


USAREUR TRAINING ASSISTANCE
TO THE
WEST GERMAN ARMY (U)



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By Authority of: Kenneth E. Lay, Colonel, Infantry

Date: 21 July 1958



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TO THE
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Foreword

This monograph, by Dr. Ernest F. Fisher of the USAREUR Historical Division, is a sequel to "USAREUR Planning for German Army Assistance." The several revisions of the original plan and the steps leading to its implementation are discussed in detail. Emphasis, however, has been placed upon the activities of the training teams on duty with the various German service schools and troop units, including a discussion of the administrative and training problems encountered during the program. The discussion is carried up to 30 June 1957, at which time the operational control of the training teams was transferred to the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Germany.

All pictures are U.S. Army photographs, taken at the training sites and made available by the German Training Assistance Group, Headquarters, USAREUR.

Recent monographs and special studies published by this division are listed on the inside front cover. A limited number of these publications is available for distribution upon request addressed to the Chief, Historical Division, Headquarters, USAREUR, APO 164.

July 1958



KENNETH E. LAY
Colonel, Infantry
Chief, Historical Division

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Contents

	<u>Page</u>
FOREWORD	i
CHAPTER 1: PLANNING	
1. Scope and Initial Steps	1
2. Organizational and Administrative Measures	3
3. Personnel Problems	12
4. Logistical Responsibilities	15
5. The Andernach Program	19
CHAPTER 2: IMPLEMENTATION	
6. Combat Arms Training Teams	25
7. Technical Services Training Teams	40
8. Other Teams	54
CHAPTER 3: CONTINUATION AND PHASEOUT	
9. Extension of Training Assistance	62
10. Transfer of Operational Control	66
11. The Training of Tactical Units	68
12. Final Transfers	74
CHAPTER 4: SUMMARY AND EVALUATION	
13. Flexibility of the Plan	76
14. Logistical Problems	77
15. Personnel Problems	79
16. The Language Problem	82
17. Relations with the Germans	82
18. Achievement	84

Appendixes

A--Training Team Activation and Movement Schedules	85
B--Maintenance Team Activation and Movement Schedules	88

Charts

1--Organization and Responsibilities, German Training Assistance Group (September 1955-June 1956)	7
2--Organization and Responsibilities, German Training Assistance Group (1 July 1956-30 June 1957)	64
3--U.S. Personnel Assigned to German Army Training Assistance	78



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SEC ARMY BY TAG PER
760884

Contents--(Continued)

Page

Maps

1--Geographical Locations of the Troop Training Teams, March-December 1956.	61
2--Geographical Locations of the Tactical and Maintenance Teams (with Sub Sections) Feb-Jun 1957	67

Illustrations

Members of the new German <u>Bundeswehr</u> military police and the U.S. Army military police meet for the first time at Beck Casern, Sonthofen, Germany . . .	Preceding	1
Practical training in the assembly and disassembly of the M1 rifle	Opposite	9
Classroom instruction on the M1 rifle with interpreter's assistance	"	15
Classroom instruction on the 3.5 rocket launcher. . .	"	23
Classroom instruction in communications equipment . .	"	26
Instruction in the nomenclature of the 76-mm gun tank	"	32
Instruction on the AN/GRC 9 radio set	"	40
Tube testing demonstration during a communication class	"	42
Practical training in U.S. Army storage methods . . .	"	46
Demonstration by members of a medical clearing platoon	"	48
Practical demonstration of U.S. Army field medical equipment	"	50
Spare parts depot at Pfeddersheim, Germany.	"	54
General Stillwell presenting wings to German graduate of 11th Airborne parachute training course.	"	73



**Members of the new German Bundeswehr military police and the U. S.
Army military police meet for the first time at Beck Casern, Sonthofen, Germany**

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CHAPTER 1

Planning

As a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in January 1956 the Federal Republic of Germany began to contribute to the defense of Western Europe with the build-up of its armed forces. Under the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 the United States had already undertaken the development and implementation of a program of training and logistical assistance to the new forces. Operational responsibility for the program, extending eventually to 30 June 1957, was assigned to Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR).

1. Scope and Initial Steps

Under the program known as the USAREUR German Army Assistance Plan,¹ USAREUR was to furnish training teams for the several German arms and services as well as logistical support--consisting of initial maintenance that the German forces were unable to supply--for Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) equipment furnished by the United States for training purposes. Spaces in USAREUR schools were to be allotted to German students; training demonstrations, as well as technical information and advice, would be given as requested; USAREUR would arrange on-the-job training in U.S. Army units and at U.S. Army installations for selected German instructor personnel; and a limited amount of training time for German contingents would be reserved on major U.S. training sites on the same space-available basis as for the troops of other NATO nations.²

¹For details of initial planning, see USAREUR Hist Div, USAREUR Planning for German Army Assistance (U). SECRET (this cross-reference UNCLAS).

²USAREUR German Army Assistance Plan (hereafter cited as USAREUR GAAP), 1 Apr 55 (rev 15 Dec 55), Sec. I, p. 1. CONF (info used UNCLAS). In USAREUR Hist Div Docu Sec.

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a. Department of the Army Approval. The Department of the Army approved the USAREUR plan in August 1955, placing a 5-month limit on temporary duty (TDY) assignments of U.S. personnel used in the program. Equipment would be furnished to the German Army from three sources. The first and foremost slice would be provided on a grant-aid basis by the United States under the Mutual Defense Assistance Pact as specified by the Nash Equipment List.³ The Department of the Army approval permitted later review of the items on the list. In addition, equipment supplementary to the list was to be obtained from the United States on both a grant and a reimbursable basis. Finally, the German economy was expected to supply many items, especially transportation equipment.⁴

Since MDAP funds were not yet available--a bilateral agreement had still to be ratified--payment for any additional equipment over that provided for in the Nash Agreement would have to come from congressionally appropriated funds. Moreover, the extent to which training costs would be financed by either grant or reimbursable aid was still under consideration.⁵ Nevertheless, USAREUR planners were convinced that, since the mission had been assigned and the plan for its accomplishment approved in principle, ways and means of implementing the plan would eventually be found.

b. Passage of Enabling Legislation. Planning schedules for implementing the program were largely dependent upon the vagaries of political-factionalism within the German Federal Government. Legislative action by the Bundestag on the bilateral Mutual Defense Assistance Pact and the so-called Soldiers' Law, which was a one-package bill containing all enabling legislation for the creation of the German Armed Forces, was a prerequisite for the implementation of training and logistical assistance to the German Army.⁶

An accurate estimate of the training assistance program's activation day (A-day)--the date on which the various German service school cadres would be activated and prepared to receive USAREUR training teams at

³The Nash Equipment List was an annex to an intergovernmental agreement negotiated by Mr. Nash, on behalf of the United States, and representatives of the West German Defense Ministry. The list enumerated the materiel to be supplied the German armed forces by the United States on a grant-aid basis.

⁴USAREUR GAAP, 1 Apr 55, Annex E, p. 2. CONF.

⁵Cable DA-986388, DA from G3 to USCINCEUR, 8 Aug 55. CONF. In USAREUR G3 GTAG files. Unless otherwise indicated, all documents cited in this study are to be found in this file.

⁶Memo, Col W. E. Chandler, USAREUR G3 Tng Br, to Col G. Felber, C/G3 Tng Br, 23 Sep 55, subj: New Estimate of A-day and Prognostication on Passage Enabling Legislation for German Army. CONF.

school sites--was essential for establishing the required lead time for U.S. personnel requisitions from the Department of Army. USAREUR planners estimated that at least five months would be needed between the announcement of A-day and the date on which training teams could be assembled, activated, and moved to the German sites. In the first quarter of 1955 they assumed that A-day would occur sometime in October of that year. Foreseeing considerable resistance to the passage of the enabling legislation, the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG) estimated that A-day would be delayed until after January 1956. Although this estimate proved to be almost correct, the use of the earlier date as a target enabled USAREUR to keep well ahead of developments when the Germans began to accelerate their training schedules in 1956.⁷

When Chancellor Adenauer announced in October 1955 that the German Army would be activated on 1 January 1956, he actually referred to plans for the activation of only a small cadre at Andernach. Since this initial step would not permit the implementation of the U.S. assistance program, American military representatives continued to press German Defense Ministry officials for a more precise date on which planning could be based. At a conference in Bonn in October 1955 German Defense Ministry officials assured U.S. military representatives that A-day would be 1 April 1956 and that the contingent to be activated at Andernach on 1 January 1956 would be expanded into the planned-for service school cadres by A-day.⁸

On 21 December 1955, after several months of delay, the Bundestag ratified the Mutual Defense Assistance Pact with the United States and at the same time extended the provisions of the so-called Volunteers' Law, which permitted the activation of the service school cadres. A statutory basis now existed for the implementation of the USAREUR German Army Training Assistance Program.⁹

2. Organizational and Administrative Measures

a. Downgrading the Classification of the Plan. In May 1955 the first steps were taken toward downgrading the classification of the German Army Assistance Plan from secret to confidential.¹⁰ Regrading was expected

⁷Memo, USAREUR ACofS G3 to DCS Ops, n.d., subj: Activities of Advance Planning and Training Section, Week 18-22 April 1955. CONF. In USAREUR SGS 322 Ger (1955), Vol. I, Item 7 atchd.

⁸(1) Cable APG-555, AMEMB Bonn to CINCUSAREUR, 1 Oct 55. CONF. In file above, B/P, Item 8 atchd. (2) Memo, Col Felber to Gen J. C. Oakes, USAREUR ACofS G3, 13 Oct 55, subj: Conference on German Army at Bonn on 12 October. CONF.

⁹Memo, Maj Gen Oakes to USAREUR CofS, n.d., subj: Activities of GTAG, Week 12-23 December 1955. CONF.

¹⁰For background information, see USAREUR Planning for German Army Assistance (U), pp. 30-33. SECRET (this cross-reference UNCLAS).

to facilitate the handling of the numerous papers generated during planning activities. However, there were two prerequisites to such action: First, the basic letter of instructions from USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, dated 1 December 1954, would have to be downgraded; and second, agreement of the West German Defense Ministry would have to be obtained, since it had classified Section II of the assistance plan, which outlined the German unit activation schedule.

Inasmuch as the other sections of the plan were tied quite closely to the activation schedule, German concurrence in regrading all but Section II of the plan was requested by USAREUR through the Advance Planning Group, Bonn. The Defense Ministry granted this request in September 1955.¹¹

By the end of October the USAREUR staff divisions and subordinate commands having responsibilities for German Army assistance planning were notified that five sections of the plan had been downgraded from secret to confidential, without change in the "modified handling, not releasable to foreign nationals" designation. Another section was regraded to unclassified-for official use only, while the section containing the German activation plan retained its original secret classification but was removed from the copies of the plan and destroyed, since recent changes in the German schedules had made it obsolete. The over-all classification of the plan therefore became confidential.¹²

b. Organization of the German Training Assistance Group. To cope with the immediate personnel, fiscal, and administrative matters connected with the assistance program, USAREUR headquarters organized a special operational staff with personnel selected by the interested general and special staff divisions.¹³ Until November 1955 most of the planning functions had been accomplished by the Advance Planning and Training Section, a small staff within the Training Branch of the USAREUR G3. This section was supposed to be augmented by eight field-grade officers as soon as detailed training programs could be prepared for the individual U.S. training teams. Until the MDAP agreement was ratified USAREUR had neither the funds nor the spaces available to support this augmentation. However, effective 1 November 1955 a temporary overstrength was authorized, permitting an increase in the section's strength from 3 officers and 2 enlisted men to 11 officers, 3 enlisted men, 2 Department of the

¹¹(1) Memo, USAREUR ACoS G3 to DCS Ops, 26 May 55, subj: Activities of Advance Planning and Training Section, Week 23-27 May 1955. CONF.
(2) Cable SC-2496, USAREUR to USCINCEUR, 26 Sep 55. CONF NOFORN. Both in USAREUR SGS 322 Ger (1955), Vol. I, Item 7 atchd; B/P, Item 9 atchd.

¹²Cable SC-3001, USAREUR to Distr, 24 Oct 55. CONF.

¹³Memo for rec, Lt Col P. E. Alban, GTAG, 4 Jan 56, subj: Conference on Administrative and Financial Problems Connected with Implementation of USAREUR GAAP. UNCLAS.

Army civilians, and 2 local wage rate employees.¹⁴ (Chart 1.) Also, the Advance Planning and Training Section was established as a separate branch within the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, and was redesignated the German Training Assistance Group (GTAG).¹⁵

The German Training Assistance Group was given a 5-point mission that included control and supervision of the organization and functions of the USAREUR training teams; over-all supervision of training assistance; acting as the single point of contact between USAREUR headquarters and the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Germany; supervision and coordination of the administrative and supply requirements of the teams; and inactivation, to include disposition of personnel and equipment, following the completion of the training assistance program.¹⁶

c. Funding. In funding the German Army Assistance Plan the USAREUR Office of the Comptroller was essentially a planning and budgeting agency because actual administration of MDAP funds was accomplished by USEUCOM. The Comptroller especially monitored all funding and expenditures for German Army assistance within USAREUR to assure that operational funds were being used for activities that were a proper charge to MDAP. Since the Department of Army fiscal code for MDAP expenditures was stated in very general terms, USEUCOM provided guidance for making the correct fund determination.¹⁷ Funds to support the USAREUR German Army Assistance Program were derived from two MDAP accounts. Project Account 413 was used to pay expenses of the GTAG training teams and technical representatives, to finance the training of German students at U.S. Army service schools, and to pay the salaries of civilian employees, the per diem of training assistance personnel, and the costs of the material and equipment used by the training teams. Project Account 414 paid for U.S. country mission expenses--including military training activities, station allowances, and transportation of mission personnel within the United States and to and from Germany.¹⁸

¹⁴C/N 1, USAREUR ACofS G3 to CofS, 28 Sep 55, subj: Request for Temporary Overstrength. CONF. In USAREUR SGS 322 Ger (1955), Vol. I, Item 8 atchd.

¹⁵(1) USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf, No. 26, 8 Nov 55. CONF. (2) Memo, Lt Col E. Cook, GTAG, to Col P. F. Oswald, C/G3 Tng Br, 15 Jul 57, subj: Origin and Closeout of GTAG. CONF. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br files.

¹⁶Stf Study, GTAG, 23 May 56, subj: Organization of the GTAG Control Office. UNCLAS.

¹⁷(1) Intvw, Dr. E. F. Fisher, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj R. F. Pesavento, USAREUR Ofc of Compt Bud Br, 24 Jan 57. UNCLAS. (2) DF, USAREUR Compt to G4, 16 Feb 56, subj: FY 1956 and 1957 Fund Requirements, Field Training Equipment, GAAP. UNCLAS.

¹⁸Memo for rec, USAREUR Cen Fin & Acct Ofc, n.d., subj: Appropriation, Limitation, Project, and Object Classifications Utilized in Connection with USAREUR GAAP, FY 1956. UNCLAS.

With the approach of the implementation-planning phase of the program, the USAREUR Office of the Comptroller revised the original funding estimate of \$1,096,813 to \$2,564,479 on the basis of the latest training assistance requirements. In January 1956 the Department of the Army authorized USCINCEUR to proceed with the implementation of mutual defense assistance for Germany within a fund ceiling of \$2,666,220, of which approximately two-thirds was funded from Deutsche Marks allotted by USEUCOM Military Assistance Division to USAREUR's Central Finance and Accounting Office, and the remainder from U.S. dollar appropriated funds.¹⁹

d. Changes in Team Activation Dates. In the original USAREUR German Army Assistance Plan of 1 April 1955 the U.S. team activation dates were expressed in terms of the German Army activation day, which at that time had not yet been determined. The combat arms training teams, for example, were scheduled for activation by A-5 (months). Following the Defense Ministry's announcement that A-day would actually be 1 April 1956, GTAG began developing a revision of the assistance plan. The revised plan, published on 1 December 1955, called for the activation of teams one month before A-day, which would place the combat arms teams on the sites with their parent units on or about 1 March 1956.²⁰


Original plans specified that the teams would undergo approximately 30 days of pretraining at the parental site before moving to the German training site, and an additional 30 days of preparation with the German cadre at the training site before the commencement of formal training assistance. However, changes in the German activation schedule made in January 1956 required another revision of the team activation dates. Specifically, the Germans informed the U.S. Army representatives that German advance detachments would not arrive at the training sites until late in April 1956; therefore, the U.S. teams were not wanted at the sites before 20 April. Since the revised USAREUR plan scheduled the arrival of at least eight of the training teams by 1 April, the teams would have to remain at the parental sites longer than intended. The activation date for 13 of the teams was therefore postponed. One signal maintenance and the armored, armored reconnaissance, field artillery, antiaircraft artillery, antitank, engineer, and signal teams were activated on 15 March instead of 1 March; the armored infantry and infantry teams were activated on 26 March; and the activation of the second signal maintenance and the engineer teams was delayed until 1 April.²¹

¹⁹(1) Memo, USAREUR ACoFS G3 to DCS Ops, 30 Oct 55, subj: Activities of Advance Planning and Training Section, Week 26 September-1 October 1955. CONF. (2) Intvw, Dr. Fisher with Maj Pesavento, cited above. (3) Cable DA-995095, DA from DCSOPS to USCINCEUR, 10 Jan 56. CONF. In USAREUR SGS 400 Ger (1956), Vol. I, Item A. (4) Memo for rec, GTAG, 22 May 56, subj: Finance Conference Briefing. UNCLAS. (5) USAREUR GAAP, rev 30 Sep 55, Sec VII, p. 3. CONF.

²⁰USAREUR GAAP, rev 1 Dec 55. CONF (info used UNCLAS).

²¹(1) Memo for rec, Lt Col A. H. Hislop, GTAG, 11 Jan 56, subj: Conference at MAAG Bonn. CONF. (2) GTAG Tng Teams Hist Repts, Dec 56. UNCLAS. In USAREUR Hist Div Docu Sec.

ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES, GERMAN TRAINING ASSISTANCE GROUP
(September 1955-June 1956)



*Col J. A. Heintges Sept - 7 Nov 55
Col W. E. Chandler 7 Nov 55 - 21 Aug 56
**Denotes primary area of responsibility.
***For field-grade officers at Sonthofen.
Source: USAREUR G3 GTAG. UNCLAS.

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Integration of the Federal Border Police into the expanding German Army also affected the activation dates of several training teams. On 11 November 1955 the German Government announced that Federal Border Police volunteers would be integrated into the new German Army; legislation permitting the voluntary transfer of approximately 20,000 of these trained paramilitary personnel into the Army was passed in March 1956.²² The sudden influx of manpower resulted in five teams whose activation dates originally had been planned for 1 August 1956 being brought into the program much earlier; the ordnance school team was activated on 2 April, the quartermaster and medical teams on 15 May, and one military academy team on 28 May. In addition, the activation date of the military police training team was advanced from 1 June to 15 May, and that of the team for Materiel Receiving Group North from 1 July to 26 March 1956.²³

e. Regulations for Team Commanders. Before the training assistance program was initiated the GTAG Control Office and the Operations and Training Branch of the Army section of MAAG, Germany, agreed on a series of general regulations to govern relations between the American teams and the German training personnel during the assistance period. Weekly and daily unit service schedules were to be determined by the senior German officer at each training site, while company commanders were to have responsibility for planning the exact times and places of training within the over-all schedule. The respective German commanders were to decide on the time, location, mission, and objective of the training and would determine who among their personnel received the instruction--that is, whether instruction was to be given to whole units or to selected personnel only. However, details and procedures regarding the employment of the U.S. training team were to be the sole responsibility of its commander. It was agreed that U.S. Army regulations were to be followed for the operation of American weapons and equipment, but employment of this materiel in combat would be governed by German field service regulations. This principle was also valid for training in firing the U.S. weapons on German ranges; however, when German units fired on U.S. Army-controlled ranges the Germans were subject to the regulations for that range.²⁴

f. The German Program of Instruction. The programs of instruction prepared by the German Defense Ministry and incorporated into the training assistance plan originally provided for a troop training course of

²²(1) Cable Ger-20228, USMRMA Bonn sgd Leonard to DA for G2, 14 Nov 55. CONF. In USAREUR SGS 322 Ger (1955), Vol. I, Item 19 atchd. (2) CINCUSAREUR's Bimthly Amb-Comdr's Conf, No. 2, 2 Apr 56. UNCLAS. In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (1956), B/P 2.

²³(1) Memo for rec, Lt Col Hislop, cited above. CONF. (2) Memo for rec, Maj I. R. Beard, GTAG, 13 Jan 56, no subj. UNCLAS.

²⁴Ltr, Maj Gen J. S. Bradley, C/MAAG, Germany, to Gen H. I. Hodes, CINCUSAREUR, 9 Jan 56, w/Incl, List of Regulations. UNCLAS.

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320 hours, and for school troop and officer candidate courses of 160 hours each,²⁵ with 50, 45, and 45 hours, respectively, allotted for instruction by U.S. training teams. Since USAREUR planners were convinced that the number of hours allotted to the U.S. teams in each course was inadequate, they took steps to persuade the Germans to increase them.

In July 1955 American and German officers discussed and clarified details of the projected training program for the school troop battalions. The German representatives agreed to increase the instructional time allotted to the U.S. team in the armored school troop training course from 50 to 70 hours. On the basis of this decision, the GTAG staff used the 70-hour figure as a desirable minimum in preparing programs of instruction for the other school troop teams. Time was to prove that even this figure was valid for planning purposes only, because by the spring of 1956--after the training program had been under way for several months--the number of hours of training assistance actually given the Germans by the individual teams exceeded the planned minimum.²⁶

The German program of instruction for the troop training course provided for a total of 140 hours in individual weapons training, of which 50 hours were allotted to the U.S. team. The 50 hours included 35 hours of training in weapons and equipment, 10 hours of familiarization firing of the weapons, and only 5 hours for training in the care and maintenance of the weapons and equipment. (This German lack of interest in the maintenance of equipment was to develop into a troublesome problem.) In addition, 20 hours were allotted to participation in and observation of U.S. troop demonstrations. Upon request, team personnel were also expected to give advice on instruction techniques, battle training, weapons and equipment training, and marksmanship, although these subjects would cover a 65-hour block of instruction for which the U.S. team was not directly responsible.²⁷

Both the school troop and the officer candidate courses were originally allotted 45 hours of U.S. team instruction out of the 160 hours scheduled for each course. This included 35 hours of instruction in the use of weapons and equipment, 5 hours of familiarization firing, and 5 hours in the care and maintenance of equipment. In addition, special

²⁵School troop courses were highly specialized forms of training for prior-service personnel of the service school battalions who were destined to be assigned as school instructors. Troop training was less specialized training for recruits or fillers in the operation and basic maintenance of their individual weapons and equipment and included the basic training of the soldier.

²⁶(1) Memo for rec, Lt Col Hislop, 29 Jul 55, subj: Conference of German-USAREUR G3 Planners, 27 July 1955. CONF. (2) GTAG Tng Teams Hist Repts, Dec 56, cited above. UNCLAS.

