in Bonn, rested upon the sanction of practice rather than upon any formal agreement with the Soviets. If its continuation on the customary scale jeopardized more essential duty and leave travel from West Germany to Berlin, the Embassy favored curtailing leave travel to Berlin. USAREUR nevertheless opposed firmly any Soviet attempt to restrict leave travel, since the control of such travel to Berlin was considered to be implicit in the right of the U.S. Ambassador to Germany and of CINCUSAREUR to determine the procedures to be applied for the occupation and government of the American sector of Berlin. Any restriction upon leave travel imposed by the Soviets would

¹⁴Cable 74, USBER to AMEMB, Bonn, 16 Jan 56. In USAREUR SGS 617 (1956), Item 3. CONF.

¹⁵Cable SX-1250, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 17 Jan 56. SECRET. No Gp.

¹⁶Cable 75, USBER to AMEMB, Bonn, 18 Jan 56. CONF.

¹⁷Cable 160915Z, USMLM to CINCUSAREUR, 16 Feb 56. CONF. No Gp.

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be an infringement upon the right of free access to Berlin.¹⁸

b. (S) The Preparation of Uniform Travel Orders. In early 1956 the Soviet authorities declared that continued access to Allied military garrisons in West Berlin would be assured, even though the German Democratic Republic had been granted sovereignty. These declarations led to speculations that the Soviets--through their East German satellite--intended to interfere with diplomatic and other officially-sponsored travel to and from West Berlin. In order to thwart such interference, the U.S. Embassy at Bonn suggested that only military-type travel orders be used for U.S. government personnel travelling to and from West Berlin but not stationed there. Consequently the form and wording of travel orders issued by the U.S. Embassy were changed to correspond substantially to those of orders issued by USAREUR. Except for the heading and command line, which in case of orders issued by the Embassy carried the Embassy authentication and the phrase "in connection with the occupation of Berlin," orders utilized thereafter for all authorized travel to and from Berlin, by both civilian and military personnel, were similar.¹⁹

c. (C) New Soviet Restrictions. Meanwhile the Soviets continued their probes. A clearance request for a special troop train scheduled for 20-21 May 1956 to move elements of the 6th Infantry Regiment from Berlin to West Germany for training exercises was denied by Soviet military authorities. The scheduled movement was nevertheless carried out by attaching additional cars to the regular daily U.S. passenger trains.²⁰

On 16 November the Soviet detachment commander at the Helmstedt border crossing point advised the British train commander that, since

¹⁸(1) Cable SX-1261, CINCUSAREUR to AMEMB, Bonn, 17 Jan 57. (2) Cable 709, AMEMB, Bonn, to Dept of State, 15 Jun 57. No Gp. (3) Cable SX-4048, CINCUSAREUR to AMEMB, Bonn, 17 Jun 57. (4) Cable, Dept of State to AMEMB, Bonn, 19 Jul 57. SMC IN 6280. (5) USAREUR CAD Jnl, 30 Jun 57. All in USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1957, p. 307. SECRET (info used CONF). Gp-1.

¹⁹(1) DF, USAREUR CAD to CofS, 13 Jan 56, subj: Uniform Travel Orders for Berlin. SECRET. No.Gp. (2) Cable SX-2079, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 5 Mar 56. CONF. Both in USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1956, p. 330. SECRET. Gp-1.

²⁰Cable SX-3230, CINCUSAREUR to Berlin Comd, 17 May 56, in USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1956, pp. 328-9. SECRET (info used CONF). Gp-1.

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unauthorized personnel were traveling on military trains, individual travel orders and identity cards, in addition to two lists indicating the name and category of each passenger, would be required in the future. Soviet officers would also enter Allied trains to check the passengers against the lists submitted. This change in Soviet procedures was to take place on the night of 25-26 November. When Allied representatives in Berlin sought to clarify the situation, they were informed that these measures would be enforced without amendment and that the restrictions would also apply to Autobahn travel. The three Allied Ambassadors thereupon reaffirmed that train commanders would not discuss with Soviet officers the categories of personnel entitled to ride on the train. Rather than permit the Soviets to enter the trains or remove passengers, the commanders would return the trains to their points of departure.²¹

