



UNCLASSIFIED

UNIT HISTORY (U)

1964

UNITED STATES MILITARY LIAISON MISSION TO COMMANDER IN CHIEF, GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES IN GERMANY


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PREFACE

The purpose of this document is to review events and developments of 1964 related to the methods of operation and activities of the United States Military Liaison Mission to the Commander in Chief, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. This review is summarizing in nature and covers only a representative part of USMLM activities. Throughout the document mention will be made of the close interrelation of USMLM with mutually supporting activities of the British and French Military Liaison Missions. A study of the variety of operations which are performed within the scope of "liaison" will be useful in understanding the capabilities and limitations of USMLM under the provisions of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement.

PAGE 1 OF 99 PAGES

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HISTORY
USMLM (TD E1-3731)
1964

USMLM - General
1967
Cy 1
5334

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UNITED STATES MILITARY LIAISON MISSION
TO COMMANDER IN CHIEF GROUP OF
SOVIET FORCES IN GERMANY
APO US FORCES 09742

UNIT HISTORY 1964

I. MISSION:

A. (U) Primary Mission: The United States Military Liaison Mission (USMLM), established by the Huebner-Malinin Agreement of April 1947, performs liaison between the Commander in Chief of United States Army, Europe (CINC, USAREUR) and the Commander in Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (CINC, CGFG).



CINC, USAREUR, General Freeman with CINC, GSFG, General Yakubovsky at Heidelberg. (U)

The duties of the USMLM, as outlined in the Huebner-Malinin Agreement are to maintain contact with the CINC, GSFG and to provide representation for the protection of the interests of US nationals in the Soviet Zone of Germany (SZG). Under the Huebner-Malinin Agreement (Appendix A), accredited members of the Mission may travel in East Germany in the performance of their duties.

B. (C) Secondary Mission: The secondary objective is to exploit USMLM liaison status and

potential for the collection of intelligence information within the Soviet Zone of Germany. (Letter, AEAGB, Hq USAREUR, 2 Aug 61, Subj: Terms of Reference-USMLM (U).)



Field reconnaissance (C)

II. ORGANIZATION AND TRI-SERVICE INTEGRATION:

A. (C) USMLM is a USAREUR subordinate unit accredited to CINC, GSFG. USMLM (TD E1-3731) is composed of a Chief, Army who is appointed by CINC, USAREUR and an Army element of 11 officers and 19 enlisted men. A Navy element of one officer and an Air Force element of 4 officers and 4 enlisted men are attached. (Appendix B)

B. (S) DCSI, USAREUR exercises primary staff supervision over Chief, USMLM to include the provision of policy and operational guidance, as well as levying intelligence collection requirements.

C. (S) Navy and Air Force personnel are included in USMLM as authorized by the Hueb-

ner-Malinin Agreement. CINCUSNAVEUR and CINCUSAFE exercise normal staff supervision over Navy and Air Force elements in matters involving administration, discipline and training. They levy collection requirements, assign priorities and provide special collection guidance for Navy and Air Force intelligence targets. Each element provides its own funding support.

D. (U) By terms of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement, USMLM is authorized 14 personnel accredited to Hq GSFSG, without regard to service or grade. At present the 14 accreditations are held as follows:

Chief, USMLM (Army Element)	1
Deputy Chief, USMLM (Army Element)	1
Liaison Officers:-	
Army Element	5
Air Force Element	2
Navy Element	1
NCOIC, Potsdam Installation (Army Element)	1
Drivers:-	
Army Element	2
Air Force Element	1
	—
TOTAL	14

III. GENERAL:

A. (C) During 1964 USMLM successfully accomplished its dual mission. It remained the only direct channel of communication between the US and the USSR in East Germany, and the only area where American military observers could observe, photograph and appraise a combat-ready Soviet military force in the field.

The USMLM intelligence-gathering program with its refined reconnaissance methods and efficient reporting system was of great importance to the US intelligence effort.

B. (C) Events and activities involving USMLM participation were diverse and often of international significance, resulting in 65 meetings with representatives of GSFSG during the course of the year.

Данное удостоверение личности одновременно является и пропуском. Оно дает право вольно или принудительно передвигаться по территории республиканского ГСВГ, въезда в Берлин и выезда из него.

Члены экипажа заправочной станции на территории гаваретных районов, военных частей, учреждений, заводов и предприятий.

В случае убития владельца личного удостоверения, последний подлежит сдаче в Отдел внешних сношений штаба ГСВГ.

При утере удостоверения следует немедленно сообщить в Отдел внешних сношений штаба ГСВГ.



Штаб ГСВГ

УДОСТОВЕРЕНИЕ ЛИЧНОСТИ

19 64.

УДОСТОВЕРЕНИЕ ЛИЧНОСТИ № II/A
Предъявитель сего

является членом Американской военной миссии связи при Главном командовании Группой советских войск в Германии.

Данные о владельце удостоверения Должности. **офицер связи**

Дата рождения **12 февраля 1928 г.**
Национальность **американец**
Рост **185 см** Вес **71 кг**
Цвет глаз **карие**
Цвет волос **шатен**

19 65.
(ПНЧУК)
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У НДЕЯ 19 64

Совiet Accreditation Pass For USMLM Personnel (U)



Chief, USMLM meets with Chief, SERB, at SERB (U)

[REDACTED]

C. (C) During the year cordial operational and social relations were maintained with British and French Military Liaison Missions, as well as with US intelligence agencies and units located in Berlin.

D. (C) A revised Permanent Restricted Areas (PRA) map, comprising approximately one-third of the Soviet Zone, was issued by GSFG, and ten Temporary Restricted Areas (TRA) maps denied additional large areas to Mission travel for considerable periods. The number of Mission restriction signs continued to increase throughout the Soviet Zone and the task of intelligence collection became more difficult.

E. (S) USMLM spent 645 tour days in the Soviet Zone in 1964, and traveled 193,669 miles. During the year it was involved in 8 incidents and 32 detentions. Hostile surveillance was not a major problem. Copies of 643 separate intelligence reports and 79,862 photographic prints were forwarded by USMLM, in addition to the daily TWX and numerous replies to specific requests for information.

F. (S) Mission travel in East Germany presented numerous challenges and problems and occasionally produced dangers approaching combat conditions. Observations of Soviet and East German armed forces continued to provide Headquarters USAREUR-USNAVEUR-USAFE with information based on personal observations

of their own personnel who remained immediately responsive to the needs of those respective headquarters. The unique status of USMLM enabled it to observe, photograph and evaluate numerous activities of a significant portion of the Soviet and East German armed forces in the Soviet Zone of Germany.

By observation and reporting of new equipment, tactics, combat practices and troop dispositions by the Army, Navy and Air elements, USMLM remained the most important overt collection agency available to the US intelligence community to maintain surveillance of Soviet and East German activities in the Soviet Zone of Germany.

IV. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT:

A. (C) ADMINISTRATION:

1. OFFICER PERSONNEL: Seven officer replacements arrived in 1964, to include one Air Force and six Army officers. All officer replacements were fluent in the Russian language and most had a working knowledge of German. Five of the six newly assigned Army officers were USA Field Detachment "R" graduates. All new USMLM officers attended a three-day course at the Leica Camera Factory at Wetzlar. This was to familiarize themselves with the camera itself and methods of photo-



Leica School (U)

graphy. The turnover in Army personnel was unusually large and materially affected reconnaissance operations during a period of several months. It is anticipated that officer replacements can be made more uniform in the future because of the recently authorized extension for five-year tours of duty. Most replacement officers arrive at USMLM after having spent two years in Europe at Detachment "R", which allows them one year with USMLM to complete a normal three-year overseas tour, and up to three years if they avail themselves of the full extension.

2. ENLISTED PERSONNEL: The transition to the new centralized enlisted procurement system resulted in some unexpected difficulties. In several cases replacements were unqualified physically or by temperament or training for service with USMLM. In other cases, replacements arrived several months late. Since it was difficult to specify by MOS the exact type of individual needed for specific Mission activities, a special classified message was prepared outlining the necessary qualifications. The USMLM enlisted personnel accredited to GSFG must be outstanding soldiers in good physical condition and with exceptional endurance. Proficient drivers, linguists, clerks and intelligence analysts must perform multiple duties. Through the efforts of Berlin Brigade, USAREUR and DA, the enlisted personnel assignment problem was brought under control, and by the end of the year USMLM was again receiving top-caliber personnel.

B. (C) LOGISTICS:

1. US SUPPORT:

a. GENERAL: Berlin Brigade provided USMLM the normal logistical support provided lodger units. Requirements that were beyond the capabilities of Berlin Brigade were referred to USAREUR.

b. VEHICLES: The reconnaissance vehicles played a key role in the successful accomplishment of the intelligence collection. Repeatedly, the specially-equipped Ford sedan proved itself rugged enough to move on trails and cross-country and fast enough to elude surveillance.



USMLM vehicle on secondary road (U)

In 1964, USMLM traveled 193,669 miles on operational missions with the 10 accredited vehicle passes which were broken down as follows:

Ambulance	- 1
Chief's Car	- 1
Tour Cars	- 8



Штаб ГСВГ


ПАСПОРТ № 13

ЛЕГКОВОГО АВТОМОБИЛЯ

" ФОРД "

Американской военной миссии связи

1964 г.




In January 1964, USMLM had six 1962 Ford Galaxie Sedans and six 1963 Ford Galaxie Sedans. During the course of the year nine new cars (one model 1963 and eight model 1964) were received and a corresponding number were turned in. Experience has proved that four vehicles need to be replaced after about 25,000 miles of travel, or the breakdown and accident rate begins to rise rapidly.

c. POTSDAM INSTALLATION: Although by terms of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement, the Soviets were charged with providing logistical support for the Potsdam installation, experience has shown that much of the support must be drawn from US sources. Items of food and furnishings were the principal items which were supplemented from US sources during 1964.

The Potsdam installation, which USMLM has occupied since 1947, was built in 1910 by a member of the German nobility. In 1925 the estate was sold to the House of Hohenzollern and became the residence of Prince Segismund of Prussia, a nephew of Emperor William II. His son, Prince Friedrich Karl, lived in the house until 1945. From 1945 until 1947 Soviet troops occupied the estate and raised pigs on the grounds. After cleaning and renovation,

the estate, consisting of a three-acre lakefront area with a large three-story mansion, two two-story houses in bad need of major repair and a garage-stable-living quarters building was turned over to USMLM. Only the main house is habitable.



USMLM Potsdam Installation (Lakeside View)
(U)

d. USMLM BERLIN INSTALLATION: The Berlin installation at 19/21 Fohrenweg is the location of the Operations Section and of all support activities such as supply, photographic laboratory, publications and reproduction section and all classified files. This building was once the secret headquarters of Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, wartime Chief of Staff of Hitler's military supreme command. The four-story building was erected in 1936. It has three stories and an attic, each with about 10 rooms. The lower two floors are bomb-proofed with steel-reinforced concrete floors two or three feet thick and walls of similar material about 18 inches wide. The ground floor contains mess facilities and there is an "L" shaped underground escape tunnel with special air funnels.



USMLM Berlin Installation (U)

2. SOVIET SUPPORT:

a. Under the terms of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement the Soviets are responsible for providing logistical support for the Potsdam installation and its normal liaison activities. This includes rations, coupons and cash to purchase gasoline in the Soviet Zone of Germany, maintenance of the Potsdam house and hiring of domestic help, such as firemen, cooks, gardeners and maids.

b. Soviet rations received from GSFG continued to be sufficient in quantity and, in the course of the year, showed improvement

in quality. However, the variety of rations and the quality and hygienic condition of many items were far below minimum US dietary and health food standards, requiring augmentation from US Army Commissary in Berlin. In December, for the first time, fresh bananas were included in the Soviet-provided rations. Many Soviet ration items were produced in East Germany and Bulgaria, but some came from USSR.

c. At the end of the year the domestic help provided the Potsdam installation was at full strength; however, for a period of several

years there had been a shortage of from one to three East German employees.

d. In the course of the year, USMLM was issued blankets and several items of furniture. In the autumn, a joint inventory of Soviet-issued items was held and numerous salvage and undesired articles were returned to the Soviet External Relations Branch (SERB).

e. Repair and maintenance of USMLM facilities in Potsdam remained at barely adequate level. As in past years, there were fairly frequent breakdowns in the sewerage, drainage, water and electrical systems, all of which remained inadequate. Repair and maintenance provided by the Soviets was generally limited to work of an emergency nature, and even then advance notice of several days was needed. At the end of the year the interior of the main building required minor repairs and painting, and the fence surrounding the grounds was scheduled for replacement.

V. LIAISON ACTIVITIES:

A. (C) RELATIONS WITH SOVIET FORCES

1. GENERAL: USMLM liaison activity consisted of 65 meetings with the Soviets, which amounted to an increase of 15 meetings

over the previous year and 6 more than in 1962. The two shot-down USAF aircraft, US Army defectors in East Germany, and aid to US citizens stranded in the Soviet Zone served to illuminate the unique status of USMLM in East-West negotiations.

2. MEETINGS WITH SOVIETS: A total of 65 meetings were held in 1964, of which 35 were at the request of USMLM. Forty-six meetings were held during the first half of the year. Major negotiation sessions resulted from the Soviet shooting down of the USAF T-39 aircraft on 28 January and the USAF RB-66 aircraft on 10 March. Less important, but equally heated discussions were held concerning US Army defector Francis Bunting, new-type license plates for Mission vehicles, and Soviet demands to remove curtains from Mission sedans.

During the second half of the year, there was a significant decrease in the number of meetings. Defectors, alleged Mission travel violations, hospitalized American citizens and diesel trains were subjects of discussion. The last week of the year was highlighted by a visit of Chief, USMLM to CINC, GSFG for the purpose of extending holiday greetings. (Appendix C)



Old (left) and new (right) USMLM license plate. (U)

[REDACTED]

Yumang, the Soviets gave the usual reply: "Yumang entered the territory of the German Democratic Republic and by his own personal desire asked the authorities for political asylum. For this reason, all questions concerning the return of Yumang to American control must be decided by him personally, by means of direct address to the organs of the GDR from whom he requested political asylum." Inasmuch as the United States does not recognize the existence of the "GDR" no further USMLM action was taken.

On 1 April, SERB informed USMLM of the death by suicide of US Army defector Pvt Henry Kierman, who was buried in Bautzen.

b. On 23 February defector Francis Bunting, who had defected from the US Army to the Soviet Zone in 1952, telephoned the USMLM Potsdam installation and identified himself as an American military defector who wanted to leave East Germany and return to US Army control. Shortly thereafter, defector Bunting appeared at the installation and signed a voluntary statement affirming his desire to return to US-control.



*Defector Francis Bunting at USMLM
Potsdam Installation. (C)*

Defector Bunting remained at the USMLM Potsdam installation until 14 April while extended negotiations were carried on with SERB for his release. Finally the Soviets indicated that they would encourage prompt handling of his application to the East German police for permission to leave. Bunting then left the USMLM installation, made his application and returned to his home to await developments.

During the period between 14 April and 15 July, Bunting made several calls to the USMLM Potsdam installation and USMLM representatives twice visited the defector at his home. He was subjected to subtle pressure to withdraw his application, such as an offer of a better job and a better apartment in a new location. However, he maintained that he still wished to leave East Germany.

On 15 July the Soviets stated that the East Germans had granted Bunting permission to leave, but that he had chosen not to leave without his family, which included a stepson who was serving in the East German Army. USMLM confirmed that such was the case and on 21 July, Chief USMLM withdrew his request for assistance, commenting that the case could probably not be considered closed.

c. On 6 May Chief USMLM attended a meeting at SERB and found an East German representative present. Chief SERB stated that "representatives of the German Democratic Republic want to present to you a question concerning an American defector and to turn him over to you as a staff representative." This meeting occurred during the period that Bunting's return was being negotiated so that Chief USMLM thought the offer concerned Bunting. Chief USMLM reiterated that he was accredited only to Soviet headquarters and would deal only with the Soviets.

The East German speaking in German to a Soviet Captain who translated the proceedings into Russian, stated that "tomorrow morning an American citizen, a former officer of the American Army" would be "sent out of the GDR". They asked that "Headquarters, US Army take the person and the American pro-

erty which he has." He would be turned over unofficially without signatures. The person was then identified as Captain Svenson and the East German spokesman added that "authorities of the GDR do not desire to publish the fact that Svenson is being transferred and that his asylum is removed, provided the other side will not publicize the case". USMLM was informed that the transfer could take place on 7 May either at Wartha with the vehicle in which Svenson had defected, or at Potsdam with the vehicle following a few days later. Chief USMLM departed Berlin for Wartha early in the morning on 7 May and at 1000 hours, Deputy Chief USMLM informed SERB that it was desired that the transfer be effected at Wartha at 1500 hours. One hour and a half later, SERB notified USMLM that the transfer could take place at 1800 hours. Chief USMLM took Captain Svenson into custody in the Soviet Zone of Germany and delivered him to

US military authorities in West Germany for trial by court martial for desertion and theft of an Army vehicle.

8. AID TO US CITIZENS HOSPITALIZED IN EAST GERMANY:

(a) McFadden: On 17 September, USMLM was contacted by US Consular Section in Berlin requesting information about Mr. Michael John McFadden, a young American citizen who had been injured on the Helmstedt Autobahn. McFadden was reported to have incurred injuries as a result of a blowout of the rear tire of a scooter on which he was riding. It was known that he was being treated in an East German Hospital at Burg. USMLM telephoned the hospital from its Potsdam installation and was informed that Mr. McFadden was in critical condition and that his left leg was about to be amputated. Hospital officials also



Mr. McFadden leaves Burg EG hospital in USMLM ambulance. (C)

[REDACTED]

provided the address of Mr. McFadden's parents in the United States. The information was forwarded to the US State Department officials.

On 18 September the Chief of Mission requested permission through SERB to proceed to the hospital which was located in a Permanent Restricted Area (PRA) to see Mr. McFadden and to evaluate the situation regarding subsequent evacuation of the patient to West Berlin by USMLM ambulance.

Three days later, Chief, USMLM received Soviet permission to proceed into the PRA to the hospital at Burg, and visited McFadden there. By this time the patient's leg had been amputated above the knee, but he appeared to be recovering rapidly from the operation.

On 25 September, arrangements were com-

pleted with SERB for the movement of McFadden to West Berlin by USMLM ambulance, and on the following day with the aid of a Soviet escort vehicle the evacuation was accomplished.

(b) Carter: On 19 October a USMLM reconnaissance officer spending the night at a hotel in Dresden was approached by an East German doctor who told him of an American citizen being treated in a local hospital. The doctor requested the USMLM officer to visit the patient.

The following day the USMLM officer went to the Medical School Hospital in Dresden and spoke with the 24-year-old American, Mr. William Carter, who was suffering from an acute cardiac infection. Carter had been with an American musical group on tour of Scandina-



Mr. Carter at hospital in Dresden. (U)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

vian countries and East Germany. He had become ill during the tour and was admitted to the Dresden hospital on 30 September. The doctor indicated that Carter had been close to death at the time of admission to the hospital, but that he was now out of danger and could probably be discharged in about a month.

On 28 October Chief, USMLM requested SERB to arrange to have the Soviet Commandant in Dresden notify the hospital that Chief, USMLM would visit Carter on 30 October. By 30 October there was no answer from SERB so the planned visit was postponed. Although permission of Soviets to visit hospital was not really necessary, since the hospital was not in a PRA, it was useful to attempt to involve the Soviets in this matter concerning an American in the Soviet Zone. Such action exercises provisions of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement which permit USMLM to assist stranded American citizens.

