


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UNIT HISTORY (U)

UNITED STATES MILITARY LIAISON MISSION
TO THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES IN GERMANY

1986


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FOREWORD

(C) USMLM's Unit History serves several important informative functions:

-It is a repository of information pertaining to USMLM's role as a military liaison mission representing the Commander in Chief, US Army Europe to the Commander in Chief, Headquarters, Group of Soviet Forces Germany.

-It provides an annual chronology of the Mission's operational accomplishments in overt intelligence collection.

-It summarizes developmental trends within the Group of Soviet Forces Germany and East German Armed Forces.

-It contributes to the military history program of the Armed Services.

(C) USMLM's 1986 Unit History joins those from previous years to comprise an important record of trends, precedent and policy. As such it becomes a most useful reference document in the conduct of the Mission's daily affairs.

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INTRODUCTION

(U) USMLM's 1986 Unit History marks thirty nine years of service and achievement. Those of us who are currently assigned to this organization realize that USMLM owes its outstanding reputation in large measure to those who have served here before us.

(U) In recognition of the continuing meritorious service being performed by USMLM, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved during 1986 the award of the Joint Meritorious Unit Award (JMUA). The period covered by this award (the first joint service unit award ever received by USMLM) covers the period 1 January 1981 through 31 March 1985. The JMUA was formally presented to USMLM by General Glenn K. Otis, CINCUSAREUR, at USMLM's West Berlin compound on 3 October 1986.

(C) The success of USMLM is also enhanced by the guidance and support rendered by others as well. Those who continue to make major contributions to USMLM include:

- The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, USAREUR and his staff who direct both the liaison and the overt collection missions of USMLM;

- The US Commander, Berlin and his staff who provide the logistic support that underpins our entire operation;

- The intelligence analytic community at the theater and national levels whose requirements, evaluations and recommendations guide and encourage our collection efforts;

- Our friends in the British and French Military Liaison Missions whose professionalism, enthusiasm and cooperation enable us to achieve a truly allied effort.

(C) A review of this year's Unit History will reveal that USMLM's accomplishments are indeed significant and compare most favorably with collection successes enjoyed in previous years. This reflects not only on the high quality of the Army, Marine and Air Force officers and NCO's who comprise our reconnaissance tour personnel but also on the outstanding support provided by an equally impressive body of USMLM military and civilian analysts, support and administrative personnel. Together they are continuing to make a unique contribution to our nation's national security.

William D. Halloran II
WILLIAM D. HALLORAN II
Colonel, GS
18th Chief of Mission

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UNITED STATES MILITARY LIAISON MISSION
UNIT HISTORY
1986

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PART I GENERAL

(U) ADMINISTRATIVE NOTE: Overall classification of this document is SECRET. In the interest of production efficiency and in accordance with provisions of para 4-200, AR 380-5, individual pages are marked with this classification. Individual paragraphs, however, are marked according to content.

A. (C) MISSION.

1. The primary mission of USMLM is to carry out responsibilities for liaison between CINCUSAREUR, on behalf of US Commander in Chief Europe (USCINCEUR), and CINCSFG and to serve as a point of contact for other US departments and agencies with CINCSFG, in accordance with provisions of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement.

2. The secondary and confidential mission of USMLM is to exploit its liaison status and attendant access for collection of intelligence information in the German Democratic Republic (GDR).

B. (C) REFERENCES

1. TDA E1W1AUAA
2. USEUCOM DIRECTIVE 40-18, 30 Mar 78
3. USAREUR REGULATION 383-27
4. USAFE REGULATION 23-11, 03 Feb 79
5. 7452D SPECIAL ACTIVITIES SQUADRON REGULATION 23-1
6. USMC TABLE OF ORGANIZATION 5503, 17 Dec 76

C. (C) AUTHORIZATION. The Huebner-Malinin Agreement (Annex A), signed in April 1947, authorized the exchange of Military Liaison Missions between the Soviet and US Military Headquarters in Germany and laid down general guidelines for their activities and for the support to be rendered by the headquarters to which they were accredited. The agreement provided for 14 accredited personnel with complete freedom to travel, except in areas of military disposition, to "include all necessary technical personnel, office clerks, personnel with special qualifications, and personnel required to operate radio stations." A total of approximately 70 civilian and military personnel of all three services currently comprise this unique joint organization.

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D. (C) STATISTICS.

1. (C) Intelligence Information Collection. In carrying out its second and classified mission, USMLM dispatched 532 reconnaissance tours into the GDR for a total of approximately 626,000 kilometers. The Mission produced 803 Intelligence Information Reports based on information acquired during these tours.

2. (U) Temporary Restricted Areas (TRA). In 1986 HQ GSFG levied 72 TRA. Section II, paragraph C, contains details.

3. (U) Detentions and Incidents. USMLM tours were detained three times in 1986, as compared to two in 1985. Six reportable incidents occurred. See Section II, paragraph F.

4. (U) Liaison and Representation. CUSMLM or his representative met with SERB or HQ GSFG representatives a total of 27 times to discuss a variety of topics. See Section III, paragraph B for details.

E. (C) ORGANIZATION.

(C) USMLM, with its support base in West Berlin, is able to intensely utilize all 14 accreditations (passes) for operational and liaison purposes in East Germany. Details of pass utilization and of the tri-service organization are provided in succeeding sub-paragraphs:

1. (C) Pass Utilization. The 14 accreditations provided for by the Huebner-Malinin Agreement are normally held as follows:

CUSMLM (Army)	1
Deputy Chief of Mission (DCUSMLM) (USAF)	1
Naval Representative (NAVREP) (USMC)	1
NCOIC, Potsdam House (Army)	1

Liaison Officers

Army	4
USAF	2

Liaison NCOs

Army	3
USAF	1

2. (C) Army Element. The IDA in effect on 31 Dec 86 authorizes 11 officers, 26 enlisted personnel, and four Department of the Army civilians.

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3. Air Element. The Air Element is composed of five officers and 11 enlisted personnel, organized as the 7452d Special Activities Squadron, subordinate to the 7455th Tactical Intelligence Wing.

4. Naval Element. The USMLM naval element consists of one USMC officer.

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PART II. COLLECTION

A. (C) GROUND DIVISION COLLECTION ACTIVITIES

1. (C) GENERAL OVERVIEW: The change in the collection environment is the most apparent change affecting USMLM tour personnel. As always, it is an incremental but continual process. Scrutiny of USMLM historical records, however, suggests this change has accelerated rapidly during the past five years. Several events within the past year have brought this change in the collection environment into dramatic focus. Each of these events is discussed in detail in other portions of the Unit History and only briefly noted here:

The change in GSFG commanders,

The Soviets' issuance of Allied Mission Instructional Cards to their soldiers,

The completion of Staff Discussions between Headquarters, USAREUR and Headquarters, GSFG and finally,

The distribution of a new PRA map.

The cumulative effect of these events has resulted in significant changes in USMLM Ground Division.

Simultaneously, the internal changes continuously occurring within GSFG over the past five years are also important. The tremendous influx of new military equipment suggests a massive modernization program within GSFG is underway. This new equipment, combined with intriguing but sometimes perplexing structural changes within GSFG, provide a never-ending challenge to tour personnel and analysts as they attempt to catalog and explain what they see.

These two forces, changes in the collection environment and the GSFG modernization program, have provided the opportunity for an unusually large number of outstanding USMLM Ground Division collection highlights during the past year. Inasmuch as this has been an exceptionally good year for collection, we believe it especially appropriate to briefly review the targeting and reporting procedures used to produce this information. A comparison of previous unit histories suggests a periodic examination of these processes is useful for future mission members in understanding of the evolution of this organization's operations.

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2. (C) GROUND OPERATIONS SECTION:

a. (C) ORGANIZATION: As the title suggests, USMLM Ground Operations Section is responsible for all internal operations of the Ground Division as well as external coordination of operations with FMLM and BRIXMIS. Additionally, the Chief, USMLM has tasked the Ground Operations Section with staff supervision of many routine operational reports, both Air and Ground, to Headquarters, USAREUR, the executive agency for USMLM.

Presently one Ground officer and one noncommissioned officer are assigned to the Ground Operations Section. During the past year, a clear need for additional personnel was established and action was taken to obtain more positions for this vital section.

b. (C) COORDINATION: The Ground Operations Officer meets weekly with his British and French counterparts to coordinate current activities, review activities of the preceding week, and project future operations on both a weekly and long range basis. During 1986, Tri-Mission Operations Officers reviewed and updated all Tri-Mission OPLANs which provide the parameters for these combined activities. At the Tri-Chief level, the following Tri-Mission OPLANs were approved and are now in effect:

OPLAN JUPITER - Currently undergoing revision. It provides for combined coverage of targets during times of increased military or political tensions. This OPLAN is primarily a means for observing and reporting indications of hostilities.

OPLAN STAMPEDE - Encompasses a number of topics. This OPLAN provides for the geographic division of the German Democratic Republic. The four sectors remain the same as in past years: A, B, C, and the Local areas. The boundaries of these areas change periodically, as does the rotation of the Missions throughout these areas. The pairing of Air/Ground teams remains standard. Area rotation throughout the German Democratic Republic still averages nine weeks, three per area. This rotation is accelerated during spring and fall Soviet troop rotation and averages 10-14 days per area. In a change this year, the Local area rotates once every 48 hours, between liaison missions. OPLAN STAMPEDE also contains the lists of sensitive reserved targets which are periodically reviewed and updated.

Additionally, Ground Operations Section maintains and updates internal LOIs or OPLANs which have been written to support current USCOB regulations. The latest plans to be updated are those which support recovery or assistance for US controlled personnel hospitalized in the GDR or assistance to the Provost Marshal's office in locating a lost autobahn traveler. Both events occur periodically.

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Ground Operations Section is the USMLM focal point for guest passes to Potsdam, distribution/use of plated sedans, and publishing the USMLM weekly schedules and pass exchange schedules.

c. (C) TARGETING: USMLM Ground tours have the responsibility for coverage of the Local area two of every six days. The Ground Operations Section schedules these tours as well as Ground area tours, attempting to maintain a US presence within area on a 24 hour daily basis. During periods of increased activity or exercises, an internal operational objective is to increase USMLM coverage, resulting in an many as 2-3 tours in area. Touring standdowns occur infrequently. Large scale social events and semi-annual PT tests provide the only respite for the USMLM Tour Officer and Tour NCO.

Using a single Apple II Plus computer containing over 1600 known targets in the GDR, the Ground Operations Section plans tours to service these targets on a recurring basis. Targets are assigned for coverage based upon target value, a determination based on historical perspective, current installation needs, and current order of battle needs as each relates to the individual targets. Some targets are visited weekly while others are visited once a year. The target coverage is accomplished, of course, by area while the Ground Division rotates through the respective areas of the GDR. Allied Military Liaison Mission reporting generates additional targeting as do taskings from USMLM Ground Production Section.

Some things never change, yet all aspects of Ground Operations are in a state of constant refinement. This applies to the actual art of touring in the GDR. Touring is multi-faceted and will be addressed as such, but the following theme underscores all activity in the GDR. This is extracted from a CUSMLM policy guidance letter: "Individual Tour Officer and tour NCO judgment and initiative are the bed-rock upon which the success of this Mission is built."

d. (C) TOUR PLANNING/PREPARATION: The Ground Operations Section schedules and plans all Army and Naval tours and assigns the associated targets based on a number of considerations. These considerations involve current intelligence needs, level of activity within an area, tips from the Berlin TAREX system, target sensitivity and, most importantly, Tour Officer/NCO background and experience levels. Explicit target briefs are tailored to each tour and circulated through Production analysts for latest intelligence updates/requirements prior to being briefed to the Tour Officer. This briefing takes place three days prior to the scheduled tour and gives ample time for Tour Officer preparation. Six to twelve hours prior to the tour, the Tour Officer provides his detailed brief-back

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to the Operations Sergeant to insure he properly understands his assigned tasks. This gives the Operations Section an opportunity for an additional verbal update and modification of the tour as required in response to current activity. Additional reference materials available for the Tour Officer's planning are target folders; a map room with all known Ground and Air targets posted; STOL maps reflecting disposition of forces; city, Bezirk and commercial maps; reviews of recent reports and current intelligence; face to face interchange with analysts from the Production Section; and, most importantly, the wealth of touring experience in both officer and NCO ranks at USMLM.

e. (C) TOUR EXECUTION: This is a function of activity encountered and pre-tour preparations. All tours are purposely programmed to do more than possible in the time allotted to do it. A goal of the Operations section is to maximize effective use of the valuable credentials an accredited soldier holds. Tour Officers; however, have the flexibility to deviate from scheduled targets. The two-man tour crew is expected to "read" or tailor the tour to the existing environment. Tour crews operate under the following guidance, extracted from a Chief of Mission Policy Guidance Letter:

"A Tour Officer or Tour NCO is literally a 'one-man band. He is a long-range reconnaissance scout, a linguist, an avid collector with an eclectic curiosity, and a reporter, in addition to being an accredited representative of the U.S. Armed forces in the GDR. He must never lose his curiosity while creatively addressing a myriad of tasks; always executing sound judgment. Successful intelligence collection is a precision art. The idea is to leave the collection environment relatively undisturbed. The best tour is the one that is never seen. Remember to practice patience. Success demands persistence over time, not insistence at any one time."

f. (C) TOUR EQUIPMENT: The Mercedes 280 Gelaendewagen remains the tour vehicle of choice for USMLM. In 1986 additional G-Wagons were ordered and received with the intention of retiring the Mercedes 350 tour sedan. Vehicle modifications have become standardized over the years and include special lighting switches, skid plates, expanded fuel tanks and additional roll bars. A complete list of vehicle modifications follows:

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- (1) An electric switch panel and rewiring for light options.
- (2) A rectangular hatch or sunroof.
- (3) A shield for the main fuel tank and an auxiliary 70 liter tank with raised filler nozzle.
- (4) Fuel pump repositioned to a protected area and sealed with silicon.
- (5) Extended front bumper mounting a winch with an internal control switch.
- (6) Dual inside rear view mirrors.
- (7) A front tow pintle.
- (8) Undercarriage protected with skid plates.
- (9) Two infrared lights mounted behind the grill on either side of the radiator.
- (10) Roll bars and reinforcement supports installed in the roof.
- (11) Storage boxes mounted in the rear.
- (12) A central fire extinguisher system.


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(U) Photo of present USMLM tour vehicle, the Mercedes 280G with extensive modifications



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(U) The traditional Tour NCO Kit has not undergone radical evolution and consists primarily of hand tools, pioneer equipment, and self recovery aids.

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The primary collection aid of the Tour Officer is the reliable NIKON F3 camera with power winder and an array of lenses. The latest additions to the Tour Officer's kit include two models of hand-held self contained video cameras. One model is the JVC minicam in VHS format. The second model is a new JVC miri-camera. The new camera will allow for interchangeable use of the NIKON family of lenses for long range video products. Special equipment available from Operations for Tour Officer use includes NI-TEC for night photography and MOTOROLA two-channel walkie talkies.



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(C) Tour Officer Collection Kit

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3. (C) GROUND PRODUCTION SECTION:

a. (C) ORGANIZATION: The USMLM Ground Production Section is authorized one officer, one civilian and six enlisted personnel. During the year, the Production Section operated within the following structure:

***An Administrative Cell consisting of the Ground Production Officer, a civilian Intelligence Analyst, a senior enlisted Intelligence Analyst and a Reports Processing Clerk.

***An Order of Battle Cell which includes three enlisted Intelligence Analysts

***A Technical Intelligence Cell comprised of two enlisted Intelligence Analysts and

***An Installation Analysis Monitoring Cell consisting of two enlisted Intelligence Analysts.

The fortuitous acquisition of a Reports Processing Specialist (71L20) has significantly enhanced section operations. The volume of reporting and associated enclosures has reached such a scale that it demands full-time attention. Previously, the Installation Analyst performed this function as an additional duty. Currently, approval has been sought to establish a civilian position for reports management and additional positions for civilian analysts.

b. (C) TYPES OF REPORTING: Production uses four serials to classify reporting as follows (Reports based on FMLM and BRIXMIS information indicated by the "500", e.g., 2500, 3500, 4500, etc.):

2000/2500 Series:	Installations and PTCAs IIRs
3000/3300/3500/3700 Series:	SANDDUNE IIRs
4000/4500 Series:	Technical IIRs
5000:	Naval IIRs
6000/6500/6700:	Order of Battle IIRs

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In addition, Production is responsible for a number of other intelligence products. These include:

***The Side Number Study: Consistently expanding in sophistication and content, this document represents Soviet order-of-battle in East Germany as derived from Tri-Mission reporting. A recapitulation is published annually in January.

***VRN Guides: These documents separately list GSFG Unit-VRN associations at front-level and army-and-below. They are also published annually (in June) and are sorted numerically, alphabetically, and by unit.

***Identification Guides: These guides have proven popular with a number of consumers, especially with the East European-based attaches who do not have an alternative source for this material. During 1986, ID guides for armored fighting vehicles, SAMs, and CBR equipment were prepared.

***Tactical Markings IIR: Soviet units have consistently used unique tactical markings for unit identification, often in lieu of side numbers (which have been obscured for OPSEC purposes). Beginning in 1985, USMLM has developed a program to monitor and report these markings in a quarterly IIR. These markings have proven invaluable in making unit attributions.

***Video IIR: The dramatic increase in video collection by the Ground Division resulted in a decision to produce a quarterly compendium of video highlights. Usually averaging 50-60 minutes in length, these video IIRs consist of a series of collection "vignettes", ranging from the simple coverage of a column to the filming of a T-80 on a driver's training course.

***USMLM SITREP: Published daily during the week and on weekends as needed, the USMLM SITREP remains an important I&W as well as OB product.

c. (C) REPORT PROCESSING: The Ground Division reporting cycle has three phases with the desired specificity of information varying within these phases as follows:

***Tour Highlights: Initial analysis of tour reporting results in publication of daily USMLM SITREP.

***Recon Reports: Thorough and detailed expansion of information collected by USMLM tours.

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---Consists of activity sheet and equipment data sheet to input VRN/side number data for analytic files.

---These reports are routed through each functional intelligence area (i.e., OB, Tech, Installations) for review. IIR tasking, based on current requirements, is levied by functional analysts and/or Production Officer.

***IIR Drafts: IIR drafts based on material collected by USMLM are prepared by the Tour Officer. Some Allied reports are rewritten by USMLM Production analysts to permit wider dissemination of material. IIR drafts are routed through functional analysts and Production Officer for review, editing, and addition of substantive comment.

d. (C) Requirements/Targeting: The Production Officer is responsible for the management of the collection requirements levied on USMLM. As new requirements arrive, the Production Officer reviews them and determines those areas, if any, applicable to the Tri-Missions' collection capabilities. If accepted, a requirement synopsis is prepared and routed among tour personnel for their information.

This year, Production has undertaken a new program to improve targeting. A list of collection requirements keyed to collection zones (i.e., A, B, C and the Local) is prepared by Production analysts and distributed to Operations prior to area changes. These requirements run the gamut from specific information needs on installations to certain VRN-area associations. Every Production Section analyst is responsible for developing and tracking requirements within his area of responsibility.

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4. (C) COLLECTION HIGHLIGHTS: The past year proved to be a very successful year for the Ground Division. This success is evident in the extraordinary diversity of significant collection highlights. It is important to remember, however, this constitutes only a brief, representative sample of the enormous amount of intelligence information gathered during the past year.

a. (C) The Training Cycle: Although the general pattern of a troop rotation phase followed by a noticeable decline in large-scale training has remained unchanged, the organizational changes within GSFG have allowed training at reduced levels to continue even during the height of the troop rotation phase. Evidence continues to accumulate that soldiers with similar dates of entry on active duty are assigned to the same company within battalions. This permits some companies to continue training even while new soldiers are arriving and receiving their initial indoctrination. Obvious benefits include not only an overall increase in readiness of GSFG units but also a more effective use of training equipment and facilities. This "phased training" concept was most evident in a sighting of the 79th GTD returning to garrison in May 1986.

The general pattern of Soviet and East German exercise activity remained generally unchanged, however. Reviewing the significant activity reported during the year, USMLM tour teams, in conjunction with the other Allied Missions, observed the following major exercises:

26 January - 6 February -- Almost every Soviet division conducted large scale, long distance driver's training marches.

17 February - 3 March -- Elements of the 3rd Shock Army deployed to the Lieberose Training Area and conducted a tactical exercise which culminated in the Jueterbog Training Area.

11 March - 24 March -- Two divisions of the 2d Guards Tank Army deployed to the Wittstock Training Area and conducted a large scale training exercise.

13 June - 17 June -- The National Volksarmee (NVA) conducted a major mobilization exercise involving the cadre of two NCO Training Schools and the equipment from two prepositioned reserve divisions.

14 August - 29 August -- A combined Soviet and NVA exercise with modest participation by Polish forces was conducted in East Germany. Units initially deployed to the Jueterbog Training Area. Elements attacked northwest into the Letzlinger Heide Training Area. The exercise ended with a large scale river crossing exercise.

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8 September - 14 September -- Elements of two divisions of the 3rd Shock Army conducted a field training exercise in the Altengrabow Training Area.