²⁷USAREUR GAAP, rev 1 Dec 55, Annex C, Sec. III, pp. 1-6. CONF (info used UNCLAS).



Practical training in the assembly and disassembly of the M1 rifle

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instructor training included 30 hours in tactics, 10 hours in weapons and equipment, and 15 hours of familiarization firing.²⁸

Initially the Germans had requested U.S. training assistance only during the third through the sixth week of the training courses for the cadre personnel at the service schools. They thought that no U.S. assistance would be required either during the first two weeks of each training course or after the completion of the school battalion's training. U.S. technical advice for German instructor personnel was also desired from the third through the sixth week of the school training and during the fourth, fifth, and sixth months following activation of the German Army, making a total of approximately four months of U.S. training assistance available to the Germans. The German concept of "U.S. advice" was assistance to German officers and noncommissioned officers in the preparation of instructional material and in organizing and conducting classes. As the training program was implemented much of this advice became full-time training assistance.²⁹

g. Schedules for Training Demonstrations. Even before the ratification of the Mutual Defense Assistance Pact, members of the German Army planning staff were attending U.S. Army exercises and training demonstrations and visiting U.S. Army installations in Europe. Although German officers were not officially permitted to observe USAREUR training and operational activities until early August 1955, between February and September 1955 approximately 280 members of the German staff made 35 visits to various USAREUR units and installations on an informal basis.³⁰

USAREUR headquarters sponsored demonstrations in installations or units under direct control of the technical services, while Seventh Army assumed this function for the tactical units. On 21 December 1955 representatives of GTAG and Seventh Army agreed on a definite schedule of demonstrations and visits on the basis of Seventh Army's capability to support such activities.³¹ On 11 January 1956 this schedule was presented to the Germans as a proposed revision to the tentative demonstration schedules established for the USAREUR German Army Assistance Plan. For senior officers, the new schedule included a visit to the NATO CPX that was to be held from 6 to 9 March 1956. A 2-day demonstration for regimental commanders, school troop commanders, and senior officer instructors was planned for early 1956 and was to include a static display of major items of U.S. equipment and orientation in U.S. supply principles in addition to a field demonstration involving a reinforced infantry company

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Memo for rec, Lt Col Hislop, 29 Jul 55, cited above. CONF.

³⁰ Memo, USAREUR ACofS G3 to DCS Ops, 10 Oct 55, subj: Activities of Advance Planning and Training Section, Week 3-8 October 1955. CONF.

³¹ (1) CINCUSAREUR's Mthly Amb-Comdrs' Conf, No. 5, 31 May 55. CONF. In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (1955), B/P 5. (2) Memo for rec, GTAG, 22 Dec 55, subj: Conference on Demonstrations for German Army. UNCLAS.

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in the attack. An additional static display of armored and infantry equipment was planned for the month of May 1956. It was estimated that approximately 400 German officers would attend this series of demonstrations.

Study of the proposed demonstrations schedule indicated that it would fit German requirements, and the proposal was accordingly incorporated into the German Army Assistance Plan.³²

h. Attendance of German Trainees at Technical Service Schools.

For the first year of training assistance the USAREUR plan allotted a total of 530 spaces for German students--90 for officers and 440 for enlisted men--in the USAREUR technical service schools. An additional 530 spaces were planned for the second year of training assistance. In the Seventh Army Tank Training Center 200 student spaces--80 for officers and 120 for enlisted men--were allotted. The USAREUR Ordnance School was to set aside 138 spaces for enlisted men; the Signal School, 10 spaces for officers and 110 for enlisted men; and the Engineer School, 72 spaces for enlisted students.³³

i. On-The-Job Training. Since the German requests for on-the-job training assistance had not been received by USAREUR before publication of the assistance plan on 1 April 1955, the schedule of spaces for German on-the-job trainees at USAREUR schools was not published until the December revision. For the period 1 April 1956 to 1 March 1957 USAREUR was prepared to provide this type of training to a total of 751 German trainees--132 officers and 619 enlisted men.³⁴

j. Public Information Policy. The establishment of a public information policy that would provide guidance for all U.S. agencies engaged in carrying out the German Army Assistance Plan had meanwhile become necessary. At a conference in early November 1955 representatives of the U.S. military and diplomatic public information offices formulated plans for the release of training assistance information to the press. The representatives of the Embassy in Bonn intended to make two major releases. The first would explain the general theory of the mutual defense assistance operation, the organization of MAAG, Germany, and the roles of the three component service commands in providing training assistance. In the second the locations of the training assistance activities, the type of training being furnished, and the number of U.S. personnel taking part in the program at German school sites would be

³²(1) Memo for rec, GTAG, 16 Jan 56, subj: Conference on 11 January Regarding Review of Training Plans. CONF. (2) Intvw, Dr. Fisher with Maj I. L. Beard, GTAG, 20 Feb 56. UNCLAS.

³³USAREUR GAAP, 1 Apr 55, Annex E, Sec. III, pp. 1-2. CONF (info used UNCLAS).

³⁴USAREUR GAAP, rev 1 Dec 55, Annex E, Sec. II, pp. 1-2. CONF (info used UNCLAS).

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disclosed. However, no action was taken until the Mutual Defense Assistance Pact was ratified by the Bundestag in December 1955.³⁵

3. Personnel Problems

Before the assistance plan could be implemented successfully a number of decisions concerning personnel had to be made.

a. Sources of Military Personnel. Originally, approximately half of the 910 officers and enlisted men required for German training assistance were to be supplied by the Department of the Army. The MAAG training complement of 100 officers and 55 enlisted men was to be assigned on a permanent change of station (PCS) to the U.S. Army section of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Bonn, under the control of USEUCOM. An additional 48 officers, 6 warrant officers, and 247 enlisted men would be sent on temporary duty (TDY) with the various training teams and would return to the United States after the completion of the training mission. USAREUR was to provide 74 officers, 2 warrant officers, and 378 enlisted men.³⁶ In December 1955, however, the Department of the Army directed that, except for the MAAG training complement, all space requirements be provided from the current USAREUR troop ceiling.³⁷ On the basis of this decision the personnel section of the assistance plan was revised and republished on 3 January 1956. While MAAG personnel assigned to USAREUR training teams would be included on MAAG's table of distribution, they were to be made available to USAREUR during the first year of training assistance. Upon completion of this mission they would revert to the operational control of MAAG, Germany. This latter provision was a change from the original plan, under which MAAG personnel were to have been absorbed by USAREUR upon completion of the training mission.³⁸

The Department of the Army's decision also necessitated a complete revision of the plan's time-phased personnel requirements for training assistance. Dates on which the personnel were originally required were advanced considerably. At a conference in USAREUR headquarters on 9 January 1956 GTAG officers presented the new requirements to representatives of Seventh Army, USAREUR COMZ, and the technical service commands. They were directed to proceed with the selection of team personnel without additional instructions. If the Department of the Army was unable to fill USAREUR's requisitions for personnel with critical MOS's, the

³⁵(1) Memo, USAREUR ACoFS G3 to DCS Ops, n.d., subj: Activities of GTAG, Week 14-19 November 1955. CONF NOFORN. (2) Cable EC-9-6324, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Dec 55. CONF. In USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1955), Vol. II, Item 35 atchd.

³⁶USAREUR GAAP, 1 Apr 55, Sec. V, pp. 2-3. CONF.

³⁷Cable DA-994102, DA from CofSA to CINCUSAREUR, 21 Dec 55. CONF. In USAREUR SGS 322 (1955), B/P, Item 8 atchd.

³⁸USAREUR GAAP, rev 3 Jan 56, Sec. V, pp. 2-3. CONF.

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subordinate commands would have to provide them from their own resources.³⁹

At the same time the commands providing the personnel were given selection criteria. For both officers and enlisted men the criteria, in order of importance, were high moral characteristics and leadership traits, professional qualification in the desired MOS, outstanding ability as military instructors, and the grade indicated on the personnel requisition. Although facility in the German language was very desirable, it was not mandatory. Emphasizing the importance of selecting outstanding personnel for the success of the training assistance program, CINCUSAREUR requested that a general officer of each command interview each enlisted man selected from his command before placing the individual on duty with a team.

b. Changes in Personnel Rotation Policies. USAREUR personnel assigned on TDY to training teams were to be rotated at the end of a 4-month period if they had dependents in the theater. All other personnel assigned to the training teams would remain in the assignments for the duration of the training assistance program, unless otherwise relieved.⁴⁰ However, the unexpected extension of the German requirements for training assistance beyond those contemplated in April 1955, together with the statutory limitations on TDY assignments for military personnel, forced changes in this aspect of personnel planning. A January 1956 revision of this portion of the plan stated that the normal period of TDY for all personnel was to be 4½ months, 2 weeks of which would provide for overlap of the replacement with the individual being relieved to permit orientation and training of the replacement and assure continuity of training.⁴¹

c. German Language Instruction. In the original assistance plan no provisions had been made for German language courses for U.S. Army training team personnel, since it was assumed that formal instruction would be given through interpreters. At an early stage, however, it was recognized that the training personnel's complete ignorance of German would seriously diminish the effectiveness of the entire assistance program. Since considerable informal assistance in U.S. military doctrine and technique would be required, especially of the MAAG officers assigned to the training teams, at least a fair knowledge of German was believed essential. USAREUR's initial concept was that one 16-week language course would enable the student to acquire a basic vocabulary of 1,500 words, including the necessary military terminology.⁴² The possibility that the Army language school in Monterey, California, would be able to provide instruction

³⁹Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG Seventh Army, 19 Jan 56, subj: Time-Phased Requirements to Support the German MAAG. UNCLAS.

⁴⁰USAREUR GAAP, 1 Apr 55, Sec. IV, Annex B, pp. 11-12. CONF.

⁴¹USAREUR GAAP, rev 3 Jan 56, Sec. V, pp. 3-4. CONF.

⁴²(1) Intvw, Dr. Fisher with Lt Col P. E. Alban, GTAG, 9 Jan 56. UNCLAS. (2) Memo for rec, Lt Col Hislop, 11 Jan 56, cited above. CONF.

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was ruled out because the enrollment of such a large number of additional students would have involved expensive augmentation. Furthermore, funds were not available to provide the training through civilian school contracts. The hope that the initial MAAG requirements for linguists might be met by personnel redeployed from Austria proved unfounded when USAREUR received only four linguists, who unfortunately did not qualify in other respects.⁴³

USAREUR's suggested solution was to give language training to approximately 100 MAAG officers and enlisted men at the USAREUR Intelligence School in Oberammergau. The classes could be organized on short notice to coincide with the arrival of the training team personnel in Europe, and the arrival could be advanced by 13 weeks to enable the team personnel to complete the course. Although the Department of the Army favored the proposal, nonavailability of TDY funds--the major expense involved in providing such training--was the most serious obstacle.⁴⁴ Moreover, Defense Department policy prohibited the use of MDAP funds for the linguistic training of U.S. personnel. When the Department of the Army steps to obtain an exception to this policy were unsuccessful, a compromise was reached. Temporary duty funds would be provided if USAREUR could supply the Deutsche Marks required to support the instruction at Oberammergau. This the USAREUR Comptroller could do, and by November 1955 all funding obstacles to the establishment of the language training program were eliminated.⁴⁵

A revision of the personnel section of the original training assistance plan provided for two language courses, the first to begin early in January 1956, the second scheduled for early April. Unexpected delay in the ratification of the Mutual Defense Assistance Pact forced postponement of the first language course until 14 January, necessitating a reduction in the courses' length from 16 weeks to 12, since the first training teams had to report at the school sites by 15 April 1956.⁴⁶ The reporting dates for MAAG personnel were advanced sufficiently to enable them to attend the courses before reporting to the German school sites.⁴⁷ Although the teams needed one month between their activation dates and their movement to training sites for organization and preparation, MAAG language students were able to complete a full 12-week course. Meanwhile USAREUR personnel

⁴³(1) Cable DA-986979, DA from G1 to USCINCEUR, 18 Aug 55. (2) Cable SX-2027, USAREUR to AMEMB Bonn for Adv Plng Gp, 29 Aug 55. Both CONF. Both in USAREUR SGS 322 Ger (1955), B/P, Item 8 atchd.

⁴⁴See note above.

⁴⁵(1) Memo, Col W. E. Chandler, C/USAREUR G3 Adv Planning and Tng Sec, to Maj Gen J. C. Oakes, ACofS G3, 2 Sep 55, subj: Discussion w/DA on German Army Assistance Plan Problems. CONF. (2) Cable DA-9920662, DA from G1 to CINCUSAREUR, 15 Nov 55. CONF. In USAREUR SGS 322 Ger (1955), B/P, Item 8 atchd.

⁴⁶Memo for rec, Lt Col Hislop, 11 Jan 56, cited above. CONF.

⁴⁷USAREUR GAAP, rev 1 Dec 55; 3 Jan 56. CONF NOFORN.

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on temporary duty, or, in some instances, GTAG personnel, activated the training teams pending the arrival of MAAG instructors.⁴⁸

d. Obtaining German Civilian Personnel. The USAREUR plan called for employing 100 German civilian interpreters who would be assigned to the several training teams as required. With few exceptions, all formal training assistance was to be presented by U.S. instructors through the assigned interpreters. Salaries and spaces for these employees were to be provided from MDAP allocations.⁴⁹

The German interpreters for the training teams were obtained through regular civilian personnel channels. Based on GTAG's recommendations, the Civilian Personnel Branch of USAREUR G1 prepared local wage rate (LWR) personnel requirements, which were forwarded to the area command nearest the final locations of the training team. TDY costs were expected to be reduced by recruiting interpreters from areas near the actual training sites. Consequently, interpreters reporting directly to the team commander at the parental site would generally be on TDY for only one month before the team's move to the training site.⁵⁰

The interpreters had to be male, and single men were preferred. Candidates were expected to have either some military background or a record of employment with USAREUR units. The interpreters had to be fluent in both German and English, and at least 50 percent had to be translators as well as interpreters, since training teams would often require written translations of the training material used in the instruction. Typing ability was desirable but not mandatory.⁵¹

4. Logistical Responsibilities

In its letter of instructions dated 1 December 1954 USEUCOM assigned two major logistical responsibilities to USAREUR--providing administrative and logistical support for the U.S. training teams at both the parental and training assistance sites, and assisting the German Army in the reception, storage, distribution, and maintenance of MDAP materiel.⁵²

⁴⁸ Intvw, Dr. Fisher with Lt Col P. E. Alban, GTAG, 9 Jan 56. UNCLAS.

⁴⁹(1) Intvw, Dr. Fisher with Lt Col Alban, 16 May 56. UNCLAS. (2) Memo, USAREUR ACoS G3 to DCS Ops, subj: Activities of Advance Planning and Training Section, USAREUR G3, Week 12-17 September 1955. CONF. In USAREUR G3 Adv Planning & Tng Sec files.

⁵⁰ Memo, Maj W. G. Trigg to Lt Col A. H. Hislop, both GTAG, 4 Jan 56, subj: Interpreters for Training Teams. UNCLAS.

⁵¹ DF, GTAG to USAREUR G1, Attn Civ Pers, 23 Jan 56, subj: LWR Personnel Required to Support GAAP. CONF.

⁵² USAREUR GAAP, 1 Apr 55, Sec IV. CONF.

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Classroom instruction on the M1 rifle with interpreter's assistance

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a. Team Support. USAREUR headquarters delegated the responsibility for the logistical support of the U.S. training teams to the area command nearest the training or school site, with orders to provide medical support, signal communications facilities, and quartermaster laundry and dry cleaning services. In some instances teams remote from USAREUR installations were authorized either to contract locally for these services or, if more convenient, to make appropriate arrangements with the nearest British Army garrison. Such administrative support as financial, personnel, welfare, and postal service was also supplied by the nearest command.⁵³

b. MDAP Equipment Support. In fulfilling the second logistical responsibility, USAREUR was faced with serious limitations. Since USAREUR depots were already filled with equipment and supplies, no depot space was available for the storage of additional MDAP equipment. Moreover, since depot maintenance facilities were barely adequate for maintaining the equipment in use, the depots were capable of handling the maintenance of only minor additional quantities of MDAP equipment.⁵⁴

According to initial plans, a 1-year supply of spare parts was to accompany each MDAP item; a 60-day supply of spare parts would accompany each major item to the training site, the balance being stocked at the northern and southern ordnance depots. A February 1956 revision of the plans eliminated the 60-day spare parts requirement and made the German Army logistical organization responsible for the supply of the necessary spare parts at the training sites.⁵⁵

USAREUR planners expected the German Army depots to be capable of providing depot maintenance for most of the MDAP equipment within seven months after their activation. If the maintenance requirements exceeded the capabilities of the depots commercial facilities would perform this maintenance on a contract basis at German expense. Until the German schools and units achieved sufficient field maintenance capability USAREUR mobile teams would provide the maintenance support at the school or tactical unit sites. No such support, however, was planned for either the quartermaster or the medical schools, since U.S. team personnel would be able to provide the support required for the relatively small amount of MDAP equipment on the sites.⁵⁶

c. Revision of Estimates. In the February 1956 revision of the assistance plan USAREUR had to re-estimate the German capability of supporting MDAP equipment. Among the resultant changes was the extension

⁵³USAREUR GAAP, rev 27 Feb 56. CONF.

⁵⁴USAREUR GAAP, 1 Apr 55, Sec IV, pp. 2-4. CONF (info used UNCLAS).

⁵⁵USAREUR GAAP, 1 Apr 55, Sec IV, Annex B, p. 1; and rev 27 Feb 56, p. 3. CONF.

⁵⁶USAREUR GAAP, rev 27 Feb 56, pp. 6-8. CONF.

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of U.S. assistance in the reception, storage, and in-depot maintenance of MDAP materiel until 31 March 1957. The revision also provided for financing this support from MDAP funds--a change from the earlier USEUCOM directive that MDAP funds could not be used for this purpose.⁵⁷ The estimate that the German Army depots would be capable of assuming full maintenance responsibilities for the MDAP equipment by A/7 (months) was revised upward.⁵⁸ Four U.S. mobile ordnance maintenance teams were to support the German Army schools. One team would service the antiaircraft, armor, anti-tank, armored infantry, military academy II, signal, and armored reconnaissance schools; the second team would service the field artillery school; the third, the infantry school; and the fourth, the engineer, military police, medical, aviation, and quartermaster training schools. No maintenance support was planned for the ordnance school, since the U.S. training team had adequate personnel to provide the necessary service without assistance.⁵⁹

Similarly, it was planned that field maintenance for signal equipment would be performed by three U.S. mobile signal maintenance teams. One team would service the signal school and maintain the radar equipment at the antiaircraft and field artillery schools; the second, the antiaircraft, armored infantry, armored, antitank, and armored reconnaissance schools; and the third, the infantry, field artillery, aviation, quartermaster, medical, engineer, and military police schools.⁶⁰

At a conference on 22 June 1956 representatives of MAAG, Germany, and USAREUR agreed that USAREUR would furnish ordnance and signal equipment spare parts to the German Army on an emergency "fill-or-kill" basis as permitted by existing capabilities and USAREUR's primary responsibility to support the Seventh Army. USAREUR also agreed to provide maximum depot maintenance within its existing over-all capability on a case-by-case basis, with the Federal Republic reimbursing USAREUR for the costs involved. Reimbursement was especially important because, as USCINCEUR had pointed out earlier, such maintenance on materiel already accepted by the recipient country could not be charged to MDAP projects.⁶¹

In October 1956 the German forces still lacked the tools and technical training to assume responsibility for maintenance of the MDAP materiel. Consequently, early in October representatives of GTAG; MAAG, Germany; and the Federal Defense Ministry met to determine how this increasingly heavy burden of USAREUR's could be lightened. It was decided to augment the

⁵⁷ Ibid., pp. 2-3.

⁵⁸ Ibid., Annex D, pp. 1-2.

⁵⁹ Ibid., pp. 2-3.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ (1) DF, USAREUR ACoFS G4 to CoFS, 27 Jun 56, subj: MDAP Equipment for FRG. CONF. (2) Cable, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 26 Jun 56. UNCLAS. Both in USAREUR SGS 400 Ger (1956), Items 1 and OA.

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GTAG field maintenance teams with German personnel under the operational control of the team commanders. This measure would provide the German technicians with valuable on-the-job training and, it was hoped, would enable USAREUR to withdraw from the maintenance program gradually.⁶²

d. Training Aids. On 13 October 1955 American officers met with representatives of the German Defense Ministry to review training aid requirements as outlined in Section II of the assistance plan. Items no longer considered applicable and those that would be provided by the German Army were eliminated from the program. All remaining items were to be supplied by USAREUR when the training teams became operational. Standard classroom fixtures, such as blackboards, projectors, viewgraphs, screens, and public address systems, would be supplied by the German forces.⁶³

In implementing the decisions of this conference USAREUR's initial problem was to supply the several training teams at the parental sites with the required training publications and a basic issue of graphic training aids and viewgraph slides pertinent to the equipment the Germans would receive. To assure uniformity of nomenclature and terminology for American-made equipment the German Defense Ministry translation service at Mannheim translated selected training publications and distributed the German versions to German Army units. It also prepared translations of captions for graphic training aids for distribution to the training teams. Lesson plans and disassembly mats were translated by USAREUR, checked for accuracy by the German translation service, and then reproduced by the USAREUR training aids center for issue to the training teams. The initial distribution was 400 lesson plans and 10 to 15 disassembly mats per weapon per school, making a total of 200 disassembly mats and 7,000 lesson plans for the basic weapons. Later 250 additional mats were prepared, and early in 1957, when the emphasis in training assistance shifted to the tactical units, an additional 3,000 lesson plans and 300 mats were reproduced by the USAREUR training aids center and distributed to the training teams stationed with the tactical units.⁶⁴

To provide additional assistance in the preparation of instructional material each team was issued a set of six German-English dictionaries, including technical and military dictionaries with a glossary of communications terms. In July 1956 each team was allotted \$100 to be expended during the third quarter of 1956 for paint, acetate, plywood, grease pencils, and other expendable materials required in the preparation of additional training aids.⁶⁵

⁶² Memo for rec, 19 Oct 56, subj: Attachment of German Personnel to U.S. Maintenance Teams. UNCLAS. In USAREUR SGS 322 Ger (1956).

⁶³ Memo for rec, Maj P. R. Williams, MAAG, Germany, 17 Oct 55, subj: Training Aid Requirements for German Army. UNCLAS.