On the first of November, SERB informed USMLM that the hospital had been notified that Chief, USMLM would visit Carter on the following day. Chief, USMLM made the visit as scheduled and left fresh fruit, coffee and American cigarettes with the patient. The East German doctor said Carter should be able to travel in about three weeks. Carter expressed a desire to join his musical group in Paris about 3 December. It was decided to attempt to arrange evacuation of Mr. Carter to West Berlin through the Soviets.

On 13 November, Carter telephoned USMLM Potsdam house and said that he wanted to leave the hospital on 19 November. Chief, USMLM requested clearance from SERB to bring Carter to West Berlin on 19 November. Shortly after USMLM called Carter to inform him of plans to evacuate him to West Berlin on 19 November, an East German police official arrived at the hospital to tell Carter that he had no visa for entry to West Berlin. (This served to further confirm that all telephone calls to USMLM Potsdam house are monitored.)

On 18 November, SERB informed USMLM that Carter would have to apply "to the com-

petent authorities of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) who authorized this entry" in order for him to leave the Soviet Zone. Finally, on 20 November, Carter was issued an East German exit visa, was sent by train to East Berlin and flew to Paris from the East German airport at Schonefeld.

USMLM had succeeded in involving the Soviets in getting a stranded US citizen out of East Germany, but inasmuch as Carter had initially accepted an East German entry visa he was forced finally to request an East German exit visa before he was permitted to leave.

9. T-39 AIRCRAFT INCIDENT:

At 1401 hours on 28 January, a USAF T-39 twin-engine, jet trainer military aircraft from Wiesbaden Air Base on a local training mission inadvertently flew into the Soviet Zone of Germany. Two Soviet interceptor aircraft pursued the plane and shot it down in the vicinity of Erfurt about 1514 hours.

Chief of Mission received a warning order at 1700 hours for USMLM to stand by for possible search and rescue operation. Forty minutes later, USMLM was directed to initiate a search for the missing aircraft, and by 1800 hours the first USMLM search team, composed of Army and Air Force officers fluent in Russian and German, departed Berlin for the Erfurt area. At 1915 hours, Chief USMLM met with Acting Chief, SERB and informed him that: "Information has been received of a downed American aircraft in East Germany. A USMLM team has been dispatched to investigate and render assistance under the terms of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement. It is requested that your office give us any information and render any assistance that may be required." Acting Chief, SERB replied that he would inform higher headquarters and notify USMLM as soon as any information was available.

At 2000 hours, when the second USMLM search team was being dispatched, the first search team arrived at the vicinity of the crash site, having covered a distance of ap-

[REDACTED]

proximately 190 miles at an average speed of almost 100 miles per hour along icy roads. Directed to search for the crash site about 20 kilometers north of Erfurt, the first search team had proceeded to the area, where an East German civilian informed that a US plane had crashed and burned, killing all crew members. He advised the search team that the best route to the crash site was through Vogelsberg. In Vogelsberg two groups of civilians pointed in the direction of the crash site and reported that a short distance down the road was a demolished American plane with three dead aviators. About this time VOPO vehicles attempted to detain the USMLM search team.

The members of the USMLM search team left their vehicle and started on foot up the hill toward the crash site. The hill was covered with ice and VOPOs placed themselves in positions to physically prevent the members of the team proceeding any further. The team could distinguish Russian soldiers on top of the hill and could hear the clanking of metal. When a USMLM officer called out in Russian for help, several Russians scrambled down the icy hillside. A senior lieutenant stated that he was in charge and that the USMLM search team would not be permitted to view the crash site. He would give no information as to the status of the crew of the aircraft, saying only that the team could view the site the following day. Seeing that further discussion would be useless, one of the USMLM officers attempted to force his way up the hill toward the crash site. The Soviet lieutenant pushed him back, saying: "Don't even consider it; don't make me use more force", and nodded to a Soviet soldier standing next to him holding a submachine gun at the ready. The lieutenant then advised the USMLM search team to: "Go see the Commandant — he will give you permission to look". As the search team returned to their vehicle and departed the area, it encountered a detail of East German soldiers erecting a Mission Restriction Sign. The road was also blocked by a VOPO truck and as the team drove up a VOPO on foot made threatening

gestures with his submachine gun. Seeing that the team was leaving instead of entering the area, the VOPO patrol moved their vehicle so that the USMLM search team could proceed.

In Erfurt, one member of the search team telephoned the USMLM Potsdam installation and gave a full report on the events which had transpired since the team departed. Another member went to see the Soviet Commandant, who was still in his office at 2245 hours. In reply to a request that the team be permitted to proceed to the crash site, the Commandant stated that no aircraft had crashed in the Erfurt area and, furthermore, he could not permit the team to enter the area since it had been declared a Temporary Restricted Area for training purposes by Headquarters, Group of Soviet Forces. He further stated that the restriction had become effective at 1800 hours and would continue for an indefinite period. The first search team then went to the Erfurter Hof Hotel to rendezvous with the second USMLM search team of Army and Air Force officers which had departed Berlin at 2000 hours. Both teams were instructed by Chief USMLM to disregard the restrictions and attempt to reach the crash site.

At 2325 hours, Chief USMLM again visited SERB regarding the previous request for information and assistance. Only the Soviet interpreter was available, and he said he would transmit the message.

On 29 January, after eluding initial surveillance and departing Erfurt in the early morning hours, one USMLM team attempted to reach the crash site from the east while another team approached from the west. The first team eluded a further surveillance attempt by driving three miles cross-country without lights to a location from which the crash site could be observed in the moonlight. During about four hours preceding dawn, 12 Soviet vehicles visited the crash site and Soviet troops were continuously at work on the hilltop, apparently removing certain parts from the wreckage.

The second USMLM team was able to follow battle telephone cable to within 200 yards

[REDACTED]

of the aircraft before being discovered and forced to withdraw. At daylight the team worked its way to within 75 yards of the crash site where it encountered 15 Soviet troops with unslung weapons. Since further advance could have been made only at the risk of physical violence, the USMLM lieutenant colonel in charge of the team dismounted and requested permission to inspect the crash site in the name of CINC, USAREUR. A Soviet colonel replied that no aircraft had crashed and that the immediate area was a winter training area. The Soviet colonel warned that USMLM vehicles should not be using secondary roads and trails in this area, which was restricted. After again insisting on being allowed to inspect the crash site and citing the seriousness of this situation, the USMLM team finally was forced to follow the Soviet escort to the Erfurt Kommandatura.

A third USMLM team, which departed Berlin shortly after midnight, managed to elude surveillance and penetrate to within 150 yards of the crash site before being halted by four Soviet soldiers carrying submachine guns. Once again the USMLM officer requested to view the aircraft crash site, but the team was escorted from the area after being accused of having penetrated a restricted Soviet training area.

The one USMLM team still not detained, remained at its observation post until dawn and photographed two Soviet staff cars, two Soviet ambulances, two shop vans, a cargo truck and approximately 100 Soviets at the crash site. It was then forced to take evasive action to leave to return to Berlin with proof that an aircraft had crashed there.

About noon, in the office of the Soviet Commandant at Erfurt, the two USMLM teams being detained were accused of a violation of a TRA and were shown a map outlining the restricted area which included the crash site. The USMLM officers protested not being able to telephone their headquarters but the Soviet Commandant stated that it would be not permitted until after the investigation was com-

plete. Repeatedly the existence of a downed USAF aircraft was denied and the USMLM officers were told it would be impossible for them to visit the site. Finally, about 1400 hours, both teams were released and proceeded to a hotel in Erfurt where they telephoned the Potsdam installation and received instructions to form one composite team to remain in Erfurt for possible employment and to send remaining personnel back to Potsdam to report on the situation.

Meanwhile, about noon on 29 January, Chief USMLM delivered to SERB a letter from General Freeman, CINC USAREUR, to General Yakubovsky, CINC GSFG. The letter contained a description of the downed aircraft, details of the incident and a request that CINC GSFG initiate an investigation as to the condition of crew and aircraft and assist USMLM under the terms of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement.

Further US efforts were stalemated until the next day when, at a meeting with SERB at noon on 30 January, Chief USMLM was informed that arrangements could be made for release to US-control of the aircraft wreckage and the bodies of three USAF officers killed in the crash. An hour and a half later a second meeting was held between Chief USMLM and Acting Chief SERB, and arrangements were made for a US convoy to proceed to the crash site. Chief USMLM departed Potsdam immediately after the meeting to go to the crash site with Acting Chief SERB. The convoy of recovery vehicles from Tempelhof Air Base and the USMLM ambulance departed Berlin about dusk.

Chief USMLM arrived at the crash scene shortly after dark and inspected the aircraft wreckage and the charred bodies of the crew. Although some electronic equipment appeared to be missing, the major portion of the burned wreckage was there. The Soviet attitude was now most cooperative. SERB prepared a statement concerning identification and evacuation which was signed by Chief USMLM and Acting Chief SERB.

[REDACTED]

On 31 January the evacuation convoy arrived about 0200 hours and the ambulance was loaded with the remains of the crew members. At dawn, Chief USMLM and the ambulance departed the crash site. Upon arrival at Berlin, the USMLM ambulance proceeded to Tempelhof Air Base where the bodies of the officers were transferred to a USAFE C-130 aircraft which took them to Wiesbaden for funeral services.

The remainder of the evacuation convoy personnel started work immediately upon arrival but made little progress in the dark on the ice and snow-covered hill. The next day the wreckage of the T-39 aircraft was loaded into trucks with the assistance of the Soviet troops. The Soviets were completely cooperative, even to the extent of pointing out to the recovery party where scattered fragments could be found at some distance from the crash site. About 2100 hours the recovery convoy departed the crash site for Berlin. The wreckage of the T-39 reached Berlin about 0900 hours on 1 February, and shortly thereafter USMLM teams returned to the general area of the crash and interrogated German nationals in the area concerning the incident. It was thus learned that the T-39 aircraft was shot down by two Soviet Air Force interceptor-fighters.

The Chief of Staff, GSFG sent a message to Chief of Staff, USAREUR commending USMLM for the manner in which the inspection and evacuation was accomplished.

10. RB-66 AIRCRAFT INCIDENT:

On the afternoon of 10 March, a USAF RB-66 twin-engine, jet reconnaissance military aircraft departed Toul-Rosieres Air Base in France on a local training mission. About an hour later the aircraft was observed on radar to be approaching the Soviet Zone of Germany. The plane disappeared from the radar screen after it had reached the vicinity of Gardelegen, northeast of Helmstedt. By 1700 hours, US-

MLM was on an alert status, and by 1745 hours information had been received that the aircraft, which appeared to have crashed, probably was the RB-66 and that the three crewmen had probably parachuted. The parachuting had been observed by the pilot of a British plane flying the air corridor to Berlin. At 1830 hours Chief USMLM organized three search teams which were to be prepared to depart on order. The first USMLM team departed at 2000 hours and the second team left a half hour later. At 2200 hours Chief USMLM went to a meeting at SERB and notified the Soviets that an American aircraft was reported crashed in the Soviet Zone of Germany. He requested assistance and informed SERB that USMLM search teams had been dispatched to locate the aircraft which presumably went down "somewhere toward the west end of the central air corridor". Acting Chief SERB replied that he would inform higher headquarters, but warned that the USMLM officers should not violate the PRA or the TRA then in effect in the area in question. Chief USMLM stated that the teams had already departed and he expected the Soviets to assist those teams in getting to the crash wherever it might be.

That night the first USMLM search team drove through maneuvering elements of two Soviet Army divisions in the TRA and PRA and recovered samples of chaff dropped from the downed aircraft. The team came to within 300 yards of the crash site at about 0600 hours when it was effectively blocked on a narrow trail and apprehended by Soviet troops in two armored personnel carriers. The team was escorted under armed guard from the area to the Soviet Kommandatura at Gardelegen. The second USMLM search team proceeded to the area and talked with a German national who pointed out the crash site, but the team was stopped at about 0315 hours by a Soviet security detachment in an armored vehicle. The Soviet troops were very angry and aggressive. A Soviet lieutenant colonel ordered his troops to hook a tow bar from a Soviet truck to the USMLM vehicle and towed it to the Komman-

[REDACTED]

datura at Gardelegen. The third search team departed Berlin on the morning of 11 March and arrived at the crash site about noon. The team was pursued and fired upon by Soviet troops and forced to stop. They were then escorted to the Gardelegen Kommandatura.

The 11th of March was a most frustrating day for the three USMLM search teams. From the time of their detention until their release at 2300 hours, they were held incommunicado at the Soviet Kommandatura at Gardelegen. Because of the friendly attitude of local German nationals in Gardelegen, the cars were ordered driven into the courtyard of the Kommandatura. Food was promised but never arrived. The Soviets repeatedly denied knowledge of the aircraft or the condition of the three crew members, but the local German nationals had said that two men parachuted safely while another was in the Gardelegen hospital.

At Potsdam a USMLM request for a meeting with SERB at 1000 hours was rejected with the explanation that Chief SERB and Deputy were not available. After continued attempts to arrange a meeting, Chief USMLM finally proceeded to SERB office at 1500 hours and delivered a statement to the Soviet lieutenant on duty, requesting an immediate meeting with the Chief of Staff, GSFG and the immediate return to US-control of the three USAF officers who reportedly had parachuted from the RB-66. Finally, at 2200 hours on 11 March Chief USMLM was able to meet with Chief SERB and transmit a letter from General Freeman to General Yakobovskiy. However, the Soviets still refused to acknowledge the crash or provide any information or assistance.

On 12 March at about 0100 hours all three USMLM search teams returned to Berlin after having been ejected from the TRA and surveilled from Gardelegen to Potsdam. When the debriefing was completed, it was decided that it would be futile to send additional search teams into the restricted area.

At 1600 hours, Chief USMLM requested permission to visit the injured USAF officer reported to be in Gardelegen hospital. SERB promised to forward the request.

On 13 March at 1550 hours Chief and Deputy SERB were unavailable and a request for information on the status of the USMLM previous request to visit injured USAF officer was given to SERB lieutenant-interpreter. At 1915 hours the request was repeated. At 2045 hours the lieutenant-interpreter telephoned USMLM a message from Chief SERB that there was no information, that permission had not been granted and that Chief SERB would contact Chief USMLM when information was received.

On 16 March at 1140 hours, at a meeting at Potsdam, Chief USMLM was informed that the injured USAF officer was suffering from bruises and a broken leg and was in a Soviet military hospital in Magdeburg where he was receiving all necessary aid. SERB stated that permission would be granted for an American medical officer to visit him. At 2100 hours an Air Force surgeon visited the patient who was suffering from partial amnesia.

On 17 March at a meeting with SERB about 2100 hours, Chief USMLM was told that the Soviets would permit a doctor and driver to make a second visit and the next day, at 1220 hours, an orthopedic specialist from USAFE made the trip. He was impressed by the medical care provided by the Soviets.

On 19 March at a USMLM-SERB meeting, Soviet permission was granted for an additional medical visit the following day. The USAF medical officer visited the injured officer again and pointed out to the Soviets his concern over certain apparent medical complications.

At 1050 hours on 21 March, Chief USMLM was informed that the USAF injured officer would be returned to US-control that afternoon. At 1500 hours, Chief USMLM and the USAF medical officer accepted custody of the patient who was then transported through

[REDACTED]

the Helmstedt Checkpoint to the airport at Hannover where a USAF aircraft flew him to Wiesbaden for further hospitalization.

At a meeting with Chief SERB on 24 March, Chief USMLM thanked the Soviets for the excellent treatment given the injured USAF officer and requested information regarding the status of the two remaining crewmen. In the meantime, East German newspapers had stated that the flyers would be tried for espionage before an East German court. However, at 1010 hours on 27 March, Chief SERB telephoned Chief USMLM to inform him that the two remaining flyers would be turned over to US-custody at 1430 hours

at Marienborn. Two East German Air Force officers participated as observers in the release meeting, but Soviet responsibility was insisted upon by Chief USMLM. An accusation of espionage was read by a representative of GSFG and this charge was denied by Chief USMLM. Chief USMLM signed a statement accepting custody of the USAF officers from Chief SERB at 1453 hours and they were transported through the Helmstedt Checkpoint in a USMLM vehicle for air evacuation from Hannover to Wiesbaden.

After the completion of arrangements for the return of the USAF officers to US-control, the Chief of Staff, GSFG directed



Newspaper photo concerning release of two of the RB-66 fliers. (U)

[REDACTED]

SERB to inform Chief USMLM that he was greatly displeased with USMLM actions which resulted in USMLM vehicles entering restricted areas without Soviet permission. Chief USMLM replied that emergency circumstances indicated that the lives of US citizens were in danger, therefore a decision to proceed immediately with the expectation of Soviet permission and assistance was justified. No further Soviet criticism was expressed, however, subsequent USMLM negotiation efforts to recover the aircraft wreckage continued throughout March and April without success. By the end of 1964, the wreckage of the RB-66 aircraft had still not been returned to US-control.

11. SOCIAL ACTIVITIES:

a. On 22 February 1964, a Washington's Birthday Ball was held by USMLM at the Potsdam house. Officers and wives of SERB,



US Commander Berlin at USMLM social function at Potsdam. (U)

Headquarters GSFSG and the Potsdam Kommandatura were invited, as well as officers and wives of the French and British Missions. About 100 persons attended the gala affair, which featured an American orchestra for dancing and a buffet dinner. Potsdam house decorations were based on the life of George Washington and the thirteen original states of the American Union.

b. In May a farewell reception for departing USMLM officers was held at the US Officers Club in Berlin. Selected Soviet guests were in attendance. All Soviet personnel accepted an impromptu invitation for a final drink at USMLM Chief's quarters.

c. In August a farewell party for the US Commandant, Berlin was given by Chief USMLM in his quarters. Soviet guests included Chief SMLM-Frankfurt, Chief SERB and other Soviet officers and their wives.

d. In September an informal Potsdam house dinner and movies was hosted by Chief USMLM for Mission and SERB officers and wives. Soviets declined to stay for the movies.

e. In November, Chief USMLM with his wife and one other USMLM officer attended annual SMLM-F party in Frankfurt.

f. On 29 December, Chief USMLM was invited to GSFSG headquarters for exchange




Soviets at USMLM Potsdam House. (U)

[REDACTED]

of holiday greetings and presentation of gifts. General Yakubovskiy, CINC GSFG, was very cordial and champagne was served.

g. Soviet social activity increased during this year. At parties Soviet officers and their wives seemed to be much more at ease than previously, and their clothing and general appearance showed gradual improvement. Local Soviets made no effort to reciprocate for party invitations which they accepted, but their low standard of living explains their reluctance to entertain Westerners.

B. (S) RELATIONS WITH BRITISH AND FRENCH MISSIONS: Intelligence operations continued to be closely coordinated with the British Military Liaison Mission (BRIXMIS) and the French Military Liaison Mission (FMLM). This included frequent meetings of the



Chiefs of the British, U.S. and French Military Liaison Missions. (U)

three Chiefs of Mission, weekly operations officers' meetings and daily debriefings at the USMLM Berlin installation following all Allied reconnaissance trips. It was evident that coordinated trip scheduling and prompt exchange of

information and reports worked to the mutual advantage of all three Missions. With the limited number of accredited personnel and vehicles, it would have been impossible for one Mission alone to approach the extensive overall coverage afforded by the jointly coordinated operations of the three Allied Missions.



Many social events, both in Berlin and Potsdam, were arranged by USMLM, BRIXMIS and FMLM. Members of the Allied Missions participated in frequent social gatherings which enhanced mutual understanding and respect, and helped to maintain a spirit of genuine cooperation which was evident in all joint operational activities.

C. (S) RELATIONS WITH OTHER US AGENCIES AND PERSONNEL: Close contact was maintained with DCSI, USAREUR. This was facilitated by frequent visits of the Chief, USMLM and other USMLM personnel to DCSI, and by regular staff visits of DCSI personnel to USMLM. Air Force and Navy elements likewise maintained close contact with their higher headquarters by frequent visits.

