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USAREUR PLANNING FOR GERMAN ARMY ASSISTANCE(U)

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HISTORICAL DIVISION
HEADQUARTERS,
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
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FOREWORD

The history of USAREUR participation in German rearmament is being prepared in a series of monographs covering each successive stage of development while the records and principal participants are still available. The present study "USAREUR Planning for German Army Assistance" is the first of the series.

The purpose of this study is to describe the role of Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, in the planning for assistance in the formation of a new German Army. The narrative retraces the evolution of military planning from the European Defense Community concept to West Germany's admission to NATO. Since the monograph deals with all problem areas and salient features of the USAREUR German Army Assistance Plan of 1 April 1955 in great detail, it was considered unnecessary to submit this plan to further analysis.

The author, Dr. E. F. Fisher of the Current History Branch, Historical Division, conducted research in the files of Headquarters, USAREUR, and at the Military Assistance Division, Headquarters, US EUCOM, where he also interviewed key planning officials.

Recent monographs and special studies published by this Division are listed on the inside cover opposite the title page. A limited number of these publications is available for distribution upon request sent to the Chief, Historical Division, USAREUR, APO 164

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CHAPTER 1

Military-Political Background

1. The European Defense Community

Since 1947, when the Soviet objective of dominating the entire continent of Europe became increasingly apparent, U.S. foreign policy had been directed toward assisting the nations of Western Europe to defend their freedom against this threat. An important step in this direction was taken in 1950 with the formation of a defense community composed of the nations of the North Atlantic area. To strengthen this coalition, the German Federal Republic was to become a member of the defensive organization of Western Europe. Therefore, in the spring of 1952 seven European states, strongly encouraged by the U.S. Government, signed the European Defense Community Pact for the purpose of integrating the military and economic resources of Western Europe, including the German Federal Republic. The European Defense Community (EDC) thus formed would strengthen North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defenses against the overwhelming Soviet military potential in Eastern Europe. With the signing of the EDC Pact, Europe entered a 2-year period of planning for military and economic integration, while the various national parliaments proceeded to discuss and ratify the pact. Although never a signatory to EDC, the U.S. Government nevertheless played the role of careful observer and loyal advocate of the European Defense Community concept throughout these two years.

2. The EDC Interim Commission

The Interim Commission of EDC was composed of four committees, the military, economic, political, and legal. Each was charged with developing basic plans for future use in the event EDC became an effective organization. The military committee, under the chairmanship of French General R.M.E. Delaminate, accomplished considerable

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planning toward genuine unification of the European military forces in matters of standardization of pay rates, uniforms, length of service, and provision of special military visas to facilitate freedom of movement of European Defense Forces (EDF) contingents throughout the western community. Two important subcommittees--The Coordinating Subcommittee and the Organization and Training Joint Subcommittee--were headed by former German officers. Of the two, the Coordinating Subcommittee was the most powerful within the military committee of the Interim Commission. Despite a climate of close and effective cooperation in the military sphere, political events prevented the commission from accomplishing more specific planning for the creation of a German contingent during the EDC period.[1] The so-called Detachment A, whose mission was to provide and maintain liaison between Headquarters, US EUCOM, and the Interim Commission, and to plan for U.S. military assistance, was limited to assisting the committees and working groups of the latter by providing information relative to organization and procedures used by the U.S. forces. Most of the information was supplied to the German members of the commission to whom no regular channels for information were available. Fear of repercussions from the French, however, made Detachment A somewhat reluctant to establish closer contact with the Germans despite the obvious advantage of a direct relationship.[2] From USAREUR's point of view, the Interim Commission of EDC proved to be more of an obstacle than a help to progress in planning for military assistance to the German contingent. Each subject concerning planning for USAREUR's possible role in assistance to the German EDF contingent had to be cleared through the Interim Commission before discussion with the Germans. Moreover, officers of Detachment A were in no position to put pressure on the commission to permit more specific planning lest the future of EDC be jeopardized in the French Assembly.[3] Although U.S. policy throughout the EDC period was committed to integrating West Germany into the NATO area and obtaining a German military contribution to the defense of Western

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[1] Interv, Dr. E. F. Fisher, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col F.A. DeLatour, US EUCOM/MAD, 26 Apr 55. SECRET.

[2] Briefing by US EUCOM on EDC Matters, 23 Mar 53, pp. 8-15. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381 EDF (1953), Item 1 atchd, (B/P).

[3] Memo, Brig Gen R. G. Gard, USAREUR DCOFS for Opns to Adm Arthur W. Radford, JCS, 2 Nov 53, sub: Status of Planning for German EDF Contingents. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381 EDF (1953). Vol. II, Item 1 atchd.

Europe as soon as possible, the EDC Interim Commission made little progress in this direction.[4] With their negative attitude concerning advance planning, the French seemed to be heading for the very thing they dreaded, that is, a large degree of German independence in defense matters.[5] The failure of the EDC Interim Commission to function effectively during this period kept planning for assistance to the Germans by either US EUCOM or the component U.S. commands, including USAREUR, virtually at a standstill. Despite official assurances by the French, their representatives, who chaired the majority of the committees and subcommittees of the Interim Commission, delayed planning activities relative to the German contingent throughout the EDC period, apparently in the belief that the treaty would never be ratified.[6] Nevertheless, U.S. official policy remained committed to the assumption that the European Defense Community would eventually become a reality. Consequently neither US EUCOM nor USAREUR considered an alternate solution in the event the EDC concept would be rejected.[7] By the beginning of 1954 all interested nations except France had completed the ratification procedure required to bring EDC into being. In August 1954, after long and bitter debate, the French National Assembly rejected the EDC Pact and, with it, the grand concept of an integrated European defense force as opposed to a coalition of several national armies.

3. Military Reaction to the Rejection of EDC

That U.S. planners were taken somewhat by surprise by the French rejection of EDC seemed to be indicated by the fact that no immediate alternate plan of action was available. However, the problem of prior development of such an alternate plan lay outside the responsibility of the Defense Department, indeed the U.S. Government itself, since the United States was not a signatory power to the EDC. The initiative in this respect was skillfully taken by Sir Anthony Eden, then British Foreign Minister, in consultation with the foreign ministers of the prospective member nations of EDC.

The Department of Defense, however, approached the problem from the point of view of creating a German armed force as quickly as

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[4] Cable, no number, HICOG, Bonn, sgd Reber to State Dept (3204) pass MSA for Harriman, 12 Jan 53. SECRET. In file above, Vol. I, Item 2 atchd.

[5] Cable 142, State Dept sgd Smith to Paris for Anderson and Bruce, 20 May 53. SECRET. In file cited above.

[6] Briefing by US EUCOM on EDC matters, 23 Mar 53, pp. 17-18. SECRET. In file above, Item 1 atchd, (B/P).

[7] (1) Ibid. (2) Cable no number, London sgd Aldrich to State Dept, 12 Mar 53. SECRET. In file above, Vol. II, Item 4 atchd.

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possible with British and with, or without, French cooperation. On 2 September 1954 Deputy Secretary of Defense, Robert B. Anderson directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare and forward to the Secretary of Defense by 15 October 1954 their recommendations for U.S military and logistical assistance to the German Federal Republic. The plans were to be drawn up without waiting for a specific political pact dealing with German rearmament. United States defense policy was to adapt any military plans thus developed to the political framework that would eventually emerge from the Brussels and London discussions in the fall of 1954.[8] The Defense Department assumed that although the French had rejected the EDC plan for the arming of Western Germany, they would not actively oppose, either in the French Zone of Germany or in the communications zone leading through France, joint U.S.-UK action to rearm Germany. German armed forces were to be limited to an initial over-all strength of 12 EDC-type divisions, 1,326 aircraft, and 300 naval vessels, together with necessary support personnel, as contemplated in the original EDC Treaty. United States military assistance to the Germans would be planned to cover development and training of the German armed forces from the cadre stage to the attainment of combat-effective units. U.S. training and logistical assistance to the Germans would be time-phased so as to coincide with the buildup rate of the German forces. Except for the production of atomic, thermonuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, U.S. policy set no limitations on armaments production in the U.S. and British Zones of Western Germany. Joint U.S.-British policy contemplated the retention of U.S. and British forces in Germany at their approximate present strengths during the period of the German buildup.[9] On the basis of the foregoing guidelines and assumptions laid down by the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were directed to make specific recommendations concerning German rearmament covering the following problems: (a) The composition of the German forces, including recommendations regarding tables of organization and equipment; (b) the training organization and procedures; (c) the facilities requirements for both German and U.S. forces in Germany, including turn-over to Germans of facilities now being used by U.S. forces; (d) the procedures for logistical support of the German forces; and (e) the rate of buildup of the German forces.[10] Representatives of the three component commands of US EUCOM met in Paris on 16 September 1954 to assist in the development of US CINCEUR's position in regard to

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[8]Memo, SD to JCS, 2 Sep 54, sub: Military Program for the Rearmament of Western Germany. SECRET. In SGS USAREUR 381 EDF (1954), Item 32 (B/P).

[9]Ibid.

[10]Cable DEF-967577, Off SD sgd Hensel to US CINCEUR, 10 Sep 54. SECRET. In file above, Vol. I, Item 11 atchd.

German rearmament in accordance with instructions received from JCS. The first conference at the Military Assistance Division, US EUCOM, took place in an atmosphere of uncertainty. With its attendant political and military assumptions, EDC was no longer a reliable basis for planning. The Western European Union, which was later developed at the London and Paris conferences as the alternative to EDC, was still a nebulous hope of several western diplomats, rushing desperately from one capital to another in an effort to create an alternative to the defunct EDC arrangement. Consequently, the program to be drawn up for U.S. military assistance to the German armed forces was developed without specific reference to any particular political arrangement that might be created by future international conferences. Nevertheless the conferees assumed that a separate German armed force would be created as distinguished from the former concept of a German contingent integrated into EDC. Following these discussions, representatives of Headquarters, US EUCOM, the three component commands, and the Advance Planning Group in Bonn proceeded to Washington, D.C., arriving there on 20 September 1954 for discussions with the JCS representatives.[11] US CINCEUR's recommendations together with those of the three services formed the basis of a study by the JCS Planning Committee, prepared at the direction of Deputy Secretary of Defense Anderson. The JCS approved the study and on 13 October 1954 forwarded it to US CINCEUR for planning guidance.[12]

Following the discussions in Washington, JCS recommended to the Department of the Army that over-all responsibility for training German armed forces should be assigned to US CINCEUR, who in turn would delegate specific responsibilities to his component commanders and to MAAG, Germany, when that organization was established. Further, MAAG, Germany, upon its creation, should be given the same training functions as other NATO MAAG's. The Department of Defense, together with the military departments, should also plan for the assignment of sufficient numbers of training personnel to MAAG, Germany, to insure against delay in the buildup of the German forces. If necessary, training and rearmament would be undertaken before an agreement on the final political settlement.[13]

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[11] DF, USAREUR ACOFS to DCOFS for Opns, 5 Oct 54, sub: German Rearmament Planning at Hq EUCOM and DA. SECRET. In file above, Item 32 atchd (B/P).

[12] US CINCEUR's Conf, 15 Dec 54, sub: Col G. C. Teal's Remarks Regarding Responsibilities of CINCEUR for Military Assistance Planning for West German FEDREP, MAD. TS Ctl, AG 1478. SECRET.

[13] Ibid.