Anticipating the Soviet restrictions, for the following two weeks USAREUR limited military train travel to members of the Forces and their dependents. On 24 November, at Soviet insistence, the U.S. train commander, without allowing Soviet personnel to board the train, paraded all passengers past a door of the train to facilitate a check of passengers and their travel documents. On this occasion the Soviets confiscated the temporary identification card of a school teacher on the ground that it was not a valid document. On 25 November two officers from USAREUR headquarters flew to Berlin to represent CINCUSAREUR on the westbound train on the night of 25-26 November; the train arrived at its destination without incident.²²

On the night of 8-9 December the Soviets delayed the U.S. Ambassador's special train at the check point and retained the Russian translations of the travel orders of four passengers, including those of the Ambassador, because their passports lacked the Certificate of Status stamp. Four days later, CINCUSAREUR sent a strong protest to his Soviet counterpart, objecting to the interference with military trains and convoys in and out of Berlin. He added that the determination of U.S. military personnel who should have access to Berlin was his concern and no one else's. After this protest the Soviets stopped the harassment temporarily, but the question of travel documentation remained unresolved.²³

²¹(1) USAREUR CAD Jnl, Nov 56. No Gp. (2) Background Paper, 28 May 60, Inspection of Military Convoys, 1956-1960. In USBER file 341. Both CONF.

²²USAREUR CAD Jnl, Nov 56. CONF. No Gp.

²³(1) Ibid. CONF. No Gp. (2) USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1957, pp. 302-5. SECRET (info used CONF). Gp-1.



d. (C) Tripartite Efforts to Standardize Travel Documentation. A factor complicating travel documentation was the lack of uniformity in procedures. The French used a travel order that was signed by the French commandant in Berlin, regardless of the issuing headquarters, while the British employed a status stamp signed by the United Kingdom's High Commissioner and linking the bearer to the occupation of Berlin. The United States, on the other hand, employed two types of travel orders—one issued over the Ambassador's signature in Bonn and the other over CINCUSAREUR's signature in Heidelberg, Bremerhaven, or Berlin. There were similar differences among the Western Allies' documentation procedures for road movements.²⁴

After several conferences attended by Allied and Soviet representatives in Berlin it became evident that the Soviet objective was not merely to standardize travel documentation but also, and more significantly, to restrict Berlin travel to duty personnel. The Soviets insisted that personnel should carry in addition to travel orders, documents indicating that they were going to Berlin either on permanent change of station or on temporary duty.²⁵

e. (C) Agreement on New Travel Documentation. The lengthy negotiations between the three Allied political advisers and their Soviet counterpart concerning a new travel document were finally brought to a successful conclusion in November 1957. On 2 December new Western Allied travel orders for Berlin, accepted by the Soviets, were used for the first time, and concurrently U.S. train commanders were instructed to cease protesting to the Soviet check point authorities against the showing of the identity documents of passengers, a practice that had been in effect since 25 November 1956. For a short time no further difficulties were encountered at the check point.²⁶

f. (C) The Stamping of Travel Orders. Related to the issue of travel documentation was a Soviet attempt in January 1958 to affix stamps to travel orders of Western Allied train passengers. The Soviets rejected Allied protests concerning this procedural change and insisted that all

²⁴Cables 86 and 93, USBER to AMEMB, Bonn, 16 Jan and 1 Feb 57. Both in USAREUR SGS 094 Berlin (1957). Both CONF.

²⁵Cable 144, USBER to AMEMB, Bonn, 20 Apr 57. (2) Cable 151, USBER to AMEMB, Bonn, 29 Apr 57. Both in USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1957, pp. 305-6. Both SECRET (info used CONF). Gp-1.

²⁶USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1958, pp. 303-4. SECRET (info used CONF). Gp-1.

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travel orders would have to be stamped, beginning on the 31st of that month. The reason given was that the Soviet authorities wished to assure themselves that travel orders would be used for only one round trip. When Western Allied representatives pointed out that all travel orders were limited to one round trip and that the Allied military officials would stamp them as invalid following such a trip, the Soviets extended the stamping deadline to 11 February. Four days before the expiration of the deadline, Allied political advisers agreed to accept the Soviet stamp on the travel orders, provided that the stamping took place on the station platform and trains were not delayed. The new procedure went into effect on 10 February. The stamping was done, however, in a glass-enclosed train-side office instead of on the open platform as initially agreed.