Other interested agencies at DIA, EU-COM, USAREUR, USAFE and USNAVEUR made staff visits to USMLM during the course of the year to exchange ideas and receive orientations on the capabilities of USMLM.

Liaison with the Berlin intelligence community was maintained by participation of the Chief of Mission in the IO/USCOB weekly WATCH Committee meeting and by informal staff visits between representatives of the various US intelligence agencies and USMLM.

In 1964, USMLM inaugurated a program designed to familiarize key military and civilian supporting staff personnel in Berlin with the mission, organization and operating peculiarities of USMLM. The program consisted of a series of monthly visits by selected supporting staff personnel to the USMLM Berlin installation for a briefing by Chief, USMLM, followed by a luncheon at Potsdam house. The program has resulted in better understanding of the support requirements of USMLM.



Berlin Command Staff
Officers visit USMLM
Potsdam Installation. (U)

During the year various American VIPs were hosted at the Potsdam house by the Chief of Mission, and received a conducted tour of Potsdam, to include visits to the palaces located there.

On New Year's Eve, as has been traditional, USMLM officers and their wives entertained their personal friends from the Berlin US community at a New Year's Eve party in Potsdam house.

VI. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS:

A. (S) COLLECTION ACTIVITIES IN EAST GERMANY:

1. GENERAL:


Allied Collection Effort: The joint intelligence collection activities of the US, British and French Military Missions in the Soviet Zone of Germany have continued to produce outstanding results in 1964. Coordinated operational scheduling and division of intelligence targets

among the Missions proved beneficial to all. Through agreement, the Soviet Zone was uniformly covered on a rotating basis by ground and air teams of the three Missions. Weekly meetings of Operations Officers facilitated planning, adjustment of reconnaissance areas and targets and exchange of information. USMLM served as an information center where all Mission officers reported significant Soviet Zone activities immediately upon their return from an operational trip.

2. DETERRENTS AND OBSTACLES TO COLLECTION:

a. Permanent Restricted Areas: On 15 February 1964, a new PRA map was imposed on the Allied Missions by Headquarters, GSFG. It resulted in an overall increase of only about 150 square miles in total restricted areas, but served effectively to prevent further Mission observation in the Elbe River North crossing





areas and the area west and southwest of Berlin, through which passes most of the rail traffic between Poland and the Soviet Zone of Germany. Access to approximately one-third of the Soviet Zone of Germany is denied by means of the PRA map. These PRAs serve as locations for the more sensitive Soviet and East German military equipment and operations in the Soviet Zone. (Appendix D)

b. Temporary Restricted Areas: In addition to PRAs, access to large significant areas was denied the Allied Missions by ten Temporary Restricted Areas (TRA) maps which banned Mission travel in certain areas for a total of 72 days. These TRAs usually attempted to cover maneuvers and field exercises, and have been used occasionally to screen movement of special equipment and units (generally missile-associated). (Appendix E)

c. Mission Restriction Signs: Another form of restriction to Mission movement are the more than 2500 Mission Restriction Signs which bar Allied Mission travel along portions of specific roads and trails. The number of these restriction signs is constantly increasing and the East German authorities have, in the course of the past year, arbitrarily "signed off" numerous military installations and areas.

3. TOURING STATISTICS: During 1964 USMLM dispatched 441 intelligence-collection trips which spent a total of 645 tour days in East Germany.


There were 71 less trips conducted in 1964 than in the previous year and 121 less tour days. The principal reasons for fewer trips and less tour days were the T-39 and RB-66 aircraft incidents which necessitated a cancellation of all scheduled touring during two extended periods, an unusually large replacement of reconnaissance officers in June and July which required extensive orientation and training of new tour officers and resulted in fewer two-man trips, and a general slackening of GSFG maneuver activity which could be covered with less intensive field reconnaissance.

USMLM traveled 193,669 miles on operational missions as compared with 202,779 miles in 1963 and 207,099 miles in 1962. These figures indicate that more miles were covered per trip in 1964 than in previous years, but the overall travel total was affected by the limitations which reduced the number of trips.


During several periods in 1964, Chief USMLM obtained GSFG accreditation for his private vehicle and made scores of trips in East Germany in connection with operational missions, liaison functions, investigation of incidents and checking situations connected with American citizens in Soviet Zone hospitals. None of the more than 20,000 miles of travel is included in the compilation of regular reconnaissance trips, tour days or mileage.




Mission Restriction Sign (U)



Private vehicle of Chief, USMLM. (U)



4. INCIDENTS AND DETENTIONS: USMLM was involved in 8 incidents and 32 detentions during the year; this was 7 less incidents than in 1963, but 12 more detentions. As in 1963, the most detentions occurred during the winter months when USMLM vehicles became stuck in the vicinity of Soviet military activities. However, there was at least one detention during every month of the year. Generally, incidents and detentions are almost accidental in nature and must be considered a normal hazard of reconnaissance trips. (Appendix G)



USMLM vehicle being winched on impassable road. (U)


5. SURVEILLANCE AND HARASSMENT: While there was at least one instance of surveillance in every month of the year, the high month for surveillance was May with 12 instances. Surveillance is seldom associated directly with Soviet activity. During East German Army field training, on the other hand, harassing surveillance is often encountered. In such East German cities as Rostock, Stralsund and Halle, discreet surveillance is almost habitually encountered. Instances of surveillance in 1964 totaled 58; this compares with 82 cases in 1963, however, discreet surveillance has come to be common and is generally not reported. At the present time, surveillance is not considered a major problem area. (Appendix F)



EG surveillance team ("Tails"). (U)

6. USMLM OPERATIONAL TOURS:

a. Preparation: A USMLM reconnaissance officer usually spends two days of preparation before beginning a two-day operational collection trip. During the week prior to a normal scheduled reconnaissance trip, the officer receives a schedule which shows the general area in which the tour is to be conducted, names his driver and designates the time for conducting the reconnaissance. At least two days prior to his departure he receives from the operations section a list of collection requirements which affect his trip. Collection requirements might be a request for inventory, orientation and possible photography of designated electronic installations or inventory and sketch of facilities in certain military training areas; collection guidance could request a visit to certain East German and Soviet installations to determine type of units, strengths and equipment in installations or a check of important rail sidings to pick up troop or equipment movements



Photography of designated electronic installation. (C)

[REDACTED]

It might be required that the trip include visiting river crossing areas to observe and photograph equipment and operations. Photographing of new items of equipment on the roads and checking certain known Soviet trash dumps to recover material of intelligence value might be included in requirements. Also, the reconnaissance officer could be requested to purchase maps, city charts, military and scientific publications and similar items of intelligence interest.

Based on the available hours of daylight and the distance and condition of routes between targets, and taking into consideration Mission Restriction Signs and priority of targets, the reconnaissance officer determines a tentative route and schedule. Requirements section files are then reviewed for Special Intelligence Collection Requirements (SICR) applicable to his trip, and target folders on every target he plans to visit are examined. Target folders contain all previous observations made by US, British and French effort against the target during the previous two years. From this data the reconnaissance officer knows what has been seen and what he should normally expect to see. A 1:25,000 annotated map in the target folder shows exact limits of the Soviet installation, barracks, fuel area, ammo dump, training area, rail siding or electronic site. The folder contains available photographs of the target. A typical reconnaissance trip will have from 5 to 15 targets, depending on the concentration of targets. The reconnaissance officer must then review the Soviet and East German military equipment identification board, the troop unit disposition holdings for the general area and the data on the specific installations which he plans to visit.

He must also determine what special equipment he will need to take with him. If the weather is expected to be good and distant observation of targets is required, the officer may decide to take telephoto as well as the standard lenses.




Telephoto coverage of Soviet Training Area inside the PRA. (C)

In addition to a pair of standard binoculars he may need to take a 30 power telescope or a pair of special binoculars for night observation. As well as the standard tape recorder for reporting vehicles and weapons in long columns, the officer may want to take a special search light on a cable which enables him to check and photograph materiel traveling by rail at night. Small containers are carried to recover samples of POL products. A compass, flashlight, wire cutters, work gloves, film, notebook and pencils are all necessities.


When the officer is ready to depart he leaves a copy of his tentative tour route with the Operations Officer, notifies his driver of the time of departure, requirements for overnight reservations and for trip lunches. He must commit all requirements to memory and his maps have no annotations other than the boundaries of the PRA or TRA. No firearms or classified documents are taken on reconnaissance trips.

b. Execution: Having prepared himself for the reconnaissance trip, the USMLM officer drives his vehicle from the USMLM Berlin installation to the USMLM Potsdam installation where he will pick up his assigned driver.



Soviet Control Point for Allied Missions and barriers at Glienicke Bridge. (Boundary between Berlin and Potsdam). (U)

There is no standard sequence for a reconnaissance trip. Every trip is different and effort is made to avoid setting a pattern. The team will often leave during the hours of darkness so that it will be able to observe some of the frequent Soviet night movements and also be in position to visit a target at first light. Sometimes on the way to the target the team hopes to visit at first light, the USMLM will intercept large scale Soviet or East German Army movement on one or multiple routes. The movement may be of such scale as to warrant the abandoning of the originally planned first-light target. The team may pass the military column on the road and take as complete as possible an inventory of personnel, vehicles and vehicle registration numbers or it may pull off the road to a point where it can better observe that column and try to follow.



Soviet tank column. (C)

At first light the team may try for undetected panoramic photography of military installation, may make an unobserved visit to a trash dump to recover documents and materiel of intelligence value or may go to a training area to inventory the facilities while the area is not in use.

The limited daylight hours must be fully utilized, inasmuch as there never seems to be enough time to do all that is desired. The Soviets will often detain a team until nightfall in order to deny the use of the best time for observation. Night photography is very difficult and possibly for this reason the Soviets habitually move sensitive electronic and missile equipment during the hours of darkness. Large scale troop movements are made at night possibly to avoid interference with daytime civilian traffic.

A USMLM team moves promptly from one target to another, attempting to observe, photograph and obtain desired information without being observed. Occasionally, however, the hunter becomes the hunted and Soviet or VOPO vehicles attempt to stop the USMLM vehicle and prevent it from leaving the area. It is at this time that the driving skill of the USMLM drivers is of considerable importance and American automobile manufacturers would be more than proud of the performance of their sedans in trail and cross-country maneuverability.

While moving from one target to another, the team will often observe a Soviet traffic regulator posted at a road junction. This is an indication that movement of Soviet units has occurred or is about to take place. By a close study of the map and by traveling in concentric circles the team is usually able to find other traffic regulators and to determine the route of travel and whether or not the column has already passed. Then the team can either hunt the column or select a good observation post from which photography can be made and wait patiently for the column to appear. The target could be anything from empty cargo trucks in a driver school to a more interesting




column of rocket launchers, tanks, missiles or electronic vans. The insigna of the traffic regulators can sometimes be a guide to expectations.



SCUD-Associated equipment in Soviet vehicle column. (C)

Every reconnaissance team on every trip sooner or later encounters Mission Restriction Signs and often has to change its planned route in order to avoid violating them. Sometimes a team may encounter signs in an area where no military installation is known to exist. Many hours of searching the area to find a possible explanation for the restriction may show conclusively that there is nothing of military significance in the area. This is the case of several areas where only a few times a year East German troops come for field exercises. Other times the team will come upon a new military installation which they will attempt to photograph, to plot exactly on the map and to identify.

Some trip requirements are relatively simple ones, such as determining whether a local Kommandatura has been closed, or photographing an East German civilian communications tower or checking Soviet telephone lines along the main highway. Nevertheless, each of these requirements brings the reconnaissance team to an area where unexpected additional intelligence targets of opportunity may be encountered.





Radio site. (C)

About noon the team will stop for a "picnic" lunch at a place where even the lunch break will not be completely lost. Such places are concealed locations from which major highways and rail lines can be watched or where Soviet training is likely to occur within observation distance.


Reconnaissance teams always pay close attention to major rail lines, crossings and sidings. If there is any regularly exploitable bottleneck in Soviet military movement which the Missions can exploit, it is the rail system. The single-track rail lines and the considerable rail traffic make it necessary for military trains to spend considerable time at holding points and in rail sidings. Thus, the team can often move ahead and get prepared to take pictures later if photography is not possible or advisable when the military train is first sighted. (*Photo page 26*)

Team personnel are always ready for targets of opportunity. Both driver and reconnaissance officer must constantly be on the alert for anything unusual. An unexpected silhouette, an antenna showing over the tree tops, vehicle trackage on a dirt road, tracked vehicle scarrage on a paved road--any of these is enough to make the team take a second look.





A passing military train. (C)



A 122mm howitzer in training area. (C)


A team will remain in an area only for a safe period of time. If the requirement cannot be fulfilled with reasonable rapidity, the team will abandon the requirement until a subsequent trip or another team can exploit the target. Weather, position of the sun, pres-

ence of curious or interested spectators—all can cause a team to abandon a requirement and proceed on another mission.

At night the team may choose to conduct all-night observation of an important road or rail location or monitor traffic into an installation or training area. Nighttime may be used to observe a night exercise in a training area or to cruise the region to detect night troop movements. Most tours spend the nights in hotels in the Soviet Zone and continue the trip on the second day. Often the reconnaissance officer, before or after checking into the hotel, will proceed to a book store or magazine stand to purchase maps, books or periodicals of intelligence value.

At the hotel the vehicle will be locked in a guarded parking lot with binoculars, cameras and other equipment locked in the trunk, but exposed film and notes will be kept


by the reconnaissance officer on his person. Soviet passes are used to register at the hotel and after a meal the team may take a brief walk about the city or may go to bed promptly in anticipation of an early morning departure. It is sometimes useful for a team to have supper and then drive around until after midnight checking rail sidings and installations before retiring for the night.



Soviet Ordnance Depot as seen from adjacent hill. (C)

Most trips are two days long and allow the team to visit a series of targets on different route back to Potsdam on the second day. However, when Soviet units are on large-scale field exercises or a Temporary Restricted Area is in effect USMLM usually sends out teams for periods of twenty-four hours of continuous observation. They check all road and rail routes into the TRA and report all Soviet troop movements encountered outside of the TRA.

In the local area a USMLM officer is detailed weekly as duty officer. Two or three days a week in coordination with the French and British Missions he conducts reconnaissance in the general area of Potsdam. Using the Potsdam installation as a base of operations he makes short trips during daylight and darkness to check local units, training areas and rail sidings.



Soviets in downtown Potsdam. (U)

When the USMLM team returns from a normal reconnaissance trip, usually after dark on the second day, it has usually covered from six to eight hundred miles. Many miles of cross-country travel and numerous Soviet or VOPO harassments and attempted interferences are everyday occurrences. Upon arriving at the Potsdam installation the driver unloads the blankets, the remains of the trip lunch and his own gear. He then fills out the trip ticket while the USMLM reconnaissance officer telephones the Berlin installation to announce his return. He still has to write a "highlight" report of his reconnaissance before he can go home, although his full report can be delayed until the following day.


c. Reporting: Regardless of the amount of time spent in preparation for a reconnaissance trip and regardless of the successful execution of the reconnaissance plan, the information acquired has value only if it is reported to those who need it. Thus, the two days of planning and preparation and two days of field reconnaissance are usually followed by two days of report preparation.

When the USMLM reconnaissance officer returns to the Berlin installation he immediately renders a short "highlight" report on items of immediate interest. Allied Mission officers also utilize the USMLM Berlin instal-

lation for this immediate report. These reports are the basis for a daily intelligence report by USMLM to higher headquarters. The USMLM officer leaves his film to be developed, locks his reconnaissance notes in a safe, puts away his equipment and goes home.

The following morning the officer is present at the office to answer any questions regarding his short report and to begin the task of rendering a complete intelligence report on his reconnaissance trip. Assembling his notes, restudying all target folders on targets visited, and examining the trip photographs when they are developed, he then begins the slow but important task of completing a full report. Reading his notes in chronological order, he will reorient himself on the target map and make certain that all information which he has regarding the target is reported in narrative form and also entered in a graphic form on the map. If necessary he will draw sketches for inclusion with the report. Mission Restriction Signs, new construction, POI, installations, routes of approach—all will be entered on the map for future reference. He will briefly analyse what he has seen in the light of what has previously been reported. Any change in sightings will be brought to the attention of the Operations Section. When his photographs are available he will carefully examine each photograph for significant details. He will compare photographs of materiel with previous ones displayed on the identification board. Any modifications will be reported immediately and the new picture will be brought to the attention of all reconnaissance officers. He will discuss his photographs with the personnel in the Operations Section and will include with his report any photographs determined to be significant.

After carefully checking times, map coordinates and installation numbers, he will finish work on his report and turn it into the Operations Section for proofreading and editing. The report will then be typed for reproduction on a multilith duplicator and the of-



Close-up photo of Soviet radar site. (C)

ficer will once again check the report before it is published. By this time the reconnaissance officer has probably already started on the preparation for his next trip.



Soviet Electronic Installation (C)

[REDACTED]

B. (S) OBSERVATIONS IN EAST GERMANY:


1. SOVIET ARMED FORCES:

a. GENERAL: Throughout the year GSFG remained in a state of combat readiness while maintaining an adequate troop training program and modernizing its weapons and equipment and organizational structure. The training cycle progressed evenly from small unit training to division-size field exercises. The abrupt end to the massive spring GSFG maneuver, which was interrupted by the shooting down of the RB-66 USAF aircraft, caused much speculation, and the absence of the usual fall GSFG maneuvers also was indicative of less Soviet emphasis on large scale exercises during 1964. Replacement of wheeled vehicles continued to be observed, particularly there appeared to be some standardization of Soviet electronic and shop vans. At the end of the year the intensive two to three-month drivers' training exercises indicated the annual rebuilding of GSFG mobility capability. Specialized and advanced unit training was often stereotyped, probably on the theory that results can more easily be evaluated and training errors more readily isolated. Discipline and

endurance on the part of the Soviet troops participating in a much-practiced combat training situation achieved proficiency by simple repetition.

The year saw a reorganization of GSFG armies and accompanying adjustments in troop dispositions. A new pattern of Soviet vehicle and aircraft numbers made it difficult to determine the exact changes in Order of Battle which resulted from the reorganization.

b. SOVIET GROUND FORCES: During 1964 Soviet Ground Forces continued with the intensive, highly repetitive training in order to maintain troop combat capabilities. As in past years, particular attention was given to exercises in mobility with emphasis on river obstacles. Some newly developed equipment such as the "mule" and the "scissors" bridge was received in limited amounts, apparently for field testing. New weapons such as the T-62 tank, 122mm Gun-How M1963 and the Anti-tank Rocket Launcher M1962 "Blunderbuss", which had already been introduced into GSFG, were issued on a larger scale. Sightings of the SCUD "End Tray" Radar and the BMD-20 atomic-capable warhead indicated a steadily increased capability on the part of Soviet Ground Forces in the missile field.



Soviet truck-mounted "Scissors" bridge (C)
(British MLM photo)

[REDACTED]

SECRET

c. SOVIET AIR FORCE: The Twenty-fourth Tactical Air Army, during 1964 continued to modernize its equipment through modification of its high performance models, and to increase its operational effectiveness by adding new fighter, reconnaissance, light bombardment and trainer type aircraft to its inventory. A slight decrease from about 1179 to 1047 aircraft was noted. During the year the number of Fishbed C/D/E aircraft increased from 105 to 126. Fitter aircraft increased from 105 to 126 and Brewer Maestro (Firebar) bombers increased from 28 to 71. The number of obsolete Beagle bombardment aircraft decreased from 153 to 87. The Twenty-fourth Tactical Air Army inventory with breakdown of aircraft as to type is listed in Appendix H. Data for the inventory is incorporated from a joint Air Team/USMLM-RAF/BRIXMIS-French Air/FMLM compilation.