Combined exercises involving both Soviet and East German forces occur periodically but the actual "combined" nature of the operation is questionable. Perhaps the best indicator of the difference between official expressions of Soviet-German "Waffenbruederschaft" and reality is the extremely rare occurrence of low level, combined training by elements of the two forces. The paucity of sightings suggests the animosity between Soviet and East German personnel is still quite prevalent if muted.

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On 11 November, a BRIXMIS tour photographed a very rare event - a combined Soviet and East German ECM column movement in the vicinity of Paaren (UU6436).



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(C) Combined Soviet/East German ECM column



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
(C) Combined Soviet/East German ECM column

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b. (C) New Equipment: GSFG experienced a "banner year" last year. It appeared new equipment deliveries occurred with an ever increasing frequency to all units. USMLM, in conjunction with the other Allied Missions, was remarkably successful in discovering these deliveries of equipment through chance encounters. Additionally, by exploiting the Berlin "tip off" system, USMLM was able to target tours against probable new items of equipment.

In conjunction with the other Allied Missions USMLM tour crews have closely monitored the deployment of the SS-12 in GSFG. This surface-to-surface missile system has proved elusive due to the extraordinary security measures which the Soviets employ to cover the system's movement. Early in the year, on 9 January, a USMLM tour crew obtained excellent night photographs of the SS-12 TEL enroute from Jueterbog to Neustrelitz. This coverage provided extensive details on the technical characteristics of the SS-12 TEL and several associated support vehicles.



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(C) Night photo of the rear of the SS-12 TEL

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A timely tip off provided a USMLM tour crew the opportunity to obtain the first photos of the SA-11 air defense system deployed in GSFG. This system is replacing the venerable, relatively short range SA-4 system at Army level, probably on an interim basis. In addition to the initial sighting, the SA-11 system was seen on several other occasions deploying by rail to the Letzlinger Heide Training Area. During these sightings, all of the major elements of the system were photographed as well as many of the support vehicles.



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
(C) SA-11 TEL (without missiles) deployed at Naumburg/Freyburg Training Area 401. The tarped SA-11 TEL is seen on the Drivers' Training Course at this facility. See top photo, next page, for a second view of the TEL at the same location.

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(C) SA-11 TEL




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(C) Partial view of the SA-11 Transloader at Naumburg/Freyburg
Training Area 401

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(C) Night photo of the SA-11 Command and Control Vehicle
being off-loaded from a train at Letzlingen Railsiding

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The Soviets' historical emphasis on artillery support was very evident in the two new items of artillery equipment deployed in GSFG this year. Both of these artillery pieces add significantly to the mobility and firepower of GSFG units.



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(C) The 2S9 122mm Howitzer mounted on an extensively modified BMD chassis. This artillery piece is deployed with the Air Assault Brigade in GSFG. This photograph was taken by an FMLM tour near Cottbus 282.

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Front level artillery units also received special attention this year. The 2S7, which had eluded the AMLM for several years, was seen loading on a rail flat after completing training at the Letzlinger Heide Training Area. A BRIXMIS tour crew observed the loading process and noted many other extremely valuable details concerning the weapons system such as the mobility, crew size and organizational structure.



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(C) 2S7 (BRIXMIS photo)

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New items of equipment added immeasurably to the ground mobility of not only GSFG but also the NVA forces. Many variants of several modern vehicles such as the KrAZ-260 and the KamAZ series trucks have been deployed recently in East Germany. Many variants of several modern vehicles such as the KrAZ-260 and the KamAZ series trucks have been deployed recently in East Germany.



CONFIDENTIAL

(C) A variant of the relatively new Tatra series truck -
the Tatra-815, Tractor.

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GSFG's extensive modernization program has also included the often ignored soldier. Here the new AKS-74 is seen in the hands of soldiers riding in the back of a Soviet truck to training.



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(S) AKS-74

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Although the materials handling equipment (MHE) capability of the forces in GSFG is still woefully inadequate, the Soviets continue to deploy new and improved versions of various cranes to support their MHE needs. During the past year, several new models were observed with both Soviet and East German forces. Although the total numbers of these items are apparently still not sufficient, these sightings represent a pattern suggesting the problem has been noted and steps are underway to correct the deficiency.



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(C) New model crane mounted on the KrAZ-260.

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(C) However, the Soviets are still likely to use whatever item of equipment is available to meet their needs. Here a civilian model tractor is driven by a Soviet soldier as part of a larger Soviet column movement.

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Even relatively new items of equipment continue to undergo modification. In the past year, the survivability of the T-80 was significantly increased when a KMT-6 mine plow was added to the front glacis of selected tanks in Soviet units.



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(C) Photograph Taken by a USMLM Tour Crew of the T-80 with KMT-6 in the Naumburg/Freyburg Training Area 401 (PB9275)

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Many older Soviet weapons systems still have a number of features that have yet to be adequately covered. On 9 July, a USMLM tour crew observed the movement of the 152mm Field Gun M-1976 within the Potsdam area. This encounter provided not only technical quality photos of the breech, recoil mechanism and suspension but also supported previous indications of the formation of a 152mm Brigade in the 34 AD. In related activity, an Artillery Training Regiment has apparently been created in the Potsdam area.




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(C) Details of the 152mm Field Gun M-1976

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(C) Details of the 152mm Field Gun M-1976

Another facet of technical collection concerns the photographing and reporting of new models of Box Boded Vehicles (BBV) or variants of older models. Tour crew photography of BBVs is continuously scrutinized and new features reported. Present holdings suggest there are over 2000 unique BBV variants in GSFG and new models proliferate.




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(C) Probable Delivery of a New Model BBV Mounted on a URAL-4320.
Photo Taken Near Bliesendorf (UU53C0)

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Another aspect of technical reporting involves the recovery of lost or discarded items of Soviet and East German military equipment. These items are generally portions of CBR related material such as protective mask canisters or parts of main end items such as road wheels or fenders. Occasionally, ammunition components are also recovered. Markings and dimensions prove to be a vital source of intelligence information.



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(C) Portion of a BMP-2 fender recovered from the Ranzig River Crossing Site. The "spongy" flotation material used as filler inside the fender is readily visible. Analysts determined this material permitted the much heavier BMP-2 to float during swimming operations.

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
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(C) Canister or shipping container for a tank round, with Soviet designation BM-23. Information from the packing material and measurements of the internal dimensions provided analysts significant details concerning this model of tank ammunition.

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Four crews routinely photograph training signboards at Soviet and East German training area which is another aspect of technical intelligence reporting. Soviet units in particular use these signboards to train personnel rather than relying on extensive manuals or other training literature. Signboards are frequently changed depending on the topic covered during the particular training period. Translations of these signs provide extensive details on training standards and occasionally technical details on equipment.



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(C) A typical training board at Eper Training Area 492 (UT4251). This signboard portrays the standards for a day and night driving course for BMP and tank crews.

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c. (C) INSTALLATION COVERAGE: USMLM Ground tours have continued to provide analysts at all levels of the intelligence community detailed descriptions of Soviet and East German deployment areas. This project was initially started about five years ago to validate the then current holdings of Headquarters, USAREUR. From the beginning, it was clear many more Soviet and East German deployment areas existed than previously suspected (commonly referred to as Potential Troop Concentration Areas or PTCAs). Many areas had apparently gone unreported. A concentrated effort was made to search for and report on these sites. Very detailed reports on PTCAs continue to be completed on each site discovered. These reports provide details on terrain, vegetation and military development such as bunkers, vehicle revetments and communications.



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(C) Typical View of Military Development in a Soviet PTCA




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(C) Typical View of Military Development in a Soviet PTCA

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Other installation coverage involves often highly developed ranges and garrison locations. In August, a USMLM ground tour completed initial coverage of a previously unknown BMP range near Stegelitz. This coverage was made possible by the change in PRA boundaries in June. The detailed coverage obtained provided extensive information on Soviet training practices from the training signboards posted.



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(C) Unique View of Range Facilities at Stegelitz BMP Range (PC9989)


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The coverage of installations can often provide important order-of-battle or unique information on tenant units. For example, a USMLM tour was able to approach a storage facility associated with an East German reserve division and photograph the Unit Vehicle Identifier (UVI) for this unit. This type of unit-garrison association is invaluable in monitoring out-of-garrison movements, particularly important in the case of reserve divisions.



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(C) East German reserve division UVI



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(C) East German reserve division UVI

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d. ~~(S)~~ ORDER OF BATTLE/STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS: VRN analysis, in conjunction with analysis of side numbers, tactical markings and Field Post Numbers (FPN), provides USMLM Ground Production analysts an excellent tool to study the organization and structural changes of GSFG units. Structural analysis is possible in various contexts. The structure of many units remains elusive for years. Often, however, even one brief, chance encounter will provide sufficient information to develop a comprehensive organizational structure.

(1) As an example of the possibilities of this analysis, on 22 August, a USMLM tour crew observed the off loading of BM-27 and associated equipment at a rail siding at Haldensleben. The extraordinary practice of assigning both side numbers and VRN on both the BM-27 TEL and the BM-27 Resupply provided sufficient information to develop the structure of the unit. A six TEL battery and one resupply vehicle per TEL were apparent. This analysis contradicted theater and national-level TOE references, which listed two resupply vehicles per TEL. The structure and resupply capability of this MRL unit has major significance for NATO war planners.



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~~(S)~~ Photograph of a BM-27 Resupply. Note the unusual use of a side number in combination with a VRN.

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(2) (S) during the past year, other modifications to the Soviet force structure were noted. These included:

(a) Addition of a third 2S3 battalion to the divisional artillery regiment of motorized rifle divisions only (all MRDs except 94 GMRD).

(b) Confirmation that some maneuver regiments in 9 TD, 27 GMRD, and 79 GTD have retained their D-30 subsequent to the arrival of 2Si.

(c) Identification of Army-level CBR battalions with every GSFG army with the exception of 20 GA. These battalions are of two types: a Chemical Protection Battalion and an Intersection and Reconnaissance (Nuclear Burst Detection) Battalion.

(d) Formation of BMP-2 and T-64B battalions in 35 MRD which reflects an alteration in the previous practice of one BMP-2 or T-64B company per battalion.

(e) Arrival of two new artillery units in Potsdam: an artillery training regiment and a 152mm Field Gun M-1976 Brigade, probably assigned to the 34 AD.


(f) Creation of a second SS-21 Brigade in GSFG, assigned to 3 SA.

(g) Major re-evaluation of Soviet radioelectronic combat (REC) units. This detailed analysis resulted in the isolation of Army-level REC Battalions with four of the five GSFG armies as well as a significant alteration in previous assessments of front-level REC organizations.

This last example, in particular, represents a classic example of how USMLM's VRN data base and technical intelligence skills when combined with SANDDUNE reporting can produce a unique perspective on Soviet organizations. Having re-examined tour reporting on REC units for the previous six years, Production Section analysts used VRN-equipment correlations in conjunction with documentary information to produce an entirely new estimate of the REC organization in GSFG. Moreover, individual unit TOEs were developed which have significantly changed previous assumptions on these units' structure.

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FIGURE 1
ORGANIZATION OF REC REGT (GND), GSFG




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(S) Chart depicting the TOE organization of REC units.
Chart extracted from IIR 2 215 6016 87 detailing the organization
of REC units using VRN analysis

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e. (C) SPECIAL REPORTING TOPICS:

(1) (C) As a service to other collectors and analysts, USMLM continues to compile Identification Guides. These guides serve as a valuable reference for collectors and analysts in many agencies. USMLM's extensive photo holdings provide the basis for these very detailed and useful products. During the past year, USMLM's Ground Division Technical Analyst compiled guides for the following types of Soviet and East German equipment: Armored Fighting Vehicles; SAMS; CBR systems.



EQUIPMENT NOMENCLATURE: SA-13 TELAR
GENERAL DESCRIPTION: Transporter-Erector-Launcher and Radar
ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL: EGA, REGT AIR DEF BTRY
SOV, REGT AIR DEF BTRY

RECOGNITION FEATURES:

There are two version of the SA-13 TELAR. Both are mounted on an MT-LB chassis. The basic ID features for both are as follows:

1. Turret has been removed from right front corner.
2. A pedestal has been mounted centrally on the rear deck with four launch rails attached to accommodate the missile canisters.
3. When in the travel position, the pedestal rotates and is lowered until it is parallel to the deck. The launch rails overhang the rear of the vehicle.
4. When tarped, the vehicle resembles the MTP-LB.
5. In the launch position, the launch rail can be raised to a maximum of 60 degrees and can be rotated 360 degrees.
6. A small radar dish is located between the launch rails.
7. The launch rail pedestal has a plexiglass window for visual target acquisition.

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(C) Sample of the Description and Photo from a
Typical Identification Guide

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(2) (C) USMLM Ground Division analysts routinely monitor Soviet and East German open press literature to obtain the occasional "freebie" or open source report of new equipment, tactics and order of battle information. During the past year several interesting items of information were gleaned from this time consuming but potentially lucrative resource.



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(C) A Soviet T-54/55 with a laser rangefinder mounted over the gun tube. This photo was obtained from an issue of "Red Star" dated 28 Jan 86.

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(3) (C) A readily apparent change in GSFG in the past three years has been the reduction in the support GSFG provides for agriculture in the Soviet Union. Large harvest support camps which were historically erected each summer to provide intensive maintenance on many hundreds of cargo vehicles destined for shipment to the Soviet Union have disappeared. Likewise, the distinctive harvest support markings frequently seen on poorly maintained trucks returning from the Soviet Union are now a thing of the past. Additionally, Soviet units have ceased to engage in the time honored practice of maintaining their own livestock to support the needs of the local garrison. Instead, Soviet soldiers are occasionally seen assisting GDR authorities collecting the harvest or more frequently, loading agricultural goods into Soviet vehicles from East German civilian warehouses. Discussions with the "locals" suggest many of these deliveries taken by the Soviets are really destined for the Soviet Union. The small number of observations and the relatively minor scale of the operation, however, suggest the goods are only for use by local Soviet units. Additionally, SANDDUNE reports suggest Soviet soldiers are occasionally "hired out" by their commander to East German factories in return for consumer goods and other services provided to the unit.

5. (C) SUMMARY: As stated in the introduction, USMLM's Ground Division collection highlights for the past year have been varied and extensive. However, information is valueless without effective targeting, innovative collection and accurate reporting. Thus, the preceding highlights are actually a reflection of the extremely professional skills of all members of the Ground Division during the past year. Their hard work and diligence has continued to provide the cornerstone for the success of USMLM's Ground Division.

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B. ~~(S)~~ AIR COLLECTION ACTIVITIES

1. ~~(S)~~ General:

a. ~~(S)~~ Aircraft and Air Operations:

1) ~~(S)~~ Soviet:

a) ~~(S)~~ Helicopters: The upgrade of the helicopter attack regiments observed during the previous two years continued in 1986, not only in the form of additional HIND F replacements for the HIND D' and E, but also in the addition of extensive radical tactics training. HIND helicopters were observed in combined arms attacks, working closely with fixed wing aircraft, during night flare and adverse weather training, and in possible air-to-air intercept scenarios. Weapons fit remained consistent for most of the regiments observed, but slewable barrel gun pods were observed at both Weimar Nohra and Stendal Attack Helicopter Regiments. The first observation of the PKPI-1 submunitions dispenser on the HIP airframe during August has also added a significant anti-personnel capability to this old workhorse of the helicopter attack capability, as has the addition of a slewable barrel gun pod and chin armor to the MI-17 airframe. Following closely on the heels of the deployment of the HIP H (ECM-MOD) last year was the introduction of several variants of HIND G, which have been assessed as being possible ESM-support aircraft. The six HIND G observed to date are stationed at Neuruppin Soviet Airfield, and have always been observed flying two ship, two variant formations.

b) ~~(S)~~ Fixed Wing: The year was highlighted by radical upgrades to the fixed wing force. FULCRUM, the new light fighter similar to the US F-16, replaced the FLOGGER G regiments at Wittstock, which subsequently moved to Damgarten, replacing the last antiquated FISHBED regiment in GSFG. Shortly thereafter, another FULCRUM regiment replaced the FLOGGER B at Merseburg. The Grossenhain FITTER to FENCER C conversion which had begun last year was finally completed, and the antiquated BREWER fleet at Welzow was replaced with a full regiment of FENCER E. The upgrade to FLOGGER J-2 at the three FLOGGER ground attack regiments rapidly approached completion. Training continued in the accelerated vein observed last year, with considerable live ordnance deliveries and a GSFG first, the use of IR-suppressant flares.

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2) ~~(S)~~ East German:

a) ~~(C)~~ Helicopters: The East German helicopter training cycle was marked by routine flying. With the exception of a HIP observed one time carrying a possible TOW or HEAT-type quad-type missile launcher, no significant equipment upgrades were observed.

b) ~~(S)~~ Fixed Wing: The new airfield at Laage became the home of two fighter regiments, each equipped with the FITTER K airframe. One of these is assessed to be of naval subordination. A Laage FITTER K became the first national aircraft to carry tactical air-to-surface missiles, with an AS-10 variant missile observed.

b. ~~(S)~~ Electronics/SAMs:

1) ~~(C)~~ Soviet: The TIN SHIELD three-dimensional radar continued to be deployed. TIN SHIELD still appears to be a test bed, with various antenna fit observed at practically all sites. Of high interest was the discovery of a small periodic loop antenna on the trailer hitch of the TIN SHIELD, which was quite similar to the ones observed on the ODD GROUP radars at both Gubkow SA-5 Site (East German) and Quedlinburg EW Site (Soviet). A modified FLAT FACE and ODD GROUP, which displayed added ancillary arrays, were assessed to be related to the introduction of the new IFF system.

2) ~~(S)~~ East German: TIN SHIELD deployments continued. The opening of the coastal areas allowed the discovery of several new sites under construction. One of this facilities, which bore all the construction signatures of the new SA-3 sites at Fehrbellin and Schoenermark, now has SA-2 equipment loaded at it despite the SA-3 signature. The long controversy about the "U/I" device previously reported at Beckendorf and at several other facilities was settled when the optical tracker was photographed at Leipzig - it turned out to be identical to the optical tracker on the SA-8 TELAR. East German SA-2 sites have been replacing their FAN SONG F radars and deploying FAN SONG E radars with the optical tracker installed.

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2. (S) Significant Achievements:

a. (S) On 27 February, FULCRUM was photographed at Wittstock carrying a semiconformal external fuel tank. This resulted in one of the first Air Team reports which facilitated significant technical analysis, allowing estimation of fuel tank capacity and weapons estimation.



(S) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ FULCRUM with Semiconformal Fuel Tank

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b. (S) On 17 March, FULCRUM was initially observed at Merseburg Soviet Airfield. In addition to this first-time sighting, the tour team collected an interesting video tape of variable exhaust nozzle control on landing.




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(S) FULCRUM at Merseburg

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c. (C) On 14 April, close-up photography of the AS-11 rail on FLOGGER J-2 was obtained at Altenberg Soviet Airfield. This confirmed a significant weapons enhancement on the workhorse of the ground attack fleet.




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(C) FLOGGER J-2 with AS-11 Rail

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d. (P) On 12 April, the first close-up photograph of the SA-5 GAMMON launcher was obtained at Gubkow East German SA-5 site. This remains the only close-up photograph of this system.




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(P) SA-5 Launcher at Gubkow

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e. (C) On 12 April, an East German FITTER K from Laage Airfield was photographed carrying a probable export variant of the AS-10 KAREN tactical air-to-surface missile. This was the initial confirmation of the East German national forces capability to carry such large missiles, significantly enhancing their offensive capability.



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(C) East German FITTER K with AS-10

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f. (S) On 18 August, HIND F was observed at Gadow Rossow Soviet Range carrying two slewable barrel gun pods. This observation completely satisfied the collection requirement on one of the four different gun pods seen with this weapons system to date.



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(S) HIND F with Slewable Gun Pods

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g. (S) On 19 August, one of the four HIND G variants was photographed near Neuruppin Soviet Airfield. This was the first starboard photography of this helicopter and showed similar modifications to those which had been seen on the port side.



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(S) HIND G Variant at Neuruppin

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h. (U) On 14 October, the return of the Wittstock FULCRUM regiment from weapons training in the Soviet Union was observed in the Rheinsberg Gap. This resulted in the first confirmation and photography of the weapons load of FULCRUM, which included AA-8, AA-10, and AA-11 missiles.




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(U) FULCRUM Weapons Load

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(S) FULCRUM Weapons Load




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(S) FULCRUM Weapons Load

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i. (U) On 29 July, a tour to Grossehain Soviet Airfield succeeded in collecting the first and only photography of the FENCER C radar. Encountering an open nose on one of the aircraft on the flight line, the tour immediately capitalized on this opportunity to significantly change the national estimate of this airframe's electronic fit.




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(U) FENCER C Radar

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j. (S) On 19 July, unusual modifications to a SQUAT EYE radar were observed at Steinheid Soviet Early Warning Site. These modifications are probably a harbinger of the introduction of the new Soviet IFF system.




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(C) Modified SQUAT EYE at Steinheid

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k. (S) On 24 November, the PKPI-1 submunitions dispenser was photographed on a HIP H in the vicinity of Falkenberg. This was the first technical photography of a system known to be deployed with Soviet forces in Afghanistan.