While this issue was being settled, the Soviets sought to introduce another administrative control by requesting the Western Allies to submit lists of train crew members so that the Russian authorities could issue travel orders to the crews for the following month. The American authorities contended that only they were qualified to issue orders and to determine who should be included in the crews. Agreement was reached that they would issue travel orders, valid for 30 days.²⁷

g. (C) Broadening the Categories of Personnel Authorized Travel Orders. As a corollary to removing all restrictions upon the Autobahn travel of dependents of U.S. military personnel stationed in Berlin whose nationality was not American, British, or French, in November 1957 USAREUR authorized limited travel on military trains for this category of dependents, mostly of German nationality. To test Soviet reaction, a few passengers of this category were to travel on the military train, and if the Russians did not object the ban would be removed completely. Accordingly, 20 test cases were made by permitting such passengers to travel, on permanent-change-of-station movement orders, on the U.S. military passenger train between Berlin and Frankfurt. There were no Soviet objections, and steps were taken to lift the ban completely.²⁸

At about the same time the categories of personnel authorized Berlin travel clearance and military travel orders were broadened further. Travel privileges were extended to all American, British, and French civilian employees and to dependents of U.S. military personnel possessing

²⁷Ibid. SECRET (info used CONF). Gp-1.

²⁸(1) Cable SX-6698, CINCUSAREUR to AMEMB, Bonn, 28 Oct 57. (2) Cable SX-7568, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 11 Dec 57, in USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1958, p. 304. SECRET (info used CONF). Gp-1.

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an identity and privilege card issued by the military services. This modification was facilitated by the fact that, after the introduction of the new travel documentation, the Soviet check point authorities were unable to differentiate between civilian employees stationed in Germany and those stationed elsewhere.²⁹

h. (C) Restrictions on U.S. Citizens. In 1960 U.S. military authorities barred individuals whose U.S. passport contained a visa of the German Democratic Republic from being issued movement orders or certificate of status stamps by the U.S. Commandant in Berlin. This decision was based on the U.S. Government's policy of discouraging U.S. citizens from travelling into or through the Soviet Zone and of prohibiting such travel for U.S. military personnel and Department of the Army civilians.³⁰

47. (C) The Freight Car Issue

a. Soviet Demands. Early in August 1957 Soviet check point officials protested against the attachment of freight cars to U.S. military passenger trains. They also insisted that all freight cars be marked and that the train commander show the freight warrants upon request. In the past, train commanders had shown only the "train consists" documents issued by the Frankfurt, Bremerhaven, or Berlin rail transportation offices that listed all cars composing the train and their contents. Documentation for freight cars attached to U.S. military passenger trains usually remained in the custody of the train commander and was not shown at the check points.

The Soviet position seemed to be that, instead of using the full quota of passenger and freight trains authorized under existing quadripartite agreements, the U.S. authorities attached freight cars to military passenger trains. While the Soviets did not question the United States' right to do this, they insisted upon the same documentation for these freight cars as for regular freight trains. This insistence was probably motivated by their wish to interfere with shipment of HICOG-12

²⁹ Cable SX-7005, CINCUSAREUR to AMEMB, Bonn, 13 Nov 57, in USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1958, pp. 304-5. SECRET (info used CONF). Gp-1.

³⁰ Ltr, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR, 16 Dec 60, subj: Certificate of Status Stamp. In USBER file 341. CONF. No Gp.



and ICEM items³¹ as well as with shipments of technical radio equipment manufactured by a West Berlin firm on Civil Aeronautics Authority contracts. These shipments were not sent by regular freight but were moved in baggage and freight cars attached to U.S. passenger trains.³²

b. U.S. Procedure. The procedure by which freight cars were attached to military passenger trains was based on precedent, since the U.S. Army transportation office records in Berlin showed that freight cars, mail cars of the Bundespost (Federal Republic of Germany Postal Service), reefer cars, and baggage cars had been attached to U.S. military passenger trains before 1 March 1948.

c. Soviet Actions. On 19 September 1957 the Soviets removed a mail car from a passenger train. USAREUR's protest and request for immediate return of the car were rejected by the Soviet authorities with the statement that passenger trains containing freight cars would no longer be cleared through the check points. As an immediate result, USAREUR issued instruction for the removal of all freight cars from the next Bremerhaven-Berlin train before it reached the Soviet check point. These instructions, however, were rescinded the following day, and the previous procedure was immediately restored.