Soviet Submarine-Chaser. (C)




Soviet Fishbed "D" Fighter. (C)

d. SOVIET NAVAL FORCES: During 1964, observations of Soviet Naval Forces were restricted to the port of Sassnitz, where periodic sightings of one or more "SO-1" class submarine chasers (SC) provided continuing confirmation of the location of a small detachment of the Baltic Fleet in Sassnitz on a permanent basis.

2. EAST GERMAN ARMED FORCES:

a. GENERAL: In 1964 the East German Armed Forces improved steadily and became a well-trained and well-equipped fighting force. Political reliability remained a doubtful matter. Nevertheless, the Soviets provided the East Germans with considerable new weapons and equipment and joint GSFG/EGA exercises were held several times during the year.

b. EAST GERMAN GROUND FORCES: The East German Army received FROG and SCUD surface-to-surface missiles and accompanying equipment from the Soviets. Several joint GSFG/EGA maneuvers indicated that the Soviets were prepared to build up the effectiveness of Warsaw Pact forces. Anti-tank missiles and FAN SONG "E" surface-to-air missile radar were seen in increasing numbers in East German Army units and their military electronic materiel inventory included the most modern Soviet equipment.



Soviet missile-associated electronic equipment in EGA units. (C)

c. EAST GERMAN AIR FORCE:

During 1964 East German Air Force aircraft decreased in number from 503 to 478, approximately 5%. The Soviets continued to modernize the East German Air Force equipment by adding two new Fishbed C/E squadrons and by adding to the inventory a new Czech jet trainer (L-29 Maya) squadron. The light bombardment, reconnaissance aircraft strength remained relatively the same. Data for the inventory is incorporated from a joint Air Team/USMLM - RAF/BRIXMIS - French Air/FMLM compilation. (*Appendix H*)

d. EAST GERMAN NAVAL FORCES:

During 1964 observations of East German Naval Forces were restricted to the port of Sassnitz. The torpedo boat flotilla which had been transferred to Sassnitz in mid-1963 was relocated and replaced by the entire destroyer force of the East German Navy consisting of four "Riga II" class destroyer escorts (DE).

3. CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT YEARLY OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES:

a. WINTER: As usual the arrival of winter was met with mixed emotions on the part of USMLM reconnaissance personnel.

While winter operations were made more difficult by icy roads, snow, fewer hours of daylight observation and lack of natural camouflage provided by vegetation, they were enhanced by the increased capability to cross frozen fields to avoid restriction signs in approaching targets.




Soviet T10 heavy tank crosses snow covered road. (C)

Observation and photography was made easier by the fact that targets were now devoid of the camouflage of natural vegetation. As in previous years, thick fogs increased driver fatigue and reduced the area which could be effectively covered. In 1964 there was much less snow than in the previous year. During the winter period, Soviet counter-intelligence efforts to limit observation and photography resulting in their issuing a new Permanent Restricted Areas Map and imposing five Temporary Restricted Areas. Mission Restriction Signs continued to be erected in great number throughout the Soviet Zone and harassing surveillance by East German "tails" increased. The Allied Missions were presented with a new type of license plates with much larger numbers which made it almost impossible for the Mission vehicles to pass unnoticed and unrecorded. A Soviet demand that curtains on the rear window of Mission sedans be re-

moved was resisted and the matter was finally dropped. The Soviet shooting down of two USAF planes over the Soviet Zone caused complete disruption of normal reconnaissance missions. BRIXMIS and FMLM continued regular operations while USMLM resources were diverted to search and rescue efforts.


(1) JANUARY: The year began with many Soviet driving school vehicle columns in the immediate vicinity of all Soviet military installations. These columns supplied valuable VRN computation and vehicle-inventory data. Engineer units were busy with amphibious and bridging operations at the Elbe River and Elster-Gallin crossing sites.

The EGA used the first TRA to screen a three-division field exercise of units from Military District V in the Military District III area. The Air Forces had a quiet month but the BREWER "B", BREWER "B" modified bombers and L-29 jet trainers (MAYA) were sighted for the first time in the Soviet Zone. MONGOL jet trainers were being sighted at additional airfields. Anti-tank guided weapons



Soviet amphibians. (C)

mounted on GAZ 69s, engineer mine-laying equipment, SCUD associated equipment, new truck-mounted, SCUD associated equipment, new truck-mounted, scissors bridging equipment, T-62 tanks and 122mm Howitzers (M1963) were all seen in increasing number during the month. The transition to the preparation of Intelligence Reports on the DD Form 1396



Soviet Brewer "B" bomber. (C)

caused momentary report-reproduction problems which were soon overcome. The shooting down, by the Soviets, of a USAF T-39 aircraft in the vicinity of Erfurt brought all other US-MLM activities to a standstill, as it was necessary to marshal all resources for search and rescue operations.


(2) FEBRUARY: The Soviet Valentine to the Allied Missions was a new PRA, the first since 1961. As usual, the boundaries had been drawn to include certain road junctions and sections of road in order to hamper Mission travel in sensitive areas. In the early part of the month, USMLM was able to take a last look at the Gnevsdorf-Bad Wilsnack-Elbe River North amphibious training area, which had been one of the most profitable for the photography of engineer and amphibious equipment and observation of river-crossing techniques. Final visits were also made to a large area now restricted along the East German-Polish frontier. In addition to the new PRA two Temporary Restricted Areas (TRA) limited Mission movement during February as the Soviets held divisional exercises throughout the Zone. Amphibious training continued at Elster-Gallin and at Elbe River North.



Soviet Combat and Training Snorkels at Elster-Gallin. (C)

The 122mm Gun-How M1963 was observed with various Soviet units in the southern part of the Soviet Zone. East German Army Forces continued low-level training at home stations and in field training areas. Routine flying activity was observed as the weather improved.

New license plates were received by all Allied Missions. They differed from the old plates in that the new numbers were twice the size on a more vivid yellow background. Some Commandants were detaining teams for a longer than usual period and insisting that rear-window curtains be removed. USMLM photographed the END TRAY radar on the 25th of February on the Helmstedt Autobahn.



Soviet SCUD "End Tray" Radar. (C)


(3) MARCH: March was the month of the RB-66 incident and the Leipzig Fair, both of which provided USMLM reconnaissance teams with a change from routine intelligence-gathering activities. The Leipzig Fair has always been a prime target for US-MLM and the Spring Technical Fair of 1964 was no exception. The final 45-page report forwarded 1,171 items of literature and samples, 374 separate photos and much additional information regarding factory markings, fair exhibits and interviews.



Leipzig Fair (C)

This was also the month of the "vanishing GSFG maneuver" when elements of several Soviet armies were observed going into the large TRA and were even encountered inside the TRA and PRA by USMLM teams involved with the RB-66 incident. But two days after the RB-66 was shot down all activity abruptly terminated and units returned quietly to their home stations.


In March the Anti-tank Rocket Launcher M1962 "Blunderbuss" was photographed for the first time in the hands of GSFG troops, and there was positive indication that FROGs were in the hands of East German Army troops.



Missile Train (C)

b. SPRING: Only one TRA and no important Soviet or East German Army maneuvers made the second quarter of 1964 calm but still interesting. The hours for daylight observation increased and the vegetation provided Mission vehicles with more natural camouflage in their observation posts. Good flying weather increased the frequency of military air activity sightings which included parachuting from small aircraft. River crossing training continued to hold Soviet interest.

(1) APRIL: Despite a more cautious reconnaissance policy resulting from the serious detentions which occurred during the two aircraft incidents, April was a profitable information-gathering month. The annual Letzlinger-Heide Soviet weapon and equipment demonstration series took place, although on a much smaller scale than the massive activities of 1963. East German Army training was intensive until preparations for the May Day Parade began during the last part of the month. Several Soviet units moved from home stations to field training areas, but no extensive exercises were observed. Anti-tank missiles (SNAPPER, SWATTER and BABY CARRIAGE) were observed several times during this month and Soviet amphibious training continued at Elster-Gallin.




EGA Snappers and Baby Carriage Anti-Tank Missiles (C)



(2) MAY: The month of May was very quiet and all types of observations were disappointingly infrequent in spite of excellent weather. Between the May Day Parade with its interesting display of anti-tank missiles at the beginning of the month, and the last week in the month when units started moving out to training areas, there was little military training activity of significance. A reconnaissance team observed Soviet parachute training near Loburg where two Colt aircraft were dropping groups of 7 to 10 men.

On aerial bombing and gunnery ranges FISHBED "D" fighter aircraft were observed dropping bombs and FITTER fighter aircraft were seen firing rockets. A FISHBED "D" delta-wing fighter plane was observed operating from a grass strip, a capability which had not been attributed to this aircraft. The parachute training first observed in May continued into June.



Soviet Parachute Training (C)

Amphibious training continued at the usual crossing sites. The FAN SONG "E" radar was first observed in an East German unit by a USMLM reconnaissance team at the Rauhen SAM site. Because of the lull in military activity, reconnaissance teams were able to wander afield and discovered numerous new construction sites which later proved to have military significance.


(3) JUNE: Activity of GSFG and East German Army steadily increased as amphibious training became more intensive and large-scale field exercises were observed in the vicinity of the Alter Grabow PRA. A new unit of 130 mm guns was observed at Werder and shortly thereafter Soviet dependents were seen moving there.



Grass Strip used by Soviet Fighters. (C)

c. SUMMER: As was to be expected, Soviet and East German military activity increased with the arrival of the warm summer months. It did not, however, reach the expected level. There were no large scale maneuvers and the expected Warsaw Pact exercises in the Soviet Zone failed to materialize. All training areas were occupied and there was increased sighting of new tanks, personnel carriers, radar and numerous replacement vehicles. Numerous Soviet Kommandaturas were discovered to have been closed or consolidated.

(1) JULY: Ground and air activity increased considerably. Many new types of replacement vehicles were encountered on the roads of the Soviet Zone. Increased numbers of T-62 tanks, 122mm Gun-How M1963 and BTR-60P personnel carriers were observed in Soviet training areas. TRA #8 covered a joint GSFG-East German Army exercise near



[REDACTED]

the Polish border and military trains were sighted moving in all directions. A USMLM reconnaissance team observed 350 feet of Class 50 Soviet ponton bridging (PMP) being laid across the Elbe near Dresden in the impressive time of five minutes. Even using prepared banks and a familiar area, the Soviet exercise was remarkable.

(See para VI, B, 4a)

The re-equipping of many airfields with FISHBED "D" type fighters was observed and new coloring and numbering systems for Soviet aircraft were also discovered.

(2) AUGUST: Training and exercises continued as expected, but still no large scale maneuvers materialized. East German Army exercises were frequently encountered and the scope of the exercises was increasing to include additional joint GSFG-East German Army exercises, but on a relatively small scale. A battalion of the new Soviet T-62 tanks was observed at Neustrelitz. A warhead type rocket, believed to have an atomic capability was observed protruding from the launch frame of a BMD-20 Rocket Launcher.


(3) SEPTEMBER: A seven day TRA and a Soviet inter-army exercise brought summer military training activities to a close. Sighting of the annual "pendel" trains bring-



"Pendel" Train of "M-Wagons" used in the Annual Soviet Troop Rotation Program. (C)

ing replacements from the Soviet Union began to be frequent and indicated that Soviet troop rotation activities had made an early start. It became increasingly evident that during the summer months there had been a reorganization and redistribution of some Soviet units.

A FISHBED "D" fighter aircraft was observed with a new "tail pod" which was later determined to have a braking parachute. Deployment of air units to auxiliary fields and grass strips continued. The Soviet light vehicle "mule" was observed for the first time.



Soviet "Mule" (C)

d. FALL: As the weather turned cold and the leaves dropped from the trees, USMLM reconnaissance teams looked forward to the end of the harvest and the advent of frozen ground to signal the commencement of GSFG fall maneuvers. However, the expected large-scale maneuvers of past years failed to materialize. Recovery of an Anti-tank Rocket Launcher M1962 "Blunderbuss" warhead and a TM-46 anti-tank mine proved to be some consolation, but the reconnaissance teams ended the year with the feeling that they had been "cheated" out of a field exercise. With the introduction of the basic troop training cycle in November, it was evident that the possibility of large scale activity had ended for the year.

(1) OCTOBER: The last TRA served to cover a Soviet intra-army exercise extending beyond the Letzlinger-Heide and Alten Grabow PRAs. At the same time a large proportion of the East German Army was participating in harvest activities. The 7 October Parade in East Berlin provided a public showing of the SCUD-A and FROG-4 surface-to-surface missiles in East German Army units.



EGA Parade on 8 Oct (C)

Soviet driver training activity increased throughout the Soviet Zone. A reconnaissance team recovered the expended round of an Anti-tank Rocket Launcher M1962 "Blunderbuss". It was discovered that a probable airfield was being constructed in the Jannersdorf training area. Some Soviet troops were observed engaged in potato harvesting, generally for their own use rather than as assistance to the civil population.

(2) NOVEMBER: The troop rotation program gained momentum and training emphasis centered on basic driving, communications, small arms and small unit training. Training was conducted largely at home stations and reconnaissance teams had excellent opportunities to closely observe Soviet vehicle columns and record thousands of vehicle registration numbers.



Soviet Driver School (C)

(3) DECEMBER: Military activities moved down into low gear as the Soviets continued with the basic training cycle. Driver schools were larger than in November and engineer and signal troops moved out into training areas for specialized training. A reconnaissance team observing an engineer mine-laying exercise was very fortunate in being able to recover one of the TM-46 anti-tank mines which troops had been using. East German Army vehicles appeared with new six-digit registration numbers. Severe weather and the approaching holidays brought military activity to a virtual standstill.




Basic Soviet Engineer Bridge Training (C)

4. THE STORY BEHIND A REPORT:

a. THE FIVE MINUTE BRIDGE:

At 1150 hours on 16 July a USMLM reconnaissance team crossed the autobahn bridge over the Elbe River near Dresden at Uebigau. Down the river about 500 yards to the northwest the USMLM team leader observed that a bridging exercise was about to take place. Six Soviet motorboats were cruising around in the river and the lead vehicles of a military bridge convoy could be seen approaching from the direction of the Soviet engineer installation at Uebigau.



River-Crossing Exercise on the Elbe near Dresden. (C)

Hoping to be able to observe the forthcoming operation without interference the USMLM team left the autobahn and proceeded along the river about a kilometer on the opposite side from where the bridge column was expected to begin operations. It was impossible to drive the vehicle to a good observation post, so the reconnaissance team made an exception to a general rule and proceeded on foot. Three reconnaissance officers, two of whom were new USMLM officers on an orientation trip, moved forward to the edge of the river bank from where they could get an unhindered view and have an opportunity for excellent photography of the bridging exercise which was about to take place.

As they moved into place behind some bushes on the river bank with their binoculars and telephoto lenses in hand, the PMP (heavy floating bridge) column moved toward the bridging site. At this moment the USMLM reconnaissance team became aware that a Soviet GAZ 69 vehicle was racing toward them across the tidal plain. It was readily apparent to all that there was not time to get back to their vehicle and depart the area; therefore, one USMLM officer ran out to meet the approaching Soviets while the other two hid the cameras, binoculars and telephoto lenses in the bushes on the riverbank.

The Soviets reached the USMLM team just as the PMP vehicles halted and allowed the dust to settle. The Soviets, one of whom appeared to be the commander of the bridging battalion, were most irate. As usual, they demanded to know what the USMLM team was doing there and where its vehicle was. During a short period of stalling for time, the USMLM team observed the seventeen ponton carriers execute a right turn and back down to the river's edge where they released their pontoons into the water almost simultaneously. At this point the three USMLM officers, deliberately, and one of the Soviet officers, inadvertently, looked at their watches. The time was 1210 hours.

While carrying on a more or less polite conversation, the USMLM team leader observed that by 1211 hours the BMK-90 (motor boats) had moved up to the pontoons which had been turned end-to-end and by 1213 the pontoons had been joined together and were being pivoted out into the stream. By 1214½ hours the bridge, apparently held in place by the boats, had been swung across the river. No anchorage was observed, but there was so much dust and such a mass of vehicles and equipment that the possibility of additional anchorage could not be ruled out. At exactly 1215 hours, as all present checked their watches, a Soviet Kraz 214 cargo truck crossed to the west bank where it drove off the end ponton into about only six inches of water.

[REDACTED]


The Soviet Colonel did not appear at all surprised when the USMLM personnel commented that it had all been done in five minutes. While the USMLM officers were divertingly congratulating the smug Soviet on an excellent performance, the Kraz 214 recrossed the river and the bridge was swung back to the east bank and broken down into ferry units. The motor boats then commenced to propel the ferries across the river as the Soviet Colonel turned his full attention back to the USMLM team and became insistent that they accompany him to the Dresden Kommandatura.

At the Kommandatura the USMLM team was accused of being engaged in the "dirty business" of spying. After being released the team immediately departed the area but returned in the darkness of early morning hours to attempt to recover the cameras, binoculars and telephoto lenses. It was hoped that the Soviets had not seen them being hidden and that they were still there. Upon parking the vehicle and proceeding once again on foot to the edge of the river, the USMLM reconnaissance team came upon a night swimming-party of about 15 East Germans. Quietly the officer-team moved through the darkness to the spot where they thought they had left their equipment. All bushes seemed to look alike as they started to search along the riverbank. Fortunately they found all the items where they had been hidden. The USMLM team then left the area.

On the following day about 0900 hours the team once again crossed the Elbe on the autobahn bridge at Uebigau, and they saw another bridging operation in progress. However, this time they stopped on the bridge and observed the exercise from a much greater distance, until a Soviet amphibious jeep arrived and forced them to abandon bridging reconnaissance for that particular trip.

b. THE BLUNDERBUSS: Early on 26 October, a USMLM reconnaissance team

was making observations related to an inventory of training facilities at a training area which is regularly used by Soviet troops. Fresh trackage indicated the presence of Soviet units in the vicinity. Traveling on a secondary trail across the range and through the impact area the reconnaissance officer noticed the damaged warhead of a practice projectile for the Anti-tank Launcher M1962.



Recovered pieces of Practice Projectile for Anti-tank Rocket Launcher M1962. (C)

The driver at the same time observed a group of Soviet troops active on the range in the distance. Nevertheless, the team was able to stop long enough for the reconnaissance officer to recover the inert projectile and several other items before investigating Soviets arrived in a light cargo truck. They pursued the USMLM team out of the range and training area to a secondary road where the USMLM vehicle was able to break contact. A week later the USMLM officer returned to recover additional pieces.

The projectile, which was marked "PG-76G", had a maximum diameter of 100 millimeters and the windshield was fitted for a point-initiating fuse. Analysis of the projectile confirmed the claim made by the Soviets in 1963 that they had developed an anti-tank launcher which had an effective anti-armor range of 400 meters. This new

anti-tank rocket replaced a much less potent weapon, the RPG-2, in many Soviet units and is now being issued to East German troops. The old RPG-2 had an effective range of only 180 meters. It is estimated that the new weapon not only has greatly increased range but probably penetrates 300 to 350 millimeters of armor.