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4. The Paris Accords

French rejection of EDC threw the basic issue of Western Germany's military and economic integration into NATO back to where it had been three years earlier at the time when the EDC treaties were signed.[14] Immediately following the collapse of EDC, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and Belgium's Henri Spaak initiated efforts to modify the existing Brussels Agreement so as to include the German Federal Republic in a West European security system. In September the broad outline of a new agreement, incorporating many of the features of the Brussels Agreement, was drawn up by a conference of the Foreign Ministers in London. This formed the basis of the so-called Paris Accords, creating a Western European Defense Union into which the armed forces of the German Republic would be brought as equal partners with the NATO powers. The Paris Accords also provided for granting West Germany its sovereignty and admitting it into NATO. The ratification of the Paris Accords constituted one of Western Europe's last opportunities to create some semblance of defensive unity as an alternative to the now defunct EDC. A sense of urgency that permeated the NATO powers helped no doubt to shorten the usually lengthy ratification procedures in the various national parliaments. With the ratification of the new treaties by the French Senate on 27 March 1955, the last great obstacle to the rearmament of Western Germany was cleared away, for the Danish and Dutch parliaments followed quickly with their ratifications. On 5 May 1955 Great Britain and France deposited the ratified treaties in Bonn, three days short of ten years following the collapse of the Third Reich. Shortly thereafter a sovereign West Germany took its place as an equal member of NATO. Over five years of delay, doubt, and bitter debate had intervened since the revolutionary scheme of EDC had been launched. Unlike the relatively minor role envisioned under EDC, the United States was the driving force in NATO and as such took the lead in ratification of the Paris Accords to which it was a signatory power. The United States was the first of the three Allied Powers to deposit the ratified treaties with Bonn. Since the German armed forces were to be brought into the defense scheme of the West through NATO rather than EDC, the United States, as the leading NATO power, was bound to play the key role in the formation of the new German armed forces and their integration into NATO.

5. West German Obstacles

Many problems still lay ahead on the German side, for as yet no laws existed that would permit the Federal Government to put

[14] Mthly HICOG-Comdrs Conf, Feb 55, Dr. Conant's Remarks. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (1955), B/P 2.

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German citizens into uniform. The powers and organization of the new Defense Ministry had yet to be clearly defined. A decision had to be made as to who would name the commander in chief of the German armed forces, and whether the Chancellor, the President, the cabinet, or a committee of the Bundestag would be responsible, in fact and theory, for the high command. Revision of the Federal Constitution, a document written during the Allied occupation and at a time when it was envisioned that Germany would never again become a military power, would be a prerequisite for some of the legislation regarding rearmament. Such revision would require a two-thirds majority in the Bundestag, a majority that, under the existing fluid political and diplomatic circumstances, might possibly prove difficult to achieve.[15] Chancellor Konrad Adenauer had expressed a strong desire that the United States, in addition to the planned-for military assistance, should help the Federal authorities insure the development of democratic attitudes and methods in the new German military establishment. With this in mind the Defense Department directed CINCEUR and his component commanders to emphasize throughout the German buildup period the establishment of constitutional democratic relationships between the new armed forces and existing civilian authorities. To this end the closest possible cooperation between the U.S. military commands and the State Department representation was enjoined.[16] Visits to the United States were organized for key military and political personalities of the Bonn Government for the purpose of observing and studying the American approach to the problem of civilian versus military control. Army Secretary Robert T. Stevens declared before a House of Representatives subcommittee in February 1955 that the Army regarded its assistance in reconstituting Western Germany's ground forces as one of the significant undertakings for the fiscal year beginning 1 July 1955. The account which follows seeks to explain the role played by USAREUR in planning for this undertaking and to show its impact on the U.S. military mission in Central Europe.[17]

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[15] Mthly HICOG-Comdrs Conf, 28 Mar 55. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (1955), Vol. III, Item 4.

[16] Memo, H.S. Hensel, Asst SD to SA, SN, SAF, 28 Dec 54, sub: Military Program for the Rearmament of West Germany. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 Ger (1955), Vol. I, Item 1A.

[17] USAREUR PIO press release, 25 Apr 55. UNCLASSIFIED

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CHAPTER 2

U.S. Army Planning During the EDC Period

6. Formation of Military Assistance Division, US EUCOM

U.S. military planning for assistance to West Germany was initially concentrated within Detachment A, the military liaison group between Headquarters, US EUCOM, and the U.S. Observer Group to the EDC Interim Commission. In the fall of 1953, as the ratification of the EDC Treaty and the realization of a German contribution appeared imminent, US EUCOM established a special branch of the Military Assistance Division (MAD), supplanting Detachment A, to coordinate the activities of the various agencies engaged in planning for assistance to the Federal Republic, and to provide guidance to US EUCOM and USAREUR headquarters on such matters.[1] This action was taken in response to a joint State-Defense-Foreign Operations Administration message in June 1953, calling US CINCEUR's attention to the need for reevaluating the military assistance planning and developing a more dynamic programming policy. CINCUSAREUR's role in planning for military assistance to Western Germany was limited to submitting recommendations to US CINCEUR concerning USAREUR's anticipated responsibilities in the training and logistical support of the German contingent in the event of the ratification of EDC. However, since USAREUR had little knowledge of German plans and had to rely on information copies of US EUCOM-HICOG correspondence concerning military assistance planning, its planning activities consisted largely of general recommendations regarding use of training areas

[1] US CINCEUR's Conf, 15 Dec 54, sub: Col G. C. Teal's Remarks Regarding Responsibilities of CINCEUR for Military Assistance Planning for West German FEDREP, MAD. TS Ctl, AG 1478. SECRET.

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and release of troop housing facilities to the Germans. In its role of Central Army Group headquarters, USAREUR was active in planning deployment, within the CENTAG area, of the hoped-for German groupments, but the practical value of this activity was slight.[2] In March 1953 US EUCOM authorized USAREUR in its capacity of CENTAG headquarters to discuss with German representatives the deployment of future EDF contingents within CENTAG.[3] Among the few accomplishments of this period was the preparation of a list of possible caserne and depot facilities that could be released by USAREUR to the Germans. USAREUR was able to draw up this list in collaboration with the German planners, after having discussed German ideas and possible needs in this area as well as USAREUR's intentions for the utilization of such properties. Moreover, within the CENTAG Plans Section of USAREUR G3, preliminary discussions took place with the French representatives during 1953 concerning the deployment of the future German EDF contingents in CENTAG. These talks had no tangible results because of both the uncertain political situation, especially in France, and the anxiety of the U.S. Government not to influence adversely French action on the EDC treaties. During this 2-year period USAREUR was therefore unable to develop definite and comprehensive plans concerning its possible assistance to the German EDF.

7. USAREUR Contacts with German Planners

Early in 1953, when it still seemed as if the EDC plan would be ratified, USAREUR had an opportunity to enter into direct relations with responsible German planners. Former Oberst (Colonel) Bogislav von Bonin, then Chief of the Planning Section of Dienststelle Blank, made efforts to establish closer contact with Headquarters, USAREUR. This direct approach by the Germans induced USAREUR to bring up the over-all problem of effective planning for training assistance to the German contingents to EDF and USAREUR's specific relationship to the future German military organization.[4] In answer to USAREUR's request for policy guidance in this matter, US EUCOM replied that direct contact between U.S. Army officers and German military officials would definitely be in violation of JCS

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[2] US EUCOM ltr, to CINCUSAREUR, 23 Jun 53, sub: Responsibility with Respect to U.S. Military Assistance to West Germany. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1953), Vol. II, Item 19A.

[3] Sum of Conf, US EUCOM-USAREUR, 23 Mar 53, sub: Equipping and Training of German Contingent to EDF, 18 June 1953. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381 EDF (1953), Item 1 atchd (B/P CAG).

[4] Ltr, Maj Gen E. T. Williams, USAREUR COFS, to Maj Gen R.K. Taylor, US EUCOM COFS, 28 Feb 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 381 EDF (1953), Vol. I, Item 1 atchd.

policy. As in the past, German queries on military matters would have to be directed to the EDC Interim Committee.[5]

8. Release of Troop Housing

Before June 1953 USAREUR's role in training or supporting the projected German contingent had not been clearly defined. At that time, however, US EUCOM authorized USAREUR to contact German representatives concerning the fulfillment of their housing and training area requirements. The Secretary of Defense had directed U.S. forces stationed in the Federal Republic to do their utmost to facilitate the use by EDF units of former German military installations such as barracks, depots, training grounds, etc.[6] This was certainly a logical decision for if the Germans were to obtain such facilities, they would have to make arrangements with USAREUR, which had physical control of virtually all military installations in the U.S. Zone. Since these matters had to be dealt with through direct contact between USAREUR and the German authorities, neither US EUCOM nor the EDC Interim Committee were to be the channel for negotiations, whose substance, however, would be of considerable interest to the latter.[7] For instance, the disposition of casernes no longer needed by USAREUR presented several difficult problems. Both local German authorities and the Bonn Government desired these casernes for housing the steady flow of refugees from Eastern into Western Germany. Yet USAREUR insisted that if these properties were released to satisfy civilian requirements, there would be considerable difficulty in recovering them when needed for housing the future German contingent. Since the Federal Republic could not apply confiscation, the onerous task of again requisitioning these properties and removing the refugees would fall upon USAREUR rather than the Bonn Government. Moreover, Dienststelle Blank had insisted that USAREUR should retain control of all confiscable property of potential military value, even though there was no further need for these properties by the U.S. forces. This placed USAREUR in an untenable public relations position. CINC-USAREUR therefore suggested to HICOG that West Germany establish a high-level control authority, to whom USAREUR could release these

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[5] Ltr, US EUCOM COFS to USAREUR COFS, 12 Mar 53. SECRET. In file cited above.

[6] Cable DA-941379, COFSA to CINCEUR, 15 Jun 53. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1953), Vol. I, Item 1 atchd.

[7] Sum of Conf, US EUCOM-USAREUR, 23 Mar 53, sub: Equipping and Training of German Contingent to EDF, 18 June 1953. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381 EDF (1953), Item 1 atchd (B/P CAG).

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properties to assure their future availability, thus freeing USAREUR from this difficult position.[8] HICOG agreed that properties of future military value should be retained by USAREUR or released to the Federal Republic only with the understanding that they would be made available when needed by the German EDF contingent.[9] This, in substance, was the procedure eventually adopted by USAREUR in agreement with German authorities.

9. Training Area Requirements

Under the EDC concept USAREUR took the position that the procurement of major training areas required for the German EDF contingent was largely a German responsibility. USAREUR did not foresee a possibility of turning over to the Germans, or sharing with them on any other than a "space-available" basis, for an indefinite period, any of the major American training areas such as Grafenwoehr, Hohenfels or Wildflecken.[10] The Germans, however, citing the provisions of Articles 74 and 101 of the EDC Treaty, maintained that the procurement of large additional training areas was an EDC problem, which should therefore be presented to all members of EDC for solution. The significance of this approach was that additional training area requirements would not have to be met solely at the expense of the already diminished area of the Federal Republic. They would be provided by the member nation having the largest amount of land available for such purposes. In practice this would have meant that the vast new training areas required under the EDC concept would probably have been provided by France, which, of all EDC powers, had the largest areas of sparsely settled land.[11] Despite the efforts of HICOG to assist USAREUR in enlarging present, or requisitioning additional, training areas, the German authorities steadfastly maintained that, other than possibly a new divisional training area in the vicinity of Vogelsang-Elsenhorn, no further areas would be available in Western Germany. Both USAREUR and HICOG recognized the difficulties faced by the Federal Republic in making available additional large tracts of land. But against this fact USAREUR

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[8] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to HICOG, 7 Mar 53. SECRET. In file above, Vol. I, Item 1 atchd.

[9] Ltr, HICOG to CINCUSAREUR, 23 Mar 53. SECRET. In file above.

[10] Rept, 1st Mtg of CAG (USAREUR and COFFA) Working Comm on EDC (German) Deployment, Jan 53, p. 3. SECRET. In file above, Item 6A atchd (B/P).

[11] Interv, Dr. E. F. Fisher, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col W. F. Woodward, USAREUR G3 Tng Br, 15 Jul 54. UNCLASSIFIED.

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placed the need to fulfill its mission, that of defending Western Europe in face of the threat of aggression from the East.[12] However, realizing that any further requisitions of large areas of land in Western Germany for training purposes would necessarily involve the transfer of thousands of people and the loss of valuable agricultural land, the NATO planners reluctantly decided to limit their projects to the improvement of existing facilities. Nevertheless, USAREUR maintained that training area requirements for German contingents would have to be met by the Federal Republic from its own resources.[13] By the fall of 1954 it seemed that this problem would eventually have to be solved on a level higher than USAREUR.