There were no further incidents at the check point until 16 October, when the Soviet authorities detained Bundespost cars attached to the daily U.S. parcel-post train. The Soviets explained that their action was taken to confiscate anticommunist literature. The United States answered by pointing out that the Paris Agreement of 1949 bound the U.S.S.R. to insure the normal functioning of railroad transport and that the delaying of the mail cars was inconsistent with this agreement. Unofficially, however, the Federal Republic of Germany was asked to ship its propaganda material by other means.

³¹The HICOG-12 shipments consisted of printed material and films carried on a prepaid space-available basis. They were not to exceed 12 tons--thence their designation--per day, 10 tons of which were to be printed matter and the remaining 2 tons--films. The ICEM (Inter-governmental Committee for European Migration), of which the U.S. was a member, was authorized to ship baggage and personal effects of emigrants to the West, not including the Federal Republic, by military trains on a space-available basis. CONF. Gp-4.

³²USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1958, pp. 299-300. SECRET (info used CONF). Gp-1.

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In December 1957 the Soviets made another attempt to modify the U.S. procedure of attaching freight cars to military passenger trains. They directed that Soviet approval for such action would have to be obtained 10 days in advance, and threatened that cars attached to U.S. military passenger trains without Soviet approval would be removed at the check point. USAREUR replied that German mail cars had been attached to U.S. trains since December 1945 and that their removal would be contrary to international agreement. The Soviets raised no further objections and the matter was dropped.³³

48. (C) The Threat of East German Check Point Control

a. (C) Coordination of Policy. In November 1957 it seemed possible that the Soviets might transfer check point control of Allied military trains to East German officials. USAREUR therefore wanted to modify the existing standing instructions under which U.S. military train commanders accepted East German clearance under protest. The U.S. Embassy at Bonn was asked to secure tripartite agreement to a stronger procedure by which the train commander would return his train to its point of origin rather than accept East German documentation.³⁴

The U.S. Embassy's immediate reaction was to reject the USAREUR recommendation, on the ground that there was little likelihood that East German authorities would assume control of the check points and that the United States should avoid a self-imposed blockade resulting from the return of trains in order not to accept East German clearance.³⁵ By the end of December 1957, however, USAREUR succeeded in obtaining the U.S. Embassy's agreement to a modification of the standing instructions.

b. (C) Revision of the Instructions for Train Commanders. Under the revised instructions, the train commander was to reject any East German demands for visas or other documentation for any passenger on the train. He was to protest against such demands and insist that the train be allowed to proceed by virtue of its Allied status. If the train was not cleared following the protest, the train commander was to demand that it be returned to its point of origin. He would also prevent passengers from

³³Ibid., pp. 300-2. SECRET (info used CONF). Gp-1.

³⁴(1) Cable SX-7350, CINCUSAREUR to AMEMB, Bonn, 29 Nov 57. (2) CAD Jnl, Nov 57. Both CONF. No Gp.

³⁵Cable 265, AMEMB, Bonn to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Dec 57. CONF.

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being subjected to customs control or inspection.³⁶

In March 1958 the responsibilities for providing the personnel needed for the military trains to and from Berlin were redefined. The new instructions made USACOMZEUR responsible for providing a train commander for each regularly scheduled passenger train and the USAREUR Provost Marshal was to furnish train commanders for freight trains. Two enlisted men were to guard each passenger train and one enlisted man was to guard each U.S. mail car. USCOB was to provide a crew of at least three enlisted men to accompany each freight train. This crew was to include interpreter personnel capable of reading and conversing in Russian and German and one radio operator capable of maintaining continuous watch over the radio equipment installed on each passenger and freight train.³⁷

c. (C) Supplementary Special Instructions for Train Commanders.

(U) In early 1959, when the replacement of Soviet control personnel by East Germans seemed imminent, special instructions were issued to train commanders. These instructions summarized the U.S. policies and USAREUR directives that covered the movements of military trains through the Soviet Zone.