Blunderbuss (C)
—(French MLM Photo)

Winter weather and frozen ground helped to make possible such entry into ranges and impact areas. Soviet sentries tended to be less vigilant on cold, windy days, and the hard ground made it possible to travel through ditches and ruts with little difficulty.

c. THE MINE: On the morning of 9 December a USMLM reconnaissance trip in the local Potsdam area was on an operational visit to a Soviet engineer training area south of Nauen. The trip, which happened to be the first operational mission for a new driver, encountered Soviet engineer units bridging a canal. After being forced to abandon one observation point because of the approach of Soviets in a GAZ 69, the team moved to a second vantage point from which the operation could be observed and photographed. Soviet soldiers in a light cargo truck which happened to be moving along a main road,

spotted the USMLM vehicle and stopped to investigate. They blocked the only apparent exit from the fenced-in field and trail which led to the bridging site. After several minutes of a "cat and mouse" game in which the USMLM vehicle moved slowly behind a large haystack the Soviet truck left its blocking position at the entrance to the main road and proceeded to the vicinity of the haystack. When the Soviet truck arrived at the haystack the USMLM sedan moved rapidly to the now-open exit and departed the bridging site.

Further down the road the USMLM reconnaissance team noticed Soviet troops in a field and parked their sedan in the branches and shadows of a tree to observe what was taking place. The group activity turned out to be an exercise in which two five-man engineer squads were laying a hasty anti-tank and anti-personnel mine field. After observing the number of personnel, interval between men, number of mines carried, how and where entrenched, and photographing the exercise the USMLM team was forced to leave the area when the Soviet officer supervising the exercise became aware of the observers.

That same afternoon the USMLM team, now with an experienced driver, returned to the mine-laying exercise area. The only apparent unblocked entrance to the training area appeared unguarded, and there were no Soviet troops visible in the open area where the mines had been laid on the edge of the woods. The USMLM sedan was driven quickly off of the main road and into the engineer bivouac and training area. The reconnaissance officer hoped to be able to stop and personally check the area where the mines had been laid in order to measure distances and depths at which mines were emplaced. Since the entrance by which the USMLM vehicle had entered the training area could be easily blocked, the team proceeded along the edge of the woods looking for an alternate escape route. They found that all routes through the woods were barricaded and that the engineer unit




which had been observed in action earlier in the day was now engaged in close order drill about 30 yards inside the woods, not far from tents which indicated an active bivouac area. By now it was evident that there was only one way out, the way by which the team had entered.

Fortunately, the area where the mines had been emplaced now lay between the Soviet troops and the open road, so the reconnaissance officer made a quick attempt at physically checking and measuring the mine field. Hoping that no Soviet vehicle would enter the area from the road during that period, the USMIM team moved toward the mine field and the reconnaissance officer observed a large box at the edge of the tree line. Quickly, the tour officer dismounted from the vehicle, examined the material in the box, which consisted of about 15 anti-tank mines, took one of them and placed it in a blanket in the trunk of the sedan. The USMIM team then departed the area expeditiously.


The following morning the tour officer returned to the area to find about 40 Soviet soldiers thoroughly probing the open area where the mines had been emplaced the day before.


Upon examination the mine was discovered to be a variation of the Soviet Anti-tank Mine TM-46. It was the first acquisition of this type mine. It was OD in color, weighed about 18¹/₂ pounds and had three fuse wells. One fuse well for the detonator was located on the top center of the mine, one on the side under the carrying handle was for booby traps, and one on the bottom of the mine was for an anti-lift device. The mine was checked by ordnance personnel and found to be filled with low-grade TNT, and it had an inert practice fuse. There was an anti-disarming device on the inside, a booby trap fuse on the side, and a previously unknown booby trap anti-lift device on the bottom.

This collection effort will probably make it possible to develop safer combat meth-



Soviet TM-46 Anti-tank Mine. (C)





Fuses on TM-46 at Mine (C)

ods of removing and disarming Soviet mines. Inasmuch as Soviet anti-tank mine warfare could affect so many Allied troops, the widespread significance of this acquisition is obvious.



T-62 Latest Soviet Main Battle Tank. (C)

5. NEW EQUIPMENT AND TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS: GSFG continued to modernize its weapons and equipment during 1964. Additional T-62 main battle tanks arrived and at least three tank divisions were observed with battalions of the latest tanks.

A new cargo-transporting light wheeled vehicle similar to the US 'mule' was introduced during the year and a new truck-mounted scissor bridge was observed. An improved anti-tank rocket was issued to Soviet and East German Army troops during the year, and electronic and command post trucks were replaced by more modern, standard military vans. A modified rocket launcher BMD-20, with a possible atomic-capable round, and the radar "End Tray" were observed and photographed for the first time. New equipment in East German hands included Fan Song "E", SCUD and various anti-tank guided missiles.

Introduction of the BREWER "B" and BREWER "B"-Modified bombers and additional FISHBED fighters into the inventory of the

24th Tactical Air Army occurred in 1964. The FISHBED (MIG 21) fighter was also observed operating from a grass strip, and carrying a tail-pod housing containing a braking parachute. This modification required a reevaluation of the role and operational capabilities of the new aircraft. MONGOL and MAYA jet trainers were also observed in East Germany for the first time.



Soviet Fishbed "D" Fighter with Parachute Pod on Tail. (C)

Despite steady modernization of GSFG, obsolescent weapons and equipment such as World War II vintage tanks, assault guns, towed artillery, personnel carriers and trucks remain in the inventory of GSFG units and continue to be observed frequently in the Soviet Zone of Germany. Most of these weapons and vehicles are believed to be retained for training use in order to minimize wearout of GSFG's combat-ready TO&E arms inventory.

VII. (C) TOURING IN EAST GERMANY — IMPRESSIONS:

A. (C) SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL: The Soviet as seen by USMLM in East Germany is one of the most suspecting persons imaginable. If he is by himself, he is likely to be friendly and straightforward, but if other Soviets are around he is completely different. This trait of mistrust and suspicion is noted not only in the Soviet fighting man but also in his dependents. Of course, the fact that he and his dependents live in a fenced-in area and have little or no contact with the local populace

certainly helps to foster his cautious and guarded nature.

The Soviet officer is usually initially hostile toward USMLM personnel, but person-to-person contact with the USMLM officer speaking fluent Russian soon overcomes initial hostility and most farewells are almost friendly. Judging by American standards the Soviet military personnel live a most dreary and demanding life. The only opportunity for the Soviet soldier to leave his casern is when he goes out to train, or possibly in a group for a Saturday afternoon or Sunday visit to the local Soviet cemetery, to a park or to a museum. Radio Volga, the sterile Russian newspapers and an occasional dull movie is the limit of entertainment. Soviet personnel love to fish and can be found fishing near all the Soviet installations where there is any kind of water, often during the summer months at 3 A.M. in the morning.



Soviet Detail (C)

The reaction of the Soviets is very slow compared with that of a German or an American. Soldiers and junior officers are often very hesitant to take any action in the fear that it is better to do nothing than to do the wrong thing. The USMLM officer receives the impression that the ratio of officers to enlisted personnel is extremely high. Most trucks are usually observed carrying an officer, and usually when a detention occurs, the USMLM team is suddenly surrounded by Soviet officers even when it occurs in a remote area where relatively few Soviets are involved.

[REDACTED]

It is always advantageous to take the initiative when dealing with the Soviets. If a car is disabled or blocked and the Soviets appear, it is usually to our advantage to immediately ask for help and act as if we had a perfect right to be there. This has, in many cases, helped USMLM to avoid a detention. One Sunday a USMLM officer was following Soviet tanks into what he later found out was a bivouac area when the vehicle became stuck in the sand on the tank trail. After trying without success to extract the vehicle with the aid of the hand-operated mechanical winch, the reconnaissance officer sent the driver to try to locate a tractor on a local collective farm. Suddenly the USMLM officer noticed three Soviets in field uniform walking through the woods toward the place where the vehicle was stuck. Realizing that the Soviets were certain to notice the vehicle within a minute or two, the USMLM officer moved toward the Soviets, told them that he needed help and pointed out where he was immobilized. The three Soviet tank personnel immediately hurried to the car and surveyed the situation. The Soviet sergeant commandeered four East German male civilians walking in the area and with gestures indicated that they were to help lift the rear of the car. The hastily-formed team lifted the rear wheels of the car, but were unable to extricate it. Shortly thereafter the driver returned with a tractor which pulled the car free. The Soviets were thanked for their help and as the USMLM vehicle departed the area the Soviets were seen moving down the tank trail toward the bivouac area. It is probable that these Soviets were with a unit that was stationed in a PRA and were not acquainted with USMLM. They apparently had no idea whom they were assisting; it was enough that the visitors spoke "their language".

All Soviets are extremely interested in hearing about America. A USMLM officer was recently detained in a Soviet housing area when a new unit was in the process of moving in. As soon as the USMLM car was detained, all the Soviet vehicles extinguished their lights and within five minutes all lights in the houses were turned off. The entire moving operation was

thrown into confusion and in the darkness the Soviet officers had difficulty keeping away the soldiers and children who wanted to see what the Americans looked like and what kind of car they had. From time to time in the darkness a Russian soldier would approach cautiously and whisper a question: "What does a car like that cost in America?" "What does an ordinary worker earn in a month?" "How much does a suit cost?" "Is it true that workers in America have their own cars?" In the darkness the Soviets continued to unload equipment and take beds, pillows and furniture into the buildings.

Usually the first question the Russian will ask when he stops a USMLM vehicle (if the USMLM officer does not ask the question first) is: "Why are you here?" The usual answer is that we were lost, were looking for a certain primary road and had stopped to have lunch or take a rest stop. If there are several Soviets present, one of them will usually go to find out what should be done. If there is only one Soviet present, or if the USMLM officer can approach as though he has been looking for help and hurriedly ask for directions to a certain town or road, it is often possible to leave quietly and to avoid a detention.

The Soviet soldier is a hard working, conscientious individual whose training proves that practice makes perfect. Soviet bridging and tank-snorkeling operations are repeated again and again until everyone performs his assigned task by rote. So long as he meets the expected situations and the already practiced, all goes according to plan. However, a new situation or strange conditions present many problems. It is not unusual to find a completely lost Soviet column stopped by a group of Soviet officers standing by a vehicle looking at a map, with puzzled expressions on their faces and pointing in different directions. Of course, the fact that they cannot read the German road signs or speak the language does not help.

If a Soviet soldier is in the presence of others, particularly if officers are present, he will give strictly limited replies. When asked his name, the time of day or where he is from, he is likely to give no answer or ask in turn,

[REDACTED]

"Why do you need to know?" On the other hand, if he is by himself such as on traffic regulator duty, he may at times tell the destination or origin of the columns he is directing or even reveal his unit. In general, however, it may be said that the Soviet soldier is very security conscious.



Soviets Returning to Installation. (C)

The Soviet soldier does not enjoy being stationed in Germany, although many of the officers do enjoy it. This is probably because his life is even more controlled here than in the Soviet Union. Comparing local conditions with life in the Soviet Union, he feels that the East Germans live remarkably well. However, since he cannot legally change his money or receive his meager pay in East German money and thus be able to purchase the things he sees, he has to resort to blackmarketing Soviet gasoline or illegally exchanging his hard earned rubles at an unfavorable rate. This situation results in very little shopping being done in East Germany by Soviet soldiers.

There is no open fraternization between the Soviets and German civilians. One exception to this is in the vicinity of Soviet airfields where the vast areas are more difficult to patrol than casern fences, and the Soviet soldier may sometimes succeed in getting through a hole in the fence to have a date with a local girl. Here, again, the language barrier and a natural distrust of foreigners make such occurrences rare. Only top NCOs and officers with their

families are seen with any frequency in the German cities located near the Soviet military installations, particularly during the early part of each month. These Soviets receive a portion of their military pay in East German currency and apparently are permitted to spend it as they desire.

For getting around in East Germany, the Soviet uses his feet, drives a bicycle or motorcycle, or rides in a Soviet military vehicle, generally a truck. It is not uncommon on Sundays to see an officer with his wife and children traveling in a standard Soviet cargo truck or stopped in the woods by the side of a truck. A few Soviets have bicycles or motorcycles. In general Soviet military personnel do not tour in East Germany. When they get leave they go back to the Soviet Union, and usually go there by train.

The Soviet soldier is used to privation. If he does not eat for a day or two, he does not feel ready to complain. In several instances USMLM personnel have observed Soviet Army traffic regulators who were posted during long distance movements of military units and were not picked up within twenty-four hours. In one case all the traffic regulators in a town were picked up except one. By the following day he was hungry, wet, cold, tired and needed a shave. When the USMLM team talked to him, he was still patiently waiting to be picked up. He readily accepted a sandwich and the USMLM team asked him why he did not call his headquarters, since he had obviously been overlooked. He replied, that he could not speak German and did not know how to use the telephone, and anyway, he could not leave his post. By the following day he had finally been picked up.

B. (C) SOVIET COMMANDANTS: In almost every East German city or town where a Soviet garrison is located there is a Soviet Kommandatura, usually with a Lieutenant Colonel in charge. To assist him, there are a minimum of three other officers and at least five enlisted personnel. The Kommandatura is kept open on a twenty-four hour basis and when a USMLM team becomes involved with Soviet

[REDACTED]

troop units it almost inevitably is turned over, sooner or later, to the nearest Soviet Commandant. These Commandants are generally responsible for supervising Mission Restriction Signs in their area and are informed of all PRAs and TRAs in their vicinity.

When a detention occurs the Commandant or his representative arrive at the place where the USMLM team has been stopped, usually in a motorcycle sidecar, a light utility truck or a cargo truck. He asks for the team's documents, talks with the other Soviets on the scene and finally requests the USMLM team to follow him to the Kommandatura. There the team must usually wait in a room for an undetermined period while the Commandant "investigates the circumstances surrounding the detention and determines the extent of the violation". This can take from fifteen minutes to fifteen hours, depending on the number of hours of remaining daylight for observation, the time required for local Soviet units to clear the area, and the desire of the Commandant to "teach the visitors a lesson".

In almost all cases the Commandant feels that his prestige rests upon his being able to find or fabricate a series of "flagrant violations". The usual initial charge is violation of a restricted area or violation of a posted Mission Restriction Sign. Occasionally, when no serious charges can be substantiated the team is released with a reprimand for driving in a dirty car.

Sometimes the Commandant can be of assistance, USMLM teams have, on a few rare occasions, visited the Commandants for assistance when they could find no hotel rooms. Once the Commandant called a hotel announcing that he was the city Commandant and wanted a room for several American "comrades". To the reply that there were no rooms vacant, the Soviet shouted into the telephone for them to find a vacant room. When the USMLM team arrived at the hotel they were shown to a room which still contained someone else's clothing. Most often, however, the Commandant takes the line that it is all up to the East Germans and he does not wish to interfere in their affairs.

In the past year there has been a tendency

to consolidate and eliminate some Soviet Kommandaturas. As a result in a few areas it is sometimes necessary to wait much longer for a representative from the Kommandatura to arrive. Relations with Commandants are almost always militarily correct. They are usually polite, firm and business-like. In an unimaginative manner they carry out their tasks of immobilizing for a short period the USMLM teams who have been referred to them because of alleged travel violations. They invariably imply that USMLM is a spying operation, but they appear to be resigned to the fact that they are very limited in how drastic they can be in curtailing USMLM activities.

C. (C) EAST GERMAN MILITARY PERSONNEL: Most of the personnel serving in the Armed Forces of East Germany are conscripted civilians, so it is not unusual that the vast majority of them are openly friendly to the Allied Missions. Navy and Air Force personnel are probably more carefully selected or better indoctrinated, because they do not appear nearly so friendly as Army personnel. Field grade officers are usually hostile or, at most, neutral in their attitude, in sharp contrast to the average soldier who uses every opportunity to show his friendship and respect for everything "western".

East German personnel particularly dislike being used to harvest potatoes and to perform other non-military tasks which they feel are degrading. Most of them are unhappy in the Army and can hardly wait until they are finished with their service commitment. Nevertheless, the East German soldier, like the West German soldier, is efficient and quick to react. The East German Army practice of placing traffic regulators immediately ahead of a moving column and promptly picking up the regulators once the column has passed, is in distinct contrast to the Soviet system of leaving personnel in position for many hours.

The East German soldier readily waves at the Mission vehicles from his columns and formations. They seek opportunities to talk with USMLM personnel and are usually willing to talk freely about themselves.

[REDACTED]


D. (C) EAST GERMAN POLICE (VOPOs): Despite rigid indoctrination and training the "peoples" policeman has been recruited from East German civilian population and he finds it difficult to hate westerners. Sometimes the VOPOs will voluntarily assist in finding parking space for a Mission vehicle, or will hold a traffic light on green to allow the Mission vehicle to continue without halting. In most cases they maintain a respectful "neutrality" in the restrictive measures which the Soviets attempt to impose on USMLM personnel, but occasionally a thoroughly hostile and obnoxious VOPO is encountered. This type of zealous VOPO may even attempt to detain a USMLM vehicle. Normally, however, even the conscientious VOPO prefers to avoid the "loss of face" which occurs when they are unsuccessful in stopping a USMLM vehicle. No Mission documents are ever shown to VOPOs and they appear to be pretty well instructed to leave Mission vehicles alone.

The VOPO is principally of nuisance value, in that he often appears just when a Mission team is about to occupy an observation post or do some sensitive, long-range photography. He also maintains an effective passive surveillance by reporting the location and license number of every Mission vehicle he sees. Thus, it is not difficult for the Soviets to determine fairly closely where any USMLM vehicle has been.



EG VOPOs (right) (U)

E. (C) VEHICLE SURVEILLANCE ("TAILS"): During the past year active Soviet or East German surveillance has not been a major interference with Mission travel. In several cities the USMLM vehicles will be habitually met by a VOPO or civilian surveillance vehicle which will follow it as long as the Mission vehicle remains in town. If the Mission vehicle parks, the "tail" will park. Sometimes when the team spends the night the surveillance vehicle will be parked outside waiting all night long.



EG "Tail" (U)

In certain areas Mission vehicles encounter surveillance teams which have two-way radio communication. When a special surveillance effort is attempted a "team" may be composed of a fast, West German Mercedes or BMW and from three to six slow East German sedans. On some of these special occasions a surveillance group may attempt to actively stop a Mission vehicle and even force it off of the road. "Tailing" is terminated by the higher speed of the Mission vehicle on paved roads, or by superior trafficability of the Mission vehicle on trail and cross-country travel. A dusty or narrow trail, or muddy or sandy ground is usually enough to discourage a "tail" from following. Apparently they must account for any damage to their vehicles and they are not anxious to have bushes or trees scratch their

precious West German sedans, nor can they afford to risk running into something while pursuing a Mission vehicle through a cloud of dust.

F. EAST GERMAN CIVILIANS: As a rule, the East German population is very friendly to the West. Their reaction to the presence of a USMLM vehicle and to Mission personnel is generally one of welcome relief that the West has not forgotten them. On East German roads, truck and bus drivers more than a quarter of a mile away will blink their lights in greeting when they recognize a Mission vehicle. The people on the streets and in the fields almost always wave at the passing Mission personnel, who represent to them the United States of America and freedom. Encounters with East German people are usually pleasant and without their help and understanding the task of the Mission would be considerably more difficult.



East German Youth Greet USMLM (U)

During a three-day vigil of a rail line, a USMLM team had a typical and interesting experience with an East German hunter. Shortly after the team had settled down in a concealed spot to begin surveillance, an East German "Jaegermeister" appeared out of nowhere and said he was happy that the Americans were in the area. He had at first thought that the vehicle was Russian. The team was about to leave the area because of the hunter's knowledge of their location but decided to remain and hope he would not expose them. About

evening the Jaeger returned and announced that the team was still safe since the local police knew nothing about their presence in the area. The following day he returned twice to assure the team that they were still safe and informed the tour that about 3 A.M. the following morning a friend of his would be in the area for the start of the deer season. This friend of his knew about the team, but they were told there was nothing to worry about. The third day the Jaeger and his friend stopped by and expressed their hope that the team had been successful with their surveillance.