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(C) HIP H with PKPI-1 Munitions Dispenser




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(C) HIP H with PKPI-1 Munitions Dispenser

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1. (S) On 9 November, a HIND G variant carrying an unidentified external store was observed. All subsequent sightings of HIND G have been in pairs, with the second ship carrying this store, giving rise to speculation that this may be an electronic support measure (ESM) controller airframe.



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(S) HIND G with Unidentified External Store


m. (S) Ongoing analysis throughout the year by the Production Branch staff gleaned such valuable information as the variant electronic fit of the FENCER E reconnaissance platform, the existence of two pitot tube variants on the Merseburg FULCRUM and initial hypotheses about FENCER K's video downlink configuration.

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
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(S) Merseburg FULCRUM Pitot Tube Configuration 1




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(S) FULCRUM Pitot Tube Configuration 2

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
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(C) FENCER E at Welzow



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(C) FENCER E at Welzow

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(C) FENCER E at Welzow

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C. (C) NAVAL COLLECTION ACTIVITIES

1. (C) GENERAL: The PRA change of 9 June 1986 has had a profound impact on the role of the USMLM NavRep. For the first time in nearly 30 years, the AMLMs were granted access to large portions of the Baltic Coast, including Usedom and Ruegen Islands and the Darss Peninsula. Two of the three East German naval flotillas, an ASW helicopter squadron, the two largest shipyards, a wide range of coastal defense (missile, communications, early warning and observation) sites and training areas all became subject to AMLM exploitation as a result of this PRA change.

2. (C) TARGET ENVIRONMENT:

a. (C) Naval targets are generally quite sensitive. This sensitivity arises from the fact that nearly all naval targets are East German. East German targets have been historically more sensitive than Soviet targets. Moreover, the security at East German installations is more disciplined and the local population is more likely to report a tour's presence when it is clear that the target is one of their own (East German) rather than Soviet. This is especially true in areas where the only military presence is East German and the local population is not used to seeing AMLM vehicles. Finally, hundreds of new Mission Restriction Signs (MRS) have sprung up literally overnight to "protect" military facilities in these newly opened areas, and the local population takes them far more seriously here than they do in areas where the signs have been in place for years. As a result, the VOPOs and local inhabitants have taken a far more active role in reacting to AMLM tours.

b. (C) Tours covering naval targets become vulnerable to incidents/detentions because nearly 75 percent of all naval targets are on islands or peninsulas where access is limited to a single bridge or causeway. All the authorities would have to do is close the bridge or block the causeway once a tour has passed and the tour would be effectively detained. Moreover, since most naval targets are concentrated in "clumps" around naval harbors, the risk of being reported is significantly increased.

3. (C) SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: Since 9 June, USMLM has been able to reconnoiter approximately 95 percent of the known naval targets in these newly-opened areas. Highlights of this activity include the following:

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a. (S) Confirmation of a new class of PARCHIM FFL: After an initial sighting of a PARCHIM FFL with Hull #01 off Ruegen Island in June, this same ship was later observed in the Peene Shipyard in Wolgast. Closer observation showed that this prototype differed from the PARCHIM I in a number of ways. It had a BASS TILT fire control radar instead of a MUFF COB, a 30mm 6-barrel gatling gun instead of a 30mm twin AA gun, a 76.2mm DP single gun instead of a 57mm twin gun and a possible BAND STAND surveillance radar instead of the normal STRUT CURVE. Moreover, when observed head-on, it appeared significantly larger than the PARCHIM I FFL. Hull #02 was subsequently observed in the final construction phase and five other PARCHIM II hulls were observed in various phases of construction.




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(S) PARCHIM II FFL in Wolgast

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b. (C) "MUKRAN" Ferry: On 27 August, the NavRep "attended" the commissioning ceremony for the "MUKRAN", the first of six ferry-boats to be built in the Mathias Thesen Shipyard in Wismar. Each ferry is capable of carrying approximately 100 fully-loaded railroad cars between Klaipeda, USSR and Mukran, GDR in 2-3 days. The second ship, the "KLAIPEDA", is currently under construction. All six vessels are expected to be built by the early 1990s. This ferry system greatly enhances the Soviets' capability to reinforce GSFG in a timely manner.



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(C) MUKRAN Ferry in Wismar

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
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c. (S) Naval Order of Battle: Access to the 1st Flotilla in Peenemuende and the 6th Flotilla in Dranske-Bug has enabled USMLM to partially confirm the NOB in these two harbors.



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(C) Five KONDOR II MSC in Peenemuende




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(S) Naval Combatants in Dranske-Bug

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d. (S) Weapons Systems/Radars: Access to naval ports and shipyards has greatly improved the opportunity to take close, hand-held photography of surveillance radars, fire control radars and weapons systems on board East German Naval combatants. These include the STRUT CURVE, SQUARE HEAD, TSR-333 and BASS TILT radars and the twin 57mm AA gun.




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(S) Radars on East German Naval Combatants


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(1) BASS TILT Fire Control Radar on PARCHIM II FFL




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(1) Twin 57mm AA Gun on FROSCH LST

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e. (S) Coastal Defenses: The change in PRA significantly increased the number of coastal defense sites accessible to AMLMs. This most important of these were early warning, surface-to-air missile and coastal surveillance sites. USMLM has been able to make a number of corrections to previously-held information based on USMLM exploitation of these sites.




(S) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Putgarten EW (TIN SHIELD) Site

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(f) Kaegsdorf SA-3 Site



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(f) Niehagen Coastal Surveillance Radar Station

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D. (S) SANDDUNE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES

1. (S) Project SANDDUNE represents a special complement to USMLM reporting. SANDDUNE reporting provides unique order of battle and technical intelligence data on GSFG. Past reporting on GSFG unit organizational structures, training, manning, unit equipment fits and the technical characteristics of Soviet equipment have been buttressed with reporting during calendar year 1986, as detailed below. During this year, the SANDDUNE section produced over 200 IIR, covering a multitude of subjects in order of battle and technical intelligence.

2. (S) Highlights of 1986 SANDDUNE reporting (30XX and 33XX IIR series only) were:

	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>IIR NUMBER</u>
a.	(S) Identification of a military construction regiment/brigade in GSFG.	2-215-3011-86
b.	(S) Unit structure and training in the 794 Ind Co (Spetsnaz).	2-215-3006-86
c.	(S) Isolation of a number of new units in the 8 GA, to include the 194 Radiotech Regt (Osnaz), the 794 Ind Co (Spetsnaz) and Army-level engineer-sapper and maintenance battalions.	2-215-3014-86
d.	(S) Analysis of the movement of two divisions during an 8 GA FTX in February 1986. Specific uploading/off-loading times and locations are specified for all participating-participating units.	2-215-3016-86
e.	(S) Initial identification of an air defense dedicated signal regt in GSFG, with details on unit structure and equipment.	2-215-3026-86
f.	(S) Analysis of vehicle registration number (VRN) allocation patterns and shared series in the 35 MRD.	2-215-3027-86

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- g. (f) In-depth reporting on the chemical service in a GSFG tank division. Reporting covered all aspects of the service, to include manning, training, terminology of equipment and command and control. 2-215-3031-86, 2-215-3032-86, 2-215-3048-86, 2-215-3050-86
- h. (f) Analysis of a tank armaments service inspection of a tank regiment of the 47 GTD/3 SA. 2-215-3046-86
- i. (f) COMINT monitoring procedures and NATO targets covered by a Soviet early warning site. 1-215-3006-86
- j. (f) Equipment fit of Vectoring and Target Designation Point BTR-50P. 1-215-3302-86
- k. (f) Removal of SS-21 battalion from the 12 GTD and the formation of an SS-21 brigade in the 3 SA. 1-215-3001-87
- l. (f) AFV modernization and rehabilitation measures in the 3 SA during 1986. 2-215-3001-87
- m. (f) Detailed reporting on activity involving the chemical staff of the 8 GA. Reporting covered division chemical equipment stocks, meteorological reporting procedures in the army, exercise activity and the firm identification of nuclear burst direction finding and chemical protection battalions in this army. 2-215-3006-87, 2-215-3007-87, 2-215-3008-87
- n. (f) Manning and the structure of an army air assault battalion. 2-215-3014-87
- o. (f) Analysis of a probable Front CPX with exercise play directed SW from the area of 8 GA/3 SA into West Germany. 2-215-3017-87

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E. (S) RESTRICTED AREAS

1. (S) PERMANENT RESTRICTED AREAS (PRA).

a. (U) In accordance with Article 5 of the 10 April 1986 Agreed Summary of Joint USAREUR and GSFG Staff Discussions Concerning the Military Liaison Missions Accredited to the Soviet and United States Commanders-In-Chief in Germany, new Permanent Restricted Area (PRA) Maps were exchanged on 9 June 1986, with effective date 10 June 1986.

b. (S) The total amount of permanently restricted area in East Germany was reduced from roughly 39 percent to approximately 25 percent. The greatest reductions were along the Baltic Coast and the eastern borders of East Germany. In addition, all Autobahns and roads which form the boundaries of PRAs are now open to Allied Military Liaison Mission (AMLM) travel. Stopping in Autobahn rest areas and service stations inside PRAs is now also permitted. For the most part, travel and access to areas throughout East Germany have been vastly improved, with potential for improved coverage of some known areas, as well as first-time access to previously denied potential targets.

c. (S) Although some areas previously open to AMLM have been closed by the new PRA Map, significant gains have been made over the May 1984 PRA Map. Gains/losses realized by each USMLM major collector are outlined below:

(1) (S) Air Targets:

(a) (S) Airfields: Of the 29 major Soviet airfields, 20 now have improved potential for collection. Observation Points (OPs) for only four other airfields appear to have been degraded, while five airfields underwent no change.

(b) (S) Ranges: The better OPs for Gadow Rossow and Retzow Air-Ground Ranges have been lost; however, access to OPs used before the 1984 PRA change remain, which will permit continued video coverage. Belgern Range has been significantly degraded. Access to ranges at Ohrdruf, Kleitz, Jaegersbrueck and Jerischke has been somewhat improved.

(S) (S) Static Targets (missile sites, radars, DF/PD sites, electronic warfare sites, and military communications sites): Thirty-two Soviet static targets emerged from PRAs, while only 15 others were lost. Twenty-four East German static targets

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came out, while 17 went into PRAs. As many as 94 Soviet static targets now have better collection potential, while coverage of only 34 sites has been degraded. Fifty-nine East German static sites have improved collection potential, while 27 have been degraded. The two SA-5 sites at Rostock and Berlin are now deep in PRAs and inaccessible to AMLM coverage.

(2) (U) Ground Targets: In contrast to the general increase in AMLM access/trafficability throughout East Germany, little if any loss of accessibility to ground maneuver routes has been noted. Access to rail lines is increased. Major access routes to the Baltic Coast and the port cities of Wismar and Rostock have been improved. The southern Elbe river crossing sites are now outside PRA, and access to the northern Elbe river crossing sites has been somewhat improved.

(3) (U) Naval Targets: Major areas of the Baltic Coast are now accessible for the first time in roughly thirty years. Some of the most important known naval targets remain protected by PRA (e.g., the Mukran Ferry, Peenemuende and Warnemuende), but many others are now open (e.e., much of Ruegen Island, the Rostock-Petersdorf harbor facilities and the Port of Wismar). Overall, access has been increased to about 90 percent of the coastline.

2. (U) TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREAS (TRA).

a. (U) In 1986, HQ GSFG imposed a total of 72 Temporary Restricted Areas (TRAs) against AMLM, an almost two-fold increase over the 37 imposed during 1985. TRAs 001-86 through 050-86 were imposed before the 10 June 1986 PRA Map Exchange. It is particularly noteworthy that, even though the new PRA map reduced the total restricted area by almost 50 percent, the rate of introducing new TRAs began to decrease after the PRA Map Exchange went into effect.

b. (U) There were several other noteworthy differences in TRAs imposed during 1986, as compared with TRAs imposed in previous years:

(1) (U) The average duration of time that TRAs were in effect during 1986 was far below past norms (5.1 days as compared with 11.3 days each in 1985). Many of the TRAs were of extremely short duration.

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(2) (U) Several of the TRAs imposed during 1986 had unusual starting and/or stopping times. Whereas TRAs historically have been in effect during the hours 0001-2400 during each day of a given TRA, almost one-third of the TRAs imposed in 1986 had differing starting/stopping times.

(3) (U) AMLMs were notified of TRAs on several occasions at unusual times. Several of the TRAs imposed during 1986 were delivered to USMLM during non-duty hours (for both USMLM and SERB), of particular note being those delivered on Sundays and during night-time periods. This, in itself, was unprecedented.

c. (U) As with previous years, patterns and trends noted in the issue of multiple TRAs lead to the belief that most of the TRAs were exercise/movement-related.

d. (U) There were 119 days in 1986 when at least one TRA was in effect against AMLMs. Over one-half of the TRAs imposed during 1986 were in effect during the months of March, April and May, while no TRAs were imposed during the months of October, November and December. The following shows the TRAs in effect during each month of 1986:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>NR OF TRAs</u>	<u>TRAs IN EFFECT</u>	<u>NR OF TRA DAYS</u>
JANUARY	3	001-003	4
FEBRUARY	8	003-010	21
MARCH	12	011-022	19
APRIL	15	023-037	10
MAY	12	038-049	8
JUNE	2	050-051	13
JULY	8	051-058	12
AUGUST	11	056-066	17
SEPTEMBER	6	067-072	15
OCTOBER	0	NONE	0
NOVEMBER	0	NONE	0
DECEMBER	0	NONE	0

e. (U) TRAs imposed during 1986:

(1) (C) TRAs 001-86, 002-86 and 003-86 covered maneuver routes traditionally used during this time of year for exercises. The effective times for all three were unusual.

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(a) (S) TRA 001-86 was in effect during the period 28-30 January. It denied AMLMs access to maneuver routes between the Lieberose and Briesen-Brand PRAs, river-crossing areas, and associated routes near Ranzig and Hartmannsdorf, as well as Observation Points (OPs) for Brand Airfield.

(b) (S) TRA 002-86 was in effect during the period 30-31 January. It mainly denied AMLM access to tactical and wheeled maneuver routes running east-west between the Jueterbog and Altengrabow PRAs. These maneuver routes have traditionally been used for exercises of 2 GTA, 20 GA and 3 SA.

(c) (S) TRA 003-86 was in effect during the period 30 January-01 February. This TRA denied AMLM access to maneuver routes used for exercise movement and driver training in the Luebben Triangle. TRA 003-86 protected east-to-west movement from TRA 001-86 through the Briesen-Brand PRA to the Jueterbog PRA.

(2) (S) TRA 004-86 was in effect during the period 05-15 February. This TRA denied AMLM access to wheeled maneuver routes running east-west between the Weimar, Zeitz and Grimma PRAs, as well as other maneuver routes in the general area. Geographically, this TRA may have denied observation of movements by 57 GMRD east to the Grimma PRA, as well as by 20 GMRD west to the Weimar PRA.

(3) (S) TRAs 005-86 and 006-86 were both in effect from 08-18 February. These TRAs denied AMLM access to movement routes between the Jueterbog and Altengrabow PRAs used by the 35 MRD.

(4) (S) TRAs 007-86, 008-86 and 009-86 were all in effect during the period 10-20 February. These three TRAs, in conjunction with TRAs 005-86 and 006-86, effected a continuous band of restricted area between the Jueterbog, Altengrabow, Grossenhain, Dessau, Brandis, Weimar and Ohrdruf PRAs.

(5) (S) TRA 010-86 was in effect during the period 15-25 February. TRA 010-86, in conjunction with TRAs 004-86 and 006 - 009-86, may have been imposed to deny AMLM coverage of exercise movement by 8 GA and/or 1 GTA from the Jueterbog Training Area (PRA).

(6) (S) TRAs 011-86 through 016-86 were all short-duration TRAs, and are believed to have denied AMLM coverage of an East German exercise.

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(a) (S) TRA 011-86 was in effect during the period 10-14 March. This TRA denied AMLM coverage of OPs at Koethen Airfield, Hinsdorf East German EW Site, and East German training areas north of Halle.

(b) (S) TRA 012-86 was in effect during the period 13-14 March. This TRA had minimal effect on AMLM collection activity in the affected area.

(c) (S) TRA 013-86 was in effect during the period 14-15 March. As with TRA 012-86, this TRA had minimal effect on AMLM collection activity.

(d) (S) TRA 014-86 was in effect during the period 17-18 March. This TRA denied AMLM coverage of movement routes between the Grossenhain and Jueterbog PRAs, Holzdorf East German Airfield, and Dahne East German Early Warning Site. USMLM was notified of this TRA over one hour after it went into effect.

(e) (S) TRA 015-86 was in effect during the period 19-20 March. This TRA denied AMLM coverage of movement routes and training areas used by elements of 8 GA, particularly 57 GMRD.

(f) (S) TRA 015-86 was in effect during the period 21-23 March. This TRA covered approximately the same area as TRA 011-86.

(7) (S) TRAs 017-86 through 020-86 were imposed at the same time and are believed to have shielded a large exercise in south-central East Germany.

(a) (S) TRA 017-86 was in effect during the period 24-25 March. This TRA denied AMLM coverage of road and rail movement routes used by 8 GA elements from the Weimar and Saalfeld PRAs to the Ohrdruf Training Area, and further denied AMLM coverage of the 8 GA Command Bunker Complex at Tonndorf.

(b) (S) TRAs 018-86 through 020-86 restricted AMLM coverage of road and rail movement routes regularly used by 1 GTA to the Jueterbog PRA, and denied AMLM coverage of two air-ground ranges and four Soviet airfields in the affected area.

(8) (S) TRA 021-86 was in effect during the period 25-26 March. This TRA denied AMLM coverage of movement routes used by 57 GMRD between the Weimar and Lossa PRAs and to training areas. This TRA may have been associated with TRA 017-86.

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(9) (U) TRA 022-86 was in effect during the period 27-28 March. This TRA may have been related to Spetsnaz activity to the South of Aschersleben.

(10) (U) TRAs 023-86 through 028-86 were all imposed at the same time, and are believed to have shielded short-duration East German exercise activity. TRAs 023-86 through 027-86 were all in effect during the period 02-03 April, while TRA 028-86 was in effect during the period 02-06 April.

(a) (U) TRA 023-86 denied AMLM coverage of Neu Buckow rail siding, which is regularly used by Soviet Air Defense units when moving to/from Baltic training areas. This TRA also enclosed East German 8 MRD units in the Rostock area.

(b) (U) TRA 024-86 denied AMLM access to Trollenhagen East German Airfield, Demmin-Tutow Soviet Airfield, and East German MD V storage facilities at Anklam. This area has not often been used for movement.

(c) (U) TRA 025-86 denied AMLM coverage of rail sidings and routes traditionally used by units deploying to/from the Letzlinger Heide Training Area. Civil Defense and Special Purpose Forces activity has been conducted in this area in the past. Participating units have included sub-elements of the East German Border Command Regiment.

(d) (U) TRA 026-86 denied AMLM coverage of routes and rail sidings used by the Soviet 32 TD, Petkus Heidehof Soviet Air-Ground Range, Holzdorf East German Airfield, Falkenberg Soviet Airfield, and other facilities located in the Doberlug-Kirchhain area.

(e) (U) TRA 027-86 restricted AMLM access to Altenberg Soviet Airfield, and possibly movement by two separate MD III units in Dobeln.

(f) (U) TRA 028-86 denied AMLM access to Zachow and Fehrbellin East German SA-3 Sites, and to road and rail routes from the Potsdam area into the Rathenow PRA.

(11) (U) TRAs 029-86 through 032-86 were all in effect during the period 04-06 April, and are believed to have covered a Soviet exercise.

(a) (U) TRAs 029-86 and 031-86 only marginally effected AMLM collection activity in their respective areas.

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(b) (U) TRA 030-86 restricted AMLM access to movement routes used by 25 TD elements between Prenzlau and the Templin PRA, and may have been used to cover movement by SSM units from Furstenburg.

(c) (U) TRA 032-86 denied AMLM access to Western OPs for Weimar Nohra Airfield and eastern OPs for Hassleben Airfield.

(12) (U) TRA 033-86 was in effect during the period 10-11 April. This TRA, situated in the Ludwigslust area, only marginally affected AMLM collection activity.

(13) (U) TRA 034-86 was in effect during the period 10-11 April. This TRA denied AMLM coverage of routes used for ground transit between the Weimar and Lossa PRAs.

(14) (U) TRA 035-86 was in effect during the period 10-14 April. This TRA denied AMLM coverage of movement routes between the Dresden and Koenigsbrueck PRAs to the Border PRA containing the Weisswasser Training Area.

(15) (U) TRAs 036-86 and 037-86 were both in effect during the period 12-14 April.

(a) (U) TRA 036-86 had marginal effect on AMLM collection, as it denied coverage only of Fehrbellin East German SA-3 Site.

(b) (U) TRA 037-86 denied AMLM coverage of maneuver routes between the Brandis and Jueterbog PRAs.

(16) (U) TRA 038-86 through 049-86, all imposed together, were in effect from 15-19 May, with the exception of TRA 049-86 which expired on 22 May. These TRAs are believed to have been intended to cover a major readiness exercise during the Soviet Troop Rotation Cycle (ongoing at that time). These TRAs denied AMLM coverage of tactical movement routes and traditional road movement routes used by major elements of all five armies of GSFG into the Jueterbog, Altengrabow, Letzlinger Heide and Wittstock PRAs. AMLM access to the ranges at Gadow Rossow, Belgern, Petkus; and the airfields at Neuruppin, Zerbst, Koethen, Brandis and Brand were also denied.

