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Declassified by by: 29 Apr 96
Itg USAREUR/7A
ODCSINT, ATTN: AE-AGB-CI-SO
Unit 29351, APO, 09014,

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY
SPECIAL STAFF, U.S. ARMY

HISTORICAL MANUSCRIPT FILE

CALL NUMBER

USMLM-Germany
1967

TITLE

UNIT HISTORY (U) 1967, United States Military Liaison Mission to Commander in Chief, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany

OFFICE OF ORIGIN

United States Military Liaison Mission to Commander in Chief, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany

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EXCLUDED FROM THE GENERAL
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RETURN TO ROOM

SC# 7684

OCMH FORM 10 Replaces OCS Form 340, 1 Sep 50,
1 Jun 62 which will be used until exhausted.

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FOREWORD

(C) The United States Military Liaison Mission to the Commander in Chief, Group of Soviet Forces, Germany, operates in the former Soviet Zone of Occupation of Germany in accordance with provisions of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement. This agreement presents USMLM with the unique opportunity of using trained military observers to travel in the former Soviet Zone of Germany, relatively immune from the diplomatic and political restraints normally encountered in other Communist Bloc countries. During 1967 members of USMLM were able to monitor, assess, and report on military activity, political developments, and economic and technological matters in East Germany.

In spite of the restrictions imposed by Soviet and East German military and security forces, USMLM was able to provide continuous and accurate information to the intelligence community, rapid responses to the needs of the Commander in Chief, and a persistence of effort that would render it difficult for the communist forces to unobtrusively engage in maneuvers or diversions designed to achieve a decisive advantage.

Although the intelligence collection mission of the USMLM represents its greatest contribution, it must be emphasized that the very existence of the USMLM and its continued presence in East Germany constitute assets which should not be relinquished without the most serious and careful consideration at the highest level.

To compensate for the lack of diplomatic relations with East Germany, USMLM is often required to accomplish through the Soviets tasks normally handled by diplomatic representatives. This includes, among others, rendering aid to US citizens who may have become lost, injured, or have experienced other difficulty in East Germany. USMLM is also called upon to intervene in the recovery of aircraft and their crews and passengers who have landed or have been forced down in East Germany. It also reports on items of interest such as current developments, personalities, attitudes of the population, living conditions, prices, quality of goods, condition of crops, new construction and propaganda trends; and conducts detailed coverage of the Leipzig Fairs.

In times of crisis, such as the Berlin Blockade, the various confrontations since 1958, and the Cuban situation of 1962, the capabilities of USMLM take on a special importance.

The year 1967 was one of change for the USMLM and its associated missions. In the command echelon, General James H. Polk replaced General Andrew P. O'Meara as Commander in Chief, United States Army, Europe and Seventh Army. Major General Richard W. Whitney replaced Major General Charles H. Chase as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, the officer with staff responsibility for USMLM operations. Colonel Paul G. Skowronek, after spending four years as Chief of Mission, departed for a Washington assignment and was replaced by Colonel Thomas F. McCord. In addition, Brigadier A. R. D. G. Wilson was replaced by Brigadier David G. House as Chief of the British Commanders' in Chief Mission; and Colonel Henri Marty was replaced by Lt Colonel Georges Rohe as Chief of the French Military Liaison Mission. Finally, the deputies of the US and British Missions changed, as well as the operations officers of all three Missions.

On the Soviet side, Army General Pyotr Koshevoy continued as Commander in Chief, Group of Soviet Forces, Germany, and Colonel Alexander Pinchuk remained for a fourth year as Chief of GSFG External Relations Branch (SERB).

Despite the major personnel changes and the continuing efforts of Soviet and East German forces to neutralize our efforts, the British, French and United States Military Liaison Missions continued to emphasize the Allied presence in East Germany. This close Allied unity, cooperation and coordination insured a sustained effort to satisfy the intelligence and liaison requirements of all three countries.

In fulfilling its intelligence mission, USMLM tour teams spent 749 touring days in East Germany and traveled 242,857 miles over its roads and territory. Quantitatively, this travel resulted in 663 detailed information reports with over 3,600 separate photographs; qualitatively, it presented our higher headquarters with first-hand information by qualified military observers on which to base their evaluation of Soviet and East German forces.

In liaison matters, USMLM was able to achieve at least some warming up in the Soviet attitude toward more frequent social and semi-official intercourse. Further, a strongly-worded protest regarding East German violations of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement brought immediate and lasting results from the Soviets in curtailing harassment and surveillance.

During the year the Mission was privileged to receive a number of distinguished visitors both to its Potsdam House and Berlin Mission headquarters. Among these were the Honorable George C. McGhee, United States Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany; General Harold K. Johnson, Chief of Staff, United States Army; and the former and present Commanders in Chief of USAREUR, General Andrew P. O'Meara and General James H. Polk.

Finally, our Mission life was not without its moments of tragedy. Mrs. Marian McCord, the wife of the Chief of Mission, and Richard L. Nichols, the two-year old son of Sergeant Major Nichols, both passed away. These losses had a profound effect on the Mission community, whose closeness was greatly apparent in the comforting acts and expressions of condolences.

The members of the United States Military Liaison Mission are proud of their contribution to the security of the United States during 1967, and are most grateful for the opportunity to have served. In the pages which follow we have attempted to present by narrative, photographs and statistics a picture of Mission activities for 1967, and we hope our story is both meaningful and useful.

Thomas F. McCord

THOMAS F. MC CORD
Colonel, General Staff
Chief of Mission



THE UNITED STATES MILITARY LIAISON MISSION TO CINC GSFG

UNITED STATES MILITARY LIAISON MISSION

UNIT HISTORY

1967

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PART I Background

AGREEMENT

ON MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS ACCREDITED TO THE SOVIET AND UNITED STATES COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY

In conformity with the provisions of Article 2 of the Agreement on "Control Mechanism in Germany", dated November 14, 1944, the United States and the Soviet Commanders in Chief of the zones of Occupation in Germany have agreed to exchange Military Liaison Missions accredited to their staffs in the zones and approve the following regulations concerning these missions:

1. These missions are military missions and have no authority over quadripartite military goverment missions or purely military government missions of each respective country, either temporarily or permanently, on duty in either zone. However, they will render whatever aid or assistance to said military government missions as is practicable.

2. Missions will be composed of air, navy and army representatives. There will be no political representative.

3. The missions will consist of not to exceed fourteen (14) officers and enlisted personnel. This number will include all necessary technical personnel, office clerks, personnel with special qualifications, and personnel required to operate radio stations.

4. Each mission will be under the orders of the senior member of the mission who will be appointed and known as "Chief of the United States (or Soviet) Military Mission".

5. The Chief of the mission will be accredited to the Commander in Chief of the occupation forces.

In the United States zone the mission will be accredited to Commander in Chief, United States European Command.

In the Soviet zone the mission will be accredited to the Commander in Chief of the Group of Soviet Occupational Forces in Germany.

6. In the United States zone the Soviet Mission will be offered quarters in the region of Frankfurt.

7. In the Soviet zone the United States Mission will be offered quarters at or near Potsdam.

8. In the United States zone the Chief of the Soviet Mission will communicate with A/C of Staff, G-3, United States European Command.

9. In the Soviet zone the Chief of the United States Mission will communicate with the Senior officer of the Staff of Commander-in-Chief.

10. Each member of the missions will be given identical travel facilities to include identical permanent passes in Russian and English languages permitting complete freedom of travel wherever and whenever it will be desired over territory and roads in both zones, except places of disposition of military units, without escort or supervision.

Each time any member of Soviet or United States mission wants to visit United States or Soviet headquarters, military government offices, forces, units, military schools, factories and enterprises which are under United States or Soviet control, a corresponding request must be made to Director, Operations, Plans, Organization and Training, European Command, or Senior Officer, Headquarters, Group of Soviet Occupational Forces in Germany. Such requests must be acted upon within 24-72 hours.

Members of the missions are permitted allied guests at the headquarters of the respective missions.

11. a. Each mission will have its own radio station for communication with its own headquarters.

b. In each case couriers and messengers will be given facilities for free travel between the headquarters of the mission and headquarters of their respective Commanders-in-Chief. These couriers will enjoy the same immunity which is extended to diplomatic couriers.

c. Each mission will be given facilities for telephone communication through the local telephone exchange at the headquarters, and they also will be given facilities such as mail, telephone telegraphy through the existing means of communication when the members of the missions will be traveling within the zone. In case of a breakdown in the radio installation, the zone commanders will render all possible aid and will permit temporary use of their own systems of communication.

12. The necessary rations, P. O. L. supplies and household services for the military missions will be provided for by the headquarters to which accredited, by method of mutual compensation in kind, supplemented by such items as desired to be furnished by their own headquarters.

In addition the respective missions or individual members of the missions may purchase items of Soviet or United States origin which must be paid for in the currency specified by the headquarters controlling zone where purchase is made.

13. The buildings of each mission will enjoy full right of extra-territoriality.

14. a. The task of the mission will be to maintain liaison between both Commanders in Chief and their staffs.

b. In each zone the mission will have the right to engage in matters of protecting the interests of their nationals and to make representations accordingly, as well as in matters of protecting their property interests in the zone where they are located. They have a right to render aid to people of their own country who are visiting the zone where they are accredited.

15. This agreement may be changed or amplified by mutual consent to cover new subjects when the need arises.

16. This agreement is written in Russian and English languages and both texts are authentic.

17. This agreement becomes valid when signed by Deputy Commanders of United States and Soviet Zones of Occupation.

Lieutenant-General HUEBNER
Deputy Commander in Chief,
European Command

Colonel-General MALININ
Deputy Commander in Chief,
Chief of Staff of the
Group of Soviet Occupation
Forces in Germany

HEADQUARTERS
EUROPEAN COMMAND

CORRECTED COPY

General Orders)
Number 17)

8 April 1947

ORGANIZATION OF THE US MILITARY LIAISON MISSION TO THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE SOVIET OCCUPIED ZONE OF GERMANY

1. Effective 7 April 1947, the US Military Liaison Mission to the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany is organized with station at Potsdam, Germany.

2. Personnel will be furnished by Headquarters, Office of Military Government for Germany (US).

3. Equipment will be requisitioned in the normal manner. The authority is Table of Allowances, Number 1205, this headquarters.

4. Initial rosters will be prepared in accordance with AR 345-900, 22 May 1942, as changed by Changes No 4, 22 June 1944.

5. This unit is assigned to Headquarters, European Command, and attached to Office of Military Government for Germany (US), to include personnel and administration.

6. Correspondence to the unit will be addressed as follows:

Chief of US Military Liaison Mission to Commander in Chief,
Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany, Care CG, OMGUS, APO 742,
US Army

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL CLAY:

OFFICIAL:

C. R. HUEBNER
Lieutenant General, GSC
Chief of Staff

WM E. BERGIN
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General

MISSION

(U) PRIMARY: To conduct liaison between the Commander in Chief, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (CINC, GSFG) and Commander in Chief, US Army Europe (CINC, USAREUR), the successors to the parties to the original agreement.

(C) SECONDARY: To exploit USMLM liaison status and potential for the collection of intelligence information in East Germany. This mission is carried out with due regard for the primary mission.

(U) REFERENCE: Letter, AEAGB, Hq USAREUR, 2 August 1961, Subj: Terms of Reference - USMLM (U).

(C) USMLM is directly subordinate to Headquarters USAREUR, and is accredited to Commander in Chief, Group of Soviet Forces Germany (CINC, GSFG). The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, HQ USAREUR (DCSI, USAREUR), exercises primary staff supervision over USMLM, to include the provision of policy and operational guidance and the levying of intelligence collection requirements.

(C) CINC, USNAVEUR and CINC, USAFE exercise staff supervision over the Navy and Air Force elements in matters involving administration, discipline, and training. They levy requirements, and provide guidance concerning Navy and Air Force targets.

PART II Liaison Activities



(U) COLONEL SKOWRONEK RELINQUISHES COMMAND OF USMLM TO COLONEL MC CORD

RELATIONS WITH SOVIET FORCES

(C) Although the majority of official meetings with the Soviets (through SERB) are normally official and impersonal, Chief USMLM has attempted to institute a new policy in the past few months. The basis of the new approach is to emphasize the value of informal or semi-official contacts between US Mission and Soviet officers, thus bridging the gap between the very formalized official encounters at meetings and the less pleasant encounter when US officers are detained at Soviet Kommandaturas. Chief USMLM and other Mission officers very informally raised the subject with Chief SERB, Deputy Chief SERB and other SERB officers who, especially since late November, have agreed in principle that the Soviets should for instance attend more Western social functions with their wives. They have agreed that it is of at least some importance that we get to know each other better and exchange ideas. This has resulted on several occasions in Soviet remarks that former Allies such as we were in WWII should preserve these ties and as side remarks the fact that "Germans are Germans," that is, former enemies. As of year's end this new approach had not begun to pay off but prospects appear to be better for 1968.

CINC-CINC MEETING

(S) In June CINC USAREUR, General James H. Polk, stated his desire that an informal meeting be arranged between CINC Soviet Forces in Germany and himself in Potsdam. This was to be a prelude to more formal CINC-CINC meetings at Headquarters GSFG and Headquarters USAREUR. On 13 July Chief USMLM advised Chief SERB of CINC USAREUR's intention to invite CINC GSFG to an informal luncheon on 2 September at USMLM Potsdam House, to be followed by participation of both CINC's at the annual USMLM Labor Day Picnic. There was no immediate Soviet reaction to acceptance or nonacceptance by CINC GSFG. Chief USMLM attempted over the next few weeks to elicit any hints as to acceptance, but to no avail. On 8 August a formal written invitation was delivered to General Koshevoy for the luncheon. Once again Soviets were noncommittal, and Chief USMLM continued to pry for evidence of

CINC GSFG intention. Evidence in favor of Soviet acceptance of the invitation appeared to be the great attention that SERB paid to repairs to USMLM Mission House, and to a dressing up of their own installations on the route from Potsdam to Potsdam Mission House. In addition, a Soviet officer in charge of maintenance at Potsdam Mission House stated to German employees on one occasion that a high ranking personage would be at the house on 2 September. However, on 31 August at 1600 hours in the afternoon, Chief SERB requested meeting with Chief USMLM at which time he stated that unfortunately, due to the press of business, CINC GSFG regretted that he could not attend the luncheon. Chief USMLM accepted the declination with regret and stated that maybe a meeting could be arranged some other time. Chief SERB appeared flustered and asked Chief USMLM "when," that he hoped not any time in the next few weeks, since CINC GSFG would be out of town for "some time." Chief USMLM stated he had no particular date in mind. Chief USMLM then asked Chief SERB for the names of Soviet officers who would be attending the Labor Day Picnic. Chief SERB then named five officers who would be attending, appearing to make up the list as he went. Chief USMLM then stated that he still had not received General Polk's and General Sutherland's (Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, USAREUR) guest passes. Chief SERB expressed surprise that CINC USAREUR would be attending since CINC GSFG would not be attending. Chief USMLM said that General Polk still desired to visit USMLM Potsdam House for lunch and tentatively planned to attend the Labor Day Picnic. Chief SERB promised to call his Chief of Staff to expedite the passes, which eventually was accomplished in time. Chief USMLM sensed that Chief SERB was genuinely surprised that CINC still intended to visit Potsdam and that he regretted having committed Soviet officers to attend the picnic. This apprehension was confirmed when a SERB officer called the USMLM Duty Officer the next day at 1510 and tersely announced, "No Soviet officers will attend the USMLM picnic."

MEETING BETWEEN CINC GSFG AND CHIEF USMLM

(C) For the past four years no Chief of USMLM has been granted an audience with Commander-in-Chief, Group of Soviet Forces, Germany. In fact, the only occasion on which either a British or US Mission Chief has met the present CINC GSFG, General Koshevoy, was at a French Bastille Day Reception in Potsdam in 1965.

In 1967 the Chiefs of all three Allied Missions were replaced. Each outgoing Allied Mission Chief requested an audience with General Koshevoy to pay farewell respects and to introduce the new Mission Chief. In what seems to be the relative status of relations between Western Allies and the Soviets, the old and new French Mission Chiefs were received in July by General Koshevoy, and the old and new British Mission Chiefs were received by his Chief of Staff, Colonel General Turantayev. However, outgoing USMLM Chief, Colonel Skowronek, and new Chief, Colonel McCord, were not permitted a trip for this purpose. After waiting an appropriate time after Colonel Skowronek's departure, Colonel McCord stated his continuing interest in paying his respects to General Koshevoy. After another period of no response to this letter, CINC USAREUR directed Chief USMLM to once more request that he be received by General Koshevoy. That message was delivered to Chief SERB on 26 July and Chief SERB was profuse in his agreement that Chief USMLM should indeed meet with General Koshevoy, and that as soon as a "mutually agreeable time" could be arranged such meeting would be set up. As the Christmas season approached, at which time gifts are exchanged between HQ USAREUR and GSFG, Chief USMLM proposed to Chief SERB that a good opportunity to meet General Koshevoy would be on the occasion of delivering CINC USAREUR's gifts to him. Chief SERB agreed to this. However, due to the untimely death of his wife, Colonel McCord was not available for the exchange. At year's end Chief USMLM had still not met General Koshevoy. However, at a meeting between Acting Chief USMLM and Deputy Chief SERB, latter reaffirmed General Koshevoy would receive Chief USMLM when latter returned from emergency leave.

USMLM LIAISON MEETINGS

(C) During the year there were 45 meetings between Chief USMLM and Chief SERB or their representatives, seven more than held in 1966. This number does not include several impromptu visits to SERB by USMLM officers which lengthened into friendly chats on anything from philosophy to Soviet non-attendance at USMLM functions.

LIAISON MEETINGS

03 Jan — Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) for the purpose of passing on information concerning the derailment of US duty train near the GRIEBNITZ-SEE station and to request all necessary assistance from the Soviets.

06 Jan — Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) for the purpose of delivering statements from HQ USAREUR to HQ GSFG concerning the alleged misbehavior of US servicemen in East Berlin and concerning the Soviet protest of actions of USMLM officer on 16 December 1966.

12 Jan — Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) for the purpose of delivering statements from HQ USAREUR to HQ GSFG in connection with the derailment of US duty train on 3 Jan and the detention of a US military sedan in East Berlin.

26 Jan — Meeting at SERB (SERB request) for the purpose of receiving from Chief SERB reply to USAREUR message delivered by USMLM on 12 Jan 67 concerning alleged improper Soviet detention of US military sedan in East Berlin on 5 Jan and a USAREUR request for investigation of derailment of US military train near Berlin on 3 Jan.

31 Jan — Meeting at Wittenberg (SERB request) for the purpose of receiving Soviet protest against USMLM officer for Mission travel violation on 30 Jan.

01 Feb — Meeting at Potsdam Soviet Kommandatura (SERB request) for the purpose of receiving notification from SERB that USMLM team was being held for investigation in connection with injury of several Soviet soldiers struck by USMLM sedan near Gross Glienicke on 31 Jan.

01 Feb — Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) for the purpose of delivering a statement from HQ USAREUR regarding the involvement of USMLM vehicle in an accident on 31 Jan.

02 Feb Meeting at Potsdam Kommandatura (SERB request) for the purpose of receiving reply from HQ GSFG to HQ USAREUR message pertaining to USMLM sedan accident.

03 Mar Informal meeting at SERB (USMLM request) for the purpose of delivering sample U. S. movement orders with signature of Deputy Commander, Berlin and to receive oral report on the condition of Soviet soldiers injured in an accident on 31 Jan.

27 Mar Meeting at SERB (SERB request) for the purpose of receiving invitation from SERB for USMLM personnel to attend a Soviet film.

28 Mar Meeting at SERB (SERB request) for the purpose of receiving a verbal protest from CofS, GSFG to CofS, USAREUR regarding the detention of a USMLM team on 17 March.

10 Apr Meeting at SERB (SERB request) for the purpose of discussing possible visit of Ambassador McGhee to Potsdam and the recent detention of a USMLM team.

12 Apr Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) for the purpose of delivering a letter from USCOB for CofS GSFG regarding USCOB entry into East Berlin.

19 Apr Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) for the purpose of discussing the possibility of visiting General Koshevoy at GSFG Hq prior to the departure of Colonel Skowronek on 24 May.

26 Apr Meeting at social function in West Berlin. Discussion of USCOB entry into East Berlin.

04 May Meeting at SERB (SERB request) for the purpose of receiving a message from CofS GSFG to CofS USAREUR pertaining to USMLM sedan accident of 31 Jan.

09 May Meeting at SERB (SERB request) for the purpose of receiving a letter from CINC GSFG to CINC USAREUR pertaining to the departure of CINC USAREUR.

12 May Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) for the purpose of delivering a letter concerning the authentication of movement orders for travel to and from Berlin.

12 May Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) for the purpose of delivering a letter from CINC, USAREUR to CINC GSFG regarding the USMLM change of command on 24 May.

25 May Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) for the purpose of delivering a letter from CINC USAREUR to CINC GSFG regarding the USMLM sedan accident of 31 Jan.

26 May Meeting at Wuensdorf (SERB request) for the purpose of receiving an oral message from CINC GSFG to CINC USAREUR regarding the landing of a Soviet aircraft in Bavaria on 25 May.

27 May Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) for the purpose of passing on a reply to Soviet query of 26 May regarding the landing of Soviet aircraft in Bavaria on 25 May.

28 May Meeting at SERB (SERB request) for the purpose of transmitting a message from HQ GSFG to HQ USAREUR regarding the landing of Soviet aircraft in Bavaria on 25 May.

29 May Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) for the purpose of passing a message in connection with the landing of Soviet MIG 17 in Bavaria on 25 May.

13 Jul Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) for the purpose of announcing to Soviets the intention of USMLM to hold its annual Labor Day Picnic at Potsdam on 2 Sep, and to inform SERB of CINC USAREUR's intention to invite CINC GSFG as his guest. In addition, a verbal request was submitted for the repair of the road leading into the US Mission House, Potsdam.

24 Jul Informal meeting (USMLM request) for the purpose of introducing Major John Stewart, Allied Contact Section, Frankfurt, to SERB officers.

28 Jul Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) for the purpose of requesting status of answer to USCOB letter dated 12 April to Deputy Commander and CofS GSFG regarding USCOB entry into East Berlin.

31 Jul Meeting at SERB (SERB request) for the purpose of discussing USCOB entry into East Berlin.

31 Jul Meeting at SERB (SERB request) for the purpose of receiving a complaint from SERB regarding the detention of two USMLM officers in Wittenberg and to discuss USMLM Vehicle #21 accident.

01 Aug Meeting at Wittenberg (USMLM request) for the purpose of discussing the detention of USMLM officers in Wittenberg.

01 Aug Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) for the purpose of delivering an oral protest from CofS USAREUR to CofS GSFG regarding the detention of two USMLM officers in Wittenberg.

01 Aug Meeting at Wittenberg (USMLM request) for the purpose of obtaining release of two USMLM officers who were being detained in Wittenberg.

09 Aug Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) for the purpose of delivering invitation from General Polk to General Koshevoy for luncheon and picnic on 2 Sep.

18 Aug Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) for the purpose of discussing the unsatisfactory work performance of one of the East German employees at USMLM Potsdam Headquarters.

31 Aug Meeting at SERB (SERB request) for the purpose of replying to CINC USAREUR invitation to CINC GSFG for luncheon on 2 Sep and to receive SERB complaint concerning alleged USMLM traffic violations.

20 Sep — Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) for the purpose of delivering a letter from Chief USMLM to Chief SERB regarding SERB complaint received 31 Aug about alleged USMLM traffic violations, and to pay for damage to East German streetcar by USMLM vehicle on 30 Jul.

02 Oct — Meeting at SERB (SERB request) for the purpose of receiving an oral reply from Colonel Pinchuk regarding USMLM letter dated 20 Sep pertaining to USMLM counterprotest to SERB complaint of 31 Aug regarding USMLM traffic violations.