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[12]Cable 214, HICOG to CINCUSAREUR, 19 Nov 53. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1953), Vol. II, Item 48 atchd.

[13]Stf study, 15 Dec 53, sub: Submission of Estimate of Future Infrastructure Requirements (6th and 7th slices) Hq LANDCENT. SECRET. In file cited above.

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CHAPTER 3

Unilateral Planning During the Interim Period

10. Preparations for Defining USAREUR's Mission

Before the French National Assembly's rejection of EDC, USAREUR expected to be called upon in the near future to initiate a training and assistance program for the future German Army. USAREUR's original action concerning development of planning for possible assistance to the German Army was a letter to US EUCOM 15 July 1954, in which USAREUR's capabilities for logistical and training support of a German Army were set forth in detail.[1] US EUCOM forwarded this letter to the Department of the Army. Immediately following the action of the French National Assembly, USAREUR planned to proceed with training assistance to the German Army. Assigned over-all monitorship of this planning activity, USAREUR G3 instructed all staff divisions to begin developing plans within the scope of their responsibilities.[2] USAREUR's principal concern, however, was to keep the military assistance program within limits that would not affect the combat efficiency of the command. Headquarters, US EUCOM, and Department of the Army G3 were informed that if the new military assistance concept led to increased demands upon USAREUR to the extent that the program became a major activity of the command, additional means would have to be provided in order to carry out USAREUR's primary mission as well as the training assistance

[1] Interv, Dr. Fisher, with Col DeLatour, US EUCOM MAD, 28 Apr 55, SECRET.

[2] DF, USAREUR G3 Tng Br Adv Plng & Tng Sec to all Stf Divs, 2 Sep 54, sub: Planning in USAREUR for Assisting in the Formation of the German Army. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381 EDF (1954), Item 32 atchd (B/P).

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program for the German Army.[3] US EUCOM's view, reflecting that of the JCS, was that USAREUR would be assigned the responsibility for the conduct of the U.S. Army portion of the training program, and that MAAG, Germany, when established, would function as a title I MAAG rather than as a Title II military mission-type MAAG. USAREUR had previously recommended the creation of a title II-type MAAG that would be able to carry the major portion of the training tasks, thereby relieving USAREUR of the responsibility.[4]

11. Drafting of the US EUCOM Letter of Instructions

US CINCEUR decided that CINCUSAREUR would be assigned training and assistance responsibilities; on 30 September, at a conference between representatives of USAREUR and US EUCOM, USAREUR was requested to submit a draft directive on the subject. The CENTAG Plans Section of USAREUR G3 prepared the draft letter of instructions, which was submitted to US EUCOM.[5] This draft outlined the scope, plans, and policies of the training and assistance program as envisioned by USAREUR. In addition, the letter of instructions was to specify in detail the various tasks to be assumed by USAREUR as well as the command arrangements appropriate for the accomplishment of the mission. In his recommendations, CINCUSAREUR again pointed to the necessity of providing USAREUR with means to carry out this mission in addition to the primary one of the command.[6] On 8 November US EUCOM replied to USAREUR's recommended draft with counterproposals. This reply was reproduced by USAREUR and submitted to all staff divisions for comments and recommendations for changes. The staff study embodying these recommended changes and comments to US EUCOM's reply became the basis for the USAREUR position at a third conference between representatives of US EUCOM and USAREUR in Paris 18-19 November 1954. From this conference emerged a draft letter of instructions regarding training and logistical assistance to the German Army, which represented in USAREUR's opinion a reasonable

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[3]Cable S-2296, USAREUR to US CINCEUR for MAD, 17 Sep 54. SECRET. In file above.

[4]Cable SX-2084 USAREUR to DA G3, 7 Sep 54. SECRET. In file above, Vol. II, Item 24 atchd.

[5]Memo, Col J.G. Felber, C/USAREUR G3 Tng Br to Maj Gen E.D. Post, USAREUR ACOFS G3, 5 Oct 54, sub: Plan for Training German Armed Forces. SECRET. In file above, Vol. II, Item 30A atchd.

[6]Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to US CINCEUR, 19 Oct 54, sub: Recommended Letter of Instructions on Program for Rearmament of West Germany's Army. SECRET. In file above, Item 35A atchd.

compromise between the US EUCOM and USAREUR positions.[7] The basic issue between the two commands' drafts was USAREUR's desire to be given full authority and responsibility for assistance to the German Army. Department of Defense directives, however, based upon congressional action, had already charged US EUCOM with this responsibility, which, therefore could not be delegated to CINCUSAREUR.[8] On 18 November 1954 the draft letter of instructions from US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR was completed; and on 1 December the final directive, entitled "Letter of Instructions for Planning Assistance to be Furnished the Army of the FEDREP Germany," was issued by US CINCEUR to the component services. USAREUR was thus finally able to make detailed and definitive plans for training assistance to, and logistical support for, the future German Army.

12. The Letter of Instructions

In the final letter of instructions that US EUCOM sent to USAREUR, dated 1 December 1954, the missions of the US EUCOM Advance Planning Group (also designated APG/MAAG) and of USAREUR were set forth in detail. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had assigned to US EUCOM the over-all responsibility of assisting in the achievement of the objectives of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program by providing training assistance to German Army instructor and cadre personnel in accordance with currently accepted plans for organization and training of German units. In order to minimize the loss of combat effectiveness of U.S. Army units, US EUCOM was to furnish storage and maintenance for MDAP materiel provided to the German Army until German units and installations were capable of assuming this responsibility. The administration of all fiscal matters pertaining to U.S. funds for the support of MDAP, Germany, was to be a responsibility of US EUCOM.[9] US CINCEUR in turn delegated to CINCUSAREUR the mission of providing for German cadre and specialist training as well as for logistical support and the administration of budget funding. Over-all training authority and responsibility was of course not delegated by US CINCEUR.[10] Within the framework of existing resources

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[7] Memo, C/USAREUR G3 Tng Br to USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, n.d. sub: Letter of Instructions for Rearmament of FEDREP of Germany's Army. SECRET. In file cited above.

[8] Interv, Dr. Fisher with Col DeLatour, US EUCOM MAD, 28 Apr 55. SECRET.

[9] Ltr, US EUCOM to CINCUSAREUR, 1 Dec 54, sub: Letter of Instructions for Planning Assistance to be Furnished the Army of the FEDREP Germany. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381 EDF (1954) Vol. II, Item 35A atchd.

[10] Ltr, Dep US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 16 Nov 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above, Item 36A atchd.

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and capabilities, augmented by such assistance from the Department of the Army or other sources as required, USAREUR would provide training and logistical assistance to the German Army during the initial build-up period; training personnel would be made available to insure accomplishment of the training mission. Until such time as the German Army's logistical organization was capable of assuming responsibility, USAREUR would also provide assistance in the reception, storage, maintenance and distribution of MDAP materiel. To facilitate German planning, USAREUR would provide information and technical advice, as authorized by security regulations and policy of US EUCOM and higher headquarters. The administration of all U.S. Army budgeting, funding, fiscal, and management engineering services pertaining to the MDAP for the German Army would be provided by USAREUR. Depots and billeting facilities would be made available to the German Army authorities to the maximum extent, compatible with U.S. requirements. USAREUR was further instructed to reexamine the requirements for its present training facilities in Germany to insure maximum allocation of training facilities to other NATO nations and to Germany, consistent with USAREUR essential training needs. USAREUR would be responsible for training German instructor personnel, utilizing U.S. personnel provided by the Department of the Army and USAREUR for this purpose. The control and support of mobile training teams supplied by the Department of the Army to assist USAREUR in the accomplishment of this training mission would also be assigned to USAREUR. Spaces for German Army students would be provided in USAREUR-operated schools as programmed in the training assistance plan. If USAREUR lacked sufficient resources for properly implementing the training program, estimates of additional needs would have to be prepared.[11]

13. Mission and Functions of the Advance Planning Group, Bonn

In September 1954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff designated Advance Planning Group (APG), Bonn as the single point of contact between US EUCOM and the German planners on all military assistance and training activities. APG also was to act as intermediary between US EUCOM and HICOG on all matters. APG represented the military part of the U.S. country team assigned to Western Germany, and all its actions had to be based upon agreed State-Defense-Foreign Operations Administration positions established at the country level. During the period preceding ratification of the Paris Accords the U.S. policy was to regard Western Germany as a sovereign nation, insofar as military relationships were concerned. Every step was to be taken so that the new military assistance program would not influence adversely the equally important political and economic relationships with the

[11] Ltr, US EUCOM to CINCUSAREUR, 1 Dec 54, cited above.

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Federal Republic. HICOG was particularly anxious that during the period before ratification of the Paris Accords all discussions between U.S. and German military planners be properly coordinated to insure consistency with U.S. policy.[12]

The Advance Planning Group was to function in Bonn as a branch of Headquarters, US EUCOM, and continue to do so until the formation of MAAG, Germany, at which time the latter would take over the normal MAAG functions. The future MAAG, Germany, would continue to function as the direct representative of Headquarters, US EUCOM, in accordance with the command structure outlined in Defense Directive 5132.3. Until this time APG was to continue discussions concerning preparation of U.S. military assistance plans with German military planning officials and with planners of the component commands; APG would also arrange for direct contact between German and component command planners on military assistance matters.[13] While the national parliaments of the NATO countries and the Federal Republic were debating the ratification of the Paris Accords, APG Bonn gradually built up its personnel strength in all three services. US EUCOM planned to have approximately one-half the ultimate MAAG strength of 134 personnel on duty with APG by 31 March 1955. This number would be supplemented, as required, during the actual training phase of the German Army buildup by assignment of personnel from the Army or Air Force. US CINCEUR recommended to the Department of the Army that the APG strength be limited to that necessary to perform the ultimate MAAG function following the initial buildup phase. This position was taken in order to keep the overhead personnel at a minimum and to utilize existing U.S. organizations, such as USAREUR and USAFE, which would be given training responsibilities in addition to their primary mission in Germany. If the important and extremely delicate training assistance mission was to succeed, close cooperation among US EUCOM and the three component commands in Western Europe would be vital.[14]

Instructions concerning military assistance issued to the component commanders in December 1954 had also outlined the mission assigned APG/MAAG on the training assistance to be furnished the German armed forces. Representing US EUCOM on all matters concerning MDAP support of the new German armed forces, APG would furnish the U.S. Ambassador to Germany such advice as he might

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[12] US CINCEUR's Conf, 15 Dec 54, sub: Col G.C. Teal's Remarks Regarding Responsibilities of CINCEUR for Military Assistance Planning for the West German FEDREP, MAD. TS Ctl, AG 1478. SECRET.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

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require in directing the Mutual Security Program. Over-all coordination of the MDAP at country level, advising and assisting the West German Government in the preparation of requests for aid, including training, were responsibilities of APG/MAAG, Bonn. Such requests for assistance were to be screened by APG in accordance with JCS criteria and forwarded to US CINCEUR as the basis for the development of an approved MDAP for the Federal Republic. APG would prepare net deficiency lists for US CINCEUR with recommendations as to the end-item requirements, the desired delivery schedules, and a priority of supply among the various military units. Advice and assistance would also be furnished the Federal Republic on the use, nomenclature, technique of operations, maintenance, and tactical employment of items furnished or planned to be furnished under the MDAP. When deemed appropriate, the APG/MAAG would advise and assist the German armed forces on technical, organizational, administrative, and logistical matters in accordance with U.S. doctrine. In obtaining formal training for selected German personnel in U.S. service schools, both in the United States and overseas, APG would also act as intermediary. It would also exercise control over United States training personnel and technical representatives assigned for duty with German units following their activation. After coordination with USAREUR, APG/MAAG would contact the Department of the Army about the desired arrival schedule for approved training personnel furnished by the Department of the Army to assist in the training mission. Responsibility of establishing a prescribed system of inspections and reports to insure proper reception, storage, distribution, issue, utilization, and maintenance of MDAP end-item equipment was also given to APG/MAAG. The group would also coordinate liaison between USAREUR and the German planners.[15]

In carrying out their missions, APG/MAAG and USAREUR obviously would have to coordinate every action step by step. Since USAREUR would continue to have many contacts with the Federal Republic, once it achieved full sovereignty, some future overlap in authority seemed likely. For example, the presence of approximately 310,000 U.S. military and dependent personnel in Germany would require close USAREUR liaison with Bonn. Also, in providing training and logistical assistance and support to the German Army in its initial buildup stage, USAREUR would have to cooperate very closely with German authorities. USAREUR-CENTAG operational planning as well as the need to meet with British and French representatives on matters of common interest would frequently bring USAREUR into areas of interest and

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[15] Ltr, CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 1 Dec 54, sub: Letter of Instruction for Planning Assistance to be Furnished the Army of the FEDREP, Germany. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381 EDF (1954), Vol. I, Item 35A atchd.