⁶⁴ Intvw, Dr. Fisher with Maj W. Freudenberg, GTAG, 5 Feb 57. UNCLAS.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

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e. Instructions for Implementing the Plan. The depositing of the Mutual Defense Assistance Pact in Washington, D.C., on 27 December 1955 and the establishment in Bonn of the Military Assistance Advisory Group on 30 December cleared the way for implementing the assistance plan. Accordingly, on 11 January 1956 USAREUR alerted its subordinate commands for the forthcoming implementation, which would begin on 1 March 1956.⁶⁶ The actual directive, published and distributed on 2 March 1956, spelled out the details of the administrative, operational, and logistical support to be given the GTAG training teams by the subordinate commands.⁶⁷ Four changes were subsequently published--on 22 March, 23 April, 13 June, and 23 July 1956. Essentially these changes were minor refinements of administrative or operational detail, based upon experience. The sole exception was Change 2, which outlined the logistical support that the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) was to furnish the GTAG training teams located in its area of responsibility. The basis for this change was provided by an administrative order that BAOR headquarters had prepared, in coordination with USAREUR, directing its subordinate commands to provide NAAFI (British Navy, Army, and Air Force Institutes)⁶⁸ privileges, medical and dental facilities, and British Army postal services to the teams.⁶⁹

5. The Andernach Program

In May 1955, long before the passage of the enabling legislation, German military planners began informal discussions with their American counterparts concerning a possible acceleration of the German school and unit activation schedule. At the same time, USAREUR headquarters consulted Seventh Army to determine whether such a change could be supported on the basis of current assistance planning. In October 1955 the German Defense Ministry formally requested the Advance Planning Group, Bonn--as MAAG was known prior to the ratification of the mutual assistance agreement--to accelerate U.S. training and logistical support. The Germans suggested that the activation date be advanced three months to enable the Defense Ministry to establish token Army units and begin formal training by 2 January 1956 on a limited scale at Andernach.⁷⁰

⁶⁶(1) Cable EC-3-7234, USCINCEUR to DA, 29 Dec 55. UNCLAS. In USAREUR SGS 322 Ger (1955), B/P, Item 9 atchd. (2) Cable SC-1120, USAREUR to Subor Comds, 11 Jan 56. CONF.

⁶⁷Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to Subor Comds, 2 Mar 56, subj: Instructions for Implementation of the USAREUR GAAP. UNCLAS. In USAREUR Hist Div Docu Sec.

⁶⁸British equivalent of the U.S. exchange system for the military services, viz., post or base exchanges.

⁶⁹Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to Subor Comds, 23 Apr 56, subj: Change 2 to Instructions for Implementation of USAREUR GAAP. UNCLAS.

⁷⁰(1) Memo, USAREUR ACoFS G3 to DCS Ops, 24 Jun 55, subj: Activities of Advance Planning and Training Section, Week 9-23 June 1955. (2) Cable SMC-IN 3848, AMEMB Bonn sgd Conant to State Dept, 12 Oct 55. Both CONF. Both in USAREUR SGS 322 Ger (1955), Vol. I, B/P, Items 7 atchd, and 8 atchd.

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a. The German Request. To assist in the Andernach phase of the German Army training program, the Defense Ministry requested the assignment of 3 American officers and 24 enlisted men as instructors, as well as the delivery of certain items of equipment to arm approximately 800 men, by about 5 December 1955. The requests, which were for individual arms, crew-served infantry weapons, training ammunition for these weapons, and a few radio sets, were modest and easily filled;⁷¹ they found an immediate response at USAREUR headquarters. Plans were prepared to organize a U.S. Army training team to instruct the German units activated at Andernach in the use of U.S.-supplied MDAP equipment and to assist in the instruction of other military subjects as requested. These plans for Andernach, however, did not affect the over-all plan prepared to cope with the anticipated activation of the nine combat arms and service cadres. It was still expected that the bulk of training assistance would be required in the second quarter of 1956.⁷²

b. Preparatory Steps. In mid-November 1955 GTAG representatives established liaison with the German camp commandant and inspected the Andernach training camp facilities. Housing for training team personnel was found to be adequate, and sufficient storage space for the team's vehicles was available. Company-grade officers and enlisted men were to be assigned quarters in the camp; the field-grade officer in charge of the team would be billeted with German officers of equal rank in a local hotel. Medical care would be provided by either two German medical officers or civilian contract surgeons; their services would be available at all times and would be supplemented by a local hospital and ambulance service.⁷³

Since there were virtually no facilities for terrain exercises in the Andernach area, the Germans planned to make on-the-spot arrangements with local property owners. Classroom space, while somewhat limited, was found to be commensurate with the training needs. After reviewing the planned 12-week training program with the Andernach staff, the GTAG representatives explained the committee system of training employed in U.S. service schools and obtained German agreement to use this method for the Andernach program.⁷⁴

c. Organizational and Administrative Measures.

(1) Initial Organization. On 19 December 1955 the U.S. training team for Andernach, composed of 4 officers and 25 enlisted men, was activated at Patton Barracks in Heidelberg. During the pretraining period

⁷¹USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf, No. 25, 25 Oct 55. CONF.

⁷²Memo, USAREUR ACofS G3 to DCS Ops, 10 Oct 55, subj: Activities of Advance Planning and Training Section, Week 3-8 October 1955. CONF. In USAREUR SGS 322 Ger (1955), Vol. I, B/P, Item 7 atchd.

⁷³Memo for rec, Maj W. Freudenberg, GTAG, 17 Nov 55, subj: Visit to Andernach Training Camp. CONF.

⁷⁴Ibid.

- 20 -
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team personnel prepared lesson plans, rehearsed instruction, and were briefed on the details of their mission by members of the GTAG Control Office.⁷⁵

After a 3-week organizational period on the parental site the team moved on 9 January 1956 to Andernach, with the GTAG Control Office retaining operational control.⁷⁶ Bad Kreuznach subarea headquarters provided such support as mail service, post exchange supplies, and gasoline for privately owned vehicles, while the team made arrangements for laundry and dry cleaning on a cash basis with a local German firm. Office equipment and space for the administrative section of the team were provided by the Andernach camp authorities.⁷⁷

(2) Funding. Because USEUCOM was not notified of MDAP fund availability until 10 January 1956, the USAREUR Comptroller had no documentation for fund citations until 1 February. However, as a temporary expedient the Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, paid the required per diem to team personnel from his training funds. When MDAP fund citations became available, the Comptroller reimbursed the G3 training fund in February.⁷⁸

d. The Language Problem. Since no language trainees from Oberamergau would be ready in time for the Andernach training program, the training team commander recommended that at least 8 or 10 German interpreters be made available for this phase of training assistance. In addition, two of the training team's officers spoke fluent German, and several of the Andernach trainees had been employed by the U.S. forces as civilian workers in recent years and were expected to be familiar with American military terms.⁷⁹ Upon arriving at Andernach the U.S. team found that approximately 80 percent of the trainees could speak and understand some English. Thus, the language problem did not materialize to the extent anticipated; instead, the two national groups quickly became acquainted, and the presentation of instructional material was greatly facilitated.⁸⁰

⁷⁵ Memo, Maj Gen J. C. Oakes, USAREUR ACoS G3 to CoS, 23 Dec 55, subj: Activities of GTAG, Week 12-23 December 1955. CONF.

⁷⁶ Cable SX-1120, USAREUR to Distr, 11 Jan 56. CONF. In-USAREUR SGS 353 Ger (1956), Vol. I, Item 1.

⁷⁷ Memo for rec, Maj Freudenberg, 12 Jan 56, subj: Visit to Andernach. CONF.

⁷⁸ (1) Memo for rec, Lt Col P. E. Alban, GTAG, 20 Jan 56, subj: Fund Citations for GTAG-MAAG-PCS Personnel. (2) Cable EC-3-620, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR for Compt, 1 Feb 56. Both UNGLAS.

⁷⁹ Memos for rec, Maj Freudenberg, 17 Nov, 7 Dec 55, subj: Visit to Andernach. CONF.

⁸⁰ Memo for rec, Maj Freudenberg, 12 Jan 56, cited above. CONF.

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e. Messing. Early in the Andernach program the team found that the German Army diet did not meet U.S. military standards, either in quantity or in caloric content. For political reasons, however, it seemed desirable for all U.S. team officers to mess with their German colleagues. Consequently, this practice was made a firm requirement by the team commander. The enlisted men were required to eat only the noon meal with the Germans. Some, either by preference or from necessity, ate all their meals in the German troop mess and seemed none the worse for it, but most of the men either prepared their breakfasts on hot-plates in their billets or ate breakfast, as well as the evening meal, in a local off-post restaurant.⁸¹

f. Beginning of Instruction. According to GTAG plans, U.S. personnel were to conduct all instruction concerning MDAP-supplied materiel for the entire training complement; interpreters were to be employed as assistants. The German staff at Andernach, however, insisted that their own officers and senior noncommissioned officers instruct the troops after having received the corresponding instruction from the U.S. training team on the preceding day. In fact, the school commandant requested that during the actual instruction by German personnel, U.S. training team personnel simply stand by to assist if some portion of the equipment being studied proved difficult to explain or operate. He felt that it was psychologically important for his troops to be taught by their own leaders, rather than by U.S. instructors, lest they lose respect for their own officers and NCO's.⁸²

Following a week devoted to getting acquainted with the German personnel, meeting various dignitaries from Bonn, and giving interviews to the press, the team began formal instruction on basic infantry weapons on 16 January 1956. In the initial course 4 officers and 12 enlisted men of the team taught a morning class composed of 5 German officers and 40 noncommissioned officers. During the afternoons the U.S. enlisted men acted as assistant instructors to the German personnel who had been trained in the morning class and were instructing their own troops. Since this system required that each member of the team be rated as an instructor in his basic weapon and in his military occupational specialty, a double burden was placed upon the team. After three weeks this time-consuming system was abandoned and entire units were instructed at one time by training team members.⁸³

⁸¹(1) Memo, USAREUR ACofS G3 to CofS, n.d., subj: Activities of GTAG for Week 20-27 January 1956. CONF. (2) Memo for rec, Lt Col A. H. Hislop, GTAG, 8 Feb 56, subj: Visit to Andernach, 6-7 February 1956. UNCLAS.

⁸²(1) Memo for rec, Capt. G. M. Schneider, Andernach Tng Team, 30 Dec 55, no subj. (2) Intvw, Dr. Fisher with Maj Freudenberg, 4 Jan 56. Both UNCLAS.

⁸³(1) Memo for rec, Maj Freudenberg, 16 Jan 56, subj: Report from Andernach Team. (2) Memo for rec, Maj E. F. Schumacher, CO, US Tng Team, Andernach, n.d., subj: Information from U.S. Training Team, Andernach. Both UNCLAS.

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Since German Army practice allowed each unit commander considerable autonomy in preparing training schedules, the U.S. team commander had to discard previously prepared detailed training schedules in favor of more flexible ones that could be adjusted--often on very short notice--to the immediate requirements of the German units. This practice required close daily liaison with each unit commander to enable the team to keep abreast of the latest changes in schedule and to adjust its own timetable accordingly.⁸⁴

g. Scope and Duration of Instruction. The German training cadre activated at Andernach on 1 December 1955 consisted of 4 infantry companies, 1 military police company, 1 service company, and 1 band. During the first two months of the training period the infantry companies received infantry basic training from their own officers and NCO's. Concurrently, instruction in the use and maintenance of the basic infantry weapons was given by the U.S. training team. Halfway through the program the four companies were divided into arms and service platoons, which eventually formed the cadres of the various service schools of the German Army.⁸⁵

The 12-week training period was conducted in 2 phases. The first, of 8 weeks duration, consisted of general training for all personnel, and the second was devoted to specialized training in the various arms and services. In Phase I, 55 hours of instruction on items of U.S.-supplied equipment were given, and in Phase II 170 hours were allotted to more specialized instruction on the equipment peculiar to the various arms and services. Thus, a total of 225 hours of instruction was given by the U.S. team on U.S. equipment.⁸⁶

Although it was originally planned that the team would complete its mission on 31 March 1956, unforeseen delays in the processing and forwarding of MDAP equipment from USAREUR depots, together with changes in the timing of the German training program, prevented accomplishment of the training on schedule. Since departure of the team as planned would have impaired the effectiveness of the assistance already given, the team was retained at Andernach through the month of April 1956.⁸⁷


h. Results. In addition to the successful accomplishment of the team mission--the instruction of the German cadres in the use and maintenance of the weapons and equipment supplied under the Mutual Assistance Program--an important result of the team's activities at Andernach was the development of an attitude of mutual respect and comradeship between

⁸⁴ See note above.

⁸⁵ Tng Prog, U.S. Tng Team, Andernach, Dec 55-Feb 56. CONF.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ (1) Ltr, Brig Gen M. F. Summerfelt, MAAG, Germany, to CINCUSAREUR, 27 Mar 56, subj: Extension of Assignment of the U.S. Training Team at Andernach. UNCLAS. (2) CINCUSAREUR's Mthly Amb-Comdr's Conf, 2 Apr 56, G3 Comments. CONF. In Hist Div Docu Sec.



Classroom instruction on the 3.5 rocket launcher

AGL (I) 6-58-100-65999

UNCLASSIFIED

the U.S. instructors and their students. In the opinion of the U.S. personnel taking part in the program, this latter development was the most important outcome, since it established a favorable atmosphere in which the German Army Assistance Program could flourish in the months to come.⁸⁸

⁸⁸ Memo, Maj Schumacher, n.d., cited above. UNCLAS.

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CHAPTER 2

Implementation

Although USAREUR originally had planned for only 18 training teams, it eventually provided 34. The first 10 teams were activated on 15 March 1956--7 for the combat arms and 3 for the technical services. Seven other teams were activated from May to September 1956, and 17 more during January and February 1957. Extracts from team reports, contained in this chapter, indicated some of the problems U.S. personnel encountered in executing the program.

6. Combat Arms Training Teams

a. The Armored Reconnaissance Team. The armored reconnaissance team was activated on 15 March 1956 at Mangin Casern, Mainz, and while at its parent site received administrative and logistical support from the U.S. 2d Armored Division. It was organized into a weapons section, to instruct in the use of small arms and crew-served weapons; an automotive section, to provide instruction on the M41 tank and the M47 VTR; and communications and tank gunnery sections. This organizational pattern was retained until the team was inactivated.¹

During the preparatory period at Mainz all subjects on the proposed training schedule were rehearsed, with interpreters, under simulated classroom conditions. The rehearsals showed that the use of interpreters caused delays that had to be taken into account in instructional planning, since in almost all subjects the time required for a satisfactory presentation through an interpreter was from 1½ to 2 times longer than scheduled in the GTAG lesson plans.

¹Armd Recon Tng Team Hist Rept, 15 Dec 56, Sec 2. UNCLAS. In USAREUR Hist Div Docu Sec.

UNCLASSIFIED

(1) Movement to German School Site. Meanwhile, one of the MAAG officers assigned to the team had been sent to establish contact with German officers at the future school site in Bremen. After numerous inquiries he located two officers, one of whom became the commanding officer of the school battalion of the armored reconnaissance school. A civilian Volkswagen was apparently their sole item of equipment. Friendly relations were established, and plans were made for moving the U.S. training team to Bremen.²

The team moved to Grohn Casern, Bremen-Vegesack, on 25 and 26 April 1956. Within 15 minutes after its arrival, the S3 of the German training battalion requested that his unit's officers be permitted to observe firing and range procedures on the U.S. Army range at Bremerhaven the following morning. After hurried phone calls the necessary arrangements were made for the time requested. In addition, the German officers were given the opportunity to fire the carbine and to take part in limited firing exercises. This incident proved to be typical of the informality and spontaneity of many of the later requests for training assistance. In the months to come the team found that the requests were often presented on very short notice, without regard to the preparations that team personnel had to make in order to present the instruction properly.³

(2) Training Assistance Activities. Early in June the team, acting in behalf of the German commandant, obtained the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation commander's authorization for school personnel to use the small-arms range upon request. From 12 June to 1 December German company-size units practiced at least 3 times weekly, with trainees spending a minimum of 7,200 man-days on the range.

On 18 June the team initiated a short course of instruction at the Tirpitz Casern for the newly arrived officer and NCO faculty-cadre of the reconnaissance school. This course was continued until 2 July, when the first class of student officers and NCO's began to arrive.

Formal basic training for fillers of the school battalion and the first course of instruction for students began on 3 July. The program of instruction and lesson plans served only as guidelines for actual instruction, for the unpredictable German training schedules often required drastic changes in the time devoted to a particular subject as well as the subject's place in the training program. In the opinion of the U.S. team commander, the only constant factor in the entire training program was the excellent relationship between the U.S. instructors and the German students.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.



Classroom instruction in communications equipment

AGL (1) 6-58-100-65999

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The team divided its time between the school battalion and the school proper by working 2 days a week with the school and 3 days with the battalion. This system was followed by the team throughout the training program.

Since German Army doctrine allowed company commanders considerable autonomy in training matters--including the discretion to schedule the various subjects in the training program--requests for training assistance varied considerably. For example, one company requested and received 22 hours of U.S. training, while another company received none, preferring instead to use the cadre previously trained by the GTAG team. Because of this autonomy, individual German company commanders often had to be sold on the need for the type of instruction the team was prepared and anxious to give. This was illustrated when the German units requested classes in the operation, but not the maintenance, of U.S. signal communications equipment. When the classes were arranged the U.S. team pointed out the need for training specialists in the installation, tuning, and minor repairs of the equipment--training that the German company commanders considered unnecessary. Shortly afterward the training team learned that the U.S. radios in the field were operating in a radius of only 4 to 5 miles instead of the rated 10 to 15 miles. Viewing this development as a challenge rather than a complaint, the team commander requested a U.S. communications specialist to be placed with each of the "deficient" radios during the next field exercise. This was done, and the German trainees learned the step-by-step procedures of installation, tuning, and adjustments during operation. Within an hour all sets were operating at a range of 16 miles. Subsequently German commanders accepted the classes they had previously refused, having been made to realize that proper maintenance was needed.

The training assistance given from July through September 1956 was almost entirely basic weapons instruction. At the completion of basic training by the school battalion in October, the emphasis shifted to automotive training, tank gunnery, 81-mm mortar firing, and signal communications. In addition, the team offered short courses of instruction in U.S. reconnaissance tactics and marksmanship; in the use of hand grenades, explosives, and mines; and in atomic-bacteriological-chemical (ABC) warfare. Courses in tank gunnery were also given, varying in length from 12 hours for recruits to 48 hours for more experienced personnel.

In July the school battalion received its fully authorized equipment of 20 M41 tanks. As the tanks were received, the team assigned one NCO to the motor pool to act as adviser, trouble shooter, and "walking field manual." The following incident illustrates one of the many indirect ways training assistance was given outside the formal classroom. One day the duty NCO saw two German tank drivers get into an M47 recovery vehicle and drive it rapidly out of the motor pool. From some Germans in the motor pool he learned that a battalion tank had thrown a track and was immobilized in a stone quarry in the training area. Since no

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track jack was available to help recover the tank, the U.S. tank instructor was notified, and a party of team members followed the recovery vehicle to the training area. Having refused the team's offer of assistance, the Germans continued their vain efforts to pull the tank from the quarry. Finally a German officer asked the tank instructor how he would remove the tank. Although skeptical of the reply, the officer, in despair, accepted the U.S. team's assistance. With the proper method the tank was quickly removed from the quarry, the track "walked" back on, and the tank driven away without damage. This excellent demonstration given the German operating personnel in the proper handling of equipment was not soon forgotten.⁴

(3) Extending Training Assistance to Tactical Units. In August 2 additional German units, the 3d and 5th Reconnaissance Battalions were activated at Lingen and Hemer respectively. Since these units had a high proportion of recruits, the reconnaissance school requested the U.S. team to provide training assistance. From September through December 1956 field teams were sent to the new battalions each week, the personnel and subject matter being rotated weekly to suit the requirements of the German units. Faced with similar requests, other training teams sometimes sent small permanent detachments that remained with German units throughout the training assistance period. The armored reconnaissance team, however, found that its system of rotation was preferable. The German unit knew when instructors on a certain subject would be available and that their time would be limited. Consequently, the units were prepared for the particular subject, the equipment was on hand, and the students anticipated the training. A sense of urgency kept all students in class and eliminated the practice of canceling classes at the last moment--a chronic problem in situations where the U.S. instructors were continually "on-call." In the opinion of the training team commander this system proved the most effective training method of the entire program.⁵

(4) Summary of Assistance.

(a) Instruction. From May through December 1956 the U.S. team presented a total of 1,096 platform hours of formal instruction. In addition, 1 team member was on duty every day in the motor pool during the entire 8-month training period, and another spent over 500 hours on the firing range as an adviser during the same period; these assignments were rotated.

Instruction on U.S.-supplied weapons, at least equivalent to that received by U.S. basic trainees, was given to the entire school battalion and to elements of three line battalions. Moreover, 3 full courses were given at the armored reconnaissance school, which contained the cadres of 3 new battalions. The amount of instruction given in such specialized

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

UNCLASSIFIED

subjects as tank gunnery, signal communications, and automotive maintenance varied according to the needs of each unit and the time available.

On the other hand, the team was unable to train a corps of indigenous instructor personnel capable of giving advanced training on U.S.-supplied equipment. Initial organizational problems as well as shortages of equipment and personnel prevented the German units from releasing sufficient personnel for the intensive training required to produce qualified instructors.⁶

(b) Phasing of Personnel. The USAREUR personnel on the team changed substantially during the period May-December 1956. Approximately two-thirds of the initial complement of 3 officers and 18 enlisted men on TDY from USAREUR were replaced on 1 August and 10 October 1956. There was a 1-week overlap after the arrival of new TDY personnel before personnel returning to their units were relieved. The changeover took place two weeks before the arrival of a new class of German students, so that the transition from the old to the new team was smooth. The rapid and effective integration of new personnel into the team was facilitated by extending TDY for approximately one-third of the USAREUR personnel from one training cycle to another. Seven of the USAREUR enlisted men remained with the team throughout the period, and this continuity was important to the success achieved by the team.⁷

b. The Armored Infantry Troop Training Team.

(1) At the Parental Site. The armored infantry team was activated on 27 March 1956 at Mangan Casern in Mainz, where the 42d Armored Infantry Battalion of the U.S. 2d Armored Division provided administrative and logistical support. Pretraining activities consisted of the preparation of lesson plans, rehearsals of instruction with interpreter participation, and the construction or procurement of needed training aids. Team personnel were screened to determine their ability as instructors and were then assigned specific topics for which they prepared lesson plans.⁸

Training and rehearsals for the instruction to be given were hampered by the absence of such items of equipment as 4.2-inch mortars, .45 caliber submachine guns, 106-mm recoilless rifles, M1C sniper rifles, and M39 armored utility vehicles. The initial shortage of training aids was overcome by the time the team left for the German armored infantry school at Muensterlager.⁹

⁶ Ibid., Sec. 4.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Armd Inf Tng Team Hist Rept, 14 Dec 56. UNCLAS. In file above.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 1-2.