(17) (U) TRA 050-86 was in effect during the period 08-15 June, and overlapped into the issuance of the new PRA Map (09 June 1986). This TRA denied AMLM coverage of the northern Elbe River crossing site, as well as the east-west tactical routes and deployment areas which are associated with the area. The area affected

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by this TRA, plus its seven-day duration, is typical of a division-level field training exercise by either the 25 TD, 94 GMRD or the 21 GMRD.

(18) TRA 051-86 was the first TRA imposed after the 09 June 1986 PRA Map Exchange, and was in effect during the period 26 June - 04 July. This TRA was originally in effect until 02 July, but was extended to 04 July for unknown reasons. TRA 051-86 denied AMLM coverage of tactical and wheeled maneuver routes running between the Jueterbog, Altengrabow, Lehnin, Dessau, Quedlinburg, Letzlinger Heide and Rathenow PRAs. Airfields, EW sites and SAM sites in the affected area were also denied to AMLM coverage.

(19) (b) TRAs 052-86 and 053-86, issued together, both took effect 24 July, but terminated at different times. Effective dates for TRA 052-86 were 24-26 July, while TRA 053-86 lasted until 30 July. TRAs 052-86 and 053-86 denied AMLM coverage of tactical and wheeled maneuver routes between the Ludwigslust, Parchim, Pritzwalk and Perleberg PRAs, as well as those running between the Templin and Wittstock PRAs. These TRAs also denied AMLM coverage of OPs for the Parchim and Mirow Soviet Airfields. TRA 053-86 denied access to the possible DR3 Drone flight route.

(20) (b) TRA 054-86 was in effect during the period 24-30 July. This TRA denied AMLM coverage of maneuver routes running between the Jueterbog, Briesen-Brand, Finsterwalde, Spremberg and Weisswasser PRAs, as well as the rail line connecting the Jueterbog and Finsterwalde PRAs. It also denied AMLM access to OPs for Petkus/Heidehof Soviet Range, Luckow East German Airfield, Holzdorf East German Airfield and Finsterwalde Soviet Airfield. This TRA covered areas often used for exercises and movements by 32 GTD and other units.

(21) (c) TRA 055-86 was in effect during the period 26-29 July. This TRA covered the same general area as TRA 051-86 (26 June - 04 July), and denied AMLM coverage of maneuver routes and the rail line running between the Stendal and Letzlinger Heide PRAs. Access to OPs for Mahlwinkel and Stendal Soviet Airfields was also denied by this TRA.

(22) (b) TRA 056-86 was in effect during the period 29 July-01 August. This TRA denied AMLM coverage of wheeled vehicle routes and the major rail line running between the Quedlinburg and Dessau PRAs, as well as access to Cochstedt Soviet Airfield.

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(23) (U) TRAs 057-86 and 058-86 were in effect during the period 30 July-02 August.

(a) (U) TRA 057-86 denied AMLM coverage of traditional movement routes used by 12 GTD between the Wittstock and Rathenow PRAs. It also denied AMLM coverage of Neuruppin Soviet Airfield, Rhinow East German Auxiliary Airfield, and the Fehrbellin East German SA-3 Site.

(b) (U) TRA 058-86 denied AMLM coverage of movement routes between the Jueterbog, Lehnin and Altengrabow PRAs, and the Wittenberg Soviet SA-3 Site.

(24) (U) TRA 059-86 was in effect during the period 01-03 August. This TRA denied AMLM coverage of maneuver routes running between the Gotha, Hassleben, Lossa, Naumburg, Weimar and Kranichfeld PRAs. It also denied AMLM coverage of the Weimar Nohra and Hassleben Soviet Airfields, the Ermstedt and Schaderroda Soviet EW Sites, and the Bienstedt East German DF Site.

(25) (U) TRAs 060-86, 061-86 and 062-86 were imposed to cover a major river crossing exercise at the Sandau and Havelberg River Crossing Sites. Participating units most likely transited from the Templin PRA, through the river crossing sites (TRA 062-86), and returned through the areas covered by TRAs 061-86 and 060-86.

(a) (U) TRA 060-86 was in effect during the period 10-16 August. This TRA denied AMLM coverage of maneuver routes running between the Templin and Wittstock PRAs.

(b) (U) TRA 061-86 was in effect during the period 12-15 August. This TRA denied AMLM coverage of maneuver routes running between the Rathenow and Wittstock PRAs, access to the Northern Elbe River Crossing Site, and access to all OPs for Gadow-Rossow Air-to-Ground Range.

(c) (U) TRA 062-86, a very short-duration (26-hour) TRA, was in effect between 13-14 August. This TRA denied AMLM coverage of the major Northern Elbe river crossing sites.

(26) (U) TRA 063-86 was in effect during the period 24-28 August. This TRA connected the Templin and Wittstock PRAs, and denied AMLM access to temporary communications deployment sites near Zechow and Theinsberg.

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(27) (C) TRAs 064-86, 065-86 and 066-86 were all in effect during the period 25-30 August.

(a) (C) TRA 064-86 connected the Lehnin and Jueterbog PRAs, and denied AMLM coverage of East German training areas used by 35 MRD and 34 Artillery Division. It also covered their traditional road movement routes from garrison into the Jueterbog PRA.

(b) (C) TRA 065-86 denied AMLM coverage of movement routes from the Lieberose Training Area/Cottbus PRA to the Briesen-Brand PRA. Access to the Ranzig River Crossing Site, Brand Soviet Airfield, Loepten East German Auxiliary Airfield, and the Paetz East German PD Site was also denied by this TRA.

(c) (C) TRA 066-86 denied AMLM coverage of Golssen Rail Siding and the wheeled vehicle route from the Briesen-Brand PRA to the Jueterbog PRA.

(28) (C) TRAs 067-86 and 068-86 were in effect during the period 07-13 September, and covered an announced major exercise involving elements of the 3 SA, 8 GA and 20 GA.

(a) (C) TRA 067-86 denied AMLM coverage of major movement/maneuver routes from the Northern Elbe River crossing sites through the Stendal PRA to the Letzlinger Heide PRA. This TRA effectively denied AMLM coverage of any ground activity between the Jueterbog, Beelitz, Lehnin, Ragosen, Altengrabow, Letzlinger Heide, Stendal and Rathenow PRAs.

(b) (C) TRA 068-86 denied AMLM coverage of transit routes from the Lossa and Naumburg PRAs, through the Dessau PRA, to the Altengrabow and Letzlinger Heide PRAs.

(c) (C) TRAs 067-86 and 068-86, together, denied AMLM coverage of Allstedt, Cochstedt and Stendal Soviet Airfields, the Hillersleben Soviet EW Site, the SA-3 sites at Stendal, Zerbst, Koethen and Moeckern, and the Bernburg SA-4 Site.

(29) (C) TRA 069-86 was in effect during the period 21-27 September. This TRA denied AMLM coverage of major movement routes between the Rathenow and Wittstock PRAs, and access to the Fehrbellin East German SA-3 Site and Neuruppin SA-4 Site.

(30) (C) TRAs 070-86 and 071-86, issued together, were both in effect 22 September, but terminated at different times. TRA 070-86 was in effect during the period 22-26 September, while TRA

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071-86 was in effect until 28 September. These TRAs denied AMLM coverage of movement between the Fuerstenwalde, Cottbus, Briesen-Brand and Jueterbog PRAs. These TRAs also denied AMLM coverage of Brand Soviet Airfield, Heidehof/Petkus Range, Brand Soviet SA-3 Site and the Dahme EG/GCI Site.

(31) (P) TRA 072-86 was in effect during the period 24-28 September. This TRA linked the Dessau PRA, the Jueterbog PRA and the northern portion of the Torgau PRA.. It denied AMLM access to all maneuver/movement routes between these PRAs, as well as access to the Elstal, Gallin and Pretsch River Crossing Sites.

3. (P) MISSION RESTRICTED SIGNS (MRS). At the close of 1986, the number of Mission Restricted Signs was estimated to be approximately 30,000, encompassing perhaps 45 percent of the GDR. This figure does not include East German Sperrgebiet signs, nor signs warning of firing activity on training ranges. For a fuller discussion of MRS -- their history and impact on the USMLM -- see Annex E.

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F. (P) DETENTIONS AND INCIDENTS.

1. (U) General. In carrying out USMLM's two missions in the GDR, accredited personnel repeatedly come into contact with Soviet and East German military personnel and the civilian population. The nature of certain of these contacts is such that reporting to higher headquarters and mention in the Unit History are appropriate. These contacts are divided into two categories:

a. (U) DETENTION. When a tour is halted and its freedom of movement is physically restricted. Accreditation documents are surrendered to Soviet authorities and an official protocol (Akt) is generally (but not always) completed by the Soviets. Circumstances surrounding a detention may be such that it is also reported as an incident.

b. (U) INCIDENT.

1) (U) Serious Incident. A relatively grave occurrence whose resolution may require action at a higher level than Chief USMLM/Chief SERB. Action taken frequently includes an exchange of letters at Chief of Staff or higher level.

2) (U) Incident/Reportable Event. Occurrence whose resolution can be accomplished at the Chief of Mission/Chief SERB level or which may require no additional action.

2. (C) DETENTIONS. Three USMLM tours were detained in 1986; and one tour experienced an unauthorized halt by Soviet personnel in a previously restricted area, which became open with the June PRA Map:

a. (P) Detention: Jannowitz (VS2095), 22 May 1986. A USMLM tour was conducting reconnaissance in an open area of potential collection on Soviet T-80 and SS-12. No evidence of training was noted. At approximately 0855B hours, the tour observed four dismounted, unarmed Soviet personnel, and turned North to depart the area. After traveling several hundred meters along a deteriorating dirt road, the tour vehicle became mired. At approximately 0925B hours, as the tour attempted to extricate itself, a UAZ-469 with two Soviet personnel approached the tour from the South, then turned away. Ten minutes later, the UAZ-469 returned, accompanied by a BMP-2. The BMP-2 assisted the tour by pulling it from the bog, then blocked the tour vehicle. As the BMP maneuvered to prevent the tour vehicle from leaving the scene, it inadvertently struck and slightly damaged the right-rear of the tour vehicle. At 0945B hours, two additional BMP-2 and a GAZ-66 arrived and positioned themselves around the tour vehicle. At this point, there were approximately

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thirteen Soviets and two possible East German MfS personnel (wearing camouflage suits over civilian clothes) at the scene. At 1130B hours, a Soviet Major, two Soviet Captains and two civilians (one very well-dressed) arrived. At 1140B, another Soviet Major and a civilian arrived. At 1225B hours, the Soviet Kommendatura representative arrived and interviewed Soviet personnel at the scene. At 1300B hours, he requested the tour occupants' credentials and asked both members of the tour to accompany him to his vehicle. The Tour NCO remained with the vehicle, while the Tour Officer accompanied the Kommendant. The Kommendant and two other Soviet Majors questioned the Tour Officer and accused him of violating prohibitive signs (not true) and of being in PRA (not true). The Tour Officer pointed out his location on the map (clearly not in PRA) and, after much discussion, the Soviets prepared an Akt, accusing the tour of being 150 meters inside PRA in a "Questionable Area". The Tour Officer refused to sign the Akt and was escorted back to the tour vehicle. The Kommendant escorted the tour approximately ten kilometers North to Ruhland (VT2101), returned the tour's credentials, and released the tour. The tour returned to the USMLM Residence in Potsdam, and then returned to Berlin without incident at 1745B hours. Duration of Detention: 5 hours, 15 minutes.

b. (4) Unauthorized Halt: Velten (UU7839), 10 July 1986. A USMLM tour was conducting a routine route reconnaissance when it was halted by Soviet troops at 101115B July 1986, in an area which had been a Permanently Restricted Area (PRA) prior to the PRA change of 10 June. The tour had entered a dead-end street when a Soviet truck with two Warrant Officers came from behind, recognized the USMLM vehicle, and blocked the road. One of the Soviets walked to a nearby Soviet installation and returned with a Major who identified himself as the Unit Kommendant and an armed soldier who positioned himself immediately behind the tour vehicle (weapon at sling arms, no threatening gestures). The Tour Officer informed the Major that the area had been previously restricted but was now open; the Major replied that no matter the case, he was still required to inform the Wuensdorf Kommendatura and departed to do so. The result of his calls was the arrival of the Kommendant of Schoenwalde (UU7332) and the Kommendatura Representative from Bernau (UU0457) (who both acknowledged that the area was now open but that they had no authority to release the tour) and finally the Potsdam Kommendant, accompanied by a Major from the Soviet External Relations Branch (SERB) in Potsdam. The latter agreed that the area was open, apologized for the delay, and immediately allowed the tour to continue its mission. The Soviet Warrant Officers who originally blocked the road said they did not know the area was no longer restricted,

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and pointed out they had neither inflicted damage nor committed unsafe acts. All the officials apologized profusely when the Tour Officer said he strongly protested being unjustly delayed. The atmosphere was correct and cordial throughout. Duration of Delay: 2 hours.

c. (9) Detention: Grossenhain (VS0284), 18 December 1986. A USMLM Air tour was involved in covering a circuit and recovery program by SU-24 FENCER Aircraft at Grossenhain Soviet Airfield when it was detained by Soviet troops near the village of Folbern at 181515A December 1986. The tour had approached the area from the North and, believing it had no surveillance, had taken up an Observation Point at VS0284. After approximately ten minutes, the tour observed a possible surveillance vehicle approaching from the South and a Soviet military vehicle (GAZ-66) approaching from the North. The tour exited to the South on a hard-surface road, but, after having travelled only 400 meters, were directed to stop by Soviet soldiers on foot wielding traffic regulator sticks. The tour came to a halt, to avoid an incident, and immediately was blocked from behind by the Soviet GAZ-66, which attached a winch cable to the rear bumper of the tour vehicle to prevent its further movement. Seemingly out of nowhere, several groups of Soviet soldiers appeared on foot and on motorcycle. The tour vehicle was covered with military overcoats, leaving only the rear windows open. After an hour and 45 minutes, the Meissen Kommandant appeared, accompanied by a Latvian surnamed Major who was introduced as the Deputy Base Commander at Grossenhain Airfield. The two proceeded to charge the tour with having conducted technical surveillance of the Airfield, to include laser and infra-red, as well as photographic coverage. Although some photography had been accomplished out of sight of any onlookers, the Tour Officer denied all the charges and demanded to know why he and his Sergeant had been detained in an open area. The Kommandant corrected himself and stated that the technical collection (presumably laser and infra-red coverage) had been done by other crews earlier. An Akt was prepared, which the Tour Officer refused to sign, and the crew was released at 1715A hours. Duration of Detention: 2 hours.

d. (C) Detention: Halle (QC0711), 29 December 1986: A USMLM tour arrived in Halle at 1300A hours, and spent one hour in the city, checking the major rail sidings. At 1400A hours, the tour elected to depart Halle using one of the only two routes that skirt the Northern edge of Halle, since the main route (Highway 80) lies in PRA. Both of the Northern routes include sections that are behind MRS. Approximately 400 meters after the tour passed an MRS, the tour crew noticed a UAZ-469 following approximately 50-60 meters

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behind the tour vehicle. After travelling approximately 200-300 meters, the tour crew noticed a GAZ-66 with Kommendatura markings following the UAZ-469. After the Soviet vehicles followed the USMLM tour vehicle approximately three kilometers, the GAZ-66 suddenly moved out into the left lane with its lights flashing and moved abreast of the UAZ-469. This action occurred on the main road at QCO210. Both Soviet vehicles then accelerated until they were only 20 meters behind the USMLM vehicle. The GAZ-66 proceeded to overtake the USMLM vehicle, despite the fact that there was oncoming civilian traffic. The oncoming civilian vehicles stopped. However, as the GAZ-66 swerved back into the right lane, it narrowly missed hitting an East German civilian vehicle. The driver of the USMLM vehicle swerved to avoid a collision and the driver of the GAZ-66 backed in front of the tour vehicle, again almost causing a collision. The UAZ-469 then pulled in behind the USMLM vehicle. The tour crew stopped and made no attempt to avoid the ensuing detention. From this point on, the detention formalities proceeded routinely. Duration of Detention: 4 hours, 5 minutes.

3. ~~(S)~~ Incidents. Six incidents/reportable events occurred in 1986:

a. (U) Nebra (PB7984), 17 January 1986. A USMLM tour was travelling north in the vicinity of Nebra (PB7984). While rounding a corner, the tour vehicle slid slightly into the oncoming traffic lane and scraped an oncoming East German vehicle. The road conditions were extremely slippery, due to ice. The USMLM vehicle was traveling at approximately 20 kilometers per hour. Minor damage was incurred by both vehicles. The door on the driver's side of the Moskvich was dented, but still intact. The tour vehicle had minor scrapes along the side and rear panel of the driver's side. There was absolutely no personal injury to either party and both vehicles remained operable. The Volkspolizei (VOPO) were summoned from Nebra, and arrived at 1530A hours. The Tour Officer ascertained from the senior ranking VOPO that the Soviets had been informed. At this point, a salt truck arrived and salted the road. At 1630A hours, MFS personnel arrived and took pictures of the scene. At 1700A hours, the Soviet Kommendatura from Nebra arrived (two Lieutenant Colonels, a Warrant Officer and civilian translator). The Lieutenant Colonel presented his credentials, asked for the vehicle passport, and requested details of the accident. After the investigation, the Tour Officer was told by the Lieutenant Colonel that the driver of the Moskvich had apparently been drinking wine and was a poor driver. The Lieutenant Colonel appeared satisfied with the Tour Officer's explanation, shook hands and departed at 1745A hours. The atmosphere throughout the incident was calm and businesslike. There was no harassment from the VOPOs or the MFS.

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The Soviets were very cordial and helpful. USMLM personal credentials were not exchanged, nor was an Akt presented. The tour continued its mission and crossed back into West Berlin at 0930A hours, 18 January 1986.

b. (S) Brachwitz (PC9913), 09 July 1986. A USMLM tour was involved in an unprovoked, intentional collision by an East German Army Robur LO-2002 on the Northern fringe of the town of Brachwitz (PC9917) at 1145A hours. The tour was en route to Air Observation Points (OPs) for Allstedt Soviet Airfield (vicinity PC8005). Upon encountering the LO-2002, the tour was surprised to see the LO-2002 move over to the tour's side of the road. The tour stopped to assess the situation and the LO also stopped, effectively blocking the road. Realizing that two women with a baby carriage to the rear of the tour vehicle would prevent any rapid turnarounds, the Tour Officer signalled the LO-2002 to move to one side in order to let the tour through. Other than staring, there were no reactions by the two personnel in the cab of the LO-2002. The LO-2002 then moved slowly to its right and the tour, thinking it was being allowed to pass, slowly started moving. At this point, the LO-2002's driver suddenly and without warning accelerated into the left side of the tour vehicle. The tour immediately stopped in order to assess damage. The LO-2002 moved down the road approximately 30 meters and also stopped. When the Tour NCO got out of the vehicle to check damage, the LO-2002 departed. The tour returned immediately to Potsdam, stopping en route to call in and ask that the Chief, USMLM, meet them in Potsdam. Chief, USMLM directed the Tour Officer to make an immediate verbal protest with SERB. Colonel Medved, Deputy Chief of SERB, checked the damage to the vehicle and stated that he would report the incident to his higher headquarters. The Tour Officer informed Colonel Medved that Chief, USMLM would be formally protesting this matter. Colonel Medved called the Glienicke Bridge Control Point to clear the tour's passage across the bridge. The tour returned to Berlin at 02258 hours, assisted by a USMLM standby crew.

c. (S) Redlin (UV0116), 30 July 1986. At 08258 hours, a USMLM Tour was transiting East to West along an unnumbered route which forms the boundary for the Retzow PRA. At approximately 08288 hours, the tour passed the road intersection (UV1413) in Jaennersdorf (UV1439), a BTR-70 was stopped and preparing to enter the road upon which the tour was travelling. The BTR-70 turned West on the same road. The tour crew had no idea as to whether the BTR-70 was reacting to USMLM presence or not. The tour crew was aware of the presence of the BTR-70, and did nothing to provoke the sequence of events which follow:

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(1) (U) The tour was travelling 40-50 kilometers per hour (KPH) in order to observe activity at Jaennersdorf Tank Range (UW0415), when they observed the above BTR-70 quickly approaching the tour vehicle. The estimated speed of the BTR-70 was 80 KPH.

(2) (U) The tour sped up to approximately 100 KPH in order to distance itself from the BTR-70. The BTR-70 appeared to maintain its speed of approximately 80 KPH and the closest it came to the tour vehicle was 150 meters. The tour then added an additional 100 meters of distance, giving and maintaining approximately 250 meters separation.

(3) (U) As the tour approached the village of Redlin (UW0116) (aware of an "S" curve in the village), they slowed to negotiate the same curve. As they were coming out of the second portion of the curve, the tour saw the BTR-70 come into the curve.