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responsibility to which APG/MAAG would lay claim. Similar problems had always existed between US EUCOM and USAREUR and had generally been solved through redefinition of the areas of responsibility and more effective liaison between the two headquarters. US EUCOM's representative in Germany, APG/MAAG in Bonn, would have frequent and undoubtedly close contact with German authorities. Much would depend on maintaining a sound working relationship between APG/MAAG and USAREUR during the extremely important buildup period of the German armed forces.

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CHAPTER 4

Official Initiation of Planning Activities at USAREUR

14. Preparation of the USAREUR Plan

On 2 September 1954, two months before the US EUCOM letter of Instruction was written, USAREUR G3 sent to the other staff divisions and some of the subordinate commands, a directive entitled, "Planning in USAREUR for Assisting in the Formation of the German Army." The directive stated that the organization and training of German units as visualized under the EDC concept would serve as a tentative basis until the German plans could be revised. It was generally assumed, and correctly so at the time, that the over-all manpower ceilings of the German EDC contingent would be retained. That the present Dienststelle Blank would eventually be converted into a German defense ministry with the return of sovereignty, under any alternative to EDC, also appeared to be a reasonable certainty for planning purposes. A Title I MAAG would be responsible to US CINCEUR for over-all supervision of U.S. training assistance furnished the Germans. Upon requests transmitted through MAAG, USAREUR would give the German planners all practicable advice and assistance, such as providing mobile training teams that would assist in the training of cadre and instructor personnel; making available student spaces as required in USAREUR engineer, ordnance, signal and tank training schools; assisting in the reception, storage, maintenance, and issuance of MDAP materiel until the German logistical organization was capable of assuming these functions; and supplying information, authorized for release by security regulations of USAREUR and higher headquarters, to the Germans on a need-to-know basis to facilitate their planning activities. Over-all disciplinary and administrative control of the German personnel being trained, including their selection, assignment, uniforms, and pay, would be exercised by the Bonn Government. Pending further information concerning the German plans, a target date for full assumption of

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logistical and training responsibilities by the Germans was set for E Day (effective date of treaties permitting German rearmament and completion of necessary legislation in the Bundestag) plus 9 months. Moreover, USAREUR assumed that essential equipment which could not be provided by the Germans, by the other participating nations, or through offshore procurement, would be furnished by MDAP. USAREUR also expected that existing restrictions regarding U.S. military liaison with Dienststelle Blank would soon be relaxed.[1] On the basis of the directive the staff divisions submitted preliminary plans to the USAREUR G3 Training Branch early in October. Incorporating these plans into a staff study, G3 pointed out the need for a planning staff, the impact of the plan upon USAREUR, the major problems to be solved in planning, and the information required from higher headquarters so that more definite planning could take place. This study, including a time-phased planning program, was coordinated with APG, Bonn, and then submitted to the USAREUR chief of staff for approval on 15 November 1954. After its approval it became the basis for specific planning by the staff sections having training responsibility.[2]

15. The Revised German Plan

The rejection of EDC by the French National Assembly required the German authorities to reevaluate their planning assumptions based upon the EDC concept. Earlier planning concepts that had meanwhile become obsolete were revised since the German forces to be created under the Paris Accords would be national rather than integrated groupments. A new plan, "significantly different" from the EDC concept, was presented to the Advance Planning Group, Bonn, by the Germans in November 1954.[3] The new plan for the creation of a German armed force as a contribution to the defense of Western Europe was based upon an army consisting of 6 infantry and 6 armored divisions, in addition to 3 armored, 2 mountain, and 2 airborne brigades. Such an armed force would be organized as a field army, including 1 army and 4 corps headquarters. As a result of the revised plans the phased buildup scheduled for the training of the German army was increased from 24 to 36 months. The first 8 months would be devoted to the

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[1] DF, USAREUR G3 Tng Br Adv Plng Tng Sec, 2 Sep 54, sub: Planning in USAREUR for Assisting in the Formation of the German Army. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381 EDF (1954), Item 32 atchd (B/P).

[2] Memo, Col A. S. Collins, Jr., USAREUR SGS, to Gen D.V. Johnson, USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 3 Nov 54, sub: Status of Planning for the Training of the German Army. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 30A atchd.

[3] Cable 265, HICOG sgd Conant to US CINCEUR for MAD, Nov 54. SECRET. In file above, Item 37.

training of an instructor cadre. From the ninth to the eighteenth month the various units would become partially manned by the phasing-in of volunteers. In the nineteenth month the drafting of manpower would begin, with the field army being built up progressively by six draft calls to a ceiling of 375,000 men, not including the territorial forces. This force was within the over-all manpower EDC ceiling, but the divisions planned were to be smaller in manpower than the EDF groupments contemplated under EDC.[4]

16. The Advance Planning and Training Section, USAREUR

In order to facilitate and coordinate preparation of the plan within Headquarters, USAREUR, for assistance to the German Army, G3 was assigned over-all monitorship of planning in USAREUR. Planning activities were transferred from the CENTAG Plans Section to the Advance Planning and Training Section which was organized within the Training Branch of G3. Lt. Cols. A. H. Hislop and P. E. Alban were detailed as action officers in this section.[5] Col. J. A. Heintges was assigned to USAREUR by the Department of the Army and took over duties as section chief on 1 December 1954. Lt. Col. G.D. Willets, USAREUR G4 Operations Branch, was designated as the point of contact for G4. This Advance Planning and Training Section was then given the tasks of providing the format for the USAREUR plan, writing the G3 portion of the plan, providing information and guidance to other staff divisions, and consolidating the USAREUR plan in its final form for presentation to CINCUSAREUR for approval.[6]

The staff divisions having training and logistical responsibilities analyzed the German plan for personnel and equipment requirements. This task was somewhat complicated by the fact that information from several references in the plan had to be correlated to obtain total requirements. These totals were then edited in terms of the highest U.S. training standards. This process involved subtracting from, or, in many instances, adding to the German requirements. Toward the end of December 1954 the responsible staff divisions realized that the time-phased program for planning that had

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[4](1) Cable, no number, HICOG to Secy of State, 30 Nov 54. SECRET. In file above, Item 37 atchd. (2) USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf, 14 Dec 54, p. 5. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

[5](1) DF, USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 2 Dec 54, sub: Preparation of Hq USAREUR's plan for Rearmament of Germany's Army. SECRET. (2) Memo, Col A. S. Collins, Jr., USAREUR SGS to Gen D.V. Johnson, USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 3 Nov 54. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 381 EDF (1954) Vol. II, Items 35A atchd, 30 atchd.

[6]Ibid.

been set up by G3 could not be fulfilled. Under this program USAREUR would have been required to submit the final draft plan for assistance to US EUCOM by 1 February 1955. However, before being able to submit such a draft, USAREUR planners needed clarification of many details in the German plan concerning type and schedule of training. This involved frequent time-consuming conferences with members of the Dienststelle Blank planning staff as well as with representatives of APG, Bonn. Logistical and maintenance requirements were extremely difficult to determine until the list of MDAP items available to Germans had been completed. The distance between the two planning headquarters, in addition to existing security regulations limiting exchange of necessary information with the German planning authorities, made the meeting of the February deadline even more difficult. A further delay was caused by the German Christmas vacations, lasting from 23 December to 4 January, during which only a skeleton staff was available at the Blank office. For these reasons USAREUR requested an extension to 1 April 1955.[7] In granting USAREUR's request for the extension of the deadline, US EUCOM left the establishment of the new date open pending receipt of the additional information required for logistical planning. Two months later US CINCEUR informed CINCUSAREUR that the 1 April submission date had been approved.[8] As a basis for the development of the final draft plan, the Advance Planning and Training Section, in coordination with other staff agencies, prepared the USAREUR German Army Assistance Outline Plan. On 31 January copies of this outline plan were distributed to the general and special staff divisions with a request for concurrence on the concept and format of the plan before its submission to the chief of staff for review. All staff divisions previously had indicated their concurrence as the outline plan was developed, making this distribution therefore essentially a formality. During the month of February the draft outline plan was examined in great detail.[9] This included a series of conferences that took place in Heidelberg on 4-5 February between representatives of the USAREUR general staff divisions and a visiting team from the Department of the Army. These conferences dealt with the major problem areas of USAREUR planning, such as the selection of personnel to man the field training teams, the enforcement of security regulations in

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[7] Cable SX-3897, CINCUSAREUR to CINCEUR for MAD, 27 Dec 54. SECRET. In file above, Item 41 atchd.

[8] (1) Cable EC-9-055, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 5 Jan 55. SECRET. (2) Cable EC-9-1092, 8 Mar 55. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 322 Ger (1955), Vol. I, Item 1 and atchd.

[9] DF, USAREUR ACOFS G3, 31 Jan 55, sub: USAREUR German Army Assistance Outline Plan. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

connection with the release of information to the German planners, and the need for additional training areas. One of the more difficult problems faced by USAREUR was that of planning for the storage of materiel intended for the German Army, for, until the MDAP agreement--replacing the earlier Nash agreement[10]--was completed with the Federal Republic, USAREUR had no definitive materiel lists. Lack of such lists was to make the preparation of the logistical portion of the plan extraordinarily difficult. The discussions gave the USAREUR planners an opportunity to familiarize the Department of the Army representatives with their problems, while the latter gave USAREUR some general guidance concerning departmental policy on planning.[11] By 17 March 1955 the final staffing of the draft USAREUR German Army Assistance Plan was completed, with all general, technical, and administrative divisions which had contributed to the planning having concurred in the contents of the plan. At that time G3 intended to forward the draft plan to the USAREUR chief of staff for review on 18 March.[12] USAREUR requirements for military training personnel and materiel as stated in the final draft plan represented from USAREUR's point of view the minimum means necessary to accomplish its mission in accordance with U.S. Army training standards and procedures. These requirements were developed by utilizing the U.S. T/O&E's, the German program of instruction as determined from their plan, the Nash materiel list, and the German deficiencies list. Additional items of materiel that were not found on either list were included in the plan under the category entitled "List of Materiel Required for Training." These were items related to the equipment to be furnished the Germans and were believed to be essential to conducting comprehensive instruction.[13]

A control office, designated the German Training Assistance Group, and consisting of 12 officers, 3 enlisted men, and 1 Department of the Army civilian, was to be located at USAREUR headquarters in Heidelberg. This control office, actually a redesignation of the former

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[10] The Nash agreement dealt with the supply, storage, and maintenance of certain military equipment to be furnished by the United States to the German EDC contingent. The list of items to be provided under this agreement was known as the Nash materiel list.

[11] Conf, DA team and USAREUR Stf Reps, 4-5 Feb 55. Notes by Dr. E. F. Fisher, USAREUR Hist Div. SECRET.

[12] Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 17 Mar 55, sub: Activities of the Advance Planning and Training Section, 10-17 March 1955. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 Ger (1955), Vol. I, Item 7 atchd.

[13] Ltr, Maj Gen E. D. Post, USAREUR DCOFS for Opns to US CINCEUR, 29 Mar 55, sub: USAREUR German Army Assistance Plan. SECRET. In file above, Item 8 atchd.