UNCLASSIFIED

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(2) Movement to School Site. The team of 5 officers, 15 enlisted men, and 6 interpreters moved to Muensterlager on 27 April and shortly thereafter began an orientation course for the officers of the school battalion. Covering the weapons and equipment of an armored infantry battalion, the course was designed to acquaint the officer cadre with the equipment to be issued.¹⁰

(3) Instruction of School Battalion Personnel. Formal training assistance was given to both the cadre and recruits of the school battalion in two phases--the first, from 2 May to 2 July, and the second, from 3 July to 30 November 1956. During the first phase the school battalion had training priority, whereas during the second phase the emphasis shifted to assisting the school personnel in its training mission. Nevertheless, by adjusting its schedules during the second phase, the U.S. team provided the school battalion with 217 hours of instruction on weapons, 114 on vehicles, and 115 on communications. This brought the number of instruction hours for the school battalion during both phases to 510 hours on weapons, 283 on vehicles, and 181 on communications, for a grand total of 974 hours. The major difference between the schedules of the 2 phases was the significant increase, from 66 to 115 hours, in communications instruction. Training time on weapons and vehicles was reduced proportionately.¹¹

The training assistance ultimately given the school battalion was appreciably greater than originally contemplated in the GTAG plan of instruction. Initial plans called for instructing only selected German personnel who would then train the balance of the personnel. Upon arriving at the school, however, the team found that the Germans had not prepared a specific program of instruction in U.S. weapons and equipment. Moreover, since the German personnel had a mixed military background--a few men had considerable but varied military experience, while the majority had virtually none--GTAG's plan of instruction was disregarded and a new one formulated. Consequently, both the cadre and the recruits of the school battalion were given combined and identical instruction, necessitating far more courses than initially planned.¹²

(4) Instruction to Armored Infantry Personnel. Since the original plan to form a small group of German instructors from school battalion personnel had to be abandoned, the workload of the U.S. team was greatly increased when the courses for armored infantry students opened in July. After considerable urging the school battalion permitted the U.S. team to establish a special course for training German instructors. These instructors proved to be excellent and were able to assist the team in the subsequent courses of instruction. The school training

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 3.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 3.

¹² Ibid., p. 4.

UNCLASSIFIED

program was divided into three 8-week courses beginning in July and ending in the middle of December. The U.S. team presented a total of 871 hours of instruction during this period, of which 550 hours were on weapons, 153 on vehicles, and 168 on communications. Because of the limited number of hours devoted to weapons and equipment in each of the three training courses, only familiarization instruction was given on the items of U.S. equipment.¹³

(5) Instruction of Two Armored Infantry Battalions. As part of the organization of the German 3d Armored Division in Hamburg, the 3d and 13th Armored Infantry Battalions were activated by cadres graduated from the school. Essentially these personnel had received only familiarization courses in U.S. weapons and equipment and were thus not qualified to conduct recruit and replacement training on these subjects. Therefore, the German battalion commanders requested additional training assistance from the U.S. team. From 17 September to 1 December, two field detachments from the training team were at the battalion sites. A team of 1 officer, 7 enlisted men, and 2 interpreters presented 390 hours of weapons instruction and 101 hours of communications instruction to the 3d Armored Infantry Battalion, while the other battalion received 358 and 40 hours, respectively, on weapons and communications from a team of identical composition, less 1 interpreter. Consequently, by September 1956 the U.S. training team, without increasing its original strength, was providing training assistance simultaneously to the school battalion, to armored infantry personnel, and to two armored infantry battalions. This was achieved even though the initial plans had called only for training support of the school battalion at this stage of the assistance program.¹⁴

c. The Armored Troop Training Team.

(1) Initial Instruction. From 6 May to 15 December 1956 the cadre of the German armored school battalion at Muensterlager received instruction in the basic arms of the individual soldier as well as specialized training in the use, functioning, and maintenance of armored division equipment. The school battalion, in turn, was to provide the training and demonstration troops for the conduct of instruction. The German Armored School (Panzertruppen Schule), activated on 2 July 1956, was primarily responsible for the general orientation of newly inducted officers and NCO's who, upon completion of the course of instruction at Muensterlager, were to form the cadre of future armored units. Concurrently with the school curriculum, the U.S. team only instructed in small arms, acted as advisors on the firing ranges, and gave general orientation in the organization and equipment of an armored division.¹⁵

¹³ Ibid., pp. 4-5.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Armd Tng Team Hist Narr, 15 Dec 56, pp. 4-6, 9. UNCLAS. In file above.

UNCLASSIFIED

Training assistance was divided into three phases, the first extending from 6 May to 30 June, the second from 1 July to 31 August, and the third from 1 September to 15 December 1956. With the U.S. Army service school system as a pattern, the team was divided into four faculty committees: small arms, automatic weapons, combat vehicles, and communications. The students included experienced veterans of World War II, as well as younger officer and noncommissioned officer candidates, and volunteer recruits. Instruction for each group varied according to background and future duties. In teaching the veterans, the goal of instruction was to establish a uniform level of knowledge as a basis for the organized instruction that was to follow in the later phases of training. For the officer and noncommissioned officer group, the team sought to familiarize and partially qualify the students in all the arms and equipment of the armored division before they advanced to other subjects in their military education. Finally, the recruits received only basic training in their individual arms.¹⁶

Since the officer candidates were scheduled to complete their course at the armored school by the end of June 1956--when the school battalion cadre would begin training fillers for the battalion--the U.S. team decided to establish a modified gunnery course for these students. Time and strength limitations, however, precluded a training program as comprehensive or as lengthy as that given U.S. tank crews. Older and experienced tankers from the former Wehrmacht experienced little difficulty in absorbing the gunnery instruction, while the younger students, who often insisted upon dwelling on the theoretical rather than the practical, were somewhat slower in mastering the training.¹⁷

(2) Instruction in Maintenance. During the first phase of training the school battalion requested only six hours of maintenance instruction. However, an effective maintenance program was needed to prevent the deadlining of an excessive number of tanks. Although the team commander brought the matter to the attention of the school battalion commander, who agreed to increase the time devoted to maintenance instruction in the second and third phases of training, the tank maintenance problem remained critical throughout the assistance program.¹⁸


(3) Team Work. With the arrival of the volunteer recruits in June the school battalion became a fully organized unit, with a headquarters and service company as well as 4 tank companies, 1 of which was actually a training company for the officer candidates of the armored school. To accommodate the varying requirements of the companies, the U.S. training team modified the committee system and assigned an officer to work directly with each company commander. Because of the German company

¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 5-6.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 6, & Incl 1.

UNCLASSIFIED



Instruction in the nomenclature of the 76-mm gun tank

AGL (1) 6-58-100-65999

UNCLASSIFIED

commanders' latitude in arranging their training schedules, this modification, which permitted closer contact between the training team and the various units and allowed the team personnel to adjust more readily to the immediate training requirements of each unit, proved more satisfactory.

During the second phase of training assistance the four companies of the school battalion were instructed in the use of the M47 tank and in tank gunnery procedures. The standard preliminary examination used for U.S. tank gunners, followed by firing exercises on the range, culminated this phase. To the highest scoring platoon in the firing exercises the U.S. team awarded an impressive flagon of cognac in a colorful and friendly ceremony. Gestures of this type helped maintain the genuinely cordial atmosphere in which the training assistance program took place.¹⁹

(4) Final Phase. The training program begun in the third phase was prepared with the assistance of the U.S. training team and was designed to advance the school battalion through individual tank, platoon, and company tactics.²⁰ Concurrently, the team established a series of specialist training courses in the basic maintenance problems of MDAP equipment to make the school battalion more self-sufficient in the maintenance of its organic equipment.²¹

Track mechanics were given 80 hours of instruction to qualify them in second echelon maintenance of the M47 and M41 tanks and the M47 tank recovery vehicle, while weapons mechanics of the service company received 55 hours of instruction in second echelon maintenance of the battalion's weapons. Communications chiefs and repairmen received 20 hours of instruction in maintenance of the organic communications equipment. In addition, 30 mechanics were sent to the Mainz Ordnance Depot for a 6-week course in tank maintenance.²²

With the extension of assistance to the tactical armored units in September 1956, a later phase of the over-all GTAG program was anticipated. On 10 September the team dispatched 2 small sections, each consisting of 1 officer and 8 enlisted instructors, to the 3d and 13th Tank Battalions of the newly activated 3d Armored Division, located in Hamburg-Rahlstedt and Flensburg, respectively. Their mission was to present a 6-week course of instruction to the 50-man cadre of each battalion. The training was so well received that the course was repeated for additional cadre personnel in each battalion. This second course also included weapons firing by selected personnel at the Putlos range on the nearby Baltic Sea. Honoring requests of the Panzertruppen Schule and the 3d Tank Battalion, the U.S. team commander delivered a series of lectures on the organization and tactics of the U.S. armored division. Training

¹⁹Ibid., p. 7.

²⁰This program was based upon the U.S. Army Program for tank battalion training (ATP 17-300).

²¹Ibid., p. 9.

²²Ibid., p. 10.

UNCLASSIFIED

assistance to both battalions was concluded by 12 December 1956.

By the time the third phase ended, platform instruction by U.S. personnel had virtually ceased, and German instructors from the armored school battalion were effectively handling all tank instruction at the school. The role of the team was reduced to monitoring instruction and providing advice on the ranges. At the end of the year the German Armored School was capable of providing effective instruction on U.S. MDAP equipment.²³

d. The Infantry Troop Training Team.

(1) Activation and Preparations. From the date of its activation at the Neckarsulm headquarters of the 60th Infantry Regiment, 9th Infantry Division, on 26 March 1956 to its departure on 10 April for the German infantry school site at Hammelburg, the U.S. team worked intensively preparing lesson plans, training interpreters in American weapons and instructional techniques, and conditioning team personnel for their roles as instructors.²⁴

Training the eight interpreters assigned to the team required considerable time and effort. Two experienced men, though professionally well qualified, had to be released because they lacked sufficient knowledge of technical and mechanical terminology. Team personnel devoted considerable time to instructing the interpreters in the operation and nomenclature of infantry weapons and communications equipment and acquainting them with U.S. Army methods of instruction.²⁵

(2) Training Activities. As in other instances, training assistance proper was first given to the school battalion (Lehr Battalion) and then to the infantry school. On 7 May the U.S. team began the first phase, consisting of four 5-week training cycles, which was designed to provide the school battalion with a cadre qualified to train new soldiers and to act as demonstration troops for the infantry school. The fourth and last cycle began on 5 November. The number of students instructed in each cycle varied from 109 to 253. Sixty-six hours of instruction was given in each cycle, although the same class was generally repeated 5 to 8 times, depending upon the size and number of instructional groups in each cycle. This increased the average amount of platform instruction to about 220 hours per cycle. Of the 66 hours of instruction, 18 were devoted to mechanical training in individual weapons, 16 to mechanical training in crew-served weapons, 16 to communications, 12 to familiarization firing, and 4 to special demonstrations.²⁶ The tactical

²³ Ibid., pp. 1-11.

²⁴ Inf Tng Team Hist Rept, 15 Dec 56, pp. 1-5. UNCLAS. In file above.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 2.

²⁶ Ibid., pp. 5-7, & Annex E, p. 20.

UNCLASSIFIED

demonstrations--a very effective part of the training--were provided by units of the U.S. 10th Division, with the team coordinating schedules, rehearsals, and presentations as well as furnishing the interpreters. From May to October 1956, 11 demonstrations were presented to infantry school trainees in groups varying in size from 92 to 1,200, according to the type of demonstration.²⁷

(3) Problems. During the pretraining period the team was divided for instructional purposes into a light and a heavy infantry weapons section. However, after the training assistance got under way this organization was found to be impractical, because all light weapons training was scheduled for the first half of each cycle, and heavy weapons for the second. Under the circumstances the light and heavy weapons instructors had to assist in each others' classes. This problem was solved by merging the two sections into one.²⁸

As was generally the case throughout the first year of the assistance program, the German maintenance of U.S. equipment was poor. At the training team's request, Seventh Army provided technical teams to assist the German units in raising their standards of maintenance.²⁹

e. The Antitank Troop Training Team.

(1) At the Parental Site. The antitank training team was activated on 15 March. During the pretraining period at the parental site in Heilbronn the team trained two principal instructors for each weapon or main item of equipment, making it possible to conduct two classes in the same subject simultaneously. Then sufficient assistant instructors were trained so that classes of 50 students in each weapon could be accommodated, and finally, rehearsals were held with the interpreters. Although qualified in their MOS's, many of the team personnel lacked experience as instructors; therefore, some time was devoted to training in teaching techniques.³⁰

The major problem faced by the team at the parental site was the absence of a definitive list of the types of weapons and equipment to be issued to German antitank battalions. In several instances it was impossible to determine what items would be on hand for training until the equipment was actually issued. This uncertainty resulted in the preparation of instruction on weapons that were never issued and in hastily assembled instructions for items of equipment that were suddenly issued to the German units.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 7, & Annex I, p. 24.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 7.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 9.

³⁰ At Tng Team Hist Rept, n.d., pp. 1-2. UNCLAS. In file above.

UNCLASSIFIED

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(2) Training Activities. On 25 April the team arrived at Grohn Casern in Bremen-Grohn. However, because the Germans were still so short of both personnel and equipment, major training assistance could not begin until 7 May. Although original plans specified that instruction would be given only in light and heavy infantry weapons, the team discovered that the primary weapon to be issued to the antitank battalion would be the M41 tank rather than the 106-mm recoilless rifle. Consequently, the size of the team was increased and MOS requirements were changed to provide the needed instruction. Moreover, both instructors and interpreters prepared a new program of instruction for the M41 tank.

The first phase of the training was given to the antitank school battalion cadre. Originally the first phase was scheduled for completion before the start of the second, but delays in the arrival of training equipment caused the two phases to overlap. During the second phase, beginning on 5 July, the U.S. team assisted in basic weapons training for antitank school students. NCO's from the German school battalion completed their training on U.S. weapons and began to instruct students at the school under supervision of the team. By December 1956 the team had presented 930 hours of formal instruction in U.S. weapons and had supervised 1,129 hours of German instruction.³¹

f. The Antiaircraft Artillery Troop Training Team.

(1) Preparatory Steps. The antiaircraft artillery training team was activated on 15 March 1956 at Funari Barracks, Mannheim, where the 34th AAA Brigade provided administrative and logistical support. As a first organizational step the team was divided into six groups or sections according to the types of equipment in which instruction was to be given--small arms, light antiaircraft (M16-M42), light antiaircraft (75-mm Skysweeper), antiaircraft (90-mm guns), communications, and radar. Each group was headed by an officer responsible for preparing a general plan of instruction and detailed lesson plans for each hour. All team personnel were given a course in techniques of military instruction.³²

The 12-year gap in German military experience was illustrated by the difficulties the team experienced in translating the lesson plans for distribution to the German students. In anticipation of the move to the German school site at Rendsburg, manuscript lesson plans were prepared for all subjects. The completion of the translations of these lesson plans was delayed for many months because modern military terms were often lacking and the German officers disagreed on the meanings of certain technical terms. (This problem seems to have existed only in antiaircraft artillery, where weapons techniques and development had

³¹ Ibid., pp. 2-4.

³² AAA Tng Team Hist Rept, 20 Dec 56, p. 1. UNCLAS. In file above.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

advanced far beyond the German military experience in World War II). A suitable technical and scientific dictionary was finally received three months after the team's arrival in Rendsburg.³³

(2) School Battalion Training. Movement of the team and an attached signal maintenance unit to Rendsburg was accomplished on 22-23 April. The 5 batteries of the school battalion and an initial group of 25 officer candidates had been assigned for instruction. The first conference with the school battalion commander revealed that he was not familiar with the mission of the U.S. team, but when the team's mission and capabilities were explained in detail, he approved the training team's proposals to form five groups of students and to employ U.S. Army methods and scheduling of instruction.

The first phase of formal training for the school battalion began on 7 May with instruction in basic individual weapons, followed by instruction in crew-served weapons. Since both experienced soldiers and recruits were being trained, the program was adjusted frequently to the battalion's changing requirements. Moreover, additional changes in the training schedules were necessitated by changing requirements imposed by German higher headquarters and by delayed shipments of expected items of equipment.³⁴

During the basic and advanced training phases the school battalion received a total of 248 hours of instruction in the operation and maintenance of 75-mm and 40-mm antiaircraft guns, self-propelled 40-mm and .50 caliber multiple mounts, and PU 107/u and M18 generators.³⁵

After completion of weapons instruction the battalion commander requested the team to continue its assistance by means of training films, because the battalion lacked sufficient instructors for a full 8-hour daily training schedule. During this period approximately 300 hours were devoted to the exhibition and discussion of training films by team personnel.³⁶

With the arrival of increasing quantities of MDAP equipment the maintenance problem became acute. To correct this situation the U.S. team commander recommended giving selected German personnel a course in maintenance procedures. The recommendation was accepted, and a 24-hour course was instituted for personnel selected from the staff battery of the school battalion. As a result, the maintenance of equipment improved and continued to be satisfactory for the remainder of the assistance

³³ Ibid., pp. 4-5.

³⁴ Ibid., pp. 5-6.

³⁵ Ibid., Tab B.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 6.

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period.³⁷

(3) School Training Assistance. When the school was preparing its training schedule the U.S. training team was asked to present a portion of the instruction. The program prepared for this purpose was submitted to the school, and the American method of instruction, previously used in training the school battalion, was explained and demonstrated. The U.S. program was approved and integrated into the school training schedule.³⁸

The first of 5 scheduled 8-week courses began on 9 July 1956. The first two courses involved instruction by U.S. personnel on the use of all MDAP equipment. Beginning with the third course on basic individual weapons, however, German instructors took over--which allowed the team more time for instruction on the crew-served weapons. It was hoped that formal training assistance to the school battalion could be continued during the school courses; however, as the school training requirements increased in scope, the assistance to the school battalion became primarily advisory, except for specialized instruction on particular items of equipment.³⁹

The expectation that some students in the AAA school would be retained as instructors following graduation, thus enabling the U.S. team personnel to withdraw gradually from the training responsibilities, was not fulfilled. Because of increasing requirements of the German Army, the students were rushed through the school as quickly as possible and assigned to waiting units. German instructors remained in short supply since field units had priority on such personnel.⁴⁰ By the end of 1956 the U.S. team had trained approximately 1,500 German antiaircraft personnel in the use and maintenance of U.S. equipment. This figure included the school battalion troops as well as the students of the first three training school courses.⁴¹

(4) Personnel Problems. A training assistance plan, which assumed on-schedule delivery of certain AAA equipment to the Germans, determined the assignment and phasing in of both MAAG and USAREUR personnel. When, however, both the delivery times and the items of equipment to be supplied through MDAP were changed, the team found itself with instructors who could not be utilized effectively. For example, 4 MAAG enlisted men were assigned to the team as 90-mm gun instructors, although no instruction was given in this weapon. Of 10 MAAG enlisted men assigned

³⁷ Ibid., p. 6, & Tab E.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 6.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 7.

⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 7-8.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 10.

UNCLASSIFIED

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as AN/TPS 1D radar instructors, only 4 were qualified and even these eventually proved to be surplus. Despite the initiation of transfer actions in July 1956, these men were not transferred until December. On the other hand, no MAAG enlisted personnel were available as automatic weapons instructors, although the bulk of training assistance had to be given in these weapons. USAREUR eliminated this shortage by providing TDY personnel with the required MOS's.⁴²

g. Field Artillery Troop Training Teams.

(1) Preparatory Steps. The field artillery training assistance team was activated on 15 March 1956 at Babenhausen, where it received administrative and logistical support from the 531st Field Artillery Missile Battalion (Corporal). In preparation for its training mission the team organized 5 instructors' committees similar to those formed at U.S. Army service schools--4 for the self-propelled and towed 105-mm and 155-mm howitzers, and 1 for signal communications. Eight German interpreters were also assigned to the team.

Lessons plans to be used at the German field artillery school were prepared from Department of the Army training publications and from notes sent by the artillery and guided missile school at Fort Sill. The lesson plans were translated into German and rehearsed under conditions closely approximating those anticipated at the German artillery school.⁴³

(2) Instruction at School Site. On 15 April 1956 the team moved to the German artillery school at Idar-Oberstein and established headquarters at the Strassburg Casern. Training assistance for the cadre of the school battalion began on 18 April and continued until 30 June. Instruction was given in the nomenclature, functioning, and maintenance of the towed 105-mm, M2A1, and 155-mm, M1, howitzers; the 13-ton M5 tractor; the M1 aiming circle; the battery commander's telescope, M65; the M1 rifle; the M2 carbine; the .45 caliber pistol; the .30 and .50 caliber machine guns; the 3.5-inch rocket launcher; the radio sets AN/PRC-6, -8, and -9, AN/GRC-3 through 8, and SCR-506 and -193; and the SB-22 switchboard.

The second phase of training assistance began on 4 July with a similar program of instruction for the students of the artillery school. To this program, however, were added the M7B2, 105-mm and M44, 155-mm howitzers, both of which had meanwhile been delivered to the school. The courses were repeated in a 2-month cycle through December 1956. Originally the team was to instruct the artillery school students for three months; however, because of the shortage of German instructor

⁴²Ibid., pp. 17-18.

⁴³Fld Arty Tng Team Hist Rept, 24 Dec 56, pp. 1-2. UNCLAS. In file above.

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personnel the team continued to provide this service through the end of December.⁴⁴

(3) Problems. The principal problem encountered was the lack of maintenance parts and materiel. No spare parts or maintenance equipment had been issued through German supply channels by the time the primary items of equipment were received at the school. Procurement of the proper lubricating oils and cleaning materials remained a serious problem throughout the first year of training assistance. Since the oil-operated recoil mechanisms of artillery required continual maintenance, the shortage of oil and maintenance tools not only hampered the operation of the equipment but constituted a safety hazard.⁴⁵

h. The Airborne School Team. On 1 September 1956 the airborne troop training team was activated at the German infantry school at Hammelburg. Personnel for the team were drawn from the U.S. infantry troop training team that had been active at the Hammelburg site since April 1956. Two MAAG personnel--the former chief of the infantry school team and one enlisted man--constituted the team strength until 10 December, when an additional enlisted man from the 11th Airborne Division reported for temporary duty. On 30 October 1956 the team moved to the permanent location of the German airborne school at Altenstadt-Schoengau.⁴⁶

Training assistance at the airborne school was devoted initially to the preparation of 3 programs of instruction for the school--a 3-week basic training course for parachutists; a 2-week qualification course for jumpmasters, including training in air transport and heavy-drop techniques; and, finally, a 3-week troop-type parachute packing course.

The team also maintained liaison between the airborne school and the U.S. 11th Airborne Division for arranging the training of selected German personnel as instructors. Of 7 officers and 22 noncommissioned officers accepted for parachute training by the 11th Airborne on 8 November, 6 officers and 19 noncommissioned officers were graduated as qualified parachutists on 15 December 1956.⁴⁷

7. Technical Services Training Teams

a. The Signal Team.

(1) Activation and Preparations. On 15 March 1956 personnel on TDY from Seventh Army units activated the signal training team at the


⁴⁴Ibid., pp. 2-4.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Abn Sch Team Hist Rept, 20 Dec 56, p. 1. UNCLAS. In file above.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 2.