(4) (U) At approximately 0830B hours, the BTR-70 failed to negotiate the curve. At excessive speed, it struck and sheared in two a 40-foot tree, 18 inches in diameter. The BTR-70 was lifted 6-8 feet into the air and the tree was lifted approximately 4-5 feet above the top of the BTR-70 chassis prior to falling across the front glacis slope and turret of the BTR-70.

The extent of personal injury to the Soviets in the BTR-70 was unknown but certainly present. The tour personnel stopped to assess the situation, and then returned to Berlin. An East German civilian was on a tractor approximately 30 meters from the scene of the accident and could summon help/render first aid as quickly as the tour could; the scene of the accident was in the village/town and this would speed up the summoning of help; and, if USMLM personnel returned to the scene of the accident they would put themselves in the position of possibly being accused of having caused the accident.

d. (U) Schlotheim (PB1578), 21 November 1986. A USMLM tour was proceeding in the direction of Schlotheim (PB1570), when the tour observed two Kamaz 5511s loaded with bricks stopped in the road, blocking both lanes of traffic. It appeared as if the vehicles were lost and the occupants of the two vehicles were conferring. The tour crew stopped approximately 100 meters behind the trucks. The Soviet trucks then continued to proceed slowly towards Schlotheim. The two trucks stopped again on the right side of the road, and the officer in the lead truck dismounted. The tour continued and began to pass the trucks. As the tour passed the rear truck, the officer remounted the lead truck. The lead truck then attempted to block

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the tour vehicle and, in so doing, almost collided with the tour vehicle. The USMLM Tour NCO took evasive action and swerved to the left off the highway. The tour vehicle crossed a deep ditch on the South side of the road, evading further incident with the two Kamaz trucks, by continuing South through a plowed field. After clearing the area, the tour crew inspected the vehicle. The undercarriage and front wheels were apparently damaged when crossing the ditch. A standby crew was called for recovery, and the tour returned to Berlin without incident at 0225A hours.

e. (U) Satzkorn (UU6115), 08 December 1986. A USMLM tour was traveling East on Route 273 and had signalled for a left turn, when an East German civilian Lada attempted to pass the tour vehicle on the left. The civilian car struck the tour vehicle at the driver's door. Road conditions and visibility were good. The Volkspolizei (VOPOs) arrived on the scene at 0805A hours and began what appeared to be an initial accident investigation, along with taking photos of the area. One additional VOPO car arrived at 0815 hours and subsequently departed at 0822A hours. A civilian car arrived at 0820A hours with two occupants, both of whom stayed in the background, and one of whom carried a camera. The Soviets arrived at 0835A hours. USMLM tour personnel were not injured. Thirty minutes after the accident, the driver of the civilian vehicle complained of chest pains, and was evacuated at 0910A hours by ambulance. From approximately 0912A to 0918A hours, Soviets, VOPOs and the USMLM Tour NCO checked the brake lights, turn signals, and blinkers on the tour vehicle. The USMLM tour was released at 0926A hours and attempted to return to Berlin. The Tour Officer was assured upon release that Colonel Medved, the Deputy Chief of SERB, had been notified and that checkpoint personnel at the Glienicke Bridge would be contacted. When the tour arrived at the bridge (0955A hours, the officer was not aware of the accident. After 40 minutes, the tour was instructed to go to SERB and meet Colonel Medved. At SERB, the tour was told that Colonel Medved was "out" and the tour personnel were to wait for him at the Potsdam House. At 1205A hours, the Tour Officer called SERB and spoke with Colonel Medved. He was present at SERB but was waiting for a car. He called back at 1220A hours and asked the tour to drive to SERB. When the tour arrived at SERB, Colonel Medved and a Soviet representative from the accident scene inspected the car and asked for a recitation of the accident's details. Colonel Medved had the Soviet representative read the appropriate regulations from the Soviet driving manual and requested that the Tour Officer sign an Akt. When the Tour Officer refused, Colonel Medved called to the checkpoint personnel at the Glienicke Bridge so that the tour could pass. The tour returned to Berlin at 1354A hours.

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f. (U) Rostock Autobahn, 11 December 1986. At 2030A hours, a USMLM tour team (MAJ De Leon and SSG Lawrence) arrived at the scene of a vehicle accident on the Rostock Autobahn. An East German civilian car had been hit in the rear by an East German civilian truck. The tour stopped at the accident site and assessed the situation. One pregnant woman had head injuries and was going into shock. SSG Lawrence, a German linguist, gave the pregnant victim first aid. An East German ambulance arrived on the scene at 2122A hours. East German medical personnel who later appeared on the scene stated that SSG Lawrence's quick, competent assistance may have saved the victim's life. Volkspolizei on the scene thanked the tour crew and indicated that they should go to the Guestrow Hospital to recover the tour's sleeping bag used to aid the victim. The Tour Officer refused to do this, since the hospital is in a PRA. A Volkspolizei vehicle subsequently returned the sleeping bag to the tour crew at 2241A hours. The tour continued their mission, after reporting details of the incident to its headquarters in Berlin.

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G. (S) INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT (IIR) PRODUCTION.

1. (S) Due to a change in National IIR Reporting Procedures, assignment of 1986 IIR numbers ended on 30 September 1986; 1987 IIR numbers were used effective 1 October.

2. (S) USMLM IIR production figures for 1986, to include both 1986 and 1987 numbers, are listed below; 1985 figures for the same category follow in parentheses behind the total figures:

AIR DIVISION (1 215)	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
USMLM Originated:	067	016	083 (064)
Based on Allied Reports:	032	007	039 (063)
SANDDUNE Reports:	026	006	032 (014)
Total:	125	029	154 (141)
GROUND DIVISION (2 215)			
USMLM Tour Reports:	205	072	277 (280)
SANDDUNE Reports:	124	049	173 (280)
Based on Allied Reports:	104	052	156 (139)
Total:	433	173	606 (699)
NAVAL REPRESENTATIVE REPORTS (5 215):			
Air Reports	005	002	007 (000)
Ground Reports	016	009	025 (007)
SANDDUNE Reports	004	002	006 (007)
Bio Reports	050	000	005 (015)
Total:	030	013	043 (029)
TOTAL ALL IIR:	588	215	803 (869)

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PART III LIAISON AND REPRESENTATION

A. (c) OFFICIAL VISITORS: Visits by members of the intelligence community and others with a professional interest in USMLM's collection activity promote an informative dialogue which assists USMLM in its efforts to maintain an effective and active collection program.

The following is a selected list of key personnel briefed by USMLM in Berlin during 1986:

JANUARY

COL Richard M. Sheridan
Mr Miller

Cdr, 502 MI Gp
FTD

FEBRUARY

Rep (R-NY) Jack Kemp
Mr John J. Guenther
COL Robert H. Hart
Mr George A. Glass
COL Florian Yoste
COL William Lyon
Ambassador Francis J. Meehan

HQMC, Sp Asst to Dir of Intel
HQMC, Head SIINT/EW Branch
Bonn Desk Officer, State Dept
Dir OPINTEL, HQ TAC
INTEL SYS, HQ USAF
AMEMB, East Berlin

MARCH

Mr Robert Blackwill
MG (Ret) Adrian St John
COL John W. McGuiness
MG Dave R. Palmer
BG Charles Otstott
BG John M. Shalikhvili
COL Thomas M. Montgomery
COL Michael B. Allen
COL Richard H. Goldsmith
COL Johnnie E. Wilson
COL John Otjan
COL Richard M. Scott
COL Robert H. O'Toole
COL Anthony Newton
BG Ronald M. Holdaway
COL Frank O'Brien
COL Raymond L. Abrahamson
Rep (D-TN) Barton J. Gordon
Ambassador Richard Burt
MG John H. Mitchell

Chief of Delegation, MBFR
JCS Rep, MBFR
Cdr, 207 MI Gp
CG, 1 AD
ADC, 1 AD
ADC, 1 AD
Cdr, 1 Bde, 1 AD
Cdr DIVARTY, 1 AD
Cdr, 2 Bde, 1 AD
Cdr, DISCOM, 1 AD
CofS, 1 AD
Cdr, 3 Bde, 1 AD
Dep Community Cdr, Ansbach
Cdr (Incoming) FSB
JA, USAREUR
SJA, V Corps
FTD, Plans & Pgs
AMEMB, Bonn
USCOB

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APRIL

COL John R. Desiderio, Jr.
GEN Richard H. Thompson
BG Harry D. Walker
BG Billy J. Stalcup

MR Darold L. Griffin
COL Melvin L. Byrd

COL Charles M. Wiker
COL Edward L. Wills
Mr Martin Hurwitz
LTG Sidney T. Weinstein
COL John I. Alger
Mr John B. Eastman
COL William D. Chesarek
COL Thomas N. Neary
BG C. Norman Wood

Dep INY, HQ USAFE
USA Mat Cnd
CG, USAMC-Europe
DCofS for Supply, Maint &
Trans, AMC
DCofS Pdn, AMC
Cdr, USA Elec Mat Readiness
Activity
Ch, Mat Dist & Mgmt, AMC
Cdr, Anniston Army Depot
Dir, GDIP Staff
ACSI, DA
NWC
NWC
NWC
NWC
Asst ACSI, USAF

MAY

GEN (Ret) William A. Knowlton
RADM Geoffrey Chesbrough
COL Gerald A. Daniel
BG Richard B. Griffiths
COL Richard E. Hawley
Mr Edward Hurwitz
BG Jim R. Joy
BG Donald M. Lionette
RADM Thomas A. Mercer
RADM William E. Powell
BG John D. Robinson
BG Denis L. Walsh
COL Robert Woods
COL George W. Kirschenbauer
LTG Howard G. Crowell
MG Charles J. Fiala
MG Richard M. Pascoe
RADM Robert Steele
Mr Frank T. Lyons

Mr Robert C. Goffus

GEN Glenn K. Otis
COL Jimmy Walker
COL James R. Henderson
Mr Herrod Sorrenson

CAPSTONE
CofS USEUCOM
CofS USAREUR
CofS USAFE
CofS USNAVEUR
Staff Mbr, House Appns
Committee
Staff Mbr, House Appns
Committee
CINCUSAREUR
AFMIC
Dir, USA Msl & Space Intel Ctr
Chief Scientist, FTD

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Sen (R-SC) Strom Thurman
Mr Scott Salmon
GEN Earl T. O'Loughlin
COL John A. Webb

OACSI, DA
CG, AF Log Cnd
XO to CG, AF Log Cnd

JUNE

COL Wes Dixon
Mr Ed Pechous
Mr John Berg
COL D. S. Hinton
BG George J. Walker
Mr Franklin J. Buck
Dr Andrew Eckles
Mr Robin Beard
MG Jack W. Sheppard
MG Richard Trzaskoma

AFIS
Dir European Ops, USAREUR
Dir European Ops, Bonn
Vice Cdr, 322 Airlift Div
Dep CG, INSCOM
Berlin DOD Special Rep
Science Advisor to CINCUSAREUR
Asst Sec Gen, NATO
CG, 21 AF
CG, 322 Airlift Cnd

JULY

Mr Charles Hawkins
COL Charles R. Piver
COL Thomas Davis
Mr William J. Casey
LTG Leonard Perroots
Adm Burkhalter
COL George Kolt
Ambassador David M. Abshire
CAPT (USN) C. W. Kirchhoff
COL John S. Prater
BG Jack Woodall

Dep Asst SecDef, Intel
AFSAC
Cdr, ESAA
Dir, CIA
Dir, DIA
Chief, Intel Community Staff
National Intel Officer, Europe
NATO, Brussels
HQ USEUCOM
Cdr, 7575 Ops Gp
CG, Berlin Bde

AUGUST

Mr Allen C. Davis
BG Charles Eichelberger
DR Andrew Eckles
Ambassador Richard Burt
MG John H. Mitchell
COL George C. Lewis
Mr Robert Winchester

Ms Diane Dorman

Sen (R-TX) Phil Gramm
Rep (D-MI) George W. Crocket
COL Thomas A. Cardwell

POLAD to DCINC USEUCOM
DCSI USAREUR
Science Advisor to CINCUSAREUR
AMEMB, Bonn
USCOB
ACSI, AMC
Spec Asst to Sec of Army,
Legislative Affairs
Staff Member, House Oversight
Subcommittee

Cdr, 601 TCW

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SEPTEMBER

MG Donald A. Logeais
COL Whittenberger
Mr James A. Williams
RADM Dale N. Hagen
Mr Richard P. Sentner
Mr Thomas Sheehan
Mr Charles E. Hayden
Mr Werner E. Michel
Mr Frank J. Aurelio
COL Blanck
Mr John O. Marsh, Jr.
BG Carmen Cavezza
Mr Robert K. German
Mr Robert Glenn Priddy
Mr Thomas Price
Mr Joseph Holmes
BG Larry D. Church
COL Donald Panzenhagen
Mr R. K. Price
COL Murcheson

HQ MAC/Log
HQ USAF
POLAD USBER
Cdr, NAVINTCOM
Dir Int Prog Div, NAVINTCOM
CIA
CIA
Asst to SecDef, Intel
Dep Asst to SecDef, Intel
Cdr, MEDDAC
Secretary of the Army
Exec Asst to Sec Army
INR/WEA Office Director
Dir, USA Msl & Space Intel Ctr
Div Ch, Space Cmd
Div Ch, Space Cmd
DCSI, USAFE
Exec to DCSI, USAFE
NSA Rep, Europe
USAFE/DOX

OCTOBER

Mr Nicholas Bryan
GEN Glenn K. Otis
Dr Andrew Eckles
COL Edward C. Albritton
MG George A. Joulwan
Mr Wayne Merry
Mr Charles Battaglia

BG Gerald A. Daniel
Mr James T. Van Vuren
COL Peter Cummings
COL Richard P. Scheff
Mr Jim Peak

DIA/OA-4
CINCUSAREUR
Science Advisor to CINCUSAREUR
HQ USAF/LEGR
DCSOPS, USAREUR
Berlin Desk Off, State Dept
Staff Member, Senate Select
Committee on Intel
USAFE/IG
Tech Dir FTG
4513 ATTG
Dep JAG, USAREUR
Def Intel, Aerospace

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NOVEMBER

Mr John Elliff	Staff Member, Senate Select Committee, Intel
Mr Ed Levine	Staff Member, Senate Select Committee, Intel
Ms Charlene Packard	Staff Member, Senate Select Committee, Intel
Mr John Fogel	Bonn
BB Loring Astorino	Cdr, 7 Air Div
GEN Robert H. Reed	CofS, SHAPE
Mr William Krug	Polit Sec, State Dept
Mr D. Maceachan	Dir, Office of Sov Analysis
COL Richard Myers	OCCSI, USAREUR
COL Leonard L. Walls	Chief of Recon, HQ USAF
COL Charles W. McClain	PAO, 7th Army
COL D. G. Monroe	USDAO, Warsaw

DECEMBER

Ambassador Francis J. Meehan	AMEMB, East Berlin
COL Sullivan	32 ADCOM, G-2
LTG Spence M. Armstrong	Vice CINCMAC
BG Paul E. Harvey	CG, 322 ALD
Mr Paul Berenson	Scientific Advisor to SACEUR

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B. (C) RELATIONS WITH GSFG/SERB

(U) Meetings with Soviet Authorities: In 1986, 27 formal meetings were held with SERB. In the early part of the year, these meetings frequently addressed the ongoing negotiations between Headquarters USAREUR and Headquarters GSFG that began shortly after the killing of MAJ Nicholson by a Soviet sentry in March 1985. Once the negotiations were completed and an Agreed Summary document was signed in April, meetings between the USMLM and SERB reverted to more routine business. The meetings are outlined below in chronological order. In addition to these formal meetings, numerous other more informal meetings were held throughout the year to monitor progress on the restoration of the Potsdam House.

1. (U) On 3 January, CUSMLM met with CSERB at the latter's request to discuss formulations derived at the third full session of the USAREUR-GSFG staff negotiations.

2. (U) On 18 January, CUSMLM met again with CSERB, this time to receive a written reply from CINCGSFG, GEN Lushev, to a letter written by GEN Otis seeking movement on the stalled negotiations.

3. (U) In a very brief meeting on 22 January, the DCUSMLM and NAVREP met with DCSERB to deliver GEN Otis' written reply to CINCGSFG's letter of 17 January.

4. (U) Seven days later, on 29 January, the CUSMLM met with CSERB to discuss CINCUSAREUR's offer (as contained in his letter of 22 January) to meet directly with CINCGSFG. CSERB began the meeting by extending the profound condolences of Headquarters GSFG, and of himself personally, on the tragic death of the seven U.S. astronauts. He then presented a letter from GEN Lushev expressing his regrets that he could not meet with GEN Otis "owing to circumstances beyond my control."

5. (U) The concluding document for the USAREUR-GSFG Staff Negotiations was the subject of a 30-minute meeting between CUSMLM and CSERB on 3 February.

6. (U) The first meeting of 1986 to deal with a subject other than the negotiations was held on 8 February in CSERB's office at 1230 hours. The purpose of the meeting was to deliver a Chief of Staff GSFG protest letter concerning the actions of USMLM liaison personnel near Neustrelitz. The text of the letter follows:

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THE GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES IN GERMANY
8 February 1986

Dear General Fiala:

On 1 February of this year, the crew of US Military Liaison Mission Vehicle Number 28 (senior occupant - Major D. Grob) penetrated the Permanent Restricted Area (PRA) in the vicinity of the town of Neustrelitz, where they were detained by GSFG servicemen. Taking advantage of the fact that our servicemen had cleared a portion of the road to allow other traffic to pass, the members of your Mission departed the scene of the detention at high speed. While attempting to stop the American Mission vehicle, a Soviet traffic regulator was knocked down and sustained bodily injuries. During the detention, the GSFG servicemen acted in strict accordance with instructions and did nothing to threaten the safety of the Mission members. Their behavior sharply contrasts with the irresponsible and aggressive actions of the USMLM tour crew; it is only through sheer luck that their actions did not have tragic consequences.

General, the provocative behavior of the members of your Mission during the course of this incident (which) radically contradicts the agreements reached during the meetings of the Commanders-in-Chief on 12 April 1985 and made specific during the joint sessions of our staff representatives causes me particular concern.

With regard to the above, I must register a decisive protest and request that the guilty parties be severely punished. I likewise insist that you take the most effective measures to preclude provocative actions by members of the USMLM and violations of the rules and regulations established for them.

RESPECTFULLY,
L. BUGROV
GENERAL-MAJOR
Acting Chief of Staff

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CUSMLM rejected the allegation that the tour had been in a PRA or had injured a Soviet soldier, but promised to investigate the matter. He also lamented the initial hostile reaction of the Soviet soldiers to the USMLM presence. CSERB responded by saying, "All the more reason to get the MLM (instructional) card to the troops." The meeting ended on a friendly note with an inquiry by CSERB about U.S. attendance at the 19 February Soviet Army-Navy Day reception in Potsdam. CUSMLM responded that Headquarters USAREUR had determined that U.S. attendance at this social event would not be appropriate under the circumstances. (On 4 March, a reply to the protest letter, rejecting the charges, was sent from the USAREUR Chief of Staff through SMLM-F to GEN-MAJ Bugrov, Acting GSFG Chief of Staff.)

7. (U) CUSMLM was summoned to SERB on 4 March to receive the GSFG response to a USAREUR protest of a Soviet airspace violation on 24 December 1985. COL Pereverzev, CSERB, presented the following note verbale:

"With regard to the assertion of the Commander in Chief of the United States Army in Europe, pertaining to an alleged violation of the airspace of the Federal Republic of Germany by a Soviet Mi-8 helicopter on 24 December 1985 near the town of Widdershausen (FRG), a most thorough investigation was conducted by Headquarters GSFG.

An analysis of objective control data, the reports of the flight controllers, as well as the reports of the aircrew which conducted flights on 24 December 1985 indicate that there was no violation of the national boundary of the FRG by GSFG helicopters. The flights were conducted in conditions of good visibility, ruling out the possibility of error."

A spirited but friendly discussion of the matter ensued, with CSERB puzzling over the form of the original USAREUR protest. He suggested it would be better if the FRG and GDR were to settle these matters between themselves.

8. (U) On 3 April, CUSMLM met with the DC SERB to announce that the Summary Document had been approved and that he was prepared to make arrangements for the signing ceremony.

9. (U) CUSMLM met with the AC SERB on 5 April to discuss the wording of the Summary Document for the USAREUR-GSFG staff negotiations. The meeting, called by SERB, was primarily concerned with differences in wording between the Soviet and American versions. At the conclusion of the 30-minute meeting, the AC SERB announced that GSFG had agreed to sign the document in Heidelberg on 9 April. (The final session of the negotiations was actually held in Heidelberg on 10 April. See the 1985 USMLM History for further details on the last-minute efforts to conclude the negotiations.)

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10. (U) At CSERB's request, CUSMLM met with him at 1635 hours on 8 April to discuss once again the Summary Document. The particular issue discussed was the placement of a sentence dealing with the rights and responsibilities of a sentry on his post. The U.S. side, having reluctantly agreed to its inclusion in the document, insisted it be integrated into paragraph 3. The Soviets were equally insistent the sentence stand alone. Ultimately, CSERB and CUSMLM agreed that the two general officers in charge of the delegations make the final decision on the sentence's position.