(1) (U) Prohibitions. The train commander was not authorized to discuss with any non-U.S. personnel at check points the categories of personnel authorized train travel. He was not to permit any person to enter or leave the train in the Soviet Zone, any identity documents to be confiscated, any physical comparisons of passengers with their individual identity documents to be made, any cars to be detached from the train, except for mechanical failure, any customs inspection or currency control to be made, or any Soviet or East German officials to enter any part of the train for the purpose of checking the documentation of passengers or members of the crew or of removing them from the train. However, the fact that the Soviets or East Germans had the physical capacity to force entry to the train was recognized, and no active force was to be employed to prevent such entry. Rather than submit to any of the prohibitions enumerated, the train commander was first to insist that the train be permitted to proceed by virtue of its Allied status

³⁶Cable SX-7859, CINCUSAREUR to USATC Frankfurt; USCOB, 30 Dec 57, in USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1958, p. 303. SECRET (info used CONF). Gp-1.

³⁷Ltr, USAREUR to distr, 12 Mar 58, subj: Instructions for Train Commanders on Military Trains to and from Berlin. AEACA 278/30 AG (AG-GO). CONF. No Gp.

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and as a matter of right. If passage was still refused the train commander, rather than accede to unacceptable demands, would insist that the train be returned to its point of origin.

(2) (U) Authorized Concessions. If Soviet personnel were replaced by East Germans, the train commander would demand transit for the train. If no Soviet officer was produced upon demand, the train commander would request that the train be returned to its station of origin. If this request was refused, he would report by radio to Berlin Command. If he was unable to establish radio contact within a reasonable time, he would submit to the documentation processing normally carried out by Soviet check point officials. If movement of the train was still refused, the train commander would submit, under written protest, to whatever Soviet or East German documentation might be offered on the spot. He was to implement this final emergency measure only to prevent a train from being trapped indefinitely in the Soviet Zone if radio contact could not be established.

(3) (U) Detached Cars. If a car was detached from the train and set out, the train commander would take the necessary steps to guard it after the passengers and property had been removed.

(4) (U) Stowaways. The train commander would not permit stowaways to remain aboard the train if they were detected before the train entered the Soviet Zone. In Allied-controlled territory they would be ejected at the next station and turned over to the military police. Moreover, before its entry into the Soviet Zone the train would be searched to assure that no stowaways were aboard.

Stowaways apprehended while the train was passing through the Soviet Zone were to be arrested, kept under guard, and turned over to military police at Helmstedt or Berlin, as appropriate. No radio report was to be made of a stowaway's presence, and if Soviet or East German officials asked for the removal of an alleged stowaway the train commander would not admit knowledge of the presence of such a person. If these officials appeared to have definite knowledge, they would be advised that the stowaway would be turned over to U.S. military police after the train had left the Soviet Zone. The officials would not be allowed to enter the train.³⁸

³⁸Berlin Comd, 15 Jan 59, Special Instructions for Berlin Train Commanders. Cy in USBER file 341. CONF (UNCLAS on 1 Jan 62).

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(5) (U) The British Instructions. Within 15 days the British issued similar orders to their train commanders. There were several points, however, in which their orders differed from the U.S. instructions. For instance, if a car was detached in the Soviet Zone, the British train commander would "not leave any member of the guard with the abandoned wagon." If a stowaway was found on the train, the British train commander would not surrender him voluntarily, but if the Soviets asked that he be handed over, the train commander would "immediately do so." On no account would he surrender the stowaway to the East Germans. Finally, British train commanders were admonished to be "always . . . correct and polite in your dealing with the Russians. To lose your temper will only make matters worse."³⁹

(6) (C) Stiffening of U.S. Attitude toward Soviet or East German Interference. In 1960 a gap in the existing instructions was filled when the train commander was ordered to remove physically from the train, if necessary by carrying him, any Soviet or East German official who entered the train and refused to leave it when told to do so. The official would not be struck, nor would firearms be used. However, the train commander would demand that the train be returned to its point of origin rather than accede to any further demands.⁴⁰

49. (S) Reexamination of Rail Access Policies

a. (S) East German Threats. In December 1960, shortly before the trade agreements between the Federal Republic of Germany and the East German regime expired, the East Germans issued statements linking the renewal of the interzonal trade agreements with Allied rail access to Berlin. In refuting these statements the United States affirmed that there was no connection between the two and that, irrespective of any failure on the part of the West and East Germans to renew their trade agreements by 1 January 1961, the Allies retained the right of access as a result of their agreements with the Soviets.