20 Oct — Meeting at SERB (SERB request) for the purpose of receiving an oral protest regarding the conduct of USMLM officer.

10 Nov — Meeting at SERB (USMLM request) for the purpose of orally protesting the treatment of USMLM officer in Magdeburg on 25/26 Oct 67.

17 Nov — Meeting at SERB (SERB & USMLM request) for the purpose of delivering a written protest from Chief USMLM to Chief SERB and to receive a written protest from Chief SERB to Chief USMLM pertaining to recent USMLM incidents.

06 Dec — Meeting at SERB (Informal) between Deputy Chief USMLM and SERB Officer for the purpose of discussing the replacement of household servant who was murdered in September and other support matters.

14 Dec — Meeting at SERB (mutual request) for the purpose of discussing delivery of Christmas gifts to CINC GSFG; to receive reply from SERB regarding USMLM protest of 17 Nov regarding harassment and surveillance of USMLM officers; and to receive the condolences of Colonel Pinchuk and the officers of SERB on the death of the wife of Colonel McCord.

22 Dec — Meeting at SERB (informal) (USMLM request) for the purpose of discussing the renewal of USMLM credentials and the delivery of Christmas gifts.

28 Dec Informal meeting at SERB (USMLM request) for the purpose of having final discussion regarding the exchange of Christmas gifts.

29 Dec Informal meeting at USMLM Potsdam House (mutual request) for the purpose of exchanging Christmas/New Year's gifts and greetings.

MAY DAY IN LEIPZIG

(C) On 1 May, Colonel Skowronek, departing Chief USMLM, and Colonel McCord, Chief designate, made their last trip together to Leipzig to attend the annual May Day Parade. Leipzig, being one of the largest and most industrial cities of the so-called GDR, stages a lengthy and spectacular parade on this occasion. This year's parade consisted of marching delegations from every type of industrial enterprise, educational, health and military organization in the entire Leipzig metropolitan area. It lasted some three hours, and at least 150 thousand people paraded. There were three main themes for the occasion: (1) Soviet/East German Friendship; (2) 50th Anniversary of the October Revolution and (3) The "Dirty American War in Viet Nam." These three themes were stressed in heroic-sized signs on large buildings, by placards carried by marchers, and over a constantly blaring PA system. The two US Colonels mixed freely in the crowds and photographed at will. They were exposed to whatever the East German population wished to do to them. It is stressed that they were in their Class "A" uniform with the large Mission shoulder patch, no overcoat or other outer garment, and were clearly identifiable as American officers. At no time did anyone in the vast crowd register anything more hostile than surprise at seeing them there, and in general they received many looks of obvious approbation. This even included some marchers, who would tug at their comrades and point to the "Amis," many times smiling and on some occasions waving. This event is a continuing indication of at least the general apathy of the average East German toward the extremely exaggerated propaganda directed against the United States in general, and against the war in Viet Nam in particular.

(U) CHIEF OF MISSION OVERSEES
THE TRANSFER OF SOVIET MIG-17

RETURN OF SOVIET MIG-17

(C) On 25 May, a squadron of Soviet Fresco aircraft (MIG-17) took off from a base in the Carpathian Military District USSR for what was to have been a routine bombing exercise in East Germany. The plan called for a landing at Finsterwalde Airfield; refueling and taking off for a bomb run at the Belgern bombing range; and then deploying back to home base in the USSR.

The aircraft, flying in trail approximately five minutes apart and at an altitude of approximately 3000 feet, had made their course correction north of Dresden to a heading direct to Finsterwalde. That is, all but one.

Sr. Lt. Yepatko, an outstanding pilot, flying next to the last aircraft, had reached his own personal moment of truth. Instead of veering north to a heading of 330 degrees he banked to the southwest, increased to full throttle and dove for the ground. Leveling out at approximately 200 feet altitude he followed the mountains peaks in Western Czechoslovakia in the general direction of Bavaria.

After his ten minutes of full speed at breakaway, he throttled back to save fuel and continued at tree-top level to his landing area northwest of Augsburg, Federal Republic of Germany, where he made a superb crash landing. This was in keeping with Yepatko's rating painted on the nose of his aircraft--"otlichno (outstanding)."

The sensational news hit the press immediately, and by coincidence the Chief of USMLM and the Air Team Chief were on TDY at USAREUR and USAFE Headquarters respectively when official word of the defection arrived.

Meanwhile, back at the Mission on the following day, word was received from SERB that the Chief of Staff, GSFG desired an immediate meeting with Colonel McCord (by name) at Wuensdorf, GSFG Headquarters. Deputy Chief, LTC Callahan, accompanied by LTC Szymczyk, attended as the Chief's representatives and were told, in a polite manner, that the CINC GSFG demanded from CINC USAREUR the return of the plane and pilot to Soviet authorities.







(U) UNLOADING AND TRANSFER OF MIG-17

Unknown to the Soviets, the US State Department had already approved the return of the aircraft, through SERB, with details to be worked out. However, Sr. Lt. Yepatko had asked for asylum and for no confrontation with the Soviets, and the Soviets were so informed through SERB on 27 May.

On the following day, 28 May, HQ GSFG expressed to HQ USAREUR, through SERB, that they were prepared to accept the aircraft near Hirschberg (state border of GDR and FRG); and that they demanded that Chief of Soviet Military Liaison Mission, Frankfurt, be allowed to meet with Pilot Yepatko.

Chief USMLM, having returned from Heidelberg, 29 May, recommended the transfer site be the Wartha-Herleshausen border control point. He also prepared a draft transfer document ("AKT") to acknowledge transfer of the aircraft remains. These were duly accepted by USAREUR.

On 31 May, Chief USMLM was again called to HQ USAREUR. A commission of two (Chief and Air Team Chief USMLM) was established to transfer the MIG-17, subsequently agreed for 2 June. The Soviets were advised of the place of transfer, the need for a lowboy for the aircraft, a 2-1/2 ton truck for loose parts and pieces, and a crane to effect the transfer.

Because transfer would occur in the Federal Republic of Germany, the Soviets were requested to present a list of commission personnel and workers involved in the aircraft transfer. West German authorities agreed that Chief USMLM could check all Soviet personnel and vehicles into the FRG. The Soviets were advised that the aircraft could not be moved from Augsburg to Wartha-Herleshausen intact and thus there would be "some" loose parts. It was not revealed that the aircraft had been well exploited by USAFE representatives.

On 2 June at 1000 hours, Chief USMLM met Colonel Kazarov, Chief of the Soviet commission, at the checkpoint and cleared the Soviet personnel and vehicles into the FRG. Colonel Kazarov was belligerent and uncooperative at first, declaring that the location Chief USMLM had picked for transfer was unsuitable and that there was too large a crowd of people observing the procedure. Chief USMLM allowed

Colonel Kazarov to pick a more suitable place to spot the crane and the two lowboys, but told him that the spectators were free to observe so long as they did not interfere with the safety of the operation. Kazarov remained surly, and told Chief USMLM he could not accept the aircraft until his team of specialists had inspected it. Kazarov was informed that he was free to inspect the aircraft, but that he would be allowed only 30 minutes to do so and to sign the US transfer document; otherwise Chief USMLM was authorized to return the aircraft to US Headquarters. Soviet technicians then jumped on the aircraft, and in less than two minutes reported to Kazarov that certain items were missing. When questioned about this, Chief USMLM advised Kazarov that the "AKT" stated that "remains of an aircraft", and not an intact aircraft, would be transferred. Kazarov was obviously put out and stated that he had seen a photograph of a completely intact aircraft in the Stars and Stripes. Chief USMLM explained that the aircraft had been subjected to "sightseers and picnickers" before coming into US control. He stated that his CINC had not sent him to argue, but rather to transfer aircraft remains. If the Soviets had a complaint, they knew the proper channels in which to register it.

Colonel Kazarov requested a five minute adjournment to check with his authorities. Chief USMLM agreed, reminding Colonel Kazarov of the waning time. In approximately five minutes, Colonel Kazarov returned from the East German side and stated Soviet acceptance of the aircraft. While the transfer "AKT" was being translated and typed, the Soviets tried to start unloading the aircraft. These actions were halted by the USMLM commission until the "AKT" was signed.

Final signing by Colonel McCord and LTC Puchrik was effected in Colonel Kazarov's VOLGA automobile. Unloading and transfer of the aircraft, then authorized, was accomplished swiftly and smoothly.

At 1245 hours the Soviets, with aircraft in tow, departed through the Wartha-Herleshausen exit point, and Chief USMLM made his final report to DCSI, Heidelberg, via radio-telephone.

Prior to departure, Colonel McCord complimented the Soviets on a professional job, well-done, and he invited Colonel Kazarov to be his guest at Potsdam. Colonel Kazarov expressed his thanks but stated that he "seldom ever gets to Potsdam."

The final word on the transfer was registered by Colonel Pinchuk, Chief SERB, who met the Soviet convoy as it returned to East Germany. He angrily remarked to Deputy Chief USMLM, LTC Callahan, that the Americans should have gotten all the parts together and anyway what did they want with the missing ammunition. He threatened further discussion on the whereabouts of the missing elements. As of the end of 1967, no protest from GSFG had been directed through USMLM channels, although it was learned that a protest had been made to the government of the Federal Republic of Germany.

LAST VISIT TO GOTHA HOSPITAL

(C) Prior to his reassignment to the States, Captain George Kolt paid a farewell visit to Gotha Hospital on 17 August. Captain Kolt's previous visits, during which he brought gifts to the Director and certain helpful personnel of the hospital, were in appreciation of the excellent and compassionate services he was given in September 1965 after a serious automobile accident. He was always greeted with great enthusiasm, but this last time the Director warned him that the "authorities" had caused him many difficulties after Captain Kolt's last visit. As a result, the Director was forced to ask that there be no more visits. Captain Kolt, rather than embarrass the Director, asked him to relay his final thanks and appreciation to the physicians, and departed immediately. Previous visits had been most friendly, with the East German personnel speaking openly of the discouraging life in the East. The reaction of the East German authorities demonstrates their fear of Western contacts. The plight of the East German intellectuals who must live in this increasing isolation must be a continuing source of friction between the people and the government.

(U) CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY
GENERAL HAROLD K. JOHNSON VISITS USMLM

(U) THE USMLM TEAM

LTC PUCHRIK
AIR FORCE

COL MC CORD
CHIEF OF MISSION

MAJ OBUHANYCH
NAVY (USMC)

PASSES AND CREDENTIALS FOR US PERSONNEL AND VEHICLES

(C) In 1967 there were 94 letter requests to SERB by the USMLM for issuance or reissuance of Soviet Credentials for touring personnel or vehicles. This compared with 86 during 1966, 84 during 1965, 102 during 1964, 68 during 1963 and 92 during 1962. Sixteen officers and enlisted men received new Soviet credentials during the year, while there were 63 exchanges of credentials for previously accredited personnel. Exchanges were due largely to leave, and to the need to periodically rotate drivers and reconnaissance officers in order to maintain peak touring efficiency. There were 15 vehicle pass exchanges, principally for repair or replacement of damaged and unserviceable vehicles. There were 58 letter requests for guest passes to visit the USMLM Headquarters in Potsdam (representing 192 guests) submitted. All were approved with the exception of one request for Berlin Brigade special staff officers. This represents a major change over 1966, when the Soviets disapproved 19 of 74 letter requests. The change in Soviet attitude toward guest passes could be attributed to USMLM indicating on each request the purpose for the pass. This seemed to satisfy the ever-present Soviet curiosity and suspicion. Further, it furnished SERB with explanations for questions asked by their higher headquarters.

COMMAND DIESELS

(U) Twenty-two letter requests for clearance of command diesel trains through the Soviet Zone were processed during the year, as compared with 19 last year, 17 in 1965, 30 in 1964 and 21 in 1963. Command diesels to transport senior commanders and staff officers to and from Berlin were irregularly scheduled to supplement daily military trains which routinely carry personnel, baggage, mail and supplies through the Soviet Zone between Berlin and West Germany.

MISCELLANEOUS CORRESPONDENCE

(U) There were 38 items of other miscellaneous correspondence to SERB from USMLM. The variety of subjects included letters of transmittal forwarding sample signatures of officers designated to authenticate American movement orders; maintenance and repairs to the Potsdam House; letter invitations to Soviet personnel; acknowledgement of monthly gasoline support; request for Chief USMLM to



(U) SOCIAL ACTIVITIES



transit the Wartha-Herleshausen Checkpoint enroute to USAREUR Headquarters in Heidelberg; and letters concerning vehicle and personnel accreditations held by SERB, which are no longer needed. Included in this number were letters of protest concerning provocative actions by members of the East German Ministry for State Security.

SOCIAL ACTIVITIES

(C) General. Throughout the year, the Soviets have continued their general policy of no visitor passes for Berlin assigned personnel to the three Allied Mission Headquarters in Potsdam. Exceptions were made in the case of some technical personnel such as US Army Medical Officers. Also, Allied Mission members and their families not currently on pass were issued temporary passes to attend certain social functions. The Soviets continued to absent themselves from all farewell parties in honor of those U. S. officers assigned to Viet Nam.

New Year's Day. At the traditional Mission reception at his quarters, Chief USMLM presented Major Obuhanych, USMC, with a US EUCOM Certificate of Achievement for an outstanding contribution.

Red Army Day. Colonel Lezzhov, the new Chief of SMLM-F, hosted the annual reception on 23 February at his Headquarters in Frankfurt. In attendance from USMLM were Colonel and Mrs. Paul G. Skowronek and LTC and Mrs. Augustine S. Puchrik. Colonel Lezzhov, an Air Forces Officer and former Assistant Soviet Air Attache in Washington, was pleased to renew his acquaintance with LTC Puchrik whom he had met in Washington. Colonel Lezzhov expressed a desire to meet more US Air Force officers if possible.

Washington's Birthday Ball. The annual USMLM George Washington Birthday Ball was enlivened with waitresses and US soldiers in colonial costumes. One hundred guests attended the ball. Among the guests were seven Soviet officers, five with wives. The Soviets kindly allowed the East German orchestra to attend, even though no prior arrangements had been made for their passes. During a break in the dancing, U. S. officers rehearsed the band in several Soviet songs, which made a great hit with the Soviet guests. The band was also taught "Army Blue" for the last dance.



PRELUDE TO WASHINGTON BIRTHDAY BALL

DCSI Luncheon. Chief USMLM hosted a working luncheon on 28 March at his quarters in honor of Major General Richard W. Whitney, DCSI USAREUR. Present were General Whitney, his staff and Mission personnel.

DCSI Dinner Party. Chief of Mission and Mrs. Skowronek hosted a dinner party at their home in honor of Major General and Mrs. Richard W. Whitney. Guests present were Major General and Mrs. Franklin, and members of the Allied Missions.

Farewell Dinner. A Farewell Dinner in honor of Colonel and Mrs. Paul G. Skowronek was hosted by LTC and Mrs. Patrick O. Callahan on 26 April at their home. SERB attendees were Colonels Pinchuk and Grishel', and LTC and Mrs. Minayev.

SERB Social Event 31 March. For the first time in approximately six years the SERB officers reciprocated their numerous Allied Mission social engagements. The occasion was a showing of Tolstoy's epic "War and Peace." The showing was held in the old Potsdam Kommandatura and was well attended by accredited Allied Missions officers and their wives. Colonels Pinchuk and Grishel' and several other SERB officers were present. Colonel Pinchuk introduced the film and explained that this first showing would consist of the first four parts of the eight part total film and would be divided into two sessions. During the 30 minute intermission, refreshments of caviar, hors d'oeuvres and vodka were served, after which the last half of the film was shown and guests departed without further social activity. Duration of the showing was some four hours, and at years end the Soviets were still promising a showing of the second half.

In Honor of Departing Chief. LTC and Mrs. Puchrik and the Air Team hosted a formal farewell dinner at the Tempelhof Officers' Club, 20 May in honor of departing Chief and Mrs. Paul G. Skowronek. Guests were Colonel and Mrs. McCord and Allied Air Team members and wives.

In Honor of Departing Chief. Chief Designate, Colonel Thomas F. McCord, and Mrs. McCord hosted a farewell cocktail-buffet on 22 May at their home for Colonel and Mrs. Skowronek. Guests present were members of the Allied Missions.

Departing Chief's Farewell. Colonel and Mrs. Paul G. Skowronek hosted a farewell cocktail party on 23 May at the Harnack House for the Berlin community. Attending were members of all the Military Missions, including the Soviets, plus the Berlin military and diplomatic corps. The party was a fitting farewell to a long and successful tour.

Deputy Chief, USMLM, Farewell Party. On 1 July LTC and Mrs. Patrick O. Callahan were honored at a farewell party at the Harnack House. Soviet officers, including the Deputy Chief of the Soviet External Relations Branch, Colonel Grishel', attended. Members of the Berlin diplomatic and military community also attended.

Farewell to Departing Chief BRIXMIS and Deputy Chief USMLM. Colonel and Mrs. McCord hosted a farewell party at their home on 3 July for Brigadier and Mrs. David Wilson, departing Chief BRIXMIS, and LTC and Mrs. Callahan, departing Deputy Chief USMLM. Attending were members of the three Allied Missions.

Bastille Day. Lt Colonel Georges Rohe', Chief of French Military Liaison Mission, and officers hosted a reception party at their Potsdam Mission House, attended by the largest number of Soviet officers and wives in recent tri-Mission history, including two general officers, one from HQ GSFG and the other from the 24th Tactical Air Army. The highlight of the party was a Soviet Lt. Colonel whose inebriation embarrassed the other Soviets and who finally was physically delivered to his quarters by a French officer.

CINC USAREUR Visit to Potsdam, 2 September. The initial plans for the meeting of General James H. Polk, CINC USAREUR, and General P. K. Koshevoy, CINC GSFG, at the Labor Day Picnic failed to materialize. However, Colonel Thomas F. McCord, Chief of Mission, hosted an informal luncheon at the Mission House in Potsdam for General Polk and Major General J. W. Sutherland, Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, USAREUR and 7th Army. Also present were members of USMLM and Major W. H. Gilbert, General Polk's Aide-de-Camp. The lunch featured a typical Soviet ration provided the USMLM Potsdam mess.



(U) CHIEF FMLM EXCHANGES VIEWS WITH SOVIET GENERAL



(U) WORLD WAR II ALLIES OFFER A TOAST
PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP

(U) A GOOD TIME WAS HAD BY ALL

(U) THE MARINE CORPS BIRTHDAY BALL

Labor Day Picnic, 2 September. The annual Labor Day Picnic followed the informal luncheon and the frivolity was watched by the many East Germans lingering along the paths and roads outside the Mission grounds. Although Soviet members of SERB had officially accepted invitations to attend, and in fact had looked forward to the picnic, they were not allowed to attend. It appears the failure of their CINC to meet with General Polk may have made it politically embarrassing for them to meet General Polk, whom they thought would be in attendance. Passes were made available for all Allied Mission members and their families not on pass, and attendance by Allied Mission personnel was gratifyingly heavy. The major athletic attraction was the volleyball court, where Mission teams competed as enthusiastically as if they were on tour.

Farewell to BRIXMIS Deputy Chief. Colonel and Mrs. Thomas F. McCord hosted a farewell dinner, 30 September at their quarters in honor of Group Captain and Mrs. Colahan, departing Deputy Chief, BRIXMIS. Guest list consisted of members of the Allied Missions.

Farewell to USMLM Deputy Chief. On 25 October, the Chief and Members of USMLM hosted a farewell party in honor of departing Deputy Chief, LTC and Mrs. Harold P. McKinney. LTC McKinney was the first officer to serve a second tour of duty with the Mission. Because of his long tenure, Soviet officers made one of their rare appearances at a West Berlin party held at a private residence. The Soviet officers were extremely affable and expressed their desire for "more unofficial contact between Soviet and US officers."

Marine Birthday Party. The annual party in honor of the US Marine Corps was hosted by Marine Major and Mrs. David E. Obuhanych on 10 November at the Berlin Country Club. Allied Mission officers and wives were well represented, although Soviet officers declined.

Air Force Party. Members of the Air Team and LTC and Mrs. Puchrik hosted their annual winter party at the quarters of Air Team Chief on 2 December. Although no Soviets attended, the Polish (with wife) and Czech Military Attaches did attend. Other guests besides Allied Mission personnel were from Berlin Brigade and Tempelhof.

BRIXMIS Christmas Luncheon. Brigadier and Mrs. David G. House, Chief, BRIXMIS, entertained the officers and wives of the Allied Missions at the annual BRIXMIS luncheon on 13 December. The soiree was held at the British Officer's Club.

FMLM Chief Award. Lt Colonel Georges Rohé, Chief FMLM hosted an informal cocktail party on 13 December at the Pavillon du Lac on the occasion of his receipt of the Legion d'Honneur. Among the military guests were 10 officers from SERB and Soviet Headquarters (without wives), and the Polish Military Attache.

Annual Exchange of Christmas Gifts. In the absence of the Chief of Mission, Deputy Chief and officers were the hosts for SERB officers at the Potsdam House on 29 December. The occasion was the annual exchange of Christmas presents between SERB and USMLM and the presentation of gifts from the Commanding General and Chief of Staff, USAREUR, to their Soviet opposite numbers. The general atmosphere was merry, and many toasts were proposed to increased cooperation and social contacts in 1968.

Farewell Parties. In addition to the aforementioned social events, farewell cocktail parties were given by the Chief and officers of the USMLM for all departing Mission members. The Soviets are particular about not attending if they know, or even suspect, that the departing officer is headed for Viet Nam, as was the case with Majors Schweikert, Ayotte and Rogers. In the cases of Major Heine and Captain Kolt, it was assumed the Soviets knew of their respective assignments to the Air War College and the USAF Academy, but after the Kolt party and upon queries on their non-attendance, a Soviet officer stated that the Soviets were certain that young officers such as Kolt must be going to Viet Nam.

DEPARTING MEMBER	DATE
Maj and Mrs. Ronald J. Ayotte	14 April
Maj and Mrs. Paul Schweikert	12 May
Maj and Mrs. T. C. Heine	23 Jun
Captain George Kolt	26 Aug
Maj and Mrs. Jerome J. Rogers	16 Nov

(U) ANNUAL EXCHANGE OF CHRISTMAS GIFTS
POTSDAM HOUSE

POTSDAM HOUSE OPERATIONS

(C) Operations at the Potsdam House, normally directed by the Deputy Chief of Mission, have varied considerably in the past year--no doubt because of the fact that there have been three different deputies and four different enlisted men who occupied the NCOIC position. These men have been assisted by new Mission members who periodically joined the Mission. The overall effect has been one of general progress through the trial and error system. New ideas have been tried on everything from new menus to refurbishing old rooms.

The "Chief's Suite" has been refurnished to reflect some of the conveniences of the West. The old Russian procured furniture was replaced with United States supplied furnishings, making the suite more livable and the walls have been decorated with mirrors and paintings.

The two empty rooms at the entrance have been redone into furnished lounges for visiting ladies and gentlemen. Decorative furniture for the lounges was procured locally, and elegant wall paper completed the transformation. New drapes and furniture were bought for the tour drivers' rooms. After considerable persuasion, the Soviets now butcher and cut the meat prior to delivery. This makes for more tasty preparations, and less pilferage by the East German help.

The indigenous help, always a problem, has been subjected to the steady supervision of observant Duty Officers and our new NCOIC, whose understanding of the German language and native psychology have produced greater effectiveness and less loss in the kitchen.