11. (U) On 10 April, the Summary Document was finally signed by MG Price of the USAREUR staff and GEN-MAJ Bugrov of HQ GSFG. Within 48 hours, SERB was calling USMLM to complain that information concerning the signing had been "leaked" to the Western news media. On 17 April, CUSMLM met with the DC SERB in Potsdam at CUSMLM's request to present a USAREUR note verbale concerning the media coverage of the negotiations. The note read as follows:

"As MG Price stated on 10 April 1986, HQ USAREUR shares GEN-MAJ Bugrov's sentiments to avoid publicity of our joint discussions. Accordingly, USAREUR has not released such information to the news media. The Western press, however, has amply demonstrated its ability to ferret out information using its own sources.

HQ, USAREUR desires to promote good relations with GSFG, not to exacerbate them."

At the same meeting, DC SERB expressed the concerns of the GSFG Chief of Staff, COL-GEN Krivisheyev, for the safety of USMLM personnel while travelling in the GDR in light of recent events in the Middle East. The warning, passed verbally, suggested that "during this period of uncertainty, USMLM consider limiting its activities in the GDR... (and) that mission members be advised to be extremely cautious during their travels in the GDR."

12. (U) With the negotiations concluded, meetings with SERB reverted to more routine matters. On 21 April, CUSMLM met with the AC SERB to discuss security at the Potsdam Mission House in the wake of U.S. bombing raids in Libya. CUSMLM reminded the AC SERB that USMLM's safety was the responsibility of HQ GSFG. Accepting this without comment, the AC SERB proposed one or two "mobile patrols" as a temporary measure. CUSMLM insisted that he have the right to terminate these patrols when he concluded they were no longer necessary. AC SERB concurred.

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13. (U) On 2 May at 0900 hours, CUSMLM was summoned to SERB to receive a reply to a USAREUR protest letter concerning SMLM-F activities. The response, signed by the GSFG Chief of Staff, follows:

"THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE
GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES IN GERMANY

30 April 1986

No. 306

Dear General Fiala,

I have thoroughly studied your letter dated 21 April of this year and consider it necessary to state the following.

The content and tone of the letter leave no doubt about how subjectively and tendentiously you are informed about the activities of the Liaison Missions. Consequently, the SMLM vehicle incidents which have occurred in the American Zone of late are represented in a completely distorted light. Really, can you seriously and responsibly accept that "On 12 March of this year a SMLM crew committed provocative acts and followed military vehicles at an unsafe distance", when you know that a woman with a child and a sick soldier were in the vehicle? Why, even a US Military Police representative felt compelled to apologize to the senior member of the Soviet crew for this unwarranted detention.

I am even more astonished by your accusation that LTC Tetyakov and MAJ Zyurin almost intentionally penetrated a Permanent Restricted Area. In this case I consider it essential to note that it was the entire Soviet delegation, led by my deputy GEN-MAJ L.K. Bugrov, that was in the PRA, which they entered by invitation of your Headquarters. The only reason for this misunderstanding -- which you characterized as a "blatant and wanton act by Soviet military personnel" -- is to be found in the fact that your Headquarters failed to provide for unimpeded departure of the column from your Headquarters Compound. At the first intersection the SMLM vehicle with the officers named above was cut off from the main portion of the column. The driver and officer-in-charge of the vehicle (MAJ Zyurin), not knowing the precise route which traffic takes to the Autobahn, made a wrong turn and had to reach the Autobahn by following road signs. Immediately upon arrival of the vehicle at the SMLM residence, representatives of your Contact Section were informed of the circumstances surrounding this odd occurrence. Nonetheless, your Headquarters yet again hastened to draw incorrect conclusions and -- which is extremely strange -- to use it to cast doubt on the sincerity of HQ GSFG's desire to improve relations.

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As concerns transit by SMLM personnel based in Baden-Baden, such trips are conducted in strict accordance with a HQ GSFG plan, and your Headquarters is informed of them in good time. The transit through the US Zone by SMLM personnel accredited to CINC FFA, which is prompted by the geographic situation in the French Zone, is no less established a tradition than, for example, the fact that USMLM family members live in West Berlin and cross without hindrance via the Potsdam Bridge checkpoint at any hour of the day or night. I believe it essential to draw your attention to the fact that the periodic stops made by members of this SMLM at rest areas (outside PRA) are explained exclusively on technical grounds and by the physiological needs of the personnel, not by "abuse" on their part. I hope you agree that it is far from every driver and passenger who can ride in a vehicle 4-5 hours without stopping, and the consumption of food enroute is hardly one of life's real pleasures. In the case in point, US military personnel transiting from the FRG to West Berlin and back may stop at any rest area along their route of travel.

General, in light of the foregoing I reject all the accusations contained in your letter and once more express the hope that the multiple statements by your side regarding its desire to improve the living/operating conditions of the Military Liaison Missions will be confirmed in the near future with practical steps.

Respectfully Yours,
/S/
G. Krivisheyev
GEN-COL"

The original USAREUR protest letter had been sent to GSFG through SMLM-F.

14. (U) The new PRA map, which had been guaranteed by the Agreed Summary document, still had not been exchanged as of 5 May when CUSMLM delivered the following note verbale to the ACSERB:

"My Commander in Chief accepts the Soviet offer of a new Group of Soviet Forces, Germany map which reduces the Permanent Restricted Area (PRA) in the Soviet Zone of Germany. In accordance with his previous guarantee that a reduction in PRA coverage of the Soviet Zone will result in a reciprocal reduction in PRA coverage in the former American Zone of Germany, his staff is now preparing a map which reduces PRA to about 25 percent of the former American Zone.

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My Commander in Chief has considered the Soviet proposal that the maps should be exchanged simultaneously. He agrees, but you should not regard this as setting a precedent. He also insists the new maps cannot be negotiable but they will become effective at 2400 hours on the day of exchange. He proposes that the exchange take place on the 20th day following your acceptance of this proposal."

Identical notes had been passed the same day by CBRIXMIS and CFMLM.

15. (U) The incoming CUSMLM, COL Halloran, was introduced to CSERB by BG Lajoie on 14 May at 1130 hours. The meeting began with the usual expressions of hopes for improved relationships and then turned to other items of business. Among the items discussed were the new PRA map, the MLM information cards which GSFG had agreed to issue as part of the Agreed Summary (but so far had not done so), the presentation of COL Halloran's credentials to CINCSFG, and security measures at the Potsdam House. As the USMLM party prepared to depart, CUSMLM was given a sealed envelope which, when opened, revealed 12 TRA notifications. Such was the going-away gift from SERB to BG Lajoie.

16. (U) The exchange of the new PRA maps was discussed by the CUSMLM and CSERB on 20 May. CSERB reported HQ GSFG had agreed to the exchange proposals outlined in the 5 May note verbale delivered by the three Chiefs of Mission. The date for the exchange was set for 9 June with the maps becoming effective at 0001 on the following day.

17. (U) The CUSMLM payed a courtesy call on the Chief of Staff, GSFG, GEN-COL Krivisheyev, at HQ GSFG in Wuensdorf on 31 May. The 45-minute meeting was low-key, businesslike, and nonconfrontational. Krivisheyev did, however, contend that the previous CUSMLM had not always accurately reported to his headquarters what happened between USMLM and GSFG, particularly the events surrounding the killing of MAJ Nicholson. The meeting ended on a more upbeat note with the Chief of Staff wishing the CUSMLM well in his new assignment.

18. (U) On 9 July, CUSMLM officially presented his credentials to the CINCSFG, General of the Army Lushev. During the 30-minute meeting, GEN Lushev stressed his desire for improved communications, deeper trust, and better relations with USAREUR. He voiced no complaints about the actions of USMLM and raised no contentious issues. In response to a question concerning the distribution of the MLM instruction cards, CUSMLM was told the process was very nearly completed and that he would soon have a copy.

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19. (U) Just the next day, a USMLM air tour was involved in an incident with an NVA vehicle. Without provocation, the East Germans intentionally collided with the mission crew near the town of Brachwitz (PC9914). Although there were no injuries and only minor damage to the tour vehicle, CUSMLM decided to protest the incident firmly. On 11 July, he presented the following letter to the CSERB:

"11 July 1986

Colonel Yu. Pereverzev
Chief, Soviet External Relations Branch
Group of Soviet Forces in Germany

Dear Colonel Pereverzev,

I strongly protest the unprovoked and extremely reckless actions by military personnel of the German Democratic Republic in an incident that occurred on 9 July 1986 near the village of Brachwitz. An American tour vehicle was deliberately struck by an East German Robur LO-2002. This attack was unprovoked and extremely dangerous, putting in jeopardy the lives on not only the American personnel, but also German civilians to include at least two women and an infant. Perhaps realizing the seriousness of their actions and their cowardly nature, the East German soldiers fled the scene without ever once having attempted communication with my tour personnel.

This attack could not have been an accident. Furthermore, this truck belongs to the same East German military unit responsible for the killing of Adjutant Chef Mariotti in March 1984. Ironically, the 9 July incident occurred less than four kilometers from where Adjutant-Chef Mariotti's vehicle was deliberately rammed and he was killed. I can only conclude that this East German unit has been given licence to maim and kill members of the Allied Military Missions.

In the Agreed Summary of staff negotiations concluded between our two headquarters this past April, both sides agreed that members of the military missions enjoyed a special status and that force of any kind was never to be used against them. I realize that the German Democratic Republic was not a party to these negotiations. Nevertheless, I hold your headquarters responsible for ensuring that the East Germans comply with this basic guarantee of safety for members of military missions.

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In this respect, let me stress once again that this was an unprovoked attack. My personnel were simply attempting to transit the area on a route made necessary by GSFG's imposition of a Permanent Restricted Area (PRA) west of the city of Halle which denies US access to Route 80 in that area. My tour personnel were not in the vicinity of any known military installation, nor were they in a restricted area. In short, there was absolutely no cause for this violent attack.

I ask that you immediately express my concern for the safety of my personnel to your headquarters and that you take the necessary steps to ensure that the East Germans do not commit such incidents again. Finally, I ask you to consider opening Route 80 west of Halle to transit by members of the military missions. This would not only improve our ability to travel freely in accordance with the letter of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement and the spirit of the new PRA map, but would also remove the necessity for mission vehicles to transit an obviously sensitive and hostile area.

Sincerely,
/S/
WILLIAM D. HALLORAN II
Colonel, GS
Chief of Mission"

During an FMLM-sponsored reception that same night, the Chief of Staff, GSFG assured the CUSMLM that his headquarters would indeed look into the incident.

20. (C) On 5 August, the CUSMLM was summoned to SERB to receive an oral protest delivered by the DCSEB concerning interzonal travel by the SMLMs. Restrictions on interzonal travel had been imposed on the Soviet missions following the killing of MAJ Nicholson. With the conclusion of the negotiations between the two headquarters, GSFG had apparently assumed the restrictions would be lifted. The French command, however, and BAOR were particularly insistent that the restrictions be maintained until it was clear GSFG had indeed distributed the MLM instruction cards required by the Agreed Summary and was prepared to live by the provisions of that document. During this meeting, DCSEB announced that HQ GSFG would take unspecified "retaliatory actions" against the three AMLMs unless the restrictions were lifted.

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21. (C) CUSMLM met with CSERB on 11 August to receive a "clarification" of the Soviet position on interzonal travel. Choosing to characterize as an "ultimatum" a statement by an Allied Contact Section member that the MLM cards were a precondition to the lifting of the restrictions, CSERB declared that his headquarters was not pleased. He then proceeded to outline how GSFG would retaliate: Guests of the USMLM, to include non-accredited personnel, would be required to go to the FRG first before being permitted to visit Potsdam. After further discussion on how these "countermeasures" would affect USAREUR-GSFG relations, CSERB made the rather surprising statement that "measures were being taken" to prevent a recurrence of the incident of 9 July near the village of Brachwitz. Since this incident involved NVA personnel, CSERB's acknowledgement of Soviet responsibility for East German actions was seen as a major concession by HQ GSFG, and as an indication it took seriously the provisions of the Agreed Summary document.

22. (U) The MLM instruction cards were finally given to the three Allied missions on 22 August. In response to a direct question, CSERB assured the CUSMLM that the cards had been distributed throughout GSFG. CUSMLM then informed CSERB that the restrictions on interzonal travel were lifted. CUSMLM also thanked CSERB for Soviet assistance in evacuating an American military dependent back to West Berlin from an East German hospital. The woman had spent three days in the Magdeburg hospital following an automobile accident on the Helmstedt Autobahn.

23. (U) At CSERB's request, a meeting was held on 28 October to discuss several old items of business. The first two items concerned restrictions placed on SMLM-F by HQ USAREUR. Specifically, SMLM-F has been prohibited from using certain PX facilities in the Frankfurt area because of alleged SMLM speculation on audio-visual equipment. ACS had also lengthened the time required to process guest pass requests in an effort to reciprocate for similar Soviet requirements. CSERB characterized these measures as being designed "to complicate the relations between our two headquarters." CSERB then raised two other issues. The first was a request by CUSMLM that the wife of the PDH NCOIC be permitted to drive by herself across the Glienicke Bridge. This request, having languished at SERB for nearly eight months, was flatly denied. The final issue was that of USMLM guest passes. Although this issue is raised periodically by SERB, this time there was a new wrinkle. CSERB specifically complained about non-accredited members of the USMLM driving U.S. flag-plated vehicles to Potsdam without an accredited member being in the vehicle. CSERB asserted this practice was an exception to policy which HQ GSFG was no longer willing to tolerate. Legal concerns were the alleged reason for this change, since non-accredited personnel had no legal status in

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the GDR under the Huebner-Malinin Agreement. To meet CSERB's concerns, non-accredited USMLM members and their guests travelling without an on-pass escort now travel to Potsdam in a "BC-plated" vehicle.

24. (U) On 24 November, CUSMLM delivered a strong oral protest to CSERB concerning an incident that had occurred the day before near Schlotheim. Protesting the actions of Soviet personnel whose vehicle -- a Kamaz dump truck -- had nearly collided with a USMLM tour vehicle, CUSMLM described the incident as "unwarranted and reckless". He further noted that the consequences would have been more serious had it not been for the quick reactions of the Tour NCO. CSERB was obviously unaware of the incident, but promised to investigate the matter. As on previous occasions when USMLM personnel had left the scene of a potentially serious incident, CSERB complained that they should have remained in the area "to sort things out." CUSMLM countered that the tour had decided to leave the area because of the obvious hostile intentions of the Soviet personnel.

25. (U) CSERB responded to this protest on 15 December. Stating that the Soviet investigation of the incident had yielded another version of the event, CSERB went on to say that it had been a simple near-accident brought about by the Soviet driver's unfamiliarity with the area. CSERB flatly denied there had been any hostile behavior on the part of the Soviet servicemen involved.

26. (U) CUSMLM was called to SERB on 19 December to receive a protest over the detention of a USMLM tour the day before. The detention near Grossenhain was the result of a trap that had been set for some time by the Kommandant of the airfield located nearby. CSERB accused the tour of conducting intelligence collection operations "using technical means." To substantiate his charge, CSERB produced several grainy shots of mission vehicles. He also freely admitted the tour had been in an open area, but insisted that the reason for the detention was because the tour had overstayed its welcome by being in the vicinity of the airfield too long. CUSMLM denied the accusations and protested about the crew being detained in an open areas while transiting on a hard-top road leading away from the airfield.

27. (U) The final meeting of the year between CUSMLM and CSERB occurred on 30 December and again concerned the detention of a USMLM crew. This detention was in the city of Halle as the tour attempted to transit to the northwest from the city's center. This unusual transit route had been made necessary by the enclosure of part of Highway 80 in PRA with the new map of 10 June. The tour was detained after having passed beyond several MRS signs. CUSMLM

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protested the detention as being unwarranted and potentially dangerous because of the driving practices of the Soviet soldiers who had participated in the detention. CSERB countered that the detention was carried out because of the presence of the tour behind MRS signs. He did, however, promise to investigate the charges of unsafe driving practices. The meeting then turned to the general topic of MRS. CSERB insisted the MRS signs were legal and had to be obeyed. To deny the validity of MRS, he contended, would require HQ GSFG to include 60 percent more area to that restricted to AMLM travel by PRAs. CUSMLM denied once again the validity of the signs and accused GSFG of attempting to gain a unilateral advantage by enforcing the travel restrictions implicit in MRS.

C. (U) Social Events: Again this year, USMLM was enjoined from hosting social events that included Soviet personnel. The previous year's policy was modified slightly, however, in that beginning on 30 May, USMLM personnel were permitted to attend the BRIXMIS-hosted Queen's Birthday parade and reception at which there were Soviets. The policy was modified even more in July when USMLM personnel were permitted to attend third-party hosted events in either Potsdam or West Berlin.

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PART IV LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

A. (C) GENERAL

1. (C) During 1986 plans were submitted and approved for the upgrade of the communications room to a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF). This will be required with the planned acquisition of the RAPIDE/MAXI system. With support provided by USCOB DEH, Information Management and Berlin Special Security Detachment (SSD), surveys were conducted and work orders submitted so that the room will meet established standards. Work began in November, when the windows of the communications room were removed and bricked up. Other construction will be performed during 1987, after necessary materials have been received. Completion of construction work is planned by late 1987.

2. (C) A major physical security upgrade throughout the building was proposed, based upon a physical security evaluation. The aims were to enhance security on the first floor (Ground, Air and Joint Divisions) and on the third floor (SANDDUNE). The proposals were approved by DEH and material ordered.

3. (U) Portions of the landscape and security upgrades were performed during 1986. A new, electrically operated main gate was installed. A permanent reinforced barrier was constructed inside the compound at the Clayallee gate. Additional perimeter lighting and repair of the perimeter fence was requested and approved by DEH as future projects. The requested carport for back-up Mercedes 280 GE vehicles was approved but not funded for FY 87.

4. (U) The Soviets continued to provide logistical support to the USMLM Potsdam facility in accordance with the Huebner-Malinin Agreement. Routine support included:

a. Coal for heating (until removal of coal furnaces), natural gas for heating and stoves and electricity for lighting and appliances.

b. Gas coupons for travel in East Germany were delivered at the following times:

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<u>VOUCHER NR</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>	<u>ISSUE DATE</u>	<u>FOR THE PERIOD</u>
#01.18.86	6,000 liters	16 Jan	Jan-Feb
#03.59.86	6,000 liters	21 Mar	Mar-Apr
#05.28.86	6,000 liters	13 May	May-Jun
#08.49.86	6,000 liters	22 Aug	Jul-Aug
#09.21.86	6,000 liters	11 Sep	Sep-Oct
#11.29.86	6,000 liters	18 Nov	Nov-Déc
Total	36,000 liters		

c. Rations continued to be delivered twice weekly, on Tuesdays and Wednesdays. Ration support was generally uneven and attempts to increase quantity as well as quality were only temporarily successful. Rations were supplemented by US-funded commissary purchases of condiments, baking supplies, and beverages.

d. Trash removal twice weekly by the Soviets.

e. East and West German telephone service, supplemented by a West German HF radio connection to USMLM Berlin. A second radio, in addition to one located in the Nicholson Villa, was installed in the main facility.

f. An East German Volkspolizei is stationed in the guard shack outside the entrance to the Potsdam compound. One guard is always present. During the discussions of the renovation of the main building, the Soviets routinely advised that the security fence should be heightened and, at the water's edge, extended. Extensive additions were not approved by USMLM for esthetic considerations, however, some repair and upgrade was done. The main gate into the compound was provided by the Soviets. It is approximately 1.5 meters high and made of wrought iron. SERB has desired to raise all the barriers at the front entrance but did not do so during this year.

g. The household staff consisting of six women and four men provided support as cooks, housekeepers, servers and gardeners. There was no change in the staff from the previous year.

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5. (U) The Nicholson Villa became the residence of the Potsdam House NCOIC and his family after the main facility was completed. The coal furnace and water heater were removed and replaced with gas furnaces. In September the wood parquet floors were stripped, sanded and sealed. This completed the process of installing new floors in this building.

6. (U) The small caretaker building received an extensive upgrade. The walls were repaired and painted, the coal storage shed was removed and the roof repaired. This building was designed for use by the East German staff, however, radiators were not installed, precluding use in winter.

7. (U) Renovation of the main house continued during the year. Work was performed in spurts and all initial promised dates of completion were not met. Progress was measured and problems discussed at the bi-weekly meetings with SERB and SPEZIALBAU Potsdam contract personnel. The main residence was officially opened by a reception on 19 June. This was held even though substantial work was still required throughout the house. Shortly thereafter the main facility was again designated as the primary facility for social and operational functions. The third floor was opened for tour personnel. Work continued throughout the year and nearly all the furnishings were installed. The building is quite impressive, featured by the main ballroom, first floor social rooms and the wood panelled Torgau room. All rooms throughout the house are carpeted with either wall-to-wall carpeting or oriental rugs. The Soviets and East German contractor claimed that one million DME were expended for the entire renovation project (this includes the Nicholson Villa).


8. (U) Several projects related to the renovation remained outstanding at the end of 1986. Most of these, however, such as insulating the foundation, replacing the window shutters, and construction of drains must be done when the weather is favorable. In October, SERB and SPEZIALBAU representatives inspected the carriage house in preparation for renovation. This work is scheduled to begin in July 1987 and will include refurbishing the building roof and exterior walls, installing gas heat and upgrading the electricity supply in several rooms. Interior renovation will be limited to the first floor with only structural repairs being done on the second floor.