During a visit to a Soviet river-crossing area, a USMLM team had to pass through a small town, drive over a dike and out onto a tidal plain along a winding road for about a mile. When the team arrived, the Soviets were busy putting a bridge across the river and constructing ferries, so the team stayed to watch and photograph the proceedings. About a half hour later, as the team was leaving the observation post, it noticed a man on a bicycle approaching across the tidal plain. Starting back toward the dike, the team stopped to see what the man wanted. He was an elderly man carrying an axe and a shovel. He explained that it had been over a half hour since the team had passed through the village and crossed the dike. He knew there was no other way out and was afraid that the vehicle was stuck. Thus, he was on his way to try to "help the Americans so that the Russians would not catch them".



EG Hospital (U)

Several times World War II veterans of the German "Wehrmacht" have come up to USMLM officers, saluted and reported information concerning Soviet troop dispositions, installations and materiel. Usually this involves serious risk and appears to be done without thought of reward. Not infrequently Mission personnel will be approached by East German civilians who were prisoners of war in WWII and who spent time in American PW camps. "Those were the best years of my life. Hot water, good food and clothing and interesting work. After twenty years back here, I still do not live as well."

Ferries across the Elbe stop operation during the night. However, one ferry operated by two brothers is always ready to carry Mission traffic, regardless of the hour. Each of the brothers lives on opposite banks of the river and have pointed out to USMLM personnel where they live. "Wake us up any time of the night when you are chasing the Russians and we will get you across the river", they said.

Vehicle repair facilities in the Soviet Zone are very limited, and the assistance of rural Machine-Tractor Stations is often sought to get a Mission vehicle repaired. Usually all other work stops and everyone present does all possible to make necessary repairs. Often it requires much imagination, improvisation, hard work and hand-made parts to complete the emergency repairs. Nevertheless, in almost every case, the MTS personnel will not give up until the USMLM vehicle is able to run again.



East German MTS (U)

Once, when a USMLM team was stopped for lunch at a location overlooking a Soviet installation in a PRA, an elderly German woman approached with tears in her eyes. She said she just wanted to be able to look at some human beings (westerners) for a change. She complained that things were unbearable in "New Russia", that she was being forced to join a collective farm and that everything good was being given to the Russians and communists. The team offered her a sandwich, which she gratefully accepted and ate hungrily. She then proceeded to tell the team of alternate routes into the area, other good observation posts, as well as Soviet schedules for troop training, as she had observed it from the high ground. She asked again and again, "When and how will this all end?"

Another Mission team was following Soviet movement in a training area when an elderly woman waved her arms for the vehicle to stop. She informed the team that they were heading in the wrong direction because the Russians had gone the other way. When the team informed her that they were aware of the Russians' location, she indicated that she had been afraid the team might not have seen them.

A very sorrowful situation sometimes occurs when a farmer or local civilian approaches while the tour is taking a rest or lunchbreak. Often, he asks if he can go to West Berlin in the trunk of the car, although he knows what the answer will be. In some cases the man disappears and returns shortly with a child. He points to the blond-headed four-year-old and pleads for the team to take the child anyway. "I'll hit him on the head and knock him out. He won't cause you any trouble. We can lay him in the trunk. I have relatives, (or friends) in West Germany. I can have no future here, but please don't deny my little boy a future." When a person is ready to give up his own children, it is evident that "something is rotten in East Germany".

A small portion of the population, generally among the older generations, has the attitude of "Why don't both you and the Rus-



East German Crowd Gathers to see "Amis" and "Ami Vehicle" (U)

sians go home and leave us alone." Another smaller group is the vested-interest group who make up the "new elite" in the classless society. These few firmly committed communists are not always hostile, but are unyielding in their praise of all things Russian or communistic and in their criticism of all things "western".

The average East German is very well informed by West Berlin radio and television stations. Some say that is what makes life bearable. They seem to know about every escape over the "wall" shortly after it is announced on the Western TV or radio.

G. HOTELS AND ACCOMMODATIONS: Most hotels in the Soviet Zone are of pre-war construction and are in urgent need of painting, new furniture, new plumbing and new management. In larger cities such as Leipzig, Dresden and Magdeburg, there are a few newer and more comfortable establishments which cater to foreigners and party functionaries. The new hotel International in Magdeburg, which is scarcely a year old, already shows signs of de-


terioration. Its elevators are periodically out of operation and minor plumbing and electrical deficiencies in the rooms are not infrequent.

Often in the small East German hotels, the hospitality of the host more than makes up for the austerity of accommodations. No hot water, no soap and often no heat are just a few of the inconveniences encountered. However, the Mission team is usually received as honored guests and they appreciate that they are provided the best that is available.

Food in East German restaurants and dining rooms often leaves a lot to be desired. While the USMI/M team can often find crab meat, filet steaks and delicacies in the few elite hotels in larger cities, it is normal to find hotels or restaurants in smaller cities where the only meat available is duck and the rest of the menu is similarly limited. It appears that tourism is not encouraged among the East Germans and as a result their transient accommodations have been allowed to deteriorate.

[REDACTED]

H. (C) ROADS AND MAPS: Hitler's extensive autobahn net extends throughout the southern part of the Soviet Zone and permits USMLM teams to move quickly to any area except the north. An adequate pattern of pre-World War II two and three-lane highways joins the major cities. However, many of these are restricted to Mission travel by signs to prevent Allied Missions from approaching militarily sensitive areas. To circumvent these restrictions, Mission vehicles travel many miles on dirt roads, trails and paths. Using the basic U.S. Army World War II 1:100,000 series maps, the Mission officer frequently gets quite a surprise when there is no bridge at a river or an airfield, military installation or factory is found where a through-trail is shown. The maps have certain advantages, however, since the team will often find trails shown on the maps which have long since been covered with grass and would not be shown on a newer map. Many approaches to targets are made using trails which only Mission members seem to realize exist.



USMLM Vehicle on Trail (U)

U.S. Army maps are used in conjunction with current East German road maps which show the principal routes. USMLM teams also find detailed city maps helpful in urban recon-

naissance when hesitant or erroneous movement could lead to surveillance or harassment.

I. (C) TRAFFIC AND DRIVERS: Vehicular traffic is very light in East Germany and it is often possible to travel for over an hour on major highways during the day without meeting another vehicle. At night there is even less traffic. In the larger cities there is, of course, more traffic. But even there, generally the traffic signals are operated only during peak traffic hours and are turned off early in the evening and during slack periods throughout the day.

At Leipzig during the annual Fair there is an abnormal density of vehicles because taxis are brought from all over East Germany for this occasion. Many foreign visitors to the Fair bring their own vehicles and this also helps to give a busy, prosperous appearance to the city for a few weeks each year.

There is one place where you can almost always expect to find a small, patient line of cars—at the gasoline filling station. There are so few stations and service is slow with the gas often having to be hand-pumped.

The few East Germans who are privileged to have a car drive very carefully and few accidents are observed. Most of the accidents which are seen involve Soviet trucks colliding with small East German sedans, and these are most frequent when sudden storms cause icy or snow-covered roads. There is almost no effort at snow clearing and little road sanding is done. The small number of vehicles on East German roads accounts for the very backward condition of motor travel throughout the Soviet Zone.

[REDACTED]

APPENDIX A (U)

A G R E E M E N T

ON MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS ACCREDITED TO THE SOVIET AND UNITED STATES
COMMANDERS IN CHIEF OF THE ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY

In conformity with the provisions of Article 2 of the Agreement on "Control Mechanism in Germany," dated November 14, 1944, the United States and the Soviet Commanders in Chief of the zones of Occupation in Germany have agreed to exchange Military Liaison Missions accredited to their staffs in the zones and approve the following regulations concerning these missions:

1. These missions are military missions and have no authority over quadripartite military government missions or purely military government missions of each respective country, either temporarily or permanently, on duty in either zone. However, they will render whatever aid or assistance to said military government missions as is practicable.

2. Missions will be composed of air, navy and army representatives. There will be no political representative.

3. The missions will consist of not to exceed fourteen (14) officers and enlisted personnel. This number will include all necessary technical personnel, office clerks, personnel with special qualifications, and personnel required to operate radio stations.

4. Each mission will be under the orders of the senior member of the mission who will be appointed and known as "Chief of the United States (or Soviet) Military Mission."

5. The Chief of the mission will be accredited to the Commander in Chief of the occupation forces.

In the United States zone the mission will be accredited to Commander in Chief, United States European Command.

In the Soviet zone the mission will be accredited to the Commander in Chief of the Group of Soviet Occupational Forces in Germany.

6. In the United States zone the Soviet Mission will be offered quarters in the region of Frankfurt.

7. In the Soviet zone the United States Mission will be offered quarters at or near Potsdam.

8. In the United States zone the Chief of the Soviet Mission will communicate with A/C of Staff, G-3, United States European Command.

9. In the Soviet zone the Chief of the United States Mission will communicate with the Senior officer of the Staff of Commander-in-Chief.

10. Each member of the missions will be given identical travel facilities to include identical permanent passes in Russian and English languages permitting complete freedom of travel wherever and whenever it will be desired over territory and roads in both zones, except places of disposition of military units, without escort or supervision.

Each time any member of Soviet or United States mission wants to visit United States or Soviet headquarters, military government offices, forces, units, military schools, factories and enterprises which are under United States or Soviet control, a corresponding request must be made to Director, Operations, Plans, Organization and Training, European Command, or Senior Officer, Headquarters, Group of Soviet Occupational Forces in Germany. Such requests must be acted upon within 24-72 hours.

Members of the missions are permitted allied guests at the headquarters of the respective missions.

11. a. Each mission will have its own radio station for communication with its own headquarters.

b. In each case couriers and messengers will be given facilities for free travel between the headquarters of the mission and headquarters of their respective Commanders-in-Chief.

These couriers will enjoy the same immunity which is extended to diplomatic couriers.

c. Each mission will be given facilities for telephone communication through the local telephone exchange at the headquarters, and they also will be given facilities such as mail, telephone, telegraph through the existing means of communication when the members of the mission will be traveling within the zone. In case of a breakdown in the radio installation, the zone commanders will render all possible aid and will permit temporary use of their own systems of communication.

12. The necessary rations, P.O.L. supplies and household services for the military missions will be provided for by the headquarters to which accredited, by method of mutual compensation in kind, supplemented by such items as desired to be furnished by their own headquarters.

In addition the respective missions or individual members of the missions may purchase items of Soviet or United States origin which must be paid for in currency specified by the headquarters controlling zone where purchase is made.

Lieutenant-General HUEBNER
Deputy Commander in Chief,
European Command.

13. The buildings of each mission will enjoy full right of extraterritoriality.

14. a. The task of the mission will be to maintain liaison between both Commanders in Chief and their staffs.

b. In each zone the mission will have the right to engage in matters of protecting the interests of their nationals and to make representations accordingly, as well as in matters of protecting their property interests in the zone where they are located. They have a right to render aid to people of their own country who are visiting the zone where they are accredited.

15. This agreement may be changed or amplified by mutual consent to cover new subjects when the need arises.

16. This agreement is written in Russian and English languages and both texts are authentic.

17. This agreement becomes valid when signed by Deputy Commanders of United States and Soviet Zones of Occupation.

Colonel-General MALININ
Deputy Commander in Chief,
Chief of Staff of the Group
of Soviet Occupation Forces
in Germany

UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS EUROPEAN COMMAND

CORRECTED COPY

8 April 1947

General Orders)

Number 17)

ORGANIZATION OF THE US MILITARY LIAISON MISSION TO THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE SOVIET OCCUPIED ZONE OF GERMANY.

1. Effective 7 April 1947, the US Military Liaison Mission to the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany is organized with station at Potsdam, Germany.
2. Personnel will be furnished by Headquarters, Office of Military Government for Germany (US).
3. Equipment will be requisitioned in the normal manner. The authority is Table of Allowances, Number 1205, this headquarters.
4. Initial rosters will be prepared in accordance with AR345-900, 22 May 1942, as changed by Changes No 4, 22 June 1944.
5. This unit is assigned to Headquarters, European Command, and attached to Office of Military Government for Germany (US), to include personnel and administration.
6. Correspondence to the unit will be addressed as follows:

Chief of US Military Liaison Mission to
Commander in Chief, Soviet Occupied
Zone of Germany,
Care CG, OMGUS
APO 742, US Army

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL CLAY:

C. R. HUEBNER
Lieutenant General, GSC
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Wm. E. Bergin
/t/ WM. E. BERGIN
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General

UNCLASSIFIED

**HEADQUARTERS
EUROPEAN COMMAND**

GENERAL ORDERS)

NUMBER 23)

APO 757
27 February 1948

Organization of the 7890 Headquarters Group (EUCOM) I
Redesignation of the US Military Liaison to the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet
Occupied Zone of Germany II

I - ORGANIZATION OF THE 7890 HEADQUARTERS GROUP (EUCOM). 1. Pursuant to authority contained in paragraph 5, AR 220-5, 16 December 1944 and Changes thereto, the 7890 Headquarters Group (EUCOM) is organized at Frankfurt, Germany, effective 1 March 1948.

2. Officer personnel and equipment authorized officers, divisions and sections of Headquarters, European Command listed in Inclosure 1 will be transferred to the above unit.

3. Initial rosters will be prepared and submitted by the Adjutant General, this headquarters, in accordance with paragraphs 4a and 5a, AR 345-900, 22 October 1947, as changed.

II - REDESIGNATION OF THE US MILITARY LIAISON MISSION TO THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE SOVIET OCCUPIED ZONE OF GERMANY. 1. Pursuant to authority contained in paragraph 5, AR 220-5, 16 December 1944 and Changes thereto, the following unit is redesignated, effective 1 March 1948:

Present Designation

US Military Liaison Mission to the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Occupation Zone of Germany

New Designation

7893 US Military Liaison Mission to the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Occupation Zone of Germany.

2. The provisions of paragraphs 4a and 6, AR 345-900, 22 October 1947, as changed, will be complied with.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL CLAY:

1 Incl: a/s

OFFICIAL:

/s/ John A Klein

JOHN A. KLEIN

Colonel, AGD

Adjutant General

C. R. HUEBNER

Lieutenant General, GSC

Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: A

25 - 7893 US Mil Liaison Mission

UNCLASSIFIED

**HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 403**

**GENERAL ORDERS
NUMBER 71**

3 April 1963

REDESIGNATION OF UNITS

TC 010. The following units are redesignated, with no change in title, mission, location, assignment or TPSN except as specifically indicated.

Effective date: 17 May 1963

Authority: Letter, AGRZ-CA (M) (13 Mar 63), Headquarters, Department of the Army, 14 March 1963, subject: Modifications to AR 330-330 (Military Personnel and Organizational Codes) and AR 310-41 (Tables of Distribution)

Fund obligations: Not applicable

Special instructions: Organization morning reports of the following units prepared for 16 and 17 May 1963 will contain a statement in the record of events section as prescribed by paragraph 110d, AR 335-60, to provide for reporting changes in TD prefix as indicated below:

Unit	Present TD Prefix	New TD Prefix
Headquarters USAREUR staff divisions	73	E1
Southern Area Command	73	E1
Northern Area Command	73	E1
9th Hospital Center	73	E1
Headquarters, Special Troops, USAREUR	73	E1
US Army School, Europe	73	E1
US Army Signal Brigade, Europe	73	E1
Special Ammunition Support Command, USAREUR	73	E1
7th Engineer Brigade	73	E1
513th Intelligence Corps Group	73	E1
USAREUR assigned units and activities	73	E1
US Army Communications Zone, Europe	73	E2
US Army Southern European Task Forces	73	E3
US Army, Berlin	73	E4
Seventh Army	73	E7

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

OFFICIAL:

IRVING T. SHANLEY

Major, AGC


Asst AG

Telephone: Heid Mil 7733/6768

WILLIAM C. BAKER, JR.

Major General, GS

Chief of Staff


UNITED STATES MILITARY LIAISON MISSION
TO COMMANDER IN CHIEF GROUP OF
SOVIET FORCES GERMANY
APO 742 US FORCES

GENERAL ORDERS
NUMBER 3

22 June 1963

TC 355. The undersigned assumes command.

Period: Indefinite.

Auth: Paragraph 12b, AR600-20.

/s/Paul G. Skowronek

/t/PAUL G. SKOWRONEK

Colonel, GS

Chief of Mission


DISTRIBUTION:

"a" plus Special

APPENDIX B

ORGANIZATION CHART
 UNITED STATES ARMY ELEMENT
 UNITED STATES MILITARY
 LIAISON MISSION

Table of Distribution
 E1-3731 dtd 17 Dec 63



————— Command
 - - - - - Operational Control

AGG: 11 Off 19 EM (Army)
 ATCH: Air-4 Off 4 EM;
 Navy-1 Off

*Two Comm Center EM authorized by
 Change 10 to TD E1-3731 dtd 6 Nov 64

B-1

[REDACTED]

APPENDIX B

PERSONNEL CHANGES (U)

RANK	NAME	ARRIVED	DEPARTED
Col	Skowronek, Paul G.		
Lt Col	Balaker, Basil C.		
Lt Col	Swenson, Shirl H. (AF)		
Lt Col	Fair, Leland B.		
Lt Col	Callahan, Patrick O.	4 Sep 64	
Major	Brownlee, Robert W.		17 Jun 64
Major	Jones, William R. D.		22 Jul 64
Major	Schneider, William P.		25 Jul 64
Major	Squires, John L.		25 Mar 64
Major	McCarthy, Alfred B.		17 Jun 64
Major	Fitzurka, Andrew, Jr. (AF)		
Major	Kelsey, Jesse T.	1 Jul 64	
Major	McKinney, Harold P.	1 Apr 64	
Major	Turner, Frederick C.		
Major	Clayborne, John W. (USMC)		
Major	Miller, David C.	1 Jul 64	
Major	Thompson, Walter W. (AF)		
	(promoted to Major 3 March 1964)		
Capt	Clark, Richard W.		17 Jun 64
Capt	Szymczyk, Norbert J.		7 Jun 64
Capt	Farrar, John H., Jr.	1 Jul 64	
Capt	Odom, William E.	1 Jul 64	
Capt	Heine, Theodore C., Jr. (AF)	27 Jul 64	
Capt	Kelly, Richard P., Jr.	1 Jul 64	
DAC	Heller, Geraldine E.		17 Jun 64
DAC	Wax, Mary H.	18 Aug 64	
SGM	Cardon, Paul R.		28 Sep 64
MSG (E8)	Miller, Joseph R., Jr.		
MSG (E8)	Wolfe, Paul J.	5 Sep 64	
MSG (E7)	Albiez, Fritz		18 Aug 64
MSG (E7)	Brodts, Howard F. (AF)		
SFC (E7)	Moreau, Ralph T.	12 Jun 64	
TSG (E6)	Kreieg, James T. (AF)		15 May 64
TSG (E6)	Handy, Max J. (AF)		
TSG (E6)	Whiting, Philip (AF)	28 May 64	
SSG (E6)	Smith, Ray		16 Feb 64

UNCLASSIFIED

RANK	NAME	ARRIVED	DEPARTED
SSG (E6)	Knott, Richard E.		14 Mar 64
SSG (E6)	Harber, Charley D.		
SSG (E6)	Warner, Luther R., Jr.		
SSG (E6)	Haile, Harry P.		
SGT (E5)	Uiterwyk, Robert H.		12 Nov 64
SP (E5)	Sheffer, Charles A.		10 Sep 64
SP (E5)	Wendell, Allen R.		1 Aug 64
SP (E5)	Kezer, Richard H.		
SP (E5)	Brown, Robert	17 Mar 64	
SP (E5)	Gorder, Leroy E.		
SP (E4)	Briody, James F.		19 Sep 64
SP (E4)	Erwin, Jesse R.		26 Aug 64
SP (E4)	Schulte, Gary N.	20 Jun 64	
SP (E4)	Hurd, Francis G.	27 Oct 64	
SP (E4)	Greenstein, Barry	30 Sep 64	
SP (E4)	Hurt, William H., Jr.	22 Jul 64	
SP (E4)	Townsend, Floyd R.		
SP (E4)	DeLuca, Richard J.	17 Aug 64	
A1C	Preisler, Wolfgang (AF)		
PFC	Kotz, Eugene M.		20 Jul 64
PFC	Doucet, Carol J.		20 Jul 64
PFC	Jones, James C.	6 Sep 64	3 Dec 64
PFC	Wilson, Jon H.	27 May 64	
PFC	Elam, Bobby H.	18 Sep 64	
PFC	Dechert, Steve	22 Oct 64	
PFC	Apel, Peter P.	22 Nov 64	
PFC	Achman, James A.	14 Dec 64	
PFC	Glasscock, Lonnie	17 Aug 64	
A2C	Voss, Thomas L.		