UNCLASSIFIED



Instruction on the AN/GRC 9 radio set

AGL (1) 6-58-100-65999

UNCLASSIFIED

USAREUR Signal School at Ansbach. The arrival of additional personnel a few days later brought the team to its full strength of 8 officers and 40 enlisted men. While preparing for its training mission at the parental site, the team was divided into three sections for refresher training in radio, radar, and multiple channel and very high frequency (VHF) radio operations. Each section devoted 75 hours to the preparation of programs of instruction in its particular field. Nevertheless, team personnel were given refresher courses on items of equipment that were currently in use and were to be issued to the Germans for training purposes. A course in the techniques of military instruction was also given to 16 enlisted members of the team. All personnel took an 8-hour course on the various items of optical equipment that the team expected to use at the German signal school.

Because of the generally intricate nature of signal equipment, team and USAREUR Signal School personnel gave the German interpreters assigned to the team thorough instruction that included a familiarization course in low- and high-powered radio sets. Initial difficulties in accurately translating U.S. signal equipment nomenclature into German were overcome by the purchase of technical dictionaries.

When officers of the training team visited the German signal school at Sonthofen before the team's arrival on 4 May, little information was obtainable for planning purposes. No knowledgeable German personnel were present, and no facilities or equipment could be inspected. Nevertheless, they established liaison with the commanding officer of the signal school battalion (Fernmelde Lehr Battalion) and made arrangements for billeting and messing team personnel.⁴⁸

(2) Major Training Activities. Training assistance for the signal school battalion began in May 1956 with instruction on both small arms and such unit radio equipment as the AN/PRC-6, -8, -9, and 10; the AN/GRC-3 through -9, and -26; and SCR-506. In June the team initiated courses on the AN/TRC-3 and -4 and the CF-1 and -2 carrier equipment. Concurrently with this training the team provided radio instruction to officer students. In November 1956 assistance was extended to officers of the signal battalions of the 1st, 2d, and 4th Grenadier Divisions. At the same time the team gave a course in signal equipment maintenance, extending through January 1957, for members of the school battalion and divisional signal battalions. On request from the German signal school commandant, the team also prepared a recommended course schedule, including a detailed outline of requirements for setting up a maintenance course for the signal school's permanent program of instruction.⁴⁹

⁴⁸Sig Tng Team Hist Rept, 14 Dec 56, pp. 1-3. UNCLAS. In file above.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 5.

UNCLASSIFIED

(3) Problems. Changes in the scheduling of instruction were caused by shortages in training equipment and in German instructor personnel who were transferred to high-priority tactical units. Furthermore, the early phases of the program were hampered by a lack of adequate training aids, which, in view of the complex nature of signal equipment, were essential for proper instruction. Eventually, however, this problem was solved through either the construction or the purchase of the required training aids.⁵⁰

b. Signal Maintenance Teams.

(1) Mission. While the signal team was providing training assistance to the German Army signal school, two signal maintenance teams had the primary mission of maintaining the MDAP signal equipment in the hands of other German service schools until the school personnel could perform their own maintenance. Nevertheless, circumstances also required the maintenance teams to give a certain amount of instruction in assembling and operating the equipment issued.

The two signal maintenance teams were activated at the USAREUR Signal School on 15 March and 1 April 1956, respectively, from personnel on temporary duty from USAREUR, Seventh Army, or COMZ units. During the preparatory period at Ansbach personnel of both teams received supplementary training to qualify them for their future tasks, and all team members received training in the techniques of military instruction. Radar repairmen were given refresher courses on radar sets AN/TPS-1D and AN/MPQ-10, and some were required to take qualification courses as projectionists. Before leaving, the teams drew the maintenance equipment required in the field and deprocessed it at the parental site.⁵¹


(2) Maintenance Activities. Although activated later, the second signal maintenance team moved to its duty station at Muensterlager first, on 23 April 1956. Its primary mission was to repair and maintain the U.S. signal equipment issued to the German armored and armored infantry schools at Muensterlager and to the antiaircraft artillery school at Rendsburg. After its arrival the team was divided into two sections, one located at Muensterlager and the other at Rendsburg, with satellite detachments at Bremen and Hannover being supported from Muensterlager.

Support activities of the team were divided into three major phases. The first was completed with the establishment of repair shops as bases for team operations at Muensterlager and Rendsburg. The second began when contact was established with the officers of the German units that

⁵⁰ Ibid., pp. 6-7.

⁵¹ (1) Sig Maint Team No. 1 Hist Narr, 17 Dec 56 (hereafter cited as Hist Rept No. 4), pp. 1-2, 6. (2) Sig Maint Team No. 2 Hist Narr, 15 Dec 56 (hereafter cited as Hist Rept No. 14), pp. 1-2. Both UNCLAS. Both in file above.

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Tube testing demonstration during a communication class.

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were to be supported. During this phase the team personnel assisted the Germans in unpacking, checking, and identifying the MDAP signal equipment as it arrived. The third phase began in late May 1956 with the issue of radio sets to the various German units and the repair of defective items in the team's maintenance shops. Initially the workload was light, but it increased rapidly during the following two months. Beginning in August 1956 regular weekly team visits were made to German units in the Bremen and Hannover areas, and defective equipment was brought back to the main shops for repair or replacement. In October maintenance support was extended to the 1st Grenadier and 3d Armored Divisions at their request. This extra workload was assumed without impairing the accomplishment of the team's primary mission. From May through December 1956 the team installed 62 major items of signal equipment, inspected 790, and repaired 555.⁵²

Delays in the German Army activation timetable postponed the movement of the first team to Sonthofen until 4 May when it established a maintenance shop in direct support of the U.S. signal training team and the German signal school. From May through December 1956 the team systematically inspected all MDAP signal equipment issued to the German signal school as well as to tactical units in southern Germany. The maintenance effort of these units was supported while German signal personnel were acquiring the technical know-how to accomplish their own maintenance responsibilities. During this time the team repaired over 300 items of signal equipment. From 21 to 30 September 1956 the team visited the 4th Grenadier Division's signal battalion at Regensburg where it assembled, checked, and repaired equipment, and gave a total of 1,282 man-hours of instruction on 8 types of U.S. signal equipment. Instruction on operating and maintaining AN/GRC-26, AN/TRC, and carrier equipment was given the same unit from 20 to 30 November. For this assistance the team was augmented by two enlisted instructors and an interpreter from the signal team at Sonthofen. This instruction was extended through 8 December 1956 for 112 additional hours on maintenance of the AN/TRC and carrier sets. Repairmen from the team also supported the U.S. signal detachment on duty with the German 5th Armored Division at Grafenwoehr by checking and repairing divisional signal equipment. From May to December 1956 support to German tactical units increased to such an extent that the team fell behind in its tasks of inspecting equipment and procuring spare parts.⁵³

At first, defective equipment was repaired with the spare parts that came with each item of equipment; but these were quickly exhausted by increased usage of the equipment. Difficulties in the German logistical system often caused delays of several months in the receipt of requisitioned parts, so that equipment had to be deadlined for extended periods.⁵⁴

⁵²Hist Rept No. 14, pp. 1-4.

⁵³Hist Rept No. 4, pp. 3-4.

⁵⁴Ibid., pp. 4-5.

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c. The Engineer Troop Training and Maintenance Teams.

(1) Activation and Preparations. Upon activation at the USAREUR Engineer School in Murnau on 15 March 1956, the team was divided into three sections for instruction on weapons, bridges, and other engineer equipment. At Murnau these sections prepared and rehearsed the instruction for later presentation to the personnel of the German engineer school and the school battalion in Munich. At the same time, team personnel received training in techniques of military instruction from members of the USAREUR Engineer School faculty.⁵⁵

On 1 May 1956 the team moved to Funk Casern in Munich, the home of the German engineer school battalion. The German engineer school facilities were located at nearby Lohengrin Casern. To support the training assistance program, an engineer maintenance team was activated on 1 April at the Rhine Engineer Depot in Kaiserslautern. It arrived in Munich on 8 May, but was not integrated into the training program until 30 June. Since shop space for the maintenance team did not become available until the second week in July, the team's arrival was somewhat premature.⁵⁶

(2) Major Phases of Training Assistance. On 7 May 1956 the U.S. team began the training of the school battalion cadre. This phase of training emphasized maintenance and operation of U.S.-supplied equipment as well as indoctrination in U.S. Army instructional methods. With the arrival of German fillers, on 10 July the school battalion began a 3-month basic training cycle for recruits. Because of a shortage of qualified German instructors among the cadre, the U.S. team members assisted in portions of the basic training weapons instruction, although only German officers or NCO's were supposed to conduct the basic training of recruits.⁵⁷

As increasing quantities of MDAP equipment arrived during the basic training phases, the U.S. team presented courses to the battalion cadre in drivers' training and in the maintenance and operation of equipment. Students for specialist training were sent to the USAREUR Engineer School for additional instruction and to the USAREUR Ordnance Shop in Dachau for a 4-week on-the-job training program.⁵⁸

Following the completion of basic training of the fillers, training assistance for the school battalion featured practical training in bridging operations at the German engineer training area in Grossmehring. Meanwhile, in July 1956 the first troop training courses began at the

⁵⁵ Engr Tng Team Hist Narr, 15 Dec 56, pp. 2-4. UNCLAS. In file above.

⁵⁶ Ibid., pp. 5-6.

⁵⁷ Ibid., pp. 6-7.

⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 7-8.

engineer school. During each 8-week course officers and NCO's were trained for engineer assignments in the German Army, and the U.S. team gave instruction and advice in weapons, bridging techniques, and heavy equipment operation. This assistance was supplemented by a series of demonstrations, presented by Seventh Army engineer units, in which various engineer companies used their equipment and built class-60 floating bridges, and an armored infantry platoon simulated an attack.⁵⁹

From late August until October 1956 training assistance was also extended to the engineer battalion of the 4th Grenadier Division at Degerndorf. This program included the presentation of U.S. instructional methods, weapons, explosives, demolitions, and mine warfare, and a familiarization course on the M5 high-speed tractor--including its first and second echelon maintenance. On 6-7 November one section of the team went to the infantry school at Muensterlager to present instruction in the use of explosives and demolitions and in mine warfare.⁶⁰ Specialist training in the maintenance and operation of engineer equipment was a continuing program. Closely related was the establishment of a regular maintenance and spare parts supply system, with standards comparable to those of the U.S. Army. The constant efforts to stress the importance of such a system to personnel at all levels of command met with varying degrees of success because the German engineers did not seem to realize its importance.⁶¹

By December 1956 the U.S. team had accomplished its training mission despite a 6-week interruption of training assistance caused by an epidemic of paratyphus C that incapacitated the school battalion. Both the school battalion and the engineer school received 573 hours of instruction in bridging and related subjects; 483 hours in weapons, demolitions, and mine warfare; 1,433 hours in heavy equipment and automotive materiel; and 124 hours in miscellaneous subjects and demonstrations.⁶²

d. Quartermaster-Transportation Troop Training Teams. In January 1956 GTAG, in coordination with MAAG, Germany, decided to combine the quartermaster and transportation teams since these two service branches would be combined in the German Army. This action was expected to reduce the number of German students for quartermaster-transportation training to approximately 100 and, consequently, the original team strength by 10 enlisted driver-instructors.⁶³

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 8.

⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 8-9.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 10.

⁶² Ibid., pp. 9, 11.

⁶³ (1) Memo for rec, Lt Col A. H. Hislop, GTAG, 11 Jan 56, subj: Conference at MAAG, Bonn. CONF. (2) Memo for rec, Maj I. R. Beard, GTAG, 13 Jan 56, subj: Conference. UNCLAS.

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(1) Preparatory Steps. The combined teams were activated on 15 May 1956 at the USAREUR Quartermaster School in Lenggries, where personnel of both teams were given refresher courses in military instruction and a brief familiarization course in the German language. The lesson plans, training aids, and administrative equipment for the training program were either prepared or secured at the Lenggries Quartermaster School before the teams moved to the German training site at Andernach on 30 June 1956.⁶⁴ While the facilities at Andernach were not comparable with those of a U.S. Army service school, both teams found them adequate for their initial needs. However, shortage of space somewhat limited the transportation team's efforts to conduct training in vehicle maintenance, driver testing and training, and convoy operations.⁶⁵

(2) Quartermaster Instruction. Formal activation of the German school and the beginning of the first of four 8-week training cycles took place simultaneously on 4 July 1956, although actual training began two days earlier. The classes enrolled in the first 4 cycles consisted of 82, 203, 217, and 300 German Army students, respectively, with the U.S. teams providing training assistance during a portion of each of the courses.

For purposes of instruction the quartermaster team was divided into the logistics section, which gave advice and provided training assistance in logistics, especially quartermaster supply and operations; and the arms and special subjects section, which primarily provided instruction on the basic infantry weapons supplied the school.⁶⁶ However, the training assistance requested by the school did not follow the pattern expected by the team. During the initial period the German Quartermaster Corps had not yet fully developed its own doctrine or policy. Consequently, the bulk of training assistance was provided by the weapons personnel rather than by the logisticians, as had been planned. Moreover, the assistance was confined to contributions by the American officers, on the basis of their experience and training, to weekly panel-type discussions on a wide range of logistical subjects. Thus, the U.S. officers were given an opportunity to explain the American logistical system from the policy level down to the unit level.⁶⁷


Since few definite decisions as to the German Quartermaster Corps' doctrine and equipment were made during the training assistance period,

⁶⁴(1) QM Tng Team Hist Narr, 20 Dec 56 (hereafter cited as Hist Rept No. 20), pp. 1-2. (2) Trans Trp Tng Team Hist Narr, 31 Jan 57 (hereafter cited as Hist Rept No. 19), pp. 1-2. Both UNCLAS. Both in Hist Div Docu Sec.

⁶⁵Hist Repts Nos. 19 and 20, pp. 4-5, Annex A.

⁶⁶Hist Rept No. 20, Annex A.

⁶⁷Ibid., pp. 16-17, 19.



Practical training in U. S. Army storage methods

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the assistance that could be given was greatly limited and its effectiveness was difficult to determine or to evaluate.⁶⁸

Throughout the training period the German quartermaster school staff examined and tested various items of equipment to determine their suitability to German Army requirements. Field kitchens and laundry and shower units produced by German manufacturers were tested, and the officers of the U.S. teams were invited to join in the critiques of the tests. Without exception, training team personnel found the equipment tested to be less satisfactory than the standard equipment issued by the U.S. quartermaster. The U.S. Army field range, M1937, was demonstrated to the school staff and faculty and proved to be so effective that plans were made for acquiring 200 units and establishing a course of instruction in their use. These plans, however, were abandoned because of the high cost of shipping the units from the United States.⁶⁹

(3) Transportation Instruction. The transportation troop training team's task was greatly complicated by the fact that, under the German system, responsibility for land transportation was divided between the Troop Office (Truppenamt) of the Army and Branch IV (Abteilung IV) of the Defense Ministry. The former had control over all Army truck units while the latter was responsible for coordination and liaison with commercial carriers operating on Defense Ministry contracts, to include clearance and control of military truck convoys. Consequently, the U.S. team assisted in teaching military transportation subjects at the quartermaster school to the exclusion of those aspects of military transportation for which Branch IV was responsible.⁷⁰

From July 1956 to January 1957 three courses in transportation subjects were presented to a portion of the quartermaster corps cadre. The first course (2 July-25 August) was given to 82 noncommissioned officers; the second course (3 September-27 October) was attended by 14 officers, 177 NCO's, and 23 enlisted men; and in the third course (5 November 1956-29 January 1957) enrollment rose to 28 officers, 214 NCO's, and 19 enlisted students. In addition, seven specialists training courses were given simultaneously during the period 4 February to 31 March 1957.

Throughout the program the team made a special effort to assist the school staff and faculty in the preparation of lesson plans and the use of U.S. Army methods of instruction. At the same time, the team made every effort to turn over the bulk of the instruction to the German faculty as quickly as possible. As a result, the amount of platform instruction given by the team was steadily reduced from 25 hours during

⁶⁸ Ibid., pp. 4-5, 19, Annex C.

⁶⁹ Ibid., pp. 18-23.

⁷⁰ Hist Rept No. 19, pp. 4-5.

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the first course to 18 and 12 hours in the second and third courses, respectively. In each course a 4-hour demonstration of helicopter resupply and transport missions was also presented.⁷¹

In addition to formal instruction, the team organized a series of field trips, permitting the school staff and faculty first-hand observations of U.S. Army transportation corps operations. The first trip, in June 1956, featured a field display of truck transportation companies and a demonstration of vehicles and equipment of the 10th Transportation Group at Ludwigsburg. During exercise WAR HAWK in December 1956 several German quartermaster school officers, accompanied by a U.S. team member, studied the transportation aspects of the exercise. Groups of German officers also attended the indoctrination and orientation courses at the USAREUR Transportation Center in Frankfurt.⁷²

e. The Medical Troop Training Team.

(1) Preparations. The plans for medical corps training assistance were modified in February 1956, when the Germans indicated their preference for assistance based upon the principles of the field army medical service of the U.S. Army rather than training assistance on U.S. Army medical equipment. The team therefore presented instruction based upon the Army Medical Service officers' orientation course presented at the Medical Field Service School in Fort Sam Houston, Texas.⁷³

The medical troop training team was activated on 15 May 1956 at the USAREUR Military Police and Intelligence School in Oberammergau. By 24 June the full team was assembled at the German training site at Degerndorf, where final preparations for the training assistance program were made with personnel of the two German medical schools. The training assistance requirements of the two schools differed because their missions varied. The medical troop school trained veteran officers and NCO's in advanced techniques of military medical units; the Army medical school trained medical aidmen for assignment to tactical units. Since the German cadre and school staff were able to train the aidmen with little assistance, the U.S. team devoted its effort almost exclusively to the medical troop school.⁷⁴


(2) Training Schedules. Early in the first training cycle it was discovered that the medical troop school staff scheduled subjects in

⁷¹Ibid., pp. 3-4.

⁷²Ibid., pp. 4-5.

⁷³Memo for rec, Lt Col J. E. Burns, USAREUR Med Div, 9 Feb 56, subj: Medical Training Assistance of German Army. CONF.

⁷⁴Med Tng Team Narr Hist, 16 Dec 56, pp. 1, 7. UNCLAS. In Hist Div Docu Sec.



Demonstration by members of a medical clearing platoon

AGL (1) 6-58-100-65999

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nonsequential order and that some groups of students were being given subjects more rapidly than others. The U.S. team suggested that a master training schedule and program would permit a sequential and chronological presentation of the subject matter and eliminate frequent rescheduling of classes with the inevitable last-minute difficulties involved in setting up the classrooms. The training officer of the medical troop school finally prepared a master training schedule, assigning each subject to a particular week in the training cycle but retaining the authority to select the time of presentation within the week. The plan went into effect in the fourth week of the first training cycle and proved satisfactory.

U.S. instructors also experienced some initial difficulty in maintaining the schedule for starting and terminating class periods. The normal training hour consisted of a 40- to 45-minute period for presenting and summarizing the subject matter and a 5- to 10-minute question-and-answer period, with a 10-minute break between classes. Some German instructors habitually exceeded their time allowances and consequently failed to clear the classrooms in time for American instruction to begin in the next period. When German instructors finally adopted the American practice of carefully timing their presentation during the rehearsal period, the matter was no longer at issue.⁷⁵

Although the training program of the German medical troop school began on 5 July 1956 and continued until 31 January 1957, the medical school did not begin its formal training program until 19 November 1956. Troop school training was divided into three 8-week cycles, each providing 320 hours of instruction, about 130 of which were presented by the U.S. training team. The first training cycle consisted of refresher instruction for 87 veteran noncommissioned officers. The 122 hours of training assistance given by U.S. team personnel during this first cycle represented 38 percent of the total training received. During the second cycle 18 medical officers and 74 NCO's were given instruction; the U.S. team's 138 hours of instruction represented 43 percent of the total.⁷⁶ The last class was composed of 82 students.

Concurrently with the first cycle of the German medical troop school training, the U.S. team presented an orientation course to the school staff and faculty on the subject matter destined for later presentation to the trainees. The 41 hours of instruction consisted of 13 hours of formal classroom instruction in medical subjects; 3 hours of classroom instruction in weapons, followed by 7 hours on the pistol and carbine range; and 18 hours of practical demonstrations.⁷⁷

⁷⁵Ibid., pp. 13-14.

⁷⁶Ibid., pp. 7-10.

⁷⁷Ibid., pp. 8-9.

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During the second training cycle at the medical troop school, an orientation course was also given to the cadre of the 5th Medical Training Battalion. From 6 to 29 November 1956 the cadre was given 10 hours of instructor training on the organic weapons of the battalion. These instructors subsequently gave weapons training to the students of the medical school. The mission of the battalion, whose cadre was composed of 5 officers and 52 enlisted men by 9 November 1956, was to conduct basic medical corps training for the 106 students of the newly activated medical school.⁷⁸

(3) Training Material. To support classroom instruction, range firing, and the series of practical demonstrations, the training team distributed 30 mimeographed German-language handouts, based upon the lesson plans and containing ready reference material. The students received this material enthusiastically and assembled it in reference files for future use in their duty assignments. In each cycle 69 training films were shown--9 (later 15) with German sound tracks and the others with German-language transcriptions of the English sound track. The students were also shown 52 medical vuegraphs and 67 35-mm color transparencies illustrating U.S. medical activities in Korea. Throughout the program these visual aids proved to be effective means of instruction.⁷⁹

However, most of the standard U.S. graphic training aids proved to be unsatisfactory for use in the program. The team therefore produced German-language training aids that met its requirements. For example, during the second cycle one of the enlisted weapons instructors designed a self-adjusting, reflex, mirror-equipped device for training students in the proper adjustment of the windage and elevation corrections for the M1 carbine. This device was also reproduced locally.⁸⁰

(4) Problems. One problem encountered was the inability of the team's two interpreters, occupied with full classroom work, to meet all requests for German translations of American subject material within the time limits set by the school staff and faculty. Efforts to utilize bilingual German students proved to be unsatisfactory, since their translations had to be virtually redone by the interpreters. At the end of the training assistance period only one translation of a U.S. Army medical publication had been received. This translation, however, was apparently accomplished by personnel unfamiliar with medical terminology.⁸¹

⁷⁸ Ibid., pp. 12-13.

⁷⁹ Ibid., pp. 8-11.

⁸⁰ Ibid., pp. 14-15.

⁸¹ Ibid., pp. 17-18.