Personnel problems are always interesting in their solution. One of our truculent waitresses quit for a "buyer's" job, and the house food supply made a remarkable recovery toward stabilization. The previous Chief Cook was demoted because of her tippling on the job. Although she fought her demotion to the extent of reporting the NCOIC to SERB for meanness, she has accepted her lower status. Two of the three East German men supporting Potsdam House operations were efficient and conscientious. The other continued to be lazy, slovenly, and on many days virtually useless. His behavior caused friction and



(U) THE AMERICAN FLAG FLIES IN POTSDAM



(U) POTSDAM HOUSE



(U) VOPO TURNS AWAY THE CURIOUS FROM POTSDAM HOUSE



EAST GERMAN CHILDREN VISIT POTSDAM HOUSE

lowered morale among the East German employees. Because of this behavior he was the subject of numerous complaints to SERB, and they have finally agreed to replace him.

During the year the house had its usual quota of uninvited guests, all purporting to be escapees from the Soviet or East German systems. One claimed to be a Soviet Sergeant. Unfortunately, the Mission is in no position either to verify the bona fides of these peoples or to help them even if it could, so they are politely turned away.

As of years end, the House is in the best condition in the Mission portion of its history. This has been achieved equally through Soviet cooperation and through continued initiative in redecorating by Mission officers and wives.

AN UNVITED GUEST

PART III Intelligence Activities







(C) THE MAN AND THE TARGET





(C) A TOUR OFFICER AT WORK

USMLM TOUR TEAM

(C) The secondary mission of the United States Military Liaison Mission is to exploit the Mission's liaison status and potential for the collection of intelligence information in East Germany. The USMLM team, composed of tour officer(s) and driver, is entrusted with the task of executing collection missions in East Germany. The following vignettes are an attempt to provide an insight into the modus operandi and experiences of these teams.

THE TOUR OFFICER

(C) Perhaps a definition of "Tour Officer" is in order, for it does not seem quite as likely that a true image, or any image at all, for that matter, is called up for the reader by that term. Certainly it is not as clear-cut as "battalion commander", or "G4", or "S3". Of course, there is no such thing as the average tour officer, or the typical tour officer, or the ideal tour officer. One of the things that helps to make USMLM a result-getting organization is the fact that each of its assigned officers and NCO's, though they may have similarities in background, experience or training, brings to the organization his own individual talents, ideas, and fresh approaches to the old problems of accomplishing USMLM's dual mission. We will, however, attempt to sketch a portrait which gives a general idea of what this particular species of humanity looks like.

First, the name. The terms "liaison officer", "tour officer", and "reconnaissance officer" are synonymous when used to refer to officers assigned to USMLM who are accredited to the CINCGSFG and regularly travel in the Soviet Zone of Germany. "Liaison Officer" is a handy term, since it does not imply the intelligence information gathering mission, while "reconnaissance officer" can be used with impunity among those who are privy to that aspect of the USMLM operation. "Tour officer", a sort of compromise, is most commonly used, and is an outgrowth of the reference to trips into the Soviet Zone as "tours".

The current model Army tour officer, as one can observe from the USMLM roster, is generally a Major or Lieutenant Colonel of about any branch of service. Air Team members and the Navy Representative are generally Captains or Majors of the USAF and USMC, respectively. These officers normally have about ten to fifteen years commissioned service, are fluent in Russian and/or German, and may or may not have previous experience in intelligence assignments. Assignments to USMLM are the result of rather careful screening, to provide the most capable and adaptable personnel available. The average newly-assigned tour officer is probably quite normal for his branch and service, with the exception of his language training, unless he is a product of the Russian Foreign Area Specialist Program (FAST).

Though it is not a requirement, every attempt is made to fill as many spaces as possible with FAST Program graduates, and assignment to USMLM is considered highly desirable, both by USMLM and participants in the program. These officers have, in addition to the "normal" background of their branch and service, four years of intensive training in the Russian language and the Soviet area, and probably an M. A. in Soviet Area Studies.

Upon assignment to USMLM, the new tour officer is one in name only he must then become a full-fledged, productive liaison/reconnaissance officer as quickly as possible, utilizing every resource available to USMLM and bringing to bear his own energy, diligence, and background. He must begin to learn the geography of East Germany, especially its transportation nets and the dispositions of the twenty-six Soviet and East German divisions located there. He must learn to identify the tremendous variety of Soviet and East German military equipment and vehicles. He must learn as much as possible about the history of USMLM operations in the Soviet Zone, and from the experience of others begin to develop a feel for the methods and techniques which have proved successful in accomplishing the missions of USMLM. He must develop his own distillate of the ingredients of diplomacy and aggressiveness, caution and daring, circumspection and boldness, which characterize the successful, productive, tour officer. He must develop to the highest possible degree his ability to react to constantly new and changing situations with actions which take into account all the complex considerations required of USMLM representatives, when the reaction must be instantaneous and time for reflection comes only afterwards. He must quickly learn the full meaning of the responsibility given him by virtue of the fact that he is representing the United States in East Germany. Most of the time he is alone with only his car and his driver. He knows that "tour officer judgement" is expected to provide good results with no incidents reflecting negatively on himself, USMLM, or his country.

Through reading of reference files, study of maps and identification photography, briefing and discussion, and traveling as a back-seat passenger with experienced tour officers, an attempt is made to accomplish as much as possible of this training before the new officer's

first solo trip. From that point on, it is the individual's responsibility to continue to learn and develop, taking advantage of every available hour and situation of his own as well as the experience of his contemporaries in all three Allied Military Liaison Missions. He must continue to grow and develop, for there is no such thing as becoming so proficient or accomplished that the tour officer can relax and coast. The best tour officer we ever knew departed on his final trip into the Soviet Zone complaining that he felt he could have made good use of a few more hours of preparation, and returned from it with the comment, "Well, it was a pretty good trip, but I wish I were going to have a chance to go back and try to do better on this or that target." That is a tour officer.

THE TOUR DRIVER

(C) The degree of effectiveness of any team effort can only be measured in proportion to the extent of the compatibility and individual contributions of the members comprising the team. Consequently, a successful team effort will reflect the ability of its members to effectively utilize its potentialities and can only be realized if the individual skills complement each other. No USMLM tour team could possibly hope to fulfill the requirements of an exacting trip without both tour officer and driver making a concerted effort to cooperate with one another and hence remove as far as possible those idiosyncratic tendencies inherent in the human personality.

The tour driver must be aware of his basic responsibilities: a thorough pre-departure vehicle check; assurance of adequate provisions; taking vehicle counts when running vehicle columns; fulfilling the role of sentinel at an OP; detecting tail vehicles; and the accomplishment of other fundamental operations. In order to properly discharge these basic requirements, a driver must plan and program. There are, however, certain intangibles not specifically called for, but necessary, if the driver is to effectively make his contribution to the tour team effort.

First, and foremost, he must be alert. Driving skills, linguistic prowess, ID familiarization, and an intimate knowledge of East

Germany are no substitute for a keen and sensitive awareness. Tour driving is an ordeal; much of the time is spent patiently traversing East German roads and terrain - boredom sets in; fatigue. But, the arrival of the unexpected must always be anticipated. A quick reaction can prevent an accident or a detention. Quick response can result in the procurement of important intelligence data.

A tour driver must be observant, incessantly scanning the horizons in search of pertinent discoveries. He is an invaluable aid to the tour officer, who must navigate, observe, and photograph. The driver properly utilizing his vantage point of observation allows the tour officer to devote more attention to the fine points of his mission. Each member must rely on the other if a maximum capitalization of intelligence collection opportunities is to be realized.

There is much to be derived as a tour driver. Aside from the feeling of accomplishment, there is also the element of danger and adventure. Events take place which whet the imagination and challenge resourcefulness and driving skills.

The USMLM tour driver is in an enviable position. He has the unique distinction of being a vital link in the reconnaissance of communist forces in East Germany. He also has the opportunity of participating in a challenging and satisfying operation.

(C) TOUR DRIVER PREPARES FOR THE NEXT MOVE

(U) A TOUR CAR AND RECOVERY DOLLY

THE EQUIPMENT

(C) The tour officer's equipment groups into two general categories. First, his mobility equipment. The heart of the mobility equipment is a 1967 Ford Fairlane automobile, equipped with a powerful 390 cubic inch engine, special suspension to allow for more road clearance and stiffer ride over bad roads, and special plating under the chassis to protect the engine and transmission from tree stumps and rocks. The tour car is also equipped with a 35 gallon gas tank, switches which allow the driver to cut off his horn (to prevent the possibility of blowing it by mistake) or to cut off all lights in the rear of the car, and two other switches for back up lights, and fog lights. In the past year the tour cars have added VHF radios to their equipment. The radios are standard

commercial sets giving us the capability to report to base stations in Berlin and Potsdam without actually driving to their locations. While the 50-mile range of the radios does not allow communications from all over East Germany, it is sufficient to allow a tour to report significant indicators without having to cross into West Berlin or rely on East German commercial communications. Thus, the new radios are a significant improvement in USMLM's capability to perform effectively in critical situations where the Soviets would certainly attempt to interfere or prevent reporting.

In addition to the car's installed equipment, the tour car always goes out loaded with an impressive bag of tricks for maintaining mobility through mud, snow, ice, sand, forests, swamps, meadows, fields, and everywhere else that USMLM tours commonly go. The equipment includes an axe, a shovel, a heavy-duty winch and 50 feet of steel cable, two nylon tow straps, a steel tow cable, a tow chain, two four-foot "cheater boards" to place under the rear wheels to free the differential or to place across narrow ditches, and, lastly, a box full of tools. The winch is capable of dragging a car even if the wheels are off the ground, as long as the tour driver's and officer's strength last. The box of tools has been used for such applications as rebuilding the front end of the tour car after it had become immobilized from having the front wheels jammed in by running into a ditch across a road. The last essential component of the mobility kit is the tour driver's and officer's ingenuity and adaptability in using local material, and human assistance to help them get out of any situation they may find themselves in. More than one USMLM tour has been rescued from a mud hole by local citizens with the local collective farm's tractor or team of horses.

The second category of equipment is the intelligence collection equipment. The tour officer normally carries his collection equipment in two large black leather bags. One bag contains complete map coverage of East Germany marked with the Permanent Restricted Areas, but without any notations of intelligence significance. The basic map used by the tour officer is the Series M642 1:100,000 maps which are adequate but not entirely accurate. The tour officer normally carries a few city plans for cities that he is planning to enter on his tour, but city plans for many of the cities in East Germany are not available. The tour officer's map case may also include a few sheets of 1:25,000 maps of



(C) TOUR OFFICER EQUIPMENT

areas in which he is planning to work, and always the so-called "clobber-map." The clobber-map is a 1:500,000 road map published by the East German petroleum monopoly which USMLM overlays with the outlines of the PRA's. This is the only map which we will show either the Soviets or East Germans if we are detained, or in the parlance - "clobbered." The other big black bag carries the real "guts" of the tour officer's tools. It is full of photo equipment, a tape recorder and a pair of binoculars. The tape recorder is used for recording the composition of passing columns of vehicles, or in other situations where the tour officer must record a mass of information quickly while keeping his eyes on whatever is happening.
The photo equipment that the tour officer uses is quite extensive. His basic tool is a Leica camera with a 135mm lens. This is supplemented with two more Leica's; one with a 50mm lens the other with a 280mm or 640mm lens. In addition the tour officer may take a 500mm or 1,000mm Soviet made mirror reflex lens used on a Pentax body. A new addition to the bag of tricks is a 680mm Perkin-Elmer mirror reflex lens which is less than 3 inches long. This is used on a Pentax Spotmatic body, and promises to be a very useful addition to our photographic inventory. Another new addition to the inventory is the Leicaflex camera. Several of the tour officers have found this to be useful when using the Leica long focus lens, because it eliminates the bulky and cumbersome old reflex housing which had to be used with the Leica. In addition to the cameras and lenses the tour officer also carries an ample supply of film. The standard film has been Tri-X supplemented with High Speed Ektachrome and Plus X for special jobs. In recent months, however, USMLM has been experimenting with a new 1600 ASA Kodak recording film which allows the tour officer to shoot under formerly impossible light conditions. Although there are certain technical problems with this new film, it may develop into a valuable new addition to our capability.
The last item to be mentioned is the binoculars, which play an important role in touring. We are presently very pleased with our Hensoldt 8x56 glasses which afford good magnification with outstanding twilight viewing.

It is this relatively unsophisticated kit which the tour officer uses to supplement his mobility, planning, and good judgment to accomplish USMLM's mission in East Germany.



(U) THE CHIEFS OF MISSION
BRIGADIER HOUSE COLONEL MC CORD LTC ROHE

ALLIED COOPERATION

(S) During 1967, the combined effort of the British, French and United States Military Liaison Missions was an outstanding example of allied cooperation and coordination. The challenge was provocative and stimulating. The target - 20 Soviet Divisions and an Air Army, 6 East German Divisions, and more than 3,000 military installations dispersed in an area of 108,174 square kilometers.

To maximize the allied collection effort against targets in East Germany the country was divided into three operational areas, with each Mission responsible for one-third of the area. Normally each Mission covered an area for a two week period. This arrangement was modified on occasions when a high priority target or sustained activity demanded the concentrated efforts of all three Missions.

To assure complete and efficient coverage of targets in East Germany, Tri-Mission ground and air operations meetings were held at least once a week. At these meetings, mutual requirements were discussed and integrated plans finalized.

The quarterly Chiefs of Mission meetings served to focus attention on important policy matters affecting all three Missions. The Chiefs of Missions discussed problems of mutual interest, resolved differences, and established policy.

A unique example of allied cooperation is the "Highlight" debriefing. This debriefing is considered a "first priority task" by the reconnaissance teams of all three Missions. Upon their return from East Germany all teams-French, British and United States-stop at the USMLM Operations Center to complete the "Highlight." This report describes all significant observations and activity of interest to the intelligence community. The reports are prepared in triplicate, with one copy for each Mission. The "Highlights" serve as the basis for a current estimate of the situation, for a possible modification of tour plans for outgoing reconnaissance teams, and for reports to higher headquarters. USMLM cables a daily Situation Report, which includes each Mission's tours, to USAREUR/7th Army and USAFE Headquarters, with copies distributed locally to the Berlin intelligence community. Final detailed reconnaissance reports, which include photography, are forwarded on DD Form 1396.

(C) THE CHIEFS OF MISSION QUARTERLY MEETING

OBSTACLES TO COLLECTION

(C) To obstruct the collection effort of USMLM, the Soviet and East German authorities continued to rely on the active surveillance of USMLM reconnaissance teams by agents of the East German Ministry of State Security (MFS), and on such passive measures as the Permanent Restricted Area (PRA), the imposition of Temporary Restricted Areas (TRA), and Mission Restriction signs. Of course, the troop security measures employed by the armed forces of GSFG and EGVA naturally present a formidable obstacle to collection.

(U) VOLKS POLIZEI - OVERT

SURVEILLANCE

(C) During 1967, surveillance of USMLM tours changed drastically. There was a clear re-orientation of purpose, and a determined effort to increase the quantity and quality of the surveillance effort of the security agencies of the German Democratic Republic (DDR).

In previous years the Ministry of State Security (MFS) agents attempted to surveil USMLM teams covertly, usually in sensitive areas along the anticipated tour route. The MFS would attempt to detain USMLM teams where charges of "espionage" would have some validity when presented to the Soviet authorities. The primary purpose appeared to be the documentation of the intelligence role of USMLM.



(U) THE MFS - COVERT

In 1967, MFS agents frequently attempted to surveil USMLM teams overtly, along the entire tour route. They attempted to detain USMLM teams on any charges whatever - such as speeding, reckless driving, taking illegal photos, or violating restriction signs. Their actions were indicative of a major effort to prove the sovereign right of the DDR to regulate the actions of USMLM through Soviet authorities, to document the intelligence role of USMLM, and to destroy the effectiveness of USMLM reconnaissance teams.

In attempting to achieve their goals, the East Germans were forced to increase their surveillance efforts. An examination of surveillance statistics brings into sharp focus the fact that the detected surveillance effort increased at least 55 percent.

In 1966, overt surveillance was largely the function of uniformed VOPO's using relatively low performance, marked police cars of East German manufacture. This surveillance was usually passive, and respectful of the safety of individuals involved. The surveillance teams of the MFS were equipped with a few reasonably high performance EMW sedans (a copy of the old BMW), and with such low performance cars as the East German Wartburg and Trabant, and the Soviet Volga and Moskvich.

MFS agents generally attempted to surveil covertly, resorting to overt, aggressive tactics only when it became obvious that they had been discovered, or when they had good prospects of trapping USMLM tours in the act of collecting intelligence.

In the final months of 1966, the MFS began to use several newly acquired BMW 1800 cars as leaders of the so called "rat pack". The "rat pack" tactic was to station low performance cars at various locations within and around a sensitive area, particularly during the imposition of a Temporary Restricted Area (TRA), and then to call in high performance BMW's to attempt a detention at a propitious time and place. The USMLM reconnaissance teams were generally able to evade by maneuvering to an autobahn where, by using a burst of speed, it was possible to separate the high performance car from its "rat pack" and then eluding it by utilizing routes over difficult terrain. By employing the "rat pack" tactic the MFS succeeded only in denying USMLM access to a given small area for a relatively short period of time.

In 1967, the role, tactics and equipment of the uniformed VOPO remained basically unchanged, whereas the role, tactics and equipment of the MFS changed rather dramatically. The acquisition of a fleet of high performance western cars by the MFS enabled its agents to change to more aggressive and dangerous tactics. The identifying IB, IP and IE prefixes, known to be used by MFS agents, were sighted in the surveillance role by USMLM teams on at least 26 BMW 1800,

3 BMW 2000, 2 BMW 3200, 2 TRIUMPH 2000, 1 OPEL RECORD, 1 CHEVROLET IMPALA, and 1 OLDSMOBILE. The new cars enabled the MFS agents to change their "rat pack" tactic of relatively short duration and limited effectiveness to a tactic of long-term, overt surveillance of a USMLM team's entire tour route. Some MFS teams attempted to begin surveillance as the USMLM team left the Potsdam House.

Taking advantage of the increased number of high-speed radio cars, the MFS was able to assign at least two cars to overtly surveil, while constantly shifting other high-speed cars to critical points along the various routes open to the USMLM team. By using blocking tactics, the MFS was sometimes able to influence the route taken by a USMLM tour so that the tour team would be detained at a time and place of their choosing. The MFS agents showed an increased willingness to force a race by attempting to pass and set up road blocks. The aggressive and needlessly dangerous tactics of the MFS made it clear that the Ministry of State Security agents were prepared to act with apparent disregard for life and property.

On 17 November 1967, the continued provocative and dangerous actions of the MFS prompted Colonel McCord to state to the Soviets:

"As Chief of the United States Military Liaison Mission, I view these provocations with great concern since they are the second and third occasions I have had within the past two weeks to bring to your attention illegal activities by East Germans.

I wish to reassure you that I am as anxious as you to maintain the excellent relations between my Mission and Soviet Forces, but it appears that the unrestrained activities of these East German hoodlums (the agents of the MFS) are becoming a serious obstacle to those relations. I therefore request that you take the necessary measures to assure the cessation of these actions. If you are unable to do so, or if able, do not agree that you should do so, I request that you so state in order that I can inform my headquarters."

Immediately following this appeal for action, the provocative actions by the plain-clothes MFS in civilian cars ceased. The Soviets apparently decided to demonstrate that they can indeed take the necessary actions to control the security agencies of the DDR. At a meeting in December, Chief SERB actually admitted to Acting Chief USMLM that he had discussed the matter with "officials of the DDR".

(U) THE CHIEF OF MISSION ADMONISHES THE VOPOS

THE PERMANENT RESTRICTED AREA (PRA)

(C) The PRA continued to effectively deny legal access of one-third of East Germany. The PRA issued to Allied Missions on 15 February 1964 remained unchanged in 1967. USMLM teams were denied the privilege of free travel into and within areas that contain at least 50 percent of the military installations within East Germany. Admittedly, the PRA map severely hampers the collection effort against targets located within the desired areas, but it does not prevent well-planned, authorized penetrations when the target warrants the risk.

PERMANENT RESTRICTED AREAS



TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA (TRA)

(C) In 1967, GSFG continued to increase its reliance on Temporary Restricted Areas in order to deny freedom of travel to Allied Missions. The TRAs imposed by GSFG denied Mission teams access into specific areas of East Germany for a total of 113 days, an increase of 40 days over 1966. The TRAs were imposed for periods from 3 to 14 days. They screened such activities as Joint Air Defense Exercises, a Joint Warsaw Pact CPX, the visit of the Soviet Baltic Fleet to ROSTOCK, the movement of sensitive equipment and units, and large-scale field training exercises. Although the TRA denies Mission teams a certain freedom of travel it also tends to focus the attention of Allied Mission teams on the specific denied areas. In 1967, well planned, coordinated reconnaissance trips during and after the TRA period resulted in the acquisition of valuable information and material.

DATE AND DURATION OF TRA'S



(S) In 1967, GSFG imposed twenty-one Temporary Restricted Areas (TRAs) on Allied Mission travel. The dates and purpose were as follows:

TRA 1-67	6-9 FEB	Screened Military District III Activity
TRA 2-67	9-13 FEB	Screened probable Joint Air Defense exercise involving elements of the 24th Tactical Air Army and East German Air Defense elements
TRA 3-67	13-17 FEB	Extended part of TRA 2-67 and screened a small Second Guards Army exercise
TRA 4-67	25 FEB-05 MAR	Screened Eighth Guards Army exercise
TRA 5-67	7-11 MAR	Screened activity of First Motorized Rifle Division and elements of Berlin Border Brigade
TRA 6-67	13-16 MAR	Apparently screened joint GSFG, EGA and CZECH Commo CPX
TRA 7-67	16-18 MAR	Extended TRA 6-67 and probably screened homeward movements of participating units
TRA 8-67	10-15 MAY	Screened Third Shock Army maneuver and an associated Air and Air Defense activity
TRA 9-67	30 MAY-05 JUN	Screened homeward movements of Warsaw Pact Forces after joint CPX

TRA 10-67	10-15 JUL	Screened a Twenty-fourth Tactical Air Army Air Defense Exercise and signal elements of First Guards Tank Army, Second Guards Army and Eighth Guards Army practicing for a GSFG CPX
TRA 11-67	20-30 JUL	Screened GSFG CPX involving HQ units of all five GSFG Armies
TRA 12-67	13-19 AUG	Screened joint GSFG/EGA FTX involving elements of Second Guards Army, Military District V, First Guards Tank Army and Military District III
TRA 13-67	20-26 AUG	Screened EGA FTX involving Military District V
TRA 14-67 EXTENDED TO: 30 SEP	17-26 SEP	May have screened movements of elements of GSFG and EGA Warsaw Pact FTX in Hungary
TRA 15-67	21-28 SEP	Screened Third Shock Army, Twentieth Guards Army FTX
TRA 16-67	27 SEP-04 OCT	Screened probable Second Guards Army exercise and possible related activity by Military District V
TRA 17-67	30 SEP-04 OCT	Screened probable Twentieth Guards Army exercise in Military District V
TRA 18-67	13-19 OCT	Screened Inter-Army FTX involving First Guards Tank Army and Third Shock Army

TRA 19-67	26-29 OCT	Screened Soviet Baltic Fleet's visit to ROSTOCK
TRA 20-67	04-12 NOV	Apparent Soviet reaction to TRA screening large NATO exercise in the Federal Republic of Germany
TRA 21-67 EXTENDED TO: 15 NOV	10-13 NOV	Screened probable FTX involving Battalion or Regimental size units of First Guards Tank Army, Second Guards Army, Third Shock Army and Eighth Guards Army

TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREAS

TRA 1 - 67: 060001 - 092400 FEB 67

TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREAS



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

TRA 3-67: 130001 - 172400 FEB 67

TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREAS



TRA 4 - 67: 250001 FEB - 052400 MAR 67

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

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

TRA 6 - 67: 130600 - 162000 MAR 67

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

TRA 7 - 67: 160600 - 180600 MAR 67

TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREAS



TRA 8 - 67: 101800 - 152400 MAY 67

TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREAS



TRA 9 - 67: 310001 MAY - 052400 JUN 67

TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREAS



TRA 10-67: 100600 - 152400 JUL 67

TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREAS



TRA 11 - 67: 200800 - 302400 JUL 67

TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREAS



TRA 12 - 67: 140001 - 192400 AUG 67

TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREAS



TRA 13 - 67: 210001 - 262400 AUG 67

TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREAS



TRA 14 - 67: 170001 - 262400 SEP 67
extended to 302400 SEP 67

TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREAS



TRA 15 - 67: 211800 - 282400 SEP 67

TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREAS



TRA 16-67: 270001 SEP - 042400 OCT 67

TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREAS

TRA 17 - 67: 010001 - 042400 OCT 67

TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREAS



TRA 18 - 67: 140001 - 192400 OCT 67

TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREAS



TRA 19 - 67: 262400 - 292400 OCT 67

TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREAS



TRA 20 - 67: 050001 - 122400 NOV 67

TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREAS



TRA 21 - 67: 110001 - 132400 NOV 67
Extended to 152400 NOV 67

MISSION RESTRICTION SIGNS

(C) The number of permanent Mission Restriction Signs, estimated in 1966 to be in excess of 4,000, increased significantly in 1967. Both the Soviets and East Germans erected these signs to bar travel in the vicinity of or within installations and training areas. Mission restriction signs usually deter tours from a particular target; however, if the target warrants closer observation, a reconnaissance team can usually find a way to circumvent the sign. The USMLM operational effort endeavored to visit every accessible installation during each quarter of 1967. This effort probably sensitized many rather isolated, and in the past, infrequently visited installations. This, coupled with the establishment of the new Soviet Early Warning net and the introduction of SA-3 GOA missile sites, accounted for the majority of the newly erected Mission restriction signs. Like the PRAs and TRAs, permanent mission restriction signs, especially those on good primary and secondary roads, channel the tour route and give the MFS and VOPO surveillance vehicles an added advantage.