UNCLASSIFIED



Colonel Skowronek
Chief of Mission



Mrs Wax
Secretary



Lt Colonel Balaker
Deputy Chief of Mission



Lt Col Swenson
Chief, AF Element



Major Clayborne
Chief, Navy Element

UNCLASSIFIED

OPERATIONS DIVISION



Lt Colonel Fair - Operations Officer
Army Elm



Major Miller - Req Off
Army Elm



Capt Kelly - Prod Off
Army Elm



MSG Wolfe - Ops Sgt
Army Element



TSG Handy - Int NCO
AF Element



SSG Warner - Asst Ops Sgt
Army Element

UNCLASSIFIED

LIAISON SECTION



Lt Col Swenson
LO - Chief, AF
Element



Lt Col Callahan
LO - Army Element



Major Clayborne
LO - Chief, Navy
Element



Major Fitzurka
LO - AF Element



Major McKinney
LO - Army Element



Major Turner
LO - Army Element



Major Thompson
LO - AF Element



Captain Farrar
LO - Army Element



Captain Odom
LO - Army Element



Captain Heine
LO - AF Element

UNCLASSIFIED

PHOTO LAB SECTION



MSG Brodt, Photo Lab
Chief - AF Element



SP5 Brown, Photo
Lab Technician -
Army Element



PFC Achman, Photo
Lab Technician -
Army Element

PUBLICATIONS SECTION



SP5 Gorder, NCOIC
Army Element



SP4 Hurt, Pub Tech
Army Element



PFC Elam, Re-
production Tech.
Army Element

COMMUNICATIONS AND MESSAGE CENTER SECTIONS



SP4 Hurd, Comm
Center Chief
Army Element



SP4 DeLuca, Msg
Center Chief
Army Element



SP4 Townsend
Comm Spec
Army Element

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POTSDAM HEADQUARTERS SECTION



SFC Moreau, House NCOIC
Army Element



SP5 Kezer, Sr Dvr/Int
Army Element



SP4 Schulte, Dvr/Int
Army Element



A1C Preisler, Dvr/Int
Air Force Element



PFC Dechert, Dvr/Int
Army Element



PFC Glasscock, Dvr/Int
Army Element



A2C Voss, Dvr/Int
Air Force Element

UNCLASSIFIED

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION



Major Kelsey, Adjutant
Army Element



MSG Miller, First
Sergeant - Army
Element



SSG Harber, Supply
Sergeant - Army
Element



SSG Haile, Motor
Sergeant - Army
Element



TSG Whiting,
Adm NCO - AF
Element



SP4 Greenstein,
Finance Clerk -
Army Element



PFC Wilson, Pers
Clerk - Army
Element



PFC Apel, Pers Clk
Army Element

[REDACTED]

APPENDIX C


USMLM LIAISON MEETINGS

- 10 Jan 64 Meeting at SERB (SERB request) to protest conduct of USMLM tour in East Germany on 9 January 1964.
- 13 Jan 64 Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) to reject SERB protest concerning 9 January incident and to register protest concerning Soviet treatment of USMLM officers on 9 January.
- 17 Jan 64 Meeting at SERB (SERB request) to deliver two statements. The first SERB statement concerned removal of ban on American Commandant entry into East Berlin, the second dealt with USMLM conduct during 1963.
- 24 Jan 64 Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) to ask for immediate confrontation with alleged American military defector, SP-6 Conrad Yumang. SERB introduced two items: the alleged violation of a PRA by USMLM tour vehicle; and a request that curtains be removed from USMLM vehicles, based on GSFG regulations which prohibits curtains on the windows of military vehicles.
- 28 Jan 64 Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) to reply to charges made by Soviets at 17 January meeting concerning alleged traffic and similar violations by USMLM vehicles during 1963. SERB replied to USMLM request of 24 January for confrontation with alleged American military defector (Yumang) in East Germany.
- 28 Jan 64 Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) to obtain assistance and information on downed USAF aircraft (T-39) in East Germany.
- 28 Jan 64 Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) to demand action on subject of downed American aircraft.
- 29 Jan 64 Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) to deliver a CINC USAREUR letter to CINC GSFG on subject of downed USAF aircraft.
- 30 Jan 64 Meeting at SERB (SERB request) in reply to USMLM request for transfer of the bodies of American military personnel and the wreckage of the plane.
- 30 Jan 64 Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) to make necessary arrangements for an American convoy and personnel to proceed to crash site of USAF T-39 downed in the vicinity of Erfurt, East Germany.
- 7 Feb 64 Meeting at SERB (SERB request) to protest the detention of Soviet vehicle in West Berlin. USMLM took the opportunity to deliver low-level protest on treatment of USMLM personnel traveling in Soviet Zone.
- 11 Feb 64 Meeting at SERB (SERB request) to protest USMLM actions and to announce issuance of a changed vehicle license plate to USMLM.
- 20 Feb 64 Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) to reply to SERB statement of 7 February and to request expeditious action on passage of USMLM guests through the checkpoint on the night of the Washington's Birthday Ball in Potsdam.
- 24 Feb 64 Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) to notify SERB and GSFG of contemplated action with reference to an American military defector, Francis Bunting, who was in custody in USMLM Potsdam house and had requested assistance to leave East Germany.
- 25 Feb 64 Meeting at SERB (SERB request) to deliver C/S GSFG (Col General Ariko) reply on American defector (Bunting) to Chief USMLM.

- [REDACTED]
- 26 Feb 64 Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) to reply to GSFG statement of 25 February with reference to American defector.
- 27 Feb 64 Meeting at SERB (SERB request) to deliver reply to Chief USMLM request of 26 February with reference to American defector.
- 28 Feb 64 Meeting at SERB (SERB request) to announce departure of Chief SERB (Colonel Kozlovskiy) on reassignment.
- 5 Mar 64 Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) to present a sworn statement of an American defector (Bunting) to SERB and to request prompt action for his return to US Army control.
- 6 Mar 64 Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) to deliver statements on painting of Mission vehicles and the use of curtains. Chief USMLM also requested information of an American military defector, Pvt Henry Kiernan, reported to have committed suicide.
- 10 Mar 64 Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) to deliver statement and request aid of Soviets concerning downed USAF aircraft (RB-66).
- 11 Mar 64 Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) to deliver a statement on crew of downed American aircraft and request meeting with C/S GSFG.
- 11 Mar 64 Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) to deliver a message from CINC USAREUR to CINC GSFG. This message concerned the downed American aircraft which crashed in East Germany on 10 March.
- 12 Mar 64 Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) concerning the Soviet shooting-down of an American aircraft on 10 March. Chief SERB used meeting to bring up subject of an American defector (Bunting).
- 16 Mar 64 Meeting at SERB (SERB request) to reply to Chief USMLM request concerning injured USAF officer, Lt. Welch (RB-66 navigator), and to submit a demand concerning an American defector (Bunting).
- 16 Mar 64 Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) to arrange travel permission and conditions for Captain John L. Monroe, Flight Surgeon, to visit injured USAF officer in Soviet hospital in Magdeburg.
- 17 Mar 64 Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) to express dissatisfaction with lack of GSFG cooperation and information on the shot-down RB-66 and to request permission for Chief USMLM to visit the injured USAF officer.
- 17 Mar 64 Meeting at SERB (SERB request) to reply to Chief USMLM request to visit injured USAF officer made earlier in the day.
- 18 Mar 64 Meeting at SERB (SERB request) to deliver letter of reply from General Yakubovskiy, CINC GSFG, to General Freeman, CINC USAFUR. Letter dealt with alleged invasion of air space of "GDR" by American military aircraft.
- 19 Mar 64 Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) to arrange a further visit to injured USAF officer. SERB introduced the subject of an American defector (Bunting) and US-MLM activities.
- 21 Mar 64 Meeting at Magdeburg Soviet hospital (SERB request) to effect release of USAF officer, Lt. Welch. Welch was transported in USAF ambulance to Hannover Airfield for air evacuation.
- 24 Mar 64 Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) for information about the remaining RB-66 crewmen and the wrecked aircraft. SERB introduced subject of alleged American military patrol traffic violations in East Berlin.

- [REDACTED]
- 27 Mar 64 Meeting at Marienborn (SERB request) to effect release of two remaining USAF officers whose aircraft (RB-66) was shot down by a Soviet fighter on 10 March over East Germany.
- 28 Mar 64 Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) to discuss arrangements for possible return of an American defector (Bunting).
- 1 Apr 64 Meeting at SERB (SERB request) to reply to Chief USMLM request for information on an American defector (Kiernan) and to discuss the vehicle curtain issue again. Chief USMLM introduced subjects of alleged American military patrol traffic violation accusations, return of RB-66 wreckage and the Bunting case.
- 7 Apr 64 Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) to allow Bunting, an American military defector, to present his request directly to representatives of the "GDR" to leave East Germany and to return to US control.
- 13 Apr 64 Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) to discuss status of American military defector (Bunting).
- 15 Apr 64 Meeting at SERB (SERB request) to request action be taken to instruct derector Bunting to stop wearing his uniform in East Germany.
- 25 Apr 64 Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) to discuss the USAF RB-66 wreckage and the return of an American military defector (Bunting).
- 6 May 64 Meeting at SERB (SERB request) to discuss return of an American army defector, Bunting.
- 7 May 64 Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) to transmit a letter from C/S USAREUR to C/S GSFG via SERB.
- 25 May 64 Meeting at SERB (SERB request) to deliver letter of reply from C/S GSFG to C/S USAREUR via USMLM.
- 4 Jun 64 Meeting at SERB (SERB request) to protest actions of USMLM team in Soviet Zone.
- 11 Jun 64 Meeting at SERB (SERB request) in response to USMLM inquiry concerning detention of USMLM officer.
- 22 Jun 64 Meeting at SERB (SERB request) to reply to a USMLM letter for travel permission to use Wartha-Herleshausen exit to West Germany and to reply to Chief USMLM request for information of an American defector.
- 30 Jun 64 Meeting at SERB (SERB request) to protest alleged American military patrol traffic violations in East Berlin and to transmit a letter addressed to Chief USMLM.
- 3 Jul 64 Meeting at SERB (SERB request) of Chiefs of the Allied Military Liaison Missions to introduce new Chief SERB, Colonel Pinchuk. At this meeting Chief USMLM met with Deputy Chief SERB and requested information concerning a reported American defector, Pvt Melton.
- 14 Jul 64 Meeting a SERB (USMLM request) to deliver oral statement regarding alleged American military patrol traffic violations in East Berlin.
- 21 Jul 64 Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) to cancel a confrontation request made earlier having to do with American defector (Bunting).
- 24 Aug 64 Meeting at SERB (SERB request) to transmit a letter from CinC GSFG to CinC USAREUR, concerning two Soviet political refugees.
- 26 Aug 64 Meeting at SERB (SERB request) to give Chief USMLM a letter addressed to CinC USAREUR from CinC GSFG.


- [REDACTED]
- 3 Sep 64 Meeting a SERB (USMLM request) to discuss hiring of employees for USMLM Potsdam house.
 - 5 Sep 64 Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) to deliver a letter addressed to CINC GSFG from CINC USAREUR.
 - 26 Sep 64 Meeting at SERB (SERB request) to protest alleged violation on part of a USMLM officer in Soviet Zone.
 - 7 Oct 64 Meeting at SERB (SERB request) to present verbal protest from C/S GSFG to C/S USAREUR concerning violation of traffic rules in East Berlin by American military vehicle BC-69.
 - 8 Oct 64 Meeting at SERB (SERB request) to protest retaliatory detention of Soviet military vehicle in West Berlin.
 - 28 Oct 64 Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) to arrange a visit to hospitalized American, William Carter, in East Germany.
 - 5 Nov 64 Meeting at SERB (SERB request) to protest alleged violation by USMLM officer in Soviet Zone.
 - 16 Nov 64 Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) to arrange for aid to William Carter, an American citizen hospitalized in Dresden. SERB protested alleged violation of restriction signs by USMLM officer on 12 November.
 - 8 Dec 64 Meeting at SERB (SERB request) to protest an alleged violation by a USMLM team in East Germany and an alleged violation by American servicemen in East Berlin.
 - 15 Dec 64 Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) to deliver request concerning routine notification of scheduling arrangements for USAREUR special diesel trains traveling from Frankfurt to West Berlin.
 - 17 Dec 64 Meeting at SERB (SERB request) to deliver a protest against a USMLM officer. Chief USMLM was prepared to protest same issue and did so in rebuttal.
 - 23 Dec 64 Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) to request removal of newly placed Mission Restriction Signs denying access to the West and North from Potsdam.
 - 24 Dec 64 Meeting at Wuensdorf (USMLM request) with CINC and C/S GSFG to extend Seasons Greetings on behalf of General Freeman, CINC USAREUR.
 - 29 Dec 64 Meeting at USMLM Potsdam house (SERB request) to deliver gifts and greetings of the New Year.



APPENDIX D

COMPARISON OF OLD AND NEW PERMANENT RESTRICTED AREAS

(C) A change in the Permanent Restricted Areas was imposed by CINC GSFG on Allied Mission travel in the Soviet Zone of Germany effective 15 February. The previous PRA map had been in effect since 1961. With the new map the Guestrow and Neubrandenburg PRA's in the north were greatly reduced. New PRA's were formed around Elsterwerder and Schildau. An area along the East German/Polish border from Fuerstenwalde to Cottbus was enclosed in the new PRA. The Wittenberge PRA in the west was enlarged to include the Elbe River North exercise crossing sites. The new PRA map resulted in a small increase of restricted areas.



COMPARISON OF OLD AND NEW
PERMANENT RESTRICTED AREAS

AREA ADDED 
 AREA DELETED 



APPENDIX E

TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREAS

1. (S) First Temporary Restricted Area map was effective during period 19001-262400 January. This TRA was located to the north of the Helmstedt Autobahn and was apparently used for an exercise by the East German Army, Military District III.

2. (S) Second Temporary Restricted Area map was effective during period 150001-222400 February. It was located to the southwest of Berlin and joined the Letzlinger Heide, Altengrabow and Juterbog training areas. These areas were apparently utilized for division level command post exercises and several field training exercises.

3. (S) Third Temporary Restricted Area map was effective during period 190001-242400 February. It was located to the north and west of Berlin, apparently to cover division level command post and field training exercises.

4. (S) Fourth Temporary Restricted Area map was initially to be effective during period 091500-202400 March but was extended to 251800 March. Zone #4 (Magdeburg, Bernberg, Halle and Sandershausen) was extended to 302400 March. Extensive restricted areas extending through most of the western and southern part of the Soviet Zone were imposed to deny observation of a large scale GSFG field training exercise. Mission observers watched elements from five GSFG armies assemble and position themselves for the exercise. However, probably due to the problems created by the shooting down of the USAF RB-66 on 10 March, in the TRA, the exercise was apparently called off and units returned to their home stations without engaging in a field training exercise.

5. (S) Fifth Temporary Restricted Area map was effective during period 261200-302400 March. Restricted areas were located to the south of Berlin and were apparently to have been for the final phases of the planned GSFG exercise for which the Fourth Temporary Restricted Area map was issued. No activity was observed.

6. (S) Sixth Temporary Restricted Area map was effective during period 080001-112400 April and included three small areas located in the north and southeastern portions of the Soviet Zone. There was apparently no significant activity conducted in these areas.


7. (S) Seventh Temporary Restricted Area map was effective during period 080001-132400 July and restricted area was located in the Dresden area. Area was apparently used for field training of East German Army units.

8. (S) Eighth Temporary Restricted Area was effective during period 210001-272400 July and restricted the southern quarter of the Soviet Zone for a joint Soviet/East German Army exercise.

9. (S) Ninth Temporary Restricted Area map was effective during period 162000-242000 September and included four separate areas to the north which were apparently used for a joint Soviet/East German Army CPX with air defense training included.

10. (S) Tenth Temporary Restricted Area map was effective during period 191000-242000 October. It covered an area west of Berlin where a GSFG-controlled FTX was conducted.

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


TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA No.1

19 Jan 64 - 26 Jan 64

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


TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA No. 2

15 Feb 64 - 22 Feb 64

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
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TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA No. 3
19 Feb 64 - 24 Feb 64

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


TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA No. 4

9 Mar 64 - 25 Mar 64

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


TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA No. 5

26 Mar 64 - 30 Mar 64

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UNCLASSIFIED




TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA No. 6

8 Apr 64 - 11 Apr 64

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UNCLASSIFIED




TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA No. 7

8 Jul 64 - 13 Jul 64

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


TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA No. 8

21 Jul 64 - 27 Jul 64

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
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TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA No. 9

16 Sep 64 - 24 Sep 64

UNCLASSIFIED



TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA No. 10

19 Oct 64 - 24 Oct 64

[REDACTED]

APPENDIX F

TOURING STATISTICS

MONTH	TOURS	ONE DAY TOURS	TWO DAY TOURS	THREE DAY TOURS	FOUR DAY TOURS	SIX DAY TOURS	TOTAL TOUR DAYS
JAN	37	8	18	3	0	0	53
FEB	30	11	15	1	0	0	44
MAR	35	13	19	1	0	0	54
APR	29	7	17	0	0	0	41
MAY	31	4	20	0	0	0	44
JUN	42	17	18	1	1	0	60
JUL	41	17	20	2	0	0	63
AUG	37	8	21	0	0	0	50
SEP	41	16	20	1	0	0	59
OCT	39	12	27	0	0	0	66
NOV	47	8	22	0	0	0	52
DEC	32	5	15	6	0	1	59
TOTAL	441	126	232	15	1	1	645

NOTE: A tour of less than five hours is not counted as a tour day; most local area tours fall into this category.