9. (U) In December, the USCOB agreed to renovate the kitchen in the Main House. This project will be contracted by DEH to a local construction firm. New cabinets, work areas, ovens, dishwashers and other appliances will be installed. No Soviet support will be provided. Work will begin in April 1987.


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10. (U) A boathouse was constructed at the Potsdam facility over the recently renovated boat dock as a self-help project. The wooden shelter was designed and built by SSG Schatz and the three male East German staff members from lumber provided by DEH.



UNCLASSIFIED
(U) Main Ball Room



UNCLASSIFIED
(U) Main Ball Room

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
UNCLASSIFIED
(U) Torgau Room



UNCLASSIFIED
(U) Torgau Room

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UNCLASSIFIED
(U) Gas Heating Furnaces

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B. (C) VEHICLES

1. (C) Vehicle Status

a. As of 31 DEC 86:

- (1) One 1983 Ford Panel Truck
- (2) One 1983 Volkswagen Kombi 9 Passenger Van
- (3) One 1984 Volkswagen Kombi 9 Passenger Van
- (4) One 1982 Mercedes 280E Sedan
- (5) Three 1984 Mercedes 280E Sedans
- (6) Two 1980 Mercedes 280 SE Sedans
- (7) Three 1987 Mercedes 300E Sedans
- (8) Six 1981 Mercedes 280 GE 4-Wheel Drive 2-Door Vehicles
- (9) Three 1983 Mercedes 280 GE 4-Wheel Drive 2-Door Vehicles
- (10) Three 1984 Mercedes 280 GE 4-Wheel Drive 2-Door Vehicles
- (11) Two 1985 Mercedes 280 GE 4-Wheel Drive 2-Door Vehicles
- (12) Two 1985 Mercedes 280 GE 4-Wheel Drive 4-Door Vehicles

Total number of vehicles: 28

b. One 280 GE 4-door and two 280 GE 2-door vehicles were in USCOB Maintenance Division for modification. These vehicles were received in early November and the work is scheduled to be completed in February 1987.

c. An order was submitted for early purchase of one 300 SE Mercedes Sedan, four 280 GE Mercedes 2-door Gelaendewagens and one 280 GE Mercedes 4-Door Gelaendewagen. These were ordered in October with an anticipated mid-Summer 1987 arrival date.

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d. This year marked the first arrival of 300E Sedans. These vehicles were not modified for touring as the current touring philosophy relies more upon 4-wheel drive Gelaendewagens. Two accreditations were assigned to these vehicles.

2. Accreditations: USMLM currently is assigned ten vehicle accreditations (20-29), of which four are allocated to sedans, one to a Volkswagen 9 passenger van, one to a Mercedes 280 GE 4-door and four to Mercedes 280 GE 2-door vehicles.

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C. (C) PHOTOGRAPHIC LABORATORY PRODUCTION STATISTICS. During 1986, despite the loss of one technician, the USMLM Photographic Laboratory recorded significant increases in every production category while maintaining its high standards. While the acquisition of new equipment and the negotiation of a new maintenance contract with a Berlin-based agency played a role, the hard work and professionalism of the laboratory staff were of paramount importance to the successful accomplishment of its mission.

Comparative production statistics for 1986 and 1985 follow:

<u>ROLLS OF FILM PROCESSED (35mm)</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>
Black and White (Original)	1904	1966
Color (Original and Dupe)	437	692
<u>PRINT PRODUCTION</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>
Proofs	31,329	33,061
Intelligence Report Prints	93,362	137,517
Other	11,867	-----
Total Prints	136,658	170,578
<u>SLIDES</u>	12,356	14,710

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ANNEX A (U) HUEBNER - MALININ AGREEMENT

A G R E E M E N T

MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS ACCREDITED TO THE SOVIET AND UNITED STATES
COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF OF THE ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY

In conformity with the provisions of Article 2 of the Agreement on "Control Mechanism in Germany", November 14, 1944, the US and the Soviet Commanders-in-Chief of the Zones of Occupation in Germany have agreed to exchange Military Liaison Missions accredited to their staffs in the zones and approve the following regulations concerning these missions:

1. These missions are military missions and have no authority over quadripartite military government missions or purely military government missions of each respective country, either temporarily or permanently, on duty in either zone. However, they will render whatever aid or assistance to said military government missions as is practicable.

2. Missions will be composed of air, navy, and army representatives. There will be no political representative.

3. The missions will consist of not to exceed fourteen (14) officers and enlisted personnel. This number will include all necessary technical personnel, office clerks, personnel with special qualifications, and personnel required to operate radio stations.

4. Each mission will be under the orders of the senior member of the mission who will be appointed and known as "Chief of the United States (or Soviet) Military Mission."

5. The Chief of the Mission will be accredited to the Commander-in-Chief of the occupation forces.

In the United States Zone the Mission will be accredited to the Commander-in-Chief, United States European Command.

In the Soviet Zone the Mission will be accredited to the Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Occupational Forces in Germany.

6. In the United States Zone the Soviet Mission will be offered quarters in the region of Frankfurt.

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7. In the Soviet Zone the United States Mission will be offered quarters at or near Potsdam.

8. In the United States Zone the Chief of the Soviet Mission will communicate with A/C of Staff, G-3, United States European Command.

9. In the Soviet Zone the Chief of the United States Mission will communicate with the Senior Officer of the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief.

10. Each member of the missions will be given identical travel facilities to include identical permanent passes in the Russian and English languages permitting complete freedom of travel wherever and whenever it will be desired over territory and roads in both zones, except places of disposition of military units, without escort or supervision.

Each time any member of the Soviet or United States Mission wants to visit the United States or Soviet headquarters, military government offices, forces, units, military schools, factories, and enterprises which are under United States or Soviet control, a corresponding request must be made to Director, Operations, Plans, Organization and Training, European Command, or Senior Officer, Headquarters, Group of Soviet Occupational Forces in Germany. Such requests must be acted upon within 24 - 72 hours.

Members of the missions are permitted allied guests at the headquarters of the respective missions.

11. a. Each mission will have its own radio station for communication with its own headquarters.

b. In each case couriers and messengers will be given facilities for free travel between the headquarters of the mission and the headquarters of their respective Commander-in-Chief. These couriers will enjoy the same immunity which is extended to diplomatic couriers.

c. Each mission will be given facilities for telephone communications through the local telephone exchange at the headquarters, and they will also be given facilities such as mail, telephone, and telegraph through the existing means of communication when the members of the mission will be traveling within the zone. In case of breakdown in the radio installation the zone commanders will render all possible aid and will permit temporary use of their own systems of communications.

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12. The necessary rations, P.O.L. supplies, and household services for the military missions will be provided for by the headquarters to which accredited, by method of mutual compensation in kind, supplemented by such items as desired to be furnished by their own headquarters.

In addition, the respective missions or individual members of the missions may purchase items of Soviet or United States origin which must be paid for in currency specified by the headquarters controlling zone where purchase is made.

13. The buildings of each mission will enjoy full rights of extra-territoriality.

14. a. The task of the mission will be to maintain liaison between both Commanders-in-Chief and their staffs.

b. In each zone the missions will have the right to engage in matters of protecting the interests of their nationals and to make representations accordingly as well as in matters of protecting their property interests in the zone where they are located. They have a right to render aid to people of their own country who are visiting the zone where they are accredited.

15. This agreement may be changed or amplified by mutual consent to cover new subjects when the need arises.

16. This agreement is written in the Russian and English languages and both texts are authentic.

17. This agreement becomes valid when signed by the Deputy Commanders of the United States and Soviet Zones of Occupation.

/s/ C. R. Huebner
/t/ Lieutenant General HUEBNER

Deputy Commander-in-Chief
European Command

/s/ Malinin
/t/ Colonel-General MALININ

Deputy Commander-in-Chief
Chief of Staff of the Group
of Soviet Occupational
Forces in Germany

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ANNEX B. (C) TOURING STATISTICS

A. (C) TOURS AND TOUR DAYS, 1986:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>NUMBER OF TOURS</u>	<u>NUMBER OF TOUR DAYS</u>
January	39	79
February	44	95
March	45	95
April	43	91
May	40	89
June	40	77
July	55	113
August	51	104
September	39	88
October	48	108
November	39	93
December	49	104
TOTALS	532	1134

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ANNEX B. (S) TOURING STATISTICS (CONTINUED)

B. TOTAL DISTANCE, 1986: 625,621 km

C. COMPARISON, 1985 AND 1986:

	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>PERCENT CHANGE</u>
TOURS	472	532	+12
TOUR DAYS	968	1,134	+17
DISTANCE	444,579 KM	625,621 KM	+41

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ANNEX C. (U) USMLM PERSONNEL ROSTER, 1986

PRESENT FOR DUTY, 31 DECEMBER 1986

COL	HALLORAN, WILLIAM D. II	USA
LTCOL	SHOFFNER, LARRY L.	USAF
MAJ	BERRY, JOHN H.	USA
MAJ	BORT, ROGER E.	USA
MAJ	CLOVIS, ALLEN M.	USAF
MAJ	CULPEPPER, MICHAEL H.	USA
MAJ	DELEON, DIONISIO A. III	USA
MAJ	ENNIS, MICHAEL E.	USMC
MAJ	EVANS, CLYDE L.	USA
MAJ	GROB, DAVID C.	USA
MAJ	JONES, RANDAL R.	USA
MAJ	LEAHY, JAMES V.	USA
MAJ	LYONS, RICHARD D.	USA
MAJ	WILSON, THEODORE C.	USA
CAPT	HINDRICHS, WERNER S.	USAF
CAPT	JOHNSON, JEFFREY S.	USAF
CAPT	MCCUTCHEON, BENNETT B.	USAF
SMSGT	BERRETT, ALLEN L.	USAF
MSG	CASHWELL, JOSEPH E.	USA
MSGT	BARRY, CHARLES L.	USAF
SFC	BOONE, DAVE A.	USA
MSGT	MORALES, RIVERA J. L.	USAF

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ANNEX C. (U) USMLM PERSONNEL ROSTER, 1986 (CONTINUED)

SFC	SATORO, GREGORY C.	USA
SFC	SCHWAB, LAWRENCE R.	USA
SFC	TERENS, DENNIS P.	USA
SSG	BENTON, JAMES F.	USA
SSG	BLAKE, RONALD H.	USA
TSGT	CHANDLEE, MICHAEL J.	USAF
TSGT	CUSHMAN, MARK T.	USAF
SSG	DAVIS, EBYLEE	USA
SSG	DUNCAN, MICHAEL L.	USA
SSG	EVERETT, RANDY B.	USA
SSG	LAWRENCE, GARY L.	USA
SSG	MERRIAM, PAUL W.	USA
SSG	SCHATZ, JESSIE G.	USA
SSG	THOMPSON, ROBERT A.	USA
SSGT	BRYSON, KATHERIN D.	USAF
SGT	COHEN-DATES, LOLA M.	USA
SSGT	DUKE, CYNTHIA G.	USAF
SSGT	GILPIN, SCOTT H.	USAF
SSGT	GONZALEZ, ANGEL L.	USAF
SGT	JOHNSON, EDWARD E. JR.	USA
SSGT	KURTZ, DARRELL L.	USAF

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ANNEX C. (U) USMLM PERSONNEL ROSTER, 1986 (CONTINUED)

SGT	LAMPKIN, ELAINE L.	USA
SGT	MCCRIMMON, JAMES E.	USA
SGT	MCKINNON, SAMUEL A.	USA
SGT	OSTRANDER, SETH E. IV	USA
SSGT	STEWART, DOYLE K.	USAF
SGT	SULLIVAN, ROBERT A.	USA
SGT	WESSELING, PAULA M.	USA
SGT	WHEELER, KEITH G.	USA
SGT	WIERMAN, LEONARD P. JR	USA
SGT	WILLIAMS, DANIEL L.	USA
SP4	ALLEY, WADE P.	USA
SP4	DAVIES, ELIZABETH A.	USA
SGT	HALE, TIMOTHY L.	USAF
SP4	HERTL, ROBERT F.	USA
SP4	JONES, ROBERT L.	USA
SP4	MCCORKLE, MICHAEL W.	USA
SP4	MUNDY, GERALD	USA
SP4	ORRMAYAN, CHERIE	USA
SP4	PETIT, RICKLE L.	USA
PFC	SMITH, RHONDA L.	USA
AIC	SUMMERS, THOMAS H. JR	USAF
PV2	BAXTER, SHELLEY A.	USA

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ANNEX C. (U) USMLM PERSONNEL ROSTER, 1986 (CONTINUED)

MR	BATES, JAMES	CIV
MR	CARTIER, CRAIG	CIV
MR	CORBETT, WILLIAM R.	CIV
MR	HANDY, MARK A.	CIV
MRS	JOHNSON, SHEILA	CIV
MS	LUTHER, VICTORIA	CIV
MS	OPPERMANN, BRENDA	CIV
MR	RATZ, MELVIN E.	CIV
MS	SEMMEY, EDA SUZANNE	CIV
MR	SEXTON, JEFFREY	CIV
MR	STINSON, DAVID	CIV

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ANNEX C. (U) USMLM PERSONNEL ROSTER, 1986 (CONTINUED)

DEPARTURES 1986

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>DEPARTURE DATE</u>
SFC	TIFFANY, HANS-JOACHIM	27 JAN 86
SP4	LEINENWEVER, CHRIS	30 JAN 86
SGT	KNIGHT, WILLIAM J.	05 FEB 86
MSG	YELL, CHARLES E. JR.	28 FEB 86
SP4	DIAL, LARRY D.	11 MAR 86
SGT	KENNEDY, DAVID J.	13 MAR 86
SSG	MCMULLEN, W. L.	22 MAR 86
SSG	EAIRHEART, STEVE J.	23 APR 86
SP4	FONVILLE, KEITH D.	30 APR 86
MRS	SEYMOUR, DIANE L.	30 APR 86
BG	LAJOIE, ROLAND	15 MAY 86
MAJ	MILTON, THEODORE R. JR.	01 JUL 86
LTCOL	KELLEY, LAWRENCE G.	31 JUL 86
MSGT	MOSES, THELTON L.	15 AUG 86
MR	HOYT, STEPHEN V.	23 AUG 86
MAJ	BOHN, CHARLES J. III	01 SEP 86
CMSGT	STAIDA, LARRY K.	01 OCT 86
MAJ	ESCHRICH, JOHN E.	01 OCT 86
MAJ	SILVA, JAMES M.	03 OCT 86
SGT	CLEMMONS, STEPHEN T.	10 OCT 86

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ANNEX C. (U) USMLM PERSONNEL ROSTER, 1986 (CONTINUED)

MAJ	WYCKOFF, THOMAS G.	15 OCT 86
SSG	MCDOWALL, JAMES H.	16 OCT 86
SGT	PECHULIS, MICHAEL I.	13 NOV 86
MAJ	BLACK, ARTHUR N.	01 NOV 86
SSGT	SCHAFFNER JAMES W.	01 NOV 86

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ANNEX D (U) DEALINGS WITH SERB, STATISTICS

(C) A Unit History is often of use to the originating unit as an internal record of background information and precedent affecting current operations. This Annex has as its purpose the provision of just such an internal record of USMLM-SERB transactions for the period 1981-1986. Included are: total annual guest pass requests and total annual requests for accreditation changes for personnel.

A. GUEST PASS REQUESTS:

	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>
JANUARY	23	48	24	100 (22)	77 (26)	65 (26)
FEBRUARY	42	39	30	56 (20)	65 (17)	60 (21)
MARCH	58	82	34	54 (37)	76 (24)	186 (51)
APRIL	85	104	93	142 (36)	216 (43)	66 (27)
MAY	42	43	17	128 (39)	126 (29)	79 (30)
JUNE	106	314	345	495 (58)	72 (20)	127 (39)
JULY	362	50	36	115 (26)	113 (27)	91 (27)
AUGUST	72	40	62	116 (35)	124 (32)	144 (38)
SEPTEMBER	22	25	38	103 (29)	85 (33)	118 (33)
OCTOBER	39	37	51	97 (24)	107 (33)	80 (21)
NOVEMBER	72	93	140	134 (34)	97 (34)	115 (23)
DECEMBER	<u>16</u>	<u>61</u>	<u>119</u>	<u>120 (28)</u>	<u>115 (32)</u>	<u>68 (23)</u>
TOTALS	900	926	949	1660 (388)	1283 (350)	1199 (359)

NOTE: Parenthetical entries for 1984 through 1986 are the number of guest pass requests submitted to SERB.

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ANNEX D (U) DEALINGS WITH SERB, STATISTICS (CONTINUED)

B. PASS EXCHANGES

	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>
JANUARY	14	12	15	23	11	9
FEBRUARY	15	19	13	26	10	12
MARCH	11	13	19	18	9	13
APRIL	11	10	12	18	13	13
MAY	14	10	17	22	10	11
JUNE	16	12	21	16	10	10
JULY	20	13	16	12	8	14
AUGUST	17	20	25	12	11	12
SEPTEMBER	13	13	21	10	10	14
OCTOBER	10	14	20	10	11	14
NOVEMBER	15	17	21	11	12	14
DECEMBER	<u>13</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>15</u>
TOTALS	179	171	225	191	131	51

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ANNEX E. (C) MISSION RESTRICTED SIGNS (MRS)

1. (C) One of the most common sights while touring in the GDR is the ubiquitous MRS. Seemingly everywhere, these signs often are the first indication of Soviet or East German military presence. Their validity under the Huebner-Malinin Agreement has been debated for over 35 years. For most of this period, the USMLM and its two sister allied military missions have denied any legitimacy for these signs and have virtually ignored them in their operational touring. Yet, they are little understood by those outside the missions. The following paragraphs are an attempt to highlight the history of MRS and give some sense of impact on USMLM's collection operations if MRS were to be obeyed.

2. (C) HISTORY OF MRS. MRS first appeared in 1951 along with the first PRA. The first MRS signs were nondescript in style and wording, and were generally ignored by the Allied Military Liaison Missions (AMLM's). In the early days of MRS, when mission crews were detained behind signs and accused of being in restricted areas, the standard response was that MRS had no validity under the Huebner-Malinin Agreement (HMA) and were not applicable to mission members. This essentially has remained the response to the present time.

a. (C) At first, the growth of MRS throughout the GDR was relatively slow paced. Then, on New Year's Eve night in 1957, all of the old signs were replaced by the MRS still in use today -- a white sign with black lettering in four languages mounted on a red pole. The uniformity of the signs and the fact that considerable manpower was detailed to the task indicated that HQ CSFG had directed the action and that MRS were going to play a large role in the Soviets' efforts to control the activities of the AMLM's. In early 1958, the number of MRS in the GDR was estimated to be "more than 1000." However, the signs began to proliferate rapidly. Two years later, in 1960, their number was estimated to have grown to approximately 3000. In ten years time, they doubled again to nearly 7000. By 1978, the AMLM's were estimating 10,000 MRS. That number continued to grow until around the 1985-1986 time-frame when BRIXMIS estimated that the number of signs had grown to as many as 20,000. Following the introduction of a new PRA Map in June 1986, there was another spurt in MRS, especially in the areas newly-opened to AMLM travel. While there is no completely accurate tally of the number of MRS, the AMLM's are fairly confident that an estimate of at least 30,000 MRS signs is in the proper order of magnitude.

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b. (f) Many of the MRS erected during the period 1971-1985 were placed to protect EG installations. It should be noted, however, that the East Germans have another restricted area sign (SPERRGEBIET) which is also frequently used, sometimes in conjunction with MRS. This sign is written solely in German and, unlike the MRS, makes no mention of foreign military liaison missions, and therefore presumably is applicable to everyone in the GDR. Estimates of the number of MRS do not include these signs.

2. (f) AREA COVERED BY MRS. Just as it is difficult to be certain of the true number of MRS, it is also difficult to estimate the area "signed off" by MRS. However, an educated guess can be made.

a. (f) During the negotiations following the killing of MAJ Nicholson, CUSMLM asserted that complying with MRS in addition to PRA would put 90 percent of the GDR off limits. The Soviets did not refute his assertion. If this silence was meant to signal agreement, then 50 percent of the GDR was protected by MRS since PRA coverage at this time was 40 percent.

b. (f) In a recent meeting with CSERB to protest a USMLM detention, CUSMLM was told that if MRS signs were eliminated, PRA within the GDR would have to be increased to 60 percent to protect Soviet and EG installations. At this point, PRA restrictions had been reduced to 25 percent of the GDR. Thus, MRS coverage would have had to have been 35 percent if CSERB was telling the truth.

c. (f) The correct percentage of area protected by MRS lies somewhere in between, but probably closer to the higher figure. The USMLM estimate is that, at a minimum, 45 percent of the GDR not protected by PRA is covered by MRS. Thus, again at a minimum, at least 70 percent of the GDR is restricted to AMLM travel by the Soviets.