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Practical demonstration of U. S. Army field medical equipment

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Another problem--delay in the receipt of the MDAP equipment--forced the team to rely heavily upon lecture, conference, and discussion types of presentation rather than upon actual handling of equipment. Practical field demonstrations presented by 11th Airborne Division medical personnel were useful, especially since no medical field equipment was available at that time. Because of delays in shipping organic weapons, weapons instruction was conducted in one instance with equipment borrowed from German engineer units stationed in the same casern.⁸²

An investigation of the delays in deliveries of medical equipment disclosed that medical items requested by the German Federal Republic during March and April 1956 had not included items suitable for the practical training required at the medical troop school. The equipment had consisted exclusively of items needed for establishing and equipping 10 mobile surgical army hospitals, including one to be used by the medical troop school for training purposes. Apparently no equipment had been ordered that would permit practical field training in the normal chain of casualty evacuation through the company, battalion, regimental and divisional levels of medical service.⁸³

The slow buildup of the medical and medical troop schools presented still another problem. The first 2 cycles were attended by only 50 percent of the number of students scheduled, and throughout the first year of training assistance the Germans operated with severe personnel shortages. Instead of the 34 officers authorized for the medical troop school staff and faculty, the actual strength never exceeded 15 and more often was only 13.⁸⁴ No counterpart of the U.S. Army Medical Service Corps existed in the German Army, and, despite a shortage of qualified medical officers, the creation of such a corps was apparently not contemplated. On the other hand, frequent discussions indicated a definite trend toward adoption of the U.S. Army medical evacuation policy, by which the responsibility for evacuation of sick and wounded personnel was placed upon the next higher echelon. Although diametrically opposed to traditional German Army medical practices, this policy was favorably regarded by the school staffs.⁸⁵

f. The Ordnance Troop Training Team. The team was activated on 2 April 1956 at the USAREUR Ordnance School in Fuessen to provide training assistance to the German ordnance school and the cadre of the school battalion at Sonthofen. During the preparatory period at Fuessen the team lacked definite information on German plans, the type of equipment for which instruction was desired, the extent of the instruction, and the

⁸²Ibid., pp. 11-12, 15-16.

⁸³Ibid., p. 19.

⁸⁴Ibid., pp. 30, 32.

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 33.

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facilities available for training purposes. Such information was essential for the preparation of lesson plans, but even after the team moved to the German ordnance school on 30 April this situation improved only gradually.⁸⁶

Ordnance training assistance, beginning on 4 June 1956 and continuing through 29 January 1957, was divided into 4 phases, each of which lasted approximately 4 to 5 weeks, according to the type of course and the number of students. During the first phase the troops of the school battalion at Sonthofen received 75 hours of instruction in each of 6 subjects--artillery, turret artillery, small arms, fire control and instruments, ammunition, and tracked vehicles. The classes were relatively small, consisting of from 4 to 23 students. German ordnance personnel were also trained to become instructors during this phase.⁸⁷

In subsequent phases, which provided orientation-type instruction, the number of hours for each instructional group was increased to 85. Beginning with the ammunition course in the third phase (11 September to 24 October 1956), U.S.-trained German instructors presented a complete 160-hour course of instruction to 36 students. In addition, during the fourth phase German personnel familiarized small groups of ordnance officers and enlisted personnel from troop units and staffs with the various ordnance subjects previously presented in the regular training assistance program.⁸⁸

With the completion of the GTAG phase of training assistance at the German ordnance school, the program of instruction, orientation, and familiarization in the functioning and maintenance of MDAP-supplied ordnance was terminated. This program did not, however, produce the qualified ordnance technicians and instructors required by the German Army.⁸⁹

g. Ordnance Company Training Teams. At a conference of USAREUR, MAAG, and German Army representatives on 4 January 1956 the Germans revealed plans for activating three ordnance companies about 1 April 1956 that would require training assistance. Although this requirement was not programmed in the USAREUR assistance plan, immediate steps were taken to fulfill the anticipated request for assistance.⁹⁰

⁸⁶ Ord Trp Tng Team Hist Narr, 12 Dec 56, pp. 1-2. UNCLAS. In file above.

⁸⁷ Ibid., pp. 3-5.

⁸⁸ Ibid., pp. 3-5.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 6.

⁹⁰ Memo, Maj Gen J. C. Oakes, USAREUR ACoFS G3, to CofS, subj: Activities of GTAG for Period 31 December 1955 to 5 January 1956. UNCLAS.

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(1) Training Activities. During the period 1-19 April 1956 three ordnance company training teams were activated in Heidelberg, where administrative preparations were made and the team personnel were trained in instructional techniques. Early in May Team 1 was sent to the German armored school at Muensterlager to train the 532d Ordnance Company. Teams 2 and 3 reported to the German 535th Ordnance Company at the Fliegerhorst Casern in Boeblingen and the German ordnance depot at Pfeddersheim, respectively. In July a section of the Pfeddersheim team was detached to provide training assistance at the German ordnance depot in Germer-sheim.⁹¹

The team at Muensterlager presented 450 hours of instruction in ordnance equipment supply and the maintenance of tracked vehicles, turret artillery, artillery, small arms, and instruments. The program of instruction was geared to the arrival of the various items of equipment on which the courses were based; as each item became available, it was included in the schedule for instruction, demonstrations, and practical work. After the team had completed its program all but three of the original team members were relieved from assignment and returned to their home stations, with their replacements reporting to Muensterlager between 1 and 10 August 1956. The new team consisted of 3 officers and 17 enlisted men, 4 of whom assisted the U.S. ordnance maintenance team that was also on duty at the German armored school.

From August to November 1956 the team gave four hours per day of on-the-job training to personnel of the newly activated German 513th Ordnance Battalion. With the completion of basic training for the German ordnance battalion on 15 November, the team increased on-the-job training assistance to 32 hours per week. Two 80-hour courses in equipment maintenance were also presented to the armored and armored infantry school battalions, and three 40-hour maintenance courses were given to units in outlying camps.⁹²

Team 2 training assistance to the German 535th Ordnance Company in Boeblingen was identical to that of Team 1 at Muensterlager. Both teams were hampered, however, because the German ordnance companies were taking basic military training concurrently with the technical assistance program. This prevented many key cadre personnel from attending classes regularly, so that much of the instruction had to be repeated. Despite this fact both teams were able to achieve their training assistance goals.⁹³

Since the third team worked only with ordnance depot companies, its activities and problems were different from those of the other two

⁹¹Hist Narrs, Ord Co Teams 1, 2, & 3, Dec 56 (hereafter cited as Hist Repts Nos. 11, 12, & 13). UNCLAS. In USAREUR Hist Div Docu Sec.

⁹²Hist Rept No. 11, pp. 6-7.

⁹³Hist Rept No. 12, pp. 1-2.

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teams. A major portion of the team's formal assistance was a 75-hour classroom course in the spare part supply procedures of U.S. Army ordnance depot companies in support of other units. The 376 hours of instruction given included all aspects of ordnance depot operations, including requisitioning, receipt of supplies, the U.S. Army stock record system, storage, in-storage maintenance, and issuance of supplies. In addition, German ordnance depot company trainees at Pfeddersheim and Germersheim were given a 16-hour course on individual and crew-served weapons. On 1 September 1956 operational control of Team 3 passed to the Chief, Army Section, MAAG, Germany, and the team's designation was changed to Ordnance Spare Parts Depot, U.S. Advisor/Liaison Team (Logistics). Detachments were located at the Pfeddersheim and Germersheim German ordnance depots.⁹⁴

(2) Problems. Shortages of tools and equipment plagued the first and second teams throughout the assistance program; although repeated remedial efforts were made. Pending receipt of equipment and tools through the German supply channels, both teams borrowed the needed supplies from adjacent U.S. units or, in some instances, procured tools from their parent organization on memorandum receipts. Because of the shortages a higher percentage of the training assistance was classroom work rather than the more desirable practical shop work.⁹⁵

8. Other Teams


a. The Military Police Training Team.

(1) Preparations. On 15 May 1956 the military police training team was activated at the USAREUR Military Police and Intelligence School in Oberammergau. Since the concept of a military police corps was new to the German Army, the mission of the team had to be expanded to include instruction in the organization and functions of such a corps. However, since the terms of the MDAF agreement limited training assistance to equipment familiarization and, upon request, to general advice on tactics and doctrine, a special request to expand the mission had to be made through USAREUR headquarters and MAAG, Germany, to the Federal Ministry of Defense. The request was approved, and the German school staff was authorized to select from the curriculum of the U.S. training program the subjects in which additional training assistance was desired. The scope of instruction was broadened accordingly and ranged from the duties of the basic military policeman to those of staff officers. The U.S. team then presented the subject matter to the school staff for a 6-week training period before the formal training assistance began. The team catalogued the complete lesson plans of the military police school at Camp Gordon, Georgia. The catalogues were prepared in German and English to afford the German school staff ready reference to this valuable

⁹⁴Hist Rept No. 13, pp. 3-6.

⁹⁵Hist Repts Nos. 11, 12, pp. 2-4.

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Spare parts depot at Pfeddersheim, Germany

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instructional material.⁹⁶

In the meantime, the U.S. team learned that there was no basic law, current or pending, that would grant jurisdiction to the German Military Police Corps in matters pertaining to the operation of military prisons and criminal investigation units. The team, therefore, eliminated the subjects in these areas of responsibility and concentrated on training material that would be of primary interest to the future German military police. Upon request from the German Defense Ministry, particular emphasis was placed on instruction in U.S. methods of traffic control and patrol operations, since the German Armed Forces planned to adopt as many of these techniques as existing German laws permitted.⁹⁷

Before the beginning of the training assistance program 4 officers of the German school staff and the 6 officers who had been selected to become provost marshals in each of the 6 German military districts were invited to visit the team at its pretraining site at Oberammergau. The German officers became acquainted with U.S. Army methods of instruction and observed various phases of military police operations. Following this initial orientation the group visited the Munich Subarea Military Police station, the provisional stockade at Dachau, and the criminal investigations operations section in Munich.⁹⁸

The team moved to the German training site at Sonthofen on 25 June. Initial preparations there consisted of synchronizing training films and setting up organic equipment for display.⁹⁹

(2) Training. Instruction began in August 1956 with the arrival of the first class of 350 students. The first hours of instruction covered the mission, functions, and organization of military police units. At the same time the team familiarized the students with the organic weapons available to the school. With the receipt of the first shipments of signal equipment (AN/GRC 9 and AN/VRC 8), the team began courses in military police communications.¹⁰⁰

The military police school was handicapped by the absence of doctrine or service regulations governing the formation of a German Army military police corps. Moreover, no instructional material or equipment was on hand, other than that brought to the training site by the U.S. training team. However, the well-known practice of "moonlight requisitioning"

⁹⁶MP Tng Team Hist Rept, 15 Dec 56, pp. 1-3. UNCLAS. In file above.

⁹⁷Ibid., p. 4.

⁹⁸Ibid., pp. 4-6.

⁹⁹Ibid., p. 8.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., p. 10.

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was apparently not unique to the U.S. Army. Much badly needed material appeared in the classrooms as if from nowhere. The team commander thought that without such "requisitioning" the program would not have survived.¹⁰¹

The staff of the German military police school was also faced with the problem of conducting basic and advanced training simultaneously. This accounted for the school's reluctance to adopt the U.S. committee system of instruction; instead, the Germans relied upon the traditionally decentralized system of placing class control and training responsibility upon a class officer who was charged with presenting approximately 80 percent of the instruction. The U.S. team found this system most unsatisfactory and repeatedly urged the school staff to adopt the committee system, which after several months of practical experience was finally instituted.¹⁰²

Familiarization instruction in the pistol, carbine, and 3.5-inch rocket launcher; instruction in the use and functioning of the organic communications equipment; and the teaching of service communications procedures accounted for approximately 50 percent of the training assistance hours. In the subjects dealing primarily with the U.S. military police organization, operational doctrine, and techniques, the majority of the instructional time was devoted to foot and motor patrols (long familiar sights in German cities), traffic control and accident investigations, organizational matters, defense against CBR warfare, arrest and search, and military police operations on trains.¹⁰³

In early September 1956, 30 additional students arrived at the school; they were expected to graduate at the same time as the students who had already completed 5 weeks of training. This meant the new students would have to receive the 16-week course of instruction in a period of 10 weeks. The team therefore formed a separate class and provided special instruction for the 30 men so that they could catch up with the first group and complete the course on schedule.¹⁰⁴

The members of the original U.S. team expected to complete their temporary duty tours by 30 September 1956, but they were granted extensions until the end of the year. The German Defense Ministry requested the retention of the original team at the training site until 31 March 1957, but Department of the Army policy prevented the team members from serving beyond 31 December 1956. Thus, when the first class of German military police students graduated in late November, plans for selecting

¹⁰¹ Ibid., pp. 14-15.

¹⁰² Ibid., pp. 10-13.

¹⁰³ Ibid., Annexes I, II.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 11.

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a replacement team were being prepared.¹⁰⁵

b. The Materiel Receiving Group Training Team.

(1) Planning and Preparations. As a result of changes in German Army buildup plans the original requirement for 2 material receiving group training teams was reduced to 1, to be located at the German Army depot north of Hesedorf.¹⁰⁶ Following its activation on 26 March 1956 in Heidelberg, the team spent a month at the parental site preparing for its training mission at the German Army depot. On 4 May the team of 19 officers and 23 enlisted men moved to Hesedorf, where a formal review by the German depot personnel officially welcomed the team and attracted favorable attention in the local press.¹⁰⁷

The team's training assistance plans were based upon the assumption that instruction would be given in the doctrine and operation of the U.S. Army depot complex organization. Since German Army doctrine for depot operations was not yet fully developed, the team's program had to be based entirely upon anticipated rather than actual needs. Moreover, it had to be revised as the Germans gradually developed plans that provided for widely distributed subdepots rather than the U.S. system of closely integrated depot complexes.¹⁰⁸

(2) Training. The emerging German depot system virtually eliminated the classroom and field-type training programs that the team had prepared before moving to Hesedorf. A new program was initiated, consisting largely of on-the-job training, in the course of which the U.S. Army general depot organization would be demonstrated and explained. To suit the requirements of the German depots, systems similar to U.S. stock record control and accounting methods were established, and personnel were trained in these systems. This training was later extended to other depots in the German supply system. Training was also given in basic weapons and in such specialized subjects as familiarization with ordnance material stored in the depots.¹⁰⁹

As requested by the German Logistics Command, detachments were dispatched to provide training assistance at field installations. Field maintenance training was given at Darmstadt; supply training, at Germer-sheim; familiarization training in the storing and handling of ammunition,

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., pp. 12-13.

¹⁰⁶ DF, GTAG to USAREUR G1, 29 Feb 56, subj: Time-phased Personnel Requisitions, GTAG Personnel. UNCLAS.

¹⁰⁷ Mat Rec Gp Tng Team Hist Narr, Dec 56, pp. 5, 10. UNCLAS. In USAREUR Hist Div Docu Sec.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., pp. 1-4.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., pp. 6-7.

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at two ammunition depots; and chemical supply training, to appropriate personnel at the German chemical school in Sonthofen. As additional German ammunition depots were opened in southern Germany, team advisers visited them for short periods. Later a permanent ammunition adviser was assigned to the German Southern Military District. When the Liebenau depot was opened in June 1956, the team assigned 2 officers, 2 NCO's, and 2 interpreters from Hesedorf to assist in establishing and organizing the new installation. More direct contact with the German central stock control agency at Bad Neuenahr was established in September, when a detachment of 4 officers and 1 NCO from the Hesedorf team was assigned to that agency.¹¹⁰

The rapid expansion of the German Army depot system drained the Hesedorf depot of personnel upon whom the team had hoped to rely as assistant instructors. The team was thus prevented from developing a consistent training program on a continuing basis, as was done in supply training courses in stateside installations. Instead, many training requirements were met on either a one time or a recurring basis, mainly because the Germans had no firm long-range supply management program. Since the team could not anticipate the German requirements and make plans accordingly, on-the-job training became the most effective method of dealing with the rather spontaneous nature of German depot organization and expansion.¹¹¹

c. The Army Aviation Training Team. The Army aviation training team, composed of 2 U.S. Army officers and 1 LWR interpreter, was activated on 29 August 1956 at the Memmingen Airfield, home of the German Army aviation school. Both officers had attended the 12-week German language and area course at Oberammergau, as well as a 1-week checkout course on the L-18C aircraft to qualify as pilot instructors. One of the officers had also attended a 3-week course at the Seventh Army Aviation Training Center at Echterdingen to qualify as a helicopter flight instructor. On 27 September the team was transferred from Seventh Army to MAAG, Germany, but remained under the operational control of GTAG.¹¹²

Formal training for the German Army helicopter pilots, consisting of academic and flight instruction, began on 7 January 1957. Except for 12 hours in helicopter aerodynamics and a 5-hour course in teaching techniques for German flight instructors, all theoretical classroom instruction was presented by the German school faculty. Most of the team's assistance constituted two phases of flight training--flight instruction of German flight and academic instructors, and training of recruits.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 6-7.

¹¹¹ Ibid., pp. 7-8.

¹¹² Army Avn Tng Team Hist Rept, 19 Dec 56, pp. 1-4. UNCLAS. In file above.

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Upon completing flight training on the L-18 aircraft, qualified students were given a 25-hour instructors' course to enable them to assist the U.S. training team in training the many recruits expected to arrive in February.¹¹³

For helicopter flight training the U.S. instructor was assisted by 6 German instructor-pilots. From 7 January to 12 February each student received at least 12 hours of dual flight instruction. By 8 February eight students had completed their first solo flights and the remainder were also prepared to solo. The shortage of helicopters hampered the program during this period.

On 15 February the operational control of the team was transferred to MAAG, Germany, and GTAG ceased to have any operational responsibility for this team's activity.¹¹⁴

d. The Military Academy Training Team. The U.S. team for assisting the German military academy was activated on 28 May 1956 at the Seventh Army NCO Academy in Munich, where enlisted personnel and interpreters underwent a short instructor-training course. At the same time the academy training aids shop constructed additional training aids.¹¹⁵

(1) Selection of Personnel. During the team's stay at the NCO Academy, unqualified personnel were weeded out. Of the 17 enlisted men initially assigned, only 5 qualified by virtue of professional experience. The other men were retained only if they showed promise of becoming good instructors with proper training and supervision. This policy, followed throughout the training assistance period, accounted for the team's relatively high turnover in personnel. Men relieved from assignment included undesirable types such as heavy drinkers, personnel with serious financial and family problems, and those with objectionable attitudes. This selection policy was mandatory because only the very highest U.S. Army standards would be acceptable at a school where future German Army officers were being trained.¹¹⁶

(2) Training Activities. On 18 June the team moved to the training site located at the Emmerich-Cambrai Casern at Hannover. During 99 training days at this German military academy, the team presented 679 hours of formal classroom instruction to the personnel of the school battalion. This included 226 hours of individual-type instruction on

¹¹³ Army Avn Tng Team Actvs Rept, 7 Jan-12 Feb 57. UNCLAS. In file above.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Mil Acad Tng Team Hist Rept, 20 Dec 56 (hereafter cited as Hist Rept No. 16), pp. 1-3. UNCLAS. In file above.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 3-4.

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small arms, 167 hours of training in the operation and maintenance of the M47 tank for the battalion's tank company, 74 hours of technical training for radio specialists, and 16 hours in American methods of military instruction. In addition to its primary mission of providing assistance to the military academy, the team presented 196 hours of formal classroom instruction on weapons and the M47 tank to units of the German 1st Grenadier Division stationed in the Hannover area.¹¹⁷

Several factors limited the team's effectiveness in assisting the academy's staff. Because of the acceleration of the training programs the school battalion had to forego a considerable amount of assistance that would have been beneficial. The tight training schedule often prevented the students from taking full advantage of the assistance offered by the U.S. instructors; many potentially interesting lectures were never given because the extra time needed for interpreting was not available. On the other hand, the academy's German staff was so highly competent that it required only a minimum of professional assistance. The inability of the U.S. training team officers to communicate directly with their German counterparts on an informal and personal basis somewhat handicapped training assistance. The German school commandant thought this language barrier at times created the impression of unfriendliness or uncooperativeness between the two national groups.¹¹⁸

On 13 November 1956, after completing the training assistance program at Hannover, the entire team--except for one MAAG liaison officer--moved to the German military academy located at Husum on the North Sea coast. Here the team presented an assistance program similar in every respect to the one completed at Hannover.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷Ibid., p. 6.

¹¹⁸(1) Ibid., pp. 6-7. (2) Memo, Lt Col H. K. Schmid, C/MAAG, Ger, Ops & Tng Br, to GTAG, 17 Sep 56, subj: Report of Visit to German Military Academy. UNCLAS.


¹¹⁹Hist Rept No. 16, pp. 2, 6-7. UNCLAS.

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MAP 1

GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATIONS OF THE
TROOP TRAINING TEAMS
MARCH-DECEMBER 1956



SOURCE: USAREUR ACOFS G 3, GTAG FILES. UNCLASSIFIED

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CHAPTER 3

Continuation and Phaseout

According to both USCINCEUR's original letter of instructions to CINCUSAREUR of 1 December 1954 and the USAREUR German Training Assistance Plan of April 1955, operational control of the training assistance teams was to be transferred gradually from USAREUR to MAAG, Germany, between 31 July 1956 and 31 March 1957. In July 1956, however, the German Ministry of Defense informed MAAG that all the training teams, as then constituted, would be needed at least until mid-November 1956. Obviously training assistance by USAREUR would have to be continued beyond the original cutoff date.¹ (For the organization of GTAG after 1 July 1956, see Chart 2).

9. Extension of Training Assistance

In August 1956 the training teams were receiving more and more requests to extend training assistance to newly activated German tactical units, even beyond the scope of the original USAREUR mission assigned in the training assistance plan. Gen. H. I. Hodes saw no objection to providing this additional assistance, within the authorized strengths of the teams at the training sites, if sufficient funds were available to meet the additional per diem requirements. At that time, however, USAREUR's primary mission in the assistance program was still the training of German cadre and school personnel.²

¹(1) USAREUR GAAP, rev 15 Dec 55, Sec. I, p. 4. (2) Ltr, CINC-USAREUR to C/MAAG, Ger, 26 May 56, subj: Planned Phaseout of USAREUR German Army Assistance Plan. (3) Cable SMC-IN 417, MAAG, Ger, to GTAG, 3 Jul 56. All UNCLAS.

²Ltr, Gen H. I. Hodes to Maj Gen C. L. Ruffner, C/MAAG, Ger, 28 Aug 56. UNCLAS. In USAREUR Hist Div Docu Sec.