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Advance Planning and Training Section that operated under the supervision of USAREUR G3 Training Branch, was to be organized shortly before the training teams were assembled a t their pretraining stations.[14] This procedure, however, seemed to be in conflict with JCS instructions assigning to MAAG, Germany, the direction of the activities of "U.S. personnel temporarily assigned by appropriate higher authority to assist in military assistance matters.[15] On 4 April 1955 at the US EUCOM commanders' conference in Paris, Gen. O. R. Cook, Deputy US CINCEUR, personally assured Gen. A. C. McAuliffe of this authority as CINCUSAREUR, despite the seeming conflict in instructions.[16]

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[14] USAREUR Assistance Plan, Annex A, Sec. I, p. 6. SECRET.

[15] App, Organization and Functions of MAAG to FEDREP, Germany, to JCS memo 2099/464, 14 Mar 55, sub: Note by the Secretaries for JCS on MDAP for FEDREP of Germany, pp. 3579-86. SECRET. AG 35-240. CONFIDENTIAL.

[16] Interv, Dr. E. F. Fisher, USAREUR Hist Div, with Col J.A. Heintges, USAREUR G3 Tng Br Adv Plng & Tng Sec, 20 Apr 55. SECRET.

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CHAPTER 5

USAREUR Problem Areas

17. U.S. Training Personnel Requirements

The German plan presented to USAREUR called for a total of 1,791 U.S. personnel as trainers. This figure included 284 officers and 1,507 enlisted men. These personnel requirements exceeded by 16 officers and 1,039 enlisted men those contemplated under the EDC plan--the tentative figures at the time having been 268 officers and 468 enlisted men. Preliminary analysis of German requests by USAREUR indicated that the Bonn planners had included a large number of noninstructor-type personnel among the enlisted men. These excessive requests were scaled down by USAREUR on the assumption that most of the duties for which noninstructor-type personnel were needed could be performed by the Germans themselves.[1] The final gross personnel requirements decided upon in the USAREUR Draft Assistance Plan were 910, much closer to the EDC than to the German figures. USAREUR had planned originally to furnish training personnel for only a 3-month period, whereas the German plan envisaged the retention of most of the training personnel for a 6-month period. In September 1954, shortly after the rejection of EDC, USAREUR revised its capabilities for supplying training personnel, indicating to the Department of the Army that only 96 officers and 320 enlisted men could be furnished from its own resources. USAREUR recommended at the same time that the Department of the Army make up the deficiency by authorizing

[1] USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf, 14 Dec 54, p. 5. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

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a temporary overstrength that would be assigned to USAREUR.[2] The Department agreed in the fall of 1954 to provide personnel for 27 mobile training teams with an approximate total strength of 162 officers and men. Instead of authorizing an overstrength for USAREUR, the Department of the Army proposed to allocate, in addition to the 27 mobile training teams, 160 spaces (100 officers, 55 enlisted men, and 5 Army civilians) to the APG/MAAG training complement. Additional personnel would have to be supplied from sources available to US CINCEUR, which in practice would mean USAREUR.[3] Thus, USAREUR would have had to provide, largely from Seventh Army sources, approximately 96 officers and 320 enlisted men in addition to the personnel furnished by the Department of the Army. A total of 736 officers and men (the EDC figure) was to be assembled to man 35 mobile training teams, which would instruct the German officer and non-commissioned officer cadres in the maintenance and use of MDAP equipment to be furnished by the United States.[4] The concept of 35 mobile training teams was based upon Department of the Army practice with country MAAG's, and was not a practical system for use in Western Germany which, unlike other NATO powers, did not yet have an armed force. Therefore the figure 35 was scaled down to 18 to be distributed among the 14 projected training sites for the German Army.[5] The following tabulation indicates the number and source of U.S. military personnel finally provided for in the USAREUR German Army Assistance Plan for the training of the German Army for the first 12-month period after activation.[6] It will be

Source	Total	Officers	Warrant Officers	Enlisted Men
Total	910	222	8	680
USAREUR	454	74	2	378
MAAG (training complement)	155	100	-	55
Department of the Army	301	48	6	247

[2]Cable SX-2084, DA to USAREUR for G3, 7 Sep 54. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381 EDF (1954), Vol. II, Item 24.

[3]Cable DA-967901, DA G3 to CINCUSAREUR, 17 Sep 54. SECRET. In file above, Item 28 atchd.

[4]CINCUSAREUR Mthly HICOG-Comdrs Conf, 29 Nov 54. USAREUR G3 Comments. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (1954), B/P 11.

[5]Interv, Dr. E. F. Fisher, USAREUR Hist Div, with Col J.A. Heintges, USAREUR G3 Tng Br Adv Plng & Tng Sec, 20 Apr 55. SECRET.

[6](1) Ibid. (2) USAREUR German Army Assistance Plan, 18 Mar 55, Copy No. 133. GOT 45-001. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

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noted that USAREUR's officer requirements were reduced from 96 to 74, while enlisted personnel requirements were increased from 320 to 378 in the final draft plan figure. Therefore, a total of 910 U.S. military personnel would be required to accomplish the initial training of the German Army. To this should be added 100 indigenous personnel whom USAREUR planned to hire as interpreters for the training teams, thus bringing the total training personnel to 1,010, or 781 less than the original request made by the Germans.

Language qualifications of the training team personnel presented a real problem, for failure to overcome the language barrier would definitely diminish the effectiveness of the training program.[7] The Department of the Army intended to partially solve this problem by giving training team personnel stationed in the United States special language courses before their assignment to USAREUR, hoping that MDAP funds would be made available for this purpose.[8] USAREUR, however, planned to attach 100 Germans as interpreters to the training teams, because the linguistic abilities of the U.S. personnel were considered insufficient. Only practical experience could show whether this solution would prove to be satisfactory.[9]

18. German Civilian Labor Supply

Potential German manpower requirements, arising from the creation of a new German armed force and from partial industrial mobilization to support this force, caused USAREUR to take steps to safeguard its vital German civilian labor supply. In March 1954 USAREUR began to collect data from USAFE, Seventh Army, the area commanders, and the technical services concerning use of German civilian workers by numbers, skills, and location. Informal and preliminary discussions were conducted with German representatives in Heidelberg on 15 September. The collection and analysis of the data from subordinate agencies were completed in October of the same year. This data would provide a basis for determining the minimum needs for German personnel in the forthcoming negotiations regarding deferments and priorities of German civilians employed by the U.S. forces. USAREUR officials then met with HICOG representatives in Mehlem on 9 December to prepare an agreed U.S. position before negotiations with the Federal Republic. The

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[7]Conf, DA Team and USAREUR, 4-5 Feb 55, Col J.A. Heintges' Remarks. SECRET. Notes by Dr. E. F. Fisher, USAREUR Hist Div.

[8]Ltr, ACOFSA G3 to USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 23 Feb 55. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 Ger (1955), Vol. I, Item 6.

[9]USAREUR German Army Assistance Plan, 18 Mar 55, Annex A, Sec III. GOT 45-001. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

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problem was twofold since it concerned the retention and exemption of German employees from the draft in peacetime and the retention of German employees in event of an emergency.[10] German representatives had previously informed USAREUR that men over 40 years of age would not be trained for the German armed forces, and indicated that the U.S. forces could continue to plan on retaining this category in their present positions. This assurance however did not satisfy USAREUR, since German industry might attract personnel in this age bracket with offers of better pay and pension benefits. USAREUR hoped to obtain an agreement prohibiting German industry from proselyting this type of personnel. Young men in the 20-22 age group were the special concern of the German military authorities, but USAREUR representatives were told that once these men had completed their period of duty they would be free to return to U.S. employ if they desired.[11] Nevertheless, USAREUR wanted to obtain agreements with the Federal Republic assuring the U.S. forces equal treatment with German industry in obtaining necessary skilled technical and professional German personnel. US CINCEUR raised no objections to CINCUSAREUR's direct negotiations with the Federal Republic through HICOG on this matter.[12] US EUCOM Policy Directive 66-1 designated CINCUSAREUR the coordinating authority for Germany to negotiate with German authorities through HICOG on behalf of the Navy and Air Force regarding policies and procedures for all local labor problems among which was the provision of occupational deferments and priorities.[13] USAREUR's subsequent discussions with HICOG indicated that the U.S. forces could not obtain a more favorable deferment policy than that granted to German industry. Therefore, USAREUR decided to press for the principle of at least equal treatment with industry in the negotiations. Although USAREUR was unable to obtain a copy of the proposed German draft legislation, advance information indicated

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[10] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to US CINCEUR, 6 Jan 55, sub: Impact of German Military and Industrial Mobilization Upon U.S. Forces Requirements for German Civilian Labor. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 230, Indigenous Pers (1955), Vol. I, Item 2 atchd.

[11] DF, USAREUR ACOFS G1 to USAREUR DCOFS for Admin, 17 Sep 54, sub: Comments on Gen Heusinger Luncheon. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381 EDF (1954), Vol. II, Item 34 atchd.

[12] Stf Study, USAREUR ACOFS G1 for CINCUSAREUR, 19 Oct 54, sub: U.S. Forces Requirements for German Civilian Manpower During Mobilization or Emergency. SECRET. In file cited above.

[13] Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G1 to USAREUR DCOFS for Admin, 29 Dec 54, sub: Impact of German Military and Industrial Mobilization Upon U.S. Forces Requirements for German Civilian Labor. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 230 Indigenous Pers (1955), Vol. I, Item 1 atchd.

that the law would be modeled on lines similar to the U.S. draft law. In all probability, deferments would therefore be limited to only high-level positions and scarce skills.[14]

Although paragraph 2(a) of Article 45 of the Forces Convention required the three occupation powers to disband civilian labor service units composed of Germans within two years of the entry into force of the convention, representatives of USAREUR hoped to work out some arrangements with the Federal Republic to insure that the strength of the Forces would not suffer as a result of deactivating German labor service units.[15] Since there were to be no restrictions on the continuance of non-German labor service units, USAREUR planned to rely more heavily on units of this category. There was a possibility that the development of a more civilian-type organization, insofar as the German labor service units were concerned, might enable USAREUR to reach some agreement with the Federal Republic on retaining the services of the German personnel employed in the labor service. While a larger percentage of labor service employees in the higher (officer) grades, as well as approximately 40 percent of the entire German labor service, indicated a desire to serve in the German armed forces, USAREUR was convinced that only a fraction of that percentage would be acceptable to the German military authorities. For the most part the younger men were reluctant to volunteer for service with the German armed forces; however, these men would eventually be drafted anyway.[16]

19. Release of Classified Information to the Germans

During the EDC period the entire disclosure policy was handled through the EDC Interim Committee, with SHAPE retaining the actual release authority. Clearance of German planning personnel was based upon NATO standards, and by the middle of December 1954 only about 43 of the approximately 800 employees of the Dienststelle Blank had been cleared for access to NATO-SPHERIC information. Since the Federal Republic at that time was not a member of NATO, German personnel could not be cleared for COSMIC, NATO's highest category of classification.[17]

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[14] CINCUSAREUR Mthly HICOG-Comdrs Conf, Feb 55, Gl's remarks. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (1955), B/P 2.

[15] Cable EC-9-343, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 24 Jan 54. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1955), Vol. I, Item 6.

[16] USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf, 22 Mar 55. NATO SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

[17] Cable EC-9-5440, US CINCEUR to DA, 18 Dec 54. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381 EDF (1954), Vol. II, Item 37 atchd.

Consequently, throughout the EDC period, NATO and U.S. imposed security restrictions greatly limited the scope of discussions with the majority of German planning personnel. With the breakdown of the EDC concept U.S. authorities had to develop a clearly defined disclosure policy for the release of information to the German planners. This was all the more necessary because of the determination of the United States to press forward with the arming of the German Federal Republic on a bilateral basis if need be. Very little delegated release authority concerning classified information was held either by US EUCOM or by USAREUR while the draft assistance plan was being developed.[18] Security regulations, based upon Department of the Army G2 policy providing that no classified information be released to the Germans, seriously handicapped USAREUR in preparing the German Army Assistance Plan. Since the existing security regulations were established at Department of Defense level, USAREUR had no authority to introduce a more liberal policy regarding release of information. The existing Defense Department regulations would have had to be amended if USAREUR was to release essential information to the German planners. On 8 September 1954 USAREUR G2 asked US EUCOM for advance authority to release information graded as "confidential--modified handling." US EUCOM replied that each request for the release of information required full justification including the date when the authority would be needed. Release authority would then be requested from the Department of the Army for the individual item on a priority basis.[19] Requests for the release of unclassified information to the Germans were to be handled by the Advance Planning Group, Bonn, on a case-by-case basis, subject to prior US EUCOM approval.[20]

While US EUCOM was attempting to obtain over-all exemption from the regulations pertaining to the disclosure of classified information, it authorized CINCUSAREUR to conduct preratification planning discussions with the Germans through APG, Bonn, within the authority contained in paragraph SX (4), Department of the Army G2 directive.[21] In the light of practical experience, however, this directive often proved inadequate for an effective exchange of

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[18] Interv, Dr. E. F. Fisher, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col E. M. Neville, US EUCOM J2 Plans and Policies Br, 26 Apr 55. SECRET.