While these two positions provided the basis for a legal dispute, the fact remained that the East Germans could deny rail access simply by failing to provide an East German locomotive and train crew for a

³⁹British Orders for the Officer Commanding the Berlin Train, 30 Jan 59. Cy in above file. No classification.

⁴⁰(1) Ltr, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR, 12 Apr 60, subj: Instructions for Train Commanders on Military Trains to and from Berlin. (2) Cable SX-4159, CINCUSAREUR to AMEMB, Bonn, 1 Jul 60. Both CONF. No Gp.

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train when it reached Helmstedt.⁴¹ Fortunately, the situation did not arise: the West and East Germans renewed the interzonal trade agreement a few hours before it expired.

b. (C) West German Customs Inspection of Military Trains. In April 1959 USAREUR drew attention to the fact that West German customs officials had been making periodic checks of Allied military trains going from the Federal Republic of Germany to Berlin. While the Germans insisted that paragraph 5 of Article 35 of the Bonn Conventions authorized their actions, USAREUR—disturbed about the political consequences—pointed out that the practice was prohibited by paragraph 7 of Article 34 of the same conventions. If such inspections were to be continued, they might provide the East Germans with the excuse for their making similar checks of military trains.⁴² The Federal Republic of Germany thereupon granted a temporary waiver in the exercise of border customs control of these trains.⁴³

50. (C) Formalization of Travel Documentation and Military Train Procedure

a. USAREUR Circular 550-182. On 23 January 1961 USAREUR published Circular 550-182, which consolidated various directives and instructions pertaining to military train and Autobahn movements and documentation for travel to and from Berlin. The new circular defined the categories of persons authorized to receive movement orders, provided instructions for convoy and train commanders, and specified the actions to be taken in a number of contingencies.⁴⁴

b. Unauthorized Passengers Found Aboard Military Trains. Following an incident toward the end of November 1961, when a U.S. military train was stopped for more than 15 hours until an unauthorized East German passenger was turned over to the Soviet authorities, USAREUR revised the

⁴¹Memo, USCOB to OAC; USBER; and Berlin Comd, CefS, 21 Dec 60, subj: Allied Access to Berlin by Rail. Cy in USBER Mission file 341. SECRET. No Gp.

⁴²Cable 1493, AMEMB, Bonn to Dept of State, 3 Apr 59. CONF.

⁴³Ltr, Fed Min of Fin to Lt Col Banks, USAREUR LO, AMEMB, Bonn, 18 Apr 59, subj: Customs Control of Military Trains to Berlin in Helmstedt. Cy in USBER file 341. CONF.

⁴⁴USAREUR Cir 550-182, 23 Jan 61, subj: Access to Berlin (U), with Annexes A - E, including appendixes. For details of the documents superseded by this circular, see its Annex A. CONF. Gp-1.



instructions to train commanders contained in Circular 550-182. In the future every reasonable precaution was to be taken to prevent unauthorized persons from boarding the train. Before the train's entry into the Soviet Zone, a search was to be made to ascertain that no unauthorized persons were aboard. If a person of East German or communist-bloc nationality was found, before or after the train crossed Soviet-controlled territory, his presence was to be reported by coded radio message and he was to be ejected from the train and placed in the custody of U.S. military, West German, or West Berlin police. If he was found aboard the train while it passed through the Soviet Zone, a similar radio message was to be sent and the unauthorized passenger was to be placed under guard and warned by the train commander that, upon request of the Soviet authorities, he would be surrendered to them. To avoid this contingency, the passenger would be given an opportunity to leave the train while it was moving slowly and at a place where he would probably not be seen. If he refused to leave the train he would be turned over to U.S. military police on arrival at Helmstedt or West Berlin. If the Soviet authorities stopped the train and made a request for his surrender, he would be turned over to them. However, he would not be handed over to East German authorities under any circumstances.⁴⁵

⁴⁵(1) DF, USAREUR DCS OPS to CofS, 6 Jan 62, subj: Change of USAREUR Cir 550-182. (2) Cable SX-1104, CINCUSAREUR to USCOB/CG USAB, 9 Jan 62. Both CONF. Gp-4.