(U) A WARNING IN FOUR LANGUAGES

MILITARY SECURITY

(C) USMLM reconnaissance officers must continually cope with the security measures imposed by GSFG and the EGVA. This security provides a major obstacle to collection, not only around fixed installations, but also when units are in the field or on the march.

There is no appreciable difference in the measures utilized by the Soviets or East Germans. Both forces are extremely sensitive to and are aware of the threat posed by the presence of Mission teams. The presence of armed security positioned around military installations is a major consideration in tour planning. Characteristically Soviet and EGVA installations are well fenced with guard towers carefully situated to assure all-around surveillance on a 24-hour basis.

(C) SOVIET TRAFFIC REGULATORS IN ACTION

Soviet and East German units training in the field are constantly on the alert to thwart USMLM collection activities. Security posts of two and three men are positioned along all routes leading into bivouac areas. Although it is usually possible to either drive through, or circumvent such posts, they do constitute a serious obstacle to reconnaissance activities.

Military units on the march offer USMLM teams an excellent opportunity to observe, to photograph, and to count. If a tour is in a fixed observation post the matter of collection is most often a routine matter, but if the tour is forced to run the columns head on, or from rear to front, the collection effort most often becomes an exciting test of skill and nerves. Column commanders resent the presence of Mission teams and are anxious to demonstrate their ability to thwart Mission efforts. Armor, artillery, and missile columns usually pose the most dangerous threat to a Mission team. Utilizing radio communications, experienced column commanders will attempt to choose the most effective time and place to block or entrap a Mission team. Split second reactions, driving skills, and the Grace of God are often needed and used in order to escape a well executed maneuver by Soviet or East German columns.

(C) RUNNING A COLUMN

INCIDENTS - DETENTIONS

(C) In general, 1967 was characterized by a leveling off of the trends established over recent years. During 1967, USMLM was involved in 20 incidents and 18 detentions, as opposed to 24 incidents and 17 detentions in 1966. The termination of the downward trend in detentions can be attributed mainly to bad luck since 7 of the detentions occurred only after the Mission cars had been immobilized by mechanical failure or accident. The loss of mobility exposed the tour teams to whatever actions the Soviets or East Germans deemed most appropriate. Thus, if even half of these 7 detentions could have been averted, the trend would have continued downward.

Many of the incidents reflect the more sophisticated and aggressive tactics of MFS personnel. The increase in the number of high performance tail cars served both as a means and an incentive to provocations. Also the fact that there was a decrease in the overall number of incidents can be attributed primarily to happenstance. An incident is an unpredictable entity, even more so than detentions, and to attempt a rationalization of their frequency introduces too many variants, such as the tour officer's concept as to what constitutes an incident, the factor of chance, and other considerations within the realm of speculation.

Although the overall number of detentions did not rise appreciably in 1967 those instigated by the Soviets did. This increase was a direct result both of a higher concentration by USMLM on Soviet associated activities and installations, and also the aforementioned breakdowns and accidents in areas of Soviet troop deployment.

An exception to the trend reversals this year was the continuation of the percentage increase of East German involvement in incidents. The reason is readily apparent in the sharp rise in the number of surveillances. However, despite this sharp rise in East German attempts to influence, harass, and provoke USMLM tours, the incident and detention rate did not rise accordingly; in fact, it was kept at a surprisingly low level.

DETENTIONS

USMLM PERSONNEL	DETAILS
MAJ DeSimone SSG Stockton	270555 Jan 67, NEUFAHRLAND. A USMLM tour car was proceeding south on Route 2 when it met an approaching Soviet armor column. The USMLM car stopped and pulled almost completely off the roadway to allow the armor column to pass. The column commander (LTC, Armor) halted the column, and turned the two lead tanks perpendicular to the road immediately behind the vehicle. This maneuver effectively blocked the USMLM car. The column commander accused the USMLM team of disregarding a traffic regulator and of obstructing the forward movement of the column. The USMLM officer stated he had seen no traffic regulator and had yielded the roadway to the column. Despite the protestations of the USMLM officer the team was escorted to the POTSDAM Kommandatura. At 0910 hours the Commandant arrived. After questioning and admonishing the USMLM Officer, he released the team at 270940 Jan. Duration of detention: 3 hours, 45 minutes.
LTC Bolte SSG Stockton	301145 Jan 67. FORST GLUECKSBURG. While travelling along a deeply rutted, water-logged tank trail, the USMLM tour car became immobile because of engine failure. During attempts to start the car, a Soviet sentry approached the car and gave orders for the tour to stay in place. The USMLM team continued to make repairs, started the car and inched forward. The

Soviet soldier stepped aside. After proceeding another 700 meters the car again stalled out. The persistent sentry reappeared and took up a blocking position in front of the car. The USMLM team was again successful in starting the car after checking the fuel line and spark plug leads. Just as the reconnaissance officer was closing the hood of the car, the Soviet soldier reached in and ripped out the spark plug leads. At this point a UAZ-69 arrived on the scene. A LTC dismounted and introduced himself, then departed to notify the Commandant at WITTENBERG. The Soviet Commandant from WITTENBERG arrived, conducted an investigation and accused the tour team of having passed a Mission Restriction Sign and a range sign, of passing a barricade, and of ignoring the orders of a Soviet soldier to stop. He then directed the tour team to follow him to the WITTENBERG Kommandatura. At the Kommandatura the USMLM officer was repeatedly accused of the above violations. The following morning at 0930 hours, Colonel Pinchuk, Chief of Soviet External Relations Branch, arrived at the Kommandatura. At 0950 hours, the tour officer was escorted into the Commandant's office and was seated before Colonel Pinchuk. Obviously annoyed, Colonel Pinchuk delivered a tongue-lashing in Russian, in which he repeated the charges already made. Colonel Pinchuk impatiently interrupted the tour officer's denials and concluded his remarks by saying Chief of Mission would be notified and that the tour officer might have to leave the Mission. The tour officer was then told to wait in his car. At 1115 hours, Colonel Skowronek arrived and at 1140 hours the tour was released to his custody. Duration of detention: 23 hours, 55 minutes.

LTC Klingelhoefer SSG Stockton SP4 Maugans	310630 Jan 67, NEUFAHRLAND. A USMLM team encountered a tank column coming from the north on Route 2. After running the column, tour made a 180 degree turn at KRAMPNITZ, in order to verify the destination of the column. At this point, the right front wheel of USMLM vehicle dropped off of the cobblestone road surface of Route 2 onto a soft shoulder. During the attempt to get back on the road, the vehicle began to skid. The attempt to gain control of the vehicle resulted in a more severe skid, sending the vehicle broadside down the road. The right front wheel hit a concrete post, turning the vehicle so that it came to rest partially off of the road on the south side, facing east. During this final movement, four Soviet soldiers who had been walking along the south shoulder of the road were struck and three of them injured. The team attempted to administer first aid, but the Soviets refused help. Representatives of the military unit of the injured men, the POTSDAM Kommandatura, and SERB arrived on the scene to determine the circumstances of the accident. The USMLM team was taken to the POTSDAM Kommandatura, and detained for purposes of investigation. The team was subsequently released at 021730 Feb, when it was established that none of the Soviet soldiers were in critical condition. Duration of detention: 69 hours.
MAJ Obuhanych SP5 Stelly	131600 Feb 67, VIC PRITZIER. A USMLM team was stopped by a three-man Soviet security post. A Soviet Sergeant accused the tour of being in a restricted area and took measures to obstruct further passage of the tour car. Upon fulfillment of tour

officer request that the Kommandatura be contacted, the Sergeant apologized for detaining the tour. The tour, however, was not released until the arrival of the Commandant. The Commandant also apologized, attributing the misunderstanding to incorrect orders given to the security post by the security officer. The team was released at 131800 Feb 67. Duration of detention: 2 hours.

MAJ Heine
SSG Kutz

011600 Mar 67, VIC OF WIESENBURG. A Soviet security post halted a USMLM team and requested the tour's documents, stating that the road was closed. Upon arrival of the Commandant, the tour was escorted to the WITTENBERG Kommandatura, despite vehement protestations of the USMLM tour officer. The Commandant stated that a security post, at NEDLITZ, had been violated and that the tour had chased a military column. Both charges were promptly denied. After much haggling the team was released at 020125 Mar 67. Duration of detention: 9 hours, 25 minutes.

MAJ DeSimone
SP4 Eastling

172145 Mar 67, ROTHENBURG. Having just recovered from a vehicle breakdown incurred while tracing a battle cable route, the tour was apprehended by Soviet communications personnel. The Soviets brandished AK sub-machine guns and were very hostile, although no physical contact resulted. Accusations included showing too much interest in battle cable, stealing a small warning sign, and evading Soviet attempts to apprehend the tour. All accusations, except that of following the battle cable, were untrue. All accusations were denied. At 180615 Mar, the

	USMLM team arrived at the HALLE Kommandatura, and at 182045 Mar, was released. Duration of detention: 23 hours.
MAJ DeSimone SP4 Paulson	070950 Apr 67, VIC DREETZ. A USMLM team was proceeding north on Route 102 after having just run a column. A white Opel, travelling in the opposite direction and in the middle of the road refused to swerve to avoid a collision. Because of the narrow tree-lined road and steep embankments, the tour was unable to evade the oncoming car and was forced to halt. A rearward escape was thwarted by a green BMW 1800. Upon arrival of Soviet officers, probably from WITTSTOCK, the tour was escorted to POTSDAM Kommandatura, where concurrence with the VOPO accusation of being in a restricted area (false) was established. Tour was released 071710 Apr 67. Duration of detention: 7 hours, 20 minutes.
MAJ DeSimone SP4 Paulson LTC Bolte SP4 Thomann	081500 Apr 67, VIC KYRITZ. A USMLM recovery team was dispatched to WREDENHAGEN where it proceeded to tow a disabled vehicle to POTSDAM via Route 5. A white Opel Diplomat discreetly followed, then overtook the USMLM vehicles and prevented further passage homeward. Upon arrival of a party of Soviets from POTSDAM, which included the Commandant, charges of failure to report an accident (the recovered vehicle had had a slow-speed collision with tree) and of the recovery vehicle exceeding the speed limit, were levelled. A trip to the POTSDAM Kommandatura followed. The tour team was subsequently released, accompanied by courteous admonishments, at 082015 Apr 67. Duration of detention: 5 hours, 15 minutes.

LTC Szymczyk SP4 Thomann	311500 May 67. VIC SCHWABECK. A USMLM reconnaissance team became bogged down after breaking off surveillance of a Soviet Missile column. A German motorcyclist spotted the tour, reported its presence to the Soviets, and led the Soviets to the scene. The Soviets arrived with a truck and assisted the USMLM car, but prevented the tour from departing. The Commandant arrived and escorted the team to WITTENBERG, where the tour was accused of following a Soviet column (true) and of not obeying the signal of a Soviet Major (false). Tour officer promptly denied both accusations. Release took place at 311845 May 67. Duration of detention: 3 hours, 45 minutes.
CPT Kolt CPT Vichnevsky	301905 Jul 67, WITTENBERG. (See Story Behind the Report---Page 139)
MAJ Broz CPT Vichnevsky SGT Standbridge	111200 Aug 67, RADIS. While passing a parked EGA tactical column, the tour was blocked by armed troops in an armored personnel carrier. When the team asserted its right to free travel, the column commander retorted that the area was restricted (false). Although a Soviet LTC advisor was with the EGA column, two junior officers from the DESSAU Kommandatura were sent to the scene. They departed with the tour's documents, and upon return released the tour at 111600 Aug 67. Duration of detention: 4 hours.
MAJ DeSimone SP4 Stegner	190950 Aug 67. DEMERTHIN. After active surveillance on Route 5, a USMLM team was detained by MFS agents at a road block. A Soviet officer arrived, probably from the WITTSTOCK Kommandatura, and accused the tour of speeding. The tour was escorted to the POTSDAM Kommandatura, and then released at 191545 Aug 67. Duration of detention: 5 hours, 55 minutes.

CPT Vichnevsky SGT Standbridge	220915 Sep 67, BRAUNSRODA. A USMLM team was detained by VOPO when the tour car became disabled. Upon arrival of Soviet officers, charges of making a phone call at the East German home (true), and impersonating an EGA officer (false) were preferred. The possibility of an accident (false) was also investigated. None of the issues were pressed and the tour was released at 221310 Aug 67. Duration of detention: 3 hours, 55 minutes.
LTC Schneider SP5 Paulson	261000 Sep 67. PRENZLAU. While observing a tank unloading at the rail siding in the vicinity of Installation 241/242, the USMLM tour was approached by a Soviet LTC. Complying with the Soviet officer's request, the tour followed a Senior Sergeant to the PRENZLAU Kommandatura. Because the tour had been on an open road and had violated no rules, bases for accusations were nonexistent. The tour was not relieved of documents and release took place at 261331 Sep 67. Duration of detention: 2 hours, 31 minutes.
LTC Szymczyk SFC Clausen	081030 Oct 67, WILDPARK. After photographing a military train, a USMLM tour car attempted to reach the WILDPARK RR siding. While making a right turn the car skidded and collided with a Soviet PROGRESS 5 bus. The collision resulted in minor damages to both vehicles, with no injuries. The tour was escorted to the POTSDAM Kommandatura. At the Kommandatura the tour officer was greeted by the POTSDAM Commandant, who stated that he could not take any action until the investigation of the accident was completed. An hour later, the tour officer was given the opportunity to read the accident report. The report contained no derogatory

	or incriminating remarks. After a friendly conversation concerned with the hazards of driving the tour officer was asked to sign a protocol and the accident report. The tour officer refused to sign the papers and was released ten minutes later. Duration of detention: 2 hours, 30 minutes.
LTC Schneider SFC Clausen	200515 Oct 67. WILDPARK. While running the WILDPARK rail siding, the tour was detained by MFS agents and subsequently escorted to the POTSDAM Kommandatura. The reason for detention was a sign violation, which was true. Chief USMLM was notified, and after receiving a protest from SERB proceeded to the Kommandatura and secured release of the tour.
MAJ DeSimone SP5 Paulson SP4 Terrana	111315 Nov 67, GOLLMITZ/PRENZLAU. After following the tour at a reasonable distance two sedans belonging to the MFS made an attempt to entrap the tour in the main square of NEUSTRELITZ. The attempt was unsuccessful, and the MFS again made an unsuccessful attempt to block the tour car at the WOLDEGK intersection. These two attempts forced the tour team to change direction. In order to evade the MFS, the team had to cross a railroad and come out from behind a Mission Restriction sign. The USMLM car was forced to stop for a lowered RR crossing gate. An MFS car, attempting to get into a blocking position, struck the USMLM car, causing minor damage to the tour car. No injuries were sustained. Soviets arrived to conduct an accident investigation. Meanwhile, an East German

civilian bus, attempting to negotiate passage between the tour car and crossing gate, brushed the tour vehicle, causing minor damages. Upon completion of the investigation, a trip to the PRENZLAU Kommandatura followed. Accusations centered around the tour being behind signs and violating traffic regulations. The tour officer stressed repeatedly that the violations resulted from harassment by MFS vehicles. Upon refusal by the tour officer to sign an incriminating protocol (stating USMLM team was behind signs) release took place at 111735 Nov 67. Duration of detention: 4 hours, 20 minutes.

MAJ Stein
SP4 Terrana

160755 Nov 67. NAZZA. An unmarked BMW succeeded in blocking the USMLM team, and representatives of the Soviet Commandant in Gotha were summoned, arriving at 1100 hours. Initial accusations were: using the car radio (false), having driven through WALTERSHAUSEN and MARKSUHL (both false) and having driven through a series of signs. (Tour had driven past a sign for the purpose of negotiating a U-turn and had just emerged from behind signs when detained) At the GOTHA Kommandatura, the sign-breaking accusations were repeated, but only the aforementioned violations were acknowledged by the tour officer. Release was effected at 161815 Nov 67. Duration of detention: 10 hours, 20 minutes.

INCIDENTS

DATE	DETAILS
03 Jan 67	At 2029 hours on 3 January, the US military passenger train traveling from Berlin to Frankfurt was derailed approximately 200 yards inside the Soviet Zone of Germany. Two persons received minor injuries and the remaining passengers and crew members were severely jolted. Three cars of the train were damaged and the train movement delayed by several hours. From information given to our Train Commander by Reichsbahn personnel it appears that the accident was caused by failure to throw a switch, after a green light had been given, causing the train to go on to, and then off a dead-end track. Under the circumstances it was fortunate that the damage and injury done to personnel traveling on the train was not more severe. USMLM tour teams attempted to reach the scene of the accident. Physical barricades as well as East German and Soviet security prevented USMLM teams from reaching the scene of the accident. SERB was then requested to take the necessary measures to assure Mission teams access to the accident area, but the emergency was over before SERB would or could effectively react USMLM representatives returned only after the Chief of Mission determined through SERB that no passengers were injured, that government property was secured, and that appropriate measures were being taken to right the derailed cars. On 12 Jan 67, at the request of HQ USAREUR, Chief USMLM delivered a statement to SERB for transmittal to HQ GSFG, expressing concern over the negligence that led to the accident. It was requested that Soviet authorities investigate the accident and take the necessary steps to assure safe train operation in the future.

14 Mar 67 While traveling through FRESDORF, a USMLM team observed East German traffic regulators (TR), troops, and tactical vehicles, participating in a small exercise. The tour continued on to WILDENBRUCH, passed through the town, and then drove up a small trail to the top of a hill to observe the exercise. At the time of leaving the road, no traffic was seen in either direction for at least a kilometer. Within two minutes of arrival at the OP, the tour driver gave a warning signal, stating that a BMW had just stopped at the foot of the hill. The officer ran to the brow of the hill and observed a man in civilian clothes running across the face of the hill. He was carrying a small handy-talky radio and putting on an EG camouflage jacket, and was shouting to someone to his left. The tour abandoned the OP and moved down the hill the same way it had entered and continued its tour without further harassment.

01 May 67 At a MAY DAY rail stakeout, near the EAST BERLIN - NEUSEDDIN rail line, a Mission car became disabled. The driver was dispatched on foot at 2215 hours to call POTSDAM house for assistance. At 2230 hours the driver was apprehended by VOPO's, who summoned the Soviets. Soviet representatives arrived and escorted the driver to the POTSDAM Kommandatura. The USMLM Duty Officer was notified at 020115 May, and the driver was subsequently released by the Soviets. The tour car was recovered before its discovery by Soviets or VOPOs.

24 May 67 A minor incident of vandalism on a USMLM vehicle occurred in the parking lot of the Baltic Hotel in STRALSUND. Circumstances surrounding this incident were as follows: At 242100 May, tour officer made a routine check of the tour car in the parking lot. The following morning at 0600 hours the vehicle was again checked and it was discovered that the right rear view mirror had been broken off. A thorough check of the vehicle revealed no further vandalism. The incident was reported to the sympathetic hotel manager, but he took no action.

25 May 67 MIG-17 Incident (See Story Behind the Report--Page 15)

26 May 67 Two USMLM drivers, returning from the POTSDAM house, were stopped at the truss-type bridge on Route 2 near USMLM house turnoff by a VOPO who was directing traffic on the bridge, one lane of which was under construction. Although other traffic was allowed to cross the bridge in turn, the USMLM car was denied passage and told that they must detour. A short time later, a second USMLM sedan crossed the bridge without incident.

13 Jun 67 Upon halting for a Mission Restriction sign near ZADEL, a USMLM car was struck from the rear by a VOPO vehicle. The tour car incurred a damaged tail light; the VOPO damage amounted to a smashed headlight, bent hood and grill, a crumpled fender and bumper, and minor motor damage. A Soviet inspector arrived at 1450 hours, and completed his investigation an hour later. The tour followed the Commandant to the RIESA Kommandatura, arriving at 1755 hours. Release took place at 1805 hours, accompanied by an apology by the Commandant for the lengthy proceedings. He found no fault with the tour.

28 Jul 67 After having approached the site from the east, a USMLM tour was spotted next to the PRITZWALK Radar site by a Soviet guard. The guard ran toward the road, presumably to stop the Mission car. Seeing that he was too late, he unslung his rifle, aimed it at the car, then raised it in the air and fired three rounds. By this time the tour was moving off rapidly to the south, exited from behind a Mission Restriction sign (barring passage north) and departed the immediate area.

15 Aug 67 — At 1200 hours, a USMLM team entered a wooded position near WARENBERG in order to observe traffic on Route 103 (a suspected maneuver route) and on a north-south railroad line. Having been seen by EG civilians at 1357 hours, the team was leaving the position when two armed Soviet soldiers (an NCO with a pistol and a soldier with an AK pointed straight up) approached at a distance of 50 meters. The soldier with the AK fired one shot (probably a blank) into the air. As the tour car turned south on Route 103, a Soviet radio operator and an MFS BMW sedan were seen. The sedan tried unsuccessfully to block passage southward.

29 Aug 67 — A USMLM tour terminated a night stake-out of the ZERBST-GOMMERN railroad line at 0415 and proceeded east. The road was wet and the weather foggy and the car failed to negotiate a sharp corner and collided with a tree. Main damage to the car consisted of the bumper being forced into the radiator. POTSDAM House was notified and relief was dispatched. VOPOs began arriving at 0830 and two plain-clothes MFS agents also arrived on the scene. At 0945, a USMLM relief team arrived with tow bar. The Soviets arrived at 1000, were very pleasant and did not ask for documents. After a short inquiry, the tour was allowed to proceed.