[19] Comment No. 2, USAREUR ACOFS G2 to USAREUR ACOFS G3, 1 Oct 54, sub: Planning in USAREUR for Assisting in the Formation of the German Army, to DF, 2 Sep 54, same sub. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br Adv Plng & Tng Sec files.

[20] Cable EC-9-4209, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 8 Oct 54. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 381 EDF (1954), Vol. II, Item 35A-1.

[21] Ltr, US EUCOM MAD to CINCUSAREUR, 23 Dec 54, sub: Logistic Support of the German Army. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 400 Ger (1955), Vol. I, Item 1.

information between the U.S. and German planning staffs. Therefore, at a meeting with Department of the Army representatives on 4-5 February 1955 in Heidelberg, USAREUR representatives stated that their main problem in planning was to be able to talk with their German counterparts on a "no-hold basis." The absurdity of the existing situation was illustrated by the classification problem encountered with regard to the German draft plan. By agreement with the Germans, USAREUR was compelled to give the plan a security classification equivalent to the German one, which was top secret. This meant that USAREUR personnel in turn were unable to discuss the top secret plan with its German authors because of the existing U.S. security regulations.[22]

Pending modification of the existing directive, US EUCOM developed a tentative procedure to govern the release of information to the German planning authorities. US CINCEUR was to retain release authority in matters involving policy determination; and the Chief, Advance Planning Group, Bonn, was to have authority concerning routine requests. The USAREUR general staff divisions with planning responsibilities would be authorized to determine whether the release of information was essential to the accomplishment of their mission to develop and implement the military assistance plan. After determining which requests involved policy decisions and separating them from those concerning routine matters, the general staff divisions were to forward their requests to US CINCEUR and the Advance Planning Group, Bonn, respectively for decision on a case-by-case basis.[23] While such a procedure would delay combined U.S.-German military planning and hamper the exchange of information, it was probably the best possible compromise within the framework of the existing security regulations. USAREUR was able to develop the German Army Assistance Plan despite these restrictions.

In the spring of 1955, concurrently with planning activities, steps were taken to modify the disclosure policy. A new policy would have to be formulated at departmental level if the draft plan was to be successfully implemented. The change in disclosure policy came about as the result of a series of conferences among representatives of US EUCOM, HICOG, and the component commands in Europe. Requirements were established for a delegated disclosure authority and forwarded to Department of the Army for action. This new policy

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[22] Conf, DA Team and USAREUR, 4-5 Feb 55. SECRET. Notes by Dr. E. F. Fisher, USAREUR Hist Div.

[23] USAREUR German Army Assistance Plan, 1 Apr 55, Sec. VI, p. 2. GOT 45-001. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

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superseded the security plan developed in the USAREUR draft plan for military assistance to the German Army.[24] The new policy was given to CINCUSAREUR by the Department of the Army G2 on 17 March 1955, but this was too late to be included in the appropriate section of the virtually completed USAREUR draft plan.

Pending revision of the security directive, information through secret classification, involving operational and logistical planning of direct concern to the German Federal Republic, could be released on a "need-to-know basis." Information in the category had to be essential for the progressive preparation of plans for using and integrating German forces in the defense of Western Europe. At the same time, permission was also given to release information of confidential classification needed for organizing and equipping a military force, as well as to transmit U.S. basic tactical doctrine required for the training and deployment of such a force. This authority included the release of training material and literature through confidential classification, necessary for the operation and maintenance of MDAP material to be furnished to future German armed forces under the Mutual Security Program.[25]

20. Training Areas

Since early 1952, when the German contribution of a military contingent to Western defense was under consideration, USAREUR had studied intermittently the problem of making major training areas available to German EDF contingents, in addition to Allied forces. USAREUR policy on the joint use of major U.S. training areas (Grafenwoehr, Hohenfels, and Wildflecken) was stated as early as 17 March 1953 at an EDC (CENTAG) meeting held in Heidelberg. This position was reiterated in subsequent meetings of the CENTAG planners and was eventually given more concrete form in a survey entitled "Summary of USAREUR Working Committee on EDC German Deployment," dated 6 July 1953. In this summary USAREUR stated that the existing training facilities in the CENTAG area were barely sufficient for the requirements of the French and U.S. forces stationed in Germany, and were therefore inadequate to provide training facilities for the contemplated six additional German EDC groupments. Whereas local known-distance ranges and courses might be shared with the Germans, USAREUR insisted that the major

[24]Interv, Dr. E. F. Fisher, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col E. M. Neville, US EUCOM J2 Plans and Policies Br, 26 Apr 55. CONFIDENTIAL.

[25]Cable DA-977876, DA from G2 to CINCUSAREUR, 17 Mar 55. CONFIDENTIAL.

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training areas could be used by the Germans only on a "space-available basis."[26] Representatives of Dienststelle Blank informed USAREUR that 2 major training areas would be required to train the 6 German groupments to be located in the CENTAG area. USAREUR therefore tried to obtain 2 additional large training areas, 1 in the vicinity of Heilbronn and 1 at Reutlingen, for the use of the German forces. There was, however, strong resistance from both local and state authorities to the acquisition of these areas, and USAREUR received no help in Bonn from Dienststelle Blank. Since the latter office did not have cabinet status within the West German Government, it could not exert much influence in facilitating the acquisition of additional land for the training of the as yet nonexistent German military contingents. In spite of this failure to acquire additional training areas for the Germans, USAREUR took what it termed at the time "an inflexible stand"--namely, that without such areas the German units could not be trained for combat.[27] In reporting on this subject to the Department of the Army, USAREUR stated that it must retain all training space and time now used if necessary combat efficiency was to be maintained. This meant that virtually nothing would be available for the German EDC forces in the CENTAG area. Further discussions with German representatives indicated little likelihood that the Federal Republic would be able to provide additional land for training purposes.[28] The difficulty of the German position was illustrated by General Adolf Heusinger in his remarks to Brig. Gen. D.V. Johnson, then USAREUR deputy chief of staff for operations, at a private luncheon given for the German planning chief in Heidelberg. General Heusinger stated that, while German authorities were fully aware of the need for additional training areas, heavy population pressure in an overcrowded and truncated land, as well as the necessity to develop every bit of agricultural land to feed this population, prevented them from taking action. He added that German planners had considered combining the training area used by the Belgian forces in the Schnee-Eifel with a former German training ground in the Vogelsang region to create one large training area. In order to accomplish this a small village would have to be eliminated and its inhabitants moved to another region.[29] However, the adverse effect that such action would have had on German public opinion at a time

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[26] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to HICOG, 12 Feb 54, sub: Comments on Dienststelle Blank's Proposals for Stationing in Step 3. NATO CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br, Adv Plng & Tng Sec files.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Cable SX-1627, USAREUR to DA for G3, 9 Aug 54. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381 EDF (1954), Vol. II, Item 28 atchd.

[29] Memo for rcd, USAREUR ACOFS G1, 15 Sep 54. SECRET. In file above, Item 34 atchd.

when the Western Allies were seeking an alternative to the rejected EDC concept led to the indefinite postponement of this project. General Heusinger took this occasion to repeat the long-held German view that the provision of NATO/EDC training areas should not be solely a German responsibility, and that the NATO powers might well consider the possibility of acquiring sizable training areas in France, perhaps in the region of Verdun.[30] In view of the French reaction to the EDC concept this suggestion offered no practical solution to the problem.

In October 1954 the Joint Strategic Plans Committee in Washington dealt with the subject of training areas in a report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This committee reported that to plan on any appreciable increase in the major training areas and facilities in Western Germany would be unrealistic. For this reason all major training areas and facilities would have to be shared with the Germans. USAREUR was especially concerned over this report and its possible repercussions, namely that the areas would have to be shared equally.[31] Despite the fact that USAREUR gave full support to the U.S. policy of establishing German armed forces, it was reluctant to accept any immediate reduction in its combat readiness, which might impair the fulfillment of its primary mission. On the other hand, USAREUR planners realized that the combat effectiveness of the West would be greatly strengthened once the 12 German divisions were in being.[32] By 1 December 1954 USAREUR's position regarding the use of the training areas by the Germans had been modified slightly, shifting from an unequivocal refusal to permit German use of U.S. controlled training space to willingness to share training facilities with the Germans as long as this would not interfere appreciably with the training of U.S. forces.[33] In spite of this slight shift in USAREUR's position, the Department of the Army accepted the earlier view that the Germans would have to meet their needs from their own resources. The Army decision was based on Article 2 amendments to the "Forces Convention on Relations," stating that the three (occupying) powers retained the rights and responsibilities heretofore exercised or held by them, and on Article 38, paragraph 8 of the "Convention on Rights and Obligations," stating that

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[30] Ibid.

[31] C/N 1, USAREUR A COFS G3 to USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, n.d. sub: Military Program for the Rearmament of Western Germany. SECRET. In file above, Item 28 atchd.

[32] Memo, Col A. S. Collins, Jr., USAREUR SGS, to Brig Gen D.V. Johnson, USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 29 Nov 54. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[33] Cable SX-3530 USAREUR to DA, 1 Dec 54. SECRET. In file cited above.

accommodations such as target ranges and training areas that were occupied but not continually used by the Forces, might be made temporarily available to the Federal Republic at its request.[34] Thereafter USAREUR reverted to its earlier position that the real estate requirements of the German forces would have to be met by the West German Government and the German people without deterring USAREUR from accomplishing its mission by encroaching upon U.S.-used property.[35] US EUCOM agreed with USAREUR's position in the belief that a firm U.S. stand would assist the German military in overcoming domestic political resistance to the requisitioning of agricultural and forested areas for the training of the German Army.[36] This left the problem to be solved at a level higher than USAREUR. A SHAPE conference on 15 February, exploratory in nature, studied the problem of the provision and utilization of training areas, taking into account the future German requirements in order to establish the best method of approach to this problem.[37] This meeting was followed up by a SHAPE Working Committee conference of representatives from SHAPE; Allied Land Forces, Central Europe (LANDCENT); Central Army Group (CENTAG); and Northern Army Group (NORTHAG). There it was assumed as a basis for committee action that existing NATO training facilities meant all training facilities being used either in Germany or in the home nations, excluding the United States and the United Kingdom.[38] With the accession of Germany to membership in the NATO organization, this assumed condition made possible the acquisition of infrastructure land training projects, which would be accessible to CENTAG forces in countries other than Germany.[39] The SHAPE position regarding training area requirements was thus brought remarkably close to that of the Germans during the EDC period--that NATO/EDC training area requirements should be a NATO rather than solely a German responsibility. This meant, in effect, that additional training areas would be provided by the member nation best able to make suitable land available.

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[34] Cable DA-972593, ACOFSA G3 to CINCUSAREUR, 14 Dec 54. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1955), Vol. I, Item 6 atchd.

[35] Ltr, Gen W. M. Hoge, CINCUSAREUR, to Dr. J.B. Conant, HICOG, 12 Jan 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[36] Interv Dr. E.F. Fisher, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col P. T. Russell, US EUCOM J3 Plans and Policies Sec, 28 Apr. 55. CONFIDENTIAL.

[37] Cable 291332Z, SACEUR to CENTAG, 29 Jan 55. NATO CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1953), Vol. I, Item 6 atchd.