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During a conference held at Camp des Loges on 6 September 1956, representatives of GTAG, MAAG, Germany, and USEUCOM discussed the future of the entire German Army assistance program. The GTAG representative asked for a revision of the original letter of instructions because of the anticipated extension of training assistance to tactical units and the need for a clearer delineation of training assistance responsibilities between USAREUR and MAAG. While MAAG should be concerned with the German logistical structure as related to end-item utilization, the direct supervision of training assistance should be USAREUR's responsibility. The representatives of the USEUCOM Military Assistance Division agreed with this interpretation.³

a. German Requirements for 1957. In October 1956 the German authorities submitted their training assistance requirements for 1957. After analyzing these requirements in coordination with MAAG and Defense Ministry representatives, USAREUR estimated that approximately 500 U.S. personnel would take part in the program--if approved--beginning in January 1957. Approximately 49 percent of the U.S. personnel were to be assigned to ordnance and signal maintenance teams. The German authorities agreed to augment certain ordnance maintenance teams with approximately 100 German enlisted personnel under the operational control of the U.S. maintenance team commanders. This would enable the teams to provide needed on-the-job training and would relieve USAREUR of the heavy demand for certain specialists in the maintenance field.⁴

b. The New Letter of Instructions. In January 1957 the emphasis of the training program shifted from assistance to schools toward direct assistance to major German tactical units, including the provision of maintenance assistance to the essential ordnance and signal support units.⁵ In an effort to redefine the German Army training assistance program and delineate the USAREUR and MAAG areas of responsibility more clearly, representatives of the two headquarters coordinated plans and drafted a new letter of instructions, which was then published by USEUCOM to supersede the initial letter of 1 December 1954. MAAG was to assume operational control of the entire training assistance program by 1 July 1957. Meanwhile, USAREUR was not only to give continued support to the training teams assigned to the German service schools, but was to provide--within the manpower ceiling and fund availability of the training assistance program--the additional field training teams necessary to furnish advice and assistance to major German Army tactical units. The extra men required for such teams would be assigned by USAREUR on TDY.⁶


³Memo, USAREUR ACofS G3 to DCS, 12 Sep 56, subj: Future German Army Assistance Requirements. UNCLAS.

⁴Memo, Col J. C. Anderson, C/GTAG, to Maj Gen R. C. Cooper, ACofS G3, 23 Oct 56, subj: German Army Training Requirements for FY 1957. UNCLAS.

⁵Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to TAG, 14 Jan 57. CONF. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1957).

⁶Ltr, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR & C/MAAG, Ger, 10 Dec 56, subj: Letter of Instructions, Assistance to German Army. CONF. In USAREUR Hist Div Docu Sec.

ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES, GERMAN TRAINING ASSISTANCE GROUP
(1 July 1956-30 June 1957)



*Col W. E. Chandler 7 Nov 55 - 21 Aug 56
 Col J. C. Anderson 21 Aug 56 - 2 Feb 57
 Lt Col R. Besson 2 Feb 57 - 30 Jun 57

**Lt Col E. Cook replaced Lt Col A. H. Hislop on 18 Aug 56

Source: USAREUR G3 GTAG. UNCLAS.

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The new instructions also gave USAREUR primary responsibility and authority for accomplishing the training assistance objectives of the Mutual Security Program for the German Army until relieved by USCINCEUR. Moreover, USAREUR would continue to provide field and depot maintenance assistance for MDAP materiel in the hands of the German Army and would retain budgetary and fiscal responsibilities for the training program until further notice. At the same time, MAAG, Germany, would develop and coordinate a plan for the orderly assumption of all German Army training responsibilities.⁷

c. Publication of New Administrative Instructions. USAREUR issued new administrative instructions to the area commands on 20 December 1956 that reflected the shift in training emphasis from service school assistance to tactical unit assistance. The GTAG-controlled teams were reorganized and redesignated, 11 additional teams were activated, 1 team was inactivated, and the maintenance teams were heavily reinforced. The 24 troop training teams were redesignated as school teams, and the maintenance teams were designated by their geographical locations instead of numerically.⁸

d. Revised Mission Assignments for Teams. On 3 January 1957 the GTAG teams were issued revised mission statements. In more general language than formerly the new statements directed the school teams to furnish training assistance and advice to instructor/cadre personnel on the functioning, operation, and maintenance of U.S.-supplied MDAP materiel; the former instructions had specifically directed the teams to provide, in accordance with the highest U.S. training standards, instruction in the nomenclature, functioning, operation, and maintenance of such equipment. As an additional mission, the teams were to act as liaison agents between the appropriate German headquarters and USAREUR's GTAG Control Office. Upon request, the teams were also to furnish advice concerning U.S. organization, training management, staff organization, technical procedures, shop organization, and the tactical employment of the materiel.⁹

Regional signal and ordnance maintenance and training teams, not provided for in the original plan, were assigned missions essentially similar to those of the maintenance teams. The signal teams were to provide training assistance and instruction in the operation, functioning, and maintenance of the MDAP signal equipment. They were also to provide on-the-job training for selected German signal personnel, carry out field maintenance within their capabilities, maintain liaison between German

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Annex C, to USAREUR ltr, 20 Dec 56, subj: Administrative Instructions for Continuance of the USAREUR German Army Assistance Plan. UNCLAS. In file above.

⁹(1) USAREUR GAAP, 1 Apr 55, w/revisions. CONF (info used UNCLAS).
(2) USAREUR ltr, 3 Jan 57, subj: Mission Statements for GTAG Teams, GAAP, CY 1957. UNCLAS. Both in file above.

[REDACTED]

signal commandants and GTAG, and furnish, upon request, technical and professional advice concerning signal units and equipment. The mission of the ordnance maintenance teams was similar, except that they were to provide no training assistance other than on-the-job training and were to give third echelon maintenance support within their capabilities.¹⁰

10. Transfer of Operational Control

a. The First Transfer. On 26 July 1956 GTAG and MAAG representatives agreed to transfer operational control of and fiscal responsibility for the Material Receiving Group Team and the Ordnance Maintenance Team No. 3 to the Army section of MAAG, Germany, effective 1 September 1956. It was recommended that USAREUR continue to augment these teams with personnel on temporary duty and provide administrative and logistical support for MAAG personnel and for teams stationed at German installations. At the same time, USAREUR proposed the transfer to MAAG of all comptroller functions for training assistance, effective 1 January 1957. These recommendations were submitted to USCINCEUR as the first step in the gradual phaseout of USAREUR operational control of German Army training assistance.¹¹

At first USEUCOM disapproved the recommendations because the USAREUR assistance plan furnished a basis for continued allocation of the required personnel as well as for administrative, logistical, and fiscal support. USAREUR, however, pointed out that the transfer of operational control would be a routine procedure, completely disassociated from the larger problem of funding and space authorizations. After a series of conferences USEUCOM finally approved the recommendation for transfer of operational control, providing there would be no change in the funding procedures.¹²

In September 1956 the two teams were consolidated, transferred to the operational control of MAAG, and redesignated as the U.S. Advisory/Liaison Team (Logistics). This change in operational control served as a model for subsequent transfers, involving the majority of the training teams, some five months later. In a supplementary action on 1 February 1957 the logistics team was augmented by sufficient USAREUR TDY personnel to provide training detachments for two ordnance field depot companies under MAAG supervision.¹³


¹⁰ USAREUR ltr, 3 Jan 57, cited above.

¹¹ Cable SC-16673, USAREUR to USEUCOM for Mil Asst Div, 4 Aug 56. UNCLAS. In USAREUR SGS 322 Ger (1956), Item OLA.

¹² (1) Cable EC-3-5486, USEUCOM to CINCUSAREUR, 27 Aug 56. (2) Cable SC-17722, USAREUR to USCINCEUR, 29 Aug 56. (3) Cable EC-3-5595, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 31 Aug 56. All UNCLAS. All in file above.

¹³ MAAG, Ger, ltr, 8 Apr 57, subj: MAAG, Germany, Plan for Assumption of German Army Training Responsibilities from USAREUR. CONF. In USAREUR Hist Div Docu Sec.

GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATIONS OF THE TACTICAL AND MAINTENANCE TEAMS (WITH SUB SECTIONS) FEB-JUN 1957



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b. Subsequent Transfers. The increasing administrative burden gradually taxed the capacity of the GTAG Control Office, which had been created to carry out only the limited program envisioned in the 1955 plan. MAAG, Germany, was therefore asked to assume the operational control of more training teams. On 3 January 1957 MAAG representatives agreed to take over the service school training teams "at an early date," to be agreed upon by the chief of MAAG and CINCUSAREUR, and also to accept the control of the other training teams at an appropriate time and in conformance with instructions from Headquarters, USEUCOM.¹⁴

By this time 15 service school teams had virtually accomplished their original training missions and were engaged mainly in advisory assistance activities. Thus, the program seemed to have reached the stage at which MAAG could appropriately assume operational control of these teams. Such a transfer would also coincide with the withdrawal of USAREUR TDY personnel from the teams. Coordinating with USAREUR, MAAG therefore recommended to USCINCEUR that the 15 teams, totaling 40 officers and 84 enlisted men, be transferred effective 15 February 1957. Following USCINCEUR's approval, the infantry, armored infantry, armored, armored reconnaissance, transportation-quartermaster, engineer, field artillery, military police, signal, ordnance, antitank, airborne, medical, and army aviation school teams were transferred as scheduled. GTAG was left in operational control of 13 teams--2 signal maintenance and training teams, 2 ordnance company teams, the military academy team at Husum, the antiaircraft school team, and 7 field training teams assigned to German divisions. Team personnel remaining under GTAG control numbered 125 officers and 383 enlisted men.¹⁵

11. The Training of Tactical Units

Because of tactical requirements, coupled with shortages in troop housing, German divisional units were spread over unusually large areas. This confronted the U.S. teams with the problem of providing the most effective and economical training assistance in terms of manpower and time. In practice the teams used centralized or decentralized methods of operation, or a combination of both. For the purposes of this study one team has been selected to illustrate each method. The 1st Mountain Division training team, employing the centralized method, conducted schools at division headquarters. The team assigned to the 4th Grenadier Division, using the decentralized method, assigned training detachments to divisional units during most of the training period. The 1st Airborne Division training team sent out mobile training detachments for limited periods.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ (1) Cable SC-14506, USAREUR to USCINCEUR, 6 Feb 57. (2) Cable EC-3-866, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR & MAAG, Ger, 8 Feb 57. (3) Cable SC-15965, USAREUR to area comds, 16 Feb 57. All UNCLAS. All in USAREUR SGS 353 Ger (1957).

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a. The Mountain Division Training Team.

(1) Mission and Organization. This team of 5 officers and 14 enlisted men was organized early in January 1957 to provide necessary training assistance to the German 1st Mountain Brigade (later Division), with headquarters in the Jaeger Casern, Mittenwald.

Since both the mountain and airborne divisions were composed of volunteers whose morale was exceptionally high, great care was taken in selecting as team personnel only experienced officers and NCO's who shared the enthusiasm and élan expressed by their German counterparts.

On 21 January the team began a limited program of training assistance that engaged all its personnel by 1 February. The team's primary mission was to provide training assistance in the operation and maintenance of U.S.-supplied materiel for the candidate instructors among the officers and NCO's of the division cadre. For this purpose five instructional sections or detachments were formed--infantry, artillery, armor, anti-aircraft artillery, and communications--resembling the organization of the service school teams activated earlier in the training assistance program.

The team also gave limited training support to the German mountain warfare school at nearby Luttensee, which was in its earliest stages of organization. Since the school was responsible for developing winter clothing and equipment for the German Army, the team supplied various items of U.S. Army winter equipment for study and comparison and, upon request, furnished a number of U.S. Army training films and publications on winter warfare and cold weather equipment.¹⁶ It also assisted the school in testing such items of equipment as the Swiss-manufactured snow tracks, designed to be mounted on a jeep, and various items of medical evacuation equipment for cold weather.

(2) Training Assistance. The team soon discovered that training assistance to divisional units could be presented best through scheduled school-type courses of instruction, extending over 1-2 weeks, in which selected cadre personnel would be given specialized training in the operation and maintenance of U.S. MDAP equipment. Such courses would supplement the division's own training program. Early in March 1957 the weapons and signal schools were organized.

¹⁶The USAREUR Historical Division, through MAAG, Germany, loaned the school copies of German military studies on winter operations in European Russia. These studies enabled the school personnel to acquire important information that would have been lost to the German Army if the U.S. Army's military history program had not collected and published them. Inasmuch as the school was responsible for formulating some of the doctrine for winter warfare, this background material based upon World War II experience was invaluable.

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The weapons school course averaged 40 students per class and gave 10, 11, and 12 hours of instruction in the carbine, rifle, and machine gun, respectively; and 6, 5, and 4 hours in the pistol, rocket launcher, and hand and rifle grenades, respectively--a total of 48 hours. The divisional commander was so enthusiastic about the course that he directed one of his staff officers to inspect the weapons school daily and report directly to him or his chief of operations on the progress of the students. Moreover, the divisional units were directed to send only selected and/or potential NCO's to the school.

The communications school, which was held concurrently with the weapons school and also enjoyed the full support of the division headquarters, was attended by some 20 students.

As a result of the success of the two schools, the division requested the U.S. team to conduct a mortar school and continue the weapons instruction. Additional communications schools were to be conducted, one in the use and maintenance of U.S. signal equipment and one for recruits assigned to division units as signal personnel. Together with German instructors trained during the cadre training phase, the team established an NCO school for personnel assigned to the armored units of the division.

During May 1957 the team conducted a division signal school, presenting three 15-hour courses to selected personnel. Forty-five students received training in basic radio operation and technique, with emphasis being placed upon maintenance and repairs. Upon completion of the course they became instructors in basic communications for their units. The mortar school trained personnel of the German 8th and 18th Battalions to serve as instructors for recruit training in the use and maintenance of the U.S.-supplied mortars. Upon request from the division, the team repeated the mortar training course in June.

The training team also acted as the coordinating office between the division headquarters and nearby U.S. units in making arrangements either for the use of U.S.-controlled ranges or for visits of German personnel to observe certain aspects of U.S. Army training. The team was also responsible for the procurement and distribution of training aids to the division.

The establishment of a central school for the presentation of training assistance had several advantages. The students attending the school were potential instructors exclusively. Since the student was sent to the team, rather than vice versa, the workload of the team personnel diminished correspondingly. Personnel and training aids were used more effectively than would have been the case if several small training detachments had been sent to distant units of the division. Since students attended on a full- rather than a part-time basis, the team was able to present a well-rounded course of instruction. At the same time, team personnel were able to establish personal contacts with members of every unit in the division, paving the way for future relations.

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(3) Differences in Training Concepts and Methods. As would be expected, differing traditions and training practices sometimes caused misunderstandings between American and German personnel. Most important, however, was the effect of such differences on the German use of MDAP equipment. For example, during a weapons maintenance inspection in one of the battalions, the U.S. team discovered that 11 machine gun bipods had been broken in normal training exercises. The relatively high breakage rate was caused by carrying the machine gun with the bipod locked in the open position and throwing the weapon down and forward upon taking a firing position. Since the weapon was designed for carrying the gun and bipod separately or in the unlocked position, and for opening and locking the bipod or connecting it to the weapon before taking up a firing position, it was obviously not meant to be used according to German tactical practices. Either the weapon would have to be modified, or the Germans would have to change their practice. In this case, as with several other items of MDAP equipment, the Germans apparently used the U.S.-supplied gun for training purposes only and planned to replace it with one of their own manufacture that was better adapted to their tactical practices.

The team also observed that German small-arms range training methods differed considerably from those of the U.S. Army. Weapons were generally zeroed-in by a senior NCO for the men of his unit rather than by the soldiers themselves. Moreover, the men were often allowed to fire on the range without adequate preliminary range instruction; in some cases they fired the light machine gun without any previous instruction on the weapon, often making the results on the ranges far below U.S. Army standards. German Army tradition laid less stress upon marksmanship than did that of the U.S. Army, and range exercises did not enable the German unit commander to determine the proficiency of the individual with his weapon.

Because German maintenance of equipment on the range was below U.S. Army standards, the team constantly stressed the importance of systematic maintenance. This stress was all the more necessary because of the German tendency to criticize the U.S. equipment for inherent deficiencies when malfunctions were experienced. Equipment breakdowns were generally caused by abusive handling by the operating personnel, whose unit commanders often lacked a basic knowledge of MDAP equipment maintenance. In German artillery firing techniques the missions consisted of only 5 elements--gun to shoot, charge, fuze, deflection change, and elevation--compared with the 7 to 10 elements used by the U.S. Army. For this reason the U.S. firing tables were not used. The team was confined to giving instruction in the operation and maintenance of the equipment, while fire control techniques remained those traditionally employed by the German Army.

Late in May 1957 all divisional units participated in one week of field training; infantry units used the Heuber training area, and armor and artillery units trained at Hohenfels. Each unit was accompanied by one training team member whose duties were limited to giving advice on

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operation and maintenance of MDAP equipment when requested.¹⁷

b. The 4th Grenadier Division Training Team. This training team, consisting of 2 MAAG officers and 17 USAREUR enlisted men, was based at the 4th Grenadier Division headquarters in the Leopold Casern, Regensburg, but some detachments were scattered throughout the division area. A tank training detachment of 1 officer and 4 enlisted men was located in Amberg with the division's tank regiment; an artillery training detachment was at Weiden with the artillery battalion; and a signal training detachment remained in Regensburg with the division signal company. From January to June 1957 the detachments averaged approximately 15 hours of instruction per week on MDAP equipment, spending additional time in advisory capacities on and off duty. One team member was on call to show U.S. training films to divisional units. The armored and artillery detachments conducted only cadre training for future instructors. The signal training detachment trained some recruits as signal specialists. Since the division followed its own range procedure, as did virtually all German units, the team gave little instruction in firing on the range or in small arms at this stage of division training.

Considerable maintenance assistance for MDAP equipment, including a supply of needed spare parts, was received from nearby U.S. Army units. This high degree of cooperation was obtained because some 75 percent of the 4th Grenadier Division's officers were former Federal Border Police (Bundesgrenzschutz) members who had worked closely with officers of the U.S. 3d and 6th Cavalry Regiments. Maj. Gen. Spitzer, the division commander, had close personal relations with the commander of the 6th Cavalry Regiment. Consequently, the German division could informally request and receive help from the two cavalry regiments whenever the GTAG team was unable to fulfill its needs.

Insufficient billeting space hampered the growth of the division. Since first priority had to be given to the reception and proper housing of the numerous recruits drafted with the first conscript class of 1 April 1957, the division could not accept all experienced volunteers. There was little the GTAG team could do to relieve the situation except to relay the information to USAREUR headquarters for joint consideration with German authorities. Local German commanders, apparently not realizing that such matters could be decided only at USAREUR headquarters or by the area commands, seemed to expect the teams to exert decisive influence over the release of facilities.¹⁸

¹⁷(1) Mt Div Tng Team Hist Rept, Jan-Jun 57. (2) Memo for rec, Dr. E. F. Fisher, USAREUR Hist Div, 12 Mar 57, subj: Visit to USAREUR GTAG Training Teams, 5-8 March 1957. Both UNCLAS. Both in USAREUR Hist Div Docu Sec.

¹⁸Memo for rec, 12 Mar 57, cited above. UNCLAS.

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c. The Airborne Division Training Team. The training team assigned to the 1st Airborne Division headquarters at Esslingen became operational on 18 January 1957 when 1 MAAG enlisted man from the infantry school team and 4 enlisted men from the U.S. 11th Airborne Division arrived for a 4-month temporary duty tour. The team gave training assistance to the cadre of the German airborne division under USAREUR auspices from 1 February until the end of June 1957, at which time MAAG, Germany, assumed operational control.

Since the units of the division were widely scattered throughout southwestern Germany, the team was divided into an infantry and an artillery detachment, both mobile. At times the detachments worked together to provide instruction in small arms, heavy weapons, and divisional artillery. Their work was supplemented by a 2-week signal training course conducted at Esslingen by a detachment of the GTAG signal training team.¹⁹

After 3 days of orientation at team headquarters in Esslingen, a training detachment from the team moved to Kempten to present a 4-week training cycle to the cadre of the 19th Parachute Battalion of the 1st Airborne Division. The detachment gave 44 hours per week of formal instruction in the nomenclature, functioning, and maintenance of the carbine, the sniper rifle, and the pistol. In addition, detachment personnel instructed in the fundamentals of defensive combat for the squad and platoon and held informal evening classes for special groups of students designated by the battalion.

The detachment then moved to Ellwangen, where a training program similar to the one presented at Kempten was given to the cadre of the 9th Parachute Battalion. During the second half of the 4-week training program the team accompanied the battalion to Grafenwoehr for familiarization firing on the ranges. After completion of this training on 12 April, the detachment returned to its headquarters at Esslingen.²⁰


At no time during this period was the recently activated German airborne school at Altenstadt-Schongau or the 1st Airborne Division itself able to provide parachute training to airborne personnel. The Germans therefore requested the U.S. 11th Airborne Division at Augsburg to give jump training to approximately 1,000 members of the German airborne division during calendar year 1957. Pending a reply, the 11th Airborne gave jump qualification training to approximately 100 cadre personnel of the German division and school.²¹

¹⁹ Abn Tng Team Periodic Actvs Repts, Jan-Jun 57, passim. UNCLAS.
In Hist Div Docu Sec.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

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General Stillwell presenting wings to German graduate of 11th Airborne parachute training course

AGL (1) 6-58-100-65999

12. Final Transfers

During the early months of 1957 GTAG officers felt confident that the 1 July 1957 target date for turning over the remaining teams to MAAG, Germany, would be met without difficulty. However, temporary duty personnel from USAREUR units would continue to be required, on a diminishing scale, until the German Army developed a full capability to meet its own training requirements, possibly by 1 July 1958.²²

USAREUR prepared a draft letter of instructions for the transfer of operational control and submitted it to USEUCOM on 8 April 1957. However, the publication of the new directive was delayed, because the implementation of the MAAG plan for assuming control had to await a decision on whether training assistance to the Federal Republic of Germany would be provided in FY 1958 on a grant or reimbursable aid basis. If the training assistance was placed in the reimbursable aid category the Germans would be required to decide on very short notice what training services they wished to buy and to deposit dollar funds for that purpose. In any case, the final phase of the assistance program could easily be disrupted by the enforced recall of all TDY personnel because of the nonavailability of funds.²³

On 26 June 1957 USCINCEUR approved the MAAG plan for assuming operational control of the remaining GTAG teams, subject to continued availability of funds.²⁴ The letter of instructions defined USAREUR's continued responsibilities. Although training assistance would cease to be a USAREUR responsibility as of 1 July 1957, the command would continue its administrative and logistical support of MAAG, Germany, in Bonn. Until the FY 1958 Army Mutual Assistance Training Program was completed, USAREUR would augment the MAAG training teams by assigning personnel on TDY and would provide them with logistical and administrative support under pertinent regulations and directives. In addition, USAREUR would provide depot-level maintenance for MDAP equipment held by the German Army. The service would be reimbursable and would be arranged on a case-by-case basis when German civil or military agencies lacked the capability. As the German capability increased, USAREUR maintenance support would be progressively reduced. USAREUR schools would continue to admit German Army students on a space-available basis. German Army personnel would also be accepted for orientation/observer training within USAREUR's capabilities. MAAG remained the official point of contact with the Federal Ministry of Defense and its

²² Cable SX-2653, USAREUR to USCINCEUR, 6 Apr 57. CONF. In USAREUR SGS 353 Ger (1957).

²³(1) Ltr, Gen Hodés to Gen G. H. Decker, Dep USCINCEUR, 19 Apr 57.
(2) Cable EC-9-2877, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 23 May 57. Both CONF. In file above.