21 Sep 67 — Chief USMLM departed Hotel Baltic, STRALSUND where he had over-nighted on a two-day tour. He was closely tailed by a motorcycle VOPO all the way to ROSTOCK where a VOPO Wartburg picked up the tail. The latter car followed Chief's vehicle throughout town, and finally Chief USMLM stopped and approached the VOPOs asking them why they were tailing him in violation of Huebner-Malinin Agreement. They refused to give their names and to state who had ordered them to tail Chief USMLM. They continued to tail almost to GUESTROW, where again two motorcycle VOPOs

picked up tail. At lunch break near KRAKOW, Chief approached halted VOPOs and posed the same questions; they answered that they had a blanket order from "their Chief" (VOPO) to follow USMLM vehicles. These incidents were subject of protest by Chief USMLM, and the severe tailing in the northern GDR also was protested by Chiefs of BRIXMIS and FMLM.

16 Oct 67 — As a USMLM tour entered EAST GERMANY via GLIENICKE BRIDGE, the Soviet sentry processed the tour documents and raised the first barrier. The USMLM team proceeded through the checkpoint to the second barrier and halted. At this point, an EAST GERMAN sentry raised the second barrier and motioned the tour to proceed. The tour officer refused to move forward and asked that the Soviet Officer in charge of the checkpoint be summoned. The illegal actions of the EAST GERMAN sentry were protested (USMLM teams do not acknowledge any actions taken by EAST GERMAN sentries). The Soviet Officer acknowledged the legitimacy of the complaint and ordered the Soviet sentry to man the barrier. After the Soviets took over control of the barrier the tour officer proceeded into EAST GERMANY.

17 Oct 67 — After having been under close surveillance by a BMW 3200 a USMLM tour slowed while proceeding through a diminished speed zone at the vicinity of the gas station at MICHENDORF, on the SOUTH RING Autobahn. The BMW overtook the tour car, signalling with baton for the team to pull over. The tour sped up but was again overtaken, this time on the NUERNBERG Autobahn. The BMW again signalled the team to pull over. Using the BEELITZ Cutoff the tour reversed direction and proceeded to the POTSDAM Kommandatura. Along the SOUTH RING Autobahn, a BMW 2000 pulled in front of the tour car and attempted to bring it to a halt. Two other MFS BMWs

were seen at a distance during this incident. At the Kommandatura, a protest was lodged based on the illegal accompaniment and the dangerous acts in attempting to stop the tour team.

17 Oct 67 The tour left USMLM POTSDAM House in NEUFAHRLAND at 0555 hours. North of the NAUEN GATE in POTSDAM (less than 1 KM from the house) the tour noticed a white BMW 3200 CS (1E5748) following very closely behind the tour car. The tour went south through POTSDAM then turned and went north to KRAMPNITZ. The BMW continued to follow. The tour then went south on Rt 2 through MICHENDORF to the Autobahn. The BMW continued following. At all times the tour proceeded slowly, observing all applicable traffic regulations, rules of the road and yielding right of way to pedestrians going to work. At MICHENDORF the tour went into the Autobahn heading west. Passing through the MICHENDORF gas station the tour slowed to the required speed, keeping in the right-hand lane. Immediately west of the gas station the BMW began blinking its lights and the passenger motioned as if to request the tour to pull over. The tour officer instructed the driver to speed up in order to avoid this unprovoked harassment. The BMW 3200 then took chase at high speed down the crowded autobahn. The tour then proceeded south on the LEIPZIG Autobahn and at the BEELITZ cutoff the BMW 3200 (now joined by a bluish green BMW 2000 CS (1P 7333) overtook the tour and tried to force the tour car off the autobahn while the passenger leaned out the window waving a black and white baton at the tour car. The tour used the BEELITZ cutoff to reverse its direction and began heading for POTSDAM. The BMW 2000 illegally crossed the center strip and got in front of the tour while the 3200 stayed behind. The tour proceeded in this fashion to the MICHENDORF cutoff where it managed to leave the autobahn in spite of efforts by

the BMWs to force the tour to continue past the cutoff. After leaving the autobahn the tour proceed up Route 2 through POTSDAM to the Soviet Kommandatura, where a sharp protest was delivered to Lieutenant Rudenko (Duty Officer) at 0715 hours.

24 Oct 67 — A USMLM team was proceeding west from MIROW when it made a left turn putting the tour behind a Mission Restriction sign. The tour had followed a GAZ-63 into the turn and was now confronted with two more GAZ-63 advancing from the south. A Soviet soldier sitting next to the driver of the first GAZ opened the right door and motioned the tour to halt. The USMLM vehicle immediately reversed its direction of travel and sped off to ROEBEL. During the negotiation of the 180 degree turn, the right rear of the tour car grazed a tree, but the tour continued on to complete its reconnaissance mission.

24 Oct 67 — At 1510 hours, as a USMLM tour was proceeding southeast on the COTTBUS Autobahn, an East German civilian sedan crossed the Autobahn centerstrip and overturned, coming to rest in the southbound lane. The tour officer and driver attempted to render assistance and first aid to the East German driver (dazed, incoherent, but apparently not physically injured). A VOPO arrived, declined to use the tour team's first aid kit, and in response to the tour officer's offer of further assistance, the VOPO asked him to move the USMLM vehicle. At 1545 hours, the tour departed, leaving a distraught driver, an unattended injured passenger, and a VOPO.

25 Oct 67 — The MAGDEBURG Parade (See Story Behind the Report (Page 143)

29 Oct 67 — A USMLM team, arriving in DRESDEN to watch the October Revolution parade, parked the sedan near the parade route, dismounted and walked to the parade area, openly joining the assembled spectators.

No unfriendliness or hostility was exhibited by the East German crowd towards the tour. At 1005 hours, a Soviet LTC, in full parade dress, approached the tour team, saluted, shook hands, and politely requested the tour to accompany him. Upon arrival at the tour car, documents were proferred, and an attempt to learn the reasons for being escorted away from the parade resulted only in an instruction to get into the tour car. The Soviet officer's UAZ-69 vehicle led the team to the autobahn exit, and the officer indicated that the tour was to leave town. When the tour expressed disappointment at not being permitted to see the parade, the Soviet LTC merely replied, "All I can say is that you are free to go." Salutes and handshakes were again exchanged and the tour team departed. At all times relations were cordial.

13 Nov 67 While travelling along the PRENZLAU Autobahn, a USMLM team was kept under surveillance by two MFS cars. One of the MFS agents made threatening gestures in the direction of the USMLM team. The USMLM officer, aware of the dangerous tactics recently employed by the MFS, proceeded to the PRENZLAU Kommandatura where he reported the illegal activities of the MFS, and requested that the Soviets direct the MFS agents to desist from further aggressive and dangerous activity. A Soviet Captain called SERB in POTSDAM and then informed the tour officer that COL Pinchuk, Chief of SERB, recommended that the tour return to POTSDAM so that Chief USMLM could make a report to SERB. Disregarding this recommendation, the tour team proceeded to NEUSTRELITZ. The tour continued to be followed and harassed by the MFS. The tour officer again protested this time to the NEUSTRELITZ Commandant. Receiving no satisfaction, the tour continued on with the tail vehicles following at a more discreet distance.

29 Nov 67 While enroute to DRESDEN, accompanied by two persistent MFS tail vehicles, a USMLM team entered a wooded area. A tail vehicle followed the tour into the woods. The tour officer directed the driver to exit on a single lane road, causing the tail vehicle to back off. The MFS vehicle was struck as the tour car slid on the wet grassy surface, giving the tail car a glancing blow on its right front fender. A cursory glance revealed a slight dent to the fender and chrome strip of the East German vehicle. The USMLM car was undamaged. The MFS continued surveillance for only another ten to fifteen minutes following the incident, making no attempts to harass or detain the USMLM team.

19 Dec 67 While proceeding south on Route 5 at 1630 hours, a USMLM tour attempted to pass a civilian truck. An oncoming motorcycle was not seen until the tour car was abreast of the truck. Due to the icy condition of the road, an attempt to get back into the right lane resulted in a collision with a tree. No personal injuries were sustained, but the car was immobilized. A routine investigation by VOPOs followed, and the Soviet Commandant from RATHENOW was summoned. The latter assisted the tour officer in contacting USMLM, after which he listened to details of the accident from both VOPOs and USMLM officer. He was very concerned that the truck or motorcycle driver might be partially at fault, but when reassured that USMLM officer had no complaint against them allowed the tour to proceed.

A BUSY MONTH

(S) Admittedly the month of September is a busy month for the Soviets, for the East Germans, and for USMLM. During this month, the USMLM collection effort was focused on visiting targets and installations which have not been reported on for ninety days, on the covering of maneuver activities associated with Temporary Restricted Areas, and on observing strategic railroad lines associated with troop rotation.

During this period the 37 tour teams dispatched spent 55 touring days covering military activity in the Soviet Zone of East Germany. Nineteen of the tours came under hostile surveillance. Two of the teams were detained by Soviet authorities.

The tour teams observed 87 military columns on the move, 47 military trains, one ship, 618 "teeth weapons" such as tanks, artillery, armored personnel carriers and missiles. In addition, 6 bivouac sites, and 5 military construction sites were visited. There were 25 sightings of troop training in progress. Twenty-eight air fields were visited and 14 instances of flying activity were observed.

As a result of USMLM tour team observations, 3 Special Intelligence Collection Requests were answered, 212 military installations were reported upon, and 3 new installations were discovered.

Seven tour teams returned with more than 119 separate items of Soviet and East German material, including such items as weapons manuals, an East German communications journal, a door panel (gas impregnated) from a chemical defense bunker, a radio chassis, and an East German fin-stabilized 105mm rocket round.

These activities were reported on in 35 intelligence reports which included 153 photographs of Soviet and East German equipment.

TOURING STATISTICS

Month	Tours	One-Day Tours	Two-Day Tours	Three-Day Tours	Total Tour Days	Mileage
Jan	35	15	20	0	55	16,030
Feb	27	10	16	1	45	13,433
Mar	43	20	21	2	68	22,265
Apr	33	12	19	2	56	18,050
May	45	28	16	1	63	20,925
Jun	43	18	24	1	69	25,795
Jul	49	29	19	1	70	26,107
Aug	48	23	24	0	75*	24,605
Sep	37	19	18	0	55	17,958
Oct	48	18	30	0	78	24,831
Nov	46	24	22	0	68	18,611
Dec	32	17	15	0	47	14,247
TOTAL	486	233	244	8	749	242,857

*One (1) four day tour

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
Incidents	1	0	1	0	4	1	1	2	1	6	2	1	20*
Detentions	3	1	2	2	1	0	1	2	2	2	2	0	18**

*Of these 17 or 85% involved East Germans

**Of these 10 or 56% were initiated by members of GSFG

PART IV Soviet and East German Armed Forces









SOVIET GROUND FORCES

(S) During 1967 there were indications of a possible change in the GSFG training cycle. Observations indicated that more emphasis is being placed on Soviet field training and combined arms exercises. The seven TRA's imposed during February and March seemed to confirm that after a relatively short period of general troop orientation, training progressed rapidly from battalion to regimental and possibly divisional level. The usual lull in training during the spring months continued through 1967 with the GSFG engaged in inspections and remedial training. However, by early May, it became evident that GSFG was ahead of the normal training cycle. Beginning with a small probable GSFG CPX during the middle of May, which led into the joint GSFG/EGA/POLISH/NGF CPX in late May and early June, Soviet ground forces continued a very high level of training by conducting several divisional and inter-army FTX's screened by ten TRA's. Also, there were indications that some units of both GSFG and EGA may have participated in a WARSAW Pact maneuver in Hungary during the latter part of September.

There were also indications that the GSFG troop rotation program began earlier than usual, in late July. Tri-Mission surveillance of the COTTBUS/FINSTERWALDE rail line during three separate one-week periods in September, October, and November did not reveal the expected massive shift of recruits and three-year veterans. It is possible that the Soviets were attempting to stagger the introduction of new recruits to lessen the obvious drop in combat readiness incurred by the rotation of approximately one-third of the seasoned troops in GSFG during the last quarter of the calendar year. This could account for the very rapid progression of GSFG from small unit, close-in training to battalion, then regimental, and then divisional level during the first quarter of 1967.

Perhaps the most significant equipment sighting in 1967 was the first sighting of the FROG-7 and the probable wheeled SCUD. Several new vans, primarily on URAL-375 chassis, as well as the introduction in significant numbers of the URAL-377 and the ZIL-131, the replacement for the ZIL-151/157 series, give GSFG a much greater cross-country mobility for both logistical support and for Front communications and

electronics. During 1967, the 122mm Howitzer (D-30) and the 152mm Howitzer (D-20) continued to appear in significantly increasing numbers. It is probable that the equipping of most or all of GSFG divisions with these newer artillery pieces is now complete.

During 1967 the introduction of the wheeled Transporter Erector Launcher for FROG and SCUD SSM systems, and the hardening of alert positions near installations containing FROG and SCUD units significantly increase the tactical mobility and combat readiness of GSFG for either conventional or nuclear warfare. There were no indications that the turmoil along the Sino-Soviet border, the Vietnam War, or the Arab-Israeli Conflict had any visible effect on the status of or the present accepted troop strength of GSFG.

SOVIET AIR FORCES

(S) During 1967 the 24th Tactical Air Army maintained a high state of readiness throughout its forces, significantly strengthening its air defenses across the zone. A new weapons system, the SA-3 surface-to-air missile, and a network of border radar sites were installed to cover and counter a low-altitude threat from the West. A new aircraft was introduced into tactical air units. Most air units were once again observed actively engaged in mobility and tactical training exercises throughout the spring, summer and fall. Some of these mobility exercises were directly related to joint operations during the imposed TRA's.

Air Defense. This year witnessed the most significant expansion and strengthening of Soviet air defenses in East Germany since the introduction of the SA-2 surface-to-air missile system several years ago. The most dramatic development was the appearance of the SA-3 surface-to-air missile system, which previously was known to be operational only in the Soviet Union. During the latter half of 1967 SA-3 sites were constructed near each Soviet operational airfield in East Germany. Concurrent with the construction of the sites, a vastly improved network of new permanent radar sites was constructed and equipped along the east-west German borders. The latest Soviet operational radar equipment, such as the "SQUAT EYE" and "THIN SKIN", along with

older but reliable equipment was installed at these new sites and at old sites already situated in general proximity to the borders. These sites were all hardened and are now operational. While no new air defense fighter aircraft were introduced into the inventory during this year, new equipment appeared on the FISHBED F (modified) and the MONGOL B. The true purpose of this equipment is still being evaluated. In view of the above developments the following can be stated: The low-altitude intercept capability of the SA-3 will enhance force survivability at each airfield defended by this weapon system; the border sites will provide greater depth in defense along with more accurate low-altitude radar coverage in areas where Soviet defenses have been weakest; aircraft equipped with new systems probably possess increased capabilities for their assigned roles, whether for air defense or tactical ground support.

Tactical Air. The most significant development of the year in the tactical air forces was the introduction of the "MOUJIK" aircraft. While only two "MOUJIKS" have been seen so far, the aircraft's true role is still not clear. Being a two-seated modified version of the FITTER Fighter-Bomber, its most likely role appears to be a trainer. However, not until additional "MOUJIKS" are seen and the type of activity in which they engage is more fully demonstrated will the aircraft's true mission be known. Mobility of fighter-bomber units was amply demonstrated throughout the year beginning as early as March. Of particular interest were deployments by FITTERS to the prepared natural surface airfields. New bombing tactics by FITTER aircraft were observed for the first time over a bomb range. Low altitude, over-the-shoulder bomb-release techniques were observed with at least one clearly-viewed air burst seen erupting into a mushroom-shaped cloud. The appearance of larger training bombs and new delivery tactics suggest FITTERS may now be training for nuclear-bomb delivery missions. Two more BREWER Light Bombers were seen fitted with wing appendages which appeared to be auxiliary engines. The first so equipped BREWER was seen at Finow Airfield in 1966. The purpose of the appendages is still not known. Two Light Bomber regiments, one equipped with BREWERS and the other equipped with BEAGLES, switched bases and have operated normally from their new bases since mid-year when the moves first became apparent.

Other Significant Observations: During the latter half of 1967, a vast program of airfield and radar site defense expansion/hardening was in evidence at all airfields and sites observed. Revetments and camouflaging were being erected for each aircraft and piece of radar equipment at primary bases and sites. Anti-aircraft guns fortified airfield and radar site defenses for greater force survivability and effectiveness.

SOVIET NAVAL FORCES

During 1967, the participation of ships of the Baltic Fleet in the joint naval parade at WARNEMUENDE in honor of the 50th anniversary of the Russian October Revolution highlighted the Naval scene. The ships and boats, under the command of Vice Admiral Savalyov, Chief of Staff of the Baltic Fleet, included three diesel powered submarines, one of which carried missiles, a large subchaser-type "KASHIN", destroyer escorts-type "MIRKA", "OSA" type guided missile boats and large motor torpedo boats-type "SHERSHEN".

EAST GERMAN GROUND FORCES

During 1967 the four Motorized Rifle Divisions, two Tank Divisions and eight Frontier Brigades of the East German Army (EGA) did not deviate noticeably from their normal dual-cycle training schedule. As in past years, with the recruits having been inducted in late 1966, early 1967 saw battalion and probable regimental level training away from home stations on a rotational basis. It included AAA, Artillery, Motorized Rifle, Tank, Engineer and Signal units. In March, during TRA's 5 and 6, Signal elements of the EGA and GSFG jointly occupied a temporary electronics site. Photography subsequently revealed that the EGA possesses the R-405. During the second quarter of 1967, the normal lull in training prevailed prior to the induction of new recruits and the preparations for the MAY DAY Parade. EGA Signal units participated in the joint GSFG/POLISH/EGA CPX that took place toward the end of May and continued into June. During the summer and early fall, the training progressed from regimental to divisional and Military District level, apparently culminating with some participation in the 50th Anniversary Parade. After the introduction of new recruits in early November, the EGA resumed its characteristic year-end small unit close-in training.

Observations prior to and during the MAY DAY Parade indicated that the EGA is being re-equipped with the 100mm Field Gun (M-55) at the divisional Artillery level, and with the 130mm Field Gun (M-46) at the Military District level. Another rather significant piece of equipment appearing for the first time in East German hands was the BTR-60PB. This turreted APC is appearing in Motorized Rifle units and 1968 should see these in increasing numbers. The BTR-60PB will probably replace the BTR-152. The AARV M-1966 appeared in greater numbers in both the Motorized Rifle Division and Tank Division during 1967. URAL-375 and some of the newer Soviet wheeled vans continued to appear and are definitely updating the EGA signal and electronics capabilities. The EGA is also augmenting its cargo carrying capability with the addition of the Hungarian CSEPEL D-705N with a two tank semi-trailer for probable use in engineer construction units. The CZECH TATRA-813 8 X 8 tractor was also observed in increasing numbers during 1967. The 4 X 4 W50-LA also made its expected appearance in the EGA in 1967.

The East German Army is led by a hard core of apparently politically reliable professionals, many of whom are Communist Party members. Patterned after the Soviet system and aided by Soviet advisors the East German Army spends a large proportion of its time in realistic field training. Today the EGA can be considered as adequately equipped, well trained, well organized and capable of supplementing overall Soviet operations.

EAST GERMAN AIR FORCE

The East German Air Force (EGAF) continued to improve its primary mission - air defense - posture and state of readiness. Most significant was the introduction of the FISHBED F and MONGOL B into the operational and training inventory. The Cottbus Air Defense Regiment received the latest model FISHBED while Rothenburg, a training base, was first to receive the MONGOL B Trainer. The Jocksdorf Air Defense Regiment, FLYING FISHBEDS C/E, was observed for the first time engaging in tactical ground support, using air-to-ground rockets over a local gunnery range. During an exercise period the Dahme radar site was configured into a full GCI site with air-to-ground voice and data link communications. Prior to the exercise it served

primarily as an air warning radar site. Other radar sites have gained new equipment, increasing their capabilities within the EGAF air defense system. A contingent of Czech Air Force FISHBEDS F deployed to Cottbus Air Base in early spring. This was the first confirmation of FISHBEDS F in the Czech Air Force. This was also the first such deployment from another Warsaw Pact country to an EGAF Air Base in recent years. The Base at Alteno-Luckau, under construction since 1965, now appears to be completed. However, no aircraft or operational equipment has been observed on the airfield to date.

EAST GERMAN NAVAL FORCES

(S) In 1967 the most significant naval event was the fleet parade in honor of the 50th Anniversary of the Russian October Revolution. No new classes of ships participated, however, the EGN showed for the first time modified versions of the "ILTIS" LTS boats and "OSA" guided missile boats. It was announced at the parade that the CINC EGN and several senior officers and enlisted men were recently familiarized with the "MIRKA" class DE which might be expected to replace the fifteen year old "RIGA" class DE. The increased number of paraded subchasers and guided missile boats reflect the consistent growth of the EGN.

PART V Summary of Significant GSFG-EGA Activities



(C) EG DIRECT FIRE POSITION



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

(C) CBR TRAINING

(C) EG MARCH TO TRAINING AREA

(S) The first quarter of 1967 saw extensive out-of-garrison activity involving elements of both Soviet and East German ground and air forces. During the first month of 1967, Soviet ground forces engaged in small unit training in local training areas consisting of small arms practice, artillery crew drill, communications, and driver school. No TRA's were imposed and considerable engineer training took place at the ELSTER/GALLIN, SANDAU and PRETZSCH river crossing sites. During the period the EGAF received several FISHBEDS F at COTTBUS Air Defense Base. This was the first appearance of this first-line fighter in the EGAF inventory. January also saw the RIEMSDORF East German radar site acquire the BAR LOCK radar as a replacement for the BIG BAR. The former radar is the current primary GCI radar used by the Soviet and East German Air Forces. Of additional interest was the sighting of an EGAF FISHBED D carrying an unidentified air-to-air missile, probably a modified Soviet missile.

February was characterized by a rapid increase in the training level of GSFG. By the middle of the month, regimental and divisional combined arms exercises were taking place. Elements of the Twentieth Guards Army, including the 19th Motorized Rifle Division and probably 14th Guards Motorized Rifle Division; elements of the Third Shock Army, including the 10th Guards Tank Division; elements of Second Guards Army, to include 32nd Motorized Rifle Division, 94th Motorized Rifle Division, and probably 9th Guards Tank Division; and elements of First Guards Tank Army, including 21st Guards Motorized Rifle Division, were involved in exercises during the month. Four TRA's were imposed and all but one screened significant Soviet activity. TRA 1-67 (6 - 9 Feb) apparently screened East German Military District III exercise activity; there was no evidence of Soviet participation. TRA 2-67 (10-13 Feb) screened a probable Air Defense exercise involving elements in northern East Germany. TRA 3-67 (13 - 17 Feb) extended a portion of TRA 2-67 and apparently screened a small exercise involving Second Guards Army. TRA 4-67 (25 Feb - 5 Mar) screened activity involving the Eighth Guards Army in southwestern East Germany. Elements of the 21st Guards Motorized Rifle Division and First Guards Tank Army were also observed preparing to enter the TRA near HALLE.

TRA's during the month of March continued at a record-setting pace, but apparently screened no major Soviet ground activity. Toward the



(C) A SOVIET BREWER



(C) THE FRESCO C



(C) NEW RECONNAISSANCE POD
ON
THE FISHBED F MODIFIED

end of the quarter the training level had declined to low-level small unit training, indicating that perhaps GSFG had moved too rapidly and had to re-evaluate the quality of this level of training. On 1 March at least 18 Soviet FITTER aircraft, thought to be from GROSSENHAIN Airfield, deployed to the ZERBST Air Defense Base. Also, at least two EGAF FARMER aircraft were seen flying at this base. While it is not usual for tactical fighter-bombers to deploy to air defense bases, it is most unusual to see EGAF aircraft at a Soviet airfield and it might have been indicative of a joint air exercise. TRA 5-67 (7 - 11 Mar) screened an East German exercise involving 1st Motorized Rifle Division and elements of the Berlin Border Brigades. TRA 6-67 (13 - 16 Mar) probably screened a joint communications CPX involving Soviet, East German, and Czechoslovakian signal units. Allied Missions, however, saw little to indicate any sizable participation by GSFG or the East German Army. TRA 7-67 (16 - 18 Mar) extended TRA 6-67 and probably screened homeward movement of any participating units. On 10 March a WERNEUCHEN-based BREWER B, number 11, was observed similarly configured as the FINOW-based BREWER B, number 01, with two wing appendages, possibly auxiliary engines, located where external wing tanks are normally located. This is the first time since 26 October 1966, when BREWER B 01 was first seen with the two new appendages, that a similarly configured aircraft was observed. Five days later, BREWER B 02 was observed flying at FINOW and was configured exactly like BREWERS B 01 and 11 with the two unidentified wing appendages, thought to be auxiliary engines. These three aircraft are the only ones observed so configured, and none have been seen since then. At least a squadron of FINOW-based BREWERS were observed taking off from the BRIESEN-BRAND BEAGLE Base, indicating that the aircraft had deployed to BRIESEN BRAND early during the month of March from FINOW. Deployment of light bombers is infrequent.