[38] Memo, 22 Mar 55, sub: SHAPE Working Committee Meeting, 15 March 1955. NATO SECRET. In file above, Item 18.

[39] Cable SX-1633, COMCENTAG to COMLANDCENT, Fontainebleau, 5 Feb 55. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above, Item 6 atchd.

In developing plans for training assistance to the German forces under the Paris Treaty of September 1954, USAREUR determined by February 1955 that German training area and facility requirements could be met from German or USAREUR resources for the first 10 months of the buildup period. Satisfaction of German requirements for the following two months would depend upon USAREUR needs at that time, a restatement of the familiar space-available position.[40] Although USAREUR was responsible for the training assistance to the Germans for only the first 12 months of the projected 36-month buildup period, USAREUR planners were anxious to obtain from the Germans their estimated training area requirements from the 11th to the 36th month after activation, which could not be filled by use of facilities available to them.[41] German planners replied that they were unable to furnish their U.S. counterparts intelligent second- and third-year training area requirements since they did not know what facilities would be available, or what facilities would be released to them by the three Allied Powers. Nor did they know what, if any NATO facilities would be available to them.[42] This, of course, threw the problem right back to SHAPE for eventual solution. HICOG's recommendation, that for planning purposes, German requirements of U.S. ranges and training areas for the first year simply be repeated for the second and third years was of course impractical, since first-year training area requirements involved the training of only 27 percent of the planned Army units, namely their cadres. Subsequent training area requirements for the second and third years of the buildup would, of course, be much greater.[43] Eventually, in the final draft plan for assistance to the German Army, USAREUR decided that U.S. training facilities in West Germany could be provided as requested by the Germans for the first 12 months of the training program, with fulfillment of requests being considered on a case-by-case basis. As for the second and third year requirements USAREUR planned to satisfy certain German range requirements within U.S. capabilities on a space-available basis.[44] The German buildup plan, on the other hand, called for the use of NATO ranges, in addition to German ranges, during the second and third years following German activation. Therefore, the problem of the provision of additional training area requirements

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[40] Cable EC-9-821, US CINCEUR to HICOG for APG, 18 Feb 55. SECRET. In file above, Item 2.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Cable 579, HICOG sgd Conant to US CINCEUR for MAD, 29 Mar 55. SECRET. In file above, Item 2 atchd.

[43] Ibid.

[44] USAREUR German Army Assistance Plan, 1 Apr 55. SECRET.

was, by 1 April 1955, returned essentially to its original position established under the EDC concept in 1953, i.e., that the U.S.-held ranges in Germany would be made available to the Germans only on a space-available basis. At the same time, the Germans insisted that they would have to be permitted to share existing ranges in Germany, as well as NATO ranges outside of Germany, which meant ranges in France.[45] As long as existing policies and procedures concerning the use of major training areas in Germany remained unchanged and the requirements of the U.S. forces were the same, the problem of training areas would be critical and unresolved. Meanwhile neither USAREUR nor US EUCOM based their current plans upon the assumption that additional major training areas would become available. There was hope, however, that the admittedly difficult problem would ultimately be solved at a higher level.[46]

21. Logistical Support

USAREUR's logistical support role in the German Army assistance program was one of the most challenging problem areas in the entire planning field. The two major problems were the support of the training teams at the 14 German training sites and the reception, storage, maintenance, and distribution of MDAP items for the German Army. Of the two, the latter seemed to be the most difficult from USAREUR's point of view.

In February 1954 the Department of the Army directed USAREUR to provide storage space for equipment and ammunition that would be allocated to the German contingent to EDF. CINCUSAREUR replied that no adequate, unused storage capability existed west of the Rhine. Storage facilities east of the Rhine were considered too vulnerable before the creation of the German EDF contingent. Washington thereupon authorized the use of storage facilities east of the Rhine if they were required.[47]

If it was to accept responsibility for the storage of MDAP items, USAREUR preferred the use of the former German army depot at Luebberstedt. This depot was located in the Bremerhaven area within a 25-mile radius of the planned German northern depot complex and 80 miles from the East Zone border. CINCUSAREUR also recommended the establishment of additional storage facilities in the

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[45] Ibid.

[46] Interv, Dr. E. F. Fisher, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col P. T. Russell, EUCOM J3, Plans and Policies Sec, 28 Apr. 55. CONFIDENTIAL.

[47] (1) Cable S-1808, CINCUSAREUR to US CINCEUR, 6 Mar 54. SECRET. (2) Cable DA-906272, DA G4 to US CINCEUR, 20 Apr 54. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 400.12 (1954), Vol I, Item 10 atchd.

Heidelberg-Darmstadt-Frankfurt area, near the future German southern depot complex.[48]

No action was taken on these recommendations, since the negotiations for an alternative to the Nash agreement had not been initiated, and the entire question of EDC hung in the balance. Six months later, after the collapse of the EDC concept, USAREUR discarded its previous plans because the Luebberstedt depot was too vulnerable and too far from the U.S. Zone. Moreover, the Germans had by this time indicated their own desire to utilize that depot for their own northern supply complex.[49]

In the spring of 1955 USAREUR decided that the Eberstadt depot in the Darmstadt area, which had previously been considered as a possible storage site for the German contingent, would now be required for use by USAREUR. Recent changes in tactical concepts governing the NATO forces--namely, the plans to hold the area east of the Rhine rather than to withdraw immediately to the west bank of the Rhine--were the primary factors in this reversal.[50] In preparing their own plans under the Western European Union concept, the Germans had meanwhile selected the hitherto unused Eberstadt area as the base for their southern depot complex. Despite strong protests by USAREUR, US EUCOM allotted the Eberstadt depot to the German planners. Consequently by April 1955, both through unforeseen changes in tactical concepts and through decisions too long delayed, USAREUR had lost the two major potential storage areas for MDAP items east of the Rhine. Since USAREUR remained responsible for assisting the Germans in handling MDAP items until the German logistical system was capable of assuming these functions, another solution had to be found. The USAREUR planners continued to insist that their storage facilities were already so full that adding major quantities of materiel would endanger the mission that these facilities were supporting.

An arrangement whereby the Germans would store and maintain ammunition received in USAREUR during the first half of calendar year 1955 was suggested at this time.[51] As a possible solution to

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[48] Cable S-1808, CINCUSAREUR to US CINCEUR, 6 Mar 54. SECRET. In file cited above.

[49] Cable SX-2593, USAREUR to DA, US CINCEUR, 5 Oct 54. SECRET. In file cited above.

[50] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to HICOG, 12 Jan 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 601 (1955), Vol. I, Item 2 atchd.

[51] Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to Dep US CINCEUR 2 Dec 54, sub: Logistic Support of the German Army. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 381 EDF (1954) Vol. II, Item 35A atchd.

the preratification storage problem, US EUCOM recommended a USAREUR investigation of German civilian contractors who could store MDAP materiel and ammunition, and if so, what their charges would be. USAREUR was reluctant to use this approach to the problem since at that time no funds were available for this purpose. Vital USAREUR missions would be impaired unless additional funds were obtained to accomplish this logistical support function.[52] A few weeks later, however, the storage problem seemed closer to solution when sufficient MDAP funds were made available to USAREUR for providing logistical support to the German Army.[53]

Moreover, US EUCOM arranged with the Department of the Army not to ship stockpiles of material stored in the United States and earmarked for the Federal Republic until called forward by USAREUR. In addition no equipment would be turned over to any West German governmental agency until an alternative to the Nash agreement, that is a new MDAP agreement, had been negotiated.[54]

As logistical planning developed, it became evident that preparation of this portion of the German Army Assistance Plan was hampered by the scarcity of detailed information in several areas. In March 1955, for instance, when the USAREUR draft plan was nearing completion, the types and amount of U.S. equipment that were to be furnished the Germans were still not definitely known at USAREUR headquarters.[55] Few facts concerning British and French plans for military assistance to the German armed forces were known at USAREUR headquarters. Further planning at USAREUR level therefore seemed fruitless until a bilateral substitute to the Nash agreement had been negotiated with the Germans, and until three-power understandings concerning British and French plans for military assistance had been reached at a higher level.[56] A few days later, however, at

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[52](1) Ltr, US EUCOM MAD to CINCUSAREUR, 23 Dec 54, sub: Logistic Support of the German Army. SECRET. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to US CINCEUR, 25 Jan 55, same sub. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 400 Ger (1955), Vol. I, Items 1 and atchd.

[53]USAREUR German Army Assistance Plan, 1 Apr 55. GOT 45-001. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

[54]1st Ind, ltr, US EUCOM to CINCUSAREUR, 8 Feb 55, sub: Logistic Support of the German Army. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 400 Ger (1955), Vol. I, Item 1 atchd.

[55]Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to COFS, 9 Feb 55, sub: Outline Plan for German Army Assistance. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 Ger (1955), Vol. I, Item 2 atchd.

[56]Ibid.

a meeting on 18 February, the G4 recommendation to interrupt the logistical planning for the above reasons was reconsidered and the decision made to continue the planning activities at USAREUR despite the admittedly limited information.[57]

Training German personnel to handle the MDAP items during storage presented USAREUR with an additional problem. A plan for camouflaging German personnel hired for the schools and depot installations during the preratification period was developed, according to which these workers were to be trained as assistant instructors and materiel maintenance personnel. After ratification they were to be integrated into the German Army to assist in the forces buildup. This plan, however, ran into several serious obstacles. The logistical planners intended to hire 1,637 workers for depot training, but the housing shortage in the vicinity of the depots complicated matters. A similar problem existed at the USAREUR training schools. Qualified personnel were located in densely populated areas, while most schools and depots were situated in remote districts where housing was not available. Moreover, security regulations prohibited telling these workers for what purpose they were being hired, and Dienststelle Blank was unable to guarantee that such pretrained personnel would eventually be integrated into the German Army.[58]

The support of the U.S. training teams that were to be scattered among 14 different German training sites, from the Antiaircraft Artillery School in the vicinity of Hamburg to the Ordnance School at Mittenwald near the Austrian border, was expected to present several problems. Initially, USAREUR planning, based upon the MAAG procedure of using mobile training teams, left no other choice but to scatter the support effort. The German draft plan, submitted in December 1954, however, foresaw the establishment of a fixed number of training sites, with all the training for a particular arm or service being conducted at one location. This portion of the German plan greatly simplified USAREUR's training team support, which was henceforth to be divided into two phases--the pretraining and training periods. During the pretraining period the teams were to receive all support from Seventh Army units or USAREUR school installations to which they would be attached before moving into the field to the various German training sites. Upon reaching the training sites, each team was to receive administrative and logistical support from the nearest U.S. area

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[57] Interv, Dr. E. F. Fisher, USAREUR Hist Div, with Col J. A. Heintges, USAREUR G3 Tng Br Adv Plng & Tng Sec, 24 Mar 55. SECRET.

[58] CINCUSAREUR's Mthly HICOG-Comdrs Conf, 29 Nov 54, USAREUR G3 Comments. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 333/1 (1954), B/P 11.

command--those in the British Zone, from the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation and the Northern Area Command; and those in the U.S. Zone, from the Southern Area Command. The German Training Assistance Group in Headquarters, USAREUR, would exercise general supervision. While the nearest American installation would adopt the role of parent unit for classes II and IV supplies, the training teams would be dependent upon German facilities for classes I and III support while they were at the training sites. Class V supplies would be drawn from German ammunition depots through German Army supply channels, while nonexpendables would be requisitioned from the nearest area command through USAREUR headquarters.[59]

22. Funding

The US EUCOM letter of Instructions, 1 December 1954, assigned to US CINCUSAREUR responsibility for all U.S. Army budget, funding, fiscal, and management engineering services pertaining to funds for support of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program for the German Army. CINCUSAREUR was directed to prepare funding estimates for items chargeable to MDAP funds and for those to be provided from U.S. Army sources, which would be the responsibility of CINCUSAREUR.[60]

Initially the USAREUR MDAP Control Group (Office of the Comptroller) was assigned the task of preparing the funding estimates for the USAREUR German Army assistance draft plan. During the first three months of 1955, funding estimate activities proceeded rather slowly because of the lack of necessary information from German planning authorities. Several conferences between USAREUR comptroller representatives and APG were held in Bonn in an effort to secure the needed information to complete the funding estimates.[61]

In February 1955 US EUCOM recommended the transfer of all MDAP funding activities, excluding MDAP-OSP, from CINCUSAREUR to US EUCOM headquarters where these functions would become the responsibility of the MDAP Control Group Branch, US EUCOM Comptroller.[62] The Department of the Army approved the transfer recommendation, effective 1 April 1955.