3. (f) USES OF MRS. In the way they are employed, Soviet MRS do not bear any resemblance to restricted area signs in the West. The Soviets do not put them up simply on the exterior walls of their military installations. Instead, they are used to mark and restrict access to virtually every form of military activity. MRS signs, usually placed two or three kilometers from what is being protected, block approaches to installations, deployment sites, airfields, radar and electronic sites, troop concentration areas, Tac trails, rail sidings, ranges, military schools, hospitals, and even some military dependent housing areas. Rather ironically, MRS are seldom

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used to make actual PRA's. Instead, they are more likely to be seen in certain urban areas like Erfurt, Dresden, and Karl-Marx-Stadt, where virtually all approaches to the city are blocked by MRS. In other cases, major transit routes used by the Soviets and East Germans for column movements and driver's training are also blocked by MRS. On occasions in the past, "portable" MRS signs have been used to put a detained mission crew in a restricted area after the fact. Finally, it must be remembered that, unlike warning signs at firing ranges and the East German Sperrgebiet signs, MRS are specifically directed only against the AMLM's.

4. (C) LEGALITY OF MRS. Neither MRS nor PRA are mentioned in the Huebner-Malinin Agreement (HMA) or the final version of the April 1986 Summary of HQ GSFG-HQ USAREUR Staff Negotiations. Of the three bi-lateral agreements establishing the AMLM's, only the BRIXMIS Robinson-Malinin Agreement mentions restricted areas: "...Freedom of travel and circulation...in each zone with the exception of restricted areas..." In contrast, the HMA states that members of the missions will be given identical passes "...Permitting complete freedom of travel wherever and whenever it will be desired over territory and roads in both zones, except places of disposition of military units..." It is this last phrase that the Soviets argue gives them the right to erect MRS. Conversely, it is the absence of any mention of restricted areas in this sentence that has allowed the USMLM to claim that MRS have no validity under the HMA.

a. (S) From the evidence available, it appears that MRS have only been discussed officially twice at a level higher than that of CSERB-Chief of Mission. The first instance was in 1958 when the Chief of Staff, GSFG, COL-GEN SIDELNIKOV, issued a letter through CSERB to the Chiefs of the AMLM's warning them he would hold them personally responsible for a violation of orders from the Soviet Command if members of their respective missions continued to disregard MRS. At a tripartite meeting held a week later in Heidelberg, a decision was made to respect Soviet MRS "For the time being" while retaliatory action was taken against the SMLM's in West Germany. This guidance lasted until about 1967 at the latest, at which time USMLM and FMLM reverted to ignoring MRS in their operational touring. During that time the number of MRS had grown from roughly 1,000 to an estimated 4,000 plus. BRIXMIS continued to honor the signs until 1972. The number of MRS signs by then had grown to over 7000. Since then, all three AMLM's have agreed that MRS would not restrict their intelligence collection activities. This agreement is periodically reaffirmed at the tri-chief level.

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b. The only other time MRS were discussed at the General Officer level was during the 1985-1986 negotiations following the Nicholson killing. MRS, in fact, were probably the most contentious issue after that of a Soviet sentry's right to use deadly force against a mission member. The discussions centered around Article 10 of the HMA which addresses the right to travel in the respective zones of occupation. The Soviet position up until near the end of the final session was that not only were MRS legal under the HMA, but that they were necessary to fulfill their (self-imposed) obligations under Article 10 to mark "places of disposition of military forces." In that respect, the Soviets argued, MRS were an important safety feature rather than a restriction to travel. The American delegation repeated their arguments against the validity of MRS and pointed out their discriminatory impact on the AMLM's. Noting that their numbers were excessive and that they were often placed indiscriminately or even capriciously, the Americans insisted that MRS could not be used as a substitute for PRA and TRA.

c. (u) Going into the final negotiating session, the American delegation was reluctantly prepared to accept a euphemism in a proposed Paragraph 5 of the Summary Document that would allow the Soviets to continue using MRS while permitting the American side to honor CINCUSAREUR's guidance that MRS not be recognized. Specifically, the Americans were willing to accept the following wording; "To recognize the right of each headquarters to take reasonable steps deemed essential to implement the provisions of Article 10 of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement, but without unduly restricting freedom of travel."

d. (u) However, the Soviets overplayed their hand. Instead of accepting the American wording, they insisted the proposed Paragraph 5 read as follows: "To recognize the right of each headquarters to take the particular steps deemed essential to prevent members of the Military Liaison Missions from inadvertently intruding onto the places of disposition of military units or military facilities." When the senior Soviet negotiator made it clear that the phrase "particular steps deemed essential" meant not only PRA and TRA, but also MRS, the negotiations stalemated. Finally, after considerable debate, the American side convinced the Soviets to drop Paragraph 5 altogether from the Summary document. Apparently sensing that the Americans would not back down on the issue of freedom of travel, the Soviets chose to eliminate the paragraph in order to preserve their headquarter's MRS policy, even if that policy continued to be officially ignored by the AMLM's. The American delegation, of

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course, was only too happy to skirt the issue in its entirety, particularly since HQ GSFG had already agreed to reduce PRA from roughly 40 percent to 25 percent. This agreement in itself significantly improved the ability of the AMLM's to transit the GDR while opening new areas to collection efforts.

5. (C) CURRENT AMLM POLICY CONCERNING MRS. The three AMLM's have essentially the same policy concerning MRS. None recognize their validity or allow their presence, under most circumstances, to deter collection.

a. (C) USMLM policy is never to acknowledge the validity of MRS. Tour personnel exercise prudence in driving behind MRS and will not normally do so while under close surveillance, while in the immediate vicinity of Soviet vehicles or personnel, or when to do so would attract an undesirable level of attention to the tour's presence. MRS are not regarded as a barrier to target coverage or to transit of a given area. However, MRS are not violated in the immediate vicinity of Soviet installations in the Potsdam, Krampnitz, Dallgow-Doerbitz areas.

b. (C) BRIXMIS and FMLM claim that MRS do not affect their operations. All three missions agree, however, that being "behind signs" raises the possibility of detention.

6. (C) IMPACT ON USMLM OPERATIONS IF MRS WERE OBEYED. In a word, the impact would be disastrous. Assuming the estimate of the area encompassed by MRS is reasonably correct, USMLM would be virtually limited to chance encounters with Soviet military equipment on major thoroughfares. The ability to get close up technical quality photography of new Soviet military equipment would be eliminated. As specific examples, had MRS been honored during 1986, coverage like the examples listed below would have been lost:

--SA-11 TELARS and support equipment at Naumburg-Freyburg TA

--Add-on armor on BMP-2 seen at Rohrbeck

--T-80 with KMT-6 at Naumburg-Freyburg TA

--Paradrop activities by SPF and air assault units in the vicinity of Redlin

--Coverage of the harbors at Peenemuende and Kroeslin

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--Introduction of the MIG-29 FULCRUM at Merseburg Airfield

--SA-5 Launcher at Gubkow SAM Site

--Troop Rotation activities at Parchim Airfield

Many other less sensational acquisitions would have also been lost.

7. (b) OTHER CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING MRS. Three other considerations should be kept in mind concerning the impact on AMLM operations if MRS were to be obeyed.

a. (b) If the decision to honor MRS were a unilateral one, there would still be an adverse impact on the operations of the other two missions. Without a doubt, the Soviets would use USMLM acquiescence to MRS as a bludgeon to beat BRIXMIS and FMLM into similar submission. Tripartite unity would be severely strained by any USAREUR decision to obey MRS.

b. (b) Once the Soviets discerned that USMLM was obeying MRS, they would almost certainly rush to erect signs around the few military installations that are still without them. The traditional Soviet proclivity for excessive security would run rampant, turning the GDR into a denied area.

c. (b) Honoring MRS in addition to PRA/TRA would concede to the Soviets a unilateral advantage in protecting their military forces outside of PRA/TRA from the prying eyes of the Western Military Liaison Missions. The West could be put at a further disadvantage if the Soviets were to announce a unilateral reduction in PRA and demand that they West reciprocate. The headquarters would be forced to accept one of three alternatives: (1) concede to the Soviets an even larger unilateral advantage; (2) openly admit the validity of MRS and begin to establish similar restricted areas; or (3) seek some other way, perhaps through increased overt surveillance, to restrict the movements of SMLM. None of these alternatives is attractive.

8. (b) CONCLUSION. Accepting the Soviet position that MRS are legal under the HMA would hamstring USMLM's operations. To acquiesce to the Soviet position would be to deny the American intelligence community a unique view of Soviet military developments. It is clear from the statements of both sides during the Nicholson negotiations that a Modus Vivendi has been struck on the issue of MRS. The Soviets will continue to erect them and insist

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they are a valid outgrowth of the HMA. The USMLM (and the other two AMLM's) will continue to deny their validity while exercising prudence in driving past MRS to collect intelligence information. Almost certainly, the fine points of this issue will continue to be debated during periodic exchanges between CSERB and the Allied Chiefs of Mission, but neither side is likely to change its position.

9. (U) A FINAL ANECDOTE. At a cocktail reception in October 1983, CUSMLM complained to the GSFG Chief of Intelligence about the proliferation of MRS and the fact they were not valid under the provisions of the HMA. The Soviet General simply shrugged and smiled. Taking that as, hopefully, a sign of concurrence with the American position, CUSMLM immediately sought out CSERB and told him that the General, CSERB's probable immediate superior, had agreed that MRS were invalid. CSERB only laughed and retorted, "You can agree all you want with the Generals, but if you are behind the signs, I will still detain you."

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ANNEX F. (U) AGREED SUMMARY, USAREUR-GSFG NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING STATUS OF MISSIONS

AGREED SUMMARY OF JOINT U.S. ARMY EUROPE
AND GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES IN GERMANY
STAFF DISCUSSIONS

WITH THE GOAL OF PREVENTING INCIDENTS INVOLVING MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS ACCREDITED TO CINCSFG AND CINCUSAREUR, STAFF REPRESENTATIVES HAVE HELD JOINT DISCUSSIONS ON ENSURING THE SAFETY AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF SUCH MISSION MEMBERS. AS A RESULT OF THESE DISCUSSIONS THE PARTIES HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

1. TO CONFIRM THAT THE 1947 HUEBNER-MALININ AGREEMENT REMAINS VALID AND UNCHANGED AND ENSURE THAT ALL ITS PROVISIONS ARE STRICTLY OBSERVED.
2. THAT MILITARY LIAISON MISSION MEMBERS ENJOY SPECIAL STATUS AS A RESULT OF BEING ACCREDITED TO THE RESPECTIVE COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF. THEY WILL RESPECT THE LAW AND ORDER OF THE COUNTRY WITHIN WHICH THEY ARE LOCATED AND WILL NOT COMMIT PROVOCATIVE ACTS.
3. THAT ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL WILL BE INSTRUCTED ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF MISSION MEMBERS AND RECEIVE INSTRUCTION CARDS WHICH ADDRESS THE PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED WITH REGARD TO THEM. AT A MINIMUM, THE CARDS WILL STIPULATE THAT THE USE OF FORCE OR WEAPONS AGAINST MISSION MEMBERS OR THE COMMISSION OF OTHER ACTS WHICH COULD THREATEN THEIR SAFETY IS CATEGORICALLY PROHIBITED. THE SEARCH OF MISSION MEMBERS OR THEIR VEHICLES IS ALSO PROHIBITED. MISSION MEMBERS WILL BE CONTINUOUSLY BRIEFED ON THE SPECIAL PROCEDURES WHICH APPLY TO A SENTRY ON HIS POST.
4. TO ESTABLISH SIMILAR PROCEDURES FOR INVESTIGATING DETENTIONS OF MISSION MEMBERS. UPON THE COMPLETION OF AN INVESTIGATION THE DETAINED MISSION MEMBERS WILL BE PERMITTED TO CONTINUE THEIR TRAVEL.
5. TO REDUCE ON A MUTUAL BASIS THE PERMANENT RESTRICTED AREAS (PRA) AND OPEN FOR FREE MOVEMENT BY MISSION MEMBERS THE CITIES WHERE THE MISSIONS ARE LOCATED AND THE ROADS WHICH PROVIDE ENTRANCE TO OR EXIT FROM THEM. WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW PRA MAPS ABOLISH THE EXISTING RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT BY MISSION MEMBERS ALONG AUTOBANS AND ROADS WHICH BORDER RESTRICTED AREAS.

THIS SUMMARY IS WRITTEN IN ENGLISH AND RUSSIAN, BOTH TEXTS BEING AUTHENTIC.

Roger J. Price
ROGER J. PRICE 10 APR 56
MAJOR GENERAL, GENERAL STAFF
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY EUROPE AND SEVENTH ARMY

Leonid K. Bugrov
LEONID K. BUGROV 10.4.56
GENERAL-MAJOR
FIRST DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES IN GERMANY

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ANNEX F. (U) AGREED SUMMARY, USAREUR-GSFG NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING STATUS OF MISSIONS (CONTINUED)

СОГЛАСОВАННЫЕ ИТОГИ ПЕРЕГОВОРОВ
ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЕЙ ШТАБОВ ГСВГ И СВ США В ЕВРОПЕ

С ЦЕЛЬЮ ПРЕДОТВРАЩЕНИЯ ИНЦИДЕНТОВ С ЧЛЕНАМИ ВОЕННЫХ МИССИЙ СВЯЗИ, АККРЕДИТОВАННЫХ ПРИ ГК ГСВГ И ГК СВ США В ЕВРОПЕ, ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЯМИ ШТАБОВ БЫЛИ ПРОВЕДЕНЫ ПЕРЕГОВОРЫ ПО ВОПРОСАМ ОБЕСПЕЧЕНИЯ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ И СВОБОДЫ ПЕРЕДВИЖЕНИЯ ЧЛЕНОВ ЭТИХ МИССИЙ. В РЕЗУЛЬТАТЕ ЭТИХ ПЕРЕГОВОРОВ СТОРОНЫ ДОГОВОРИЛИСЬ О СЛЕДУЮЩЕМ:

1. ПОДТВЕРДИТЬ ДЕЙСТВЕННОСТЬ И НЕИЗМЕННОСТЬ СОГЛАШЕНИЯ "ХЮБНЕР-МАЛИНИН" 1947 ГОДА, СБЕСПЕЧИТЬ СТРОГОЕ СОБЛЮДЕНИЕ ВСЕХ ЕГО ПОЛОЖЕНИЙ.

2. ЧЛЕНЫ МИССИЙ ИМЕЮТ ОСОБЫЙ СТАТУС, ПОСКОЛЬКУ ОНИ АККРЕДИТОВАНЫ ПРИ СООТВЕТСТВУЮЩИХ ГЛАВНОКОМАНДУЮЩИХ. ОНИ БУДУТ УВАЖАТЬ ЗАКОНЫ И ПОРЯДКИ СТРАНЫ ПРЕБЫВАНИЯ, В КОТОРОЙ ОНИ НАХОДЯТСЯ, И НЕ БУДУТ СОВЕРШАТЬ ПРОВОКАЦИОННЫХ ДЕЙСТВИЙ.


3. ВСЕ ВОЕННОСЛУЖАЩИЕ БУДУТ ПРОИНФОРМИРОВАНЫ О ПРАВОВОМ ПОЛОЖЕНИИ ЧЛЕНОВ МИССИЙ И ПОЛУЧАТ ПАМЯТКИ-ИНСТРУКЦИИ О ПОРЯДКЕ ДЕЙСТВИЙ ПО ОТНОШЕНИЮ К НИМ. КАК МИНИМУМ, В ЭТИХ ПАМЯТКАХ ДОЛЖНО БЫТЬ УКАЗАНО, ЧТО ПРОТИВ ЧЛЕНОВ МИССИЙ КАТЕГОРИЧЕСКИ ЗАПРЕЩАЕТСЯ ПРИМЕНЯТЬ СИЛУ, СРУЖИЕ ИЛИ СОВЕРШАТЬ ИНЫЕ ДЕЙСТВИЯ, КОТОРЫЕ МОГУТ УГРОЖАТЬ ИХ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ, А ТАКЖЕ ОБЫСКИВАТЬ ЧЛЕНОВ ВМС И ИХ АВТОМАШИНЫ.


ЧЛЕНАМ МИССИЙ БУДЕТ ПОСТОЯННО ДОВОДИТЬСЯ ОСОБЫЙ ПОРЯДОК ДЕЙСТВИЙ ЧАСОВОГО НА ПОСТУ.

4. УСТАНОВИТЬ СХОДНЫЙ ПОРЯДОК РАЗБОРА ЗАДЕРЖАНИЙ ЧЛЕНОВ ВМС. ПОСЛЕ ЗАВЕРШЕНИЯ РАЗБОРА ЗАДЕРЖАННЫМ ЧЛЕНАМ МИССИИ БУДЕТ РАЗРЕШАТЬСЯ ПРОДОЛЖАТЬ ДАЛЬНЕЙШЕЕ ДВИЖЕНИЕ.

5. НА ВЗАИМНОЙ ОСНОВЕ СОКРАТИТЬ ПЛОЩАДЬ ПОСТОЯННЫХ ЗАПРЕТНЫХ РАЙОНОВ (ПЗР), ОТКРЫТЬ ДЛЯ СВОБОДНОГО ПЕРЕДВИЖЕНИЯ ЧЛЕНОВ МИССИЙ ГОРОДА, В КОТОРЫХ РАЗМЕЩЕНЫ МИССИИ, И ДОРОГИ, ПО КОТОРЫМ ОСУЩЕСТВЛЯЕТСЯ ВЪЕЗД В ЭТИ ГОРОДА И ВЪЕЗД ИЗ НИХ. С ВВЕДЕНИЕМ НОВЫХ КАРТ ПЗР ОТМЕНИТЬ СУЩЕСТВУЮЩИЕ В НАСТОЯЩЕЕ ВРЕМЯ ОГРАНИЧЕНИЯ НА ПЕРЕДВИЖЕНИЕ ЧЛЕНОВ МИССИЙ ПО АВТОБАНАМ И ДОРОГАМ, ЯВЛЯЮЩИМСЯ ГРАНИЦАМИ ЗАПРЕТНЫХ РАЙОНОВ.

ДАННЫЙ ИТОГОВЫЙ ДОКУМЕНТ НАПИСАН НА РУССКОМ И АНГЛИЙСКОМ ЯЗЫКАХ, ПРИ ЭТОМ ОБА ТЕКСТА ЯВЛЯЮТСЯ АУТЕНТИЧНЫМИ.


10.4.86
ЛЕОНИД К. БУТОВ
ГЕНЕРАЛ-МАЙОР
ПЕРВЫЙ ЗАМЕСТИТЕЛЬ НАЧАЛЬНИКА
ШТАБА ГРУППЫ СОВЕТСКИХ ВОЙСК
В ГЕРМАНИИ


10.4.86
РОДЖЕР ДЖ. ПРАЙС
ГЕНЕРАЛ-МАЙОР ПШ
ЗАМЕСТИТЕЛЬ НАЧАЛЬНИКА ШТАБА
СВ США В ЕВРОПЕ И 7-ОЙ АРМИИ
ПО ОПЕРАТИВНЫМ ВОПРОСАМ

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ANNEX G. (U) CINCUSAREUR PRESENTS JOINT MERITORIOUS UNIT AWARD

Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum J-1PM-0881-86, dated 23 June 1986, announced the award of the Joint Meritorious Unit Award (JMUA) to USMLM for exceptionally meritorious service during the period 1 January 1981 through 31 March 1985.

On 3 October 1986 at 1400 hours General Glenn K. Otis, CINCUSAREUR, presented the award to the unit. In his address to USMLM members and guests from the Berlin community, he spoke of USMLM's service in the national interest, its professionalism, and its vital mission. After the ceremony, General Otis, assisted by the oldest and the youngest member of the unit, cut a cake specially decorated in honor of the occasion. A brief reception followed.

USMLM regards as particularly appropriate the joint nature of this award, recognizing as it does the contributions of Army, Air Force, and Marine personnel assigned to the Mission.



UNCLASSIFIED
(U) JMUA Awards Ceremony


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ANNEX G. (U) CINCUSAREUR PRESENTS JOINT MERITORIOUS UNIT AWARD



UNCLASSIFIED
(U) JMUA Awards Ceremony



UNCLASSIFIED
(U) JMUA Awards Ceremony
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ANNEX G. (U) CINCUSAREUR PRESENTS JOINT MERITORIOUS UNIT AWARD



Citation

to accompany the award of the

Joint Meritorious Unit Award

to the

United States Military Liaison Mission To The Commander In Chief, Group Of Soviet Forces In Germany

The United States Military Liaison Mission (USMLM) to the Commander in Chief, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany distinguished itself by exceptionally meritorious service from 1 January 1981 through 31 March 1985. During this period, USMLM provided liaison between Commander in Chief, US Army Europe (CINCUSAREUR), on behalf of Commander in Chief, US European Command (CINCEUR) and Commander in Chief, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (CINCGSFG) in a truly outstanding manner. The unit used its limited resources to maintain contact and provide a conduit for communication between CINCUSAREUR and CINCGSFG. The United States Military Liaison Mission's supreme efforts many times reduced confrontation type issues into discussion items and by so doing reduced tension between Allied and Soviet Commanders. This joint unit remained in daily contact with CINCGSFG, producing relationships which benefited the two immediate opposing Commanders, and had favorable impact on the relationships between the USSR and US generally. By their exemplary performance of duty the members of the United States Military Liaison Mission to the Commander in Chief, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany have brought great credit to themselves and to the Department of Defense.

Given under my hand this 12th day of June 1985.

William J. Crow, Jr.
Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Citation, Joint Meritorious Unit Award

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