The second quarter of 1967 was highlighted by a joint CPX during late May and early June. April was characterized by the normal lull in training for spring inspections, with a complete absence of TRA's. Soviet ground forces engaged in engineer training at ELSTER/GALLIN and DRESDEN, as well as small communications exercises and artillery crew drill in local training areas. East German ground forces were primarily concerned with preparation for the MAY DAY Parade.



(C) THE THIN SKIN IN TRANSIT



The closing of the West Ring Autobahn between 11 and 15 April gave the Allied Missions a preview of the equipment to be paraded in EAST BERLIN. Three significant air sightings were made during the month. On 20 April Czechoslovakian Air Force FISHBEDS F deployed to COTTBUS EGAF Base. This was the first observed deployment in recent years to East Germany by Czech aircraft and the first evidence of FISHBEDS F in the Czech Air Force. On 22 April EGAF FRESCOS possibly from NEUBRANDENBURG, deployed to DRESDEN KLOTZSCHE. This deployment by operational aircraft was unusual in that DRESDEN KLOTZSCHE is not known to be an operational base but rather a major repair depot for EGAF jet aircraft. On 28 April MONGOLS B were first observed in the EGAF at ROTHENBURG. This training base, located at the Polish border, is rarely visited because of its inaccessibility (in the border PRA and a long distance away from the usual touring areas). April also saw the first USMLM sighting of a Soviet THIN SKIN height-finding radar in transit. Subsequent sightings of this radar in transit were indicative of the expected extensive deployment of this newest height-finding radar, especially along border areas in conjunction with the concurrent SQUAT EYE deployment.

The MAY DAY Parade in EAST BERLIN revealed the presence of the Soviet built 100mm Field Gun (M-55), and verified that the Military District Artillery units had received Soviet built 130mm Field Guns (M-46). Allied Mission efforts to trace the homeward movements of EGA units revealed that the 2nd SCUD Brigade, probable elements of the 18th SAM Regiment, 9th Tank Division, and Military District V Artillery Regiment, participated in the parade. During the early part of May, elements of the 34th Artillery Division rotated to the JUETERBOG PRA for probable firing. Elements of the 6th and the 10th Guards Tank Divisions, 14th and 21st Guards Motorized Rifle Divisions, 19th Motorized Rifle Division, and 2nd GSFG Engineer Ponton Assault Regiments (35 and 36) rotated to the field for training and probably participated in TRA 8-67 (10-15 May) which apparently screened a Third Shock Army maneuver. On 12 May the simultaneous deployment of WITTSTOCK and GROSS DOELLN Air Defense Fighter Regiments was observed and was most probably associated with the TRA. The WITTSTOCK-based FISHBEDS D/F and FARMERS B deployed to the RETZOW prepared natural surface airfield where they operated as an alert unit for at least two days. Numerous aircraft scrambles were observed. The GROSS DOELLN-based FISHBEDS D deployed to WITTSTOCK. This was a









(C) POLISH FORCES MOVE
INTO
EAST GERMANY

unique observation, for rarely does a Mission tour catch two units in a deployment in a single touring period. The WITTSTOCK-based unit showed a high level of proficiency while operating from the grass strip over the two day period. Toward the end of the month elements of probably all GSFG Signal Regiments and 2nd EGA Signal Regiment engaged in a joint Soviet, East German, and Polish CPX in northern East Germany. Preliminary movements were not screened by a TRA, enabling Allied Missions to determine that more than 1000 Polish vehicles along with some belonging to Northern Group of Forces moved into northeastern East Germany. This probable Front CPX was apparently under Polish control. It should be noted that the bulk of GSFG is deployed in the central and southern part of East Germany, and a Polish controlled CPX represents a realistic control of deployable troops in the event of hostilities. TRA 9-67 (30 May - 5 Jun) screened homeward movements of participating WARSAW Pact forces. May also saw the introduction of an improved ECM antenna, called BARBRICK, at the LUDWIGSLUST ECM Site. BARBRICK probably has a function similar to that of MESHBRICK, which it may either replace or supplement.

The WARSAW Pact CPX continued until 5 June with indications of a probable missile deployment (FROG and SCUD), associated with the normal counterattack phase of a maneuver. Mission coverage of the homeward movement of Polish forces revealed that their vehicles, equipment, and clothing were in very good condition. Their march discipline was excellent and their reaction to USMLM tour vehicle and personnel, for the most part, could probably be best described as cool reserve. Perhaps most interesting to note is that only traffic regulators were observed under arms, and even the close reconnaissance of a temporary Polish communications site did not reveal any armed troops. During the remainder of the month training remained primarily at divisional level. The Soviets established tactical march routes east and west of the JUETERBOG PRA, and continued the rotation of artillery, engineer, armor, and infantry units into the field for training. USMLM tours spent a considerable amount of time mapping these march routes and toward the end of June a probable 20th Guards Army exercise, involving elements of the 19th Motorized Rifle Division, 14th Guards Motorized Rifle Division, and possibly 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Division utilized these march routes. The activity was not screened by a TRA.







(C) TWO SLEEPING SOVIET SOLDIERS
IN
BATTERED GAZ 46 (MAV)
-RESULT-
ONE SEM-1 (PROTECTIVE MASK)

On 19 June elements of probably two of these divisions initiated the exercise with a westward movement from the JUETERBOG PRA to ALTENGRABOW. On 23 June the participating units returned to JUETERBOG along the same routes and then moved east to the LEISSNITZ Training Area where amphibious training continued until early July. Elements of the Second Guards Army, including the 32nd Motorized Rifle Division; elements of Third Shock Army, including the 10th Guards Tank Division and 207th Guards Motorized Rifle Division; and elements of 1st Guards Tank Division conducted out-of-garrison training. There were indications that Eighth Guards Army units, including elements of 39th Guards Motorized Rifle, 20th Guards Tank and/or 57th Motorized Rifle Divisions were involved in field training in the LOSSA PRA. The semi-annual induction of troops into the East German Army in early May relegated EGA activity to small-unit low-level training during June.

On 3 June a USMLM tour officer obtained an ShM-1 (protective mask) from a Soviet truck containing two sleeping Soviet soldiers. On 6 June JUETERBOG-based FISHBEDS D/F deployed to REINSDORF prepared natural surface airfield for a one-day operation. Observation of the deployment and subsequent activity indicated the high level of proficiency and training achieved by this unit at mid-year. On 12 June a Soviet cargo truck belonging to Northern Group of Forces was photographed in POTSDAM. On 13 June the NEURUPPIN-based FRESCO Regiment deployed to TUTOW Reserve Airfield while the NEURUPPIN airfield runway was being repaired. It operated from TUTOW until early December when it returned to NEURUPPIN.

The third quarter of the year was highlighted by the appearance of the SA-3 GOA surface-to-air missile, extensive employment of the SQUAT EYE and FLAT FACE radars at sites along the periphery of East Germany, and extensive ground and air activity.

Two TRA's highlighted Soviet activity during the month of July and probably served as practice for headquarters units for the expected FTX's of late summer and early fall. TRA 10-67 (10-15 Jul) screened an air defense exercise involving communications elements of the Twenty-Fourth Tactical Air Army and signal elements of First Guards Tank Army, Second Guards Army, and Eighth Guards Army. Army



(C) SQUAT EYE FEEDING INTO FLAT FACE VAN



signal elements apparently deployed to practice for the GSFG CPX screened by TRA 11-67 (20 - 30 Jul) which involved headquarters and signal units of all five GSFG Armies. On 5 July ALTENBURG-based FISHBEDS D and FRESCOS D deployed to MERSEBURG Airfield. This large deployment was notable in view of another deployment which took place the following day involving the new FISHBEDS F MODIFIED. On 6 July, during the course of local flying and eventual deployment by the ALTENBURG-based FISHBEDS F MODIFIED, a new reconnaissance pod and wing tip appendage was observed on this aircraft. The aircraft deployed to ALLSTEDT Reserve Airfield during this period where they remained through 31 December 1967. This unit is unique because no other unit in the Soviet Zone has FISHBED F MODIFIED aircraft, and, while it is believed to have a primary role of reconnaissance, it has also been seen carrying air-to-air missiles as well as rocket pods. During the early part of July, a T-62 was observed in a rail siding north of NEUSTRELITZ leading to speculation that the 9th Guards Tank Division may have been equipped with this tank. Soviet training during the month remained at divisional level with the probable rotation of regimental size units to the field. East German Army training had progressed to regimental level with indications that units of Military District III may be preparing to take part in an FTX in August. The only paratroop unit in East Germany, the EGA 5th Battalion, was observed jumping near BARTH in early July. There were also indications that the 1967 Troop Rotation Program may have begun in late July with Pendel trains observed in some main marshaling areas. On 26 July, BEAGLES, belonging to the BRIESEN BRAND Regiment, were observed flying from FINOW - a BREWER base. At first this was thought to be a deployment, but at a later date, BREWERS, normally based at FINOW, were observed flying at BRIESEN BRAND. Since neither unit has returned to its former home base as of 31 Dec 1967, it is now believed that the units exchanged bases. On 28 July, the tie-in between the SQUAT EYE and FLAT FACE radars was confirmed at the Soviet radar site at PRITZWALK. SQUAT EYE radar cable was observed and photographed leading into a FLAT FACE van, establishing the relationship and function of the SQUAT EYE. This was most important since SQUAT EYE radars had appeared at numerous sites in East Germany, and it is now estimated that the SQUAT EYE is an antenna for the FLAT FACE, giving it a significantly improved low-altitude tracking capability.



(C) AERIAL BOMB BURST AFTER A LAB RELEASE BY A SOVIET FITTER FIGHTER BOMBER



Training during the month of August continued at a high level in East Germany, and culminated in a joint GSFG/EGA FTX screened by TRA 12-67 (13 - 19 Aug) involving elements of the Second Guards Army, including 32nd Motorized Rifle Division and probably elements of the 9th Guards Tank Division, as well as elements of First Guards Tank Army, including units of 13th Heavy Tank Assault Division, and elements of Military District III. The Assault Gun Battalion of the Second Guards Army and elements of East German 7th Tank Division and 11th Motorized Rifle Division participated. TRA 13-67 (20 - 26 Aug) apparently screened an EGA FTX involving elements of Military District V, including elements of the 1st and 8th Motorized Rifle Divisions, and 9th Tank Division. There was little evidence of Soviet participation. During the remainder of the month elements of Military District III continued to train at divisional level with units of 11th Motorized Rifle Division involved in significant activity at KLIETZ and units of 7th Tank Division moving to JUETERBOG PRA. On 24-25 August ten GROSSENHAIN-based FITTERS deployed to the REINSDORF prepared natural surface airfield. The two-day observation period resulted in photography of detailed step-by-step procedures for Soviet utilization of natural-surface airfields. No apparent major activity took place in the Eighth Guards Army area, but units, probably regimental in size, continued to rotate to the field. There were no indications that the East German 4th Motorized Rifle Division was involved in any significant activity and most probably this unit rotated battalion or regimental size units to the field for training. On 4 August PARCHIM-based FITTER aircraft performed LABS (manuevers) over GADOW-ROSSOW bomb range with bombs which air burst, leaving a heretofore unseen mushroom-shaped cloud. This was the first observation of such bombing technique using air bursts with the appearances of a nuclear explosion-shaped cloud. The most significant sighting for the month was, however, the then unidentified Soviet construction west of BRIESEN BRAND Airfield. This construction site has subsequently developed into an SA-3 GOA site. Shortly thereafter similar observations were made generally west of Soviet Airfields at FINOW, KOETHEN, MERSEBURG, and WITTSTOCK.

GSFG training continued at a very high level during September with the major activity screened by the imposition of 4 TRA's. TRA 14-67 (17-26 Sep) completely closed southeastern East Germany to Allied



(C) NEW SOVIET TRAINER
THE MOUJIK

Mission travel and could possibly have screened movements of elements of GSFG and EGA to Hungary for a major WARSAW Pact FTX. TRA 14-67 was extended to 30 September and the autobahns were opened to Mission travel in the southeastern portion of the Soviet Zone, but no signs of extensive movement out of East Germany could be found. TRA 15-67 (21 - 28 Sep) screened an extensive river crossing exercise and probable FTX involving elements of Third Shock Army, including 10th Guards Tank Division, 25th Heavy Tank Division, and elements of Second Guards Army, including elements of 32nd Motorized Rifle and 9th Guards Tank Divisions. TRA 16-67 (27 Sep-4 Oct) screened exercise activity by Second Guards Army, including elements of 32nd Motorized Rifle and 94th Guards Motorized Rifle Divisions and possible related activity by Military District V. Active training of other Soviet and East German units continued during this period in JUETERBOG, ALTENGRABOW, and LETZLINGER HEIDE TRA's. Air activity during these TRA's consisted of joint air exercises by FIREBARS, FISHBEDS, FITTERS, and FARMERS. COCHSTEDT Airfield was used as a control point for these aircraft, which were seen flying at low altitude in formation. It is very unusual to see different types of aircraft from different Soviet bases flying in formation together. Of most significance was the appearance of a new aircraft, designated the MOUJIK, at the Soviet airfield near FINSTERWALDE on 5 September. The MOUJIK is presently believed to be a trainer version for the FITTER, and as of 31 December 1967, only two MOUJIKS have been observed at Soviet airfields.

East German training remained at approximately the same level as the previous month with probable regimental rotation to the field, including Military District artillery regiments, anti-aircraft artillery and engineer units. TRA 17-67 (30 Sep - 4 Oct) may have screened Twentieth Guards Army activity east of Berlin, including elements of the 19th Motorized Rifle and 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Divisions as well as probable elements of Military District V. Troop rotation had apparently begun in earnest with sightings of pendel trains at major grouping centers and pendel train movement on COTTBUS/FINSTERWALDE rail line.

On 15 September a probable East German Army flare rocket was recovered shortly after it was fired in a large training area near

(C) THE SAGGER



(C) THE 130MM FIELD GUN

(C) THE T 62



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

(C) THE 115MM ROCKET LAUNCHER

(C) THE BTR 60 PB

ANNABURG. The rocket round, still too hot to handle with bare hands, had traces of a light grease suggesting that the flare booster had recently been uncrated. During September and again in December, USMLM tours observed off-loading of new Soviet equipment in the port of ROSTOCK. These were principally the ZIL-130 series of cargo, van and dump trucks.

The last quarter of 1967 was highlighted by confirmation of the new construction sites as SA-3 sites, and by parades in EAST BERLIN, MAGDEBURG, ERFURT, DRESDEN, and ROSTOCK in honor of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Soviet October Revolution.

Of the two PRA's during the month of October, only one, TRA 18-67 (13-19 Oct) was connected with any significant GSFG activity. This TRA apparently screened an inter-army field exercise involving elements of First Guards Tank Army and Third Shock Army within a restricted area linking up JUETERBOG, ALTENGRABOW, DESSAU, LETZLINGER HEIDE, and TEMPLIN PRA's. Elements of 6th and 7th Guards Tank Divisions, as well as units of 10th Guards, 12th Guards and 25th Heavy Tank Divisions participated. The 36th Engineer Ponton Assault Crossing Regiment also supported the exercise during the river crossing phase. TRA 19-67 (26 - 29 Oct) screened the Soviet Baltic Fleet's visit to ROSTOCK in connection with the anniversary parade. East German activity during the month was confined to a 1st Motorized Rifle Division three-day exercise in the KLIETZ training area and live firing by the 11th Tank Regiment in WEISSWASSER training area. Toward the end of the month, preparation for the 29th October parades in the various cities, and the releasing of East German draftees at the end of the month significantly lowered the training level. At the EAST BERLIN October Revolution Parade, the East German Army for the first time displayed the SAGGER Anti-tank Guided Missile on the BTR-40P and the newest armored personnel carrier for motorized rifle units, the turreted BTR-60PB. The Soviets exhibited the Armored Amphibious Reconnaissance Vehicle (M1966), BTR-60PK and BTR-60PB, 115mm Rocket Launcher (M1964), 130mm Field Gun, SCUD B, and T-62 and T-10M tanks. This is the first time the newest Soviet medium tank, the T-62, and the T-10M heavy tank have been publicly shown in EAST BERLIN.











(C) THE SOVIET ARMY TRAVELS
WITH ALL THE COMFORTS
OF HOME

As of the end of the month, Allied Missions, in continuous week-long surveillances of the COTTBUS/FINSTERWALDE rail line once in September and once in October, observed ten pendel trains carrying an estimated 15,000 recruits into GSFG, and eight trains carrying an estimated 12,000 three-year veterans departing. October also saw the first known military field pipeline construction from KRIECHOW to FINSTERWALDE and across the DRESDEN Autobahn, a total of approximately thirty kilometers.

November saw the return to normal seasonal low-level training to both GSFG and the East German Army, but the imposition of two TRA's denied a sizable portion of East Germany to Mission travel. TRA 20-67 (4-12 Nov) apparently screened no military activity and was probably a Soviet reaction to the NATO exercise in north central West Germany. TRA 21-67 (10 - 13 Nov and later extended to 15 November) probably screened a field exercise by elements of First Guards Tank Army, Second Guards Army, Third Shock Army, and Eighth Guards Army on battalion or regimental level. This TRA very neatly linked the TEMPLIN, RATHENOW, LETZLINGER HEIDE, ALTENGRABOW, JUETERBOG, ANNABURG, ZEITHAIN, KOENIGS-BRUECK and RADEBERG PRA's; and the GRIMMA, WEIMAR and LOSSA PRA's to the border of West Germany. During the remainder of the month the training level dropped to the normal yearly low, with the Soviet and East German forces engaged in small unit close-in training. This comprised driver training, and squad and platoon drill, as well as artillery crew drill. As of 24 November, the Allied Mission efforts along the COTTBUS/FINSTERWALDE and TEMPLIN/EBERSWALDE rail lines resulted in sighting a total of 15 pendel trains, carrying an estimated 22,500 recruits arriving in GSFG; and 21 departing trains carrying an estimated 31,500 seasoned troops back to the Soviet Union. According to present holdings, approximately 85,000 troops should have rotated into GSFG and a corresponding number back to the Soviet Union, but indications are that the 1967 troop rotation program was not a normal one.

Although the first Mission sighting of the wheeled Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL) for the FROG-7 in GSFG was in May, it was not until late fall that the FROG-7 again appeared. On 21 November a large column, including four FROG-7 TEL and other ancillary vans and

cranes, was observed proceeding south through POTSDAM. Three days later a USMLM tour, on information from USAREUR, staked out Route 188 near FISCHBECK and observed a FROG column containing five FROG-7 exiting the LETZLINGER HEIDE PRA and proceeding to the RATHENOW PRA. Only one week later French and British tours observed FROG-7 on a train in WILDPARK near POTSDAM. Subsequent sightings indicate that at least one of these FROG-7 TEL off-loaded at WILDPARK and proceeded to KRAMPNITZ, entering Installation 261.

These numerous sightings in late fall led to speculation that perhaps all divisions of Third Shock Army may be equipped with this modern tactical weapon with a nuclear capability. Indications are that all GSFG divisions and possibly East German divisions will continue to replace the older FROG 3/4/5 series on tracked chassis with the newer, more mobile FROG-7 surface-to-surface missile system.

Both a British and a USMLM tour made possible wheeled SCUD sightings during the second quarter of 1967, but no subsequent sightings were made. It seems plausible, however, that GSFG SCUD Brigades should also be re-equipping with the newer wheeled TEL. This is based on the fact that the JS tracked chassis for the present GSFG SCUD surface-to-surface missile units is even less reliable than the newer PT-76 chassis for the older FROG 3/4/5 systems.

1968 should see the re-equipping of more FROG Battalions with the FROG-7 and confirmation of the wheeled SCUD TEL in GSFG. The increase in mobility, better built-in missile protection, and a significant reduction in maintenance because of introduction of the wheeled TEL give GSFG a much higher force capability in the event of a conventional or tactical nuclear war in central Europe.

During the last month of the year normal seasonal low-level training prevailed with the complete absence of TRA's. GSFG training consisted of small-unit training in local training areas including artillery crew drill and driver training. Near the end of the month elements of 19th Motorized Rifle Divisional Artillery moved to the field for a short deployment. East German Army training remained at the seasonal low level after the November induction of new recruits.

During the last half of 1967, Allied Missions visited new permanent border radar sites at several locations, including those at BADEKOW, BADERSLEBEN, BEHNSDORF, DAEHRE, HASSELFELDE, KALT-OHMFELD and MARKSUHL. Each site is similar in construction and is equipped with nearly identical gear: SQUAT EYE, THIN SKIN, SPOON REST, FLAT FACE, and a SCORE BOARD. At least one site has DISCONES, providing ground-to-air communications capability. In addition to these new sites, old sites already located near the East German/West German border have been similarly configured and equipped as the new sites. All sites have been hardened with revetments. The SQUAT EYE and THIN SKIN provide more accurate low altitude radar coverage in an area where the Soviets may feel their defenses are lacking. This capability should discourage Western aircraft from intruding into East German air space, a frequent accusation, and certainly provide more accurate and timely warning information.

The introduction of the low level SA-3 GOA Missile System into the Soviet Zone of Germany was perhaps the most important event in 1967, for it marked the first time that this system had been deployed outside the Soviet Union. New construction sites were first observed in August; however, the construction remained unidentified until November when British and French aerial photography revealed the developed site configuration as being SA-3. By December the three Missions had located sixteen construction sites identically configured and located generally to the west, northwest, or southwest of Soviet airfields. Those airfields located deep in PRA's have not been checked for SA-3 site construction, but it is assumed that there are at least five other SA-3 sites. Weekly visits to the located sites showed the progress on each site, and while some sites are not as far advanced as others, the entire construction program appeared to follow a close schedule of concurrent development. Towards the end of the year, SA-3 GOA launchers and related support equipment began to appear at several sites. The foregoing developments, as well as the general program of hardening radar sites and airfields, suggest that the Soviets have realized their vulnerability and the need to insure force survivability in the event of a war in Europe.

Throughout the year the Soviets maintained a high level of aircraft deployments to auxiliary airfields at locations accessible to Mission travel. Each airfield observed was maintained in a ready status, as evidenced by mobile communications units and airfield electronics, throughout the summer and fall seasons. This is possibly indicative of higher mobility requirements and more emphasis on training in dispersal and/or recovery. The East German Air Force, meanwhile, was not observed deploying to auxiliary airfields. Those known East German auxiliary airfields were either not properly prepared for air operations, or their construction status was such that they were not completed and ready for air operations.



(C) LOW BLOW RADAR
AT
SA 3 SITE

PART VI The Story Behind the Report

THE STORY BEHIND THE REPORT

(C) In the "Story Behind the Report" the tour officer invites the reader to share with him some of his experiences, some of his trials and tribulations, some of his frustrating moments, some of his excitement, some of his failures, and some of his successes.