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[59] USAREUR German Army Assistance Plan, 1 Apr 55. GOT 45-001. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

[60] Ltr, US EUCOM to CINCUSAREUR, 1 Dec 54, sub: Letter of Instructions for Planning Assistance to be Furnished the Army of the FEDREP Germany. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381 EDF (1954), Vol. II, Item 35A atchd.

[61] Cable EC-9-699, US CINCEUR to DA for DCOFS Log, 11 Feb 55. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 400 Ger (1955), Vol. I, Item 2 atchd.

[62] Cable EC-3-758, US CINCEUR to DA, 22 Feb 55, sub: Administration of MDA Program. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 400.336 (1955), Vol. I, Item 1A atchd.

Beginning with 1 July 1955 the Department of the Army planned to transfer the allocation of MDAP funds from CINCUSAREUR to US CINCEUR, including the mission expenses, headquarters administrative funds, Army training team funds, and other Army MDAP training program funds. MDAP funds for offshore procurement of end-items, the facilities assistance program, the repair and rehabilitation of excess materiel, and all activities closely concerned with USAREUR's turnover of equipment to the German Army would continue to be allocated to CINCUSAREUR.[63]

From 1 April to 30 June 1955 the Department of the Army continued to allocate all MDAP funds to CINCUSAREUR. However, actual responsibility for these funds remained with US CINCEUR throughout this period, although USAREUR was still required to prepare the funding estimates for training and giving logistical support to the German Army.[64]

With the transfer of the MDAP Control Group from the USAREUR comptroller to US EUCOM, the task of preparing the funding estimates to implement the draft assistance plan was assigned to the Management Branch of the USAREUR Office of the Comptroller. Additional data, gathered from the USAREUR technical services after completion of the draft plan, resulted in an increase in the previous funding estimates of $1,096,812.91. The revised estimate of 12 April 1955 raised this amount to $1,548,609.73. These sums represented actually only approximate figures, since the costs in several areas remained undetermined. In the earlier estimate the costs of training materiel, demonstration teams, and administrative support were still unknown at the time the draft plan was submitted to US EUCOM for approval. Estimated costs for these three areas appeared in the revised funding estimate of 12 April 1955. However, the funding of contract storage and maintenance of MDAP items to be turned over to the German Army was added to the revision. The expenses for this activity were as yet undetermined when the new estimates were submitted to US EUCOM on 19 April 1955 for incorporation into the draft plan.[65]

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[63] Cable DA-592707, DA from COA to US CINCEUR, 4 Mar 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

[64] Cable DA-599996, DA from COA sgd TAG to CINCUSAREUR, 30 Mar 55. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 2 atchd.

[65] Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, sub: Activities of Advanced Planning and Training Section, Week 8-14 April 1955. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 Ger (1955), Vol. I, Item 7 atchd.

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CHAPTER 6

Disposition of the USAREUR Draft Plan

23. Approval of the Draft Plan by US EUCOM

During the week of 17-24 March 1955 USAREUR G3 submitted the draft assistance plan, after having made minor revisions in accordance with instructions from the deputy chief of staff for operations. The USAREUR chief of staff then forwarded the plan to Headquarters US EUCOM, for approval.[1] Representatives of the Advance Planning and Training Section of USAREUR G3, and the Advance Planning Group, Bonn, visited Headquarters, US EUCOM, to discuss US EUCOM's final recommendation concerning the USAREUR draft plan before its submission to the Department of the Army. While APG was responsible for reviewing and commenting on the plan for US EUCOM, general comments made by the US EUCOM staff divisions were also considered at the meeting. The numerous comments made at this meeting were minor in nature and in no way affected the over-all concept of the plan. The decision was made at that time to submit the plan to the Department of the Army with no comments or recommendations at variance with USAREUR's thinking as indicated in the plan itself.[2]

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[1]Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 24 Mar 55, sub: Activities of the Advance Planning and Training Section, Week 17-24 March 1955. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 Ger (1955), Vol. I, Item 7 atchd.

[2]Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G3, to USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 22 Apr 55, sub: Activities of Advance Planning and Training Section, Week 18-22 April 1955. SECRET. In file cited above.

24. Release of the Draft Plan to the Germans

Before approval of the plan by CINCUSAREUR and US CINCEUR, there had been no coordination with the Germans concerning those portions of the plan requiring their action or agreement before implementation.[3] A meeting was held in Bonn on 29 April 1955 between USAREUR representatives and APG for the purpose of deciding which portions of the plan could properly be released to the Germans. Minor changes in wording were agreed upon for Sections I through IV, and it was decided to delete Sections V, VI, and VII entirely. Section V dealt with U.S. personnel to be furnished for training, VI set forth the already superseded plan for release of classified security information, while VII outlined the funding estimates for the training assistance. APG also eliminated source references on certain line items of equipment in Section IV before turning copies over to the Germans.[4] Modified copies of the plan were released to representatives of Dienststelle Blank on 9 May 1955. The index of the plan was changed to indicate that the withdrawn items were classified as still "under development." Section VIII, giving the time-phased equipment requirements necessary to support the training plan, was added by APG. German representatives were informed by APG that the USAREUR draft Plan was a planning document only and did not in any way constitute a commitment on the part of the United States. Additional discussions would probably be required to produce a U.S.-West German plan that would be acceptable to both parties.[5] Editing of the plan prior to release to the Germans was apparently designed to give USAREUR more flexibility concerning the number of personnel required for instructor duty, as well as to keep security planning procedures and the funding estimates secret. The German reaction to the plan might possibly enable USAREUR to cut down on estimated personnel requirements. For if the Germans could be persuaded to provide additional personnel who could be trained as assistant instructors, U.S. personnel could then be relieved of their assignments sooner than provided for in the USAREUR plan, with a consequent saving in personnel. On 9 April 1955, US EUCOM forwarded the USAREUR draft assistance plan to the Department of the Army. Additional comments to the plan, submitted by US EUCOM to the

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[3] Ltr, Maj Gen E.D. Post, USAREUR DCOFS for Opns to US CINCEUR 29 Mar 55, sub: USAREUR German Army Assistance Plan. SECRET. In file above, Item 8 atchd.

[4] Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to USAREUR DCOFS for Opns, 5 May 55, sub: Activities of Advance Planning and Training Section, Week 2-6 May 1955. SECRET. In file cited above.

[5] Cable 736, HICOG Bonn from APG sgd Conant to US CINCEUR, 17 May 55. SECRET. In file cited above.

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Department on 10 May 1955, pointed out that while the USAREUR plan provided a basis for the initiation of the training assistance program for the German Army, its ultimate implementation would undoubtedly be affected by coordination of the plan with the Germans as well as by departmental action.[6]

[6] Ltr, Hq US EUCOM to ACOFSA G3, 10 May 55, sub: USAREUR German Army Assistance Plan. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

CHAPTER 7

Conclusion

Bilateral military assistance arrangements whereby the military personnel of one nation are used to train and equip the armed forces of a friendly power are not unique in history. The foundations of the U.S. Army were laid during the War of the Revolution with the valuable assistance of French and Prussian military missions, and the study of European military doctrine formed the basis of the professional studies of U.S. Army officers for many generations. The armies and fleets of China, Japan, and India received their initial training and equipment from the larger military powers of the 19th century Europe. Following the First World War, German Army personnel were used to train and assist the Red Army of Soviet Russia in its early organization and training. During the interwar period German military missions were sent to China, trying to make an effective force of the Nationalist Armies of the Chinese Republic. In short, military training and logistical assistance has been exchanged among the nations of the Western world since the 18th century.

The traditional pattern of exchange however has generally been the giving of advice and assistance to the younger and weaker power by the stronger nation with older and more highly developed military traditions. For this reason the bilateral military assistance plans developed by the United States in order to create and organize a new German Army is rather unique in the history of international military training assistance. Prussian Army leaders drew heavily, to be sure, upon lessons learned from a close study of the American Civil War. However, an American military training and assistance mission has never before been called upon to play such an all-embracing role in the training of a national army of a European State.

Germany, as already indicated, has herself been the military tutor of many nations, at times including even the United States. Furthermore, the German Army enjoyed an ancient and brilliant tradition. Consequently the tasks of U.S. training personnel will be in many respects easier than those faced by missions operating in nations whose military traditions in the modern sense are virtually nonexistent. On the other hand, the greatest challenge and problem which will probably face the U.S. mission to Germany will be that of grafting the branch of modern American military thinking onto the shattered but nevertheless living trunk of German tradition.

At the date of writing there are no West German armed forces in existence. Most of the former Wehrmacht officers are dead or scattered throughout the world. Some are comfortably settled in new careers which they would not wish to exchange for the uniform; for various reasons others are incapable of assuming their former responsibilities. A small, hard core of skilful and devoted officers led by such personalities as General Heusinger and Colonel von Tempelhof have been employed in a civilian capacity during the past three years on the staff of Dienststelle Blank in Bonn. Around this nucleus the officer and noncommissioned officer corps of the new German Army will somehow have to be built.

Unlike assistance rendered the French, Dutch, and Norwegian Armies by U.S. military assistance missions, the mission in Germany will have to start from the beginning with an Army not yet in being. Among the original NATO powers the continuity of the armed forces was virtually unbroken during the World War II, when, throughout the years of defeat and occupation, so-called armies-in-exile played active parts in the campaigning leading to the liberation of their countries. Since 1945, that is for over ten years, there has been no semblance of a German armed force. In fact, from 1945 to 1949, the policy of the Western Allies was to destroy every vestige of German military power and tradition. Today the Soviet threat has caused an abrupt reversal of this policy, whose only hope of success lay in continued cooperation among the Big Four. With the breakdown of the wartime alliance, re-creating German military strength to fill the existing power vacuum and to take part in the defense of the free nations of Europe had become a necessity.

The military assistance plan developed by USAREUR provided a solid foundation upon which to begin the reconstruction of German military power in Central Europe. Successful implementation of this plan will depend however to a large degree upon a realization on the part of all U.S. training personnel of the responsibility of their task in building up a sound German Army, and the necessity of integrating this Army into the defensive organization of the West.

Glossary

This glossary contains all foreign words and abbreviations used in this monograph, except those listed in SR 320-50-1, dated 28 October 1949, and changes thereto.

Term	Definition
APG	Advance Planning Group
B/P	bulky package
Bundestag	National legislative body of West Germany
CAG	Central Army Group (earlier abbreviation)
CCFFA	Commandant en Chef, Forces Francaises en Allemagne (Commander in Chief, French Forces in Germany)
CENTAG	Central Army Group (tentative wartime designation of USAREUR
CINCUSAREUR	Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe
COMCENTAG	Commander, Central Army Group
COMLANDCENT	Commander, Allied Land Forces Central Europe
Dep	deputy
Dienststelle Blank	Nuclear organization for future West German Defense Ministry
EDC	European Defense Community
EDF	European Defense Force
FEDREP	Federal Republic of Germany
Ger	German
Ibid.	Ibidem (in the same place)
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
LANDCENT	Allied Land Forces Central Europe
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAD	Military Assistance Division (US EUCOM)
MDAP	Mutual Defense Assistance Program
MSA	Mutual Security Agency
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NORTHAG	Northern Army Group

Term	Definition
Oberst	colonel
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SAF	Secretary of the Air Force
SD	Secretary of Defense
SN	Secretary of the Navy
TS ctl	top secret control
USAFE	United States Air Forces in Europe
USAREUR	United States Army, Europe
US CINCEUR	Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command
US EUCOM	United States European Command
Vol.	volume
Wehrmacht	Germany's armed forces, collectively