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
Incidents	2	2	0	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8
Detentions	5	4	7	1	3	3	3	1	1	2	1	1	32
Surveillance	3	4	8	4	12	5	7	1	3	1	9	1	58

[REDACTED]

APPENDIX G

INCIDENTS AND DETENTIONS

USMLM PERSONNEL

DETAILS

Maj Szymczyk SP5 Kezer	090845-1015 Jan 64, Potsdam. DETENTION. Team stopped by two VOPOs at what appeared to be accident. VOPO stated Rt 5 was for use by people with special pass. Team detained 1½ hrs and when Soviet Comdt did not appear, tour left area. Duration: 1½ hrs (MLM 007-64)
Lt Col Fair Sgt Knott	091015 Jan 64, Gumtow. INCIDENT. Soviet cargo truck blocked USMLM vehicle at head of engineer column. Soviet Lt Col directed team to turn around and leave area. Team complied. (MLM 009-64)
Lt Col Schneider Maj Turner	101530-2300 Jan 64, Potsdam. DETENTION. While investigating alleged violation by Maj Szymczyk on 9 January, team was stopped by Soviet troops. Soviet Maj arrived and escorted tour to Kommandatura Potsdam. Team accused of passing sign (false) and finally released. Duration: 7½ hrs (MLM 006-64)
Lt Col Fair Sgt Knott	171940 Jan 64, Beelitz. INCIDENT. Team followed East German army column on Rt 2 toward Stahnsdorf when stopped by East German army officer who asked what team was doing. Team replied "returning to Potsdam". East German army officer said "be careful" and trip continued immediately. (MLM 011-64)
Lt Col Swenson, A2/C Preisler	231540-231610 Jan 64, Burgliebenau. DETENTION. Soviet truck halted USMLM vehicle by blocking route. Traffic regulator dismounted and accused team of being in restricted area (false). After waiting 30 minutes, team told traffic regulator they were departing. Traffic regulator saluted and team departed. Duration: 30 minutes (MLM 013-64)
Maj Jones Capt Clark SP5 Wendell	290730-1400 Jan 64, Vogelsberg. DETENTION. USMLM team detained by Soviet officer at scene of T-39 USAF aircraft crash. Vehicle escorted to Erfurt Kommandatura and later released. Duration: 6½ hrs. (MLM 018-64)
Lt Col Fair Capt Clark Sgt Knott	291010-1410 Jan 64, Vogelsberg. DETENTION. Team detained by Soviet officer at scene of T-39 USAF aircraft crash. Vehicle escorted to Erfurt Kommandatura and later released. Duration: 4 hrs. (MLM 018-64)
Lt Col Fair Sgt Knott	072000-072300 Feb 64, Gotha. DETENTION. USMLM vehicle returning to Potsdam detained by 13 VOPOs at gate to Potsdam house and accused of having caused a wreck in Gotha. Soviet representative of Potsdam Comdt arrived and team accompanied him to Kommandatura. Team protested and, when Chief USMLM arrived, they were released. Duration: 3 hrs. (MLM 024-64)
Lt Col Swenson, Capt Thompson A1/C Preisler	071140-080120 Feb 64, Alt Lonnwitz. DETENTION. Team detained in vicinity of airfield and accused of taking photographs of aircraft. Vehicle escorted to Falkenberg where Comdt demanded team expose film. Team eventually exposed blank roll of film and was released. Detention: 13 hrs (MLM 023-64)

[REDACTED]

Lt Col Schneider 112030-112330 Feb 64, Meissen. DETENTION. Team accused of violating Mission Restriction Sign by being in a hotel behind sign. USMLM officers taken to Kommandatura and released, but required to vacate accommodations at hotel. Duration: 3 hrs (MI.M 028-64)
 Maj Szymczyk
 SP5 Wendell

Lt Col Swenson, 191640-191820 Feb 64, Ribnitz. DETENTION. Vehicle stopped by VOPO who informed team they were in restricted area. Damgarten Comdt arrived and escorted team to Kommandatura. Comdt apologized for misunderstanding and released tour. Duration: 1 hr, 40 minutes. (MLM 033-64)
 Capt Thompson
 A1/C Preisler

Lt Col Schneider 110345-2300 Mar 64, Helmstedt. DETENTION. Team searching for crash site of RB-66 was detained in PRA and taken to Gardelegen. Later escorted to Helmstedt Autobahn and released. Duration: 4 hrs, 45 minutes.
 Maj Fitzurka
 Capt Clark

Lt Col Fair 111240-2300 Mar 64, Helmstedt. DETENTION. Team searching for crash site of RB-66 detained in PRA and taken to Gardelegen. Later escorted to Helmstedt Autobahn and released. Duration: 10 hrs, 20 minutes.
 Maj Jones
 SP5 Wendell

Maj Brownles 110620-2300 Mar 64, Helmstedt. DETENTION. Team searching for crash site of RB-66 detained in PRA and taken to Gardelegen. Later escorted to Helmstedt Autobahn and released. Duration: 16 hrs, 40 minutes.
 Capt Thompson
 A1/C Preisler

Maj Jones 141305-1725 Mar 64, Haldensleben. DETENTION. USMLM team detained by Soviet security and accused of being in TRA (false). Team taken to Haldensleben and escorted to Helmstedt Autobahn where they were released. Duration: 4 hrs, 20 minutes (MLM 046-64)
 SP5 Wendell

Capt Clark 221815-1835 Mar 64, Potsdam. DETENTION. Team detained by Soviet guard at Glienicke Bridge and accused of having had an accident because of an old dent in right rear door. USMLM officer denied accident and was released by Soviet guard without further action. Duration: 20 minutes (MI.M 048-64)

Lt Col Schneider 251340-1520 Mar 64, Liebenberg. DETENTION. Team detained by Soviet security and accused of being in restricted area (false). Team released by Assistant Comdt of Templin with apologies. Duration: 1 hr, 40 minutes (MLM 051-64)
 Sgt Albiez

Maj Jones 311225-1545 Mar 64, Wessin. DETENTION. Team detained by Soviet security and accused by Wittenberg Comdt of violating TRA, possessing pass that was not in order and breaking Mission Restriction Sign (all false). Team released for lack of proof. Duration: 3 hrs, 20 minutes (MLM 053-64)
 SP5 Wendell

Maj Szymczyk 021010 Apr 64, Brand. INCIDENT. Team was approaching Soviet military installation at Brand when seen by Soviet sentry. Sentry started toward US-MLM vehicle which reversed direction and sentry fired approximately 10 shots, none of which struck the vehicle. (MLM 054-64)
 SP5 Wendell

Capt Clark 021315-1620 Apr 64, Riesa. DETENTION. Team detained by VOPO who summoned Comdt. Comdt accused tour of violating Mission Restriction Sign (false), running a column (false) and being in area of a military objective (true). Team released after refusing to sign "akt". Duration: 2 hrs, 30 minutes (MI.M 055-64)
 Sgt Haile

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Maj Jones
Maj Brownlee
SP5 Wendell

061225-061335 May 64, Grevesmuehlen. DETENTION. Team asked by VOPO to remain in place pending arrival of Comdt. Team refused and drove off but eventually was blocked by approaching Soviet G-69. Soviet officer asked team if any signs had been violated. After conference with East German army officer who was with VOPO, USMLM vehicle was allowed to proceed. Duration: 1 hr, 10 minutes (MLM 063-64)

Lt Col Schneider
SP5 Wendell

131200-131232 May 64, Leisnig. DETENTION. Officer halted by Soviet officer in town of Leisnig and accused of breaking Mission Restriction Signs. Soviet could not find sign in question and tour was released. Duration: 32 minutes (MLM 067-64)

Lt Col Swenson
Maj Fitzurka
A1/C Preisler

191855-192015 May 64, Neustrelitz. DETENTION. Team reported to Soviets by East German surveillance personnel. Soviet officer detained team and escorted them to Kommandatura in Neustrelitz where they were accused of being in restricted area. Duration: 1 hr, 20 minutes (MLM 072-64)

Maj Fitzurka
and family

311105-311315 May 64, Eisenach Autobahn. INCIDENT. Maj Fitzurka and family on orientation trip in Erfurt area were stopped at Minol Station. While in station, Maj Fitzurka took pictures of a group of East German civilians. A VOPO on motorcycle halted USMLM car and accused Maj Fitzurka of taking military pictures. Local Comdt was called and when he arrived Maj Fitzurka admitted photography, emphasizing fact that his photographs were of a personal nature and of no consequence to anyone except him and his family. Maj Fitzurka exposed film and was released. Duration: 2 hrs, 30 minutes (MLM 076-64)

Maj Turner
Capt Clark
SP5 Wendell

282100 May 64, Wismar. INCIDENT. One hour after team entered room in Hotel Staedt Hamburg, a VOPO and two civilians knocked on door. VOPO stated that he was representative of local police and that team would have to leave hotel. Team refused to speak to Germans. Team protested action of VOPO to Wismar Comdt, who stated that he had no authority in such matters and added that in future if Mission personnel could not find room they should come to him for help. (MLM 077-64)

Lt Col Fair
SP5 Kezer

050945-051230 Jun 64, Riesa. DETENTION. Team had stopped in Pausitz to check faulty brake cable. While stopped, Soviet Lt Col appeared in G-69 and halted in front of USMLM vehicle. Lt Col accused tour of breaking Mission Restriction Sign. Soviet officer ordered tour to follow him to Riesa Kommandatura. Duration: 2 hrs, 45 minutes (MLM 080-64)

Maj Jones
SP5 Kezer

111020-112020 Jun 64, Zossen. DETENTION. Team, in effort to avoid encounter with hostile Soviets, proceeded southwest along trail ahead of truck. Team was unable to find exit route to south or north and was halted by permanent barricade between Soviet Installations 3602 and 3605. Soviet Capt dismounted from truck and ordered Soviet troops in vicinity to surround USMLM car and directed one soldier to hold weapon on car. Soviet Capt accused tour of violating order to halt and requested team to follow truck out of area. USMLM officer refused to move until armed soldier had been directed to raise weapon, by which time Lt Col Dyachkin arrived at 1115 hrs. Team then escorted to

[REDACTED]

Zossen arriving at 111205 Jun. Dyachkin again accused team of disobeying Soviet officer's orders twice and being in vicinity of GSFG Hq without permission. Dyachkin then ordered tour to follow him to Potsdam Kommandatura. Chief USMLM arrived Kommandatura at 2050 hours and team was released. Duration: 10 hrs (MLM 084-64)

Maj Turner
MSgt Albiez

222135-230220 Jun 64, Werder. DETENTION. Team was accused of violation of established order and driving 30 KPH in 15 KPH zone. They were taken to Potsdam Kommandatura and released at 230220 June. Duration: 4 hrs, 30 minutes (MLM 089-64)

Lt Col Schneider
Capt Farrar
Capt Odom
SP4 Schulte

151645-152045 Jul and 161155-161700 Jul 64, Luebben and Uebigau. DETENTION. Team drove past front gate of Installation 3341 when Soviet duty officer halted vehicle and claimed team violated Mission Restriction Sign and took photographs in forbidden zone. Charge later changed to GDR traffic violation; after four hour detention team was released and escorted out of town. Team proceeded to bank of Elbe River to observe Soviet bridging exercise in Uebigau. Two Soviet Cols apprehended team. Soviet officers held them on spot until Dresden Comdt arrived. Team taken to Dresden Kommandatura, where they burned film rather than surrender it. Duration: 4 hrs and 4 hrs, 5 minutes. (MLM 116-64)

Maj McKinney
Capt Odom
Capt Kelly
SP4 Schulte

241155-241530 Jul 64, Billeben. DETENTION. Soviet traffic guard with AK halted team at gunpoint and demanded documents. Soldier then escorted team to RJ84 where Soviet Sgt took team's passes and reported incident by radio to superior. Two Soviet Capt arrived in truck and insisted team was in restricted area. USMLM vehicle escorted to Comdt in Gotha, who took team to Langensalza. Team escorted past security at Schoenstedt and released. Duration: 3 hrs, 35 minutes (MLM 135-64)

Maj Fitzurka
Capt Heine
A1/C Preisler

111330-111425 Aug 64, Joachimsthal. DETENTION. While team was having vehicle repaired in garage in town Soviet Comdt from Finow arrived in G-69 and stated team was in PRA and Joachimsthal was a closed town. After discussion of whether team or Comdt map was in error, Comdt released tour and allowed team to depart. Duration: 55 minutes (MLM 162-64)

Maj Fitzurka
Capt Heine
A1/C Preisler

271005-271605 Aug 64, Sandau Ferry. DETENTION. Team was parked on east bank of Elbe River at Sandau Ferry when two BTR-40s blocked USMLM vehicle. Soviet captain told troops to fire if USMLM team attempted to escape. Comdt arrived and accused them of breaking restriction sign and being in TRA. Team released. Duration: 6 hrs (MLM 187-64)


Capt Farrar

021810-022210 Sep 64, Rt 2 UY628107. DETENTION. Team accused of violating direction of Soviet traffic guard and proceeding down temporarily closed road. Team released by Potsdam Kommandatura. Duration: 4 hrs (MLM 196-64)

Maj Miller
SFC Moreau

132300-140530 Sep 64, Wiesenburg. DETENTION. Team was caught behind restriction sign and in maneuver area. Released by Wittenberg Kommandatura. Duration: 6 hrs, 30 minutes (MLM 211-64)

[REDACTED]



Maj Turner
SP4 Schulte 190855-190925 Sep 64, Damgarten. DETENTION. Team detained by Soviet captain and accused of being in restricted area. Escorted to Damgarten Kommandatura. Team released by Damgarten Kommandatura. Duration: 30 minutes (MLM 224-64)

Capt Farrar
Lt Col Callahan
SP4 Schulte 250730-250800 Sep 64, Forst Gluecksburg. DETENTION. USMLM vehicle proceeded south via trail past bunker occupied by 4 Soviet EM who ran toward car. As vehicle turned around Soviet sentry fired two warning shots and team halted. Released by Soviet sergeant. Duration: 30 minutes (MLM 237-64)


Capt Farrar
Lt Col Callahan
SP4 Schulte 261240-262255 Sep 64, Oberheide. DETENTION. Team accused of violation of Mission Restriction Signs (false) and of being in the area of a Soviet military unit (true, as USMLM vehicle had been chased there). Duration: 10 hrs, 15 minutes. (MLM 237-64)

Lt Col Callahan
Maj Turner
PFC Glasscock 141700-141840 Oct 64, Potsdam. DETENTION. Team was proceeding toward Bornim and was halted by Soviet traffic guard. A Soviet Lt. Col. accused team of being in restricted area and of knowing there were Soviet troops and vehicles in vicinity (false). Potsdam Comdt accused team of disregarding instructions of traffic guard (false). Duration: 1 hr, 40 minutes. (MLM 279-64)

Lt Col Callahan
SP5 Kezer 300930-301415 Oct 64, Oranienburg. DETENTION. Team detained by Soviet sentry acting on orders of Soviet AF captain and accused of being in restricted area and violating Mission Restriction Signs (false). Duration: 4 hrs, 45 minutes (MLM 373-64)

Lt Col Callahan
SP5 Kezer 121038-121600 Nov 64, Wittenberg. DETENTION. Team proceeded east on open road north of Installation 3582. Soviet lieutenant directed truck to block USMLM vehicle's path. Team escorted to Wittenberg Kommandatura and accused of passing Mission Restriction Signs (false). Team also accused of seeking economic intelligence because they had earlier asked directions of an East German civilian factory worker and had been directed through an East German factory area northwest of Wittenberg. Duration: 5 hrs, 30 minutes (MLM 342-64)

Maj Thompson
A2-C Voss 152130-160215 Dec 64, Stendal. DETENTION. Team enroute to west bank of Elbe River vicinity Sandau to tow disabled USMLM car back to Potsdam. When team arrived at Sandau Ferry, it was closed, so they drove to Havelberg VOPO Hq and requested assistance in crossing river. VOPO lieutenant called Stendal Kommandatura and received Soviet approval for them to proceed to Stendal Kommandatura. Upon arrival at Stendal Kommandatura, team was accused of being in PRA (true) and that no approval had been given for them to be there. Team escorted by Gardelegen Comdt to Gardelegen. Duration: 4 hrs, 45 minutes (MLM 416-64)



[REDACTED]

APPENDIX H

AIRFIELD INVENTORY IN EAST GERMANY

1. 24th Tactical Air Army (SAF) 1964 Inventory:

Alt Lonnewitz 5133N-1313E 36 FISHBED "D"	Altenburg 5059N-1231E 12 FRESCO 12 FISHBED "D" 28 FAGOT	Brandenburg Industrie 5224N-1230E 5 CREEK 25 HARE 2 HOUND
Brandis 5120N-1240E 37 HOUND 17 HOOK	Briesen/Brand 5202N-1345E 32 BEAGLE	Dresden/Hellerau 5106N-1345E 14 HARE 2 HOUND
Finow 5250N-1342E 8 BEAGLE 24 BREWER 7 MAESTRO 6 CREEK 10 HARE 2 HOUND	Finsterwalde 5136N-1344E 42 FITTER	Gross Dolln 5302N-1332E 36 FISHBED "D" 1 MONGOL
Grossenhain 5119N-1333E 36 FITTER	Juterbog 5200N-1300E 36 FISHBED "D" 36 FRESCO	Juterbog Damm 5158N-1303E 3 CREEK 6 HARE 4 HOUND
Kothen 5143N-1158E 24 FISHBED "D"	Kummersdorf 5209N-1319E 9 CREEK 13 CAB 12 CRATE 7 HARE 15 HOUND	Merseburg 5122N-1157E 36 FISHBED "D"
Neuruppin 5256N-1247E 36 FRESCO 4 CREEK 17 HARE 4 HOUND	Oranienburg 5244N-1313E 34 CAMP 2 CREEK	Parchim 5326N-1147E 12 FITTER 24 FRESCO 11 BEAGLE 1 CAB


Putnitz

5416N-1227E

6 FRESCO
12 FLASHLIGHT
12 FISHBED "C/E"
12 FISHBED "D"
6 MANDRAKE**Rechlin Larz**

5318N-1244E

36 FITTER
8 MIDGET
2 FRESCO "C"**Schonwalde**

5237N-1310E

(GSFG Support)

Stendal

5238N-1149E

12 MANGROVE
2 CAB
6 HARE**Wiemar/Nohra**

5059N-1119E

4 CREEK
11 HARE
1 HOUND**Welzow**

5135N-1408E

36 BEAGLE
2 CRATE**Werneuchen**

5238N-1346E

3 CAB
20 BREWER
10 BREWER "B"
10 MAESTRO**Wittstock**

5312N-1231E

24 FARMER "A/C/D"
12 FARMER "B"**Zerbst**

5200N-1208E

12 FARMER "A/C/D"
12 FARMER "B"
12 FARMER "E"
24 FISHBED "C/E"**FINALIZATION - 24TH TACTICAL AIR ARMY INVENTORY**

228 Fishbed, 126 Fitter, 1 Mongol, 12 Flashlight, 72 Farmer, 116 Fresco, 28 Fagot, 87 Beagle, 54 Brewer, 17 Maestro, 8 Midget, 19 Cab, 34 Camp, 14 Crate, 33 Creek, 96 Hare, 67 Hound, 17 Hook, 6 Mandrake, 12 Mangrove Aircraft.

TOTAL: 1047 Aircraft

2. East German Air Force 1964 Inventory:**Bautzen/Litten**

5112N-1431E

10 FAGOT
36 FRESCO A/B/C
13 MAYA (L-29)**Brandenburg/Briest**

5226N-1227E

36 HOUND
19 HARE**Cottbus**

5146N-1418E

12 FRESCO A/B/C
24 FRESCO D/E**Dessau**

5150N-1212E

5 HARE
8 HOUND**Dresden/Klotzsche**

5108N-1346E

15 CRATE

Drewitz

5153N-1432E

36 FRESCO A/B/C

Jocksdorf

5140N-1438E

12 FARMER A/B/C
12 FARMER E
24 FISHBED C/E
6 BEAGLE**Kamenz**

5118N-1407E

12 FAGOT
12 FRESCO A/B/C**Neubrandenburg**

5336N-1318E

12 FISHBED C/E
24 FRESCO A/B/C

Marxwalde
5237N-1415E

12 FRESCO A/B/C
24 FISHBED C/E
8 CRATE
2 COOT

Strausberg
5235N-1355E

15 COLT
8 CREEK

Peenemunde
5409N-1346E

12 FRESCO A/B/C
24 FRESCO D/E


Rothenburg
5122N-1457E

30 FRESCO
15 FAGOT

FINALIZATION - EAST GERMAN AIR FORCE INVENTORY

6 Beagles, 15 Colts, 2 Coots, 23 Crates, 8 Creeks, 37 Fagots, 24 Farmers, 60 Fishbeds, 222 Frescos,
24 Hares, 44 Hounds, 13 Mayas.

TOTAL: 478 Aircraft



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