HIGHLIGHTS OF A BUSY TWO-DAY TOUR

(C) The tour team departed on a regularly scheduled two-day trip with a requirement to check out previously sighted Polish R-400 radio sites and to reconnoiter suspect areas dictated by the orientation of existing sites. The purpose was to ascertain the complete temporary communications net established for a Warsaw Pact exercise.

At 1050 hours, the tour sighted a 75-vehicle Polish command post column which had just entered East Germany via the Prenzlau Autobahn. To obtain photos of the front and left side of the vehicles, the tour traversed the column head-on. The column was then re-run from the rear to obtain rear photos and vehicle registration numbers (VRNs). After ascertaining the march route of the column by tracing down traffic regulators (TRs), the tour took up a concealed position in a wooded area to obtain pictures of the seldom-photographed right side of the vehicles. The column was then followed into the vicinity of the Templin PRA. Enroute, the tour stumbled into a main assembly area and communications headquarters in the Goetschendorf/Alt Templin area. A very relaxed picnic type atmosphere dominated the scene. For example, three Polish soldiers, stripped to the waist, were having lunch at a table complete with table cloth. This banquet was set up at the base of an R-401 mast. Two Polish TRs and a Soviet TR were positioned in the area. The Poles frantically attempted to stop the tour while the Soviet, amused by their efforts, saluted the tour with his baton and gave a very snappy command to continue on. A VOPO on a motorcycle finally chased the tour away from the area. Later that afternoon a Soviet train containing 10 "M" wagons with troops and a minimum of 15 miscellaneous command/communications vans was observed

in the Waren railroad siding. That same evening the tour ran into a 28-vehicle missile column proceeding north on Route 5 in the vicinity of Pessin. Once again, the tour ran the column head-on and among other equipment noted two probable WHEELED SCUD missiles. A heavy rainstorm and darkness (2300 hours) prevented positive identification. This was the first sighting of the WHEELED SCUD in East Germany. After running the column, tour made a 180 degree turn and attempted to re-run it. Due to backed-up civilian traffic, and the fact that the last Soviet vehicle (Zil-157 van) took up a blocking position, and moved back into his own lane only when forced to do so by on-coming traffic, tour was unable to re-run the column. The tour did, however, follow the column up to the Rathenow PRA.

(C) SOVIET COMMO COLUMN ON THE MARCH

Upon arriving back at the Potsdam House on the following afternoon, tour was directed to reconnoiter the Havelberg area. Earlier in the day a 150-vehicle column had been sighted from the air. As the tour got into the area at 2030 hours, it ran into a 91-vehicle command-post column. After running it head-on, tour followed the column to the edge of the Letzlinger Heide PRA, where it assumed an OP on Route 107 and at 2300 hours caught a similar 73-vehicle column following the same route. After running this second column tour was chased by a Soviet BTR-152. While fleeing north on Route 107, tour could see the approaching headlights of a third column. Realizing that it could not slow down and identify each vehicle in the column, especially with the BTR-152 in pursuit, tour took the first trail which offered some concealment. Unfortunately the trail taken was a sandy fire-break and the car immediately bogged down, but darkness prevented the Soviet pursuer from seeing the immobilized tour car. Fortunately, the tour officer had time to get to the road's edge and was able to identify the equipment and get the vehicle count of the on-coming convoy. While the tour officer observed the column, the driver extricated the car with the aid of cheater-boards and parked it in a position where it could not be seen from the road. The driver's prompt recovery of the vehicle probably prevented a detention, since the BTR-152 returned a few minutes later, checking all trails and examining the spot where the car had been stuck. From the new OP tour staked out for another two hours and observed another column of approximately 150 vehicles. By this time it was light enough for photography, so the driver took pictures while tour officer identified and counted. In all, over 400 vehicles were accounted for.

FROG-7'S MAKE A RUN FOR IT

(S) Acting on information from DCSI USAREUR that FROG missiles might be moving from the ALTENGRABOW training area to their home stations on the nights of 24-25 November 1967, USMLM mounted all available tours. A tour composed of two officers was instructed to stake out the TANGERMUENDE Bridge, across which all road traffic from the LETZLINGER HEIDE Training area must pass to return to home stations in northeast East Germany.

Arriving at the road junction on the east end of the bridge, the tour managed to slip by two Soviet traffic regulators and took up a position in the edge of the woods about 700 meters north of the road. Ninety minutes later, the lights of a long column could be seen coming across the Elbe River on the TANGERMUENDE Bridge. The procession of vehicles led by trucks with red flashing lights was visible from a distance of several kilometers. The tour officers waited tensely as the column approached its OP. The column slowed for its traffic regulators on the east bank and then set out rapidly for RATHENOW apparently in an effort to traverse the distance between the permanent restricted areas in as short a time as possible. Poor observation conditions forced the tour to leave OP, and as the column cleared the traffic regulators the tour fell in behind and began to pass the column, which was spread out and travelling fast. Having passed the administrative vehicles, tour reached the heart of the column: one FROG-7, then another, another, and another for a total of five eight-wheeled FROG-7 transporters and associated equipment.

The action was only beginning. Demonstrating security consciousness, excellent communications, and an ability to react quickly, the tail of the column spotted the tour, and radioed ahead. Suddenly, the tour was confronted by the head of the column with its vehicles halted and spread across the road, personnel dismounted and waving a stop signal. By careful maneuvering the driver managed to squeeze the car through the narrow opening between a tree on the road shoulder and the left flank vehicle of the road block. (The Soviet officer who had been standing in the gap had judiciously stepped aside at the last minute.) With the loss of only a side-mounted mirror and some dented and displaced chrome trim, the tour managed to get ahead of the column and continued to keep the column under observation until it entered the RATHENOW PRA.

MFS HARASSMENT

On 18 August 1967, a tour was dispatched to patrol one of the major routes that had been designated open for travel while TRA 12 was in effect. Approximately fifty kilometers NW of POTSDAM tour noticed that a white Chevrolet Impala convertible, known to belong to the MFS, was rapidly closing in. The tour officer instructed the driver to maintain his rate of speed until the intentions of the Impala could be determined. The Impala passed and tour noted that its two occupants were dressed in civilian clothing. Once in front of the tour car, the Impala began a maneuver of rapid deceleration then acceleration, bumper to bumper with tour vehicle. The tour driver was instructed to attempt to pass the Impala, but the Impala swerved from lane to lane obstructing the road. The Impala continued with these antics until the tour car inadvertently struck it in the rear. At this juncture the Impala came to a complete stop as did the tour car. Since there was no apparent damage to either vehicle, tour officer took this opportunity to pull in front of the Impala. Since the TRA restricted tour to the road, it was forced to engage in a high speed chase that ended at the entrance to Potsdam House. Tour waited there for two hours, then resumed touring.

The tour officer proceeded to reconnoiter the autobahns that surround Berlin in search of any military movement that might occur in conjunction with the TRA. In light of the previous episode with the MFS tour officer expected further surveillance. Not wanting to reveal the location of an unauthorized turn-off, which by-passed a permanent VOPO checkpoint along the autobahn south of Berlin, tour officer decided to proceed directly through the checkpoint. As the tour car was proceeding through the checkpoint a VOPO approached the car and provocatively struck the windshield with his traffic baton, shattering it against the windshield. At this point tour officer decided that this incident together with the earlier episode were sufficiently serious to warrant a return to West Berlin where these provocations could be reported to the Chief of Mission. Having made his report, tour returned to continue its trip. Approximately fifty kilometers from Berlin the tour once again became involved with the white Impala. This car was now teamed with a second MFS vehicle, a new

BMW 3200 sports coupe. These two cars worked together in attempting to entrap the tour car, leading to a chase at maximum speeds along the autobahn. This aggressive MFS surveillance was effectively thwarting the activities of the tour, and the tour officer decided to return to Berlin. This last chase continued up to the checkpoint leading to West Berlin.

COMMENT: This incident reflected the determination of the MfS to frustrate USMLM intelligence activities by employing high performance automobiles and using aggressive surveillance tactics. The growing stable of high performance, unmarked civilian MfS vehicles and especially their dangerous tactics later became of such concern to CINC USAREUR that he directed Chief USMLM to protest to the Soviets. (See Surveillance---Page 48)

(C) THE NOTORIOUS WHITE IMPALA

DETENTION IN WITTENBERG

(C) After a busy week of operational touring, two tour officers were dispatched on a weekend orientation and cultural trip to WITTENBERG. This city is known the world over as the LUTHER City, and in 1967 under strict management of the East German communist party celebrated the 450th Anniversary of the Reformation. The tour officers intended to visit and photograph the many historic locations connected with the reformation and which have made the city city a symbol of Protestantism throughout the world. Fortunately the city survived World War II with very little damage, and all Luther monuments remain intact.

The tour began innocently enough. The spacious WITTENBERG square was nearly deserted, a trickle of late shoppers could be seen going home, three Soviet soldiers were sight-seeing, and a group of children approached the tour car.

Tour officers walked past the 16th century Rathaus, and then decided to leave the square. At this point it was evident that their arrival had been noted by the VOLKSPOLIZEI. This was expected and normal, and the officers continued their sight-seeing. Entering the famous Schlosskirche where Luther had nailed his 95 Theses, they were cordially greeted by the elderly couple who work as guides. After a most interesting tour of the ground floor, tour was disappointed to learn that it was too late to visit the tower of the church. As it turned out, this was a fortunate misfortune! So, thanking the guides the tour officers left the church and strolled about the city, relaxed and happy.

This happy condition changed quickly. Arriving at the town square, the tour officers noticed a Soviet UAZ-69 (jeep) parked next to the tour car. A Soviet corporal ran over from the jeep and stated that the Commandant wanted to see the tour officers. They answered that if the Commandant wanted to see them he should send an officer to invite them. Chuckling gleefully, the corporal ran back with the message. In a few minutes, a Soviet Lieutenant Colonel approached. The Soviet officer greeted the officers, then demanded documents and requested them to follow him to the Kommandatura. Despite vehement protests, the tour officers had no choice but to acquiesce.



(C) THE SCHLOSSKIRCHE

The next 52 hours and 25 minutes were both interesting, painful, and informative. The tour officers found that the Mission car was a home away from home; that emergency rations and water are essential; that green-uniformed individuals do not appreciate USMLM liaison officers; that Soviet mentality is unpredictable; and that every Soviet move must be viewed with suspicion.

Lt Col Vasilyev, the Commandant of Wittenberg, was a swarthy, stocky, muscular man who exhibited an interesting Khrushchev syndrome. There were temperamental outbreaks, accompanied by desk pounding. In between the desk pounding and the temperamental outbreaks, he managed to charge the officers with photographing military objectives from the tower of the Schlosskirche. Denials would seemingly enrage him. He paced up and down the wooden floor of his office, hands behind his back, his face livid, his boots squeaking with every step he took. Abruptly his mood would change-he was a great actor- then artificial outbursts would give way to seemingly genuine pleading. All he wanted was for the tour officers to expose the film.

Lt Col Vasilyev repeatedly stated that he could not understand why the officers persisted in denying that they had been in the Schlosskirche tower, especially when he, himself, had stood next to them! Unbelievable!

Denying all charges, the officers protested that the Huebner-Malinin Agreement was being violated by the Soviets. The Commandant made a counter charge by stating that officers had violated the agreement by taking photographs. The officers asked if photographing was specifically prohibited by the agreement. Certainly, shouted the Commandant. At this point, the officers produced a copy of the agreement (each tour officer always carries a copy in three languages) and asked the Commandant to point out exactly where this was stated. The Commandant slowly read the entire document, scowled and threw the document on the table. He said that this could not be the agreement, and specifically attacked the signature block. He said that the block indicated a "Lt Col" MALININ in the Soviet side; he did not know of any "MALININ" and obviously a "LTC" could not make such an agreement. Tour officers took the document, read MALININ's full title- General POLKOVNIK (Colonel General). The Commandant then pointed to the spot where it stated in Russian "PODP M. MALININ", saying that "PODP" meant PODPOLKOVNIK (Lt Col)! Tour officers patiently pointed out that in this case it stood for "PODPISANNI" (signed by). To this day, the officers are not sure whether the Commandant was actually confused or whether he underestimated their knowledge of Russian.

At this point tour officer demanded, as was their right, to call Chief USMLM. As usual the Soviets started to evade the issue. After steadfastly demanding their rights, the officers were surprised to hear the Commandant order a captain to place the call. The Commandant, seeing the captain's incredulous face- (the captain, not the smartest man in the world, could not understand whether the Commandant really meant it or whether he was bluffing) said he would do it himself. After this there were many excuses, but no communication. By 2300, the matter had reached a stalemate. The Soviets would not allow the officers to communicate, and they would not give up the film. The officers spent the night in the car with a Soviet sentry keeping them company. When they awakened, they were instructed to park the vehicle in the Kommandatura court yard. Again refusing to give up film, they made ready to set up permanent housekeeping in the car.

They were under constant guard, but not really close scrutiny. They were, therefore, able to change the film in the cameras.

The Soviet guards proved rather interesting, and the officers noted their characteristics: the less friendly looking, the mustached, the Asiatic giant who resembled a USMLM driver- and was soon called Stan, and the small friendly blonde.

The blonde "Kolya", was the friendliest and most curious of them all. Obviously disobeying instructions, he would sneak up to the encampment when others were not about. The American car fascinated him. His wish was to drive it, and in return "offered" his UAZ-69. Kolya became so enthusiastic that he even suggested trading cars, or playing cards in the evening to see who would end up with the UAZ-69 and the Ford.

It was also interesting to observe the more than informal officer-enlisted relationship. A captain had just called for a private first class; hearing the captain call for him, the PFC shouted back in an indignant tone, "What for?"

On the second day of detention, a USMLM search tour arrived. Despite strict security and attempts to keep the detained officers away from the search officer, they conveyed to him that they were accused of being in the Luther tower, that the condition of release was to surrender the film, and that they had categorically refused and were prepared to refuse indefinitely (especially since the USMLM team brought more food and water).

Upon its return to Berlin, the search team reported the whereabouts of the missing tour officers and Chief USMLM began to negotiate their release. Acting on instructions from USAREUR to maintain the protest against the illegal detention but to secure the release of the officers, Chief USMLM drove to Wittenberg where he ordered the officers to expose their film. This was accomplished in a short ceremony in the presence of the Chief and Deputy Chief USMLM, the Commandant, and the tour officers. This was a most interesting and educational experience for the tour officers. Perhaps their next visit to Wittenberg will give them the opportunity to see the city from the Luther tower. They say the view is magnificent.

THE MAGDEBURG PARADE

(C) Not every detention is a victory for the other side. On the night of 25 November a tour team was sent to Magdeburg to attempt to observe a practice parade being held that night in preparation for the 50th Anniversary of the Revolution celebration. The practice had been announced in the local papers in the form of a notice that the streets in the center of the city were to be closed during that period.

The tour approached the city by autobahn, went past the city, and then entered the city by secondary roads from the west.

The location selected from the map for an observation point was occupied on the ground by a VOPO check-point. The tour tried another observation point in a back alley, but VOPO patrols had been alerted and the tour was flushed at about 2300. The alley led to a fork, one branch leading back to the autobahn and the road home, the other directly to the parade route which was, of course, barricaded. The tour officer elected to drive up to the parade route, knowing that he would be detained there, but hoping that he could get close enough to fulfill his mission. The tour went up the alley, made a right turn and drove directly up to the barricade on the parade route. The VOPO's were upset, and warned that the road was closed and that tour could not drive through. However, in reply to the tour officer's question, they said that they saw no harm in the tour's remaining parked at the curb. Also, a Soviet traffic regulator, responding to the Tour Officer's query about parking saw no harm in the tour remaining parked in the vicinity and made no move to interfere. A VOPO lieutenant added that he would, in fact, insist that the tour remain where it was until a Soviet officer from the Kommandatura arrived.

The only dissenter arrived a short while later in the form of an East German Army Lieutenant Colonel, who was very upset about an officer from USMLM sitting next to the parade route. He attempted to force the tour officer to sit in the tour car, and when that did not work, he attempted to cover both the car windows and the tour officer's head with blankets. The Colonel's attempts

notwithstanding, the tour still managed to get identification and equipment counts on the passing parade. Finally, when the officer from the Soviet Kommandatura finally did arrive the tour officer managed to elicit from him an invitation to attend the parade on the following Sunday.

Thus, as a result of this detention, the tour officer was able to submit a lengthy report on both the parade practice and the actual parade. In fact, through the kind offices of the Magdeburg Commandant the tour officer not only was able to view the parade (the only such parade observed by USMLM) but had the opportunity to talk with several Soviet officers and soldiers. A most worthwhile detention.

COMMENT: Attempts by other USMLM and British MLM officers to view parades in Dresden and Erfurt met with refusal by Soviets and escort from the city. Several days later, Chief USMLM, tongue in cheek, thanked Chief SERB for allowing tour to view Magdeburg parade and chided him about inhospitable treatment of tour in Dresden. Rather embarrassed, Chief SERB stated that this was a result of "local interpretations."

(C) ON PARADE

FOUND-LOST-FOUND

(C) One of the rules of engagement of the USMLM tour officer is that he will attempt to recover any Soviet Bloc materiel that he can successfully conceal in his tour car.

During the clean-up of a Temporary Restricted Area, a tour officer was fortunate enough to stumble upon an unattended reel of Soviet battle cable for which there was a high requirement by technical intelligence. The tour officer and driver manhandled the reel into the car, covered it with their GI blanket and proceeded back to Potsdam. Upon reflection, the tour officer decided that the battle cable could be mistaken by the Soviet checkpoint guards as a man being smuggled out of East Germany. He thereupon decided to take the cable off the reel, which he did, after which he disposed of the reel in a secluded stretch of Havel River. He then successfully reached Berlin with his prize. After the technical intelligence analysts had gotten over their initial exhilaration, they asked to see the reel. They were sickened to hear that the tour officer had disposed of it since it displayed the extremely important factory markings. After his explanation of why he had been forced to dispose of it they made a strong request for the tour officer to attempt to recover the reel. Tour officer returned to the disposal point, and, after much grappling, recovered the reel. With be back seat free of the usual tour impediments, he was able to conceal the reel. He once again returned to Berlin and thus became a complete man in the eyes of the analysts.



(C) BATTLE CABLE

DAS IST SCHLECHT

(C) At Blankenburg the tour diverted for a short visit to a 13th Century mountaintop outpost, carved from solid rock, which formerly guarded the border between Braunschweig and Prussia. The custodian, a former soldier, wounded in "the last five minutes of the war" on the "Russian front" limped up and enthusiastically engaged the tour in conversation. He had worked for the US Army and then for the British as a driver and maintenance man during the brief Allied occupation of the area west of the Elbe River. He asked how the Americans could possibly have fought for and occupied this territory and then have relinquished it to the Russians. In explaining the location and purpose of the fortress which looks over the rolling country and forests to the north, he explained: "Over there they are Prussians; over here, we are Braunschweigers, --but we can't go to BRAUNSCHWEIG!" For although Braunschweig lies but a short drive to the NW, the route there is blocked by the border of the Soviet Zone. "Das ist schlecht."

(C) SHADES OF WORLD WAR II

A QUICK HIT

(C) In early 1967 USMLM was advised that tropospheric scatter communication sites were being established in the Soviet Union and that such a system would probably be extended into the Soviet Zone of Germany for communication to the Headquarters of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. In May, USMLM was notified that a probable tropospheric scatter antenna was reported to have been constructed and installed near Zossen-Wuensdorf, the location of Headquarters GSFG. USMLM was directed to make an effort to obtain confirming identification and photography.

The site of the GSFG Headquarters is securely protected by Mission Restriction Signs. Further, considerable military traffic usually travels on the roads in that area. The terrain is very sandy and cross-country trafficability for USMLM sedans is difficult. Inasmuch as USMLM rarely penetrates the restricted area around Zossen-Wuensdorf, there was a paucity of knowledge concerning the road and trail net in the area.

The long hours of summer daylight, however, markedly increase the availability of time for observation and photography. This is especially true during the early morning hours between 0300 and 0600 when there is little traffic on the roads and few people about. The tour officer, therefore, decided to reach his target at 0400 when there is enough light for photography.

The tour officer conducted a detailed map study and conferred at length with the operations officer, who on a previous mission tour of duty had toured in the area. Then on a Sunday morning in early May, the tour officer passed through the perimeter of restriction signs and penetrated deep into the area of Soviet communications and electronics installations. On a rarely used trail, he reached a point near the location of the tropo-scatter antenna. Entering a hard-surface road he turned SW toward Wuensdorf, and after a short drive found himself within easy range of the antenna. He photographed the installation in detail, and made his way out of the area undetected.



(C) TROPOSPHERIC SCATTER COMMUNICATION ANTENNA

A CLOSE CALL

(C) During a routine check of the loading ramp and rail yards at Wildpark the tour observed a Soviet T-55 tank on a flatcar ready for shipping. Ever mindful of the requirement to determine whether or not the Soviets have developed an Armor Piercing Discarding Sabot Anti-Tank Round for their tank guns, the tour officer circumspectly approached the tank, in the dark, leaving the tour car in the shadows. Nearby was an M-wagon with smoke pouring out, but no soldiers were visible nor could any be heard. As the tour officer reached the flatcar, the sound of an AK submachine gun breech closing shattered the silence of the rail yard. The tour officer hastily dropped back down the rail embankment, then looked up to see a Soviet guard, weapon at the ready, peering down into the darkness. Making his way stealthily back to his vehicle, the tour officer mounted and departed.

(C) THE TANK

RANDOM THOUGHTS OF A NEW TOUR OFFICER

(C) After listening to all the "war stories" by the "old heads", everything and everyone looked hostile to me, a new tour officer, once I crossed Glienecke Bridge. Every farmer and shepherd that happened to pass the OP was surely an informer. Every VOPO, on foot, bicycle, moped, or in a Wartburg, was calling headquarters to set up a roadblock to clobber me. Somehow, I managed to get to the OP and back to Potsdam despite the reports of the informers and the "roadblocks." Those circuitous routes I selected must have avoided the "roadblocks", and those diversionary tactics must have thrown the "tails" off. My skill and cunning got me through, or could there have been some other reason for my success?

Once, while I was waiting for some activity, a suspicious looking shepherd drove his flock of sheep right past my OP. He asked me the time of day. I answered him cautiously, suspecting his motive, and noticed that he glanced at my vehicle number as he passed. A little later the shepherd rounded up his flock, took shelter from the cold wind, and broke out a broetchen for lunch. My driver and I were sipping tea. As he finished his broetchen I tossed him a pack of Winstons. (I knew I would have to use the OP again.) As he prepared to take his sheep in for the night, the shepherd passed the car, stopped, and chatted. He told me how long it took him to train his dogs, how the weather had been, about his brother in Milwaukee and about the pleasant time he spent in Maine as a POW during WWII. I found it difficult to believe that this man would be an informer. But that VOPO back at the intersection across from the Minol station had a sneaky, suspicious look. He looked right at my number as I passed. He surely took my number and will inform the MFS; but this time and the last trip I did not see any MFS.

That shepherd quite possibly was briefed to report the presence of Mission cars at that OP, but it's two to one that he has little regard for the Party functionary from the Central Committee. That VOPO at the intersection did have a sneaky look-especially for those mini-skirts on bicycles passing through his intersection. Sure he called your number in... after all the girls had gotten to work. Then after several successful trips without MFS tail cars I began to wonder whether

the East German regime's system is effective at all and just why it may not be as effective as they may wish. Also, I wondered who in East Germany is hostile towards me. I concluded that the government is hostile and would like to see the Missions hamstrung with itineraries and escorts, and harassed to the point of total ineffectiveness. But why doesn't this come about? And just who makes up the government of East Germany? The people you see on the streets and on the farms? Office holders elected by these people you see on every trip? The nobility who have held power for generations? Negative on all three. It seems the people of East Germany do not identify with their government at all. They seem to regard it as being made up of a bunch of sycophants who betrayed their country during World War II, and have since returned with an alien ideology of the hated, conquering enemy. Guns, tanks and bayonets keep them in power. This government must be foreign to most East Germans. The language of the government is not the language of the people. The slogans are not German, but stilted translations from Soviet Russian. The East German seems to be aware of the fact that his government does not have his interests, but those of a foreign power at heart. His actions indicate that this government is the tool of a bitterly fought and hated enemy. The government is to be feared, appeased, pacified, deceived and ridiculed, but is never to be served, respected or given loyalty. Perhaps this is why I continue to make it to the OP and back successfully.