²⁴Ltr, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR & C/MAAG, Ger, 26 Jun 57, subj: Letter of Instructions, Assistance to the German Army. CONF.

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agencies on all matters connected with training and logistics assistance to the German Army. However, direct contact with German defense agencies through the senior German liaison officer at USAREUR headquarters was authorized on all routine matters pertaining to USAREUR's administrative and logistical support tasks.²⁵

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²⁵ Ibid.

- 75 -

UNCLASSIFIED

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CHAPTER 4

Summary and Evaluation

Although training assistance to the German Army was continued after 1 July 1957 with the participation of USAREUR personnel and the support of USAREUR units, the assistance program passed on that date to the operational control of the Military Assistance Advisory Group at Bonn, Germany. It therefore seems appropriate to look back from this date over the entire program for the purpose of drawing several general conclusions concerning the USAREUR plan, its nature, and its implementation.

13. Flexibility of the Plan

Throughout the USAREUR training assistance program the development of German rearmament policy coincided with a revision of military concepts and the reorganization of existing NATO forces. The USAREUR plan therefore had to be flexible enough to allow for unexpected changes in timing that would affect all phases of the program, especially those pertaining to logistics.

This flexibility was both a strength and a weakness. For example, when the Germans accelerated their armed forces' activation plans in late 1955, no major changes in USAREUR's existing logistical support plans were required. Shipment and delivery schedules were simply advanced to accommodate the speedup in German plans. Materiel programmed to arrive at the training site by A-180 was dispatched 60 days earlier. Similar shifts in schedules were made to coincide with the receipt of fillers by the first German cadres. USAREUR coordinated the revised schedules with the Advance Planning Group in Bonn--MAAG's predecessor--and then forwarded them to the Department of the Army for approval. The new schedules were published on 27 February 1956 as a revision of the original logistics section of the USAREUR German Army Assistance Plan. On the other hand, the time-phased

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MDAP equipment lists¹ had to be revised twice during the course of the assistance program because the German logistics system could not adhere to the German activation schedules. The first revision, published 1 August 1956, postponed the completion of MDAP deliveries to German Army training sites from September 1956 to June 1957. By the end of December 1956 it became evident that the German depot system would be unable to meet the June 1957 target; the completion date was set for the end of 1957. Consequently, the U.S. training teams, disregarding the timetables of the USAREUR German Army Assistance Plan, improvised in order to offer training assistance at the various schools with whatever equipment was available.²

14. Logistical Problems

Shortly after implementation of the training assistance plan began, the inability of the German Army to assume depot maintenance responsibilities for MDAP materiel within the planned schedule of 7 months became apparent.³ Achievement of such capability depended upon the solution of three major problems--the receipt, storage, and distribution of the materiel; field maintenance of the materiel issued for use at the training sites; and proper in-storage maintenance of the materiel while still in U.S. Army depots.⁴

It was hoped that the GTAG program, particularly the assistance given to the German Materiel Receiving Group, North, would enable the German Army to solve the first problem as soon as an effective spare parts supply system was established. It was also hoped that the establishment of U.S. field maintenance teams at the German training sites, together with the activation of U.S. signal and ordnance maintenance teams, would help solve the problem of field maintenance. To operate effectively, however, the field maintenance teams needed a steady supply of spare parts and special tools at the training sites. Pending the establishment of the German logistical organization, not fully accomplished in June 1957, the Department of the Army authorized USAREUR to issue spare parts to German units on emergency requisitions. At that time, attempts to solve the problem of in-storage maintenance of equipment were still hampered by a shortage of adequately trained personnel and satisfactory German depot facilities. As a temporary expedient, and until German depot facilities improved sufficiently, the U.S. Army practice of using civilian contract facilities

¹ Delivery timetables for MDAP equipment, indicating the dates on which certain items of equipment were required at the training sites.

² (1) Intvw, Dr. E. F. Fisher, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. H. Linder, G4 MDAP Br, 5 Feb 57. CONF. (2) See also Tng Teams Hist Repts, passim.

³ Ltr, Maj Gen J. F. Uncles, USAREUR CofS, to C/MAAG, Ger, 9 May 56, subj: MDAP Equipment for FRG. CONF. In USAREUR SGS 400 G45 (1956), Item 1.

⁴ USAREUR GAAP, 1 Apr 55, Sec IV, Annex B, pp. 1-7. CONF (info used UNCLAS).


- 77 -
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CHART 3

U.S. PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO GERMAN ARMY TRAINING ASSISTANCE



SOURCE: USAREUR G3 GTAG FILES. UNCLASSIFIED.

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for depot maintenance was recommended.⁵

15. Personnel Problems

a. Quality. Although the majority of the training team chiefs expressed general satisfaction with the quality of the TDY personnel supplied by USAREUR, 10 of the team commanders commented adversely on their lack of instructional ability or experience. In some instances parent units did not screen individuals' records with sufficient care to determine whether their military occupational specialty designations actually conformed to the experience and training on record. In many cases this deficiency was overcome by intensive training at the parental site and careful supervision at the German school site. While every effort was made to retain competent instructors, unsatisfactory personnel were relieved and returned to their parent units as promptly as possible.⁶

The two military academy training teams emphasized that unusually high standards should be used in selecting personnel for duty at the academies. The selection criteria for personnel assigned to such duty were to be higher than for instructors attached to service schools or tactical units.⁷

b. Extension of TDY Assignments. Early in the program USAREUR requested exceptions to the Department of Defense limitation of temporary duty to 6 months, pointing out that such extensions would save an estimated \$26,000 in per diem payments at the expiration of the initial assignments. Departmental approval was received in June 1956, well in time for the extensions to be administratively processed before the August 1956 deadline. A significant number of the USAREUR instructors requested extensions; most of these men were capable instructors whose continued presence with the teams was an asset to the assistance program. Since retention of such personnel also helped in the integration of new replacements, USAREUR approved requests for extension if the individual's parent unit had no objections and his career pattern was not adversely affected. Approximately one-third of the USAREUR TDY personnel were extended for a second 4-5 month training team assignment.⁸

⁵Memo, Lt Col E. Cook to Col P. F. Oswald, C/USAREUR G3 Tng Br, 15 Jul 57, subj: Origin and Closeout of the GTAG. CONF. In G3 Tng Br files.

⁶See Tng Teams Hist Repts, passim.

⁷Hist Rept No. 16, cited above.

⁸(1) Cable SC-30341, USAREUR to Seventh Army, USAREUR COMZ, 29 May 56. (2) Cable SC-33085, USAREUR to USCINCEUR for MAD, 15 Jun 56. (3) Cable EC-3-3809, USCINCEUR to DA for DCSOPS, 20 Jun 56. (4) Cable DA-431880, DA from DCSOPS to USCINCEUR, 28 Jun 56. All UNCLAS. All in USAREUR SGS 353 Ger (1956), Item 02.

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c. Morale Factors.

(1) Messing. Section IV of the USAREUR German Army Assistance Plan had anticipated that the Germans would supply the teams with all class I support, including messing facilities. However, the average American soldier assigned for duty with the training teams did not react favorably to the many unfamiliar dishes or to the European custom of eating light breakfasts, relatively heavy luncheons, and cold suppers. Moreover, in some instances the German troop messes were not up to the U.S. Army's standards in quantity, quality, and handling of the food served.⁹

There were two possible solutions to the messing problem, either to establish class A or billet-type messes. There were neither sufficient funds nor personnel to establish class A messes, quite apart from the fact that such a step would have had an adverse affect on German-American troop relations. Therefore, the establishment of billet-type messes with refrigerators and hot plates issued by the quartermaster seemed the most practical solution under the circumstances. Although plans were made to provide each of the teams with such messing equipment, only the anti-aircraft team stationed at Rendsburg in Schleswig-Holstein actually established a billet-type mess. Some of the personnel of the other teams ate their meals in local restaurants or prepared food in their billets with rations purchased from the nearest post exchange. The majority of personnel, however, shared the noon meal with their German counterparts in German troop messes, while taking the breakfast and evening meals in local restaurants. Consequently, the messing problem eventually solved itself as the U.S. personnel at each training site made messing arrangements to suit their personal preferences and tastes.¹⁰

(2) Housing. MAAG personnel assigned to the teams on permanent change of station either received housing at the USAREUR installation nearest their duty station or drew quarters allowances and lived in German housing. Since training teams, especially in northern Germany, were often quite far from American dependent housing areas, daily travel to and from the duty station imposed extra expense and hardship upon personnel residing in these housing areas. The anti-aircraft artillery school training team, for example, was located at Rendsburg, almost 100 miles from the dependent housing at Bremerhaven, while the armored and armored infantry teams serving at Muensterlager were 90 miles from Bremerhaven.¹¹

Severe shortages of German housing in most areas where the teams were located permitted only a small number of the permanently assigned personnel to obtain accommodations on the economy, and the requisitioned housing secured from the British fell far short of requirements. This lack of

⁹ Memo, USAREUR ACoS G3 to CofS, 30 Jan 56, subj: Activities of GTAG for the Period 20-27 January 1956. UNCLAS.

¹⁰ See Tng Teams Hist Repts, passim.

¹¹ Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to C/MAAG, Ger, 14 Feb 56. UNCLAS.

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nearby housing posed a constant morale problem to MAAG personnel in the so-called isolated areas. Moreover, even when local quarters could be obtained from the British or the Germans, the dependents generally preferred the amenities associated with a U.S.-controlled housing area.¹²

The housing problem did not affect USAREUR and Seventh Army personnel with dependents, since their families continued to reside at their sponsors' permanent duty stations. Moreover, the Germans provided quarters for single commissioned and enlisted U.S. personnel that were generally equal or, in some instances, superior to quarters provided for comparable ranks in USAREUR installations.

(3) Difference in Per Diem Payments. USAREUR personnel on temporary duty with the training teams received \$5.40 per day, irrespective of marital status, while MAAG enlisted personnel assigned on a permanent change of station (PCS) were allowed only \$1.35 if without dependents and \$2.75 if with dependents, for separate rations at stations where no government mess was available. Early in the program the GTAG Control Office recognized this problem and took steps to rectify it. Since the cost criteria for requesting specific per diem station allowances could be obtained only after the personnel had arrived at the training site, immediate relief seemed doubtful.¹³ Nevertheless, after coordination with MAAG, Germany, the problem was brought to USCINCEUR's attention with a request that he authorize the amendment of the orders of MAAG personnel to indicate either Bonn or the nearest U.S. installation as their duty station and to place them on temporary duty at the German training site. Based on a 1-year training requirement, the cost of additional TDY payments was estimated at \$232,000.¹⁴

USCINCEUR rejected the request because a general policy of providing TDY benefits to personnel on normal assignments to stations where such military support facilities as housing, commissary, and post exchanges were lacking could not be endorsed. For those areas of Germany where station allowances could be statistically justified by an actual survey conducted in accordance with joint travel regulations, CINCUSAREUR was directed to request such allowances directly from the Per Diem Transportation Travel Allowance Committee.¹⁵ Despite USAREUR's efforts, the regulations prevented any change in the assignment status of MAAG personnel while USAREUR had operational control of the training assistance program.

¹² See Tng Teams Hist Repts, passim.

¹³ Memo for rec, Lt Col P. E. Alban, GTAG, 4 Jan 56, subj: Conference on Administrative and Financial Problems. UNCLAS.

¹⁴ (1) Cable SC-30754, USAREUR to USCINCEUR, 1 Jun 56. (2) Cable MAAG-FRG-904, MAAG, Ger, to USCINCEUR, 5 Jun 56. Both UNCLAS. Both in USAREUR SGS 353 Ger (1956), Item 02.

¹⁵ Cable EC-9-3615, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR & MAAG, Ger, 22 Jun 56. UNCLAS. In file above.

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(4) Isolation. Several teams criticized the failure of the GTAG Control Office to keep them fully informed and properly oriented as to their role in the over-all training assistance program. Interestingly enough, however, such complaints came only from teams in the British area of responsibility that were remote from U.S. Army installations. This suggests that the complaints stemmed largely from the team members' feelings of isolation from familiar contacts with fellow Americans and the absence of the usual information mediums.¹⁶

16. The Language Problem

Virtually all training teams stressed the desirability of German language proficiency for all U.S. personnel participating in the program. While indigenous interpreters enabled the teams to accomplish their missions, team personnel realized both the disadvantages of the system used and the advantages of possessing at least a working knowledge of German. Although cordiality and good intentions characterized the entire program, unfortunate misunderstandings due to language difficulties were only too frequent. In some instances, especially in anti-aircraft, medical, and quartermaster troop training, the problems of converting measurement units from American to German Army usage and of properly translating highly technical terms of recently developed weapons and equipment caused some initial difficulties. It would have been preferable if these problems had been solved while the teams were still at the parental sites.¹⁷

In any case, the possibilities of U.S. Army influence on German Army thought would have been far greater if key U.S. personnel actively engaged in the training assistance program had been proficient in the German language.

17. Relations with the Germans

a. Community Relations. The team commanders rated troop-community relations, as well as off-duty relations with the local German garrisons, as good to excellent. The strict selection standards used virtually eliminated unpleasant incidents between members of the training assistance teams and the local communities. The members of some teams in the British area of responsibility tended to develop their social relationships with the British to a greater extent than with the Germans. Although the language barrier was the principle cause of this development, the German dependents' inability to secure housing near the garrison was also a contributing factor.

The nucleus of MAAG officers with each team generally set the tone and direction of the social relationships between the team and the local population. If the team commander was particularly anxious to establish

¹⁶ See Tng Teams Hist Repts, passim.

¹⁷ Ibid.

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close German-American contacts and exercised considerable influence over his command in this activity, the social relationships were usually well developed. Generally, in such instances regular weekly or monthly social get-togethers were the rule. On the other hand, if the team commander did not rigorously encourage German-American contacts, social relationships with the Germans tended to lapse. Several team commanders considered the allocation of an entertainment allowance necessary to the proper fulfillment of their social obligations, since the cost of maintaining social relationships in an isolated community, where they represented virtually the entire American contingent, was rather high.¹⁸

b. Contacts with the German Military.

(1) Liaison. The training teams rated their contacts with school personnel and tactical units from good to excellent. The U.S. team members were generally favorably impressed with the high professional qualifications of their German counterparts. As to establishing liaison and maintaining contacts, the team commanders found that in most cases the initiative lay with them, for they had to "sell" the German school authorities on the full utilization of the team's capabilities. German staff officers were often unfamiliar with the team's mission or not quite clear as to what type of assistance they might expect. Only by aggressive coordination with the school faculties as well as by pointing out how and where the team could best assist the school or unit, was a U.S. team able to accomplish the planned objectives.¹⁹

(2) Instruction Schedules. One of the most persistent problems encountered by the teams was the adjustment to the German practice of granting platoon and company commanders considerable autonomy in the scheduling of instruction. In the early stages of the assistance program the teams often experienced difficulties in adhering to their schedules of instruction, since the German officers in charge could revise the daily class schedule on their own initiative without prior notification. Where this situation existed, the teams were able, with considerable effort, to convince the school authorities of the need for a firm master training schedule that could be used as a dependable guide for planning the instruction. Once this understanding was reached, erratic scheduling was greatly reduced.²⁰

(3) German Reception of MDAP Materiel. Among the items of MDAP equipment, only the communications equipment, the M2 carbine, the 4.2-inch mortar, the .45 caliber submachine gun, the 3.5-inch rocket launcher, and the M47 tank were accepted by the Germans without reservation. The Browning automatic rifle was criticized because of its weight and limited rate of fire, and the M1 rifle was accepted only with reservations. The

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

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81-mm mortar (M1) probably would have been acceptable in its latest modification--the M29 with the circular base plate. Excessive weight mitigated against acceptance of the .45 caliber pistol. The same factor, as well as a slow rate of fire, rendered the .30 caliber light machine gun unacceptable, and the Germans planned to develop their own light machine gun. Although the Germans used the M39 personnel carrier for training purposes at the armored school, they planned also to develop their own carrier because their doctrine required troops to be able to fight from the carrier when necessary,²¹ whereas the American personnel carrier would not permit such action.

18. Achievement

The USAREUR German Army assistance plan provided for the instruction of German soldiers in the use and maintenance of weapons and equipment that the United States supplied under the Mutual Assistance Pact. Therefore, the primary objective of the GTAG teams was to train German cadres in the characteristics, operation, and maintenance of American equipment; training was to be continued until the cadre personnel were themselves capable of instructing all fillers and recruits. This objective was not accomplished within the period envisaged, largely because expediency dictated the assignment of German potential instructors to tactical units before they could be used for their intended mission. Nevertheless, by the end of January 1957 sufficient German instructors had been trained to take over basic weapons training of recruits at most schools and in many tactical units.

The extension of the GTAG training assistance program to German tactical units gave the U.S. Army a unique opportunity to exert a positive influence on the doctrine and organization of the new German Army. It also served as a means of evaluating the operational readiness of the German units that would soon be placed under the command of Central Army Group. An attempt to determine, at present, the extent or durability of any direct influence exerted by the U.S. Army would be premature. In the current opinion of U.S. training team personnel, the most significant and readily determined result of the training assistance program was the Germans' enthusiastic acceptance of the U.S. Army instructional organization and method. This acceptance undoubtedly stemmed from the favorable impression that the precision and thoroughness of training team instruction made on German students. In time it may prove to have been one of the most lasting results of the training assistance program.²²

²¹ Hist Rept No. 16, p. 13.

²² See Tng Teams Hist Repts, passim.

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Training Team Activation and Movement Schedules

Teams	Personnel*		Activation	Parental Unit	Move to Training Site
	Off	EM LWR**			
Armored	8	29	15 Mar 56 Mannheim	CCA, 2d Armd Div	27 Apr 56 Muensterlager
Armored Reconnaissance	8	25	15 Mar 56 Mainz	CCB, 2d Armd Div	26 Apr 56 Bremen
Armored Infantry	8	27	27 Mar 56 Mainz	CCB, 2d Armd Div	27 Apr 56 Muensterlager
Field Artillery	8	42	15 Mar 56 Darmstadt	Hq, V Corps Arty	17 Apr 56 Idar-Oberstein
Antiaircraft Artillery	8	48	15 Mar 56 Kaefertal	Hq, 34th AAA Brig	24 Apr 56 Rendsburg
Infantry	9	45	26 Mar 56 Heilbronn	60th Inf Reg	10 Apr 56 Hammelburg
Antitank	5	17	15 Mar 56 Heilbronn	60th Inf Reg	25 Apr 56 Bremen
Engineer	16	26	15 Mar 56 Murnau	USAREUR Engineer School	1 May 56 Munich
Signal	7	43	15 Mar 56 Ansbach	USAREUR Signal School	4 May 56 Sonthofen

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Training Team Activation and Movement Schedules--Continued

Teams	Personnel*		Activation	Parental Unit	Move to Training Site
	Off	EM			
Army Aviation	2	0	29 Aug 56 Memmingen	None	1 Sep 56 Memmingen
Military Academy	7	21	28 May 56 Munich	Seventh Army NCO Academy	18 Jun 56 Hannover
Military Police	2	7	15 May 56 Oberammergau	USAREUR Intel- ligence & MP School	25 Jun 56 Sonthofen
Ordnance	10	43	2 Apr 56 Puessen	USAREUR Ordnance School	30 Apr 56 Sonthofen
Quartermaster	5	11	15 May 56 Lenggries	USAREUR Quarter- master School	30 Jun 56 Andernach
Transportation	3	4	15 May 56 Lenggries	USAREUR Quarter- master School	30 Jun 56 Andernach
Medical	3	5	15 May 56 Oberammergau	USAREUR Intel- ligence & MP School	24 Jun 56 Degerndorf
Materiel Receiving Group	22	24	26 Mar 56 Heidelberg	HACOM	4 May 56 Hesedorf
Airborne	-	-	1 Sep 56 Hammelburg	GTAG Infantry School Training Team	30 Oct 56 Altenstadt- Schongau

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Training Team Activation and Movement Schedules--Continued

<u>Teams</u>	<u>Personnel*</u>			<u>Activation</u>	<u>Parental Unit</u>	<u>Move to Training Site</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>LWR**</u>			
Ordnance Company No. 1	3	17	3	1 Apr 56 Heidelberg	HACOM	2 May 56 Muensterlager
Ordnance Company No. 2	3	17	2	1 Apr 56 Heidelberg	HACOM	2 May 56 Boeblingen
Ordnance Company No. 3	1	6	3	1 Apr 56 Heidelberg	HACOM	20 Apr 56 Pfeddersheim

*Personnel strength figures are those for the initial phases of the training program; strengths varied with the training assistance requirements during the course of the program.

**The number of local wage rate (LWR) interpreters varied with the requirements of the program. The figures given here generally indicate the actual interpreter strength with each team for the greater part of the training assistance program.

Source: USAREUR German Army Assistance Plan, 1 Apr 55, w/revisions. CONF (info used UNCLAS).

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APPENDIX B

Maintenance Team Activation and Movement Schedules

Teams	Personnel*		Activation	Parental Unit	Move to Training Site	Training Teams Supported
	Off	EM				
Engineer	1	12	1 Apr 56 Kaiserslautern	Rhine Engineer Depot	7-11 May 56 Munich	Engineer
Ordnance No. 1	1	27	1 Apr 56 Mainz	Mainz Ordnance Depot	2 May 56 Muensterlager	Antiaircraft Artillery, Armored, Antitank, Armored Infantry, Armored Reconnaissance
Ordnance No. 2	1	5	1 Apr 56 Mainz	Mainz Ordnance Depot	27 Apr 56 Idar-Oberstein	Field Artillery
Ordnance No. 3	0	4	1 Apr 56 Mainz	Mainz Ordnance Depot	26 Apr 56 Hammelburg	Infantry
Ordnance No. 4	0	4	1 Apr 56 Mainz	Mainz Ordnance Depot	30 Apr 56 Sonthofen	Engineer, Military Police, Medical, Signal

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Maintenance Team Activation and Movement Schedules--Continued

<u>Teams</u>	<u>Personnel*</u>		<u>Activation</u>	<u>Parental Unit</u>	<u>Move to Training Site</u>	<u>Training Teams Supported</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>EM</u>				
Signal No. 1	1	19	15 Mar 56 Ansbach	USAREUR Signal School	4 May 56 Sonthofen	Signal, Antiaircraft Artillery (Radar only), Army Aviation, Medical, Engineer, Military Police
Signal No. 2	1	14	1 Apr 56 Ansbach	USAREUR Signal School	23 Apr 56 Hendsburg, Muensterlager	See Ordnance No. 1
Signal No. 3	1	16	1 Apr 56 Ansbach	USAREUR Signal School	24 Apr 56 Hammelburg, Idar-Oberstein	Infantry, Artillery

*There were no interpreters assigned to the maintenance teams inasmuch as they were able to utilize the interpreters assigned to the teams they were supporting.

Source: USAREUR German Army Assistance Plan, 1 Apr 55, w/revisions. CONF (info used UNCLAS).

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