(C) THE HOME OF A COMMUNIST INFORMER

A CONVERSATION

While in an OP intently scrutinizing a Soviet SA-3 site, the tour officer was surprised by an East German who approached very quietly from a blind spot to the rear. Seeing the binoculars and pointing to the missile site, the EG said "Ivan, eh? Go right ahead, take a good look, I won't bother you and I won't tell anyone." Hiding the glasses and trying to assume as "sanitized" a configuration as possible, the tour officer asked the EG if he smoked. The latter took the Winstons and pocketed them with profuse thanks while continuing to look at the site. "Those illegitimates!" he said. "They stole a bicycle in the village, rode it, broke it up and threw it away. They should go back to Russia, to China, the jungle, anyplace."

"What is that over there anyway?" asked the tour officer.

"Why, that's an anti-aircraft missile base."

"How do you know that?"

"Well, you see those mounds of earth? Those are launch ramps."

"Launch ramps! How do you know they are?"

"I was in the service too and I know a little about those things?"

"How deep are they?"

"About 3 meters from top to bottom."

"When did they start building the site?"

"In June (67) I was working, clearing the beet fields. Those ----- were so suspicious that they looked into every hole, expecting to find a bomb or something. They don't trust anyone. They don't even trust each other."

"How many men were working at the site?"

"I'd guess about 200."

"Where did they live?"

"Right on the place. They had some house trailers."

"Did they have passes into town?"

"No, they stayed right on the site. The first group left and a new bunch came in."

"Have you seen any missiles on the site?"

"No, I haven't, I don't think they have any yet."

"How about sentry dogs?"

"No, they don't have any dogs. Look! There they are again, those pigs, patrolling back and forth. Those dirty pork rind eaters!" He pointed to the Soviet sentry walking his post between the two security fences.

"Does this road go through?"

"No, it ends up there a little ways. Here, I'll show you how you can get out without trouble when you want to leave but go ahead and look, I have to go now."

The EG left with a cordial "Auf wiedersehen" and a wave of the hand. The tour also departed, wondering if the friendly native was the only one who discovered the tour in the OP.

PART VII Administration-Logistics-Training

*TDA E1-W1AUAA-00

TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION)
AND ALLOWANCES)
NUMBER E1-W1AUAA-00)

HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Washington, D. C.

UNITED STATES ARMY ELEMENT
UNITED STATES MILITARY LIAISON MISSION
TO COMMANDER IN CHIEF GROUP OF
SOVIET FORCES GERMANY

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SECTION I. GENERAL.....
ORGANIZATION.....
EQUIPMENT.....
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III. EQUIPMENT (Control List Major Items).....
IV. EQUIPMENT (Nonmajor or Noncritical Items)...
V. EQUIPMENT (Commercial Nontype Classified Items)
VI. EQUIPMENT (Required items from Applicable TA)

SECTION I. GENERAL

1. EFFECTIVE DATE:
2. LOCATION: Potsdam, Germany
3. ASSIGNMENT: Headquarters, United States Army, Europe and Seventh Army
4. DATE OF LAST MANPOWER SURVEY: 26 October 1966

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*This TDA supersedes TD E1-3731, 22 Mar 65, including Change 2 dated 27 Sep 66 and so much of TA 77-4, 20 April 1964, including Change 1, 24 November 1964, and Change 2, 16 February 1965, as pertains to the US Army Element USMLM to Commander in Chief Group of Soviet Forces Germany.

TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOWANCES
SECTION II - ORGANIZATION

TDA NO. E1 WIACAA 00
DATE 25 12 56
TDA [X] MTDA [ ]

DESIGNATION US MIL MSN POTSDAM

INDEX PAR a	INDEX LINE b	DESCRIPTION c	GRADE d	MOS e	BR f	ID g	REQ h	AUTH i	ARMY MGT STRUCTURE CODE j	MTDA SEQ k	RMK l
01		OFC OF THE C OF MSN									
	01	CHIEF	COL	09303	AR	0	1	1	25200000		01
	02	DEPUTY	LTC	09303	IN	0	1	1	25200000		01
	03	XO	MAJ	09303	AT	0	1	1	25200000		01
	04	INTEL SGT	E9	96B50	NC	E	1	1	25200000		02
	05	SECY-STENOGRAPHER	05	00318	GS	C	1	1	25200000		
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL					5	5			
02		OP DIV									
	01	OP OFF	COL	09300	IS	0	1	1	25200000		03
	02	ASST OP OFF	LTC	09303	IS	0	1	1	25200000		01
	03	SR LN OFF	LTC	09303	IN	0	1	1	25200000		01
	04	LN OFF	MAJ	09303	SC	0	1	1	25200000		01
	05	LN OFF	MAJ	09303	AR	0	1	1	25200000		01
	06	LN OFF	MAJ	09303	AT	0	1	1	25200000		01
	07	LN OFF	MAJ	09303	EN	0	1	1	25200000		01
	08	LN OFF	MAJ	09303	OD	0	1	1	25200000		01
	09	DET SGT	E7	96B40	NC	E	1	1	25200000		04
	10	INTEL SGT	E7	96B40	NC	E	1	1	25200000		05
	11	INTEL SGT	E7	96B40	NC	E	1	1	25200000		04
	12	PHOTO LAB SUPV	E6	84G40	NC	E	1	1	25200000		05
	13	INTEL ANAL	E6	96B40	NC	E	2	2	25200000		05
	14	STILL PHOTO LAB SP	E5	84G20		E	1	1	25200000		05
	15	INTEL ANAL	E5	96B20		E	3	3	25200000		05
	16	INTEL ANAL	E5	96B2L		E	1	1	25200000		06
	17	INTEL ANAL	E5	96B20		E	1	1	25200000		05
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL					20	20			
03		ADMIN DIV									
	01	ADMIN SUPV	E8	71L50	NC	E	1	1	25200000		02
	02	MTR MAINT SGT	E6	63B40	NC	E	1	1	25200000		02
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l

DA FORM 2952, 1 JUL 65 REPLACES DA FORM 608-4 (1 and 6 parts) AND DA FORM 608-4a, WHICH ARE OBSOLETE EFFECTIVE 1 OCT 65.

TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOWANCES
SECTION II - ORGANIZATION

TDA NO. EI WIACAA 00
DATE 25 12 66
TDA ☒ MTDA ☐

DESIGNATION US MIL MSN POTSDAM

INDEX PAR a	INDEX LINE b	DESCRIPTION c	GRADE d	MOS e	BR f	ID g	REQ h	AUTH i	ARMY MGT STRUCTURE CODE j	MTDA SEQ k	RMK l
	03	MSGR DSPCH	E6	71L40	NC	E	1	1	25200000		02
	04	COMM CEN SUPV	E6	72B40	NC	E	1	1	25200000		02
	05	SUP SGT	E6	76K40	NC	E	1	1	25200000		02
	06	PERS SP	E5	71H20		E	1	1	25200000		02
	07	ADMIN SP	E5	71L20		E	1	1	25200000		02
	08	CRYPTO SP	E5	72B20		E	1	1	25200000		02
	09	GEN VEH RPMN	E4	63020		E	1	0	25200000		02
	10	CLERK-TYPIST	E4	71B30		E	1	1	25200000		02
	11	PERS SP	E4	71H20		E	1	0	25200000		02
	12	SUP SP	E4	76K20		E	1	1	25200000		02
	13	LANG INSTR		01710	IC	C	1	1	25200000		
	14	DRIVER		05703	IC	C	1	1	25200000		
	15	GREASER-CAR WASHER		05806	IC	C	1	1	25200000		
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL					15	13			
		UNIT TOTAL					40	38			

a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l

DA FORM 2952, 1 JUL 65 REPLACES DA FORM 608-4 (1 and 6 parts) AND DA FORM 608-4a, WHICH ARE OBSOLETE EFFECTIVE 1 OCT 65.

SECTION VI - LIST OF REQUIRED ITEMS FROM APPLICABLE TA

TDA NO. E1 W1AUAA 00
DATE 25 12 66
TDA ☒ MTDA ☐

TA NUMBER	LINE ITEM NO. ECC	LINE ITEM NO. BASIC	LINE ITEM NO. CMD	DESCRIPTION	NUMBER REQUIRED	RMK
a		b		c	d	e
		01		REQUIRES QUAL AS RUSSIAN LINGUIST, MUST BE FAST PROGRAM GRADUATE		
		02		ACT AS MSGR MUST BE ABLE TO OPERATE 5 PASS SEDAN		
		03		REMARK 01 AND 92 APPLIES		
		04		REQUIRES QUAL AS GERMAN LINGUIST, REMARK 05 APPLIES		
		05		MUST HAVE TYPING ABILITY, REMARK 02 APPLIES		
		06		REQUIRES QUAL AS FRENCH LINGUIST, REMARK 05 APPLIES		
		92		BRANCH MATERIAL REQUIREMENT		
a		b		c	d	e

DA Form 2954, 1 Jul 65

(U) SGM NICHOLS REENLISTS

TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOWANCES

(C) The current Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) for USMLM was approved by Department of Army in September 1967. but was retroactive to 25 December 1966. Major changes in this TDA upgraded both officer and enlisted positions and added two enlisted and one civilian (LN) spaces. The upgrading of positions was intended to allow officer assignments more in keeping with current Army promotion policies and of receiving and retaining more qualified enlisted men with wider and greater experience.

OFFICER PERSONNEL

(C) During the course of 1967 eight officers, six Army and two Air Force, departed. Three of the departing Army officers left before their programmed tours were over and are now serving in Viet Nam. Their untimely departure severely strained the operational resources of USMLM. Four Army and two Air Force officers arrived during the course of the year to bolster the capability of the organization. One of the new arrivals, LTC Howard E. Schneider, is on his second tour with the Mission. Three of the newly assigned officers are graduates of the Army Foreign Area Specialist Program (Russian); the other officer, Major Cornelius J. O'Shea, Jr., is a graduate of the Navy (now the Defense Language Institute) Russian course. One of the newly assigned Air Force officers, Captain Paul E. Nikulla, was an instructor of German at the Air Force Academy; the other, Captain Igor Vichnevsky, speaks almost native Russian. The Soviets continue to be impressed with USMLM officers' language capability and knowledge of the Soviet Union and Soviet culture.

ENLISTED PERSONNEL

(C) Twenty Army and three Air Force enlisted replacements were assigned during 1967. The turn-over of about 75% was about the same as for 1966. This large turn-over was made without noticeable loss of efficiency, due mainly to high-caliber replacements and carefully programmed cross-training of personnel on hand. Twelve of the twenty Army replacements were obtained within USAREUR, mostly by reenlistment for USMLM under the first term reenlistment option. Three enlisted members, including the Mission Sergeant Major, reenlisted to fill their own vacancies.

AWARDS AND PROMOTIONS

(C) During 1967 fifteen members of USMLM received awards for outstanding performance of duty. The departing Chief of Mission, Colonel Skowronek, was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal, which superseded a previous award of the Legion of Merit, for his four-year stewardship of Mission responsibilities. The Legion of Merit was awarded to five officers, three Army and two Air Force, for their performance of liaison functions and intelligence collection. The Soldiers Medal was awarded to Major Ronald Ayotte for his efforts to reach the crash site of a Pan-American Airways Boeing 727 mail plane which crashed in East Germany. Nine Army and Air Force Commendation Medals were awarded for exemplary service. The approval of these awards pointed up the difficult and frequently hazardous conditions encountered in routine intelligence collection reconnaissance in the Soviet Zone and the efforts by reconnaissance teams to obtain profitable results. The awards to administrative and support personnel rewarded the dedication and hard work which made it possible for the reconnaissance teams to accomplish their missions.

SECURITY

(C) During 1967, USMLM maintained its high standards of security safeguards. The Message Center received, dispatched and stored approximately 1900 Secret and 3,000 Confidential documents. These documents were prepared, circulated and filed as appropriate without loss or compromise. In addition, for the second year an analysis of USMLM telephone security by Army Security Agency monitors revealed no disclosure of sensitive information in 568 conversations. A congratulatory letter from DCSI, HQ USAREUR, was received by USMLM for this fine record.

US SUPPORT

(C) General. Support by Berlin Brigade to USMLM continued to be timely and outstanding. Requests for maintenance and repairs for the Berlin Mission headquarters received prompt action in each case. Modification and maintenance support from the Ordnance and Transportation Divisions insured a high rate of vehicle availability. The

(U) SSGT KUTZ RECEIVES AIR FORCE COMMENDATION MEDAL

(U) COL SKOWRONEK IS AWARDED THE DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL

(U) SP EPPICH TAKES A STEP UP THE PROMOTION LADDER

(U) A NEW TYPE OF TOUR CAR

Supply and Services Division continued its excellent support in all areas, one of which was household furnishings. On one occasion several major items of furniture were provided on very short notice to outfit rooms at the Potsdam Installation in time for the proposed CINC GSFG and CINC USAREUR meeting.

Vehicles. During 1967, USMLM continued the use of modified Ford sedans for reconnaissance and liaison trips; however, a change was made from the Custom model to the Fairlane. The Fairlane offered certain advantages such as smaller size, ease of handling, and a proven stable leaf spring. Modifications included the installation of 35 gallon gasoline tanks, the addition of front and rear towing pintles, rear-window curtains, and independent switches controlling tail lights, brake lights and horn. By mutual agreement with the Soviets, USMLM is authorized ten vehicles accredited to travel in the East Zone of Germany. These include seven reconnaissance sedans, a black sedan for liaison visits, a station wagon/ambulance for administrative and emergency use, and the Chief of Mission's private Mercury Cougar which is used on operational and liaison tours.

In 1967, as in past years, the Army element provided the majority of the vehicles used by USMLM. Fifteen new Ford Fairlane Sedans were procured as replacements for worn-out or damaged vehicles. The Air Force element provided two new Ford Custom Police Specials and one Willys Jeepster. The Jeepster was a new addition to the USMLM stable of tour cars. To insure uninterrupted operations, Berlin Brigade Transportation Officer maintains several backup vehicles to replace damaged or unrepairable mission vehicles.

Ten USMLM vehicles now have COMCO radio sets installed. These sets operate in a net which has stations in both the Berlin and Potsdam Headquarters. Although testing of these radios is not complete, results are expected to prove an enhanced reconnaissance and early warning capability.

SOVIET SUPPORT

(C) Soviet Lt Colonel Karasyov is the officer responsible for logistic support to the three Allied Missions. He is a personable and cooperative officer, who is sincere in his efforts to help us.

Soviet support falls into the following areas:

Providing the Potsdam House with furniture, dinnerware, rations and other necessities.

Selection and paying of the East German help who serve as cooks, cleaners, and handymen.

Issuance of gasoline coupons for travel requirements.

Clearance of passes for guest visitors.

General maintenance such as house repair, painting, electrical fixtures, etc.

Throughout the year the Soviets were called on to perform all the above services. In practically every case they responded courteously and in some instances gave immediate service. The local help, with few exceptions, have always performed well for USMLM whether it be for political or pecuniary reasons.

TRAINING

(U) Despite continuous operational requirements, USMLM continued to meet the individual mandatory training requirements in accordance with USAREUR Training Directives. All personnel qualified or familiarized with their assigned weapons as required by AR 622-5. The required CBR training was improved this year due to the assignment of SGT Yasiejko, who is school trained in CBR. The Character Guidance Program was also improved by obtaining chaplains from the Berlin Brigade Chaplain Division as instructors. Emergency readiness posture was maintained by participating in Readiness Exercises with other US Army elements in Berlin.

PERSONNEL ROSTER

RANK	NAME	ARRIVED	DEPARTED
COL	McCord, Thomas F.		
COL	Skowronek, Paul G.		24 May 67
LTC	Callahan, Patrick O.		08 Aug 67
LTC	Puchrik, Augustine S. (AF)		
LTC	McKinney, Harold P.		01 Oct 67
LTC	Bolte, David E.		
LTC	Szymczyk, Richard A.		
LTC	Klingelhoefer, John W.		
LTC	Schneider, Howard E.	22 Aug 67	
LTC	Coleman, Richard C.	23 Nov 67	
MAJ	Broz, Alfons L. (AF)		
MAJ	DeSimone, Frank P., Jr		
MAJ	Obuhanych, David E. (USMC)		
MAJ	Stein, Michael K.	19 Jun 67	
MAJ	Rogers, Jerome J.		22 Nov 67
MAJ	Greenwalt, Randall A.	20 Jun 67	
MAJ	Ayotte, Ronald J.		22 Apr 67
MAJ	Schweikert, Paul Jr.		17 May 67
MAJ	Heine, Theodore C. (AF) (Promoted to MAJ Jan 67)		03 Jul 67
MAJ	O'Shea, Cornelius J., Jr	13 Dec 67	
CPT	Kolt, George (Promoted to CPT Apr 67)		06 Sep 67
CPT	Nikulla, Paul E. (AF)	01 Aug 67	
CPT	Vichnevsky, Igor (AF)	10 Jul 67	
SGM	Nichols, Harrel L.		
MSG	Evans, Richard, Jr.		
MSG	Walshaw, Kent D.	20 Sep 67	
MSG	Whiting, Philip D. (AF)		02 Dec 67
MSG	Brodt, Howard (AF)		13 Apr 67
SFC	Clausen, Nick G.	29 Aug 67	
SFC	Velasquez, Frank	21 Nov 67	
MSG	Wilkinson, William J. Jr(AF) (Promoted to E7 1 Dec 67)	01 Apr 67	
SSG	Turner, John L.		
SSG	Freese, Allen E.	17 Oct 67	

SSG	Elam, Bobby H.		25 Aug 67
SSG	Dowden, Robert D.		26 Aug 67
	(Promoted to E6, 24 Feb 67)		
SSG	Gorder, Leroy		01 Jan 67
SSG	Johnson, Richard F.		07 Mar 67
SSG	Davis, Benjamin G.		31 May 67
SSG	Stockton, Michael D.		06 Jun 67
SSG	Cochran, Charles W. (AF)	17 Jun 67	
SSG	Kutz, Benet J. J. (AF)		
SSG	Boyd, Wendall (AF)		19 Jan 67
SSG	Kloth, Robert J. (AF)		04 Jul 67
SGT	Yasiejko, Myron	12 Jul 67	
SGT	Oldham, Glynn C.	20 Oct 67	
SP5	Jones, Homer, Jr.		
	(Promoted to E5, 29 Apr 67)		
SP5	McClue, David G.	18 Feb 67	
	(Promoted to E5, 29 Apr 67)		
SP5	Paulson, David A.	17 Feb 67	
	(Promoted to E5, 29 Apr 67)		
SP5	Vinciguerra, Gerald L.	26 Apr 67	
	(Promoted to E5, 15 May 67		
SP5	Maugans, Marlyn L.		
	(Promoted to E5, 29 Jun 67)		
SP5	Markle, Richard L.		
	(Promoted to E5, 29 Jun 67)		
SP5	Thomann, Walter F.		
	(Promoted to E5, 8 Feb 67)		
SP5	Eppich, Steven L.		
	(Promoted to E5, 14 Jul 67)		
SP5	Gillet, Robert W.	25 Jul 67	
SP5	McBride, Stuart F.	18 Jul 67	
	(Promoted to E5, 24 Aug 67)		
SP5	Heuston, Harold S.	07 Jul 67	22 Dec 67
	(Promoted to E5, 24 Aug 67)		
SP5	Stegner, John P.	17 Apr 67	
	(Promoted to E5, 24 Aug 67)		
SP5	Brewer, Kenneth W.	10 Feb 67	
	(Promoted to E5, 24 Aug 67)		
SP5	Tracy, Allen W.		
	(Promoted to E5, 16 Mar 67)		

SP5	Roberts, James C.		20 Feb 67
SP5	Glasscock, Lonnie, III		22 Mar 67
SP5	Antoniono, James R.		29 Mar 67
SP5	Lewis, Buster G.		15 Apr 67
SP5	Stelly, Joseph, Jr		
SP5	Caldwell, Pinkney E.		10 Aug 67
SP5	Bruso, Benjamin E.		30 Aug 67
SP4	Eastling, William D.		24 Sep 67
SP4	Cloe, Michael E. (Promoted to E4, 29 Apr 67)	10 Apr 67	
SP4	LaRochelle, Vincent E. II	26 Apr 67	
SGT	Standbridge, Lyndle E. (AF)	06 Jul 67	
SP4	Taylor, Phillip P.	02 Dec 67	
SP4	Rowley, Michael		01 Feb 67
SP4	Sample, Jackie		01 Feb 67
SP4	Terrana, Vincent	18 Sep 67	
SGT	Janssen, Christian (AF)		20 Feb 67
PFC	O'Mahoney, Michael T.		27 Feb 67
PFC	Sandberg, Michael J.	01 Sep 67	
DAC	Elida Lopez		





(U) AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MISSION

LTC Puchrik
Deputy Chief of Mission
Chief, AF Element

MAJ Obuhanych
Chief, Navy Element

Colonel Thomas F. McCord
Chief of Mission

SGM Nichols
Sergeant Major

Mrs. Lopez
Secretary

ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT BRANCH

LTC Bolte
Executive Officer

MSG Evans
Admin Supv

MSG Walshaw
Admin Supv (Designate)

SP5 McClue
Pers Sp

SP5 Markle
Admin Sp

SP5 Hueston
Pers Sp

MESSAGE CENTER - FILE ROOM

SP5 Maugans
Msg Cen Chief

SP5 Jones
Msg Cen Asst

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER

SSG Turner
Commo Cen Chief

SGT Oldham
Commo Cen Chief (Designate)

PFC Sandberg
Crypto Sp

SSG Freese
Motor Maint Sgt

SSG Cochran
AF Admin Asst

SP5 Brewer
Supply Sgt

SP5 McBride
Gen Vehicle Rpmn



LTC Klingelhoefer
Army Operations Officer

MAJ Broz
Air Force Operations Officer

OPERATIONS DIVISION

SFC Velasquez
Intel Sgt

SP5 Tracy
Intel Sgt

SP5 Thomann
Intel Analyst

SP5 Cloe
Intel Analyst

LIAISON SECTION

LTC Schneider
Ln Off

LTC Szymczyk
Sr Ln Off

LTC Coleman
Ln Off

MAJ DeSimone
Ln Off

MAJ O'Shea
Ln Off

MAJ Stein
Ln Off

MAJ Greenwalt
Ln Off

CPT Nikulla
AF Ln Off

CPT Vichnevsky
AF Ln Off

PRODUCTION SECTION

PUBLICATIONS

SGT Yasiejko
Reports Supv

SP5 Eppich
Intel Analyst

SP4 Terrana
Intel Analyst

SP4 LaRochelle
Intel Analyst

SP4 Taylor
Intel Analyst

PHOTO LAB

MSG Wilkinson
Photo Lab Chief

SP5 Vinciguerra
Still Photo Lab Sp

SP5 Gillet
Still Photo Lab Sp

SFC Clausen
Detachment Sgt

POTSDAM INSTALLATION

SP5 Stelly
Intel Analyst-Driver

SP5 Paulson
Intel Analyst-Driver

SP5 Stegner
Intel Analyst-Driver

SSG Kutz
AF Driver-Linguist

SGT Standbridge
AF Driver











(U) THE TROOPS ARE WATCHING